Comments

  • Cosmos Created Mind
    Do I hear the furious stamping fury of the world's tiniest jackboots?apokrisis

    Absolutely. I want to nail you to a wall until you answer my questions. You have similarly become frustrated with me when I have refused to answer yours until you answer mine, ad nauseum. In civil society, this impulse to interrogate is generally considered somewhat anti-social. Someone even wrote about it and amusingly characterised it as the 'philosopher attack'. An excerpt:

    My sister nearly threw the phone at me, in tears, and left the room. My philosopher, on the other hand, was in an absolutely superb mood.

    What just happened? My sister was the unfortunate survivor of a philosopher-attack.
    Alan Cook

    But in philosophical circles, I suggest, there is a converse ethic. Avoiding rigorous (but polite) interrogation is what is anti-social. Less philosophy happens when people don't answer questions. I suggest a polite and productive way to proceed is in batches of questions. First one party has a go, and then the other.
  • Idealism Simplified
    Yeah, fair enough. There are different usages. Looking at Stanford, yours might actually be the more mainstream. However as we have approached this topic via Descartes, his usage is the one in use in this thread, and is the subject of the interaction problem. Here is a bit from the Stanford article on Descartes definition:

    Elsewhere, however, Descartes says that a substance is something “capable of existing independently”; “that can exist by itself”; or “which exists in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its existence” (AT 7: 44, 226, VIII A 24). Descartes contrasts substances, so defined, with modes, qualities and attributes, which can depend for their existence on substances.

    In these locations, Descartes affirms an independence criterion of substancehood. This idea may be implicit in Aristotle’s Categories and is gestured at by Al Farabi, but Descartes appears to be the first influential philosopher who explicitly defines substances as those things that are capable of existing by themselves. Descartes adds that only God truly qualifies as a substance so defined, because nothing else could exist without God, a view that would be reaffirmed with greater emphasis by Descartes’ most influential follower, Spinoza. However, Descartes recognises two kinds of “created substance” – things that can exist without anything else, leaving aside God: material body, which is defined by extension, and mental substance, which is defined by thought, which, in this context, is more or less equivalent to consciousness.
    — SEP
  • Idealism Simplified
    I kind of agree with this. Although substance dualism really is incoherent, but that doesn't matter because there are no substance dualists. You may well be right that less radical dualists (i.e. all dualists) are accused of substance dualism to make their views look implausible. You make the case yourself for the incoherence of substance dualism and its rarity in philosophy:

    So "having nothing in common" is already ruled out, from the beginning, as a false representation.Metaphysician Undercover

    Here:

    In this way we have substance dualism, one type of substance contains matter, the other does not.Metaphysician Undercover

    I think you are using 'substance' in a different way from, say, Spinoza.
  • Cosmos Created Mind
    ↪apokrisis The question I asked was this:

    Why would they need some kind of neurosemiotic model to get to what I would want to call consciousness?
    — bert1
    bert1
  • Cosmos Created Mind
    You never give your causal account. And now we have further confusion, is consciousness caused, realised, enacted, or what? As for panpsychism, the AI you used said biosemiosis incorporates the view that all matter has proto-experience, which is indistinguishable from panpsychism. I didn't say that, you did, via an AI, in your post. You're not engaging with any of the philosophical issues, and again and again, you decline interrogation.
  • Writing about philosophy: what are the basic standards and expectations?
    I’ll talk about the quality of writing, not necessarily the quality of the ideas, although I guess it’s not easy to separate them. There’s a quote I read somewhere that I can’t find again. I’ll paraphrase it—Clarity is so important and so unusual, it is often mistaken for truth. Here’s another— Clarity means expressing what you mean in a way that makes it obvious you’re wrong.

    So… clarity. I’m pretty smart. I should be able to figure out what you’re trying to say and whether I agree with it. Reality is not all that complicated. If you can’t describe it so a reasonably intelligent adult can understand it, I question the value of what you have to say.
    T Clark

    I'll second that
  • Cosmos Created Mind
    So stop being a lazy bugger and define what you mean by consciousness in a way that is relevant to how I treat it.apokrisis

    No. This is a philosophy forum. Show how your worldview solves philosophical questions of consciousness as philosophers define it.

    Panpsychism is a brute fact claim rather than a causal account. So why do you badger me endlessly for my causal account except to again crow about your brute fact claim.apokrisis

    I am merely pointing out your repeated error.

    You show no interest in what I say. And yet you won't leave me alone.apokrisis

    It's because I love you.
  • Cosmos Created Mind
    The question I asked was this:

    Why would they need some kind of neurosemiotic model to get to what I would want to call consciousness?bert1
  • Cosmos Created Mind
    Why what?apokrisis

    Why would they need some kind of neurosemiotic model to get to what I would want to call consciousness?
  • Cosmos Created Mind
    And to get to what you would want to call consciousness, they would need some kind of neurosemiotic model.apokrisis

    Why?
  • Cosmos Created Mind
    I am grateful to you for using an AI to generate your answer, which I will take to represent your view. It is much easier to understand than your posts typically are. I heartily recommend you copy its style. I note with relief it does not begin any paragraphs with 'So'.

    Biosemiotics argues that life is fundamentally a process of sign production, interpretation, and communication, which is the basis for meaning and cognition. — ApoAI

    I don't see a significant difference between mind as a process and mind as a function in relation to the conceptual issues. Both are a system doing something. In either case, whether it be a system performing interpretation embedded in an environment, or a brain realising a function, there is still a conceptual disconnect with that and consciousness.

    ]Biosemiotics attempts to address the "hard problem" of subjective experience (qualia) by positing that proto-experience or a basic level of awareness is a fundamental aspect of all matter/biological processes, which then expands to higher degrees of consciousness through complex, hierarchical information processing in the brain. — ApoAI

    This is panpsychism, which you have previously distanced yourself from. ApoAI's apparent separation of proto-experience from consciousness is conceptually mistaken; consciousness does not admit of degree.

    First-Person Perspective: It incorporates a necessary first-person, internal perspective, recognizing the subjective, felt qualities of experience that are difficult to capture with a purely functional, third-person approach. — ApoAI

    That's interesting. What is needed for an emergentist account such as this is sufficiency, not necessity. Necessity requires that consciousness is already there. What is needed is the conceptual link that moves from sign production, interpretation, and communication to consciousness, without presupposing consciousness, on pain of begging the question. Why must the processes of sign production, interpretation, and communication embody/enact/realise/constitute (pick your concept please) consciousness?

    Thank you for getting help to write an intelligible post. If it wasn't a potential violation of the site rules, I would encourage you to do so again for the sake of clarity. However the hard problem remains untouched.
  • Idealism Simplified
    Thank you, that's interesting. I can see that on this metaphysic, ideas interact with matter. But this isn't necessarily substance dualism, on which view there is more than one substance, each of which have nothing in common with the others. The non-dualist will say that if ideas and matter interact, they must have something in common, and therefore are not wholly other, and therefore not two totally distinct substances. I have no idea if Plato, Aristotle or any other platonists were, in fact, full-on substance dualists. In my experience, people who say they are dualist generally turn out not to be this kind of full-on two-distinct-substances-with-nothing-in-common type of dualist. I remember Galen Strawson arguing at length that even Descartes was not actually a substance dualist, but a property dualist of some kind (iirc).
  • Cosmos Created Mind
    Then semiosis actually defines life and mind as a modelling relation within the entropic worldapokrisis

    Indeed, functionalists do tend to end up defining 'consciousness' by fiat as a function, just as they have with 'life'. But in doing so making the concept irrelevant to the philosophy and what people actually mean by 'consciousness'.
  • Idealism Simplified
    How does the concept of 'the good' solve the interaction problem?
  • Idealism Simplified
    Descartes wasn't an idealist as far as I'm aware. Idealism is monistic so the interaction problem does not arise.
  • How LLM-based chatbots work: their minds and cognition
    So there is a lot of backstory to my particular take on Peirce.apokrisis

    Please could you tell us about it
  • "Ought" and "Is" Are Not Two Types of Propositions
    It is, and the answer, I think, is 'yes' if we include the assumption of omnipotence in the concept of perfection. It still only follows that what is is what ought to be from God's point of view. It remains possible for God to be at odds with the values of Earthly (or Andromedan) communities, and from their point of view, for God to be an evil git, who ought not to will what he wills. But I'm a moral (inter-)subjectivist. And indeed this is off topic.
  • "Ought" and "Is" Are Not Two Types of Propositions
    Oh, fair enough. In that case I agree with you.
  • "Ought" and "Is" Are Not Two Types of Propositions
    at some point you have to change from what you see about you to how you want things to beBanno

    I agree with you, but haven't you previously resisted a reduction of what ought to be the case to what one wants to be the case?
  • The writing standard introductory note, excessive or not?
    The fact that you are asking this question means you'll be fine I would think. Totally perfect posts aren't possible or necessary. Only Donald Trump is capable of those.
  • Who is the Legitimate Author of the Constitution?
    I've been involved in the set up of a couple of democratically constituted organisations, and there is always an awkward bit at the start, as sort of pre-creational, pre-symmetry breaking standing around and talking bit, where someone says, "OK, let's say this is how it's going to work" and makes a suggestion, writes it down, and then if a few people assent to it, a constitution is born. Then everyone can relax, the constitution gains a legitimacy separate from its author (who is then bound by it) and the whole thing starts off. The longer it lasts without challenge, and the more people consent to it, the more legitimacy it has. The original author doesn't need to possess any intrinsic legitimacy that the constitution must inherit.
  • Hume and legitimate beliefs
    Thanks, that's interesting and food for thought. Bit short on time at the moment so may leave it there.
  • On how to learn philosophy
    The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy is an amazing resource. It goes in depth.
  • The Duality of Mankind?
    I'm not sure that is enough to understand what I mean.Red Sky

    An example might help.
  • Cellular Sentience and Cosmic Bigotry
    Surely “consciousness” is synonymous with “living”?Punshhh

    Maybe ages ago before 'life' got redefined in functional terms.
  • Hume and legitimate beliefs
    Or maybe predictive model-formation does not really admit of rational analysis. If it has evolved it has done so without philosophy and intellectual reflection (perhaps), but that doesn't mean we can't apply reason to it anyway after the fact. Especially if there is a claim to truth.
  • Hume and legitimate beliefs
    Abduction includes elements of induction and deduction, no? The issue still remains.

    Also consider Goodman's new riddle because it's fun. Lets say we have a model arrived at by abduction that predicts that water boils at 100C at earth surface pressure. Now let 'roil' mean 'boils at 100C before 2030 and boils at 150C after". Now do we have two model-predictions that are equally supported by evidence:

    Model 1: Water will boil at 100C at Earth surface pressure next week
    Model 2: Water will roil at 100C at Earth surface pressure next week

    We all presumably think Model 1 is likely to survive the year 2030 and we will abandon model 2, but why? Is there a reason to prefer model 1 over model 2?

    Science doesn't need to worry about this, it gets on fine. But this is philosophy, so we do this kind of shit.

    This is traditionally framed as a problem for induction. But does abduction help particularly?

    (hopefully I've got Goodman roughly right, correct me if not)
  • Hume and legitimate beliefs
    "All powerful"? Whatever gives you that idea?Relativist

    Just that on that view matter always obeys laws.

    According to the theory, laws are relations between types of objects.Relativist

    Oh, OK. That weakens their claim to be real, perhaps, perhaps not. Maybe they are real, but not in the sense of having an independent existence from the systems they govern. I'm not familiar with the view. Interesting though. I can think of further problems - is the generation of objects governed by laws, or do the laws only exist once the object exist? Why does the same type of law always occur with the same type of objects? Why is there consistency across space and time?
  • Cellular Sentience and Cosmic Bigotry
    To see if their "artificial" body can generate sapience or consciousness.Copernicus

    Can you think of a test that would detect sapience or consciousness?
  • Cellular Sentience and Cosmic Bigotry
    i don't follow. Test them for what? What would that show?
  • Cellular Sentience and Cosmic Bigotry
    This self-referential loop—where the cell both contains and enacts its own design—may be the root of sentience.
    It embodies three critical principles:

    1. Self-containment (it maintains boundaries separating self from environment)
    2. Information feedback (it stores and interprets data through DNA and biochemical processes)
    3. Adaptation and evolution (it changes in response to experience)

    These mechanisms mirror the functional properties of consciousness itself: awareness, memory, and adaptation.
    Thus, the cell might not only be the first living structure but also the proto-conscious one—a physical architecture enabling the emergence of the mind.
    Copernicus

    I applaud the OP for its clarity.

    In this section there is the usual definitional conflation that functionalism seems to rely on (in my view). There are the functional aspects of mind, what mind can do (Block's 'access consciousness') and then there is the phenomenal aspect (Block's 'p-conciousness') whereby a system has experiences. Philosophers seem to be divided on whether this distinction is sustainable or not. Functionalists say it isn't - as functions are realised bit by bit, eventually they constitute the phenomenal. Pattee, and some other functionalists, do this by definition, saying that all we mean by 'consciousness' is this collection of functions (Cell phenomenology: The first phenomenon, H Pattee). Property dualists (for example) constantly point out the conceptual disconnect between the phenomenal and the functional, and insist that they certainly do not mean a collection of functions when they speak of consciousness. That's why we keep saying, ad nauseum, 'Yeah but why can't a Zombie do all that?'

    There is conceptual work to be done before we can assess the value of any related science.
  • Hume and legitimate beliefs
    Cheers. If there is something in particular that I ought follow up on, let me know.Banno

    I feel a bit bad now. I was remembering conversations on the philosophy of mind. Your awareness of academic philosophy is valuable and noticed.
  • Hume and legitimate beliefs
    That is not the view of law realists. They suggests there to be an ontological basis for the observed regularities.

    Example: two objects with opposite electric charge (e.g. electron & proton) have a force of attraction between them. This force is a necessary consequence of their properties. The properties and force are ontological.
    Relativist

    Sure, that is a possibility. But it raises a lot of questions about the details of this objective, but invisible and all-powerful, existence that laws partake of. Are the laws all omnipresent? If so, how does that fit with them being numerically distinct? Or is there really one big law that explains everything? Do laws change? Eternal god(s) without the personality?
  • Hume and legitimate beliefs
    Why think that, other than that it's possible?Relativist

    Sorry, missed this. Because laws are descriptive and don't really explain anything. Intention is explanatory. Although this might still be vulnerable to @unenlightened's defence of Hume, I'm not sure.
  • Hume and legitimate beliefs
    By “we”, you mean you.apokrisis

    While @Banno can be as annoying as you to try to have a conversation with, in this he speaks for me as well. You are obscure Apo. It took me ages to decode from your posts your view of consciousness, which turns out to be a fairly straightforward reductive functionalism. Presumably obscurity is your intent, or you wouldn't speak the way you do. You decline interrogation (unless sympathetic), which is your prerogative of course. You say interesting stuff sometimes, but it's hard going to ask questions to get it clarified. Which is what philosophers like to do. @Banno is hard going as well, and slides away. @180 Proof, like you, relatively quickly moves to insult and condescension, although perhaps less so now. Everyone else submits pretty much, except for some of the crazy ones who get banned.
  • We Are Entirely Physical Beings
    Anything born out of (may or may not be within) the universe.Copernicus

    That sounds like general monism to me, rather than physicalism in particular.
  • We Are Entirely Physical Beings
    When I said physical, I meant a product of physical eventsCopernicus

    Sorry I missed that. But what have you said about an event when you say it is physical? What is it about an event that makes it physical?
  • We Are Entirely Physical Beings
    OK, so why does experience accompany it sometimes, and not others?
  • We Are Entirely Physical Beings
    The universe is physical.Copernicus

    Are you able to flesh out your concept of 'physical'?

    Sometimes people seem to mean 'not mental' or even 'not supernatural'

    Sometimes people seem to mean 'possessing structure and function only'

    I think that the latter view perhaps captures 'physicalism' best, because that's what physicalists tend to assert: structure and function is enough to account for or explain everything else, including consciousness. Is that your view?