It's less about conclusions and more about the repeated observation that brain activity always and invariably precedes mental experiences such as thoughts, decisions, or perceptions. — Jacques

Sure, in humans and brainy animals. But that's not very interesting. It's totally consistent with the view that consciousness in rocks only occurs when there is rock-activity.

That means, they have observed that mental experiences always occur after the corresponding brain activities and never without such a lead-up. — Jacques

How do you get to that conclusion? It's come up lots of times on the forum before, but I don't see this strong connection.

As an abstract noun, the term seems to imply that "C" is a stable physical object — Gnomon

...or a property, like redness, roundness. X is red. X is round. X is conscious.

It's a good question. I'm a very extreme form of panpsychist at the moment, and I do think there are practically an infinite number of arbitrarily defined conscious individuals. I think the question of consciousness is in some ways far less interesting than the question of individuation. I don't agree that saying everything is conscious is saying nothing. It still means something.

Yes, I'm a panpsychist. I like to think I was a panpsychist before it became trendy. And I'm not one of those sell-out panpsychists who think that only basic particles are conscious. I'm a proper one who thinks rocks and plastic bags are conscious.

If so, then how is it that a property as fundamental as "consciousness" is so easily and frequently lost (e.g. sleep, head trauma, coma, blackout, etc) as well as altered by commonplace stressors (e.g. drugs, alcohol, sugar, emotions, violence, sex, illness, video games, porn, gambling, social media, etc) if "consciousness is closest to the ultimate ground of existence"? — 180 Proof

It isn't lost. The self is lost. Content is altered, but not consciousness.

Blimey! Nice going.

I realize that this is a tentative and superficial conclusion that some would say is pure heresy, but this is what has been bothering me for decades. — Jacques

I've yet to hear a good argument against your conclusion. Much of the linking of brains and consciousness seems to me to be assumed on the basis of alterations in brain function altering what we experience. But why can't the alterations in a rock's functioning alter the rock's experience? I'm not quite sure why it's considered reasonable to focus on brains particularly when looking for consciousness in nature.

By function @180 Proof is indicating a means of existing, not so much saying that they play a role, I think. Memories exist, but not as structure, not as property, but as function (or action, behaviours of neurons, something like that.) Driving exists, but if we take apart a car and its driver and examine all the parts, we don't find anything we can call driving. Thinking exists, but if we take apart a brain we don't find a object or property called 'thinking', but, the argument goes, we do observe the brain doing stuff, and that is thinking.

Beginning Logic, E. J. Lemmon. loved it.
Bertrand Russell, Problems of Philosophy. Very good.
Leibniz, Monadology. Awful.
Locke, awful
Berkeley's essay and dialogues. Very good.
Hume, the moral philosophy one. Very good.
Ethics, V. M Hare ?? Hated it
James, Varieties if Religious Experience. Good.
James, lectures on Pragmatism. OK
Kant, Critique. Never bothered reading it.
Kant, Groundwork of a Metaphysic of Morals. Odd nonsense.
Schopenhauer never bothered reading it.
Kripke, Naming and Necessity. Didn't read it.
Popper, Conjectures and Refutations. OK
Bradley, Appearance and Reality. Very good.
Some Aristotle shite

Papers of note:
Goodman's new riddle of induction. Loved it.
Frege, Sense and Reference. very good


..can't remember the rest

I had a quick scan of the article on him in the IEP and he seems to be more of a political philosopher, not so much concerned with consciousness particularly. But I could be wrong, I know nothing about him really.

Maybe someday. — frank

Maybe. Discoveries do lead to new concepts. I'm very doubtful but I'm not against people trying.

More precisely, until now they are unable to say anything at all about how consciousness comes about. — Jacques

There have been some attempts, but they fail conceptually I think. Tononi's IIT model is really interesting and ingenious, but ultimately it's just another kind of functionalism and is vulnerable to the same conceptual critiques.

So did Apo help you understand Zizek?

I would like to confirm you by quoting the German neuroscientist Gerhard Roth, who said: "As about consciousness, it is a great mystery even for neuroscientists." — Jacques

Yeah, thanks. I hadn't heard that one particularly, but I've come across a number of neuroscientists saying similar things over the years. I don't really like invoking scientific authorities in this case, as my post, trollish title notwithstanding, isn't really about the science but the concepts. From what I understand there is a great deal of interesting science around identifying the neural correlates of particular experiences, which is great, but that doesn't say much about how consciousness comes about in the first place.

@Eugen I hope you enjoyed your encounter with apohotep

He's no more 'declaring them to be the same thing' than I'm declaring light to be the same thing as switches. — Isaac

This is just wrong.

Can anyone understand what this means in a way that doesn't entail a simple denial of the facts of Tononi's position?

Yes. I addressed that. Are you having trouble understanding what I've written? — Isaac

Oh yes.

I said he's no more declaring them... — Isaac

Yes and you're wrong. You are saying light isn't the same thing as switches. I, and Tononi, no doubt, would agree with you. He is declaring more than that with consciousness. He isn't saying that integrated information causes consciousness, or produces it, or gives rise to it, or wanks it, or cunts it off, or fugglwucks it, or frottages it, or switches it on, he says it is it.

He's no more 'declaring them to be the same thing' than I'm declaring light to be the same thing as switches. — Isaac

Yes he is, actually. He says consciousness is integrated information. But don't let simple facts get in the way.

"The integrated information theory (IIT) starts from phenomenology and makes use of thought experiments to claim that consciousness is integrated information."

It's the opening sentence.

Check yourself. https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.2307/25470707

@Eugen, you might get more responses if your post was more than "Go and research Zizek for me so I don't have to."

But there is not more to phenomenal consciousness than phenomenal consciousness.

I can't imagine many people on this forum disagreeing with you and defending the idea that God is against homosexuality. In any case, this seems as much a question of scriptural interpretation than philosophy. Even if there are Christians on the forum who do think God forbids homosexuality, it's becoming somewhat offensive to say that out loud. Personally, even if I were a Christian I would still see the Bible as of its time. Go forth and multiply is hardly a socially responsible thing to do these days, and God being a corduroy-wearing 21st century liberal I'm sure he would be hoping someone would update the rules a bit.

I suggest that we don’t know that other people are conscious, insofar as it is simply part of what it means to be a person. Maybe you could describe it as an animal certainty, but it seems a stretch to describe it as a knowing.

But then, how do we know people are persons? Again, what is significant here isn't knowing or judging that they are persons but relating, communicating, giving and asking for reasons, and so on.

It follows that we don’t use standards to make that judgement, because there is no judgement--unless the question comes up. And now that the question has come up, we find it difficult to judge. This I suppose is why it's also a difficult philosophical question. — Jamal

I read your post, and I've just read it again! But I wasn't very clear in my first response. I get that you think other people are conscious and that this isn't the result of a judgement. Nor, presumably, do we have to be convinced by the argument from analogy before we think of other people as conscious. It just comes naturally. I wonder if it is possible to make arguments instinctively? Or is there's something else going on completely? Probably the latter, no doubt.

Starting with a concept of phenomenal consciousness which is not defined functionally, and then offering an explanation of that in terms of structure and function. An example of this is Tononi's IIT. He starts off great in his paper with a concept of phenomenal consciousness. Then he goes on to develop and ingenious idea of integrated information. And then he just declares that they are the same thing. Which they're not. Integrated information is integrated information. Consciousness is consciousness. If he could explain why a system could not integrate information without being conscious, he would have conceived it, and we would have a credible theory.

Yes, but we're not talking here about the possibility, we're talking about the actuality. Chalmers' actual failure to conceive it. Not its impossibility of being conceived. Why does the one indicate the other? Is Chalmers the pinnacle of human mental ability such that if he can't conceive it, no one can? — Isaac

I'm not that interested in Chalmers, probably because I suspect I'll agree with him about most things. I haven't actually read much of his hard problem stuff. I'm saying it's about conceptual possibility, not someone's actual ability to conceive it. I haven't seen any evidence of people conceiving it anyway. When they claim to, it usually using a different definition of 'consciousness' than phenomenal consciousness. Just like your earlier definition.

Do you have some argument in favour of that conclusion, or is it just a foundational principle for you? — Isaac

Something might be conceivable even without anyone to conceive it. It's about possibility. It's more obvious to think of in terms of logical possibility. - (a & -a) was as true 13bn years ago as it is now, no? Same with conceivability.

What's of philosophical interest (I think) is that you (in common with bert1 and Chalmers it seems) want to say that your ability to comprehend any given theory's model, to conceive of things the way it does, has some bearing on its veracity. It's that oddity I'm interested in. — Isaac

Conceivablility isn't a subjective feat, it's a reasonably public property of propositions. Just as the validity of inferences is objective. If we disagree about them, someone is wrong. I'm turning into @Banno

Imagination might be a subjective feat, perhaps.

1- how are qualities like the color red created, 2 - how are qualities from different modalities like a visual field and feelings and sounds bound together to be experienced simultaneously, 3 - assuming such consciousness is created how is it causally efficacious so that it adds something beyond mere automation. — lorenzo sleakes

All very good questions. Each worth a thread.

I suggest that we don’t know that other people are conscious, insofar as it is simply part of what it means to be a person. — Jamal

Really? Do you not find the argument from analogy completely compelling? I know some don't, but I struggle to understand why not.

The producer is so different from the product it seems impossible that they are the same kind of thing. But maybe that's my failing.
— bert1

An orchestra produces a Beethoven symphony. Do you find that equally impossible? Is an orchestra the same kind of thing as a symphony? — Isaac

Good question. I find that conceptually possible, because I do think the symphony is the same kind of thing as the orchestra. Beethoven symphony, however conceived (Is it the score? Or the playing? Or the sound waves?) are structure and function. An orchestra is also structure and function. That the other produces the one does not seem difficult to me.

What I would like is an argument, or observation, or evidence, that shows the emergence of consciousness from human bodies is conceptually possible.
— bert1

OK...

Consciousness is the label we give to the re-telling of recent mental events with a first-person protagonist. — Isaac

If that's what it is, then it's perfectly explainable in terms of structure and function, at least to a certain depth. We agree on that. It's just not how phenomenal consciousness is typically defined.

It evolved to give a coherent meta-model to various predictive processing streams so that responses could be coordinated better in the longer term which provides a competitive advantage worth the calorie cost of doing to in large bodies living in complex environments (usually social ones). It doesn't 'feel like' anything, we use the term 'feels like' in conversations such as these as it's something we've learned to say in these circumstances from a particular position (those taking that position use the term, it's like a badge or token of membership of that group). Our linguistic response to consciousness within social hierarchies is not the same as actual consciousness.

How was that? Not "do you agree with that?", I mean in what way do you find that not even conceptually possible?

Yes, I do find that conceptually possible. But you started with a concept that was not too different from the explanation. If you're happy with your definition and explanation, good for you.

I haven't been following this thread, although I probably should be. It's a good OP. I think I agree with your title, but probably for reasons you might not like: I don't think "phenomenal consciousness" makes a lot of sense. It has the smell of ineffable qualia and such other nasties. — Banno

No worries, I know we disagree on the substantive issues. I was invoking you on one or two of the logical matters which I thought you might already know about. The types of possibility and how they interact, for example. No matter.

I don't like qualia either, although I'm fine with phenomenal consciousness. I know they are supposed to be the same, but I think the notion of qualia are unnecessarily confusing. Too evocative of invisible pixies, which I don't think phenomenal consciousness is.

— fdrake

What I would like is an argument, or observation, or evidence, that shows the emergence of consciousness from human bodies is conceptually possible.
— bert1

I know this wasn't addressed to me. But I can think of two possible requirements you might want from this? The first demands a bare bones functional account, "how does body make consciousness?", which would perhaps make that production conceptually possible by making it empirically possible. — fdrake

Yes, that would be good. We have another verb 'make'.

Like you, I have always though that empirical possibility entails conceptual possibility. But maybe that's not right. Maybe some would say there might be a whole load of things that are empirically possible that, even if we knew what they were, wouldn't make sense conceptually. That's a weird position. That should be distinguished from mysterianism, which (I guess) is the position that we may never know how consciousness arises from the physical (because of our own limitations), nevertheless it would make conceptual sense if we could grasp it.

The second is a conceptual demand, "can a method of producing consciousness be articulated without internal contradiction?". — fdrake

That's a logical rather than conceptual demand isn't it? Further upstream? I'm not sure, I haven't thought a great deal about the different kinds of possibility and how they interact. But if so, I'm definitely demanding that as well.

For the conceptual demand, someone could say "consciousness arises from the eggs the moon lays in human skulls" - which seems to be conceptually possible. — fdrake

Oh, OK. I would say this was definitely logically possible. But not conceptually possible. (Maybe our concepts of possibility are different, not sure). I don't think it's conceptually possible for consciousness to be 'produced' (random verb!) by brains. Nor do I think it's conceptually possible for consciousness to arise from the moon laying eggs in human skulls, for exactly the same reasons. Neither brains nor moon-laid eggs can produce consciousness, because both brains and moon-laid eggs are physical. By 'physical', I mean defined in terms of structure and function. Consciousness is not defined in terms of structure and function. The conceptual difficulty arises from explaining non-structure and function in terms of structure and function. I have been accused of begging the question here, and assuming that consciousness isn't structure and function. But assuming is not the same thing as starting from what we mean by a word, especially when the referent of that word is a given, the least doubtable thing possible (and I know many reject that as well).

But it goes against what we know about eggs, the moon, the body, and human skulls. Regardless of that, those contradictions seem only to come from the inconsistency of that concept of consciousness with an aggregate of empirical data. So something can be conceptually possible even if we know it is empirically false. — fdrake

Something can indeed be conceptually possible if it is empirically false. If your claim had not been about consciousness, but about, say, cars, which are definied in terms of structure and function, I would agree. So:

"cars arise from the eggs the moon lays in human skulls" is conceptually possible but not empirically possible because of what we know about moons, laying, eggs and skulls. We've got structure and function producing more structure and function, which is conceptually easier, an 'easy problem' if you like.

Like Lord of the Rings. Does conceptually possible mean something more than "can be imagined"? — fdrake

Yes, I think it means more than that. I vaguely remember Aule creating the dwarves from the earth (or something) and it didn't work, they weren't alive. Aule, perhaps, was trying to get non-structure and function from structure and function, which Tolkien might have thought was impossible as well, I have no idea. But Iluvatar took pity on the dwarves and gave them life. Assuming 'life' means 'consciousness' here, which I think it may well do, the earth didn't spontaneously become conscious on its own, that would have been conceptually impossible. Iluvatar had to do something radically different. Aule's creating consciousness (if he had succeeded) is imaginable in the sense that I can just suspend disbelief and sort of gloss over it in my head, sort of do an [insert magic here] exercise, but not conceptually possible. Of course, Iluvatar breathing consciousness into dwarves has its own conceptual difficulties if we interpret this as substance dualism. Conceptually, substance dualism seems impossible because of the interaction problem.

Edit: something I assumed was that empirically possible implies conceptually possible. Another alternative is that something can in fact be true, but nevertheless cannot be conceptually possible. Reality as Lovecraftian abomination.

That is a worrying thought.

So, y'know, purposive behaviour, ability to adapt to new scenarios, attempts to communicate, appearance of sensations and emotions - the kind of things we'd expect from a human agent. The more it quacks like a duck, the more likely it is that it's a duck.

@fdrake That's interesting. Those premises form the basis of the argument by analogy, or the abductive argument. No science necessary. An armchair philosopher who had never touched a Bunsen burner could make that argument. You could also make the same argument, but weaker, for rocks.

deleted because off topic

My question is: how would we scientifically go from there? How would science "nail down" the question of whether X is conscious or not? What tests could we perform, that would give us conclusive proof of consciousness (or lack thereof)
— RogueAI
I find this question really good and challenging!!!!
The steps are the following
1. identify a sensory system that feeds data of which the system can be conscious of.
2.Test the ability of the system to produce an array of important mind properties
3. Verify a mechanism that brings online sensory input and relevant mind properties.(conscious state)
4. evaluate the outcome (in behavior and actions) — Nickolasgaspar

I wasn't gong to quote Nickolasgaspar but I will here as he offered a response to RogueAI's question.

Predictably, this is a purely functionlist analysis. This requires either assuming a functionalist definition of consciousness to make it work, or, repeating (begging) the question, as in #3. RogueAI is precisely asking how we 'verify a mechanism that brings online sensory input and relevant mind properties.(conscious state).'

If the ultimate nature of matter is mental (i.e., idealism is true), doesn't that blow neuroscience out of the water? Isn't the whole point of neuroscience based on the assumption that mind and consciousness are produced by a physical brain? — RogueAI

Yes, which is to say that philosophy, to borrow @fdrake's metaphor, is 'upstream' of science, perhaps. When assessing a claim we could go through the following steps:

1) Is it logically possible? (this is the headwaters, the spring of the stream). If no, it's false. If yes, proceed to:
2) Is it conceptually possible? (this is a wee burn perhaps, as the local Picts say where I live). If no, it's false. If yes, proceed to:
3) Is it physically possible? (we should probably widen this out to a full-on river here, as there's a lot to this stage). I'm not sure this is totally separate from the previous stage. New concepts might emerge as a result of physical investigations, which make things conceptually possible that weren't previously conceived of. This has not happened yet in the science of consciousness, IMO, to the extent that it is now conceivable that consciousness is emergent in some way from brain structure and function.
4) there are other kinds of possibility after this... technological, practical etc, which aren't relevant here.

Debates on consciousness are at the divide between the conceptual and the physical here, I suggest. Disagreement welcome.

As a panpsychist I go much further, and assert that any behaviour at all, including the behaviour of atoms, is valuable for the mind of the atom. Everything happens because of consciousness. I've been toying with the idea that all causation is actually psychological.
— bert1

I would class this understanding along with such other non-physicalist explanations of reality as Tegmark's mathematical universe hypothesis. They are metaphysical approaches and, so, there is no empirical way of testing them. They are not facts, they are ways of thinking about something. As I see it, they are not useful ways of thinking, but that is certainly opinion, not fact. — T Clark

'Metaphysical' yes, although perhaps 'conceptual' might be a better word. Opinion is contrasted with knowledge rather than fact. Panpsychism might be a fact, but one that I don't know empirically. I might know it conceptually though.

Well if nature is fundamentally physical, then subjective experience doesn't conceptually fit. The biological level is still function and structure. — Marchesk

That's interesting. I frequently wonder what the word 'physical' means. I think it may be 'whatever has structure which does stuff (function).' And I agree that subjective experience doesn't really fit, as I said in the OP, "Why can't all that (structure and function) happen anyway without consciousness?"

Why should we accept that definition for machine consciousness? It's not the same thing as qualia. You just created an arbitrary definition and assigned it to 'consciousness'. It doesn't answer the question of whether a machine can have qualia. — Marchesk

Indeed. This happens a lot, even academics do it. Functionalists sometimes end up saying 'but that's just what I mean by consciousness'. Which is fine, but then they're not talking about consciousness as we know it, Jim.