How can you even speak of them as the same person then? Either the unconscious peron is the same as the conscious person, or it is not. — Heiko

Because from the outside there is a continuity of body and legal status. But when the body is 'unconscious' it doesn't have a phenomenological unity (or not an interesting one that defined a person, anyway) because that depends on function.

I think I'm a panpsychist and a property dualist

When I asked 'what compelled you?' it was more an attempt to highlight the irony implied by your questioning of 'subjective intentional agency' i.e., if you, the subject, did not intend to write that post, then.... But, as they say, a joke explained is a joke lost. — Wayfarer

I don't know, I think in this case I'm finding it funnier and funnier. There's layers to it now.

I'm a bit pissed off that panpsychism and idealism are leading the way. Time for me to pause and reflect.

It's a gross equivocation of the meaning of both. I have faith and trust in science, insofar as I accept that it is conducted by people of integrity who have both the education and access to the resources to investigate and validate these kinds of theories. I presume that, if I undertook the same training and viewed the same research, then I would probably arrive at the same conclusion. — Wayfarer

Amen. Apollodorus is heading for a ban. Shouldn't have to say this stuff.

What compelled you to say that? — Wayfarer

He was supposed to say 'consciousness' wasn't he?

Anyway, I don't really see the circularity, not a vicious one anyway. Consider an analogy with DNA. Our knowledge of DNA is a product of the activities of DNA. *shrug*

EDIT: you might have an interesting insight here. But I'm not sure you've brought it out.

I don't think so. Energy is always working, no? But God spends eternity not doing anything.

I was born as "Corvus", and Cheshire was born as "Cheshire". — Corvus

Sure, but that's not what Cheshire would say. Cheshire would say "I was born as Cheshire, and Corvus was born as Corvus." What accounts for these different perspectives? They are different. In the first, the 'I' is Corvus, but in the second the 'I' is Cheshire. Yet there is but one reality. So are these statements in conflict? Is there a trick of language? What's going on?

I'm happy to follow where the logic goes. If that's mysticism or Wooga Wooga-ism, so be it. What does your spirituality say?

Anything pertaining to metaphysical or ontological questions such as why were you born, why are you you, why am I I, this type of WHY questions cannot yield meaningful answers

What is the casual story that resulted in you being corvus and not Cheshire?

By your definition comatose patients would still be "conscious" and jelly fish and humans would share similar mental experience. — prothero

Only if comatose patients retain a unified identity, which arguably they don't. When, in medical terms, someone loses consciousness, how is that to be distinguished for them losing a coherent functional identity? What phenomenologically, is the difference?

And if 'conscious' just means 'capable of experience', then yes, anything that is capably of experience is, by definition, equally conscious. The difference in complexity and richness is in what they are conscious of.

Ok, let it be so, brain in vat time again and all aboard for the ride. But if my brain is a brain in a vat it would not be a brain as I understand brains because what I now understand to be a brain is (I'm imagining) an illusory brain. And it would not be a vat as I understand a vat because I only know illusory vats. So I would not be a brain in a vat. I would be something and I would not be able to say what that thing is because all I seem to perceive now is some kind of psychological trickery and I have no experience of reality. So it turns out that I cannot coherently state the situation that I am supposing to be possible. And that makes me pause to think whether it is a coherent supposition at all. — Cuthbert

I like this. This is a far more satisfactory answer than "It's just silly lets not think about it." It takes the problem seriously and suggests a genuine solution. And this analysis seems right to me. It seems like Cuthbert has correctly articulated a niggling feeling of 'there's something wrong with the thought experiment, but I'm not quite sure what'.

But, the correlation is strong enough that we can establish a relationship. This relationship is strong enough that we even have drugs that treat imbalances in the brain of neurotransmitter levels. So, what's wrong with that? — Shawn

Oh, sure. I misunderstood, I thought you were suggesting a simple identity.

what is wrong with assuming that moods are really just neurotransmitter levels working in the brain? — Shawn

Because they're different. A mood is a background state of feeling. A neurotransmitter doing its thing is a neurotransmitter doing it's thing. The fact that they occur together suggests a relationship, sure. But a simple identity is not quite right. The two things have different properties. More needs to be said.

A. Does materialism have a particular handicap compared to other types of metaphysics that do not consider fundamental consciousness, and if so, what is this handicap? — Eugen

Materialism is very poorly defined. As a theory of mind, what people mostly seem to mean is nothing other than emergentism. Emergentism is more clearly defined and informative a word. All materialists, I suggest, think that consciousness only came into being relatively late in the universe, perhaps with the development of brains. And the hard problem applies very much to emergentists: how do we get consciousness from interactions of severally non-conscious systems exactly?

B. Are there rational arguments to circumvent the hard problem in other types of metaphysics, or does neutral monism / panprotopsychism collapse into mysterianism?

I don't see how neutral monism helps - as other posters have pointed out. The natural antithesis of emergentism is panpsychism. And I don't think panpsychism is a form of mysterianism at all. Mysterianism is, perhaps, sometimes even a form of emergentism - "We'll never know how consciousness emerges from brain activity, but somehow it does - all the evidence suggests so."

So on reflection the notion of primitive forms of non-conscious experience should not be too hard to entertain. — prothero

As you know my views are somewhat similar to yours in some ways. I know you like to reserve the word 'conscious' for creatures with brains, and use some other term 'experiential' perhaps, to refer to the fact that, perhaps, there is something it is like to be a molecule, or some kind of simple system or process. You think this is more consistent with typical usage and is less confusing. Is that right? I think the exact opposite. In philosophy 'conscious' is typically used to refer to that faculty (whatever it is) the possession of which is necessary and sufficient for that thing to have an experience. So I object to your usage as not being consistent with standard usage in the literature. You have adopted a more typically scientific/medical usage which obscures the relevant philosophy.

This is a great OP. I disagree with most of it, but I am able to disagree with it because it is so clear and transparent. I'll reply in greater length another time. In short, your definitions do reflect some usage, but crucially not other important usage. Sometimes (indeed, perhaps most often) 'consciousness' is not used to describe a set of anything. It is something like 'the capacity to experience'. It is that concept that is often the subject of philosophical discourse, including in discussion of the 'hard problem'.

I'll challenge your focus on brains. If the structure and function of brains determine, in a strong correlative way, the experiences of that brain, why does not the structure and function of a rock similarly determine the experiences of that rock? Or does it? What is the relevant difference (if there is one) between the two cases?

The (mind)ing is what the brain does. — 180 Proof

But not (consciousness)ing

In this paragraph only I found the following rather exotic philosophical.scientific terms/concepts: pluralistic monism, quantum dynamics, superpositions or blended wavelengths, panpsychism. And then you pretend all this is your opinion and ask from people to tell you what they think! — Alkis Piskas

It's possible for one's own opinion to overlap with that of others. I don't think Enrique is claiming he came up will all this completely by himself. Not that I understand it particularly.

"A process of integrating information for the purpose of self organization" — Pop

Is that what you think an experience is?

Prothero, is x conscious if there is something it is like to be x?
Is x conscious if x is capable of experience?

I think neurowhatsits have a lot to say on what we experience, but nothing at all to say on how experience came to be. I just haven't heard anything remotely convincing.

I think discussions on your threads on self, evil, consciousness, mystery, etc more than most(?) other threads illustrate a metaphilosophical problem: how one can use philosophy (instead of science) in order to generate a "theory" which purports to explain – over and above describing (or stipulatively defining) concepts for – facts of the matter. The assumption that, in other words, 'philosophy is (like) a science' is what's problematic, and many conjure-up eclectic "theories" which are incomprehensible to others trying to clarify how the concepts at issue can be used more consistently and coherently, in effect, talking past each other philosophically. I've yet to be persuaded that philosophy is theoretical (vide Witty et al). — 180 Proof

Philosophy itself is an interesting case. I could have put as one of the sentences: "Philosophy is not theoretical" Definition or theory? I guess 'definition' can be further subdivided into a number of categories. As can 'theory'.

The idea is that there could be some kind of loosely structured discourse where people who think they might have new philosophical ideas (either new possible positions, or new arguments for existing positions) can say what those ideas are, and then the responses should only be either affirming that that actually is a new idea so far as the respondent knows, or else, a link to or quote of or other brief educational presentation of someone else who has already had that (supposedly) exact idea, and why (if) not everyone is on board with it already. — Pfhorrest

It's a nice idea but it requires quite a lot of discipline from all concerned. :)

It shows just how complex the relationship between theories and definitions are. — Jack Cummins

Yes, I think that's right. I was very struck by how divided the responses are. There's only one where everyone agrees. It seems, however, that people do recognise an intuitive difference between theory and definition, even if, with some concepts/ideas they are perhaps difficult or impossible to separate completely.

I'd be interested in @Pfhorrest and @Banno's views, and anyone else's.

A definition is used for identification while a theory is used for prediction. — Harry Hindu

That seems quite good to me. With regard to consciousness it works well. Some definitions (but not others) of consciousness are completely neutral as to which objects can have it. It takes a theory to then predict which things can have experiences and which things cannot.

Brain waves are closely related to states of awareness — Enrique

In humans, no doubt. But not in rocks, because rocks don't have brains.

Amazing work. :up: — fdrake

Could have been a lot better, but thank you! The results so far are fascinating.

It seems that most of the "is" statements are definitions. The theories are more vague and require definitions to make them less so. — Harry Hindu

This was the only one I wasn't torn over when I voted. — fdrake

That's interesting. I thought it was perhaps the most straightforwardly definitional one.

I'm surprised the sentience one is unanimous so far. And I'm surprised some of the others are split nearly half each. Very interesting.

The association of numbers with different states of consciousness seems definitional, but the ordering of them seems theoretical. — fdrake

Hadn't thought of that. :up:

Hmmmphh! Don't we need to define "defintion" and "theory" first? — Harry Hindu

Inevitably! Go ahead. Maybe we should also have a theory of definition and theory as well.

Most are definitions, or descriptions, and a few are, it seems, in/direct explanations aka (testable) "theories". — 180 Proof

:up: Did you do the poll?

Either all are simply definitions or are fragments of theories. Speaking for myself, single sentences are definitional in almost all cases and if not express, clarify, expand upon concepts that are part of a theory, a theory being a set of ideas that are interrelated and designed to provide an explanatory framework for observed phenomena. — TheMadFool

Sure. You can still give a glib summary of a theory in a sentence, no?

You must look up these words in a standard dictionary — Alkis Piskas

Consulting a dictionary is never bad advice. Thank you. :)

Well you can’t even be listening to what I’m saying then. — apokrisis

Listening =/= comprehending. The former is our responsibility. That latter is mostly yours.

I guess my pet theory is that waves and wavicles throughout nature combine as readily as a body of water whether we directly witness this or not, and these hybrids comprise both image qualia (dimensional) and nonimage qualia (feeling). But this matter is also extremely quantized, at least on the microscopic scale, which significantly disassociates it, so only specific, very complex and hyperorganized arrangements can give rise to complex qualitative experience, yet the possibilities are vast and far exceed the bounds of biological taxonomy as we currently define it. So that is why my view is a version of panprotopsychism: the actual substance of perception is present at the nano and micro scale, much more fundamental to matter than the level of organization that gives rise to either biological form or humanlike sentience. I regard human sentience as the somewhat arbitrary standard for what is conscious, just as the visible spectrum is our standard for what light is, corresponding to the brain and eye respectively. — Enrique

This is is the closest you've come in this thread to giving a theory, as far as I can tell. It's far too unclear for me to engage with. I originally thought you were talking about the Penrose-Hameroff stuff about microtubules, which I don't understand, as that's the only well-known theory of consciousness involving quantum stuff I know of. But that's not what you are talking about is it? And even that can hardly be called a paradigm, it's just one theory among many.

In very general terms I'm always somewhat sympathetic to field theries of consciousness as these intuitively feel faithful to the phenomenology of consciousness and attention. Our attention seems stretchy, and spread over and through many things at once, like a field. And I think that's important evidence.

I'll ask you the same question I ask any reductive theorist: why can't all the stuff you talk about happen in the dark? Why does that necessitate consciousness?

Is any of what Apo said relevant to your theory? I am in no position to judge that at all (as I understand neither of you), but you may be able to tell.

Consciousness is a state of integrated information - is the most coherent definition that I have come across. — Pop

That's really not a definition. Definitions are about what people mean and how words are used. People don't mean "I'm in a state of integrated information about this rose" when they say "I'm conscious of this rose". (Not that normal people would even say that to be fair.) The IIT is a theory, NOT a definition!

It's something to do with nano tubules I think. Whatever they are.

EDIT: sorry, microtubules. I'm getting the wrong jargon.

Definitions are over-rated. — unenlightened

I think he is as much asking for a theory of evil as a definition. Although exploring what people mean by the word is interesting in this case. Definition and theory blend I think with this concept.

@Apokrisis,

I read Pattee's Cell Phenomenology: The First Experience

It was interesting. Have you looked at that one?

The following is a description of what I think is the most valid framework for modeling consciousness that currently exists. Tell me what you think! — Enrique

I've never really understood it, but I haven't tried to study it in earnest. Whatever its merits, I don't think it can be a 'paradigm'. The field of consciousness studies is too fractured and divergent to have any paradigms as yet. A paradigm is a kind of wide reaching set of assumptions that is nearly universally accepted. We're nowhere near that with consciousness. Although many people seem to be convinced that biology is relevant.

This is how the science of life and mind is actually going. — apokrisis

This is the statement of a priest.

I could go either way. — ArguingWAristotleTiff

Noted, but what do you think of the reputation system?

↪180 Proof Placebos do require faith. Without it they don't work
— Janus
This one. — 180 Proof

10/10
Let the faithless behold! That's made my day. :)

Here we go. 180 is about to clear things up and resolve a miscommunication. Let's see how he does. :) Get your score cards out.

And you can't say that we are morally valuable because we are made of meat, because the meat itself is not morally valuable absent a mind inhabiting it. — Bartricks

What about functionalism? If a mind is a lump of meat functioning in a particular way, lumps of functioning meat can be valuable without there being any immaterial objects. I'm just going with your assumptions again here. I'm not a functionalist, but you haven't adequately dealt with actual materialist theories of mind here.

1. How have you arrived at your belief that God exists? Was it after some theoretical or logical proofs on God 's existence or some personal religious experience? Or via some other routes? — Corvus

I consider myself a theist, but I doubt if people who knew my views would call me a theist.

I'm a theist because I think, on balance, some of the reports of religious experience/insight by others is likely true. There's no certainty there of course.

I think the most foolish of people are very often religious (more so than typical atheists), but I also think the ones that seem to be the most insightful are also religious, again, moreso than typical atheists. These are general impressions of course, and again there's no certainty, but they are very influential to me. I'm not willing to write off people's views by lazily saying they fear death, or it's wishful thinking, or any of the other psychological maladies that they are thoughtlessly diagnosed with, en masse.

I was influenced by a particular philosopher who pretty much persuaded me (I never met him, I just read his stuff) that some kind of theism was likely true. I was an atheist before that. I think quite a lot of what he said was likely just wrong, but much of it I find sound.

I'm a panpsychist. By itself, that is irrelevant to theism. But theism at least involves the idea that consciousness is present at the start, or even before the start of the universe if you think in those terms (and yes I know south of the south pole blah blah - I won't get into that now). So theism is, as a metaphysical position, at least involves the view that consciousness is not emergent. And panpsychism is the antithesis of emergentism in relation to consciousness. For me, this opens the door to theism, but not all of it indiscriminately. It does not follow from the fact that because atoms are conscious we therefore have to hate fags. That's nuts, obviously. It's why I don't like aligning myself with religious folks. I hate the bastards mostly. And I don't think most of them actually believe in anything in particular - they have neither insight, intellectual justification, nor any clear idea of what they believe. So I don't think most theists are actually theists at all. I don't think religious texts have much philosophical import, relevance or worth, at least from what I have seen (and I am no expert). However I think it possible they contain, in places, intuited wisdom and insight. There are babies in the bathwater that I don't want to murder, and am suspicious of indiscriminate anti-religious sentiment.

2. Why do you try to prove God in a theoretical / logical way, when already believing in God's existence?

Because I'm a philosopher by nature. I'm not a mystic, alas. I can't talk to God on my inner telephone, at least not yet. I'm not a romantic artist receiving divine inspiration, alas. I see no hand of God in the natural world, except as a result of my philosophical panpsychism. I'm a rather plodding stick-in-the-mud philosopher. And figuring out this stuff rationally is what I do, because it's the only thing I can do. I have to get inspiration and insight second hand for the most part. I don't 'just know' God, I don't think. But I do accept that some other people might.

Peirce & Dewey, Popper & Witty, for example, don't equate 'useful' with 'truth' (that's a vulgar form of pragmatism associated with William James or Richard Rorty IIRC). Metaphysical, like methodological, positions (e.g. materialism) aren't truth-apt or theoretical explanations, but are, instead, conceptual descriptions, interpretations or procedural criteria. So yeah, philosophy itself is "a very low bar" – anyone can "have" one to live by – the significance of which, however, consists in a combination of its relevant questions' rigour and probity. — 180 Proof

Any of the opinions expressed here would make a good debate subject.

Yes; but useful (self-consistent) or useless (not self-consistent) is more like it. — 180 Proof

Useful is a very low bar to clear for any position. Even self-contradictory positions might be useful from time to time. Unless you mean 'useful' in the more technical context of pragmatism.

"Is the useful, the true?" might be a good debate topic.

I challenge Wayfarer to affirm the proposition (or very close to it): "Both philosophical and scientific materialisms are fallacious" in a formal debate against either myself or someone else in opposition to the proposition.

Materialism of either sort is a position, not an argument. It can be true or false, but not valid or fallacious.