It is not my subjective judgment that is key here, but intersubjective judgment. — Tobias

I find neither are a good basis for ethics. Majority opinions have been terribly wrong in their collective judgement countless times.

Principles are rules of thumb, ... — Tobias

Principle: a fundamental truth or proposition that serves as the foundation for a system of belief or behaviour or for a chain of reasoning.

I argue on the other hand that there are no context independen principles, or at least that context may require us to act not in accordance to a principle. — Tobias

What context do you propose, then? Whenever our subjective judgement deems it desirable to commit violence? Whenever a lot of people agree it is desirable to commit violence? I find none of these particularly convincing.

In the event that violence is pleasurable, physically, would it remain categorically unethical? — john27

Depends on one's definition of violence.

Mine is: to (attempt to) make another act in accordance to one's desires through the use of physical force.

As you can see, the forcing of one's desires upon another is a key ingredient. In the case of BDSM type situations another's will is not being violated.

I don't deny that life is not meant to be kept, but am a little skeptical on how the love of ones life impedes or incapacitate one's spiritual integrity. — john27

We're discussing the means (violence) and not the ends (motivations).

I don't think ends can justify means, so one's motivations for choosing violence are not relevant in my view.

And it would impede one's spiritual integrity in the way that any unethical deed does. Any ethical discussion presupposes we see an inherent value in being/striving to be ethical. That it is Good for its own sake, and thus that doing wrong is undesirable.

However not all situations have that degree of difficulty. the weighing of interests between Proof's life and John's broken nose is a pretty easy one to make. (provided that proof is not threatening to blow up a city or whatever). — Tobias

The issue is that in this example, one is using their own subjective judgement to determine what is merited. By doing so, one must also accept when another uses their subjective jdugement to do the same, unless one wishes to argue their judgement is somehow more special than others.

What you end up with is a world in which people constantly use violence against one another, and wonder why others are doing the same to them. That's what we see throughout history.

Why should I refrain from making this calculation and acting accordingly, in the name of some kind of pie in the sky context independent ethical maxim? — Tobias

The point of an ethical principle is that it is context independent.

Like I said to , if we need to ask why following ethical principles is even important at all, then this will not be very constructive. An ethical discussion presupposes they matter to us.

Of course what is up for debate is what these ethical principles are, and I've just shared a rather bold one; violence is categorically unethical. I'm sure you will try to find grounds to disagree, and that is why we're here.

Context-be-damned huh? — 180 Proof

Yes.

If one believes violence can turn into a right whenever it suits one's desires, then we've entered the typical slippery slope that ends at "might makes right".

Should I not celebrate my self preservation? — john27

Self-preservation is a futile endeavor, and to sacrifice one's spiritual integrity for it is not an act worth celebrating, but such is my view. I'll yield that in a situation of self-defense it would not be easy. I'm not sure if I could do it.

... is the will to live a desire? — john27

Of course.

What if the desires of the other are unethical and my violence stops him from bringing these desires into effective action? — Tobias

Two wrongs don't make a right.

Violence is categorically unethical. While in some cases its use may be understandable, that does not change its nature, namely to force someone to act in accordance to one's own desires through physical force. If that is not unethical, nothing is.

Even in the case of self-defense, its use must not be regarded as a victory (ethical), but as a personal defeat (unethical).

If we imagine two worlds, one in which corporations are free to expand and exploit, and one in which they are curtailed by powerful governments, we will start to find different manifestations of the same human flaw - the insatiable lust for power.

There is no system capable of fixing this, for such flaws inhabit nearly every human, and in most it requires years of self-study to become aware of and eventually fix them.

Humanity is its own greatest enemy, and the more we project our own imperfections on systems, the more we blind ourselves to the evil that is residing inside us.

In the case of personal happiness I suppose it's up to the individual themselves to navigate their way through apparent contradictions.

So my question is: why would one choose to pursue truth over peace of soul and pleasure? — smartmonkey1

I struggle to think of ways one could find inner peace without some form of truth-seeking.

To live in ignorance and delusion will sooner or later cause suffering for the self and others. I always like to think of false beliefs as being dissonant with reality, and like a lie has to grow in order to keep itself alive, so do false beliefs grow, and grow ever more dissonant, until things like depression follow.

Maybe the suggestion here is that a state of blissful ignorance is preferable over the turmoil that truth-seeking can bring. Perhaps that is true for some individuals who are unable to stomach the confrontation with their beliefs. That is a very tragic state to be in though.

When I can't get my way the answer is always more force, more mandates, to cede more rights to governments.

So we can all be safe.

My love for power and telling others what to do flows from my essential goodness and desire to be a protector. :pray:

It was, is and always will be authoritarianism - the quintessential ingredient for the worst of mankind's collective behaviors: repression, tyranny, war.

Close second is probably what I call humanity's "Very Hungry Caterpillar-syndrome," which I would typify as a collective lack of understanding of the nature of one's desires, that puts humanity in a perpetual state of wanting more.

Ought we associate with people who keep dragging out the dead horse of organized religion to use as a punching bag to further our philosophical "enlightenment"?

They could suggest it as one way to be a more moral person, sure, but I think one should ask oneself if visiting lonely elders is truly the best thing one can do, ... — Amalac

Juck.

I think that if you stop purchasing the products of animal cruelty, you will be a more moral person than if you don't, ... — Amalac

One person chooses to go vegan, another may visit lonely elders in nursing homes, and yet another donates money to the homeless, etc. What makes one better than the other?

Should people who visit lonely elders in nursing homes go around telling other people that they would live more moral lives if they too visited lonely elders in nursing homes?

Unfortunate that such an interesting discussion had to end with accusations.

I have a general question. How do you determine what a benevolent intent is? — khaled

That is an expansive topic, and I don't think it is constructive to branch out our discussion even further. Lets keep this subject for when we have reached an understanding on the other topics.

If one does anything to another person the rest of their life will be a consequence of that act. You can't be certain of how much of a butterfly effect any act had. This means there are no moral acts in general. That's unavoidable I think. — khaled

It seems this idea equates every type of interaction to a cause or consequence of every thing that follows. I don't necessarily agree with that. In terms of the butterfly effect; does a butterfly cause a hurricane on the other side of the world, or is the flap of its wings a tiny influence in an ocean of influences that cause that hurricane, not all of which are meaningful in the context of our discussion.

But on the other hand, it is a possible conclusion that morality functions like truth. We cannot know truth, but we can aspire to live in accordance with it as much as possible by discarding those things we can discern as not true. Thus living morally would translate into avoiding immorality. It seems consistent.

But what is to be done when the consequences cannot be known? What's the takeaway? Say someone drops a bomb from an airplane, with the benevolent intent of reducing the crime rate by eliminating criminals, and there is no news coverage of the event. Now they don't know the consequence of their action. What's their takeaway? — khaled

No idea. Should there be one?

Assuming the goal of this hypothetical person is to live a moral life, then one would assume they will at some point be moved to reflect upon their actions. Hopefully they realize that their aspirations of doing Good far exceed their limited wisdom.

How to make one see their own ignorance? Some seem to lack that ability entirely, thus a moral life is probably out of reach for them. They're doomed to do harm, and learn very little. A tragic reality, I guess.

I explained why I don't act to solve every problem I see. — khaled

So why is inaction wrong in some circumstances, but not in others? And why is it wrong in the case of Sarah and Jeff?

One instance in which I can agree that inaction is wrong, is when one has taken voluntary responsibility over the well-being over another individual, which is the case for having children.

In so far as the consequences of that act go, I would like to think so, yes. — Tzeentch

As for the idea that one is obliged to track the consequences; I don't see how that follows. — Tzeentch

So is one obligated to track or not? — khaled

Track, no.

To make a serious consideration of the consequences before one acts, yes. If one is interested in living morally/avoiding immorality, it would certainly be advisable to say the least.

But this inevitably raises questions of what constitutes enough consideration, whether one can ever be certain, whether every consequence is meaningful, one's ideas on cause and effect, etc.

So inaction is only wrong every once in a while? — Tzeentch

Correct. Why is this strange? — khaled

Since not much of a case has been made as to why this distinction should be made.

You have it so that action is wrong only every once in a while. — khaled

I don't think that follows from my argument. The main issue seems to be with whether one can know and/or be certain.

Maybe someone has broken into your house with the intent to kill you but are hesitating. If you startle them by waking up, they will kill you and start their serial killer career. If you don't, they'll come to their senses and become an upright member of society. — khaled

If certainty that the act you're about to do is harmless is what you require, then you will never be justified in acting. Where have I made a mistake here? — khaled

The fact that this "risk" one would be taking is likely to end up with a neutral result, because the possibility of something like this happening is astronomically low.

I'll be as ridiculous as I need to be. — khaled

Ok, but do you think the fact that you need to be ridiculous speaks in your argument's favor or mine?

By some miracle, the killer has caused no harm. Are his actions neutral? Maybe. Or maybe his gross ignorance and risk-taking are of themselves immoral. — Tzeentch

Right, this is what I'm asking you to resolve. Which is it? — khaled

It's unresolved. We have already established that.

1- One is obligated to pick the option least likely to harm which they discerned to the best of their abilities. Meaning (by your system) that one must always pick inaction and must never pick action since everyone can discern that inaction is safer since it has a 0% chance of failure in your system. But you already disagreed with this in the original Jeff and Sarah example (where Jeff doesn't rebel against pinching), where you argued that pinching Jeff is not wrong.

2- One is not obligated to pick the option least likely to harm which they discerned to the best of their abilities. Meaning a benevolent serial killer who wants to live morally is justified to kill randomly. As despite despite thinking that the act he commits has a 0.001% chance of being moral, he is not obligated to pick the 99.999% alternative, so is justified in picking the very unlikely act. Even after the 99.999% alternative happens, he's still not obligated to change his behavior as again, even if he recognizes the very low chance of success he's not obligated to pick the less risky alternative. (may change depending on your resolution of the above) — khaled

I don't think this problem can be understood through something like chance, which in itself is a faulty representation.

I get your point though: if certainty is impossible, and one is obligated to choose the option with the least risk of harm, then it would follow inaction is always the correct option.

To an extent I agree. When in doubt, inaction is the safe option.

However, I don't think the impossibility of certainty, at least certainty to a degree that is meaningful in the context of our discussion, is a given. Nor do I think chance and risk are constructive ways of looking at this problem, because they inherently contain ignorance to causes.

I don't know of what obligation you are speaking here. — Tzeentch

Moral obligation. — khaled

I don't believe such a thing exists.

We're discussing what's right or wrong by your system not what practical actions a person abiding by your principles would be motivated towards or deterred from. — khaled

In that case I think I've answered your question:

Doing things that are incredibly irresponsible and risky with good intentions:

Very likely to be immoral, with a lot of luck neutral.

Or perhaps categorically immoral if we were to conclude there is some level of risk-taking that is immoral in and of itself. That has remained unresolved.

Darkness is the absence of light, whether we call it darkness or "not-light". — Tzeentch

One could also define light as "not darkness" could they not? — khaled

We could call darkness purple and it would still refer to the absence of light.

Which of these two "exists" and which is the "non existence of the other" and why can't these criteria be flipped? — khaled

Photons exist, and the absence of them is what we refer to as darkness. Strictly speaking darkness does not exist. it is what we call the absence of photons and it is by their absence that we infer what we know as darkness.

I don't think going further down this sidetrack is constructive.

I ask you what makes an action. You say something is detected for action that's not detected for inaction. I ask you what that something is. You say action. See the problem? — khaled

No, I don't. Action is like light, and inaction is like darkness.

Say A operates a gate by pressing a button. When he presses it the gate opens for a few seconds then closes. B is walking and wants to pass through the gate. B cannot operate the gate (can't get to the booth as it's on the other side of the gate). A refuses to let B through. A is denying B space. Is A imposing on B? — khaled

Assuming it fits our earlier definition of what an imposition is, ergo this is a conscious effort of A to deny B entry, then yes.

I think "yes" is the unavoidable conclusion, since this is the exact same scenario with the walker and stander, except I just changed the mechanism by which the stander is impeding the walker. If so you have an example where sserping a button is an action (since inactions can't be impositions since they can't be wrong). Now we can clearly see that sserping is sometimes an action. So, what makes it an inaction in Sarah and Jeff's case? — khaled

What this determines, and I thought we had already agreed upon this several posts ago, is that inaction can be an imposition.

What makes an imposition is the use of force (including various non-physical categories of force) to make someone act in accordance to one's desires.

In the case of Sarah and Jeff, one chooses not to get involved at all.

Similarly, if A does not operate the button so as to not involve himself (with the caveat that inaction can be immoral, in the circumstances we have discussed), then it is not an imposition.

Now we can clearly see that sserping is sometimes an action. — khaled

As I said, the linguistic trick is one I think you're playing on yourself here. I understand the confusion, but I don't see the point and it's honestly getting a little tedious.

A little fear was all it took. — Isaac

Do my eyes deceive me?

Is the Philosophy Forum finally catching up to the fact that everything about this crisis reeks?

I'm asking if it's immoral to take the higher risk option. You answered that it is not moral. That doesn't answer the question as it could still be neutral. — khaled

That depends on the outcome. It could be neutral, I suppose.

If you claim that sometimes we can be certain that our actions will lead to our intentions, then we need to be able to divine the future life of the person who we're acting upon. If we cannot do that this reduces to: — khaled

One can conclude that certainty is impossible, and thus moral acts are impossible, — Tzeentch

The certainty you require for moral action is precisely the certainty to divine the future life of a person. — khaled

By performing an action that involves another person, we must be able to foresee the consequences as far as our actions cause them. Of course that can be a complicated matter, depending on the ambition (or hubris) of one's action.

When one saves another person's life, the rest of their life will be a consequence of this act. In that case, I would agree certainty is impossible thus it is not a moral act. That doesn't automatically mean it is immoral though, or incapable of having desirable effects.

If I lack the wisdom to do something, and attempt it anyways, that's not moral. However, if it doesn't result in a negative consequence that's not immoral leaving us at neutral. Again, there is a world of difference between neutral and immoral acts. — khaled

Certainly. I never intended to imply otherwise.

Since one has no idea of the consequences of their actions, any action is as justified as another when the only criteria to judge immorality is consequence. — khaled

Or the intentions. And whether consequences can be known is up for debate. In a lot of cases I would argue they cannot, but perhaps in some cases they can.

In your system, what is "immoral" (as opposed to not moral, which is determined by intention) is determined only by consequences. — khaled

It seems we are talking past each other.

If one's intentions are malevolent the act is unquestionably immoral.

Thus, any time you act with good intent, you would be required to keep track of all the consequences of your actions. Do you do so? — khaled

In so far as the consequences of that act go, I would like to think so, yes. But also, I am not here claiming I am a perfectly moral being. Far from it.

Thus, any time you act with good intent, you would be required to keep track of all the consequences of your actions. Do you do so? Do you have some flowchart keeping track of all the consequences of every action you've ever taken? No. You don't spend all your energy tracking the morality of every act you take. — khaled

Ideally one makes such a "flow chart" before one acts, to the best of their ability. Think before one acts. If one cannot act with wisdom, do not act. It is why I advocate to seek to do Good in small ways, that are overseeable.

As for the idea that one is obliged to track the consequences; I don't see how that follows. The deed has already been done. What would the point be of tracking the consequences? Lessons?

That would imply ridding oneself of ignorance is a moral duty. While I think it is certainly advisable to do so, I doubt it would make much sense to turn it into a moral duty.

Thus for the same reason, if inaction is wrong, that doesn't mean I have to spend all of my energy tracking the morality of every time I choose not to act. — khaled

If inaction is wrong, then every moment spent in inaction towards the problems one perceives is wrong. I think there's no way around that.

If there was such a problem, say, a beggar approached me and I had a million dollars to spare, it would be wrong not to help them — khaled

If inaction is wrong, how do you justify your inaction towards all the thousands of beggars and poor people you know exist?

If inaction is wrong, how do you justify ever sitting on the couch watching tv when you know there are people out there that need your help?

Besides, I could very easily argue that spending every ounce of energy tracking whether there is a problem I could help with I'm not helping with doesn't help anyone, and so the best strategy is to just check every once in a while as most do. — khaled

So inaction is only wrong every once in a while? :chin:

I'm very interested in knowing why I am causing people's deaths in the first example, but am not causing it in the second. — khaled

If you save someone's life, you cause the rest of their life, no? Thus you are responsible for it.

In your example of the person dying in traffic you don't cause anything. This is either a result of the person's bad driving or another person's bad driving.

Right, but the intent could always be benevolent. The murderer could bet on the 0.001% chance that the victim is actually suicidal and wants to be killed. You can't say the act is wrong until after it is done, and inevitably the 99.999% is what happens. THEN it becomes wrong.

Let's say there is an extremely lucky serial killer. The killer always has the benevolent intent of helping out suicidal people, or sending as many people to heaven as possible. The killer picks targets randomly, but by some statistical miracle they all turn out to have been suicidal and wanting to die. Assume the killer wants to live morally. Should the killer continue to pick randomly — khaled

So criteria 1 is met, and criteria 3, but not criteria 2. A moral act is an impossibility and whether it is immoral comes down to whether people got hurt by the killer's ignorance.

By some miracle, the killer has caused no harm. Are his actions neutral? Maybe. Or maybe his gross ignorance and risk-taking are of themselves immoral. (Same question was raised about having children)

How would he know? Well, that's the problem with ignorance: one often doesn't realise it.

Perhaps due to his astronomical luck he continues to be neutral, ending up in some limbo of ignorance. Or his luck runs out, which I guess is more likely.

Can you guarantee that you waking up in the morning isn't enabling serial killers? — khaled

Of course. Don't be ridiculous.

One is obligated to pick the option least likely to harm. Meaning (by your system) that one must always pick inaction and must never pick action. But you already disagreed with this in the original Jeff and Sarah example (where Jeff doesn't rebel against pinching), where you argued that pinching Jeff is not wrong. — khaled

Of course not. If one can discern their actions will have a positive effect, surely one can choose to act. The question is whether one can discern it.

I think in the instance of Jeff we agreed that if Jeff agrees to be pinched to save Sarah, it is not wrong by virtue of imposing on Jeff, because no imposition took place. It can still be wrong for a myriad of other reasons.

2- One is not obligated to pick the option least likely to harm. Meaning a benevolent serial killer who wants to live morally is justified to kill randomly. As despite the fact that the act he commits has a 0.001% chance of being moral, he is not obligated to pick the 99.999% alternative, so is justified in picking the very unlikely act. Even after the 99.999% alternative happens, he's still not obligated to change his behavior as again, even if he recognizes the very low chance of success he's not obligated to pick the less risky alternative — khaled

I don't know of what obligation you are speaking here. No one is obligated by anyone to live a moral life. If individuals want to go out and take incredible risk because of contrived reasons presented for the sake of winning an argument, who will stop them?

The likely result will be they live an immoral life, and if we agree that living a moral life (or at least approaching it as we can) is something we are interested in, that prospect of failure should serve as a deterrent in itself.

Let's say there is an alternate world history, where "sserping" was defined first. And "pressing" was defined as "Not sserping". Does sserping now become an action? — khaled

No. It refers to something that isn't.

Darkness is the absence of light, whether we call it darkness or "not-light".

Let's say I'm pressing a button. What's the "something" whose existence is detected? — khaled

Your action is detected.

I have a general question about your system. If one can choose between a morally risky option (say, 50% chance of harm) and an even riskier option (say, 70% chance of harm), is one ever justified in picking the latter? Is it wrong to pick the latter? — khaled

Taking a risk implies one lacks the wisdom and/or power to produce the intended effect and must rely on luck. It cannot be a moral act, thus there's no point in talking about justification.

Right but the charity example that I gave did have that. Do you believe donating to charity is not moral? I have the receiver’s interests in mind, but I can never be sure my donation actually furthers those interests. — khaled

Any “moral act” as you put it is not moral by this definition, since no one is ever certain they have the power to being their intent about — khaled

1- If possessing the wisdom and power to accomplish intentions means that there is a 100% chance of success, then no one possesses the wisdom or power, and there are no moral acts. — khaled

Doesn’t this mean no one has the power you require for an act to be moral? — khaled

But I can never be certain still, can I? After all, maybe all the evidence I found showing this charity is legit, or that I have the power to see this act through, is a hallucination. It’s possible isn’t it? Therefore no act is moral, as no one can be certain they possess the power to do as they intend 100% of the time — khaled

It seems we can go two ways:

One can conclude that certainty is impossible, and thus moral acts are impossible, and the best one can hope for is to refrain from immoral acts. This would be a similar to approaching truth by discarding things one recognizes to be untrue.

Or one can leave the possibility for certainty, thus some form of communion with ultimate reality, open.

I lean towards the latter. Perhaps certain certainties are possible, but definitely not to the extent that we can divine the future life of a person. I believe morality consists of small acts of humility, kindness and compassion, and not of "saving the world".

Perhaps a better word for certainty would be "wisdom".

Clearly they don’t. If I have never touched a computer in my life, but for some reason was convinced I can hack into the pentagon, and by sheer chance pressing random buttons I succeeded, does that mean I “knew and had the power” to bring about my intentions? — khaled

As I said, criteria 3 is a confirmation or criteria 2. If criteria 2 cannot be met, then criteria 3 (ergo the result) is irrelevant.

If I save someone’s life and he goes on to murder others in one instance, and I save another’s life and he becomes a very benevolent philanthropist, what am I to conclude? — khaled

That one has no idea of the consequences of their actions, I suppose.

Similarly, inaction being wrong would mean you must spend every waking moment checking if you’re being immoral.

And in any case, what kind of argument is it to claim that since inaction being wrong would imply more effort, inaction is not wrong? — khaled

I'm arguing inaction isn't wrong, and pointing out the inconsistencies that arise when one tries to argue it is wrong. The most obvious being, if inaction is immoral, and one is unavoidably in inaction towards many perceived problems at any given time, one is always immoral.

These are questions you'll have to answer yourself if you wish to hold the view that inaction is wrong.

Let’s say I bought a piece of candy, like I have been doing for years. As a result, the person selling them makes enough money to buy a new tv. As he goes to buy the new tv he gets killed on the way. I know this happened. Now how would you suggest I change my behavior?

If I happened to be so unlucky that this happens every time I buy a piece of candy, how should I change my behavior then?

This is what I mean when I say that the mere fact that an act turned out wrong doesn’t really tell you what to do. Maybe it was just bad luck. Maybe it actually caused the harm.

What you have is correlation. But you shouldn’t change your behavior based on correlation alone should you? — khaled

If you suspect that the act of buying candy is actively causing people's deaths, it would certainly be a good idea to stop doing it.

In this instance you are already hinting towards the fact that your buying of the candy is not causing people's deaths, just like not pressing the button to save Sarah does not cause her death; whoever put her in the situation causes her death.

Your system doesn’t judge the morality of the act based on a prediction of likely consequences, aka, before the act is committed. It judges the morality of the act based on what actually ends up happening. — khaled

It determines based on both.

You can’t actually state that murder is wrong by a system that judges after the act. Maybe the person was suicidal. Then it’d be good. — khaled

Not if the intent was to murder, obviously. Then the act is wrong from the outset. We have already been over this.

Judging by expected outcome is what I’m advocating. — khaled

That would mean one's ignorance can justify any of one's actions, and that is not a meaningful way of constructing a moral system.


Perhaps this clarifies:

Criteria 1 discerns between benevolence and malevolence.

Criteria 2 discerns between wisdom and ignorance.


One needs to both benevolence and wisdom to do Good.

To do not Good ("Evil") is much easier: one only needs malevolence or ignorance.

If I am a fire fighter, and save a 100 people. Then the 101st turns out to be a serial killer and kills a 102 people, have I done something immoral in acting exactly as I’ve acted the 100 times prior all with good results? If so, what should be my takeaway? Am I obligated to retire? How should this new data be interpreted? — khaled

That depends, if one wishes to live morally (or avoid immoral behavior) one should probably ensure one isn't enabling serial killers, should they not? And if they cannot guarantee one's behavior isn't enabling serial killers, then maybe one should cease that behavior.

Again, why is sserping an inaction? — khaled

Because it refers to something one isn't doing?

Sarah can detect you sserping — khaled

No, she cannot. One cannot detect the non-existence of something - at most one can infer it.

Frankly, the idea that the morality of an action can be determined before the act, that is to say, without knowing the consequences, is entirely untenable. — Tzeentch

I really don’t understand how you can think so. — khaled

I expected I didn't have to go through this tedium, but alas here we are:


Example A:

I intend to help another person, but instead I end up killing them.

A just intention, but a harmful outcome. Clearly this act cannot be considered moral.


Example B:

I intend to kill another person, but instead I end up helping them.

An unjust intention, but a helpful outcome. Clearly this act cannot be considered moral either. The unintended outcome is a result of ignorance.


Both intention and outcome have to be regarded to determine the morality of an act.

Couldn't this be applied to all acts? — khaled

If we take justice to mean what I said it meant: actions that have the well-being of the subject at heart (this is too simple, but it will suffice for now) then no. If there is no one's well-being to take into account, then there's no moral act to be done.

After all, if by criteria 2, you mean the power and wisdom to make intentions a reality with 100% chance, then no act at all fulfills that criteria. — khaled

Chance is simply a guise for fudging what we don't know, so that first part is meaningless to me. One either knows and has the power, or they do not. The result of their actions will confirm or deny that.

But if you're implying there's always an element of risk involved, I would agree with that. That's something I have tried to highlight throughout our discussion, and why I have advised caution when making decisions on behalf of others.

Let's take giving to charity. There is always a chance that the money I send gets stolen and used to fund the Russian mafia. I do not have the wisdom or power to ensure that that will not happen with 100% certainty. Therefore donating to charity is not moral by this formulation. — khaled

Donating to the mafia, even if it is due to ignorance, is not moral, clearly. My advise would be, before donating to charity, figure out where the money goes.

Perhaps more importantly, aim to do good in ways where one actually possesses the wisdom and power to see it through. Do good in small things - that also is a sign of humility.

So how certain should we be before an act with benevolent intentions becomes justified? — khaled

It only becomes justified if the act leads to the desired outcome. It cannot be justified beforehand. It entails a risk.

How certain should you be? That's up to the individual and how much risk they're willing to take. That question deserves much consideration every time one acts.

Also, what is the difference between "not moral" and "immoral"? Is it ok to do "not moral" acts? — khaled

In the context of our discussion, there are three kinds of acts:
- Moral
- Neutral
- Immoral

So "not moral" means either neutral or immoral.

It's not good to commit immoral acts, obviously. Neutral acts, in the context of our discussion, are inconsequential. I hope that answers your question.

First, what happens when these criteria contradict? So what happens when one has benevolent intent, and has enough certainty that they'll succeed (so the act is moral) but the act has a negative consequence (so the act is immoral)? — khaled

Then they weren't as certain as they thought they were and they committed injustice. It's an immoral act. It is overconfidence; one tried to meddle in things that they had not the wisdom to comprehend or the power to influence positively, and one made someone else pay the price for their ignorance.

All criteria must be met for an act to be considered moral.

And second, what counts as the "outcome" exactly? If, say, I help an old lady cross the road (out of benevolent intent), but then 3 years later she ends up murdering 5 people, have I done something wrong or right? How far into the future do we need to look? — khaled

In the example of the old lady, one has not caused the old lady to murder those people. One has only helped her cross the road.

However, if one saves the life of a murderer, and that murderer goes on to murder many people during the rest of their life, that is a consequence of one's actions. One shares responsibility for that suffering, and one has committed injustice.

Your system cannot say "this is wrong". Only "this was wrong". Who cares about the latter? — khaled

Essentially what you are asking here is who cares about the consequences, which can only be acertained after the act, of their actions.

I do. And I assume you do as well. Like I said, I cannot think of a moral system that makes sense, that doesn't take consequences into account.

What does knowing that an act happened to be wrong accomplish? — khaled

One would assume it gives much reason for pause, humility, reflection.

It doesn't guide you towards living morally. — khaled

Nothing I have shared in our discussion so far has been aimed at moral guidance, but only analyzing ideas. (What is an imposition, what is a moral act, etc.)

Moral guidance is an entirely seperate matter. Interesting to be sure, and perhaps something to be kept for later. I doubt my ideas of moral guidance will be of much use if we do not agree on/understand each other's premises.

But as I explained, since your system also has the morality of acts depend on their consequences, you never know the morality of an act before it is done. So by the same logic shouldn't you spend every waking moment tracking the consequences of every act you have ever committed to ensure that they didn't have bad consequences that would make them immoral? — khaled

I would certainly advise to spend a great deal of time reflecting on one's actions and their consequences, and if one suspects they have committed injustices unknowingly, to acertain these things.

However, whether one knows the consequences of their actions or not does not change the nature of the injustice, for it already has been committed.

So no. I don't believe such a moral duty exists, for it would imply one has a moral duty to rid oneself of all ignorance, which is clearly impossible. Ignorance however, is its own punishment, so I would consider it to be in the individual's best interest to rid oneself of as much of it as possible.

And let's say you do manage to track act X to have resulted in a negative consequence (putting aside the "how far into the future should we look" question), it doesn't seem like that fact alone (that an act happened to turn out wrong) would have any bearing on future behavior. — khaled

That depends on the individual. If one sees they have committed an injustice and it does not prompt them to change in some way, that says a lot about the individual, and very little about that which I have proposed.

If it doesn't impact your behavior surely it doesn't lead you to live a more or less moral life? — khaled

I guess so. But the choice whether we let our actions and their consequences (the ones we are aware of) impact our future behavior is a choice one makes.

I guess maybe your point is that the consequences one is ignorant of cannot influence their behavior, and that much is true.

So then, how does your system lead to a more moral life if doesn't impact behavior? — khaled

We are discussing the basic premises of the system, and haven't yet touched upon the question of how it can contribute to living a more moral life. Lets agree on/understand things first before we move on.

Even then, one can bet on the chance that they're hallucinating that particular signal, once again making their intention benevolent. — khaled

It has to be genuine, of course. If one is simply putting up an act, one may fool others as to what their intentions are, but they cannot fool reality, so to speak.

If hallucinations are being used as a pretense, then obviously the intent is not benevolent at all.

And since the morality of an act is only determined by its consequence at that point, they are free to do anything. — khaled

If one isn't interested in living morally, then yes. In that case, one should do whatever one wishes.

Obviously someone interested in living morally would never come to the conclusion that they should use their ignorance to justify their every act. The consequence would be an immoral life.

"intention" requirement is trivial to fill. — khaled

It is certainly not trivial. An unjust intention categorically excludes an act from being moral.

And the consequence requirement doesn't deter an act. — khaled

How does it not? Shouldn't the thoughtful person deeply consider the consequences before they act? Frankly, the idea that the morality of an action can be determined before the act, that is to say, without knowing the consequences, is entirely untenable.

If anything this emphasis on consequences should prompt the individual to carefully consider before acting.

Hypothetically, if someone found your holding this belief that impositions are wrong, itself an imposition on them, and asked you to stop, would you? If not, why not? What justifies that imposition? — khaled

That would not match my definition of an imposition, namely the use of force to make the subject act in accordance with one's desires.

Multiple things can cause the same event correct? It's not just the person that put them in their predicament, but also the person that supplied him with the tools, and the person that supplied him with funds, and so on. — khaled

Certainly, and they all share some moral responsibility.

... sserping the button is also part of the causal chain. — khaled

Certainly not. It does not influence the casual chain.

Let's take the person who built the pods to trap Sarah and Jeff. If said person knew what their use would be, and built them anyways, is he wrong? Now, importantly, if he didn't know, and they happened to be used for evil, is he wrong? — khaled

Yes. And while you make it sound like this is some alien concept, it is actually very common that producers are held liable for the harm caused by their products, even if it was never their intention. This is not the same, but similar.

Because if the consequence is bad, then the act is wrong regardless of intention. How might one ever act morally then — khaled

By ensuring the consequence matches the intention, and yes, that requires much care and deliberation before one attempts a moral act, that is to say, before one attempts to influence another's well-being. Maybe technically one could say one is never completely certain, so it entails a risk.

No one said living a moral life was easy.

Or conversely, if every single act can be immoral or moral assuming benevolent intention, isn't every act done with benevolent intention justified? — khaled

If the consequences do not match the intention, there is no moral act or justification. If the consequences actually cause harm instead of the intended benefit, it was in fact immoral despite the intention.

To be clear, an intention can never justify an act. It would be crazy to say one's actions with harmful consequences were somehow justified because of one's ignorance.

That doesn't help very much. I can cite one of many differences between existence and non existence. For one: Existing things can be detected, non existing things cannot. Can you similarly cite a difference between action and inaction? — khaled

You can detect me standing still (existence/action), and while I am standing still you cannot detect me running (non-existence/inaction).

I don't quite understand this critique as you've already claimed that the same act can be an action or an inaction... — khaled

You haven't read carefully.

One can be in action and in inaction at the same time. I haven't argued that the standing still and not running are the same act.

So is standing still an action or inaction now? Does it refer to something that isn't or something that is? — khaled

Standing still is an action. It is something that one is doing, and thus refers to something that is, assuming the individual is actually standing still.

This is what I mean. But by the current standard, you cannot tell the morality of an act beforehand. So having children would only be wrong if the child grows up hating their life wouldn't it? Assuming of course that the parents don't have malicious intent with their children. What further consideration is needed?

Well then it looks like further amendment is needed. It's not just about the consequence anymore, the morality of an act also depends on the intent before it takes place. What to do when those contradict?

If one has a benevolent intent but the outcome is bad, was the act immoral? Was the morality of the act determined after or before the act in this case?

On the other hand, if the intent is malicious, but the outcome is good, was the act immoral? Was the morality of the act determined after or before the act in this case?

What's the "timeline of morality" here? Is the morality of the act initially determined by intent but then we "add" the consequence after the act is done and recalculate the morality of the act? If so, what's the point of this extra addition and recalculation? That's the best I can make of this so far. — khaled

The question has now become, what constitutes a moral act.

This is my idea about that:
1. The intention of the act must be just.

What constitutes justice is a seperate discussion, but for now it will suffice to say just intentions have the well-being of their subject at heart.

2. One must possess the power and wisdom to make their intentions reality.

Without these things, the person would be incapable of the intended act to begin with, and thus one would be acting ignorantly.

3. The intended outcome.

This is essentially a confirmation of 2.

Assuming the parent is well-intentioned and wishes the happiness of their child, there is a myriad of matters one is fundamentally ignorant of and powerless over.

A few examples:
- The parent does not know what constitutes the happiness of their child.
- The parent does not know the countless factors that will affect the happiness of their child, and is powerless to influence many of them.
- The parent does not know the effects of their upbringing on the child.
- The parent does not know the effects of their child on the world.

The course of a human life is simply too complicated to oversee, and the factors too diverse to control. The degree to which intentions of the parents coincides with the outcome relies mostly on luck.

Even if criteria 1 can be fulfilled and the parents accurately estimate the desires of the child, criteria 2 cannot be fulfilled, for no other reason that the actor of has very limited control and little to no knowledge over the outcome.

That is to say, having children cannot be a moral act. The question is then, is it always immoral? To me this is unresolved. Perhaps making such a decision on the basis of so much ignorance and so little power is irresponsible and immoral to begin with.

The next question is, what constitutes an immoral act.

An act that has a malicious intention, is immoral, regardless of the outcome.

An act that has a harmful outcome, is immoral, regardless of the intent. One could say that even if the intentions were good, the immorality of one's deed stems from their ignorance, or hubris.

But what of the act that is well-intentioned, and has a good outcome, but not by power or wisdom of one's own but by mere coincidence.

This would be the case for the well-intentioned parent that happens to raise a happy child. (Note: since the child is a creation of the parent, their actions will be their full responsibility, so the actions of the child will be another factor in determining the (im)morality of having the child).

It cannot be a moral act, because as we have determined: a parent fundamentally lacks the power and wisdom to have created a happy child. It is simply largely outside of their control.

But is it immoral? The same ignorance and hubris are present, with all the risks they bring, yet the intentions were good and no harm has come of it. Maybe it is not immoral. Or maybe it is. Unresolved.

I've never come across a system that determines the morality of the act both before (intent) and after (consequence) the act, so I'm confused on what to make of this. — khaled

I don't think a system could make any sense without taking both into account.

Besides, doesn't saving Sarah fall under "benevolent intent"? So the outcome could be wrong (benevolent intent, but the act ends up contradicting Jeff's wishes). What makes you so sure it is wrong? What variables determine when benevolent intent overrides the consequences of an act and when it doesn't? — khaled

The fact that one intends not only to save Sarah but also impose (sacrifice) on Jeff is what makes it wrong. The intention must be good, not half-good, half-bad.

Couldn't you say this regardless of how out of character the anger is? There is always a chance that Jeff doesn't mean what he says, or a chance that it's actually not Jeff speaking but you hallucinating. What if one bets on those chances? — khaled

Of course, and one could always bet on those chances if one felt they had ample reason to do so.

One risks making a misjudgement, though, and thus a major mistake.

Can your system definitively state that imposing a sacrifice on Jeff is wrong? — khaled

In the situation we have specified, yes.

I don't see how it could given that morality is determined after the act is done, and given that the intent in this case is benevolent (save Sarah).

But you also seem sure that it is wrong. Why is that? — khaled

See my earlier explanation of what constitutes a moral act.

Correct. Now how would this imply that one has to spend all their time fixing things? — khaled

It rests on the assumption that one is interested in living a moral life. If one isn't interested in that, this entire discussion isn't relevant to them.

In your system, action can be immoral if it's against the victim's interest. That doesn't mean that one has to spend every waking moment checking if their actions have imposed or not does it? You typed many responses to me, did you once ask me if you were imposing? — khaled

If impositions are in any way meaningful, one may expect some kind of signal from the person who one supposedly imposed on. If the imposition is not important enough to let one know, then one can assume no meaningful imposition was made.

But if you take this discussion as an imposition on my part, and you find it impossible for yourself to stop partaking in this conversation for whatever reason, let me know and I'll stop.

And how does responsibility work? — khaled

Like I said, responsibility can only be an effect of situations one has caused voluntarily.

Can one ethically have a child and choose not to take on the responsibility associated? — khaled

It should be obvious that if the choice to have a child is voluntary, one cannot choose not to take responsibility for its well-being.

Many would argue that you have a responsibility to save Sarah in that scenario. — khaled

And I disagree. After all, I haven't put Jeff and Sarah in this predicament. Whoever did that, is responsible.

But they are involved aren't they? They're sserping the button! They're causing her death! — khaled

Whoever put them in their predicament is causing their death.

There is no fundamental difference between action and inaction. — khaled

I think there is, and I also think it is fundamental. — Tzeentch

What is it then? — khaled

I explained; the difference between action and inaction is similar to that which is and that which isn't.

... , what tells you that sserping is an inaction, instead of an action? — khaled

It refers to something that isn't.

Incidentally, before I begin, you’re an antinatalist correct? — khaled

Depends on what you mean with anti-natalist.

I'm not campaigning for people not to have children. I am however seriously considering the possibility that the act of having children is immoral.

A consequentialist answer then? One cannot tell beforehand if what he’s about to do is permissible or not. — khaled

Yes, in the context of what we've specified that is true.

I don’t see how you square it with this however: — khaled

Just like when one intends to kill someone but fails, that is still an immoral act. — Tzeentch

The first quote implies that an attempt at murder is never wrong (“there is no way to determine the morality of the act beforehand”). Successful murder is itself only conditionally wrong (wrong only if the victim wants to live)

The second implies that the attempt itself is wrong. — khaled

An intent to harm can by itself be immoral.

However, when the intent is benevolent, but the outcome is wrong, it can also be immoral.

So it stands to reason that actions cannot be judged solely on either intent or outcome, but by a bit of both.

I find it curious that if Jeff is drunk then we shouldn’t respect his intentions, but when he’s malicious we should. — khaled

This is how I would personally judge this hypothetical situation and I could of course be wrong. Maybe Jeff's anger is entirely out-of-character in which case one could take a risk, just like when he was intoxicated.

If it was 20 people in that room, and Jeff was purely evil, would it still be wrong? If there were 100 would it still be wrong? What about if it was between Jeff’s wish to cause death and the entirety of the human race on the other end? Would it still be immoral to pinch Jeff? — khaled

Yes. In essence you are imposing on Jeff to sacrifice himself on behalf of others. I don't think sacrifice can be morally imposed on anyone (no matter how alien their dispositions seem to be).

If we make the judgement that somehow, because we perceive the pinch to be only a minor sacrifice, we are justified in imposing on Jeff we open a box of Pandora.

Yes I do believe inaction is sometimes immoral, but I don’t see how that means that we must spend every waking moment trying to fix things. — khaled

Because if inaction towards a perceived problem is immoral, then every moment not spent solving the problems one perceives is immoral.

Personally, I think inaction is only immoral towards those situations one has voluntarily taken responsibility for.

For example, if one chooses to have a child, one must care for its well-being and inaction is not morally permissible.

There is no fundamental difference between action and inaction. — khaled

I think there is, and I also think it is fundamental.

Let’s return to Jeff and Sarah. We say that the action is pressing a button correct? Let me coin a new verb: “sserp” and it means “to not press”. So now, Sarah can accuse you of imposing on her by sserping the button. — khaled

Sarah has no grounds to demand (impose) one's involvement in their predicament.

When I have a problem, I cannot simply make people part of that problem and then accuse them of imposing on me for not solving my problems.

The split between action and inaction is a trick of the language.

This idea hasn’t gone under much scrutiny I’ll admit, so I’m curious what you’ll say. What is it about sserping that makes it an inaction as opposed to an action? What separates them in general?

Is standing still an action or inaction? — khaled

Standing still is an act(ion). But while one is standing still, one may also be in inaction. For example, one is not running.

It is as fundamental as the distinction between that which is and that which isn't.

I think the trick of language is one you're playing on yourself here.

But the question is whether or not taking the risk is permissible. — khaled

The question of whether it was permissable lies solely with whether one was able to accurately determine the desires of the subject.

If one did, it was permissable. If one didn't, it wasn't. There's no way to determine the morality of such an act beforehand, hence the risk.

Suppose Sarah is Jeff's ex-wife and he hates her with a burning passion. So much so, that he doesn't mind dying with her, and so verbally and loudly opposes your decision to pinch him to save both. Now does it become immoral to pinch Jeff? — khaled

Yes.

Inaction is the safe option.

Or another situation, imagine the Jeff is stoned out of his mind and mumbles something about how he hates blue so much so don't you dare press the blue button. Incidentally, that's the button to pinch Jeff. Would it be wrong to press it then? — khaled

This is a situation where one could reasonably assume that the desires expressed by Jeff are not his true desires but a result of a deteriorated mental state. One could take the risk.

Whether that decision is right or wrong can only be accertained after Jeff sobers up.

I'm not sure it's purely the imposition victim who has to be taken into account but rather also the victims of not imposing — khaled

The issue with this is that it implies that inaction is immoral, which in turn implies that one has to spend their every waking moment and ounce of energy solving what one perceives to be the world's problems (despite the fact that one may be completely wrong in their judgement of what constitutes problems and solutions). Every moment spent in rest or thought would be akin to inaction, and thus immoral.

This makes no sense to me.

But pinching Jeff is undoubtedly an imposition, yes? — khaled

No, not undoubtedly. As I tried to make clear, there must be a conflict of desires or the impression thereof to make it an imposition.

In this example one can reasonably assume Jeff would want to be pinched if it meant saving Sarah, and thus one may choose to take that risk. But it is still a risk.

If it turns out Jeff disagrees, one has made an imposition.

Inaction is the only safe option here.

It sounds to me like you're implying that an imposition is wrong only if it ends up conflicting with the victim's interests. Am I correct? — khaled

No. As I said, intentions matter. Just like when one intends to kill someone but fails, that is still an immoral act.

If I do something to someone, not knowing it was their intent to do so anyways, have I imposed? — khaled

Yes, but by coincidence you haven't done harm. — Tzeentch

But here you say that one "doesn't know if they're making an imposition", implying that if Jeff had been fine with getting pinched to save him and Sarah, then pinching him is not an imposition. — khaled

The key here is in the first instance one is acting regardless of the subject's desires and end up, by accident, not doing harm.

In the second instance one is making an estimation of the subject's desires and acting in accordance with them.

Again; intention.

Additionally, by your original definition, pinching is certainly an imposition. — khaled

Not by definition. If one attempts to act in accordance to the subject's desires rather than impose their own, it is not an imposition assuming they are successful.

If one consciously attempts to use force to make someone act in accordance to one's desires, it is wrong regardless of the outcome. — Tzeentch

This seems to be your original definition of imposition, which is always wrong. We can agree that pinching Jeff falls here yes? (Desire: save Jeff and Sarah, Force: Pinch) — khaled

If one's intention is, to the best of their judgement, make a decision that is in line with Jeff's desires it is not an imposition.

The issue here is that Jeff's desires are unknown and therefore this decision does entail a risk. If it turns out we were wrong about Jeff's desires, we have imposed.

As I tried to make clear, the use of force implies a conflict of desires. If there is no conflict of desires or impression thereof, there is no imposition. One would still be able to make bad decisions that affect others, but those would be of a different nature that have to do with ignorance and not imposition.

It's just that you also tried to argue that stopping psychotic killers is not an imposition, ... — khaled

However, in such a situation one could argue that one is not imposing. — Tzeentch

I left that open-ended on purpose. We discuss the details after we have agreed on everything else.

If you claim that all impositions are wrong, and that this (self defense) is an imposition, what question remains? — khaled

I ammended my claim, leaving the question of self-defense unresolved for now. Why skip over that?

I certainly don't think you're always wrong. If you owned the chair, I would say you are definitely not wrong for instance. Do you believe that you would be wrong even then? — khaled

Yes.

There are few things as subjective as ideas of what belongs to whom, and those ideas certainly don't bestow a right to impose on the holder.

In one you claim that an imposition is an imposition regardless of the intent of the victim. In the other, you claim that the victim's intent is "key to determining whether something is an imposition". Which definition shall we proceed with? — khaled

There is no contradiction.

If it is one's desire to impose, it is an imposition regardless of the subject's desires.

If it is not one's desire to impose, but one for whatever reason feels forced to make a judgement call, the desires of the victim and one's ability to accurately determine them become key.

In case it wasn't clear, the fact that one has to use force to make someone act in accordance with one's desires generally implies conflicting desires, and conflicting desires (or the impression thereof, in case of intentions) are key to determining whether something is an imposition.

Would you say it is wrong to press the button here? That was the real question. — khaled

And the real answer is, I don't know.

However, one could use their judgement to assume that Jeff would want one to press the button to pinch him and save Sarah, in which case there is no conflict of desires and no meaningful imposition was made.

That judgement could be completely wrong though, and if it is, one has made a mistake.

Obviously in a more realistic situation one goes into dialogue to determine these things before one makes a decision.

Since impositions are wrong that leaves us with the conclusion that it's wrong to pinch Jeff and so save both of their lives, and that the morally correct option (relatively, it's a neutral option with 2 bad alternatives) is to allow both to die. Do you agree with this? — khaled

The crucial factor here, as mentioned in the previous line, is that one doesn't know if one is making an imposition. One can reasonably assume that Jeff agrees pinching him is much better than Sarah dying, but again, one could be wrong in which case one has certainly made an imposition, which is wrong.

Inaction is not a "morally correct" option; it is neutral. One doesn't get involved, one refuses to be part of the moral dilemma.

Now very importantly: Is it right to refer to better judgement, even if it involves imposing? — khaled

Certainly not categorically.

One could imagine a situation where the other may be grateful for the imposition afterwards - lets say I push someone out of the way of a moving car. But in this example am I imposing my desires on someone, or simply acting on behalf of theirs? Either way, it is a risk.

Is such an imposition wrong regardless of how certain we are that the victim will not mind it? — khaled

If one consciously attempts to use force to make someone act in accordance to one's desires, it is wrong regardless of the outcome. If one knows it will not affect the other, then one requires no force.

Ok, so I do my duty, I do all I can to come to a "sense of the better guess", and then start imposing my ideas on you. They just happen to be wildly different from yours, but that doesn't matter — Tzeentch

Why would it not matter? My having wildly different ideas should be reason to reevaluate the quality of your research. — khaled

I reevaluated my research and came to the conclusion that I am still right, and you are still wrong. Let the impositions begin!

f I thought that stabbing a power outlet with a fork would produce candy, please, kindly impose on me and stop me. By your system, such an imposition would be wrong. — khaled

As stated a few lines above, it is not clear to me whether we are in this instance imposing our desires on someone, or attempting to act on behalf of theirs. While we cannot be sure, circumstances may prompt us to take a risk, and if the subject thanks us afterwards perhaps we have made the right choice. If we are scolded and cursed afterwards, we must have imposed and then we have done something wrong.

No offense, but I don't much care for what you're "willing to consider" and I mean this in the nicest way possible. I'm interested in what you're arguing. If you argue that imposition is always wrong, that means there are no such clauses. — khaled

Then I'll change my argument to "Imposition is wrong, except in the case of direct protection of one's own physical body where I am not sure."

If you change your argument by adding said clause, I would ask why you added this specific clause, and which other clauses may be added. — khaled

We can come back to this, if we can get on the same page with everything else. I think you'll agree that the discussion is getting a bit unwieldy already.

I'll maintain that the more conflict-prone individuals there are, the more conflicts there are. And the more conflict-avoidant individuals there are, the fewer conflicts there are. — Tzeentch

If so, then why did you claim that my ideas were "the source of all human conflict" if it's only about "conflict proneness"? — khaled

A desire to impose and being conflict-prone are almost synonymous, but I'll restate it:

"The more imposers there are, the more conflicts there are. The more non-imposers there are, the fewer conflicts there are."

It's just that you also tried to argue that stopping psychotic killers is not an imposition, ... — khaled

I haven't argued that, because it clearly would be an imposition. The question that remains is whether it is also immoral to impose in such a situation.

So are you saying that, by denying you this space (where I'm sitting) I am imposing on you? — khaled

If you're doing it with the express intention of denying me, then yes.

Wouldn't that mean that I'm doing something wrong by being sat here? — khaled

Again, intentions matter. You just sitting in your chair is not an imposition. You sitting in your chair with the intention of denying someone else a place to sit is an imposition (even if the other person isn't aware or even affected).

If I try to kill someone, but I fail and the victim never notices I tried to kill them, was I not wrong for trying to kill them? — Tzeentch

Agreed. Is this intended as an analogy for sitting in chairs? — khaled

Sure. If I try to deny a person from sitting in a chair by sitting there myself, and the person just walks by and never noticed I attempted to impose on them, was I not wrong for trying to impose on them in the first place?

Say A tries to impose X on B, and B tries to impose Y on A. In this scenario, it seems your system would produce that both A and B are wrong, regardless of X and Y correct? — khaled

Correct.

And if A wants to not be wrong, he should cease trying to impose X and if B wants to not be wrong he should cease trying to impose Y. Do you agree with this? — khaled

Sure.

Can I assume you mean to say that your goal here is to arrive at ideas that approximate reality even better? — khaled

In practice, it more often translates into discarding ideas that when scrutinized appear unfeasible.

The idea that we should not impose because we're fallible is just as susceptible to being wrong as any other idea. Agreed? — khaled

Indeed.

However, because one will not impose their ideas in the first place, it does not matter if they are wrong.

In other words, what do we do when we're not sure if we're imposing or not? — khaled

Inaction is always an option.

Or act according to your best judgement, and risk being wrong. Humans are fallible after all.

If I do something to someone, not knowing it was their intent to do so anyways, have I imposed? If, for instance, I wake someone up not knowing whether or not they wanted to be woken up, and it turns out that they actually did want to wake up at that time because they have an appointment, have I imposed? — khaled

Yes, but by coincidence you haven't done harm.

Yes. Though one also has a duty to do as much research as they can to make sure their idea is actually closer to truth. — khaled

Ok, so I do my duty, I do all I can to come to a "sense of the better guess", and then start imposing my ideas on you. They just happen to be wildly different from yours, but that doesn't matter, because I did my duty and because I feel I'm right, I get the right to impose. All that stops me is whether I have the power to force you to do those things I would like you to do.

Is this how it should work? Might makes...

Isn't attempting at getting a better answer better in your eyes too? If it wasn't, why would you comment here? — khaled

Yes, as long as one doesn't impose of course one can try to find better answers to their heart's desire. I would even encourage it.

Once one starts imposing based on their conviction on having the better guess, that's when things get muddy quickly. That's what I meant with saying it is debatable.

Does this apply regardless of the potential damage and ease of the act? If, for instance you had a button that could cure all strains of COVID, is it morally permissible not to press it and just walk away? — khaled

Yes.

The problem is that it's a choice of either imposing slightly on 10% of drivers or imposing on everyone a much higher risk of accidents (including said drivers in the first place). — khaled

It is not a slight imposition. A law is an imposition made under threat of violence.

This gets difficult to discuss without a clear definition of what an imposition is. — khaled

What wasn't clear in my definition?

Is refusing to instantiate a law that you know will benefit the community an imposition? Or is instantiating it the imposition? — khaled

Inaction is not an imposition.

Creating a law is an imposition almost by definition, because laws are only created for things that people need to be forced to do or not do.

If we didn't try to get at better guesses, any guess would be just as good. Wars happen when large amounts of people disagree on something. Imagine what would happen if everyone disagreed on everything. That would be worse wouldn't it? — khaled

It would be perfectly fine if people didn't impose their conflicting ideas on each other.

It seems to me you believe that if we recognized our fallibility, and thus gave up on trying to approach objectivity, ... — khaled

I never said one should give up on trying to approach objectivity.

Try to escape? — Tzeentch

This would get everyone killed. — khaled

How? — Tzeentch

Because that's the described situation. Either you press a button that kills Jeff. You press a button that kills Sarah. Or you press neither (escaping would involve this) and both die. (I'm not sure if I kept the same names) — khaled

I thought you were talking about the example where I am being held against my will.

In the case of the button, if there are no good choices to be made, then inaction is fine. Both would die, but it is not my responsibility to save them - I didn't put them there nor did I voluntarily accept any task to care for their safety.

Perhaps one could try to talk to them, to see if either is willing to make the sacrifice.

Let's say one button would impose on Jeff by pinching him. The other button would impose on Sarah by burning her alive. Walking away leads to both being burned alive. Now in all situations, you're imposing correct? Or do you think that walking away here is not an imposition? Incidentally, do you think non interference is right here too? — khaled

Inaction would not be wrong. It is also not right. It is neutral.

In this instance one could use their best judgement to conclude that pinching Jeff is a meaningless imposition that does not compare in any way to being burned alive, and thus choose to impose on Jeff and save Sarah. Jeff will probably agree and thank you for it. If he doesn't, you have made a terrible mistake, but alas people aren't perfect.

An imposition is the use of force to make an individual act in accordance to one's desires. Force can be physical, it can be verbal, it can be mental, etc. — Tzeentch

This seems to fit the bill here too though. One of your desires is for the psychotic killer not to kill you. And you impose that one desire on the killer through the use of force do you not? I don't think your definition leaves much wiggle room. — khaled

However, in such a situation one could argue that one is not imposing. — Tzeentch

Then again, maybe the right thing to do is to sit there and accept one's fate - to turn the other cheek. Perhaps that is what Buddha would do. And didn't Jesus carry his own cross to Golgotha to die on it? I'm willing to consider that option. — Tzeentch

In ethics it all depends on your starting premises. Do you truly believe that turning the other cheek is always the correct thing to do? Some people do. Some people would just sit there and die. But neither of us would, so we seem to agree that turning the other cheek is not always the correct thing to do. Pointing out that others disagree is not helpful for this conversation because we both disagree with said others. — khaled

I don't disagree with them at all. In fact, I am willing to consider that they are right. It would be consistent with the rest of my ideas.

I'm also willing to consider that the direct protection of one's physical body deserves a clause.

Then again, scenarios involving psychotic killers are so unlikely that they're hardly worth the time and effort. I'll deal with the matter when one comes on my path.

Impose on him by stopping him because I have the better guess. — khaled

And thus begins the viscious cycle of human conflict.

But I maintain that your ideas would lead to much more conflict. — khaled

Doubtful. I'll maintain that the more conflict-prone individuals there are, the more conflicts there are. And the more conflict-avoidant individuals there are, the fewer conflicts there are.

If the fool believes in my ideas as I do, he would cease his imposition the moment he realizes his guess is bad. He would even apologize and thank me for showing him a better guess. — khaled

That undoubtedly happens sometimes, yet human conflict is as rife as ever. Perhaps convincing fools that imposing is right is the work of fools?

In your case, there is nothing that can be used to stop the psychotic killer or the fool. — khaled

Reason? Kindness? Compassion? If all else fails, simple avoidance?

I'm entertaining this line of the discussion because I'm curious just how water-tight I can make my argument, but if we're willing to open the Pandora's box of a right to impose based on the supposed existence of unavoidable psychotic killers, we are past a certain point, aren't we?

It's a bit ironic actually, that our system to "stop unavoidable psychotic killers" involves individuals sitting behind a screen dropping bombs on people like it's a computer game. It's almost like we have become the unavoidable psychotic killers.

Ends don't justify means.

I noticed you also ignored my question on what constitutes an imposition. — khaled

I've provided a straight-forward definition in the very post you replied to. Please, lets keep our discussion honest.

I'm sat in this chair right now. Right now I am denying you the space I am sitting in. Is that an imposition? I doubt it. What if the stander doesn't see it as denying? — khaled

I would put it this way:

If you are sitting in your chair, consciously trying to deny someone else from sitting in it, you are imposing. The fact that there's no one to notice it only stops you from doing harm, so the imposition is meaningless, but it is still an imposition.

Intention matters.

If I try to kill someone, but I fail and the victim never notices I tried to kill them, was I not wrong for trying to kill them?

The stander would tell you the walker is imposing, by trying to deny him that space. The walker would tell you the stander is imposing, by trying to deny him that space. Who's right here? — khaled

Neither. They're both imposing on each other and thus both are wrong. It only takes one of them to wisen up and step aside, but they both choose not to. It's a conflict of egos.

Even if this systematization sometimes inevitably makes some feel like they're being imposed upon, a lack of it would mean virtually everyone feeling they're being imposed upon. — khaled

A solution which seeks to mend feelings of being imposed upon with actual impositions seems self-defeating.

When someone feels I have imposed on them in some meaningful way, they will probably tell me, and we can work things out. Seems like constructive human interaction to me.

But you believe that any idea is as good as another. What does “testing” mean then? All the ideas are just as good what is there to test? — khaled

Ideas can approximate reality to varying degrees, and the closer they approximate reality, the "better" (for the lack of a better term) they are. Obviously I believe some of my ideas approximate reality more closely than others, otherwise I would not have those ideas. I realize however, that I am fallible and have no way to confirm, therefore I shall not impose those ideas on anyone.

There is no such thing as non interference sometimes. But let’s test this theory. You see a train barreling at someone who’s tied to the tracks. By this principle of non interference, it would be wrong to attempt to remove them. Do you agree with that? — khaled

I haven't proposed a principle of non-interference. I have however stated that I do not think non-interference is an imposition.

In your example I would say it is not wrong to remove someone from a train track who is clearly being held there against their will. I also don't believe choosing non-interference (leaving the person on the track) is wrong; perhaps it is nothing. Perhaps it is simply neutral. And perhaps freeing the person from the train track is good.

It's what your arguments seem to boil down to every time you try to explain what constitutes a "better guess" — Tzeentch

Where did you get that? What argument is the one that boiled down to that? — khaled

Correct me if I am wrong, but you have stated that when one gets the sense one's ideas are closer to truth, one gets a right to impose them.

Example:

At a moment in time, a person conducted an experiment to determine the effects of alchohol on driving skills. Lets say they found that 10% of subjects could still drive at an acceptable level under the effects of alchohol, whereas 90% of subjects could not.

You may state that because 90% of subjects could not drive at an acceptable level, the other 10% may rightfully be imposed upon. I would disagree. Since the study found no proof that they could not drive at an acceptable level after alcohol consumption, their existence in fact undermines the study's claim to truth.

The line of reasoning continues: but it is not practical to determine on a case by case basis who should drive after alcohol consumption and who shouldn't. So because it is not practical for the majority, the minority may rightfully be imposed upon: might ("we are with more") makes right.

But what constitutes a better guess, then? — Tzeentch

How do we tell when that’s the case? Very difficult. But better than not trying. — khaled

Debatable. I'm sure you're aware of what happens when collectives disagree on what is the better guess.

Try to escape? — Tzeentch

This would get everyone killed. — khaled

How?

Don't impose. — Tzeentch

The problem is that you don’t follow this. Admittedly, you would impose sometimes. — khaled

I do follow that, since I've never been in the highly unlikely situation that my life is directly threatened and the only means of survival is to defend myself.

However, in such a situation one could argue that one is not imposing. As I've stated earlier:

An imposition is the use of force to make an individual act in accordance to one's desires. Force can be physical, it can be verbal, it can be mental, etc.

In the case of directly protecting one's own life, is one really imposing desires on someone else? Is it even volutary? Or is it a biological reflex? One may argue that the will to live would be a desire one is imposing, but is it really that simple? Then there's the fact one is responding to an imposition on something that belongs unequivocally to them; the individual and their body are inseperable, they live as one and die as one. I think the instance of direct protection of oneself is more complicated than that, but these are all fair questions.

Then again, maybe the right thing to do is to sit there and accept one's fate - to turn the other cheek. Perhaps that is what Buddha would do. And didn't Jesus carry his own cross to Golgotha to die on it? I'm willing to consider that option.

What shortcuts am I taking? — khaled

We've spoken about this. You realize that knowledge of ultimate reality is outside of the human grasp, yet for practical considerations you make do with "a sense of the better guess" and consider it just grounds for impositions on others.

What do you do when some fool comes around with "a sense of the better guess" and starts imposing on you? These ideas are all fine and good, until someone comes around to uses them against you, and that is essentially the root of all human conflict.

There are situations where inaction is an imposition. Or do you not think so? — khaled

I do not think so.

"Non-interference is not an imposition." - Tzeentch

The example of someone standing in the way and not moving is good. He’s not doing anything to you, is he? How is he interfering? You’re the one that wants him to move. So he’s not imposing correct? — khaled

Correct, assuming the standing person is not consciously attempting to deny the other person of this space. If it is a conscious attempt to deny, it is an imposition.

Without laws, anarchy. With laws, oppression. How do we tackle this dilemma? — TheMadFool

That dilemma is not all that relevant to me.

Whether it's anarchy or oppression, it's the result of the collective behavior of individuals. I can't and don't want to decide for others what they must do.

I can however look at these systems and ponder their nature, and whether I want to live my life in accordance to their principles.

Is regulation just an euphemism for imposition? — TheMadFool

I would say so. Regulations, when broken, are met with punishments. In the case of state law, when one resists these punishments because, for example, one disagrees with being punished, the punishment will become more and more severe with incarceration as the end station.

As such, law is based on coercion and, in my view, clearly imposition.

I agree with you on all points. It's just that I was thrown off by the fact that both tyrannies (oppression) and democracies (liberty) operate using laws. You pointed out though that in the case of the former, it's not justified while in the latter it is. — TheMadFool

Did I point that out?

I don't think impositions made by the rulers or electorates of democracies are justified.

I'm not sure how compelling you will find it , but the point was to isolate what happens in the physical from your perception... — Cheshire

One cannot seperate these things, even if one wanted to. One never experiences the external world directly - everything goes through the mind.

In one case I'm blocking the sidewalk and in the other I'm blocking the sidewalk. However, I am only imposing upon you in one case. — Cheshire

I stated that in both instances there was an imposition.

In the other instance where there was no desire to block the sidewalk, there was no imposition, because there was no desire to impose anything. Desire plays a key role, which I think I've highlighted.

An imposition is the use of force to make an individual act in accordance to one's desires. — Tzeentch

Then there is no right to self defense. — James Riley

The one caveat I have with all of this... — Tzeentch

That will be my last extension of grace.

Read my whole posts, James. :sad:

Sorry for buttin' in but how far are you willing to go with that maxim? — TheMadFool

All the way!

I guess I'm getting mixed up between regulation and coercion. — TheMadFool

An imposition is the use of force to make an individual act in accordance to one's desires. Force can be physical, it can be verbal, it can be mental, etc.

Regulation is coercion, unless the regulation depends entirely on genuine agreement.


Second, to have a right implies a justification. A justification implies goodness. It is my view that ends never justify means and that the use of force is inherently an unjust means, therefore is never good or justified, therefore is never someone's right.


The one caveat I have with all of this is the protection of one's physical body from direct assault. While I don't believe the use of force in such a situation to be Good or just, perhaps it is not unjust either (thus perhaps some form of neutral) since one is protecting that which belongs unequivocally to them from an imposition (which is in itself unjust).

I'm really interested in your answer to this before we move on:

If you truly think there is no opinion that's better than another, why discuss anything at all? Whatever you end up with will be just as good as what you started with. What do you hope to accomplish in this thread (or any thread)? — khaled


I see a performative contradiction between what you say and the fact that you're still replying. — khaled

I explained already:

I post on this forum to test my ideas, not to convince strangers. Whether people like those ideas or find them convincing is of no interest - only their arguments are. — Tzeentch

_______________________

Now can something be "intersubjectively true"? — khaled

Can many people believe the same thing? Sure. I don't see how that is particularly relevant, though.

Do you believe that we have no right to impose because of a lack of objectivity? — khaled

My view is that you have no right to impose, period.

That still leaves you with the problem of what to do when not imposing is not an option. That's the fundamental problem with your philosophy. You believe in every situation there is the "aggressor" or "imposer" and the victim. You believe one can choose "Don't impose" at every turn. What you don't recognize is sometimes inaction IS imposing, like with the buttons example. — khaled

Non-interference is not an imposition.

Imposition is unavoidable. — khaled

Maybe so. That does not stop it from being inherently wrong, and something that should be avoided at every opportunity.

So what do we do about this? [...] You're acting right now. If the brightest minds have been wrong before what chance do you or me have of being right? How do you know you're not imposing unknowingly? Perhaps you are. — khaled

Indeed.

Another performative contradiction. — khaled

There is no contradiction.

... , then go on to say that we shouldn't act unless we're 100% sure. — khaled

I never stated that.

___________________________

Are all premises moral intuitions? — Tzeentch

No, where did you get that? — khaled

Reason requires premises. Those premises are moral intuitions. — khaled

___________________________

First off, quote where I said that agreement of a large group is what makes a better guess. Or stop putting words in my mouth. Again, if you want to argue against made up arguments, do so alone.

But no, clearly you shouldn't. Because large agreement doesn't make something right. It's a factor, not the end all be all. — khaled

It's what your arguments seem to boil down to every time you try to explain what constitutes a "better guess". But what constitutes a better guess, then?

How about "things fall to earth when they are within 1 meter of the ground and there is no solid impedance in their path" vs "things don't fall to earth when they are within 1 meter of the ground and there is no solid impedance in their path". Is one a better guess than the other? — khaled

The first guess will probably serve you better as a predictive model, but still does not answer the question of what the phenomenon we call gravity is and whether it exists according to our view of it.

Stop being tedious. — khaled

I'll be as tedious as I need to be.

Even if true, there would still be many more problems in your philosophy than mine, ... — khaled

Debatable. I don't pretend to have all the answers, but I don't take shortcuts and apply principles consistently.

What gives you the authority to decide what's a problem and what isn't? — khaled

I don't claim to hold any authority. I state the things the way I see them.

Say you got kidnapped in your sleep and forced in that situation. Now what? — khaled

Try to escape?

This question has already been answered, I guess you simply didn't understand the answer if you claim I was dodging it.

So what is to be done by your system? — khaled

Don't impose.

I find it a bit odd that the idea of not imposing on others seems so alien to you. I've lived most of my adult life according to that idea. It's how most constructive human relations are shaped.

__________________________

Maybe you cannot have everything you want. — Tzeentch

What was this about then:

But I don't believe such a practical limitation exists — Tzeentch — khaled

(looking back I took this to mean that you think no practical limitations exist at all, maybe that's not what you meant in which case ignore this) — khaled

What people believe to be practical limitations are just a projection of their desires. A pretense.

We want things, so we find justifications to want those things.

What's personal about it? I'm stating a fact. Asking "why why why" tends to stop at a young age as children realize it's a pointless exercise.

If you're getting aggravated maybe you should heed your own words: — khaled

:roll: Is a civil tone of conversation too much to ask?

That person would have to give way. That is all the state asks. — James Riley

The example features two fools.

The fact that one of the fools wisens up, does not cure the other of their foolishness.

"2+2=4" is true regardless of who you are or what you think (assuming you know how to do arithmetic). — khaled

:chin: So assuming you know how to play the game according to the rules that you believe it should be played by, it is true?

Mathematics is not objective.

If you don't want to use objective like that then let's call it "inter-subjective". Something that is subjective yet is the same for everyone (like 2+2=4). There is an inter-subjective morality. — khaled

If the whole world believed the same lie, it wouldn't make it true.

How would you ever know you have stumbled upon an objective anything? You don't, but some guesses are better than others. — khaled

Maybe so, but they're still only guesses, and the brightest minds have been wrong on countless occasions about things they thought were true. Horrible things have been done under the guise of ignorantly believing one has all the answers.

Again, I see no justification for the use of force.

For instance: "Gravity doesn't exist" is an attempt at an objective statement. It is easily found to be false. "Gravity exists" is a better attempt. — khaled

Debatable.

We don't know what gravity is, so we don't know if it exists or not. We found a way to predict how a certain phenomenon works to a degree that is accurate enough for our practical purposes.

It would be more prudent not to fool oneself and state "I don't know if gravity exists". To know one's own ignorance is the first step towards wisdom.

Reason requires premises. Those premises are moral intuitions. — khaled

Are all premises moral intuitions?

Definitely not feasible as a basis for impositions on other individuals. — Tzeentch

Why? — khaled

Because moral intuitions differ of course. If I had a moral intuitions that makes me believe stoning women for adultery is fair and just (In certain parts of the world a lot of people even agree with me - must mean I have some "better guess than others"), should I just start imposing that on the people around me because I believe it is right?

The system that provides as much as it can of both is objective. — khaled

You and I must have a wildly different idea of what the word "objective" means.

If for instance, 51% of people think A is the best president and 49% think B is the best president, the best thing to do, objectively, is to have the 51% be under A and the 49% be under B. That’s clearly not feasible, but it’s the ideal solution is it not? Do you have a better solution in mind? — khaled

I don't need to come with solutions, because I am not in the business of wishing to control other people. I cannot give solutions to fix something that is fundamentally broken.

You're the only one seeing problems. — khaled

You are seeing these problems as well. You spoke about them openly. And obviously there are entire collections of philosophy that discuss these problems; a discussion that is as old as philosophy itself. You're choosing the dismiss these fundamental discussions for practical reasons, and I do not.

Ok think of the following scenario:

You must kill at least one person. If you press the red button, Jeff lives. If you press the blue button, Sarah lives. If you press neither, they both die. — khaled

I must nothing.

My tip would be, do not get involved in situations that have only bad outcomes.

So we can all have everything we want without hurting anyone else? — khaled

Sure that is possible, unless one's desires require one to impose them on other individuals. Then hurt is very likely to follow. Sadly, this is the case for much of humanity and the pursuit of their desires will inevitably lead them to cause much suffering.

It's a bit of an ironic question, isn't it? How can I have everything I want without hurting anyone else? Maybe you cannot have everything you want.

That's all you did here, acted like a 3 year old. — khaled

If you feel the need to get personal, maybe it is time you sit on the time-out chair for a little while.