This implies that religion developed historically as a response to our disappointment with our parents. You've used that to undermine the credibility of those who believe in God. — Clarky
Also I don't agree that we are already "at the despair". You may be: I think promoting magical thinking might be a symptom. — Janus
It's total existential crisis. — Noble Dust
projects doomed to failure — Janus
but the impossibility of replacing the whole entrenched infrastructure based on fossil fuels rapidly enough to achieve the projected reductions of emissions. — Janus
s the latter mindset will probably lead to rapid disappointment and ensuing despair. — Janus
That quibble aside — 180 Proof
my normative ethics is Negative Hedonic Utilitarianism (i.e. "right" judgments and conduct that prevents or reduces harm); and my applied ethics is Negative Preference Consequentialism (i.e. "right" policies-practices that prevents or reduces injustice). — 180 Proof
Where can we find them than? I can see the laws of quantum field theory or general relativity written anywhere but in the law books of physics. — Hillary
Then where does the physical law come from? — Hillary
If laws exist, then a lawgiver must exist, too. Therefore, God. — Art48
Says the kinds of contradictions pointed out in the op.Says who? — Changeling
Well, "God" is the ur-"incoherent concept" (i.e. empty name), no? — 180 Proof
t's inevitably what it means for something to be justified that causes grief. But of course one man's justification will be insufficient to convince another.
It's not truth that is problematic for knowledge, but justification. — Banno
Really, these don't seem particularly uninterpretable. "I know that I know X" conveys either unordinary confidence (after all, knowledge is a claim, because as you point out we don't have access to absolute truth). Or, it affirms that you not only know X, but you are aware of the fact that you know. As opposed to the many things you may know peripherally or unconsciously. "I believe that I know X" is even more straightforward: You believe you have knowledge, but are not quite sure: perhaps you are not quite sure what you know is true, perhaps you feel your justification is possibly suspect. The further iterations are more rarefied and silly, but you can still assign an interpretation.The sentences should make sense if 'I know X' can be treated as an empirical fact. The sentences don't make sense. So there seems to be a problem with treating 'I know X' as if it were an empirical fact. — Isaac
How so? I mean, it seems to me to intersect in the manner of christening of terms at the very least. You've not supported your assertion. — Isaac
Which seems of the same sort as "suppose there's a big green dragon..." — Isaac
_well I can not say that I know how this comment is relevant to my point that "knowledge" and "truth" do not always overlap. "I know" and "I use a specific knowledge" are two different things. — Nickolasgaspar
Again, you're just repeating back to me what your preferred theory of knowledge is ("yet, you do not know it, because the truth is..."). You've not demonstrated that I don't 'know' it because the truth of the matter is what determines whether I know something. — Isaac
Yes. I'm deflationist about 'truth'. I thought I explained that earlier by referencing Ramsey. The entire problem here is the definition of "I know" for someone deflationist about truth. — Isaac
I've shown the problem with this above. If "I know" is simply a claim to knowledge, then we have to admit of the disjunction "I believe I know..." and "I know I know...". Then we have to admit of "I believe I know I know..." and "I know I know I know...", and so on. — Isaac
You seem to use "Knowledge" as an idealistic "quality" that a claim has it or not...when its the other way around. — Nickolasgaspar
I know how to use this technique, I know it has instrumental value, I know it doesn't match the world ontologically. The can all be true, justified claims.Knowledge and truth are not(always) the same thing.
I.e. We know Relativity(in an ontological sense) is wrong but we still use it for its instrumental value. — Nickolasgaspar
Exactly. Yet your claim was that such assertions refer to objects in the external world. — Isaac
What, that we refer to the ratio with the sixteenth letter of the Greek alphabet? That's a geometric fact? — Isaac
A claim is accepted as knowledge when it is in agreement with available facts and carries an instrumental value. — Nickolasgaspar
We can only evaluate a claim as true or not true based on the facts that are currently available to us...not in an absolute sense, because we don't know if we have all the facts needed to make such an absolute evaluation. — Nickolasgaspar
So to properly use the word knowledge, the public rule governing it's proper use (the rule which we reference to say what it 'means') cannot use the concept of what is 'actually true' since no-one in the public rule-making community has this information. It can only use what they think is true. But that (as above) already constitutes that which is well-justified - and being well-justified is already one of the criteria for 'knowledge' under JTB. — Isaac
So, like our apple, proper justification (relative to the context) is the truthmaker of "I know X". If it turns out that (like our apple not being there) that I don't have proper justification for believing X, then the proposition "I know X" is false. — Isaac
Oh? And why is it wrong?Perfectly good English, just wrong. — T Clark
I see the distinction, but it's less clear with something like "the ratio of the diameter of a circle to it's circumference is Π" This doesn't apply to any object in the external world (unless you want to posit the existence of perfect circles), but it declares rather than supposes. — Isaac
'Knew' is the past tense. We use the past tense differently to the present tense. — Isaac
to be clear, I'm not looking for someone to clarify what the standard theory is, I'm trying (or was) to explain a different theory (broadly Ramseyan - or my interpretation of it). — Isaac
There were Greeks as long ago as 500 bce who theorized that the earth revolves around the sun. Just type in ancient Greeks heliocentrism. — T Clark
An inward declaration would make no sense in the same way a private rule would make no sense. A declaration is a public event, creates a public rule. — Isaac
Not sure what you mean by "inward". — Banno
But on first glance I think you are right that suppositions are declarations. — Banno