Nope. Merely present. I'm talking about conditions (as you are in procreation - apples with apples). The 'conditions' under which it is not possible to build a house are that there are only four people present. Before anyone has even decided if they're 'available', four is too few. So you have created a condition (too few people even potentially available) where it is not possible to build a house and so people suffer harm. — Isaac

Like I said, I was never available in the first place. So that condition was already in place - I did not create it.

Four people have a desire to create a house that can only be built by five. There are only four people available. Who is the creator of the conditions here? Surely not a bystander who wasn't involved in the first place.

One doesn't, we rely on society as a whole to come to an agreement. — Isaac

I don't accept that answer. Societies have agreed on terribly immoral things in the past.

Are you seriously having trouble understanding the notion of taking more than one factor into account? — Isaac

Tell me about those factors, and I will tell you why it is still inconsistent.

Give me s counter example then. A culture, or any person considered moral (or neutral) for standing by watching a person die who they could easily save. — Isaac

It's a fairly common phenomenon in certain countries for people not to help out in traffic accidents out of fear for being held accountable.

https://medium.com/shanghai-living/4-31-why-people-would-usually-not-help-you-in-an-accident-in-china-c50972e28a82

It is also lacking in virtually all cases of childbirth as well, right? Or do you think people intentionally have kids so that they can cause the conditions for that child to be harmed? — Pinprick

Parents are aware of the harm that may befall their child, so it is intentional. They just assume on the child's behalf that the harm will outweigh the good.

Allowing your child to starve to death by not intervening and providing food for it is neglect, which is also an example of non-intervention, which you claim is neutral, which I assume means amoral. — Pinprick

I never claimed that act was neutral.

I said non-interference is neutral, meaning neither moral nor immoral, by default.

Having made the voluntary decision to create another human being whose well-being will depend entirely on them, the parent has incurred responsibilities and is no longer in a default situation.

No, my analogy only requires that it is an option. By choosing not to be a part of something you are creating the conditions where that something has one fewer participants. If, by having one fewer participant, those conditions cause harm, then you are creating condition of harm. This is exactly the same situation you're claiming to be immoral with procreation. — Isaac

What you're missing is the fact that this presupposes the person in question was a participant in the first place. That's what I take issue with - that is not so by default.

In the example of your house that needs to be built you presuppose there were five people available. What if the fifth person was never available to begin with, as evidenced by the fact that they did not participate in the building?

More goalpost shifting. With procreation you weren't talking about 'causing harm', you were talking about 'creating the conditions for harm'. — Isaac

This isn't goalpost shifting. As far as I'm concerned, by non-interference one isn't creating any conditions that impact a given event. Letting the drowning man drown is not a creation of conditions.

As I said, weird premises in, weird conclusions out. — Isaac

You may find them weird because you're not used to principles being applied consistently.

I've already made a case for why your argument that says non-interference isn't morally permissable doesn't hold up when applied consistently.

Sitting and watching people die who you could easily save is sociopathic. — Isaac

I'd argue that believing oneself to be the proper arbiter to judge who could easily save who is at least equally sociopathic.

Imagine every film, book, or play you've ever encountered. Where in any of them, does the hero sit an watch someone die because he can't be bothered to help? — Isaac

Inaction being neutral doesn't mean interceding cannot be moral. In all the situations you have presented it may very well be the case that helping out is the moral thing to do.

However, I am arguing that not helping out is not immoral, at least by default.

It's absolutely universal that such behaviour is considered immoral. — Isaac

Well, then people are universally wrong for reasons I've already described. The idea that non-interference is immoral by default cannot be applied consistently.

And quite honestly, that belief is not universally held.

Let’s say I plant a tree in a yard that will be owned by someone else 100 years from now. If that tree falls and causes property damage or some other harm, am I responsible for that? — Pinprick

Yes.

But responsibility isn't the primary subject here. It is morality, and intentionality is a large part of that. That factor is lacking in your example, but present in mine.

You mean like neglect? — Pinprick

Call it whatever you like.

Nice post, some interesting points.

Though, I don't think the idea of a "midnight deal" with Ukraine would have been very realistic. Ukraine is one of Russia's primary foreign policy interests - the country and its institutions are likely soaked with Russian intelligence operatives.

Had the United States gone flirting with Ukraine in such a way, it would have likely caused Russia to attack sooner in an attempt to pre-empt it, just like it did now.

Furthermore, NATO is at least on paper a defensive alliance. While the United States is by far the most dominant partner in the alliance, such a move would greatly damage NATO's legitimacy even to its own members.


For the United States and Ukraine to enter into a pact bilaterally I think is equally unlikely, not to mention not very convincing.

For one, such a pact would essentially tie the fate of America to the fate of Ukraine. That's a lot of power and leverage to give to a country that the United States is obviously not prepared to wage large-scale/nuclear war for.

Second, Ukraine is on Russia's doorstep, whereas 9,000 kilometers and an ocean seperate Ukraine and the United States. In the unlikely event that the United States would commit to defending Ukraine with conventional means, by the time it arrives the battle would have been over. The Baltic States suffer from the same strategic problem.

And where would the US land its troops? If NATO is not involved, Europe is not a likely possibility without dragging it into the war. Southern Ukraine would likely fall in days, not to mention landing troops under the Russian missile umbrella seems unappetizing.


In other words, in the face of permanently losing control over Ukraine, Russia would likely not take such guarantees from the United States seriously and invade anyway, calling the United States' bluff.

You could say "I was never going to help with the houses anyway, I was just going to watch everyone die of exposure without lifting a finger". — Isaac

I suppose this is close to what I would say.

The thing is, you presuppose the individual to be a part of something. A circle, a group of people available to build a house, etc.

Sometimes such a presupposition can be correct, but it is not so by default. People aren't part of something just because another holds that opinion. And when that opinion turns out to be false, the person who wasn't involved in the first place hasn't suddenly started to cause harm.

If you seriously think that sitting by watching others die of exposure but refusing to lift a finger to help is 'moral' then you're obviously going to end up with some seriously fucked up conclusions arising from that principle. — Isaac

I don't think it is moral. However assuming one hasn't caused the people to freeze and isn't involved with them in some other way, it is neutral. One may very well choose to help out, however if one has reasons not to do so, non-interference is acceptable.

No moral system that holds non-interference as unacceptable will make sense, because there are people proverbially drowning everywhere at every moment, and if non-interference is not acceptable, well you get where that is going.

So non-interference must be acceptable, at least in a default situation.

That would just be profoundly unethical, regardless of the fact that you don't know whether when it collapses anyone will be injured. It is unethical because it shows you have no moral sense in regard to the quality of what you have been contracted to provide. — Janus

Surely this man will not be condemned just for his shoddy work ethic, but also for the harm he has caused the children.

Or does he get to justify himself by saying none of the children were alive upon construction of the building, and therefore they had no well-being to take into account?

However, 180 Proof got it right, the unborn are possible persons i.e. if permitted they become actual people and this is the difference that makes the difference - fictional people are devoid of potential to become an actual person.

If so, ethics/morality becomes applicable to the unborn. — Agent Smith

That seems to me like sound reasoning.

Clearly there had been only four people available all along.

Jokes aside, this label of "availability" is a subjective one.

How are you not creating the conditions where there are only four people available, by going for a walk? — Isaac

Clearly there had been four people available all along.

The issue is that you are trying to equate non-interference to acting.

Creating conditions and direct causality are both relevant, but in the case of non-interference, I am not creating any conditions that are relevant to the incident, in this example the building of the house.

How? I don't harm my kids. — Isaac

You created the conditions by which harm may befall them, just like the school builder in my example constructed a school that may collapse.

So's moving away from rather than toward a person. So's playing a computer game instead of helping them. — Isaac

I don't know why the "rather than / instead" parts should be considered in order for something to be considered an act or not. The fact that one can interfere does not change the nature of not interfering.

Example: your choice not to interfere with world hunger does not make you the cause of it, nor is it an "act" that is "causing" harm.

If a house needs building, it takes five people to build it, you're one of only five people in the community. If, instead of helping to build the house, you decide to go for a walk, how are you not, by your action (going for a walk at the time the house needs building) 'creating the conditions' whereby that house will not be built and all the associated harms. — Isaac

I think this is an erroneous way of representing causality.

My absence did not cause the house to not be built.

The question here rather is whether my choice for non-interference can be justified.

To which I say, by default people are not entitled to each other's action.

Clearly, the only way out of this bottle (re Wittgenstein) is to assume that nonexistent people do have moral status i.e. they can be harmed/helped. — Agent Smith

I'm sure people will have some objections to my school-example, but intuitively it seems so.

Right. But the bomb causes the school to explode in your other analogy. You didn't cause it. — Isaac

I disagree. Clearly if one makes and sets the bomb to explode, they are the cause, or at least a significant part of it. It is an act.

By having children I don't actually cause the harm they might experience do I? — Isaac

Creating children is likewise an act, which contributes to their harm.

In the case of the drowning man, one created no conditions that contributing to his drowning.

Any 'harm' my children might experience in life is simply the result of their unrealistic expectations, not my fault. — Isaac

Again, having children is an act, and when one acts, one must take into account the harm one causes.

There's a fundamental difference between creating conditions (acting) and choosing not to create them (non-interference).

I suppose you tried to circumvent this by saying we're entitled to other individuals' action, which I disagree with.

As for inaction: as I've argued before on this thread, inaction/non-interference does not cause harm.

The drowning man does not drown because I did not help him, but because he ended up in the water and could not swim.


The same could be said for "depriving individuals of one's company" - one's choice of not getting involved isn't the cause, it's the person's desire for things outside himself that is the cause of his deprivation. One can hardly be held responsible for the unrealistic wants of others, or unjustified claims to other people's company and/or action.

I'd love for people to treat me like a king wherever I go, yet the fact that I desire as much does not make their indifference towards me a cause of harm.

One has a kindergarten constructed. One knows the kindergarten isn't constructed well and will collapse at some point in the future.

Can one evade responsibility through the same route as is attempted here by various posters, by making an appeal to the fact these kindergarteners weren't yet alive during the time of construction, and thus had no well-being to take into account?

The answer, which you're trying so hard to dodge, is obvious.

As I said https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/720016, but you unfortunately ignored, ... — Isaac

When you have your own dilemma pointed out you too, it seems, reach for avoidance. — Isaac

I just thought it was time to let some others share their ideas, since I had been talking way too much already and felt I was hijacking the thread.

I may get back to your comment later.

How could you possibly know where a town will flourish in two hundred years? — Janus

Finding excuses not to have to deal with the dilemma is not a very convincing way of solving it.

The answer is so obvious too, which is probably why you're trying to avoid it. That's the go-to solution for many in this thread who have an issue with antinatalism: finding excuses to avoid having to deal with what is blatantly obvious.

Of course, if one knowingly creates conditions by which individuals will befall harm in the future, one is morally responsible when that harm eventually befalls them, regardless of whether the individuals existed at the time of the creation of the conditions. That is why the harm that may befall others in the future as a result of our actions needs to be considered upon acting.

The individual in my example obviously is morally responsible for the harm they knowingly committed. It's absurd to argue that because the sufferers of said harm weren't alive when the conditions were created, the individual bears no moral responsibility. The individual was aware of the conditions they were setting up, precisely like a parent is.

The second comes forth from the first. The first takes precedence, but there may be situations conceivable where it is justified to impose. We're exploring whether we can find one here.

I don't see any contradiction here, or any objective for that matter.

If you believe the first is a hard rule and the second shouldn't even be considered, then we are done here, no?

Nevertheless, their inaction did cause the person to drown, ... — DA671

This is exactly the point - the inaction did not cause anything.

And just because one is aware of the drowning, it doesn't make one the cause.

I am sure you are aware of certain sufferings in which you could conceivably interfere (homelessness, third-world hunger, etc.). Does your awareness of it and your ability to interfere now make you the cause of it? Is it a moral slight that you are not interfering and doing everything you can to solve this issue?

I think not.

Are these just spontaneous feeling you have, not derived from any deeper objective? They seem, no offense meant, really odd, and intriguing for that reason. — Isaac

They're arrived at through reason. First, individuals do not like being harmed. Their will is as good as mine, so I should take care not to harm them and thus violate their will.

Second, if I impose something on someone, I may violate their will. Maybe there is a situation conceivable where this is justified, but then I would need to make a convincing case for it. So far I haven't seen it.

When is it ever okay to assume for another that these choices and harms are good and acceptable for someone else? — schopenhauer1

It certainly isn't acceptable by default. Perhaps in emergency situations? But even then I would argue that one is obligated to be certain (beyond a reasonable doubt) that one isn't making the situation even worse.

It can still have consequences. — DA671

Non-interference does not have consequences.

If I see a man drowning in the ocean and for whatever reason choose not to try and save him, then his drowning is not the consequence of my choice not to get involved, but of whatever circumstance put the man in the water.

However, if the possibility of an overall good outcome (it may not be perfect) is reasonably high, I believe that it is better to act than to be "neutral". — DA671

In the absence of absolute certainty there is such a thing as "beyond any reasonable doubt", but I don't agree that it applies to the question of procreation.

How does that concern affect the decision to procreate? Is non-procreation more truthful? — Isaac

No, but when you say:

You've not demonstrated that being certain one's actions don't cause irreversible harm before acting minimises harm to others though. — Isaac

Why privilege inaction over action if your concern is the welfare of others? — Isaac

It seems to imply some duty to pursue these things (minimizing harm to others and acting for the welfare of others), to which I replied that those things are not my chief concern. I see no such duty, except perhaps minimizing the harm I myself cause to others directly, that is to say by my action.

The primary reason that procreation needs to be regarded critically is that there's a non-trivial risk of harming others. However, the reason I would refrain from procreation is because I cannot see a justification for the imposition on another, as per the thread's subject.

However, if it is good that inaction prevents harm, ... — DA671

Inaction or non-interference is literally not to get involved.

I do not see why neutrality should be chosen over something that can be (for most people) good. — DA671

I'm not saying it should be, but I'm saying it can be chosen and doing so is a neutral action. People don't have a right to another's action, just because they believe it to be good for them.

So you willingly leave yourself open to accusations of cowardice? — universeness

Sure.

Should the world have stood by and not interfered with the Nazi plans for all people they considered inferiors? — universeness

"The world" should have done as they saw fit at that particular time.

A lot of your replies to me seem to assume I have all sorts of opinions about what other people should do. I don't. The only reason I'm here is to test the principles I use to guide my decisions in life. What people do with the arguments I present here is completely up to them, and it doesn't matter to me.

Then what is your chief concern? — Isaac

The search for truth and wisdom, I suppose.

So you don't breathe, eat or move then? You are never inactive, so you're always doing. The choice is over what to do. — Isaac

With inaction I mean non-interference. So the choice would be not to do anything about a given situation.

You've not demonstrated that being certain one's actions don't cause irreversible harm before acting minimises harm to others though. — Isaac

Why privilege inaction over action if your concern is the welfare of others? — Isaac

My chief concern was never the minimizing of harm to others (besides that which might be caused by myself), or the welfare of others. I see those as noble goals, assuming one doesn't go about achieving them recklessly.

The inaction resulting from your uncertainty might cause harm to others. — Isaac

Inaction does not cause harm. It's a neutral state.

And your solution to this concern; is to advocate for the extinction of your species through their global consent. is this correct? That's your solution? — universeness

No. I don't advocate anything, nor am I in the business of solving the world's problems.

Does life just scare you? Are you afraid of coming to harm? Do you spend your days afraid of all the bad things that might happen to you or those you care about? — universeness

None of those things. I'm quite happy. But I'm also aware of the misery that exists.

My concern is specifically with the morality of the act of imposing life upon someone.

We all need some bad in our lives to be able to enjoy the good. — universeness

I hope you understand that the harm that befalls people isn't always limited to "some bad", and not always followed up with good to enjoy.

The antinatalists don't understand this it's beyond their ability to. — universeness

:roll:

Let's suppose for a moment that there is a person, A, who out of the goodness of their heart makes it their business to interfere in the lives of others unasked.

A fancies himself quite good at what he does, and on nine out of every ten people into whose business he interferes he makes a markedly positive impact.

However, A isn't perfect, and one out of every ten people he ruins, by accident.

A calculated risk, A thinks. One out of every ten? That seems like good odds. A small sacrifice to make for the good for those nine others who may benefit from A's boundless benevolence.

So, is A a saint? A highly dangerous individual? What gives A the right to interfere unasked? What's the sacrifical lamb to make of this?

When it comes to the well-being of others, to take only those actions the outcomes of which we can predict with great accuracy. — Tzeentch

Why? — Isaac

Because if one chooses to interfere in the affairs of others, one should be certain their actions don't cause irreversible harm. — Tzeentch

Why? You just keep repeating arbitrary rules without basing them on any potentially shared objectives. We don't just follow rules for no reason. — Isaac

Because causing harm to others is bad.

This is turning into a silly game. Please get to a point.

When it comes to the well-being of others, to take only those actions the outcomes of which we can predict with great accuracy. — Tzeentch

Why? — Isaac

Because if one chooses to interfere in the affairs of others, one should be certain their actions don't cause irreversible harm.

But let's take this away from semantics. What ought we do? We cannot predict the future with great accuracy, our inaction could cause as much harm as our action, so what ought we do? — Isaac

When it comes to the well-being of others, to take only those actions the outcomes of which we can predict with great accuracy.

Because that would involve omniscience and none of us are. — Isaac

Why would that require omniscience?

You're saying for one's intention to match the outcome it requires omniscience?

Well then you're not using the word 'moral' correctly. The degree of prior knowledge you're describing is not the kind of action we use the word 'moral' to describe. You're describing a different type of action. let's call it a 'y-moral' action. — Isaac

Perhaps.

It seems to me that talking about morality in terms of only intentions or only outcomes makes no sense, and these two should always be considered together.

If one intends to do great good but does only great harm, they clearly cannot be said to be moral, regardless of their intentions.

If one intends to do great harm but does only great good, they clearly cannot be said to be moral either, regardless of the outcomes.

One cannot have both, so you've made moral action impossible. — Isaac

Why not?

Ignorance, of the sort you describe here, is neither virtuous non non-virtuous. It's as relevant to virtue as having a nose. We are all ignorant in the manner you describe and cannot be any other. As such the state is irrelevant to virtue. One cannot make into a virtue that which is unobtainable. — Isaac

While I would argue ignorance is relevant to one's capacity to bring about intended outcomes, I would agree it is a "neutral" factor. However, virtue ethics would imply that ignorance is not an impediment to ethical behavior, whereas I would argue that it is.

If intentions were good but the outcome was bad, then there must have been ignorance at play. In my view that does not justify the action or make it moral as per virtue ethics.

That's only if one is focusing more on the risks and is ignoring the opportunities that could also exist. — DA671

Not necessarily. I can ask the same question even if the odds were, say, 10:1. A gamble with good odds is still a gamble. The question is whether in the face of unknown consequences we can classify our choice as anything other than a gamble.

My preferred solution to the unknown consequences problem is to consider ethics about virtue, not consequence. Virtue only requires that we do our best. — Isaac

I think a just intention alone does not suffice, though it is a prerequisite for a moral action.

Similarly, a good outcome alone is not enough either.


One needs both.


The issue is that when one's intentions do not match up with the outcome, and instead one produces a negative outcome, one must have been ignorant. And ignorance is not virtuous, nor does it justify an action.

The ball is also controlled by many other agents. — DA671

Which is precisely the issue. It is largely out of the control of the parents who make the decision, which seems to me a shaky basis upon which to make decisions that can have serious negative consequences for another.

As I have said elsewhere, one cannot simply look at the risks and ignore the opportunities. — DA671

Ok, but the outcomes are unknown. All we can do is guess as to what the outcomes will be, and some of those outcomes may be good and some bad.

Does this not amount to a gamble?

By it, the simplest justification for having a child is that it will do more to improve the welfare of one's community (including the future child) than not doing so would. — Isaac

That isn't known when the decision is made. One may very well be making a decision that greatly damages their community and their future child.

So I guess one approach would be to say something like "but the chance of improvement is larger than the chance of damage", or is there some other way to continue in the face of these unknown consequences?

I don't follow. On what grounds is inaction morally superior to action? — Isaac

I didn't say one should choose inaction, I said one should choose action in ways that are within one's knowledge and power to oversee and control.

We ought be concerning ourselves with the welfare of our community. — Isaac

One ought not create the risk of massive unwarranted harm. One ought to create happiness where one can. — Isaac

I agree with this line of thought.

And if one's goal is to do good onto others, one should be humble and seek to do so in ways that are within one's control.

The key thing is the well-being of the person, not the degree of control exercised by two people. — DA671

The well-being of the person is unknown prior to the unfoldment of their life.

Getting the ball rolling is ultimately the parents' choice and no one else's, and if they must conclude that many things will be out of their control, then on what basis will they justify their choice?

I see "good odds" as the only attempt at a justification here, but I'm trying to see if there are other possibilities.

Still, I know that it is a controversial view, so I am willing to accept that creation can indeed be good/bad. As I have said elsewhere, if this view is true, then creating a mostly negative life would be immoral, especially when it's done intentionally. — DA671

How much influence can a parent be said to have on the consequence of their actions in regards to the well-being of their child?

Even the best-equipped and well-meaning parents can, tragically, bring about a terrible life for their child.

Do you agree that this is a possibility every parent should take into account? And if so, on what basis should it be dismissed in favor of having children, if not mere chance?

Typical cop-out. :snicker:

Given how confidently this argument is parroted on every antinatalism thread, I was expecting you to have something to say in its defense. This is just a cop-out.

No wonder, because what you're suggesting is absurd - that people have no moral obligation to take into account the consequences of their actions.

I do believe that the existence of lives wherein there isn't sufficient value is extremely tragic. The responsibility lies on the shoulders of many. — DA671

I think the responsibility lies on the shoulders of the parents who brought this tragedy about.

The question is, however well-meaning parents may be, how much power can they truly be said to have on the well-being of their child?

They have some influence, but as I have argued before, no parent has the knowledge and wisdom to foresee their child's life very far into the future, nor do they have control over the countless factors that influence their child's life.

I conclude that since parents do not have the knowledge and wisdom, nor the power to bring about their envisioned end-state of a happy child, even at best their action is a gamble.