That third challenge is hilarious. — Michael

https://www.pressherald.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2023/12/Trump-Challenge-Paul-Gordon-20231208.pdf

:rofl:

probably the point — petrichor

:up:

If, instead, every single human or animal entity would be "inhabited" like my own avatar, that might be a different story. — petrichor

"No sir, I'm afraid that the technology just won't allow for it."

I wouldn't enter for this reason alone. — petrichor

"But sir, might I remind you of our forgetfulness package? We have done studies, our clients which purchased the package are slightly *less* troubled by thoughts of solipsism than meatwalkers like us! This speaks to both the fidelity of our agent simulators, and the fact that they are just having too much fun to be troubled by such notions!"

A "fully-immersive simulation" prosthesis (with no off-switch / exit) = a lobotomy plus continuous 24/7 morphine drip. — 180 Proof

But a lobotomy + morphine can only offer dull, undifferentiated pleasure, whereas the simulation can be of the richest, most vibrant and stimulating world you can dream of.

Offered an alternative of my choice, I'd certainly opt for my version of Utopia. But I would still like to remember everyone and everything I liked about this life. — Vera Mont

You would prefer keeping your memories, even if they meant knowing that your existence was a lie? How much would the artificiality and meaninglessness of your life bother you?

No, I would not agree because I would not trust the technology to not have a bug which might lead to a nightmarish experience. — Art48

This kind of misgiving, while undoubtedly accurate (who wouldn't have such fears?), nevertheless seems to sidestep the larger question. Like you say, lets presume that you know with complete certainty, from God or otherwise, that the simulation is exactly as described.

In this case, I have a question: if I picked “could forget,” would there be any discernible difference between my experience of the world now, and my experience after the procedure? — Art48

None at all, save that the world as you know it now is probably not arranged in a way that you would have likely chosen in the simulation.

f I could not distinguish the two types of experience, then maybe I’d accept the procedure because, for all I know, I might currently be in a simulation, and so I would merely be trading one simulation for another, more enjoyable simulation. — Art48

But is your conviction that we *might* be living in a simulation now high enough to be a factor in this decision? For my part, I think there are pretty good reasons for presuming that we are *not*: a simulation is necessarily a vastly more complex explanation for what is, than a world that is as it seems. Therefore, the simulation explanation should be discarded. That is a topic for another thread.

Why do brains create consciousness? Its the same as asking why do two gases at room temperature combine together to form a liquid that we need to drink to live. — Philosophim

Not the same at all. The question about gases can be answered in a satisfactory way. The question about conscious cannot.

This has nothing to do with moral facts and everything to do with moral beliefs. — Michael

The question "Why should I be moral?" presumably means, "Why should I act in accordance with my moral beliefs?" In any epistemic domain, we only ever have access to our beliefs, not to facts themselves. Morality (presuming non-naturalism) is not somehow unique here.

Then, either our beliefs are (or can be) informed by moral facts, in which case the moral facts matter. Or, they cannot, or the facts do not exist, in which case they don't matter.

On the face of it there seems to be multiple reasons:

* Our standing with our fellows, with society at large, and with ourselves is elevated by being moral, and reduced when seen to be immoral.
* Our moral training induces a feeling of guilt when we are immoral, and self-satisfaction when moral
* Empathy causes us pain when we cause harm to others, by literally feeling it. Similarly, when we see others in pain, we feel that pain, and ease our own suffering by easing theirs.

To make it simple. Explain to me the difference between these possible worlds:

1. No morality.
2. It is immoral to kill babies.
3. It is moral to kill babies.

It seems to me that the only difference is that in the second one we would be correct in believing that it is immoral to kill babies. But what difference would being correct make to being incorrect? Presumably, regardless of what is or isn't the case, you wouldn't kill babies. Or would you convert to baby killing if you'd found it to be moral? In the unlikely case you'd say yes: then it's your belief that matters, not the fact-of-the-matter -- what difference does the fact-of-the-matter make? — Michael

There would be a difference only if moral facts were discoverable. If they are, then their discovery would motivate people to obey the discovered moral fact, via their motivation to be and be seen as moral, by others and by themselves. If on the other hand such facts are not discoverable, then they make no difference whatsoever.

In the above example, due to epistemological uncertainty, people would be highly skeptical. There would be an assumption that some mistake was made in whatever process of moral discovery lead to the conclusion that it is moral to kill babies. I think for most people, the result would be so incongruous with their moral intuition that they would never accept it, and go to their grave thinking there must be some mistake, somewhere. But at least a few would probably start killing babies.

This is a very broad view of "inequality".

What you call "inequality", I call "perception", and "thought".

When your eyes can pick A apart from B, that is perception.

When your mind can play with A and B, put A in these conceptual buckets, B in those, combine them, pull them apart, that is thought.

Eyes that cannot see and brains that cannot think cannot do these things. The only way to escape inequality, to return to a "oneness" where differences melt away, is to die.

These are social realities, which is where the line between real and imaginary does indeed seem to blur. Though imaginary at their core, by stable, shared imaginings they gain a kind of reality and object permanence.

A promise between two people, I guess, is a minimal social reality. Notice how much weaker it is than say money, which itself can collapse in a poof once confidence is lost en masse. Whereas a promise to oneself, we will experience again after New Year's, is nothing at all.

Take care with "that's it" A contract to build a house usually leads to there being a house, which does not exist only in someone's mind. — Banno

But still, a contract is not a house.

It is best not to blur the real/imaginary divide. Even though Imaginary things do exist, and have real consequences. A man imagining a tentacle monster in front of him shouts and waves his arms in the real world.

A promise is just as imaginary as that monster.

In loose terms it brings a previously non-existent obligation into existence. There is now something in the world that was not there previously: the obligation — Banno

What bizarre, magical thinking. As if, *poof!*, a newly minted promise, shiny and golden, floats down from The Land of Ought.

The promise exists in the mind of the promiser, and their audience. That's it.

Do you think moral judgment in situ more a matter of habit or "choice"? — 180 Proof

It depends on whether the "habits" we have built up over a lifetime are adequate to the situation or not. If the particular situation which requires judgement is easily analogous to previously learned moral rules, we might make the judgement without much conscious effort. But this is not always the case. I'm sure you can think of times in your life where moral judgement required a great deal of difficult, even agonizing deliberation. I'm guessing the op's dilemma be one of these times.

I finally read it. Good story, though probably not the one I should have read atm. Me and @Baden are both struggling to poop out our stories for the winter contest, and having to read a master of her craft like Le Guin is a tad bit discouraging.

So, in order for society to function, what is sacrificed is the sense of wonder and imagination of the child substituted over time by a conceptual scheme of relationships that impose a set of more or less instrumental values that define what it is to be happy and successful and direct behaviour along clearly delineated paths which aim to make individuals in some sense superfluous. The “inner child” must be continuously tortured for people to be “happy” in so far as those people are integrated properly into an efficiently functioning whole and the more properly integrated they are, the more ideal and well-oiled the society is, the more the child must be continuously neglected, tortured and beaten, up, i.e. the more the imaginative faculties and the freedom they threaten any established order with are repressed and degraded. — Baden

I had a somewhat different take. She presented this city and its inhabitants in an overly idyllic way that belied this interpretation; these people were not cogs in a well-oiled machine, rather, their inner children were flourishing. To me, this was a riff on the kind of saccharine, Disneyfied utopias one encounters in children's entertainment. Why do we find these fantasies so unsatisfying? "Do you believe this?" Le Guin keeps asking. No, we do not. Why? "On whose backs does this blissful utopia rest?" our inner cynic asks. What is missing from these utopias is the pervasive moral corruption that the exploitation, necessary for such utopias, creates. Only when Le Guin provides this corruption, in the form of a single wretched child, that everyone knows about without explicitly acknowledging, can we, also denizens of a corrupted world, allow such a place to exist, even in our minds.

To me, I am starting to think there is no equation possible that accurately calculates right and wrong for every possible situation — Bob Ross

:up:

that's why I am trying to work on a virtue ethical theory instead. Maybe if we have the proper virtues instilled in our characters, then we would intuit that slapping him for 10 minutes is the right thing to do, but punching him for 10 minutes is taking it too far. — Bob Ross

I would be interested in seeing you work this out.

Myself, I think consequentialism is the answer. But, a consequentialism that takes injustice into account. You can't just examine raw outcomes, you have to also consider injustices that have been brought about. So, the 99% who live marginally better at the expense of the 1% would not be a good consequence, as the injustice done to the 1% would outweigh the benefit to the 99%.

Of course, there is no objective answer to how much to weigh injustice or any of the other factors. It ultimately must come down to human judgement. But I think it is the right framework.

I would be inclined to weigh injustice very highly. But, not so highly that the injustice done to the boy outweighs the deaths of everyone else, which themselves would be terrible injustices. I think the active/passive distinction is ultimately illusory, a choice is a choice.

It doesn't seem at all appropriate to say that it believes or accepts or considers anything. That would be a very obvious misuse of language. — Michael

Because RubbishAI lacks every feature that would otherwise make this language appropriate.

ChatGPT and p-zombies are just very complicated versions of the above, with p-zombies having a meat suit. — Michael

In most contexts we make extremely fine taxonomic distinctions between objects, even though they definitely have no subjectivity. But suddenly when subjectivity is involved, you want to flatten everything not subjective into one big pile. Even p-zombies, which are physically and behaviorally identical, only lacking a presumed quality you cannot see or verify. We might spend the rest of our life's allotment of time on this forum going back and forth with @noAxioms and still not definitively figure out whether he is a p-zombie or not.

I am saying that if I had to throw you over board (knowing you will drown) to free up a life vest that would save them for this other person, then I cannot violate you to save them. — Bob Ross

But that is just making it easy for yourself: all else being equal, you should not violate someone's rights.

Instead, what if we modify the original example. You don't have to kill or torture the child. Just, slap him around for 10 minutes or so. He will cry, and will probably suffer a bit of long term trauma. Either commit this active violation of the child, or passively allow everyone on earth to die. Which do you choose?

Sure, cavemen grunts were simpler ...complex language like we have today is "better". — Outlander

The prevailing view is that the more "primitive" a people, the more complex their language. This is true of "primitive" people today, and presumably of paleolithic "cavemen": both are far more complex than English and other predominant languages today. This is because contact/conquest winnows down the complexity by necessity, so that non-native speakers have even the slightest chance of learning it. All the complexity is unnecessary anyway, our "dumbed down" languages are still fully expressive of human thought.

I would say, if your claim were true, it would be a revolutionary finding, and upend our notions about what it means to be human.

Hence, forgive my skepticism.

I still think the problem is conceptual. Frankly, it is hard to think about, how this mistake might arise.

Interesting stuff, regardless. New OP? "I am a p-zombie, prove me wrong"?

What is the computer doing then when it processes data from a camera pointed at a table. The computer 'concludes' (probably a forbidden word) that there is a table in front of the camera in question, and outputs a statement "there seems to be a table in front of the camera". You say it's not a mental activity. I agree with that. That usage of "mental activity" only applies to an immaterial mind such as Chalmers envisions. So OK, you can't express that the computer believes there's a table there, or that it concludes that. How do you phrase what the computer does when it does the exact same thing as the human, which is deduce (presumably another forbidden word) the nature of the object in the field of view.
If you can't provide acceptable alternative terms, then I'm sorry, the computer believes there's a table there. Deal with it. — noAxioms

:up:

What does it mean to "accept", "consider", or "hold as an opinion"? Again, these aren't terms that it makes sense to attribute to a p-zombie. A p-zombie is just a machine that responds to stimulation. It's a complicated clockwork body. They're just objects that move and make sound. That's it. — Michael

Until recently, only humans could "accept", "consider", or "hold as an opinion", and it has been generally presumed that these are always accompanied by subjective states. This is a fact, but it does not imply that these notions are incoherent without subjective states.

But now, it is not true anymore. Take ChatGPT. You can ask it to "consider X", that is, to examine a proposition without being committed to its belief, and it obliges very well, without a trace of subjective state.

It's quite ironic that you're anthropomorphising p-zombies. — Michael

Why ironic? They are already maximally anthropomorphized.

Would it believe it's in pain? In other words, would it believe something it knows to be false? — RogueAI

I think it would believe that "pain" denotes the cluster of behaviors that it and we engage in when injured. So long as it is engaging in these behaviors, it is "in pain".

Words popping up in my mind do not help me connect the dots of different ideas, the glyph and its content are different things. For me, it is only when I summon the content (image) in my mind that I can finally think. — Lionino

This parallels what I experience. I think you might underestimate the inner monologue. After all, I am guessing that animals can think visually as well. Our ability to manipulate glyphs which represent arbitrary concepts, both aloud and internally, is part of what sets our cognitive ability apart.

But then again, there's these guys who just don't have it! Crazy..

Belief" is a word in the English language that has a well-established meaning. If p-zombies are speaking English then the word "belief" means what it means in English. — Michael

The relevant definition in Webster's is "something that is accepted, considered to be true, or held as an opinion". This to me doesn't entail subjective state.

There is someone who made a thread yesterday or the day before explaining how he has no inner monologue and also cannot form images mentally. — Lionino

Which? I've heard of this before, its super interesting that we have so much variation in our inner lives, yet almost never talk about it.

Whatever "belief-analog" they have isn't belief. — Michael

But wouldn't "belief", for a p-zombie, be precisely this "belief-analog"? It might be false on your notion of belief, but not theirs.

Judging by your incessant posting, you have no life at all, let alone "inner", so I'm not sure on what authority you speak.

The words they use mean what they mean in ordinary English. — Michael

I'm not convinced that "belief", unlike "conscious", entails inner life.

But the larger point is, your "cheating" here:

The statement “I consider myself to be a p-zombie” is only true if you are not a p-zombie and so no rational person can believe themselves to be a p-zombie. — Michael

You can disqualify the statement because by your definition belief must entail consciousness. But the fact remains that they might be a p-zombie, along with the informational p-zombie belief-analog that they are p-zombies.

This "obvious error" rests on the presumption that inner life is necessary to the notion "belief".

Something like "the computer algorithm inside my head has caused me to speak the phrase 'I am not a p-zombie'"? — Michael

They would of course never say that, and may be naïve to the notion of computer algorithm. Something inside their heads causes them to say things, just as it does for us. The only difference is the lights are out.

don't on my account. Continue kicking, and falling on your ass.

Exactly. Zombies by definition behave as we do, but they cannot adopt attitudes towards propositions, and so do not have beliefs.

This thread is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of philosophical zombies. — Banno

The misunderstanding is once again yours. If you ask a p-zombie, "will the sun rise tomorrow", they would say "yes, I believe so". By definition they behave as we do. This includes belief. They will report beliefs, and behave as if they believe. The only difference is that none of these behaviors is accompanied by experience.

What does “p-consider” mean? — Michael

"p-consider", "p-belief" is all the informational operations of "consider", "belief" without the conscious part. Like how a computer-vision program might "believe" it is looking at a table, without any conscious awareness of it.

I’m not sure that counts as belief. Belief seems to me to be a conscious activity. Machines can record and analyze information but they don’t believe anything. — Michael

You are free to not count that as belief. But you cannot use that to then logically conclude that "I consider myself to be a p-zombie" is only true when he is not a p-zombie. By definition, you have excluded the possibility that he p-believes it.

That is, when he says "I consider myself to be a p-zombie", what he really means (to you) is "I p-consider myself to be a p-zombie".

Then the P-zombie argument falls flat because it is unbelievable that something could behave identically externally without that extra thing on the inside. The argument hinges on not being able to tell. — noAxioms

It is a thought experiment, it is an open question whether it is believable or not. But this is a different matter than having a real life p-zombie talking to you on a forum.

It may or may not be logically possible. But it seems much more likely that it is a matter of neural differences which make the concept of qualia obscure. Or simple confusion.

1. “I consider myself to be a p-zombie” is false because you are a p-zombie and so don’t believe anything. — Michael

I think p-zombies may believe things. They have the capacity to record and analyze information the same way we do. There is just no concomitant phenomenal experience of believing.

I consider myself to be a p-zombie. — noAxioms

I find it very hard to believe. But I can believe that there are differences in neural architecture such that for some people this qualia talk makes no sense. What this implies for your subjective state, if indeed there is on, is hard to say.

One ought not kick puppies

It's very easy to pick our young, or the young of our pet species, and say "Its just true! We shouldn't harm them! Like, obviously!" But why a puppy? Why not all dogs? Until recently kicking dogs was a pretty normal, accepted thing to do. Only lately did it acquire a stink. Or, why dogs at all? Why not, pigs? Cows? Chickens? These are, after all, intelligent, feeling creatures. Is there some fine moral distinction I'm missing whereby "Thou shalt not kick puppies" is a commandment from God, whereas we collectively exploit and abuse the others with total indifference to the "obvious" moral facts concerning their well being? Or, maybe, just maybe, we like dogs more?

Pseudo-philosophers do seem to love inflating their biases and inclinations into universal truths.

: I don’t see how this is incompatible with deontology, although certainly incompatible with Kantianism — Bob Ross

Suppose a good friend comes over, whom you know to be a strict Kantian. The Gestapo know this as well, and question him regularly. He notices a yarmulke inexplicitly lying on the couch. "Is someone staying here?" he blurts.

There’s a difference between violating someone’s rights (which requires active participation therein) and letting someone’s rights get violated (which is an inactive, passive, allowing of it to happen). In the latter, one is not morally blameworthy; whereas in the former they are. — Bob Ross

This is the trolley problem, and seems to be one of those cases where intuitions sharply differ. I am on the side of not considering the active/passive distinction, and I doubt I will be able to convince you. But consider:

You are taking a relaxing day off, fishing in your rowboat. Around a river bend, you come upon a drowning man. "Oh, thank God!", he cries. "Save me!"

"Sorry, friend!", you respond with a grin. "I didn't push you in, I'm afraid it's not my problem. But, best of luck!"

His final moments before submerging for the last time are spent watching you in astonishment as you row your boat down the river, whistling gaily.

Are you
a) As morally culpable as if you had pushed him in the river?
b) Less morally culpable than if you had pushed him in the river?
c) Not culpable at all?

I choose A.

What problems can you construct for deontology? — Bob Ross

For instance, an example that came up in one of your other threads: Would you lie to the Gestapo about Jews hiding in your house?

It isn’t that unnatural, and that’s why “The One’s Who Walk Away from Omelas” is such a good, quick read. Enslaving 1% of the population would increase the well-being of the 99% (if we presuppose specifically utilitarianism), wouldn’t it? Etc. — Bob Ross

I'll read it when I get a chance. This seems to be a problematic case for utilitarianism, and consequentialism in general. What if the benefit for the 99% exceeds the harm done to the 1%? Would that make it ok? I think not. But your case goes the other way. The harm done to all humanity grossly exceeds the harm done to the child.

Nope. Seems like we shouldn’t violate that child’s rights to me. — Bob Ross

But what of the rights of everyone else? Are you not maximally violating the rights of every person on earth, by making the decision to preserve the child?

Neither deontology nor consequentialism seem to fully match our intuitions, since you can construct cases where either violate them. An approach that somehow combines both would probably be needed. I think I lean towards consequentialism, while acknowledging there are cases it cannot account for.

In unnatural situations like this one, which our intuitions weren't designed for, things are bound to fall apart.

My own intuition says, torture the child, since it doesn't really distinguish between that and killing them. Would you agree to kill the child?


Why a child? What if it were middle aged, or elderly?