It would depend on the level of justification. I may sympathise with their position if their argument is articulate enough and may even be slightly swayed? — I like sushi

This is another way of saying "If I like their argments, it may be justified."

What if you don't like their arguments? Is it not justified then? I'm assuming you don't consider yourself the ultimate arbiter of cosmic justice.

So maybe we are talking past each other. When I talk of justification, justice, I talk of morality and to me any meaningful definition of morality must go beyond personal fancy.

As a general ‘rule’/‘law’ I am not for Forced Conscription at all (that should be obvious). Just because I admit there could be a situation that may contradict this does not make my position contradictory. — I like sushi

I assume you wouldn't accept others justifying their practice of forcing people to partake in violence on the basis of their personal fancy, so why do you believe this is a position you should hold?

If you’re going to be silly I can stop talking? — I like sushi

Well, I think you were being silly, which is why I gave you a silly response.

The state decides right from wrong, and everyone who disagrees may choose "of their own free will" to comply or accept the consequences.

You understand that in this context you're condemning young people who can hardly tell right from wrong to choosing between punitive torture, which is what imprisonment is, and actual torture and the torture of others, and death on the battlefield.

Your view would probably be popular in Maoist China.

The idea that we are ‘forced’ is a convenient ‘excuse’ to just follow rules you don’t believe in. — I like sushi

Try to make the argument that being made to do things under threat of violence is something different from being forced.

I believe people should fight for what they believe in. — I like sushi

Your argument advocates that people should be forced to fight for what they don't believe in, after all, they'd be volunteers otherwise.

You confess you'd be the first to abandon ship when drafted into a war you don't agree with, and simultaneously you're preaching about how no force is being applied and people (kids, basically) should accept the consequences.

So which is it going to be?

There is a choice. Stating you were ‘forced’ to do something really just means that you refused to accept the consequences of refusing to do what you were told was right. — I like sushi

Ah, so conscripts are really just volunteers if you think about it. What a remarkable insight.

It is not literally ‘forced’. — I like sushi

To be thrown in jail for refusing is akin to being threatened with violence. It is the definition of being forced. And any nation that considers sending what are by all means children into a war was unfit to make any kind of rules to begin with.

To force young people to make others suffer, and to undergo suffering themselves; it is a terrible injustice.

If that is not unethical, nothing is.

Too one-sided a view of right and wrong is what created this situation to begin with. In international politics (and honestly, I could leave out the "international" part) everyone is a piece of shit (excuse my French) and your only choice is which flavor of shit you'd like jammed into your mouth.

Torture is never justified, under any circumstance.

If one puts themselves in a situation where it is expected of them to maintain security by potentially having to torture others, therein already lies the flawed moral choice.

When the timebomb is ticking it is already too late and one will be caught in a moral dilemma of one's own creation.

A better alternative would be to distance oneself from societies that torture as far as humanly possible; not to embed oneself further in it by becoming a potential torturer oneself, which must have preceeded the situation.

Wars cannot be just or unjust; a war is not a moral agent, nor are states. The individuals participating in wars are moral agents, and whether they act justly must be considered on a case-by-case basis.

To judge wars (or the states the conduct them) as just or unjust is inaccurate.

Ultimately war is about violence, and in my view violence is fundamentally an unjust means. Use of it is always bad and undesirable. Though, one can imagine situations in which one has no choice, or the alternatives are arguably worse. That still wouldn't make violence justified. Rather it creates a dilemma without any good outcomes.

Propaganda works because people are ignorant and believe anything they're told if it confirms their biases or caters to their (often subconscious) desires. (As such, being able to view information through a critical lens requires one to view oneself through a critical lens - a skill only a minority of people possess).

If one wishes to solve the spreading of lies (and I view propaganda as being a manifestation of that, as are most forms of marketing), one should strive to cure ignorance.

Rational selfishness, is meant to denote a conscious valuing of one's life, which is finite, and the value of the requirements of one's rational faculty to meet the demands of a finite life to achieve happiness, success, equilibrium, and sustenance. — Garrett Travers

How is this different from the normal use of the word?

The use of the word "rational" here seems to do little more than introduce bounds to what we consider "acceptable" selfishness, based on Rand's (or presumably, society's) preferences.

As such, if those preferences are self-destructive, so is the concept of an "acceptable" selfishness that they prescribe.

That which is truly good for the individual, is that which makes them a better, more loving human-being. As such, selfishness and selflessness are one and the same. By being truly selfish, and thus truly caring for the positive development of oneself, one will more positively affect all those around them.

Our use of the term "selfish", greed, callousness, etc., is in fact not a selfishness - it is a self-destructiveness. Such behavior should be looked upon with pity, not disdain. Such disdain comes forth from completely misplaced envy.

Not sure what Rand would think about this, but I thought I'd throw my perspective in there.

You are not the only one to have made this connection:



Absolutely fascinating stuff. So fascinating in fact, that if I wanted to talk about it, I'd have no idea where to even begin.

Personally, I am so not racist that whatever skin color whatever person appointed to whatever office has, is of great importance to me.

Having a thought is a violation of someone else's autonomy? — Tzeentch

No, your decision not to answr is. Not answering is not a thought it is an act. — Tobias

What does that act consist of? A thought surely, an internal process, and nothing else. And that presupposses we can call it an act to begin with - something which I disagree with also.

Apparently Kant views himself as the all-benevolent person who ought to go about assigning people their moral duties. What do you think of this? I think it is profoundly silly. — Tzeentch

No, you do actually, ... — Tobias

I don't assign people moral duties.

... you think that ethics is independent from the expectations of others, ... — Tobias

Yes, and unapologetically so.

dependent on the social good in the case of lying, but independent of the social good in case of violence... — Tobias

Where have I argued that lying is dependent on social good?

I thought that question was part of the dilemma that I thought was being discussed here, which I discussed, but I think you're extrapolating positions from that that I do not hold.

... apparently there is some Tzeentch who determines the nature of ethic, ... — Tobias

I ponder it more like.

Kant thought we could rationally understand our duties or at least the grounds from which they sprang. He called that 'the moral law within'. It is not Kant that tells you, it is reason, at least according to Kant. — Tobias

I can get behind that to a degree, but in that case we should let reason assign the duties and not our fallible selves.

So in case of violence we have a context independent ethical ethical system and in case of lying we do not. Thank you, much more consistent now. — Tobias

I wasn't aware of some rule that in order for one type of unethical behavior to be categorically unethical, all unethical behaviors must be so categorically. But feel free to share some substantion for that rule.

Other people's expectations do not change the nature of things, — Tzeentch

Well, that rather depend on the ' thing' under discussion doesn't it? — Tobias

A handshake is still just a handshake. However, a handshake is also a physical imposition, in which case the desire of the other needs to be taken into account, so I wouldn't call them irrelevant in that regard.

the situation is different because in the situation you have been asked a question you have ignored someone whereas in the situation you have not been asked a question you have not ignored someone. Indeed also ignoring or not ignoring are socially determined behaviors / situations. — Tobias

I have not done anything. I guess that's the issue here - my inaction, where one may have wished for my action.

But one's wishes do not morally oblige me, even if one wishes to morally oblige me.

However I see now that the mere existence of social world has been so far a mystery to you. — Tobias

Bla bla.

The only point I am making is that not answering is an act as well and so does not absolve you from the dilemma of whether you have to tell the truth or not. You are just trying to wiggle out of that question by shifting the subject. — Tobias

I have been very clear. Inaction is not an act, and a perfectly acceptable route out of the dilemma.

Inaction towards problems which are not one's responsibility is acceptable, and by the mere asking of a question one does not become responsible.

Well, this assertion merely proves your utter disregard for decades of learning. — Tobias

There have, even in recent days, been some atrocious laws made. Should those have been accepted on this ground of decades of "learning" that they were supposedly the product of?

I think I'll be a bit more critical of what I call learning.

Your phrase ' the nature of things' is unintelligible. — Tobias

The way things are? Reality? The discussion of which is the purpose of philosophy?

I'll rephrase myself; I don't hold the philosophical ability of lawmakers in a particularly high regard (exceptions not withstanding).

Yes but you decide by assuming he does not want to have the answer. That is the violation of autonomy ... — Tobias

Having a thought is a violation of someone else's autonomy?

Oh boy, where is this going?

It is imposed on others via the categorical imperative (at least according to Kant). — Tobias

Well, I am interested in your opinion. If I wanted to know Kant's, I'd read Kant.

Apparently Kant views himself as the all-benevolent person who ought to go about assigning people their moral duties. What do you think of this? I think it is profoundly silly.

Well either ethics is context dependent and then it matters that there are different discussions, or it is not and then it really does not matter what the case at hand is. In the other thread you answered it was not, lying was always wrong. — Tobias

That last thread was not about lying. It was about violence. We may have discussed Kant's ideas of lying, but only insofar as it was relevant to violence.

Whether you like it or not we live in a world with others and with social expectations. — Tobias

Other people's expectations do not change the nature of things, nor do I find them particularly relevant in moral discussions.

I gave you an argument, namely that the situation is different when you walk past someone who asked you a question or whether you walked past someone without him asking a question. — Tobias

I don't see how they're all that different for the person who walks past.

The questioner may have all sorts of wonderful expectations and desires, but why would they be of any concern to the walker?

Should I go about having expectations and desires towards other people, and then derive all sorts of moral rights to have those things reciprocated? Or is this the moment we need to start appointing people with opinions on "what is reasonable", and we are back in the mud?

Luckily you are not a lawyer because you would have a damn hard time wrapping your head around crimes of omission. — Tobias

The question of whether action and inaction are fundamentally different (which they are, for the same reason light and dark are fundamentally different) is a seperate discussion from whether inaction is always morally permissable. But that aside, I don't credit lawmakers with having a particularly solid grasp on the nature of things, and morality by extention.

If you decide he really does not want it answered, you violate his autonomy. — Tobias

That's not a violation of someone's autonomy. Whether one decides to answer or not isn't a matter of someone else's autonomy, but of one's own!

The imperfect duty to help. — Tobias

And that duty is one you have taken upon yourself, or do you also impose it on others?

In another thread you argued that context does not matter. — Tobias

They're two entirely different discussions.

You are an inconsistent Kantian. — Tobias

I am not a Kantian at all.

But even then, I don't see how non-interference makes one the owner of the problem, as though whoever asks questions may lay some moral claim on the bystander's attention. — Tzeentch

Because you were asked a question. Not answering a question is an act too. You make it seem like it is not an act. That is a wrong assumption. If I ask you in the street "may I ask you a question?" and you are basically ignoring me, you are being rude, or you did not hear it, or you were in a hurry, but at least I am going to think about why you plainly ignored me. — Tobias

One is not entitled to my response, my time, attention or even basic politeness, just because they asked a question. What gives one the right to impose any of these things?

It is not my problem, and beliefs of entitlement don't make it mine either.

Further, inaction is not an act. Not giving a response is not an action - it is inaction, and thereby fundamentally different.

No, he asked the question, so he wanted to know. — Tobias

Isn't the crux of the dilemma that telling the truth would cause the man significant emotional harm, and thus it was not a question he truly wanted answered?

If that's not the case, then what are we even here for? If the man wants to know the painful truth, then it certainly isn't bad to tell it to him, and lying would be even more clearly wrong.

You deliberately did not help him and thereby violated an imperfect duty. — Tobias

What duty?

Nor is there if you just told the man the truth. He asked for it, you gave it, what can be wrong. Instead you chose to make yourself the owner of the problem by not telling him. — Tobias

Well, if one no longer takes the position that telling the truth causing significant harm, disproportionate to the harm of telling a lie, then there is no dilemma.

But even then, I don't see how non-interference makes one the owner of the problem, as though whoever asks questions may lay some moral claim on the bystander's attention.

The man will suffer his anxiety until the bitter end and will not even know, whereas he did ask.... You have decided he should suffer that fate. — Tobias

No, he decided that fate for himself, however tragic that may be.

There's no reason the cause of his worries and emotions should be projected on some innocent bystander.

To ensure I answered your post:

Why would I not answer? — Tobias

Because one recognizes one is trapped between a rock and a hard place, namely; to lie, which is bad, or to give the man an answer he does not want to hear, which may not be immoral, but the suffering the man hereby causes unto himself is probably also something undesirable to be a part of.

Not to answer is to choose non-interference, and such is one's right.

Why would ignoring someone be a good act? — Tobias

This was never the question.

The claim was made (or at least the impression was given) that answering the man truthfully or not answering the question was bad.

I disagreed.

That is not the same as claiming that ignoring the man is good.

I would consider the refusal to answer or to answer truthfully as neutral.

Not answering means ignoring and also means not taking the dying father seriously as an autonomous agent. — Tobias

I don't see how any of that follows.

One doesn't owe the man any answers, respect or one's attention. The fact that the man is dying doesn't create a special situation where that would be the case.

Everyone is in the process of dying.

If it becomes common knowledge that is such a situation we would lie to the dying father, then dying fathers cannot ask that question anymore because he will never know if he gets an honest answer. So we 'sacrifice' the feelings of the dying father in order to keep our framework, that we answer truthfully, intact. — Tobias

Just because an emotional aspect is introduced does not mean we can throw overboard all reason.

This situation is framed (and framing is all it is) as though one commits some terrible deed by telling the dying man the truth.

First, some special quality is attributed to the fact this man is dying and normal rules of what is right and wrong apparently no longer apply for reasons that remain unmentioned.

But more importantly, it is the dying man that makes the mistake of saddling one with questions he does not want to know the answer to. Even moreso if he takes one's refusal to answer them as a confirmation of his fears.

The situation is tragic, but caused by the dying man himself and not by whatever poor bystander he forces into this difficult dilemma.

Lying is still bad. Telling the truth, arguably, isn't. Not answering most certainly isn't.

Game-like fantasies with auto-erotic pay-offs, visual narrative voyeurism and its childlike helplessness, and internet obsessions that concentrate on ingraining the former restrict the mind to its single desires and contain our minds within social spheres that in the near past have been associated with childhood and adolescence. Reproduction is the ultimate contradiction to this state, in it the individual must act almost solely in the immediate interests of another. — kudos

I'm not so sure if this is the case. Ideally reproduction is something we partake in with no other interest than the well-being of the child.

In reality however, there can be many selfish motivations that lead to the choice to have children.

Some are economical, others seek to satisfy some deeply engrained biological desire, and yet others simply conform to ideas of what is normal.

I have serious doubts how many couples have entirely altruisitic motives when it comes to having children. If that were to be the case, isn't the first question one ought to ask oneself: how can I seek to do what is in the interest of my child's well-being, when I have never met them?

Furthermore, if one is solely preoccupied with the well-being of their child, another question should be: what gives me the right to decide my child should live. Is that truly in their best interest? And how do I know? And what makes me believe I would be the correct person to raise them?

Yet, parents don't seem to ask themselves these questions, or at the very least do not seem to try to answer them rigorously (I doubt anyone could). As such, these questions are often discarded - after all, they may think to themselves, these questions did not seem to dissuade our predecessors and I want to have children.

Does that attest to the characteristics of altruism and maturity of thought that you describe child-rearing as having?

Because to me, it very much seems like people are either ignorant to or dismiss and refuse to answer the difficult questions that one would expect to be answered prior to making such fundamental decisions on behalf of another. Why? Likely because they are not driven by altruism, but by their desires, and it makes them willfully blind.

That to me is no sign of maturity.

And the things we call truth nowadays, are they truth and facts or will time tell? And what should we do with our principles based on these? Were they principles or weren't they? — Tobias

Time will tell, or maybe it won't.

If one is so inclined, one may seek for truth and likely this will sooner translate into discarding false beliefs rather than ever uncovering truth itself.

But that essential uncertainty is fine, until one attempts to impose their will on others.

Do you have children? If so they will become the victim of your ignorance whether you want it or not. — Tobias

I don't have children, and children indeed become the victim of their parents' ignorance.

Yes but reasoning is presented, that is the whole point. When a police agent shoots a man he is asked why. If he then explains that the man was holding a gun and was shooting and that is why the officer took him down he presents — Tobias

So it is not an appeal to authority or experience that is being made, but an appeal to reason, is what I am trying to say.

I am all for serious cautions. That is why the use of violence is generally prohibited by law. — Tobias

Law is nothing but to threaten with violence. It's the imposition of the will, but on a much larger scale. I subject it to the same scrutiny I would subject an individual's impositions to, and find the same objections.

In order to guide fair judgment we have education and law, training people in using fair judgment. — Tobias

Do you not think the individuals and societies discussed in my examples were under the impression they were capable of fair judgement?

This muddy line of reasoning can only lead to what I already eluded to: that anything that societies accept can be ethical. Ethics loses its meaning.

The alternative is for one to present factors that demonstrate why certain judgements are fairer than others, but then again one only has one's own frame of reference to base it on, just like all the people who were deemed incapable of fair judgement.

If one is to take this line of reasoning, either one accepts that ethics is meaingless, or one goes down the slippery slope of appointing oneself or others as the superior judge.

The course of action society takes is to have these justification examined by a third person, even more trained and educated in weighing arguments and indeed judging the relative wight of principles. — Tobias

This doesn't solve anything. Ethics is then whatever a "qualified" third person considers it to be.

We are not free to rewrite the social contract. whenever we feel like it. — Tobias

There is no social contract that I have voluntarily put my signature under.

Indeed! and you have the idea that you are capable of fair judgment based on principles you seem able to discern, however many would be disagreeing with you. — Tobias

Is it not my right to have my own thoughts, and to be wrong?

It is not my right however, to impose these potentially wrong ideas on others, through violence or otherwise.

Yes, that is what Kantian reasoning comes down to an where the achilles heel of such reasoning has been pointed out. It cannot make sense of the idea of special obligations. No friend of yours will choose your house. Your wife will not ask whether you like her dress, your children will not expect any kind of special treatment from you... — Tobias

This line of thinking is entirely coherent, I grant you that, and entirely absurd. — Tobias

What is absurd is the idea that such considerations as murderers coming to knock on one's door play a serious role in my interactions with other people. But if what people come to me for is protection from murderers then I'll gladly show them out myself.

The problem with this line of anti-social ethics is that you end up with a life that is solitary nasty brutish and short, exactly what we all strive to avoid. — Tobias

What is anti-social or brutish about striving for consensuality in human interaction? It's the basis of ethical conduct, as far as I am concerned.

Also those terms which may be vague, gain their content from the way they are used in practical discussion and argument. It is not utterly subjective, it is intersubjective. — Tobias

So ethics is whatever a group of people decide it is. It loses its meaning. On what basis will you claim that burning the witch, stoning the woman or cutting down the peasant is unethical? Didn't a group of people "intersubjectively" decide to call it justice?

Actually the example shows the problem of your ethical system. Since all judgment is based on this one principle, you cannot make any difference between the police offiicer in my example and the man stoning his wife. — Tobias

Indeed. And I don't seek to differentiate. And I believe you can't coherently differentiate between the two either - at least not with the framework you have put forward so far.

Thinking for others is unethical. ... Therefore in your system it is perfectly fine to sign an arms deal with just such a society. — Tobias

What makes you think that an individual who abhors violence should go around selling weapons?

What we have to do is argue and try to convince this society that their law is unjust. — Tobias

What if the society cannot be convinced, or worse yet, what if the society instead convinces yours to change their laws so stoning is ethical again?

You hold on to a kind of monological ethics by which you can set our own moral compass. — Tobias

And whose moral compasses would you like to set? And perhaps more importantly, what makes you believe you are the right person or part of the right society to do so?

In Japan no one has the right to murder anymore, witches live their lives in peace and their broomsticks are now tax deductible! Progroms have been eradicated in most countries and I can go on. That is not because Kant came along and told them, or because everyone just miraculously came to see the miracle of the categorical imperative. — Tobias

You haven't presented a basis as to why these behaviors were unethical, other than "we don't do those things anymore", which is not a basis at all.

Yes and since there is no foot to stand on, you reach the conclusion that violence should not be stopped by countervailing force when it starts and we should allow ourselves and others to get killed in the name of ethics. — Tobias

I make no claims about what "we" should do. I'm only presenting you the reasoning behind what I think I should do, and asking for yours.

Of course not. I know I am not perfect, which is exactly why I am proposing these things. It is interesting that you interpret my attempts to reconcile my conduct with my imperfection as a claim to being perfect. — Tzeentch

That is because the assumption of perfection is needed. You wish to base your ethics on absolute truth and so there must be a kind of truth to which you have privileged access. — Tobias

No such assumption is needed, because I do not impose. I can be as imperfect as I like, if I do not attempt to impose my imperfections on others.

And I make no claims about having priviledged access to absolute truth. Let's keep the discussion fair and honest.

Perfection is maybe not the words, but you have to presume some sort of moral superiority above others. — Tobias

I'm sorry to say, but this must be projection.

It is out of understanding of my own ignorance that I choose not to impose. It is those who would impose that must by definition consider their ethics or morals to be superior over those of others, and thus give them the right to do so.

I get that, but the term does have overtly physical connotations. I thought that disengaging the term "violence" from the whole idea of ethical violence might be meaningful. After all, people can do a whole lot of horrendous damage to other people without ever lifting a finger against them. Disenfranchising a person or a group, for example. Maybe "trespassing" is a suitable match for the concept? In which case the question becomes, is it ever ethical to trespass against others? — Pantagruel

I see where you're coming from.

Allow me to try and explore:

What can make the use of physical force unethical, is when it is used against someone else's will. So the unethical aspect of this is that it is an imposition. Impositions can include a variety of non-violent behaviors as well.

There was a great and lengthy discussion about impositions in this thread: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12197/the-reason-for-expressing-opinions/p8

Some of its points I have echoed here.

And the truth is always temporary, facts of today will be overtaken by the science of tomorrow. — Tobias

Then it is not truth, and they were not facts.

Basing the right on truth only makes its foundation more shaky than when you just base in on the ' right' . — Tobias

A shaky foundation is the best one can hope for. However, being unsure or having a shaky foundation is entirely acceptable if one does not allow others to become the victim of one's ignorance, which is exactly what one risks in the case of violence.

No it is not an appeal to authority it is an appeal to experience. — Tobias

Unless some reasoning is presented, there's no difference between the two. And if a line of reasoning is presented, then it is an appeal to reason or logic.

You hold an all or nothing view. Either you have an unshakeable foundation or we have nothing to go on. — Tobias

Indeed. I would require nothing less than an unshakable foundation from someone who attempts to justify violence.

However, in practice we do not have an unshakeable foundation and we still have guiding lights to go on, namely practice and experience. It is not authority based on nothing it is authority based on a past record of equitable and fair judgement. — Tobias

Those things mean nothing to me. It is authority based on opinions. However many atrocities haven't been committed by individuals who made an appeal to past traditions or were under the false impression they were capable of fair judgement?

These things sound reasonable on paper, but the flaws become apparent when one is confronted with someone who has an entirely different frame of reference.

Here your reasoning spirals wildly out of control. Common reasoning is not the same as some truth being discovered. — Tobias

I shouldn't have used the term "common reasoning".

What I meant to say is that I believe these foundational truths to be accessible through reason and logic, so in theory accessible to all (though in practice, probably not), hence the use of the word "common".

And so since we are not sure of these things, no one's view can be imposed on others.... well so much for society than. — Tobias

Indeed. I consider all non-consensual aspects of society to be highly undesirable.

Is placing traffic lights imposing the view of city planners on others? — Tobias

No, but threatening individuals with violence for not stopping is.

If ethics only concerns oneself it becomes meaningless when you do not also provide me some unshakable truth on which it can be based. — Tobias

I disagree. I think that search for a foundation is incredibly meaingful. But each is to judge that for themselves.

How do I know which ethical maxims you hold when there is, as you admit no truth to base them on? — Tobias

The acknowledgement of one's fundamental ignorance can be a great basis for ethics. For one it should lead to a serious caution when imposing on others, violence being an example of one such imposition.

The problem with your slippery slope is you already assume we are at the bottom. — Tobias

No. But when one attempts to justify actions based on slippery slopes, one must either accept that the bottom is also justifiable, or be hypocritical.

Again;

If person A justifies his violence towards person B based on what he considers his "fair judgement", what should stop person B from doing the same?

And what should indeed stop anyone from basing their justifications for violence on their "fair judgement"?

More likely, there are factors that constitute what you call "fair judgement", that determine whether one person's claim to it may be better than another's; principles.

His taking a life is regrettable, not unethical. He is forced in society, we all are. — Tobias

To an extent we are forced to live in a society - a regrettable circumstance. The role we ascribe ourselves in that circumstance is one we choose voluntarily. Whether we choose to adopt its views of what constitutes justified violence is voluntary.

Now, there is an argument to be made here that society brainwashes individuals from a very young age into adopting its views. I'd agree with that, which is why I consider the non-consensual aspects of society to be highly problematic.

It is the common answer and it doesn't work. The murderer knows Kant is a Kantian so when everyone respects this maxim it is easy for the murderer to know the person is indeed in your house, ... — Tobias

As far as I am concerned that is perfectly acceptable. Our involvement in this affair is entirely involuntary, and thus inaction is an acceptable route to take if the alternative is unethical conduct. If our involvement is voluntary then we were foolish to begin with, and our forced choice between two evils is entirely our own mistake.

But I am not here to defend Kant's claim.

You have a condescending tone... — Tobias

I'm sorry you feel that way. I don't see how any of what I said is condescending.

In written discussions it is not always easy to know whether the other side understands what logical path I am taking, which is why I wrote it out in full.

I can be uncompromising and blunt, but you'll have to take the fact that I am writing page-long replies to you as evidence that I value our conversation and your contribution to it.

..., it is not the same as excusing violence whenever it is convenient. One must make an argument for this use of violence and that argument must be plausible in the eyes of others who have proven to be able to discern right arguments from wrong arguments. — Tobias

This is utterly subjective and based on opinion. It may sound reasonable at first glance, but completely falls apart when we consider how many different interpretations there may be from the various terms you use here (plausible, proven, right, wrong, etc.). Those interpretations tend to be guided by merely what is desirable at the time; convenience.

You may think that is fine, but it leads to every action being justifiable, and ethics becoming meaningless via the slippery slope I have discussed.

A. might be of the opinion that the use of force was necessary and then A. would have the task of defending his course of action. If A. says " well violence was justified because that ugly head of his constitutes a bad situation" we will tell him he committed a wrong. His ugly head does not provide a justification for violence since A. you basically do not commit violence out of a whim and B. even if he is god ugly the harm he suffered stands in no proportion to the harm you suffered. — Tobias

Reasonable at first glance, but then;

A. is of the opinion that stoning a married woman is necessary because she looked at another man. A is tasked with defending his course of action, and whatever not-entirely-hypothetical society A is a part of deems this a justifiable use of force.

If we stick to your line of reasoning, we cannot consider this unethical. It seems to boil down to, everything can justify violence as long as there's a society willing to accept it.

Every violent group action is justified.

This isn't ethics. It is a template for atrocity. — Tzeentch

No it is not and that is precisely because there does exist some kind of common reasoning. Exactly the one you seem to base your argument on and deny at will. In no society will " he had an ugly head" fly as an excuse for murder. — Tobias

One would wish for this to be the case, but my previous example shows our reasonings not to be as common as hoped.

Here's another example: Kiri-sute gomen

The "right" to murder, based on a perceived affront.

What about witch burnings? What about pogroms? We could continue, but I think my point is clear.

I think our disconnect lies in that you seem to assume (but correct me if I am wrong) that average behavior of individuals must be ethical. That whatever societies agree on is acceptable, must be justified and ethical.

I disagree with this.

The point is, people can an do reason with each other about what is right and wrong. — Tobias

And regularly they come to conclusions which are clearly unethical, like burning people at the stake baesd on superstition, or murdering people in the street based on perceived insults.

In your view nothing is left and so it is every man for himself to determine what is ethical. A recipe for a war of all against all, not for an ethical society. — Tobias

To the contrary. Every person who understands they have no foot to stand on should steer clear from violence and impositions on others, lest they make others the victim of their ignorance.

Just saying it doesn't work does not mean it doesn't work. Demonstrate it with either argument or empiric facts. — Tobias

I have, by trying to show you that basing ethics on opinion makes ethics meaningless.

Facts are stacked against you, because we are doing it in this way now for ages. — Tobias

And war and man-made suffering run like a red line through mankind's history. That may be the best mankind is capable of, but individuals need not settle for that mess.

It might not be perfect, but it does keep people from killing each other. — Tobias

Perfect it is most certainly not, but where do you get the idea that it keeps people from killing each other? Only a few decades ago mankind was a button-press away from killing, literally, everyone. We still are.

If the historical trend of ever more deadly warfare is to continue, the next war will be deadlier than World War II.

This is what deontology comes down to and I think it exposes one of its core weaknesses. It assumes a kind of free floating individual, unattached to social bonds. — Tobias

That is an interesting discussion in its own right. Not only is it my view that such an individual exists in every one, I'm also considering that analyzing and reevaluating one's core beliefs as imposed by one's upbringing, social climate or state may be a prerequisite for being a moral agent.

The problem is you think you are perfect. — Tobias

Of course not. I know I am not perfect, which is exactly why I am proposing these things. It is interesting that you interpret my attempts to reconcile my conduct with my imperfection as a claim to being perfect.

To me, consensual exchanges of physical force do not constitute violence, and that can include more extreme forms like combat sports.

I understand that may not be entirely colloquial, and that's why I shared the definition I'm using.

Well for one the wife didn't force the man through physical force. — john27

I thought we were talking about BDSM, so I assume the wife is hurting him or something along those lines.

That's to force (it is against the man's will) one's desires (the wife desires to engage in this type of interaction) through physical force (hurting).

And don't turn this into a discussion about what constitutes BDSM, please.

Therefore if you name that previous example as violence, you would do well to admit that it is malleable/contextual? — john27

How come? Isn't a subject being forced to do something against their will through physical force? It's violence, and, like all violence, unethical.

Oh sure, in that case it'd be violence. One just would not be aware that they're commiting it - carelessness coupled with ignorance causes much as suffering as malice, even if it is of a different nature.

That's not what I said.

You asked whether something would still be considered violence if physical force was applied in accordance to the would-be victims desires.

I answered, it is not violence. A doctor pulling a rotten tooth is not violence, or two partners engaging in some kinky intercourse is not violence.

The question that seemed to be implied was: but what if the victim's desires involve a third person?

In that case, the third person's desires must be taken into account.

Maybe I was imprecise with my reference to truth Ethics does not deal with true and false but with right or wrong. — Tobias

To me those two cannot be seperated. That which is Good or right must be based on truth. That which is wrong must be based on falsehoods or delusions. Truth-seeking is therefore a vital part of ethics.

To discern right from wrong we need people experienced in doing so. — Tobias

That would be an appeal to authority. Unless said person can back up their claims with reason, I would not put any value in any experience or authority on a subject they might have.

I do not think opinions are so different between individuals. Actually ethics, also in the absolutist variation you propose is only possible if opinions are not that different, or at least we must presuppose that by the light of common reason we can discern ethical principles. Actually, common reason must be more an assumption of yours than it needs to be mine. For you it is necessary that we can mentally at every age discern ethical principles by deduction alone. — Tobias

Like you said, my view of ethics is dependent on there being some truth to be discovered, or common reasoning. However, we may never be sure of these things, which is why I am also against imposing one's views on others. One's ethics should concern oneself and one's own behavior in regards to others alone. Attempting to force one's views on others risks making them the victim of one's ignorance.

But yes, to put it clearly, my view is that some of the principles I have discussed so far are (potentially) fundamental and I try to back this up by showing how ignoring those principles leads to slippery slopes in which notions of right and wrong become meaningless and all violent behaviors can be justified.

Well, if I am a police agent and I see a man shooting with a machine gun in a school aiming to kill teachers and pupils and I take him down with my fire arms, than I am praised and awarded and rightly so. My violence was necessary to stop further blood shed. I think even Kant would agree: We have an imperfect duty to intervene in this case. We cannot will people who inflict violence on the innocent to keep committing these kinds of acts (Kant was a notable proponent of the death penalty). — Tobias

I think in that situation the police agent's use of violence was still unethical, even if it had desirable effects as well. He had to take a life; something which I consider highly undesirable. Considering his circumstances it is understandable, however his choices in life contributed to putting himself in a position where he may have to take a life. Nothing forced him to associate with a society in which it is normal to murder children, yet he did.

Another famous example, which brought Kant himself into trouble is the murderer at the door scenario. In Kant's scheme lying is categorically wrong just like in yours violence is. When confronted with the question of whether it is ok to lie when a friend hides inside your house from a murderer and the murderer asks the straightforward question whether this friend is in the house, Kant was forced to say that lying would not be appropriate in this case. For ages now Kantian scholars are trying to save the moralist from Konigberg from himself. — Tobias

He could have kept his mouth shut.

Violence is fine to use in certain situations because the situations are bad and need to be resolved. — Tobias

At risk of repeating myself, this is akin to excusing violence whenever one or others deem it convenient. At most it serves as a explanation as to why individuals choose violence, but not as a limitation on it.

The problem with this line of reasoning is clear; person A deems it fine to commit violence against person B because person A is of the opinion there's a bad situation that needs to be resolved.

Every violent action is justified.

You may say, well person A has a group of people who share his opinion so instead; Group A deems it is fine to commit violence against person B because group A is of the opinion there's a bad situation that needs to be resolved.

Every violent group action is justified.

This isn't ethics. It is a template for atrocity.

More likely, there are factors that, in your view, can excuse violence. Self-defense for example, so it would probably be more useful to move on to those critical factors, because this intersubjectivity line of reasoning doesn't work and indeed any line of reasoning that depends on opinion rather than a fundamental truth or principle ends this way.

In an ideal world there are no bad situations so no need for violence. However we do not live in an ideal world we live in an actual one. — Tobias

That is a weak excuse! One cannot control the goings-on of the world, but one can control one's own behavior and whether one lives in accordance to ideals is a product of one's will to do so. The problem is that we often lack the desire to do so, or doing so conflicts with our desires.

If one believes the ideal is for there to be no violence, it is up to oneself to commit none.

Society needs such rules, we call it law. — Tobias

I don't think it's ethical for society, or indeed anyone, to make me the victim of its own imperfections.

So as long as I engage in physical force on the behalf of another's pleasure, or in accordance to someone else's desire, it would not be considered as violence? — john27

Assuming there's no third-party whose will is going to be violated, yes. It is not violence.

The question is, is the settlement we've reached - some violence - like what people disparagingly call gateway crime, a stepping stone towards extreme violence? — Agent Smith

We're not living in a world with some violence.

For one, only a few decades ago, and perhaps still today, every being on Earth was being threatened with death every day. The world's superpowers had and still have their nuclear weapons aimed at each other, ballistic missile submarines on constant patrol in striking range of capital cities.

Secondly, large amounts of people live under threat of armed conflict every day. In places like Ukraine and the South China Sea, we are an incident away from large-scale armed conflict, perhaps even World War III.

Thirdly, every nation on Earth depends heavily on their ability to use and threaten with violence against its own population to maintain control. That is to say, every citizen of every country on Earth is being threatened with violence every day by its own government.

Violence is present in every facet of life. Most nations' populations, and especially those of superpowers, are working around the clock to improve their nation's capacity for violence to even greater levels. Whole civilizations are built around it, whether they realize it or not.

We do not live in a world of some violence. We live in a world of extreme violence.

That's the game humanity has played, and will likely lose sometime in the future. A millenia-long prisoner's dilemma and arms-race that has lead to an accumilation of power that no individual is capable of wielding, ending up in the hands of exactly the imperfect human beings we're trying to keep ourselves safe from.

I'm unsure what you're getting at, but if the point you're making is that they're not in control of their actions and desires play no role, then I'd say they're not commiting violence. Just like a broken machine that hurts its operator is not commiting violence.

Maybe. I think it may be more about outbursts of aggression - most of the people I know who have done this take no interest in the reactions. It's closer to onanism. (This comes from working with prisoners) — Tom Storm

Well, I'd assume they're lying (or equally likely, unaware of what drives them). If they had no interest in the reaction of the victim, and all they were interested in was stabbing for self-gratification they'd be stabbing a rock or a tree.

You confuse intersubjectivity with majority opinion. Not every vote counts in this forum as not everyone has the moral maturity or argumentative acumen to value and weigh the reasons set forth. — Tobias

Basing the question of whose opinions matter on yet more opinions isn't going to help.

All truth is temporary, especially those concerning the social world and ethics is social, ... — Tobias

I disagree. What was unethical 1,000 years ago is unethical now, and vice versa. We can't cherry pick based on what is convenient, normal or accepted. Burning witches at the stake was never ethical, even if it was accepted at points in history.

Whether the arguments that I propose for me committing violence are sound or not, meaning that they are understandable and plausible for others who have seen enough of such situations to be able to weigh them and imagine what they would do were they in my shoes. — Tobias

It is opinion, then. This will get us nowhere when we try to talk about ethics, because opinions are so different between individuals, time periods and locations. If we accept this approach, it would be more appropriate to talk about customs or culture rather than ethics.

The opinions of others is not a sound basis for ethics. It loses its meaning. Everything could be ethical.

I find that unconvincing because I can citer many instances in which it seems that violence is not only the right thing to do, it seems even the necessary thing to do in such a situation. — Tobias

Lets hear it!

What it means to say that 'violence is unethical' in a way that it can be informative and yet retain some of its context inependent quality is to say that "we should strive for a world without violence, because in an ideal world violence is not necessary". — Tobias

Ok, I can get behind that, but there's a principle hidden in that last sentence.

But why would we want a world free of violence if we have all these opinions telling us it's perfectly fine to use in certain situations?

Not too long ago all the superpowers in the world were spending trillions on developing bombs that could wipe the Earth clean of life, all in the name of self-defense and "necessary violence". Doesn't it seem our leniency towards practical considerations is contrary to our goals? On what basis should we allow ourselves such leniency?

In that sense I would agree with you. In practice however we need rules to allow for violence when necessary. In a sense this ethical discussion mirrors he perennial problem of metaphysics how to cross over from the ideal into the real. — Tobias

I don't require such rules. Who does, exactly? You? Society? The world? Coincidentally, it seems they who require such rules are usually those who stand most to gain.

Lastly, what stops one from bringing the ideal into the real? Desires that we dress up as "practical considerations". Desire is what stops us from applying principles consistently. One may apply them to feel good about oneself, until it conflicts with one's desires, and then one may seek for a pretense as to why that is acceptable. That is not ethics. That's doing whatever the hell one wants whenever it's convenient.

Sometimes one must (attempt to) build a tower, to rise above the mud.

Yes, the stabber must have some desire to stab, no? They must enjoy to inflict pain on others, the reaction of the victim is what gives them pleasure or otherwise they would just stab a rock instead. There is a desired reaction they are after.

:roll: — 180 Proof

:roll: