• What problem does panpsychism aim to address?
    My vote, FWIW... where human infants acquire competence in pointing symbols (including samples) at things, so that a red thing is perceived as an example of red things.bongo fury

    Really? So get a newborn, poke it with a sharp stick, does it feel anything?
  • What problem does panpsychism aim to address?
    Physicalism is not identical to eliminativism.
    — Pfhorrest

    No, but it is usually implied by it.
    bongo fury

    Physicalism regarding consciousness is the view that consciousness is real, and it is physical. Eliminativism is the view that consciousness is not real (at least not in one of the main commonly meant senses).
  • What problem does panpsychism aim to address?
    What panpsychism is about is when people ask "Okay that accounts for the behavior of people and their brains but where in any of this emergence of complex behaviors did phenomenal experience start happening and why?"Pfhorrest

    I'd love to hear an actual answer to this.
  • What problem does panpsychism aim to address?
    Soon we're going to start talking about definitions.
  • What problem does panpsychism aim to address?
    To repeat. My MAIN qualm is with people naively suggesting atoms are ‘conscious’ with the poor defense of ‘just a different kind of conscious’ - which is nonsensical.I like sushi

    Indeed, if a panspychist said that I too would disagree with them. Who says this though?
  • What problem does panpsychism aim to address?
    ↪Pfhorrest Eliminativism & emergentism are non-exclusionary180 Proof

    Of course they are exclusionary, by definition. Functionalism, for example, excludes eliminativism. Functionalism says that consciousness exists and is a function. Eliminativism says that consciousness does not exist.
  • What determines who I am?
    3:15 to 7:05 maybe for an intro to the idea. Continue to 15:00 if you like. Basically the first fifteen minutes gives an overview.

  • What determines who I am?
    Are you asking if your parents could have given you a different name, or are you asking if you had a different father but the same mother, would you still be you.Harry Hindu

    Neither of those. Have you watched the video I linked to at the start of the thread?
  • What determines who I am?
    If bert1 were someone else, he wouldn't be bert1. That's why.neonspectraltoast

    Ok, that's good, thanks.

    I am bert1

    Is this a necessary or contingent truth? (Banno will like this)

    If "I" (when spoken by bert1) just means "bert1" then presumably the answer is that this is a necessary truth, and the problem is solved. I am bert1 because it is necessarily true that I am bert1. Denying this would entail the contradiction: bert1 is not bert1.

    If I is not in every sense bert1, then the fact that I am bert1 is a contingent truth, and could have been otherwise.

    So if we take the OP seriously, and think this an interesting question, and we think that I could have been other than bert1, then we must think that "I", even when spoken by bert1 does not entirely mean "bert1". That is, when bert1 is completely specified, there remains some leftovers, like cold Christmas dinner.

    So this question will split philosophers between those who think that (at least metaphysically) "I am bert1" = "bert1 is bert1" and those who think that "I am bert1" is not the same metaphysical statement than "bert1 is bert1"

    Thoughts on this characterisation of the problem?
  • What determines who I am?
    I don't think the question is about why we are the way we are. That question may well be answerable by reference to experience and DNA, environment, cosmic rays, astrology and whatever else. It's about why I am this one (regardless of the properties of this one) and not another one (regardless of the properties of that one). I don't know how to say it differently to get across the different idea. I can see why you think the question is about why I am the way that I am rather than some other way. Maybe this:

    The difference isn't about my being one of several possible qualitative identities, but about being one of several quantitatively/numerically distinct entities that I might have been any one of, but were not. (Not sure if that's right)

    Banno understands the question I think, even though he thinks it rests on a misunderstanding or mistake.
  • What determines who I am?
    If you're trying to suggest that all identities are identical aside from being in different locales inhabiting different bodies, you're sorely mistaken.neonspectraltoast

    That's one possibility, I'm not sure it's the right one and I'm not sure it actually answers the OP even if it is right. But I'm interested in why you think this could not be the case.
  • What determines who I am?
    You seem to know what you are - a bert1 - but are ignorant of why you are bert1? Is that not a question about causation?Harry Hindu

    Yes, I think it might be. But not about the causation of bert1 - that is independent of the question of why I am bert 1, that is to say, why an I looking out of bert1's eyes and not, say Banno's. One could rephrase to say "What caused me to be bert1 rather than someone else."
  • What determines who I am?
    You're all honestly confused about why you don't identify as other people...?neonspectraltoast

    I'm not sure why I am bert1 rather than someone else
  • What determines who I am?
    Hah! Well, that would be a bonus, but it is not the intention. This stuff fries my brain, I find it very hard to think about. I think this is the hard end of philosophy, because we can't think objectively about this, we have to include our point of view, which we are not used to doing, or at least I'm not. I'm still trying to get to grips with Banno's post, and one thing I notice about it is that it is all third person (the first-person speech is reported in the third person). I think the video I linked to by Stephen Priest really sets out the idea as clearly as can be done, and I recommend having a look. If indeed that idea is the same as the one the OP wants us to talk about. Priest thinks it is an extraordinary fact that out of all the billions of people one of them is extremely peculiar in that it has the absolutely unique property of being me. Banno thinks this is just a matter of grammar. I don't think it is. It's not a matter of grammar that I can see everyone's face except my own.
  • Constructive Panpsychism Discussion
    Should qualia on that definition be regarded as consciousness?Graeme M

    I don't think so, no. Consciousness is an essential prerequisite for an experience. If I'm conscious, it means I'm capable of experience. Exactly what I experience is not yet determined merely by the fact of my being conscious. What I experience are the qualia, and these change. We can't identify consciousness and qualia because qualia change and consciousness doesn't. We are conscious of one thing, then another, then another. The content changes, the consciousness doesn't. This seems really obvious to me but it seems other people's intuitions on this are quite different to mine, so much so that it is hard to have a conversation and know we are talking about the same ideas. Consciousness is that property by virtue of which I am able to have experiences. Consciousness is that which all qualia and experiences have in common, by virtue of which they have a felt character.

    I don't know if a dictionary will help, but it might. Lets take a look at the first two senses of 'consciousness' on dictionary.com:

    1) the state of being conscious; awareness of one's own existence, sensations, thoughts, surroundings, etc.

    2) the thoughts and feelings, collectively, of an individual or of an aggregate of people:
    — dictionary.com
    When I'm talking about consciousness, I mean sense 1, and this is what I believe most panpsychists and people like Chalmers who go on about the hard problem mean. The focus of definition 1 is on the awareness, not what one is aware of. There is a list of categories of content, but only to indicate that is the kind of thing that one's awareness is often aware of.

    It is possible to talk about consciousness in sense 2, we refer to someone's consciousness as the totality of the contents of their conscious mind. In this definition, the focus is on the content of awareness, not on the awareness of content.

    There's other senses as well, like the awake/unconscious distinction. Some like Banno think that covers the concept adequately. I just don't think it is the sense that most philosophers of mind use. I think philosophers typically are using 'consciousness' in sense 1 or 2.

    Does that help at all?
  • What determines who I am?
    Aside from the fact its virtually impossible between exact circumstance, place, society, or genetics you literally went through the absolute same experience and thus have the same perspective, yours would be yours and theirs would be theirs.Outlander

    Yes, but what determines which one you are?
  • Constructive Panpsychism Discussion
    So my objection to panpsychism is that I think people are mistaking the descriptive capacity of appropriate systems for actual physical entities.Graeme M

    I can't speak for other panpsychists, but I don't think experiences, or qualia, are objects, so as far as that is concerned I agree with you. I think it makes much more sense to say that the content of experience is determined by processes and functions, possibly computations, I don't know. But I don't think any of these things can simply be identified with consciousness. For me, an experience happens when a conscious system undergoes a change.
  • What determines who I am?
    Yes, we should probably stop talking about bananas. I was hoping the OP would return and give us some guidance about what we should be arguing about. It's easy enough to find things to argue about anyway I suppose, but it's good to stick on topic. :)
  • What determines who I am?
    If I'm in a room with a ten other people, and I'm not sure which one I am, I don't have to study everyone's DNA, or any of the other things that make people the way they are. I am the one whose face I can't see.
  • What determines who I am?
    The asymmetry arises as soon as the banana becomes this banana.SophistiCat

    I don't see the asymmetry.
  • What determines who I am?
    Banno, did you miss out Paul's first person experience B?
  • What determines who I am?
    Rather, you are asking: why this banana is this banana. This means that this banana is somehow special, compared to the others, because it has the property of "this".SophistiCat

    But unless the banana is conscious, there is no asymmetry (that is relevant to this issue anyway) between one banana and another, and this banana can happily be self-identical without raising any philosophical issues. If a banana is conscious however, then there is an asymmetry, and it would make sense for the banana to ask of itself, why am I this banana, and not my yellow friend over there.
  • What determines who I am?
    I think you are answering the question: "What makes someone the way they are?"

    I don't think that is the question @bizso09 is asking. I think the question @bizso09 is asking is:

    "Out of all the possible perspectives in the universe, why do I have this perspective? Out of all the pairs of eyes that people look out of, why am I looking out of these ones, and not some other ones?"

    Is that right bizso09? Do correct me if I am wrong. Tim Wood may be right and I may have missed your point.
  • Constructive Panpsychism Discussion
    What I am suggesting is that we are mistaken when we claim that consciousness exists because we are aware of it.Graeme M

    What does the word 'aware' in this sentence mean? It can't mean 'conscious' because you're implying that awareness exists but saying that consciousness does not exist.
  • What determines who I am?
    What determines who I am? The question of the OP. Short answer, or rather very long answer in very short form: DNA.tim wood

    This is not a trivial question, I am not asking why a banana is a banana.bizso09
  • Constructive Panpsychism Discussion
    Human experience requires a functioning intact human brain.prothero

    Yes, human experience requires a functioning human, just as canine experience requires a functioning dog, snail experience requires a functioning snail, and rock experience requires a functioning rock.
  • Constructive Panpsychism Discussion
    That is why panpsychism seems so untenable - it's explaining some claimed quality of the world that doesn't seem to be there. I can't for the life of me see why anyone would want to say that a rock has some kind of awareness, at least not in the sense we typically mean.Graeme M

    They'd want to say it because they think it's true, presumably what you mean is that you can't think why anyone would think it was true that a rock was aware.
  • Constructive Panpsychism Discussion
    I think saying things like "electrons are conscious" loses a great number of any audience that might be listening.prothero

    Yes, but there is little value in saying things that people can interpret to fit their own view if what you intend to do is disagree with them. But maybe you are a more agreeable person that I am, and maybe you will keep people interested long enough to have a conversation with them that I will miss out on.
  • Constructive Panpsychism Discussion
    Why is it important for some people to apply these and similar words removed from a context of living beings?jgill

    Because they think it is true, presumably. Things that seem strange sometimes turn out to be true. Then after a while it doesn't seem strange any more.
  • Constructive Panpsychism Discussion
    Rocks as simple aggregates would not be expected to have any unified experience. I think calling a rock "conscious" is part of what makes "panpsychism" seem silly to a lot of people. Asserting the individual constiuents of rocks "quantum events" have some form of non-conscious proto-experience is an entirely different matter.prothero

    There are different versions of panpsychism. You're a micropsychist (only constituents of rocks are conscious), I'm something else (not sure what to call it). I think any object at all, however defined, has a unitary experience. My view is much weirder than yours.
  • Constructive Panpsychism Discussion
    I think language is important and I try to avoid using terms like “consciousness” in ways that violate the common uses and understandings of the term. Language is imprecise and it is important to try to agree on definitions lest discussions become more disputes about usage of words than about ideas.prothero

    I agree. However, I think philosophers of mind, including me, do use the word 'consciousness' in a perfectly normal sense. Indeed, it is the sense often first listed in a dictionary.
  • Constructive Panpsychism Discussion
    Basically if what we ‘experience’ - our ‘experiencing’ - is what we call consciousness,I like sushi

    That's not what I would call consciousness. I'd call what we experience the content of consciousness, i.e. what we are conscious of.
  • Constructive Panpsychism Discussion
    But all of those still follow a nothing to something jump. A good example of the confusion might be the following. Dichromatic vision to Trichromatic vision is not a step up in the gradient of chromatics. It is dichromatic or not dichromatic, or trichromatic and not trichromatic.Jonathan Hardy

    That's interesting. Let's say that's true, that phenomenologically, there is a sharp distinction between dichromatic and trichromatic experience. And let's also assume that these phenomenologies are closely correlated with biological systems. I don't really know the biology of sight at all, but can we find a similarly sharp distinction in the biology with which to correlate the phenomenology? Or can we find borderline cases of the physical biology?
  • Constructive Panpsychism Discussion
    Can we state that awareness is not self-awareness if we do not yet understand what awareness is?Jonathan Hardy

    No, I don't think we can. But we (or at least I) do understand what awareness is.
  • What determines who I am?
    I too think it's a good question. So does Stephen Priest in this lecture:

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z10_6uaqVQc&list=PLCdW3jMJiDFAYG5-VFQy0eLyHqdGnstnB&index=3

    There's been some good threads on it in the past. The best one was on the old forum unfortunately. I wonder if I saved it somewhere? I might have done, I'll have a look.

    My short answer: this problem is a real one, indexicals can't in principle be done away with (but they probably can in practice if you work hard), this is metaphysically significant, and I don't know the answer.
  • Constructive Panpsychism Discussion
    prothero

    What is the difference between protoconsciousness and consciousness?
  • The ABCs of Socialism
    doublespeakMarchesk

    newspeak or doublethink iirc
  • How did consciousness evolve?

    Thanks. Could you give an example of the usefulness of consciousness?
  • How did consciousness evolve?
    It is definitely evolved.ttjordy

    Why definitely?
  • Natural Rights
    I voted "no" because I don't think it appropriate to speak of "rights" that are unenforceable. or the violation of which is without recorse.Ciceronianus the White

    Yes, intuitively that is my view.