annihilation of Hamas — magritte

"Double standard" anybody? — neomac

Most contemporary philosophers of mind employ a Cartesian conceptual space in which reality is (at least potentially) divided into res extensa and res cogitans. — Dfpolis

To me, too. I'm just stating the case for the other side, and asking how it works — Patterner

Behavior is explained by the physical. — Patterner

I;d say it has been explained. — FrancisRay

sleeping — Corvus

The scientific view is that organisms zombies display intelligence and behavioural autonomy because they use semiotic codes to construct a “selfish” or enactive modelling relation with their worlds. That is what can be seen plainly written into the structure of their nervous systems. It is not a mystery. — apokrisis

The substantiated position is that consciousness is not empirically observable and you insist that it be defined in an empirically measurable way to be taken into consideration in the first place — javra

He also wrote a history of the subject that I found useful - like, who's who in the zoo. — Wayfarer

What's so hard to understand here? — apokrisis

At best, consciousness = attention + reporting. — apokrisis

When we speak of pain and joy, are speaking of any other consciousness than human consciousness? No. Sharks have shark physiology. Insects have insect physiology. It’s an anthropomorphic mistake to assume they feel the same. — NOS4A2

I presume that minimal "experience"*1 means to sense (to be affected by) incoming energy/information . And ultimately perhaps to make sense (meaning) of that data. — Gnomon

Is the word "experiential" in this usage, a metaphor for conscious human subjective experience? Or does he really believe that atoms are literally aware of their environment? — Gnomon

If pressed, the best I can say is there is thinking. — Tom Storm

Common sense - which may be more useful than philosophy - tells me I am conscious. But so what? — Tom Storm

Interested in why you strongly disagree with consciousness being a cluster concept. There seem to be a lot of types of conscious states that have radically different qualities, but we'd call all of them conscious. That to me connotes approaching the idea as a fuzzy unity of overlapping things, which can be disambiguated as needed based on the context. In my mind that's a cluster concept. — fdrake

Because if we completely lacked consciousness, then loud noises would not wake us up. — Art48

A: Consider first when we have local anesthesia, as when the dentist does a root canal. It is obvious that we are conscious. We do not feel the pain because the anesthesia prevents the pain signals from reaching consciousness. It’s possible when under a general anesthesia during surgery, the situation is the same: consciousness is present but the pain signals (as well as loud noises) are not reaching consciousness. — Art48

I'd guess the following style of inference would work for it:

"What behaviours must an entity exhibit that renders consciousness the most plausible explanation for them?"

That's an ampliative inference - fallible, non-deductive. Sometimes called inference to the best explanation. — fdrake

Can you give me an example of theory neutral evidence? — Tom Storm

Further, no behaviour strictly entails any internal state absent a background theory which fills in the gaps. — fdrake

the concept is likely a cluster concept (also see here). — fdrake

In short, we would need to arrive at a minimum criterion for what counts as consciousness, such that any and all candidates under consideration which meet that minimum criterion could be sensibly called "conscious"... — creativesoul

How do you think these 8 points sit with identifying panpsychism? — Tom Storm