The Existential Triviality of Descartes' Cogito Sum

charles ferraro

With respect to Descartes' epistemology, many interesting questions can be asked about it, such as, is "thought" produced by the "I," or is an impersonal "thought-in-general" the ontological precondition for the existence of the "I," or is my personal existence really indubitably certain, or is the "I" a special kind of substance, or is the Cogito Sum an inference or a performance?

But, perhaps, the most fundamental question of all is whether the occurrence of my "thinking" and of my "existing" is vulnerable, or invulnerable, to the possibility of complete cessation?

Descartes, himself, was aware of the legitimacy of this most basic question as evidenced by the following statements:

"I am, I exist. This is certain. How often? As often as I think."

And, more explicitly:

"For it might indeed be that if I entirely ceased to think, I should thereupon altogether cease to exist."

Clearly, Descartes considered his personal thinking, his Cogito, to be an inherently contingent occurrence because it was always open and vulnerable to the possibility of complete cessation.

No indubitably certain intuition was available to Descartes which would have guaranteed that the occurrence of his thinking was inherently closed, and invulnerable, to the possibility of complete cessation.

And because such an indubitably certain intuition was not available to him, this meant that the continued occurrence of his personal existence (his Sum), which was derived from, completely dependent upon, and guaranteed by the continued occurrence of his personal thinking (his Cogito), was as contingent and tenuous as the continued occurrence of his personal thinking (his Cogito), despite the indubitable certainty of the occurrence of his personal existence (his Sum).

So then, I submit that an inadequate or incomplete version of the truth was expressed by the famous phrase: "Cogito, ergo Sum." The: "When and while I am thinking (in the first person, present tense mode), I must be existing."

And that a more adequate and more complete version of the truth would be expressed by the phrase: "Cogito contingenter, ergo Sum contingenter." The: When and while I am thinking contingently (in the first person, present tense mode), I must be existing contingently."

Neither the Cogito, nor the Sum, is a necessary occurrence because neither exhibits an inherent exemption or freedom from the possibility of complete cessation. Yes, one (my Sum) will necessarily occur whenever and while the other (my Cogito) is occurring, but neither one must occur.

In conclusion, because of their contingent natures, the true significance of Descartes' Cogito and even of his indubitably certain Sum, is their inherent existential tenuousness and triviality.

Would appreciate any comments, pro or con, which are related specifically to the concepts involved in the above argument.

1612668600_1612668600_N_T_O0

counterpunch

To my mind, the problem with Descartes epistemology is that it's sceptical doubt as opposed to reasonable doubt. He imagines an evil demon is deceiving him in order to cast doubt on everything that can be doubted. He doubts that the world he sees exists, or that he has arms and legs etc. That's unreasonable. Were it so, it would raise more questions than it answers.

Had Descartes stuck his hand in the fire - rather than a ball of wax, he would soon have discovered something prior to, and more urgently real than 'cogito' not subject to doubt - and that proved with painful certainty the existence of the physical self and an objective reality. Descartes doesn't recognise this problem.

But there is an epistemological triviality that follows from the text; in the fact that Descartes paints himself into a corner - having doubted everything that can be doubted, having established cogito ergo sum as certain, it is nonetheless, a solipsistic certainty - stranded in no space by the conditions of the thought experiment. No arms, no legs, no world - all is doubted away. His recourse is to God. From memory the passage reads something like:

"For light of reason tells us that God cannot be a deceiver" - and Descartes thereby rescues himself from the solipsistic corner of nowhere, where his certainty exists. That is the triviality of it. That it depends upon asserting the existence and nature of God - to rescue the conclusion from the limitations placed upon it by the sceptical conditions of its conception.

charles ferraro

↪counterpunch

I respect your critical position regarding the problem of Descartes' solipsism, but I do not really see what it has to do with any of the specific concepts I set forth in my argument.

counterpunch

↪charles ferraro

To be honest Charles, I found your verbal gymnastics in the opening paragraph - somewhat incomprehensible. I'm not sure what it is you're trying to say - other than, "I'm struggling to make sense of Descartes." I'd scrap it. Now I look again, it's completely unnecessary to the question you ultimately settle upon - which is whether thinking might cease. If that is your primary concern, I'd make this your first line, and continue from there.

"For it might indeed be that if I entirely ceased to think, I should thereupon altogether cease to exist." — charles ferraro

Because of the inclusion of that first paragraph, it didn't seem to me you knew, quite what's up with Descartes - and the question you settled upon isn't the biggest problem. The problems I described are the biggest problems. A method of sceptical doubt, leading to Solipsism - escaped with reference to God. If that doesn't interest you, that's fine and dandy. No harm no foul. But conversely, I have no interest in an idea that assumes cogito ergo sum is established by sound reason, by discussing the implications thereof.

charles ferraro

↪counterpunch

Of course, everyone is entitled to their opinion. Too bad you're incapable of understanding what I wrote.
Perhaps your "verbal gymnastics" are better than mine.

counterpunch

↪charles ferraro

Too bad you're a crappy writer - who opens by bombarding the reader with questions that are not the subject of the post - using unnecessary jargon in an attempt to impress. I'd be more impressed if you said what you meant directly, using simple terms where possible - and jargon where unavoidable.

is an impersonal "thought-in-general" the ontological precondition for the existence of the "I," — charles ferraro

Do you mean, is his soul the thinking thing? Dues Ex Machina? Descartes thought so, yes! He located the soul in the pineal gland!

charles ferraro

↪counterpunch

Too bad you're a pompous idiot. Why don't you grow up and learn how to engage others with civility? Is this direct enough for you?

counterpunch

↪charles ferraro

Why not engage with others contentiously? Civility is so sterile. Why not bang the table, and scream "you can't handle the truth." Besides, with the pineal gland thing, I thought we were coming around to your question.

But, perhaps, the most fundamental question of all is whether the occurrence of my "thinking" and of my "existing" is vulnerable, or invulnerable, to the possibility of complete cessation? — charles ferraro

...afterall, it is pretty much the same question as:

"is an impersonal "thought-in-general" the ontological precondition for the existence of the "I,"
— charles ferraro — charles ferraro

Both can be summed up as:

Do you mean, is his soul the thinking thing? Dues Ex Machina? Descartes thought so, yes! He located the soul in the pineal gland! — counterpunch

So there's a direct answer to both your question.

hypericin

everyone's life is bracketed by the permanent, omnipresent possibility of death. Does that make it trivial?

charles ferraro

↪hypericin

Unfortunately, yes! Unless, of course, someone who fully understands and respects the argument can demonstrate that there is a serious error, or omission, in the argument that invalidates it?

Antony Nickles

↪charles ferraro

But, perhaps, the most fundamental question of all is whether the occurrence of my "thinking" and of my "existing" is vulnerable, or invulnerable, to the possibility of complete cessation? — charles ferraro

For it might indeed be that if I entirely ceased to think, I should thereupon altogether cease to exist. — Descartes

...a more adequate and more complete version of the truth would be expressed by the phrase: "Cogito contingenter, ergo Sum contingenter." The: When and while I am thinking contingently (in the first person, present tense mode), I must be existing contingently." — charles ferraro

I'm not well versed in Descartes, but Cavell read a phrase of Emerson's that I always thought interesting. Emerson quotes his reader saying what they are too timid to: " 'I think' 'I am' ", and the take is along the lines of the distinction that Wittgenstein sees between words and their expression (that they are said, by me, right now, in this place, etc.). With Emerson it is in the sense, as you say, of a performance. But J.L. Austin will identify a class of words that perform something in being said (expressed), as in: I do, I promise, ect. The saying of it is to marry--Saying I promise is to make the promise. In this sense, saying "I think!" "I am!" is to perform the creation of your own existence. To assert yourself; claim who you are; what you are made of (averse to conformity, Emerson will say).

Now this is a little different than our imagining of "ceasing to exist", but is it really? Put the way you say as "existing contingently", when we simply conform to everyone else, part of us, in a sense that really matters to us, ceases to be; to be distinct.

In conclusion, because of their contingent natures, the true significance of Descartes' Cogito and even of his indubitably certain Sum, is their inherent existential tenuousness and triviality — charles ferraro

So it is not the proof that is tenuous, but us--are we to be trivial?

charles ferraro

↪Antony Nickles

Words that perform something in being said, or expressed.

Words that create something in being said, or expressed.

OK GOT IT!

So, then, man is like the biblical Creator God who SAID, "Let there be light, and there was light," when he SAYS "I think contingently, I am contingently," and, lo and behold, he thinks contingently, and he is contingently.

In other words, man can perform the creation of his own contingent existence whenever and while he thinks contingently.

OK

But, unlike the Creator God, his creative act is open, at every moment, to the possibility of complete cessation.

I don't know about you, but this perpetual openness to and oppressive, arbitrary, unrelenting subjection to the possibility of complete cessation clearly indicates, to me, that the contingent Cartesian thinking and the indubitably certain contingent Cartesian existing don't really matter that much, even if they are man's own creation.

Wayfarer

Clearly, Descartes considered his personal thinking, his Cogito, to be an inherently contingent occurrence because it was always open and vulnerable to the possibility of complete cessation. — charles ferraro

However, with the 'complete cessation' - presumably either death, or perhaps through entering a trance, or perhaps anaesthesia - then indeed there is no thinking, nor self-awareness. But Descartes' point, is that it is indubitable that when he is thinking, then he must exist. The fact that he might cease to exist doesn't refute this claim. And in the context of the argument, his existence is not a contingent fact: it is a basic fact, upon which other facts, such as the possibility of forming ideas, are based.

Wayfarer

Incidentally, St Augustine articulated a clear pre-cursor to Descartes, centuries previously:

Without any delusive representation of images or phantasms, I am most certain that I am and that I know and delight in this. In respect of these truths, I am not at all afraid of the arguments of the Academicians, who say, “What if you are deceived?” For if I am deceived, I am. For he who is not, cannot be deceived; and if I am deceived, by this same token I am. And since I am if I am deceived, how am I deceived in believing that I am? For it is certain that I am if I am deceived. Since, therefore, I, the person deceived, should be, even if I were deceived, certainly I am not deceived in this knowledge that I am. And, consequently, neither am I deceived in knowing that I know. For, as I know that I am, so I know this also, that I know. And when I love these two things, I add to them a certain third thing, namely, my love, which is of equal moment. For neither am I deceived in this, that I love, since in those things which I love I am not deceived; though even if these were false, it would still be true that I loved false things. — St Augustine, City of God

charles ferraro

↪Wayfarer

Nowhere in what I have written and posted here, and elsewhere, on this Forum have I ever claimed that the truth of Descartes' Cogito Sum was not an indubitably certain intuition.

If you think I did, then you are sorely mistaken.

What I have argued for, WHILE ALWAYS SIMULTANEOUSLY SUBSCRIBING TO THE INDUBITABLY CERTAIN INTUITIVE TRUTH OF THE COGITO SUM, is the contingent nature of the Cogito and of the Sum. They are not mutually exclusive. The truth of the latter does not cancel out the truth of the former, and is not intended to do so.

I simply highlighted and placed emphasis on the contingent aspect of both the Cogito and the Sum, their inherent openness and susceptibility to the possibility of complete cessation, as mentioned by Descartes himself.

To me, this provided the correct, broader context within which to place the indubitable certainty of the Cogito Sum.

Bartricks

↪charles ferraro

What you say sounds correct to me. As I read him, his point is that the thought "I exist" is necessarily true whenever or wherever it occurs. But its existence is not necessary. That is, though it will invariably be true 'if' it occurs, whether it occurs or not is a contingent matter. As such though I can know for certain that I exist, my existence is nevertheless contingent. So the most certain of matters is contingent, not necessary.

charles ferraro

↪Bartricks

Thanks Bartricks! You understood my point.

counterpunch

What you say sounds correct to me. — Bartricks

People are so susceptible to flattery.

Thanks Bartricks! You understood my point. — charles ferraro

Agree with me and I'll ask you why!

What I have argued for, WHILE ALWAYS SIMULTANEOUSLY SUBSCRIBING TO THE INDUBITABLY CERTAIN INTUITIVE TRUTH OF THE COGITO SUM... — charles ferraro

But it's not a fundamental certainty, because it's arrived at by a method of sceptical doubt. Had Descartes plunged his hand into the fire, he would have found he could not doubt the existence of his physical self, or the objective reality of the fire. In a manner that is fundamentally prior to cogito - the pain pleasure response inherent to the biological organism would force him to accept the truth of objective reality. And thus, that the thinking thing is really the biological thing, and not the soul thing.

Wayfarer

↪charles ferraro

Yes, you’re correct, I completely fail to see the point of the OP.

charles ferraro

↪Wayfarer

Thanks Wayfarer.

jgill

. . . the true significance of Descartes' Cogito and even of his indubitably certain Sum, is their inherent existential tenuousness and triviality. — charles ferraro

I've always thought his comment on existence and thought trivial. On the other hand his brilliance is apparent with the discovery of analytic geometry.

charles ferraro

↪jgill

But, hopefully, now you have reasons for what you thought. He was a genius!

Wayfarer

Thanks Wayfarer — charles ferraro

Perhaps you might say a few more words about ‘contingency’. You say that Descartes should have said, ‘I must be thinking contingently.’ Contingent upon what, exactly? That’s the thing I’m having trouble grasping.

Bartricks

↪jgill

Presumably you think Newton's most important contribution was the sterling job he did as head of the Royal Mint, and that Jesus' excellent joinery is unjustly overlooked.

baker

In conclusion, because of their contingent natures, the true significance of Descartes' Cogito and even of his indubitably certain Sum, is their inherent existential tenuousness and triviality. — charles ferraro

Of course. Whatever philosophy Descartes devised, it's always is reference to RCC doctrine. The moment one divorces Descartes' thoughts from the doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church, is the moment when they're rendered trivial.
Per RCC doctrine, the individual person/soul is contingent upon God and has no existence on his own.

charles ferraro

↪Wayfarer

If some entity or activity is closed to, not vulnerable to, not subject to, or not susceptible to the possibility of complete cessation, then I consider that entity or activity to be “NECESSARY.”

Certainly, I CAN have an “idea” or “conception” of such a necessary being in the first, person, present tense mode, but I CANNOT have a direct “experience” of such a necessary being in the first, person present tense mode.

It would be called NECESSARY THINKING ACTIVITY, or a NECESSARY “COGITO.”

If some entity or activity is open to, vulnerable to, subject to, or susceptible to the possibility of complete cessation, then I consider that entity or activity to be “CONTINGENT.”

Certainly, I CAN have an “idea” or “conception” of such a contingent being in the first person, present tense mode, AND I CAN also have a direct “experience” of such a contingent being in the first person, present tense mode.

It would be called CONTINGENT THINKING ACTIVITY, or a CONTINGENT “COGITO.”

This differs significantly from the meaning of necessary and contingent being as used traditionally in philosophy.

Traditionally, a necessary being had its originating cause situated within itself, but a contingent being had its originating cause situated outside itself in another, higher being.

This might be the case, but, for my purposes, it is too overreaching and leaps to conclusions I cannot verify empirically or through my personal experience in the first person, present tense mode.

Wayfarer

Traditionally, a necessary being had its originating cause situated within itself, but a contingent being had its originating cause situated outside itself in another, higher being. — charles ferraro

I see. Of course that is true, but I'm still failing to see its relevance to what Descartes sought to demonstrate. He wasn't attempting to argue for the immortality of the soul, but to find a first principle upon which certain knowledge can be founded.

charles ferraro

↪funky

It seems to me that the major opponent to the so-called "perennial" truth of the Aristotelian/Thomistic notion of static, eternal, divinely created, substantial forms, or substantial species, was not Renee Descartes. It was, instead, the theory proposed by Charles Darwin which claimed, and provided empirical evidence to verify, that natural species, or forms, evolved over long periods of time through the combined processes of natural selection and spontaneous genetic mutation.

charles ferraro

↪Wayfarer

The first principle Descartes discovered was the Cogito Sum. But, unfortunately, it was an indubitably certain principle that was inherently contingent. So any knowledge based upon it would be indubitably certain, but also be equally as contingent. The indubitably certain knowledge, like the indubitably certain principle upon which it was based, would be subject to the possibility of complete cessation. In no way, would it represent any kind of eternal truth.

Wayfarer

So any knowledge based upon it would be indubitably certain, but also be equally as contingent. — charles ferraro

I don't know about that. Descartes was well aware of the concept of necessary truths, or a priori truths. Typical amongst these are the truths of reason and mathematics, which are very much what I think Descartes had in mind when speaking of 'clear and distinct ideas'. The scholastic idea of 'the rational soul' was precisely that the faculty which grasped such truths was the immortal element in man. Even though Descartes broke from scholasticism in fundamental ways, I think this element of their dualism was preserved albeit in a radical new form. It was common knowledge in Descartes' time that the soul was created by God, and so, whilst contingent in the sense of being dependent on God, was of a higher order than material particulars, on account of being less removed from its source.

In contrast to contemporary philosophers, most 17th century philosophers held that reality comes in degrees—that some things that exist are more or less real than other things that exist. At least part of what dictates a being’s reality, according to these philosophers, is the extent to which its existence is dependent on other things: the less dependent a thing is on other things for its existence, the more real it is.

17th Century Theories of Substance, IEP.

So it's true that in this picture, the individual soul is contingent upon God, but that doesn't mean that it is incapable of grasping necessary truths.

Valentinus

↪charles ferraro

One element that stands out vividly after reading across the works of Descartes is the confidence that his Method is more important than any particular result it can yield by him using it. His opposition to the vision of Aquinas was directed at the desire to settle questions rather than to make them the work of future thinkers.
In that context, I read the close embrace of thinking and being as a challenge rather than an explanation. To the degree it explains something, other things stand outside, waiting to be explained.

The Existential Triviality of Descartes' Cogito Sum

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