This "obvious error" rests on the presumption that inner life is necessary to the notion "belief".

Something like "the computer algorithm inside my head has caused me to speak the phrase 'I am not a p-zombie'"? — Michael

They would of course never say that, and may be naïve to the notion of computer algorithm. Something inside their heads causes them to say things, just as it does for us. The only difference is the lights are out.

don't on my account. Continue kicking, and falling on your ass.

Exactly. Zombies by definition behave as we do, but they cannot adopt attitudes towards propositions, and so do not have beliefs.

This thread is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of philosophical zombies. — Banno

The misunderstanding is once again yours. If you ask a p-zombie, "will the sun rise tomorrow", they would say "yes, I believe so". By definition they behave as we do. This includes belief. They will report beliefs, and behave as if they believe. The only difference is that none of these behaviors is accompanied by experience.

What does “p-consider” mean? — Michael

"p-consider", "p-belief" is all the informational operations of "consider", "belief" without the conscious part. Like how a computer-vision program might "believe" it is looking at a table, without any conscious awareness of it.

I’m not sure that counts as belief. Belief seems to me to be a conscious activity. Machines can record and analyze information but they don’t believe anything. — Michael

You are free to not count that as belief. But you cannot use that to then logically conclude that "I consider myself to be a p-zombie" is only true when he is not a p-zombie. By definition, you have excluded the possibility that he p-believes it.

That is, when he says "I consider myself to be a p-zombie", what he really means (to you) is "I p-consider myself to be a p-zombie".

Then the P-zombie argument falls flat because it is unbelievable that something could behave identically externally without that extra thing on the inside. The argument hinges on not being able to tell. — noAxioms

It is a thought experiment, it is an open question whether it is believable or not. But this is a different matter than having a real life p-zombie talking to you on a forum.

It may or may not be logically possible. But it seems much more likely that it is a matter of neural differences which make the concept of qualia obscure. Or simple confusion.

1. “I consider myself to be a p-zombie” is false because you are a p-zombie and so don’t believe anything. — Michael

I think p-zombies may believe things. They have the capacity to record and analyze information the same way we do. There is just no concomitant phenomenal experience of believing.

I consider myself to be a p-zombie. — noAxioms

I find it very hard to believe. But I can believe that there are differences in neural architecture such that for some people this qualia talk makes no sense. What this implies for your subjective state, if indeed there is on, is hard to say.

One ought not kick puppies

It's very easy to pick our young, or the young of our pet species, and say "Its just true! We shouldn't harm them! Like, obviously!" But why a puppy? Why not all dogs? Until recently kicking dogs was a pretty normal, accepted thing to do. Only lately did it acquire a stink. Or, why dogs at all? Why not, pigs? Cows? Chickens? These are, after all, intelligent, feeling creatures. Is there some fine moral distinction I'm missing whereby "Thou shalt not kick puppies" is a commandment from God, whereas we collectively exploit and abuse the others with total indifference to the "obvious" moral facts concerning their well being? Or, maybe, just maybe, we like dogs more?

Pseudo-philosophers do seem to love inflating their biases and inclinations into universal truths.

: I don’t see how this is incompatible with deontology, although certainly incompatible with Kantianism — Bob Ross

Suppose a good friend comes over, whom you know to be a strict Kantian. The Gestapo know this as well, and question him regularly. He notices a yarmulke inexplicitly lying on the couch. "Is someone staying here?" he blurts.

There’s a difference between violating someone’s rights (which requires active participation therein) and letting someone’s rights get violated (which is an inactive, passive, allowing of it to happen). In the latter, one is not morally blameworthy; whereas in the former they are. — Bob Ross

This is the trolley problem, and seems to be one of those cases where intuitions sharply differ. I am on the side of not considering the active/passive distinction, and I doubt I will be able to convince you. But consider:

You are taking a relaxing day off, fishing in your rowboat. Around a river bend, you come upon a drowning man. "Oh, thank God!", he cries. "Save me!"

"Sorry, friend!", you respond with a grin. "I didn't push you in, I'm afraid it's not my problem. But, best of luck!"

His final moments before submerging for the last time are spent watching you in astonishment as you row your boat down the river, whistling gaily.

Are you
a) As morally culpable as if you had pushed him in the river?
b) Less morally culpable than if you had pushed him in the river?
c) Not culpable at all?

I choose A.

What problems can you construct for deontology? — Bob Ross

For instance, an example that came up in one of your other threads: Would you lie to the Gestapo about Jews hiding in your house?

It isn’t that unnatural, and that’s why “The One’s Who Walk Away from Omelas” is such a good, quick read. Enslaving 1% of the population would increase the well-being of the 99% (if we presuppose specifically utilitarianism), wouldn’t it? Etc. — Bob Ross

I'll read it when I get a chance. This seems to be a problematic case for utilitarianism, and consequentialism in general. What if the benefit for the 99% exceeds the harm done to the 1%? Would that make it ok? I think not. But your case goes the other way. The harm done to all humanity grossly exceeds the harm done to the child.

Nope. Seems like we shouldn’t violate that child’s rights to me. — Bob Ross

But what of the rights of everyone else? Are you not maximally violating the rights of every person on earth, by making the decision to preserve the child?

Neither deontology nor consequentialism seem to fully match our intuitions, since you can construct cases where either violate them. An approach that somehow combines both would probably be needed. I think I lean towards consequentialism, while acknowledging there are cases it cannot account for.

In unnatural situations like this one, which our intuitions weren't designed for, things are bound to fall apart.

My own intuition says, torture the child, since it doesn't really distinguish between that and killing them. Would you agree to kill the child?


Why a child? What if it were middle aged, or elderly?

Oh please. A confused little boy like Leontiskos doesn't have the balls to be an authoritarian.

Dude, I'm not here for eristic. The only philosophical thread I published is an anti-eristic thread. — Leontiskos

"Eristic"! This guy is too much.

I was under the impression that you cared to resolve your moral self-contradiction. — Leontiskos

:gasp: :rofl: :lol:

Are you just here to evangelise? — Michael

Sometimes I feel he mimics the form of philosophical debate.

(I only request that you do not edit these recent posts and falsify the record.) — Leontiskos

:rofl:
No one gives a shit, but yeah the record speaks for itself just fine

it, and in my opinion my recent posts to ↪hypericin have saddled him squarely with the contradiction at hand. — Leontiskos

Lol, another victory lap after a series of senseless posts. You are a classic time waster, and you don't know what the hell you you are talking about.

(The theory you hold denies normative truths and yet you "personally" affirm normative truths.) — Leontiskos

Sigh.

a) no moral sentence is truth-apt (non-cognitivism)
c) no moral sentence is true (error theory)
e) no moral sentence is true if nobody believes so (non-objectivism)
f) some moral sentence is true even if nobody believes so (robust realism) — Michael

There is a contradiction if they follow Hume in his is-ought distinction, for in that case a non-normative metaethical theory will not account for a normative ethical theory. — Leontiskos

Why should one thing I believe be accounted for by another? My subjectivist view on moral realism does not account for the particulars of my moral beliefs.

Do you not admit that this is an apparent contradiction? — Leontiskos

I admit that this is an apparent contradiction, due to your taking the two quotes out of context. as well as some honestly poor wording on my part. The first quote was a response to:

Is your subjective conscience theory intended to be normative? — Leontiskos

A better wording would be something along the lines, "I would phrase the theory not that one should listen to their conscience, but that one does".

Just so you know, normative/non-normative does not map to ethics/meta-ethics. It's a conflation that pops up occasionally, but this is the first time in this thread. — Leontiskos

You are right. I thought I was just adopting your terminology, but there is a difference. What I meant, and what I think this whole thread has been discussing, is metaethics.

My concern is that you purport to provide a non-normative theory and then begin flirting with normativity, — Leontiskos

Except I haven't, you haven't shown that I have, and it seems like you are insisting my theory is not normative enough!

You simultaneously hold that one should follow their conscience, while at the same time considering yourself a non-normative subjectivist who is propounding a non-normative theory. — Leontiskos

There is no contradiction between holding a metaethical theory describing what ethics is, while holding normative views on what one ought do. Both may reside comfortably in the same brain. And here they do not contradict one another. Being subjectivist does not mean that there is no normativity. It means that normativity is rooted in subjective values, rather than objective facts about the world.

Do you really say that 'ought' is a non-normative term? — Leontiskos

No. And I'm really beginning to doubt you truly understand the distinction between normative and descriptive, or an ethical and metaethical theory.

You asked me whether my theory was descriptive or normative, and I very clearly answered that it is descriptive. Then you demand that it contain normative claims. What sense does that make? To describe things like "ought" without making ought-claims is not to deny that "ought" is normative.

If you think we should listen to our conscience, then your theory of conscience is normative, and it is a "moral theory" — Leontiskos

I personally believe that one should follow their conscience. But this 'should' has no place in a descriptive moral theory. That "one should follow their conscience" is a moral claim like any other. An it is far from obvious. It is reflective of an ethos of individualism. More authoritarian or collectivist ethos don't place much value on following your conscience, at least when it contradicts the state or party.

Are there moral facts, and if so are they objective? I believe there are, and that they are subjective. You believe they are objective. The goal is a description of what these purported "moral facts" are, and how they operate. "Moral facts" involve "should", "ought", so in that sense they are the focus. But the idea is to describe, not prescribe.

But do you see how you are toeing the line between normativity and non-normativity, which I have complained about several times throughout this thread? — Leontiskos

No, I can't say that I can see how I'm toeing the line. AFAICT everything I have been saying has been descriptive, not normative.

Should we act according to our moral sensibility or not? Should we listen to our conscience or not? — Leontiskos

These are your questions, not mine. I think we probably should, but that is not the focus here.

Yes, people often do listen to their conscience. Conscience is just how one's moral sensibility expresses itself to ourselves. "Listening to one's conscience" means acting according to our moral sensibility.

Of course.

You say that a subjective conscience morality is normative, but that anti-realist theories (including subjectivism) seldom if ever intend to be normative. Is your subjective conscience theory intended to be normative? — Leontiskos

No. I would say not that one should listen to their conscience, but that one does.

I think that is a fine description of moral obligation. To refresh, my question was a response to:

I would say that, by the very substance of anti-realist metaethics, obligations aren't obligatory [...] If the anti-realist theory intends to be merely descriptive, then it is denying the existence of true obligations and substituting some faux placeholder. — Leontiskos

In the sense of obligation you described, how does moral subjectivism fail to provide "true obligations", where moral subjectivism is defined as "moral values and judgements are personal, but are deeply informed by both enculturation (moral training) and moral instincts (empathy and a sense of justice/fairness)."

I think this is the strongest argument against hard realism:

Looking at @Michael's options:

a) no moral sentence is truth-apt
c) no moral sentence is true
e) some moral sentence is true if everyone believes so
f) some moral sentence is true even if nobody believes so


f stands out as requiring a separate kind of thing in the universe: moral facts. That puts supporters of f at a unique disadvantage. If we are going to introduce a new ontological category, then there should be something only that new kind of thing can explain, or direct evidence of its existence, for the addition to not be gratuitous. But hard realists can furnish neither. Therefore f should be discarded.

This parallels the deism debate. It is famously hard to prove the non-existence of an (also ontologically novel) being. But it is up to the deists to provide direct evidence, or something that cannot be explained without a deity.

This thread is fast becoming inane. — Banno

Your participation is profoundly optional.

I would say that, by the very substance of anti-realist metaethics, obligations aren't obligatory. If the anti-realist theory intends to be normative, then this makes it incoherent. If the anti-realist theory intends to be merely descriptive, then it is denying the existence of true obligations and substituting some faux placeholder. — Leontiskos

It might be helpful if you substantiate your notion of "obligation". I'm not aware of any normative account where moral imperatives are literally obligatory. If so there would be no moral questions, people would simply act as morality dictates.

Even if morality were a subjective matter, just personal preference, your own conscience carries a normative weight, and violating it comes at a cost.

Also, I'll note that anti-realist theories seldom if ever intend to be normative.

Is it this idea? — Leontiskos

Yes. The claim is that these sort of objections you and Banno give only apply to moral theories, not theories about morality.

I'm working on being kind to fools. It's not easy. — Banno

Please be kind to yourself.

This discussion is on meta-ethics, not descriptive ethics, and your post seems to be discussing the latter. — Michael

Certainly not descriptive ethics. If you don't like my instinct example, go with your version of moral subjectivism:

"One ought do X" is true when everyone believes it's true.

It is not a valid objection to say "Why ought I do something just because everyone believes I should?".
Because it is not an ethical theory that says "You ought to do what everyone believes you should".
It is a metaethical theory that says "The truth of ethical propositions arises from everyone's belief in them".

Raising an ethical objection to a metaethical theory is a mistake. Because it is an is theory, not an ought theory, even though its subject is ought statements.

This is a very clear layout of the possibilities (though it must seem quite "convolute" to our poor @Banno).

But why is it a response to my post? Was it just the term "moral reasoning"? If I replace it with "moral obligation" I don't know that anything would change otherwise.

meanwhile still hasn't grasped the concept. Which is odd, given his very extensive readings of the literature. He must have encountered it dozens of times by now!

"Society said so, therefore I ought to obey," is a false statement. — Leontiskos

Valid and coherent, but it erroneously divorces morality from oughtness, as noted above. Society saying something does not intrinsically obligate anyone to obey. — Leontiskos

I keep seeing this mistake. Banno also makes it when he says "that we do cooperate does not imply that we ought cooperate."

You are confusing metaethical theories for ethical ones. A metaethical theory, unlike an ethical theory, is under no obligation to itself be ethically compelling. That is because it is claiming what ethics is, not what you ought to do. The fact might be that ethics originates from something that is not ethical at all.

For instance, suppose someone proposed that all ethical reasoning was instinctual. You might agree or disagree, but you can't say, "just because I have instincts doesn't mean I should obey them". The theory isn't saying that. It says, when you moralize, you are following instincts. Its just the fact of the matter, nothing to do with what you ought to do.

And you can't escape it. If the theory were true, and you say, "well, then I am under no obligation to be ethical, since I have no obligation to follow my instincts", the ethical reasoning which led you to reject instincts as a suitable ground for ethical reasoning would itself be instinctual.

Do you see the difference?

Well, you did make a series of silly mistakes. — Banno

Hilarious, when your posts pointing out my "silly mistakes" have been rats nests of mistakes.

A peace sign, not a victory sign — Leontiskos

:lol:
Thanks.

No one here is being as escalating or trollish as you are. — Leontiskos

See:

↪hypericin I find myself constantly lowering my expectation of what you understand of philosophy. — Banno

When pressed why, he gave his usual confused gibberish. I have a negative history with him over several discussions.

With you, I may have misconstrued you as dismissing my view on ethics because subjectivism is "chimerical" (I think its subjectivism, but the borders between these "isms" get blurry). This combined with some mounting frustration with you, and what I felt was an arrogant, dismissive attitude, your victory laps... But, this happens, these kind of frictions sometimes build in the course of a discussion. I apologize, you didn't deserve that.

You'll be sending me the hemlock, then? — Banno

No, you're no Socrates, I'm afraid.