The question simply makes no sense. What could an answer possibly be? "It feels like...?" What words could possibly fill the blank? — Isaac
Dozens of researchers in consciousness think they know exactly what a good theory would look like and they've constructed their experiments closely around those models. The fact that you don't grasp them is not a flaw in the model. — Isaac
Why wouldn't they? What's in the way? What compelling physical law prevents biological processes from causing whatever symptoms they so happen to cause? — Isaac
I don't want to get into a long discussion about how science has to proceed. I will say that there is no reason the mind would not be among entities amenable for study by science. You and Constance are just waving your arms and promoting a ghost in the machine with no basis except that you can't imagine anything else. — T Clark
I think at this point in history there are a few key issues left to people who wish to find support for higher consciousness/idealism/theism worldviews - the nature of consciousness, and the mysteries of QM, being the most commonly referenced. — Tom Storm
If instead the semantics of scientific concepts were perspectival and grounded in the phenomenology and cognition of first-person experience, for example in the way in which each of us informally uses our common natural language, then inter-communication of the structure of scientific discoveries would be impossible, because everyone's concepts would refer only to the Lockean secondary qualities constituting their personal private experiences, which would lead to the appearance of inconsistent communication and the serious problem of inter-translation. In which case, we would have substituted the "hard problem" of consciousness" that is associated with the semantics of realism , for a hard problem of inter-personal communication that can be associated with solipsism and idealism. — sime
Chalmers proposes that things like neutral monism or the extended mind would help us get closer to a theory of consciousness. He's flexible. But strictly speaking, he's part of the analytical tradition, so the physicalism you're speaking of is not essential to analytical philosophy. — frank
. After all, what is it that is "extended"? — Constance
All that has changed is now we are freed from the absurd ontology of physical materialism that makes it, not hard, but impossible to describe epistemic relations, which are THE biggest embarrassment of analytic's naturalism. What is left for philosophy is clearer analysis of what makes appearance possible. — Constance
You were the one arguing that perceptions were effable. So you would eff whatever their perceptions are like to them. — hypericin
Cite one you think is satisfactory. — hypericin
"Why wouldn't they?" possesses exactly zero explanatory power. The question is rather "why would they?". — hypericin
You can look them all up, but without a basic understanding of the principles they're working from it's unlikely it'll make much sense. — Isaac
Is there a question as to why glutamate exists, why bones have the structure they do, why atoms are small, why stars are far away, why the sea is wet... — Isaac
We are so, so dumb. It's always the final paradigm. — neonspectraltoast
I don't know if I'm smarter, but I am more privy to actual reality...
...I have seen many things. Things "smart" people have never seen. — neonspectraltoast
Has anyone considered that the ability to manipulate information (and information itself) and consciousness are one in the same. — Mark Nyquist
don't know if I'm smarter, but I am more privy to actual reality. And still too foolish to assert myself. — neonspectraltoast
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