Descartes' use of hyperbolic doubt and, in particular, the constant deception caused by the "evil genius," postulated conditions under which it would be possible to conceive that even the necessary "a priori" truths of logic and mathematics, his "clear" and "distinct" ideas, would be false in this world and in all possible worlds. That's why he desperately, and I think unsuccessfully, tried to argue for the existence of a "good" Deity that would, nevertheless, guarantee their truth.

Thus, only the Cogito Sum, which survived hyperbolic doubt, would be an indubitably certain first principle in this world and in all possible worlds. But it would still be contingent in this world and in all possible worlds.

Absolutely it has a bearing.

It's simply dead wrong to assert that Einstein relied wholly and solely on reason.

He also relied on the experimental results of physicists who preceded him and he was known for performing mental experiments, but he also eagerly awaited and valued the results of experiments performed by contemporaries to test predictive hypotheses generated by his theories.

He was alive when some major experiments were performed; e,g., when the bending of light rays during a total solar eclipse was verified. Nuclear fission verified his famous equation.

No theory created by human thought has had a perpetual lock on truth. In this sense, I think every theory is subject to invalidation. But this, I submit, is simply an issue of semantics

I believe there was a time when it was thought that someone would be "crossing the line" if they asked the "foolish" question as to whether, or not, it could be empirically verified that Euclidean geometry was applicable to the physical world we experience. I mean, after all, hadn't Kant demonstrated that this had to be the case?

I'm sure, even then, there were those persons who argued vehemently that it was true "in principle" that only Euclidian geometry could apply to the physical world.

But then, lo and behold, the purportedly "inviolable" Newtonian paradigm shifted to the Einsteinian and, as a direct consequence, it was proven empirically, through several rigorous experiments, that the physical world we experience obeyed, instead, a form of non-Euclidean geometry.

Thank heavens empirical science always encourages investigators to challenge and progress beyond the purportedly inviolable tenets and limits set by the current theory.

Who knows what impossibilities the next paradigm shift will make possible?

I don't mean to be facetious, but has anyone actually verified that arithmetical proofs are true in all possible worlds? Have they visited any of these worlds and done so? Where are these worlds? Have we questioned these other minds about this?

I did not claim that there are no necessary truths or that the contingent Cogito can't grasp them. What I am claiming is that there is nothing "divine," or eternal about necessary truths. Necessary truths are simply tautologies, some simple, others more complex, like 5 = 4+1 or 5 = 20+10 - 25, etc. This is NOT the meaning of necessary, as I tried to explain it to you previously.

Truths would be necessary, or eternal, as per your definition of the term, only if they were thought by a necessary Cogito that I could experience in the first person, present tense mode, which I can't.

The first principle Descartes discovered was the Cogito Sum. But, unfortunately, it was an indubitably certain principle that was inherently contingent. So any knowledge based upon it would be indubitably certain, but also be equally as contingent. The indubitably certain knowledge, like the indubitably certain principle upon which it was based, would be subject to the possibility of complete cessation. In no way, would it represent any kind of eternal truth.

It seems to me that the major opponent to the so-called "perennial" truth of the Aristotelian/Thomistic notion of static, eternal, divinely created, substantial forms, or substantial species, was not Renee Descartes. It was, instead, the theory proposed by Charles Darwin which claimed, and provided empirical evidence to verify, that natural species, or forms, evolved over long periods of time through the combined processes of natural selection and spontaneous genetic mutation.

If some entity or activity is closed to, not vulnerable to, not subject to, or not susceptible to the possibility of complete cessation, then I consider that entity or activity to be “NECESSARY.”

Certainly, I CAN have an “idea” or “conception” of such a necessary being in the first, person, present tense mode, but I CANNOT have a direct “experience” of such a necessary being in the first, person present tense mode.

It would be called NECESSARY THINKING ACTIVITY, or a NECESSARY “COGITO.”

If some entity or activity is open to, vulnerable to, subject to, or susceptible to the possibility of complete cessation, then I consider that entity or activity to be “CONTINGENT.”

Certainly, I CAN have an “idea” or “conception” of such a contingent being in the first person, present tense mode, AND I CAN also have a direct “experience” of such a contingent being in the first person, present tense mode.

It would be called CONTINGENT THINKING ACTIVITY, or a CONTINGENT “COGITO.”

This differs significantly from the meaning of necessary and contingent being as used traditionally in philosophy.

Traditionally, a necessary being had its originating cause situated within itself, but a contingent being had its originating cause situated outside itself in another, higher being.

This might be the case, but, for my purposes, it is too overreaching and leaps to conclusions I cannot verify empirically or through my personal experience in the first person, present tense mode.

But, hopefully, now you have reasons for what you thought. He was a genius!

Thanks Wayfarer.

Thanks Bartricks! You understood my point.

Nowhere in what I have written and posted here, and elsewhere, on this Forum have I ever claimed that the truth of Descartes' Cogito Sum was not an indubitably certain intuition.

If you think I did, then you are sorely mistaken.

What I have argued for, WHILE ALWAYS SIMULTANEOUSLY SUBSCRIBING TO THE INDUBITABLY CERTAIN INTUITIVE TRUTH OF THE COGITO SUM, is the contingent nature of the Cogito and of the Sum. They are not mutually exclusive. The truth of the latter does not cancel out the truth of the former, and is not intended to do so.

I simply highlighted and placed emphasis on the contingent aspect of both the Cogito and the Sum, their inherent openness and susceptibility to the possibility of complete cessation, as mentioned by Descartes himself.

To me, this provided the correct, broader context within which to place the indubitable certainty of the Cogito Sum.

Words that perform something in being said, or expressed.

Words that create something in being said, or expressed.

OK GOT IT!

So, then, man is like the biblical Creator God who SAID, "Let there be light, and there was light," when he SAYS "I think contingently, I am contingently," and, lo and behold, he thinks contingently, and he is contingently.

In other words, man can perform the creation of his own contingent existence whenever and while he thinks contingently.

OK

But, unlike the Creator God, his creative act is open, at every moment, to the possibility of complete cessation.

I don't know about you, but this perpetual openness to and oppressive, arbitrary, unrelenting subjection to the possibility of complete cessation clearly indicates, to me, that the contingent Cartesian thinking and the indubitably certain contingent Cartesian existing don't really matter that much, even if they are man's own creation.

Unfortunately, yes! Unless, of course, someone who fully understands and respects the argument can demonstrate that there is a serious error, or omission, in the argument that invalidates it?

Too bad you're a pompous idiot. Why don't you grow up and learn how to engage others with civility? Is this direct enough for you?

Of course, everyone is entitled to their opinion. Too bad you're incapable of understanding what I wrote.
Perhaps your "verbal gymnastics" are better than mine.

I respect your critical position regarding the problem of Descartes' solipsism, but I do not really see what it has to do with any of the specific concepts I set forth in my argument.

If we are simulated beings, then, by definition, our existence and the existence of our universe is CONTINGENT in the sense that both would be open to the possibility of complete cessation if, and when, our simulators decided to end the simulation.

Furthermore, this existential contingency would also apply to the existence of our simulators and the existence of their universes, if they, too, were simulated beings.

And, theoretically, this process of existentially contingent simulators and their universes could extend to, and through, an infinite series of contingent simulators and their universes.

The question then arises as to whether, or not, there could be a non-simulated simulator operating in a non-simulated universe who would be responsible for the whole series of simulations?

And, would this apex, non-simulated simulator and its non-simulated universe be open, or closed, to the possibility of complete cessation (be NECESSARY, rather than CONTINGENT)?

Wouldn't it be something if this apex simulator was simply a youngster having fun playing computer games and not at all realizing the consequences of his/her actions.

The following explains why I think the Ontological Argument is false.

CRITIQUE OF DESCARTES’ ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

That the existence of God may be rightly demonstrated from the fact that the necessity of His existence is comprehended in the conception which we have of Him.

Rene Descartes

The (ontological) argument does not, to a modern mind, seem very convincing, but it is easier to feel convinced that it must be fallacious than it is to find out precisely where the fallacy lies.

Bertrand Russell

It is this author’s contention that Renee Descartes should have rejected the validity of all ontological arguments for the existence of God and that his philosophy would have provided him with a unique and sound rationale for explaining why such arguments had to be false. Descartes should have realized that his version of the ontological argument, as well as the version formulated before him by Anselm, was simply incompatible with the new philosophical methodology and criteria he established for determining indubitably certain existence.

It was not sufficient for Descartes and Anselm before him merely to present the individual with the idea, or definition, of a necessary being and then, by performing a detailed analysis of the idea, or definition, try to claim to have demonstrated successfully the necessary existence of such a being.

I submit that Descartes’ own well-defined methodology and explicit criteria for determining indubitably certain existence should have prompted him, instead, to explain (a) the difference between contingent thinking activity and necessary thinking activity, and (b) the corresponding difference between contingent personal existence and necessary personal existence.

The specific definition of the terms contingent and necessary, as used in this paper, will be made clear during the following discussion.

In Meditation II, Descartes presented the reader with a detailed explanation of the human Cogito Sum along with the method the reader could use to realize it. He claimed that a person attempting to doubt his own existence, even under the most extreme (hyperbolic) of scenarios (the dreaming doubt and the malicious demon doubt), would ultimately and inevitably realize or intuit, during his doubting activity, that his existence was an indubitably certain existence. A simultaneous intuition or realization would occur that not existing while doubting or thinking was impossible for the thinker. Or, phrasing it positively, a simultaneous intuition or realization would occur that existing while doubting or thinking was indubitably certain for the thinker. As Descartes put it: “I am, I exist. This is certain. How often? As often as I think.”

However, Descartes did not say that his existence was necessary-in-itself. He said only if, and when, he doubted, only if, and when, he thought, only then, during the time of their occurrence, did he simultaneously intuit his existence to be indubitably certain. If he ceased to think for an instant of time, then Descartes claimed that he would have no ground for believing that he could have existed during that instant. As Descartes cautioned: “For it might indeed be that if I entirely ceased to think, I should thereupon altogether cease to exist.”

So, then, according to Descartes, a person’s thinking activity is contingent in the specific sense that it is experienced by the person as always being open to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence. In other words, the Cogito portion of the Cogito Sum is experienced by the person, in the first person, present tense mode, to be contingent thinking activity (a contingent Cogito), since it is experienced as always being open to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence.

Search as one will, there is no separate or concomitant intuition available which would also assure the person, beyond all reasonable and hyperbolic doubt, that his doubting or thinking is an activity impervious to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence. And the force of this realization would apply equally to all the many different modes of the person’s thinking activity such as perceiving, inferring, deducing, imagining, remembering, conceiving, speculating, calculating, hypothesizing, etc.

Descartes showed how the performance of a human Cogito Sum did, in fact, yield the intuition of an indubitably certain, yet contingent, personal existence (the contingent human Sum) based upon, emerging from, and restricted to the human person’s simultaneous experience of the occurrence of its contingent thinking activity (the contingent human Cogito). Or, stating it more succinctly, a person’s contingent thinking activity (the human Cogito), during the time that it is experienced by the person, always provides the person with a simultaneous intuition of the indubitable certainty of that person’s contingent personal existence (the human Sum).

Surprisingly, in none of his subsequent meditations did Descartes attempt to present the reader with a detailed explanation of the divine Cogito Sum which would have paralleled nicely the detailed explanation of the human Cogito Sum he offered in Meditation II.

Preoccupied as he was with the urgent need to provide a divine guarantee for his clear and distinct perception criterion of truth, in Meditation III Descartes decided to present the reader with a series of more, or less, traditional a posteriori arguments for the existence of God and, in Meditation V, he decided to present the reader with his a priori ontological argument for the existence of God based, curiously enough, upon his clear and distinct perception criterion of truth.

Nevertheless, had he intended to do so we suspect Descartes could have provided a detailed explanation of the divine Cogito Sum along the following lines.

If one assumes the divinity thinks, then its thinking activity (the divine Cogito) would be necessary in the specific sense that it would be experienced by the divinity as always being closed to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence and, as such, it would always provide the divinity with an intuition of its indubitably certain necessary personal existence (the divine Sum).

In other words, he could have explained how the performance of a divine Cogito Sum would have provided an intuition of indubitably certain necessary personal existence (the divine Sum) based upon, emerging from, and restricted to the divine person’s experience of the occurrence of its necessary thinking activity (the divine Cogito). The divine person’s necessary thinking activity (the divine Cogito) would provide the divine person with an intuition of the indubitable certainty of the divine person’s necessary personal existence (the divine Sum).

He could have gone on to explain that IF the human person were also able to experience the occurrence of such necessary thinking activity (the divine Cogito), then the human person, too, would be able to experience it as always being closed to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence. But that since the human person is, in fact, simply not able to experience the occurrence of necessary thinking activity (the divine Cogito) in the same way as the human person is able to experience the occurrence of contingent thinking activity (the human Cogito), the human person is, therefore, prohibited from ever having direct access to an intuition of indubitably certain necessary personal existence (the divine Sum).

This Cartesian-based distinction between the impossibility of having a personal experience of necessary thinking activity and the possibility of having a personal experience of contingent thinking activity should not be confused with the traditional distinction between an essence that contains within itself the reason for its existence (necessary being) and an essence that does not contain within itself the reason for its existence (contingent being). The Cartesian-based distinction is grounded in, and can be verified through, a person’s experience, whereas the traditional distinction is grounded in a person’s abstract thinking but cannot be verified through a person’s experience.

From a Cartesian-based perspective, the central issue is the possibility of having a personal experience of thinking activity that can cease to occur and can go out of existence versus the impossibility of having a personal experience of thinking activity that can never cease to occur and can never go out of existence.

Human thinking activity is contingent being because the human person experiences his thinking activity can cease to occur and can go out of existence – nothing more, nothing less. The human person’s, alone, is the I think contingently, I exist contingently (Cogito contingenter, Sum contingenter).
By contrast, divine thinking activity is necessary being because the divine person experiences that its thinking activity can never cease to occur and can never go out of existence - nothing more, nothing less. God’s, alone, is the I think necessarily, I exist necessarily (Cogito necessario, Sum necessario).

It is simply impossible for a human being to have a personal experience of thinking activity that can never cease to occur and can never go out of existence (the divine Cogito).

However, from a Cartesian perspective, it is precisely this impossible experience which is the indispensable prerequisite that would enable a human being to have a performative intuition of the indubitable certainty of necessary personal existence (the divine Sum), i.e., the existence of God. But, unfortunately, all ontological arguments lack this indispensable experiential prerequisite. And, in response to Russell, this is precisely where the fallacy of the ontological argument lies!

For whatever reasons, the preceding line of thought is what Descartes chose neither to pursue, nor to explain.

Nevertheless, from a Cartesian point of view based upon a well-defined Cartesian methodology and explicit criteria for determining indubitably certain existence, I would submit (a) that the occurrence of necessary thinking activity (the divine Cogito) is precisely what a person would have to be able to experience in order to make a legitimate claim to having an intuition of indubitably certain necessary personal existence (the divine Sum), and (b) that this Cartesian-based explanation of what would be required for a human person to successfully execute an intuition of indubitably certain necessary personal existence (the divine Sum) is far superior to Descartes’ ontological argument and that of his predecessor, Anselm.

This Cartesian-based critique specifies precisely what is fallacious about Descartes’ ontological argument, Anselm’s ontological argument, and all other ontological arguments for the existence of God in a manner uniquely different than the critiques proposed by St. Thomas Aquinas, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Gottlob Frege.

Ontological arguments, being conceptually abstract through and through and remaining completely detached and isolated from the empirical realm, lack the requisite foundation of a personal human experience of necessary thinking activity (the divine Cogito). Only the possibility of having such a personal experience would also permit a human person to have an intuition of indubitably certain necessary personal existence (the divine Sum).

It is of interest to note, too, that all the critiques cited above are essentially as conceptually abstract as the ontological arguments they seek to contest. The total inability of a person to experience the occurrence of necessary thinking activity is never made the central issue of contention. For all these critics, the perennially unresolved central issue is simply the logical validity, or invalidity, of the abstract reasoning involved in the ontological arguments. Without exception, this is their exclusive, limited focus.

I submit that the Cartesian-based critique succeeds in altering this traditional focus since it offers a unique, experientially grounded explanation for why, ab initio, all ontological arguments for the existence of God must be false.

Certain assumptions shared by Descartes’ arguments for the existence of God, be the arguments a posteriori or a priori, are that the ideas of the infinite and the perfect are ontologically prior to the ideas of the finite and the imperfect, and that the ideas of the infinite and the perfect are innate to the human mind because they are implanted there by God. For example, for Descartes my idea that I think contingently (which is my idea of a finite and imperfect activity) presupposes an ontologically prior, innate idea of what it means to think necessarily (which is my innate idea of an infinite and perfect activity). Or, to understand that I think contingently (a finite and imperfect activity) requires that I must have some ontologically prior, innate understanding of what it means to think necessarily (an infinite and perfect activity).

However, as this line of reasoning relates to the central theme of this essay, I would submit, contrary to Descartes’ position, that my understanding of the idea of necessary thinking activity (an infinite and perfect activity) is not innate to the human mind and is not implanted there by God.

Neither is the idea of my contingent thinking activity (a finite and imperfect activity) obtained, as Descartes would claim, by my limiting or bounding, in some way, the ontologically prior, innate idea of necessary thinking activity (an infinite and perfect activity). Instead, my idea of necessary thinking activity is a direct result of my deliberate attempt to try to remove, albeit unsuccessfully, that characteristic from the idea of my contingent thinking activity which limits and constrains it; viz., its vulnerability to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence. This, I submit, is the genuine way in which I arrive at an understanding of the idea of necessary thinking activity (an infinite and perfect activity).

Nevertheless, it does not necessarily follow, either from the former interpretation of Descartes or from the latter interpretation of this author, that I can have a direct personal experience of necessary thinking activity (an infinite and perfect activity) in the same way as I do, in fact, have a direct personal experience of contingent thinking activity (a finite and imperfect activity).

As I see it, the central issue is not a matter of the possibility of my being able to have, or not to have, an idea of perfect thinking activity or an idea of perfect being – be those ideas innate, adventitious, or factitious.

Instead, the central issue is a matter of the possibility of my being able to have, or not to have, a direct personal experience of that perfect thinking activity or of that perfect being.

Or, approaching it from a slightly different direction, doubts and desires may come from an understanding that I lack something, and that I would not be aware of that lack unless I was aware of a more perfect being that has those things which I lack. However, my ability to have an idea of, or conception of, or understanding of, or awareness of a more perfect, or infinite, being that possesses all those things which I lack (inclusive of necessary thinking activity), does not mean that I am also able to have a direct personal experience of that being and its necessary thinking activity in precisely the same way as I am able to have a direct personal experience of my being and my contingent thinking activity.

Certainly, I can postulate the existence of a being that thinks necessarily and exists necessarily, but I cannot have a direct personal experience of the necessary thinking activity which would simultaneously yield an intuition of the indubitably certain existence of such a necessary being. Again, I can perform the “Cogito contingenter, Sum contingenter,” but I cannot perform the “Cogito necessario, Sum necessario.”

Descartes’ a priori ontological argument for the existence of God is not an experientially grounded performative argument like the one he formulated that successfully and persuasively proved the existence of the human self. His ontological argument, lacking the crucial, indispensable experiential foundation of necessary thinking activity, is destined to fail from its very inception. It is a non-persuasive, quasi-intuitive argument espousing a so-called self-validating idea of God which is given in consciousness and which represents God as existing, but which, in fact, completely misses the mark.

In fact, one could assert even further that the ultimate test of the efficacy of any argument for the existence of God, be that argument a priori or a posteriori, does not consist in the ability of that argument to provide the meditator with a clear and distinct idea of God’s necessary personal existence. Instead, one could assert that the efficacy of any such argument is determined, first and foremost, by whether, or not, it can engender in the meditator a direct personal experience of necessary thinking activity (the divine Cogito). And even assuming such an argument can engender in the meditator a direct personal experience of necessary thinking activity, then can it also engender in that meditator a simultaneous intuition of indubitably certain necessary personal existence (the divine Sum)?

However, in conclusion, this author knows of no traditional, professionally recognized, a priori or a posteriori argument for the existence of God that has succeeded in providing the meditator with the requisite foundation of a direct personal experience of necessary thinking activity (the divine Cogito) while also engendering in the meditator a simultaneous intuition of indubitably certain necessary personal existence (the divine Sum).

No, Descartes was not aware of Hinduism. European thinkers only began to translate Sanskrit works during the late 18th and early19th century. As far as I can tell, Goethe and Schopenhauer were the first notable European intellectuals to praise works in Sanskrit. Schopenhauer highly praised Hindu and Buddhist thinking and even incorporated several of their philosophical insights into his own philosophy.

What disturbs me most about the "When and while It is dreaming, I exist" pun on Descartes' "When and while I am thinking, I exist" is how dependent, fragile, ephemeral, and insignificant it portrays human existence to be. Given the dream scenario, human existence lacks the dignity even of being a clear-sighted, conscious, deliberate and desirable creation of the divinity. Instead, human existence appears to be nothing more than a divine slumberer's groggy after-thought.

Given this scenario, should the sage seek to keep the divinity asleep or awake?

Perhaps, in this world or in the next, I am existing in, or as, someone else's dream; and when that someone else awakens, I cease to be. To put a different spin on Descartes' famous saying: When and while It is dreaming, I exist.

It seems to me that the question of an afterlife is a curious one because, on the one hand, if I do continue to live after I die, then by definition I will know it, whereas, on the other hand, if I do not continue to live after I die, then by definition I will not know it. So, essentially, I can only know the former, but not the latter, state-of-affairs, after I die. All the rest, to me, is pure speculation.

According to Nietzsche, Schopenhauer was an atheistic nihilist because he advocated for the Denial, rather than for the Affirmation, of the Will to Live. Despite relinquishing belief in the purported "self-contradictory" notion of God, he, nevertheless, continued to extol and subscribe to the God-derived Judeo-Christian system of values whose ultimate 'salvific" goal for all humanity was achievement of the ideal nirvanic state of Nothingness.

One could make a strong argument that Schopenhauer contributed significantly to the development of Nietzsche's philosophical thinking. Like Schopenhauer, Nietzsche was also an atheist but, in several crucial ways, Nietzsche's thought was the exact opposite of Schopenhauer's. For example, Nietzsche advocated, instead, for a deliberate human control over and enhancement of the Will to Live, referring to it as the Will to Power and, instead, he rejected the Judeo-Christian system of values, since its God and purpose was "dead." And, most importantly, he advocated for the creation of a new system of values, a neo-aristocratic system of values, grounded in the Will to Power, which would be a trans-valuation of the prevailing Judeo-Christian "herd morality" system of values. And, also, he advocated for the free creation of a new, universal, secular goal for humanity to strive toward and to realize.

The Cogito ergo Sum is not, inherently, an inferential argument.

It is, instead, a performative argument. It must be executed by each person, in the first person, present tense mode, to experience it, and the full force of its indubitable certainty, correctly.

Its truth is not inferred, its truth is intuited as an immediate insight imbedded in and resulting from the performance itself.

It is not a Cogito “ergo” Sum, but simply, and immediately, a Cogito Sum.

The “When and while I am Thinking, I must be Existing” intuitive insight, is not synonymous with an “I Think, therefore I am” logical inference.”

The intuitive insight is not about “an A, therefore a B,” an inferring “I must be Existing (B)” from a “because I am Thinking (A).”

Instead, it is about my intuiting with indubitable certainty, in the first person, present tense mode, how my Existing only occurs, necessarily occurs, and always occurs simultaneously with the occurrence of my Thinking.

In fact, as Descartes so aptly put it, “For it might indeed be that if I entirely ceased to think, I should thereupon altogether cease to exist.”

Unless of course, I can experience, in the first person, present tense mode, that someone, or something, other than myself is doing the thinking while I exist???????

Being aware of the lessons of history does not depend upon, or require, first being indoctrinated by the extreme leftists, or the extreme rightists. My common sense and history itself tells me that all totalitarians, be they of the extreme left or of the extreme right, stink to high heaven. They all try to put the rights of the state above the rights of the individual. Everything within the state, nothing outside the state, is their mantra. Somehow, when they gain social control, they all end up putting those who they characterize as "stupid ignoramuses" or "inferior beings" into concentration camps, or into gulags, for one "enlightened" theoretical reason, or another. Literally millions of innocent souls suffered this horrible fate, or were physically destroyed because they refused to conform to statist demands. And somewhere in the world today, this is still occurring. We do not need an expensive liberal arts education to know this. And we certainly do not need to pay through the nose for the kind of "education" that seeks in any way to deny, or downplay it.

And it would appear you can barely write intelligibly.

So an exaggeratedly expensive education about "cloud, cuckoo land" which is, for the most part, economically worthless will, nevertheless, provide me with an invaluable form of "social salvation" because it will sanctify me so that, henceforth, I will absolutely be able to tell the "good" from the "bad" man.

So the ivory tower, elitist yodas who practice a totalitarian form of Kancel Kulture are going to enlighten me about what I should have already learned how to do within the context of the nuclear family and my Judeo-Christian religious upbringing.

These social gnostics will reveal to me (for a hefty price of course) that secret, mystical knowledge about society that will transform me into a dogmatic, elitist, closed-minded, intolerant warrior who looks down upon the struggling riff-raff with an arrogant demeanor because, unlike them, I really know who's "good" or "bad."

History teaches us, over and over again, to beware precisely those totalitarian leaders and "PROFESSORS" who know absolutely how to distinguish the "good" from the "bad" man!!!!!!!

There is a significant difference between those persons who take courses solely because they delight in learning and those persons who take courses because they wish to be well-qualified/credentialed in order to be able to earn a good living. Both persons should be "educated" well in advance by the particular institution of higher learning to which they apply as to which courses being offered would facilitate which goal. Also, the former persons should always be required to pay the full cost of their education out of their own resources and not be able to qualify for loans. Whereas, the latter persons should be able to qualify for loans that they can pay back with relative ease because of their guaranteed future earnings.

According to Sartre, there is a Pre-Reflective Thinking activity (Thinking in the First Degree) which is the ontological condition for Descartes' Reflective Thinking activity (Thinking in the Second Degree).

The Pre-Reflective Thinking activity, which is oriented exclusively to that which is not thinking activity, does NOT posit a Transcendental Subject, when and while it occurs. When and while it occurs it is Ego-less and can only be defined as an occurrence without an essence. Pre-Reflective Thinking has only a non-positional self-consciousness, but no consciousness of an objective, essential self.

By contrast, Descartes' Reflective Thinking activity, which is oriented exclusively only towards itself, always does posit itself as a Transcendental Subject, when and while it occurs. When and while it occurs it posits the Ego-Subject as Object. But, in doing so, Reflective Thinking activity is constantly misrepresenting itself as an objective essential entity..

So, I suspect that Sartre would say that in one sense you are right, but in another sense you are wrong.

Sorry, I think I did reply. Double check.

[reply="Philosopher19;47694

Unfortunately, I still can't take away anything truly meaningful from your repeated assertions that "Existence exists," or that "We exist in it (existence)," or that Existence is Omnipresent. To me, the first two assertions are redundant, while the last statement assumes, or wrongly infers, that my personal existence can somehow extend beyond and/or occur independently of the limits of human consciousness.

As I stated previously, I still think my personal consciousness accompanies and defines me in a much more intimate, meaningful, and comprehensive way than my personal existence.

In fact, Descartes provides us with a unique method that enables us to actually prove to ourselves that our personal existence always depends upon, presupposes the occurrence of, and is inextricably bound up with our thinking (consciousness), and that our consciousness, therefore, can be experienced by each person as being, ontologically speaking, something more primordial and fundamental than our personal existence.

However, both my consciousness and my existing are fundamentally contingent, since they are both subject to the possibility of complete cessation. Neither one can be experienced as somehow being inherently necessary. Neither one, by its very nature, is immune to the possibility of complete cessation; which, one, or the other, would have to be if it were your divine, omnipresent, infinite container of an infinite number of meanings/semantics.

So, then, I have enjoyed very much interacting with you, but I will end our discourse by also agreeing that we will have to respectfully disagree.

Stay well!!

You state that "if something is meaningful, then by definition it exists."

But descriptions of certain forms of mental illness clearly demonstrate that it is possible for persons to have sensory delusion(s) that are meaningful to them, but which do not exist. Are these sorts of meaning also contained in, or caused by, your Infinite Semanticist? To me, this would be paradoxical, since it would conflict with such a deity's Infinite Benevolence, would it not?

"That which I am in, or that which sustains me" and that which is "the container of an infinite number of semantics ... Existence/God/True Infinity" possesses that NECESSARY Thinking and that NECESSARY Existence which, unfortunately, I, and others, cannot PERSONALLY EXPERIENCE.

They elude me because both my Thinking and my Existence, which are the only kinds I can experience, are inherently CONTINGENT. The only kind of thinking and existing that I can directly, personally experience is the kind that is vulnerable to the possibility of complete cessation.

I cannot directly, personally experience the kind of NECESSARY thinking and NECESSARY existing exhibited by the Infinite Semanticist that are invulnerable to the possibility of complete cessation. They may exist, but, I submit, human beings are, by nature, incapable of experiencing them.

In other words, you can entertain an infinite number of simple, or complex, arguments for claiming that a truly Infinite Entity may exist, and it may very well exist, but human beings, by their very nature, are perpetually excluded from having a PERSONAL EXPERIENCE of that entity.

I cannot experience, in the first person present tense mode, the necessary thinking and the necessary existing of the Infinite Semanticist. If I could, then, and only then, would I be able to prove to myself that such a deity did, in fact, exist; perhaps, along with its infinite plethora of word meanings.

If my consciousness is a thing, then, certainly, it is a very unique and peculiar thing.
My consciousness does not exist in one place. In fact, it does not occupy any space, or place, at all because it is not a physical entity, like my brain.

My consciousness may be said to be "omnipresent" in the sense that I can never actually step outside of it, or transcend it. It is one with me. It follows me everywhere and it insists on accompanying me whenever I reflect upon my past, my present, or my future.

As long as I exist, I will remain a prisoner of my consciousness and everything I experience, whether in my dreams or when I am awake, will presuppose my consciousness as an indispensable condition of its existence. My consciousness is an inescapable, omnipresent being that is oriented, primarily, toward physical entities; but it is not their container.

Consciousness is omnipresent, but it contains nothing; it is not a container. It is a dimensionless, non-spatial being. An active being that is oriented toward and capable of encountering and recognizing entities which, unlike itself, are spatial and have essences.

Certainly, from the frame-of-reference of my consciousness I can "assume," or infer, that other consciousnesses exist, but I can never experience them "from their frames-of-reference." And, as long as I can't, I cannot "prove" to myself, or others, definitively, that they exist. I can only surmise that they exist.

Also, it is consciousness, not existence, that generates past, present, and future as ways for consciousness to be.

We can say that all physical entities exist in space-time; that space-time is omnipresent in this restricted sense. But we cannot say that all beings exist in existence. To me, this is just a meaningless tautology.

The activity of thinking (my thinking, your thinking) is not a something with essence (a what), it is not an essential entity; in fact, thinking is, in a sense, a non-thing, a non-entity which is best defined as an activity that is always oriented toward that which it distinguishes from itself and which it recognizes to be precisely not itself. Thinking is an activity (not a something, an item of thought, or a hypothetical possibility) that can cease to occur. Death is when a person's thinking ceases to occur.

I am not sure what an omnipresent entity is. But from the point of view of the individual person, I suppose his/her personal consciousness could be called omnipresent; though I would hesitate to characterize it as an entity.

You have what I would call a limited temporal (primarily past and future oriented) definition of the finite/infinite. Your definition seems to lack the dimension of the present. Also, how would you characterize the "has an end but no beginning" option?

How about the finite exhibiting the temporal dimensions of past, present, and future; whereas, the infinite is unlimited in the sense of being devoid of, or beyond, such temporal dimensions; infinity as timelessness?

Hello Nyma:

The paradox you cite is, to me, not a paradox.

I am not claiming that "things" can go in and out of existence.

Along with Descartes, I am claiming the validity of the possibility that a person's thought can cease to occur. And that, if and when the person's thinking should cease to occur, then the person's awareness of his/her own existence would also cease to occur.

The possibility of such a scenario was accepted by Descartes when he said, "For it might indeed be if I entirely ceased to think, I should thereupon altogether cease to exist." He, also, did not consider the possibility of such a scenario to be paradoxical.

Both the person's thinking and the personal existence dependent upon the occurrence of the person's thinking are CONTINGENT because both can cease to occur. This is NOT paradoxical!!

There is no intuition available to human beings which yields an indubitably certain confirmation of the fact that human thinking will always continue to occur i.e., is NECESSARY.

Also, existence does not have an essence. Having no essence, existence cannot be described. So how, then, can the terms finite existence and infinite existence have legitimate meaning?

By the way, how do you define the terms finite and infinite? Limited/Unlimited? Bounded/Unbounded? Ending/Unending? Immanent/Transcendent? Phenomenal/Noumenal? Etc.??

Stay Healthy,
Charles

\

Please reference my article on this Forum entitled "Why I Think Descartes' Ontological Argument is False" and the associated thread comments and answers. It constitutes a response to your contention that "Descartes had the right conclusions but not the right premise." Instead, for reasons stated in my article, I think Descartes had both the wrong premises and the wrong conclusions when it came to arguing for the existence of God.

Phenomena are entities and activities encountered by the human brain that exhibit both transcendental and empirical characteristics.

Transcendental characteristics exhibited by phenomena are absolutely necessary and strictly universal (i.e., applicable to all entities and activities); whereas, empirical characteristics exhibited by phenomena are of a limited necessity and a restricted universality (i.e., applicable only to some, but not to all, entities and activities).

Noumena cannot be encountered by the human brain because they exhibit neither transcendental nor empirical characteristics.

If I may.

Two different subjects:

Subject 1. Einstein said he just discovered the possibility of making the abstract Special Theory of Relativity concrete because the theory was nothing more than a possible form that concrete things could take on.

Subject 2. Einstein also said he created the first concrete instantiation (expression?) of the abstract Special Theory of Relativity, since it was always already possible to create things of that form, he "the creator" didn't make it possible.

Am I missing something???

Abstract ideas are neither found, nor made; they are thought.

Please explain with greater precision what your statement means which begins with "... because there is nothing to be found but the potential for something to be made, but that potential itself was not made, it was always "there." " What is the subject you are referring to here?

I was referring to "natural", not manufactured, empirical entities as being encountered. Also, the ultimate constituent elements of manufactured entities are encountered. No one makes them.

I do not subscribe to the Platonic notion of pre-existent abstract ideas being instantiated. To me they are simply actual, not possible, expressions of the variety of ways in which the human brain is structured or programmed to perceive and know the empirical entities it encounters; that is why they exhibit varying degrees of universality, necessity, and applicability.