Well, it may be better to think of morality in term of decision options instead of actions. This is because I think that there’s a difference between “an active avoidance of an action” and “a passive lack of motivation towards an action”. For example, antinatalists typically engage in an active avoidance of reproduction. This means that they have a strong motivation to avoid engaging in unsafe sex. This can involve using contraception. Some religious people might argue that using contraception is immoral because you shouldn’t have sex without the intention of possible reproduction. I find these claims implausible but I think it illuminates the idea that antinatalists are not just perfectly passive individuals when it comes to anything related to reproduction. They are rather active in a different way. If there is some probability that using contraception is immoral then antinatalists who use it might be doing something evil. In addition, antinatalists that are willing to have an abortion in case they get pregnant are even more likely to get accused of being willing to do something evil. But, what about antinatalists who are celibate? Well, unless you happen to be so sexually undesirable or asexual that you never have an opportunity to be tempted to break the celibacy vow, there are times when you had to do something to avoid having sex. This might have included avoiding people who are sexually interested in you. The means by which you avoid those people might involve saying “No” when they ask you out on a date. Saying “No” is technically an action though. This action has some minuscule chance of being evil because maybe you just potentially prevent a particular child from being born by refusing a date. So, it seems to me that antinatalism requires action and that antinatalists would be better off arguing that having children is a bad decision option because it leads to a bad consequence rather than trying to make it about consent. In addition, it’s worth pointing out that the most inactive individuals on this issue are actually those who have “a passive lack of motivation towards reproduction”. Those people are arguably the most heinous potential procreators. This might involve a person who had no intention to reproduce but also no intention to avoid reproduction. So, they don’t do anything to try to have children or do anything to avoid having children. They might still end up with like 9 children though because they simply enjoy having sex and don’t bother using contraception or getting an abortion. Then, they simply give their child up for adoption. A lot of drug addicts have this sort of inactive orientation towards reproduction. They have sex for money to buy drugs but don’t use contraception. They don’t bother to get an abortion cuz all they are concerned with is how they are going to get their next high. Eventually, the baby is born addicted to drugs. Then, she gets abused in the foster care system for 18 years and then she comes out homeless. Then, she resorts to prostitution and drugs. Then, she ends up pregnant and the cycle repeats itself.

Well, by “birth control” they really mean long term contraception. Anything from non-permanent contraception like IUDs all the way to sterilization. They used to pay more money to drug addicts to get sterilized rather than use non-permanent long term methods but they have gotten backlash for it and now they simply pay a fraction of the money up front if a drug addict chooses non-permanent methods but they have to verify that they are still using the method each month to get more of the money. So, it’s still more inconvenient for them to choose the non-permanent route. They are a tax exempt charity so I think this might be the reason they are trying to keep a clean image that doesn’t offend people too much. Though, I’m not sure if it’s possible to lose your tax exempt status for being too controversial of a charity. I would recommend reading their Wikipedia page or reading through their entire website to get a better understanding of what they do and what criticisms they normally get from the public.

You haven't provided any evidence that either are false. You have talked about degrees of betterness. But read premise 1 again. It says it is 'as' wrong for me to cause myself a harm as it is to cause someone else an equal amount of harm. So, act X causes person A 10 dolors of harm, and act Y causes person B 10 dolors of harm. As an axiological hedonist how can you possibly insist that one act is more wrong than the other? You're committed to saying they're equally bad, other things being equal. Now, how can it possibly make a difference who the agent of the act is? It can't. — Bartricks

I don’t think that the 2 actions are equally bad. I actually think that it’s worse to harm yourself than it is to harm others. This is because there is a higher probability that someone has some reason to avoid causing themselves to suffer than the probability that someone has some reason to avoid causing others to suffer. This explains why there are some philosophers who are ethical egoists and moral nihilists and think they have no reason to avoid causing others to suffer but there are literally no philosophers that I have seen who think we have absolutely no reason to avoid causing ourselves to suffer pointlessly. This implies that we have a higher degree of confidence that self-harm is bad than the confidence by which we can say that harming others is bad. To give you a thought experiment, imagine that you and a complete stranger get kidnapped by a sadistic torturer. He says that he will either torture you or torture the stranger and you are the one who has to choose who gets tortured. Assuming that the suffering from the torture will be the same for you and the stranger, it’s seems like you would have more reason to have the stranger tortured instead of having yourself get tortured. Of course, you would probably have a different opinion if I gave you a thought experiment where you have to torture someone yourself in order to alleviate your own suffering. But, why would a different opinion be warranted on the latter of those 2 thought experiments?

So, Tim knows that if he hits himself it will cause 10 dolors of harm. And Tim knows that if he hits Jane, it will case 10 dolors of harm. Don't insist that Tim's act of hitting Jane will actually cause more dolors of harm - that is to change the example. No, in the example both acts cause exactly the same amount of harm. That's why, as a hedonist, you're committed to having to judge them both equally wrong. Yet they're obviously not. Hence the theory is refuted — Bartricks

No, you misunderstood me here. I’m claiming that Tim has more reason not hit himself. This is because the action of him hitting himself is more likely to be instrumentally bad than the action of him hitting Jane(if we don’t consider that he might go to jail for hitting Jane and suffer more there.)

So the first premise cannot be denied. And as for the second, it seems to me that you provide no evidence against it, you just raise the spectre of scepticism. — Bartricks

Why can’t the first premise be denied? You haven’t provided a single argument to defend the premise. You also haven’t provide any argument that the second premise is true. I have provided an argument against your second premise by insisting that there is intuitively a greater probability that you have reason to cause yourself suffering than the probability that you have reason to avoid causing suffering of others. I used the existence of ethical egoists and nihilists as evidence that some philosophers do not think they have non-selfish reason to avoid harming others. I also argued that there are practically no philosophers who think they have no reason to avoid causing pointless suffering to themselves. Even the most skeptical and nihilistic people are willing to grant that they shouldn’t cause pointless suffering to themselves. Otherwise, they would be willing to put their hand on a hot stove to prove their point. This suggests that the likelihood that self-harm is bad is greater than the likelihood that harming others is bad.

It is clear, is it not, to the rational intuitions of virtually everyone that hitting someone else is - other things being equal - much worse than hitting yourself? — Bartricks

It is not clear because those intuitions do not exist in an
ideal environment of perfect knowledge. We do not know what a group of omniscient beings would think about my theories. It’s clear that the intuitions of those omniscient beings would be far more reliable than the shallow intuitions of the average person. So, why not assume that the deep intuitions of a really skilled Axiological philosopher would not be much more reliable than that of the average person as well?

On what rational basis are you rejecting those intuitions? You can't just reject them because they are inconsistent with your theory - for that outs you as a dogmatist rather than a follower of evidence. — Bartricks

I’m not rejecting them because they are inconsistent with my theory. I’m rejecting them because you provided me with no reason to think these intuitions are rational. You simply assume that they are rational. I think some intuitions are better than others if they follow after a longer chain of arguments. It is an epistemological intuition that I hold and considering that most philosophers actually share this epistemological intuition of mine since most philosophers consider the intuitions of more philosophical people to be more reliable than the intuitions of non-philosophers, why would you reject this rational epistemological intuition that most philosophers hold?

And you can't selectively use scepticism to reject them, for that is once more arbitrary - you are only a sceptic when it comes to the probative force of intuitions that are inconsistent with your theory, but not otherwise. — Bartricks

How am I using selective skepticism?

Again, you can't deny the probative force of rational intuitions without giving up on all arguments for anything, including your own view. — Bartricks

Not if you argue that some intuitions are more reliable than others. Why are you consistently ignoring the epistemological intuitions shared by the majority of philosophers?

So, if rational intuitions have prima facie probative force, and if what makes one act right can just as easily make another wrong, and if what has appeared right to most people in one age has appeared wrong to most people in another, then we have good prima facie evidence that moral particularism is true. — Bartricks

How do you know that there is such a thing as “prima facie” evidence? I would argue that all good evidence is difficult to discover and that we can’t trust the average person to do it right. In fact, we can’t even trust skilled philosophers to do it right. Skilled philosophers are also likely to get it wrong. I don’t think that any philosopher has ever proposed a theory that is completely correct about the subject matter that it discusses. In fact, I’m sure that my Mildly Egoistic Hedonic Consequentialism is wrong about a lot of things. It may even be completely wrong. But, I think that there is a greater likelihood that it is correct than any other value theory that I had encountered. But, it’s still probably wrong to some extent and maybe even completely wrong. Humans are just too dumb to know anything resembling the complete truth about good and bad actions. This is true for me as well since I’m only a pathetic human. I’m not a philosophical deity of any sort. But, I don’t think that should discourage me from trying to get it right to the best of my ability. If anything, it encourages me to constantly adjust my viewpoints as soon as I see flaws with it. But, instead of relying on the irrational intuitions of pathetic humans like myself, maybe I should try to see if there are better intuitions that are only available to the best of our species. If you think that humans suck at philosophy, then the commonality of their intuitions towards a particular moral case becomes irrelevant. The fact that most humans hold an intuition that the torture of Tom is unjustified might actually be evidence that it probably is justified since humans are so bad at moral philosophizing. Why are you so optimistic that humans can reason about these things correctly? It seems like this is just an assumption that you hold. Why not think that all philosophical ideas that have been devised are wrong to some extent but some are simply more wrong than others?

Why? Because that 'just is' moral particularism. So, until or unless you challenge that argument, your view is refuted. — Bartricks

I have challenged your moral particularism above by expressing my pessimism in people’s ability to do philosophy well while arguing that this pessimism doesn’t suggest that we shouldn’t devise philosophical theories. This is because we should be proud to create a theory that was less wrong than any other theory or a theory that is less likely to be completely wrong than other theories. Hell, I’m even proud of you for supporting a divine command theory that is probably less likely to be completely wrong than the religious divine command theory :wink:

Clever people defend false views all the time. There are umpteen normative theories and umpteen metaethical theories under debate in the literature - they can't all be true. They can all be false, but at best only one normative theory can be true, and only one metaethical theory. So, as things stand, we know already that most clever people's theories about these matters are false. — Bartricks

I agree. Every theory on normative ethics and meta-ethics is probably false. But, some of them are more false than others. I think that clever people usually hold more complicated and plausible variations of simple theories. For example, in the 18th Century there was only 2 types of Utilitarianism which was the Jeremy Bentham’s Utilitarianism and John Stewart Mill’s Utilitarianism. Today, I don’t think a single high level moral philosopher thinks those specific versions of Utilitarianism are true. Rather, there is now like 100 different specific Utilitarian theories and theories that are almost Utilitarian and theories that are only somewhat Utilitarian like my own. But, the simple theories of Mill and Bentham are more popular among people with only a mild interest in philosophy. This is because they are not aware of all the modern variations of the Utilitarianism. I think most of the modern variations are better than the traditional variations. Some of the modern theories probably got closer to the truth than others but it’s impossible to know for sure which theories are less bad. But, high level philosophers seem to be in a better position to examine those theories for plausibility if not only because they are familiar with more versions of Utilitarianism and therefore can compare more different theories. The same thing applies across different categories of theories. I tend to think that if your theory doesn’t have a really long name like “Mildly Egoistic Hedonic Consequentialism” then there’s probably a lot of unanswered questions and flaws. Technically, I think my theory should actually be called “Mildly Egoistic and Mostly Hedonistic Consequentialism” since my theory is mostly but not completely hedonistic. My point being is that any theory with even a smallest amount of plausibility would be difficult to call anything with only 1 or 2 words. Philosophy is really complicated and so our theories should be really complicated as well. This is our best chance of not having a terrible theory.

Also, it is quite clear from our rational intuitions that the god who exists seems, in the main, to be opposed to imposing things on people without their prior consent. I mean, doing that - even when what one imposes is beneficial - seems wrong in many circumstances, and even in those where it is overall justified, it seems regrettable nevertheless. I find it hard to think of a much more significant thing to impose on someone than a life here. So, given she seems so opposed to imposing significant things on others without their consent, it is reasonable to suppose she'd be very much opposed to procreation on those grounds too. — Bartricks

So, I have 2 questions:
1. How do you know that god or gods are benevolent?
2. Did god or gods create the universe which allowed for sentient life?

Anyway, I reiterate that I do not know what you mean by 'deeper' and 'shallower' intuitions in this context. I assume that you probably mean by 'deeper' those intuitions that, if taken in isolation, would imply the truth of a principle and by 'shallower' you mean intuitions about particular cases. But I simply see no reason to accord one more probative force than another. — Bartricks

Yes, you understand right here but why do you not think that we should privilege intuitions that imply the truth of a deeper principle? Why assume that intuitions have no levels and could only be dismissed if they are deemed to be as a result of some bias? In addition, why assume that the intuitions of a greater number of people are more likely to be correct than intuitions of a lesser number of people? Could we not posit a possibility that some intuitions are of a higher quality than others even if there’s no explanation for why one of the intuitions should be dismissed? I have an epistemological intuition that deeper intuitions are more reliable than more shallow intuitions. Why should I distrust this intuition?

Note too that the philosophical community seems to be largely on my side, for if someone proposes some moral principle what happens is everyone then tries to imagine a case in which the principle would force us to judge an act wrong that is intuitively obviously right. When such a case is imagined, it is taken to be a counterexample to the principle, and depending on how clear and widely shared the intuitions are, the counterexample will often be held to refute the rule. So, what you would call 'shallow' intuitions that are, in fact, the ultimate test of credibility that any moral rule is held up to. — Bartricks

What do you mean by “philosophical community” here? Do you mean the community of academic philosophers in universities or the community of online philosophers that we have in this forum? If you are talking about the former, then there’s plenty of good explanations as to why most academic philosophers agree with you more than with me:
1. Academic philosophers often have to protect their reputation with the public to avoid getting fired and to get hired and get promotions. This means they have to “play it safe” and avoid talking about their more controversial opinions. It’s rare to see academic philosophers defend viewpoints in academic papers that are extremely controversial. This is not because most academic philosophers hold 0 extremely controversial viewpoints. I think most people believe in at least one thing that is extremely unpopular. For you, it happens to be antinatalism for example. But, let me ask you a question. Imagine that you just graduated with a PhD in philosophy and you are looking to get a job as a philosophy professor, would you write an academic paper defending your antinatalism and would you put that paper on your resume for your potential future employers to see? If you would then that’s a good way to have your resume end up in the trash. If I was looking to get a job as a philosophy professor, then I would definitely just avoid writing any papers about any topics that might offend anyone. I would probably just specialize in a less controversial field like Metaphysics and Epistemology. So, the reason why academic moral philosophers often use shallow intuitions as arguments against normative ethical theories is because they know that no one can bite the bullet on their thought experiments without risking their career. Really popular philosophers could potentially get away with expressing controversial viewpoints. For example, Peter Singer is a utilitarian philosopher and he would agree with me that the torture of Tom is justified and he’s still a philosophy professor at an acclaimed university. He’s also one of the best selling and most loved philosophers in the world despite also being one of the most hated philosophers. So, you can be loved and hated as a philosopher at the same time. There are non-philosophers who do not even attend his university who have protested outside of his university to try to get him fired from his job. Despite this, his university realizes that many more people would want to go to this university to be taught by their favorite philosopher Peter Singer than those who would boycott the university just because they don’t fire him. But, Peter Singer did not express his most controversial viewpoints until he became popular for his less controversial viewpoints. This is probably because he would of gotten fired if it wasn’t for his prior popularity. The same sort of story could be told about David Benetar who is the most famous antinatalist philosopher. He is one of only 2 academic philosophers that I know of who are brave enough to argue for antinatalism directly. The other philosopher is Christoph Fehige. There is a third philosopher named Seana Shiffrin who wrote a paper that argued children should be allowed to sue their parents for creating them but I’m not sure if she counts as an antinatalist philosopher. Anyways, Benetar didn’t write about his antinatalist views until he moved up the ranks in his university and became the head of the philosophy department of his university. If he did so early in his career, he might of gotten fired. I think my views are even more controversial than that of Benetar and Singer, so I would not get hired for sure. So, it‘s difficult to get a diversity of opinions in a university setting if it impacts your job security.
2. My arguments have been heard and critiqued by very few philosophers. In fact, you are pretty much the only philosopher that has talked to me for long enough for me to get to use these arguments. My most popular YouTube video called “Why I would plug myself in an Experience Machine” only has 16 views. My other videos average at just 1 view. Unless every argument that any moral philosopher has created gets heard and critiqued by every moral philosopher, we cannot accurately gauge the intuitiveness of various viewpoints under ideal circumstances.
3. Most academic philosophers know little about the field of Axiology and this means only a handful of philosophers could adequately critique my arguments without first doing a fair bit of research.
So, why do people on this philosophy forum usually agree with you more than me? Well....
1. I’m actually not sure if they actually do agree with you more here. I think TPF has a decent amount of people who willing to entertain my viewpoints. Like 3 people out of maybe 8 people appeared to agree with me that Bob’s procreation is justified. I’m not sure how many people would agree with me about the case of Tom but I wouldn’t be surprised if it’s a sizable minority. It’s also worth noting that there’s also a lot more antinatalists on TPF than in any philosophical department of a university. This is probably because anonymity provides a safe space to talk about controversial viewpoints.
2. Philosophers on TPF often read academic books and journals and mimic the argumentation style of academic philosophers. Because acclaimed philosophy professors like to use thought experiments which appeal to shallow intuitions to argue against normative ethical viewpoints, the use of such arguments seems more credible to people. But, as I have stated, this is due to the fact that most academic philosophers are scared of biting bullets.
3. Most people on TPF are not on the same level of philosophical sophistication as an academic philosopher typically is. Obviously, there are exceptions but on average they are closer to a non-philosopher that you might meet on the street than an academic philosopher who has highly sophisticated ideas. So, they are not the authority figure that we are looking for.

So, in conclusion, there really are no authority figures that could give us right and wrong answers to moral questions without significant biases or inadequacies. This is why I think it’s better to trust your own reasons and intuitions and not worry about what other people are saying.

I mean, one could point out - trivially - that one thing all right acts have in common apart from being right is that they're all actions, and they all happen in time, and so on. But you can't get a normative theory from that. They're just conceptual truths. — Bartricks

Ok, but you seem to think that there is at least one similarity that all right and wrong acts have that suggests that your moral particularism is just as much of a normative theory as my mildly egoistic hedonic consequentialist theory— Namely that the rightness and wrongness of an action is determined by the most commonly held intuitions about that action which cannot be explained away as a bias. This seems to be a moral rule that your moral particularism is based off of. It may be a complicated rule but it’s still a moral rule. It’s actually less complicated than the supposed moral rule that my theory follows. I would challenge you to summarize the moral rule that my theory follows in a single sentence like I just summarized the moral rule that your theory follows. My theory says that a decision option(which includes both actions and choosing not to act) is good if it is better than the alternative decision options and what determines if it’s better is a series of competing aims. The most important aim is to minimize suffering in one’s own life. The second most important aim is to maximize pleasure in one’s own life. The third most important aims are to maximize one’s own life satisfaction and to minimize the suffering of the world. The fourth most important aims is to maximize the pleasure of the world and satisfy as many of one’s desires as possible. There are other less important normative aims beyond this but they are not important to mention since it’s extremely unlikely that you would find yourself in a situation where you would need to privilege that minuscule aim above the other more important aims. In the case of Tom, there is actually a conflict between the more important aim of minimizing the suffering of the world and the less important aim of maximizing the pleasure of the world. I think that the less important aim supersedes over the more important aim here due to the magnitude of the pleasure compared to the relatively small contribution that Tom’s torture adds on to the suffering of the world. But, my theory welcomes you to disagree with me. You could accept my theory to be true and still argue that the aim of maximizing pleasure in the world could never supersede over the aim of minimizing suffering in the world. But, this would require you to defend a claim that suffering just has far more value significance than pleasure.

So, of course I agree that all right actions are actions, and all right actions are performed by agents, and so on. But the rightness is not 'supervenient' or resultant from these features, and thus such observations cannot provide a basis for a substantial normative theory. — Bartricks

In my theory, the goodness of an action is also not supervenient on any specific feature. Any action can be good because it minimizing suffering in one’s own life but it can also be good because it maximizes pleasure in one’s own life but it can also be good because it minimizes the suffering of the world but it can also be good because it maximizes my life satisfaction but it can also be good because it maximizes the pleasure in the world. I think you misunderstood my theory as being less pluralistic and diverse than it actually is.

Yes, lots. It appears that hurting another for fun is wrong. That is, my reason represents me to have reason not to hurt others for fun. This is not an assumption, but an appearance. And appearances are prima facie evidence in support of their representative contents. That too is a rational appearance.

These are appearances, not assumptions. To illustrate the difference, take one of those well-known optical illusions concerning shapes - you know, the sort where there are two objects that appear to be different sizes but are in fact the same size. Now, because these are familiar to most of us, we 'assume' the two objects are the same size. Yet they 'appear' to be different sizes. I mean, mere familiarity with these illusions does not prevent the objects featuring in them from appearing to be different sizes. Likewise, hurting others for fun appears to be wrong. That's not an assumption. It is how things appear (and appear to virtually everyone). Not everyone believes in the accuracy of such appearances (nihilists do not, for instance). But even those who do not believe in their accuracy - so, nihilists again - still typically get the impression the acts are wrong (they just don't assume they actually are). — Bartricks

In that case, why would it not be sufficient for me to simply say that it appears to me that my theories are correct and thus this is assumption-free evidence for me that they are correct? It’s seems that everyone could simply believe what appears true to them. Why should they take the intuitions of other people into account as well? Also, why not also consider the perspective of the nihilist here? Aren’t you making the assumption that the nihilist is wrong?

No, that's just plain false and amounts to a form of the most extreme scepticism. — Bartricks

Why do you think that extreme skepticism is false? Are you not simply assuming that extreme skepticism is false?

No I haven't and no it isn't. Divine command theory is a metaethical theory, not a normative ethical theory.

And it is not the theory that morality is the commands of 'God'. That's one particular kind of divine command theory - the kind associated with Christianity and Islam. But divine command theory is the theory that morality is the commands of 'a god or gods'. It isn't a religious view, but a metaethical view - a philosophical theory.

It may help if I point out that I am not religious and neither know nor care what Christianity or any other religious says about anything.

Note too, that a normative theory is a theory about what's right, not about what rightness itself is. A metaethical theory is a theory about what rightness itself is. — Bartricks

I don’t see how your divine command theory is not a normative theory but religious divine command theories are. I would like to point out that even your non-religious divine command theory seems to claim that what is right is whatever God or the gods command. How is that different than saying that what is right is what Allah commands? Is it just because your divine command theory doesn’t specify exactly what is right while religious divine command theories do? In that case, my theory also doesn’t specify what is right since there are multiple competing goals in my theory and different people may have different intuitions about what answer my theory implies for cases like the case of Tom. In addition, religious divine command theory also doesn’t specify what is right since different religious people may interpret their holy books differently.

As an example, utilitarianism is a normative theory. It says "The right act is the one that maximises happiness". Divine command theory does not contradict this, and is thus not a rival view. For it says that 'a right act is one and the same as a prescription of a god". That says nothing about the content of the prescription. So, it is consistent with utilitarianism (and deontology, and any other normative theory you care to mention). — Bartricks

Well, it’s possible for you to believe in multiple normative theories at once if you somehow glue them together and try to make them perfectly compatible with one another. For example, there is actually a normative ethical theory called “Christian Hedonism”. This theory claims that the Bible teaches us that God wants us to maximize the pleasure in our own life and so that’s what we should do. So, it combines Christian divine command theory with hedonistic ethical egoism. Another good example is Rule Utilitarianism which argues that we should follow moral rules which maximize the happiness of the world instead of performing actions which maximize the happiness of the world. So, a rule utilitarian might argue that we shouldn’t torture Tom because following the rule that we should torture people to maximize pleasure usually leads to a bad consequence so we should stay on the safe side and not violate that moral rule. So, it basically combines Utilitarianism with Deontology. Another example is Trait Utilitarianism which argues that we focus on developing personality traits which maximizes happiness of the world. It basically combines Utilitarianism with Virtue Ethics. So, it’s entirely possible that your normative ethical theory should really be called “Divine Moral Particularism” because it argues that are intuitions about moral cases are often reliable because they were bestowed to us by the divine.

nihilism is a metaethical theory with normative implications - it implies nothing is right or wrong - but that doesn't make it a normative theory — Bartricks

Actually, I don’t think that Nihilism has normative implications. This is because Moral Error Theory(which is what I’m assuming that you are referring to when you speak of “nihilism” as a meta-ethical theory) argues that all moral claims should be interpreted as claims of objective truth and that this implies that all moral claims are false since moral claims are not objectively true. Many Moral Error Theorists or “Moral Nihilists” as you call them argue that we should just treat morality of as a kind of fantasy game. So, you could have a nihilist pretend as though Utilitarianism is true for fun because he likes the concept of being a utilitarian. He would do all the things that the typical Utilitarian would do but he would simply see it as a game and argue that the “Moral Realist” Utilitarian is taking himself too seriously. So, there doesn’t have to be any normative implications to nihilism. The moral implications of this view is anything that the nihilist wants it to be.

No, because it is implausible. Your normative view is entirely compatible with divine command theory, but it nevertheless has no good evidence in its support, I think. If you drop your assumptions and just inspect people's rational intuitions they vary from case to case, yes? There's a rough shape to them, true. But nothing very fixed and definite. So, moral particularism is implied by the actual evidence - by rational intuitions. — Bartricks

Once again, you are assuming that there are no different levels of deepness of intuitions. I know you are not understanding my argument that some intuitions are deeper than others on the basis of how long of a chain of arguments one has before they rely on intuition but I already tried explaining my argument to you as simply as I possibly can. I’m also not sure what you mean by “fixed” here. My theory is not fixed onto any singular normative aim so in what way does my theory imply that morality is fixed?

If divine command theory is true, then what's right is determined by a god's commands, yes? Well, are they fixed? No, or at least, there's no good reason to think they would be. — Bartricks

Why do you assume that god’s commands are not fixed?
Also, why do you assume that my moral theory implies that morality is fixed when it doesn’t follow a singular aim?

I mean, if I command you to do something in one context, I am not thereby committed to commanding you to do it in another, or even in the same context on another occasion. So, what goes for me surely will go for a god as well. — Bartricks

You are not committed to command me to do something in another context but you could command me to something in every context imaginable. god could also do the same. Thus, it is entirely possible that your god or gods would command you to do things that are compatible with the hierarchy of aims that is present in my theory.

By the title of this thread, I thought the OP was going to be a rant about illegal immigrants :lol:

So, there is no more a pattern to morality than there is to, say, colour. Some things are blue. Is there anything all blue things have in common apart from being blue? Nope. — Bartricks

I think there are other things that all blue things have in common:
1. All blue things are made of atoms
2. All blue things exist in the same universe(if there are no other universes with blue things.)
3. All blue things could be perceived by humans who are not color blind as being blue.
4. All blue things reflect light in a similar manner and this is why they are all blue.
5. All blue things are not mental states
6. All blue things are not mathematical equations
7. All blue things are not red things

If we consider “are not” similarities then there is a near infinite amount of things that all blue things have in common. The same could be applied to wrong actions:

1. All wrong actions are not right actions.
2. All wrong actions are fictional concepts because actions are better understood as being on a spectrum of betterness and worseness.(I know you probably don’t agree with that one.)
3. If wrong actions were not fictional concepts, then all wrong actions would not be a type of object.
4. All wrong actions are not mental states.
5. All wrong actions are actions.
6. All wrong actions are concepts.

I think you get the idea here. My point is that wrong actions have a near infinite amount of things in common and so it’s not clear to me why you think that morality is not pattern based or that color is not pattern based.

Like I say, I think that's wholly unjustified and just bizarre. The core assumption is unjustified. Why assume that all right acts will have something in common apart from being right? They may do - by why assume it as an article of faith at the outset? — Bartricks

Well, I think I have already answered your questions here above. I don’t think that right acts even exist but if we were talk to about good acts instead and define them as being better than the alternative acts then there’s a near infinite amount of similarities that all good acts have in common.

And given that any pattern one thinks there may be is going to be justified - to the extent that it is justified - by its being implied by some of our intuitions, it is bizarre to then subsequently ignore the probative force of those that do not imply it. — Bartricks

As I have stated earlier, I believe that intuitions that occur within a deeper level of argumentation are better than intuitions that occur at more shallow levels. In addition, I’m perfectly willing to change my mind if someone provides a good counter-argument to one of my axiological arguments. A good counter-argument does not simply state that my argument is assuming something to be true since all philosophical arguments have underlying assumptions. A good counter-argument puts the person who holds the argument in a pretty difficult explanatory trap where it becomes very difficult to explain something if someone continues to uphold their argument. I don’t feel like my argument for the comeasurability requirement or my degree of confidence argument has been put into any sort of explanatory trap. Rather, because I just realized that there is obviously an infinite number of things that good actions have in common, this only strengthens my intuition that we can expect to find more things that good actions all have in common. And, it reveals that you haven’t even accurately diagnosed what the assumptions of my arguments are(which is understandable since you haven’t heard some of my arguments yet and I’m sure there are plenty of assumptions that I’m making that you will eventually point out since all philosophical arguments have assumptions.). I don’t deny that I have to rely on intuition at some point but I think that having a longer chain of good arguments can make your intuitions more reliable. I also consider well developed arguments of other people but I end up objecting to them or else I end up seeing them as plausible.

When we look at the evidence - and look at it 'assumption-free' so to speak - then morality appears to be roughly patterned, but not rigidly so. It doesn't 'have' to have a pattern, but it seems to have a pattern of sorts. — Bartricks

Is there such a thing as “assumption-free evidence”? Even the most reliable evidence has some assumptions that it relies on. For example, people who say that the theory of evolution has more evidence than the theory of intelligent design assume that the intuitions of scientists to measure the amount of evidence for both theories is reliable. In addition, the evidence that we have that the Earth is the 3rd planet from the Sun assumes that the government is not hiding the existence of a planet between Mercury and Venus. It also assumes that Mercury actually exists and is not merely a hoax perpetrated by the scientific community. So, there’s always some assumption that you can claim that a piece of evidence is making and so there simply isn’t such a thing as “assumption-free evidence”.

For example, imagine a divine command theory is true (which it is). That is, imagine that moral rightness and wrongness are prescriptions of a god, prescriptions that our rational intuitions give us some insight into.

Now imagine that the god is benevolent (which she is). Well, it seems reasonable to suppose that a benevolent god would issue prescriptions that would benefit us: that is, that she'd want us to do thrive and form meaningful relationships and all that stuff. If we follow prescriptions of that sort, then we're also likely to be more reproductively successful than those who did not.

In this case, then, we have a divine explanation for why it might be that living in accordance with many moral prescriptions has, in the main, proved to be adaptive. And in this case the explanation does not debunk the intuitions at all. — Bartricks

Ok, now I think you just both defeated your arguments for moral particularism and your arguments for antinatalism. Divine Command theory is a normative ethical theory which argues that right and wrong actions are the prescriptions of God. Which means that in addition to the infinite amount of things that all right acts have in common, they all share another crucial thing in common: they are all prescriptions of God. I suppose you would then argue that moral particularism is simply a method of figuring out what God’s prescriptions are. In that case, why couldn’t my degree of certainty argument and my incomeasurability requirement argument be a better method of figuring out God’s prescriptions? Another question I have now is if there is a benevolent God then why would procreation be immoral? Did this God not create mankind with good intentions or is something or someone else responsible for the existence of mankind? Was God not able to prevent the birth of mankind by not creating the universe(or did he even create it?)? Finally, it seems that this may imply that the survival advantage of thinking that procreation is permissible is not the only explanation for why people hold the intuition that procreation is permissible. It’s also possible that this was an intuition that was implanted by God herself and she thought that procreation was a good thing. Thus, this seems to make the intuitions people hold about procreation about as reliable as the intuitions that people hold about the torture of Tom. In fact, I bet you that more people would be willing to support the torture of Tom worldwide than the people who are willing to oppose procreation. There’s not a single country in the world where antinatalism is a popular movement. It seems that people in some countries like China, North Korea, and Colombia are willing to support the torture of one person to make everyone extremely happy. Hell, in Colombia, you have cartels torturing people all the time to make a profit and to simply send a message to their rivals. People living there are probably so desensitized to torture that they can think more rationally about this issue and not let emotive issues get in the way.

I do not understand you here. The intuitions about 'deeper reasons' are going to be rational intuitions, and I do not know what you mean by 'deeper' in this context. — Bartricks

Ok, imagine that John thinks that the torture of Tom is unjustified. The deeper reason he gives for believing this is because he thinks that God would disapprove of it. He believes that God would disapprove of it because of some argument that he gives that God exists and some argument that he gives that the existent God would likely disapprove of torturing Tom. We’ll refer the former argument that he gives for the existence of God as “Argument A” and the latter argument that he gives for why God disapproves of Tom’s torture as “Argument B”. John then uses “Argument C” to explain why he thinks “Argument A” works to show that God exists. Then he uses “Argument D” to show that “Argument B” works to support his hypothesis that God disapproves of the torture of Tom. Since he doesn’t have any arguments to explain why he thinks Arguments C and D work to properly support Arguments A and B, he can simply say that it’s intuitive for him to think that Arguments C and D adequately defend Arguments A and B. So, intuitions are designed to mark a stopping point for someone’s explanation for why they don’t support the torture of Tom to avoid an infinite regress. The argument that God disapproves of Tom’s torture is John’s level 1 argument. Arguments A and B are his level 2 arguments. Argument C and D are his level 3 arguments. Beyond this, he relies on his intuition. Now, let’s imagine that another person named Jack also thinks that the torture of Tom is unjustified and he also thinks that it’s because God disapproves of it. He also defends this claim with the same Arguments A and B that John uses. But, unlike John, he doesn’t have deeper arguments to support Arguments A and B. So, he says that it’s simply intuitive to him that Arguments A and B work to demonstrate his point. Well, John seems to be the superior moral philosopher here compared to Jack because his arguments appear to be more well developed and he doesn’t have to rely on his intuitions until he reaches a deeper level of explanation. Both John and Jack share their L1 and L2 arguments but John also has L3 arguments. John’s post-L3 intuitions are likely more reliable than Jack’s post-L2 intuitions. Now, let’s imagine that Tiffany thinks that the torture of Tom is unjustified but she gives no argument for why she thinks that it’s the case. In that case, if she simply says that she has an intuition that it’s wrong then her intuitions are so under-developed that they are pretty much just attitudes. So, here’s an argumentation graph for John, Jack, and Tiffany:

John: Main God argument -> Arguments A and B -> Arguments C and D -> (pretty reliable intuitions unless Arguments A through D are opposed by good counter-arguments)

Jack: Main God arguments -> Arguments A and B -> (decent intuitions unless Arguments A and B are opposed by good counter-arguments )

Tiffany: (crappy intuitions that are pretty much just attitudes)

I hope it makes sense now what I mean by intuitions about deeper reasons being more reliable. Now, here is what my argumentation graph looks like for the justification for Tom’s torture compared to what I think your graph looks like:

Me: (L1) Argument for the Comeasurability Requirement. In addition, The Degree of Confidence Argument and The Demonstration Argument for Axiological Hedonism which I haven’t yet introduced. -> (L2) Thought experiments that describe why my Comeasurability Requirement should be intuitive to you and the Stock Options analogy that I use to defend both the Epistemic Certainty Argument and The Demonstration Argument for Hedonism -> (My L2 arguments aren’t supported by what appears to be pretty good rational intuitions that I hold but these intuitions may be irrational if there is a good argument against either my L1 or L2 arguments)

You: (L1) Argument that most people find it counterintuitive that the torture of Tom is justified and this gives us strong reason to think it probably isn’t -> (L2) Argument that intuitions that other people have about cases of applied ethics is the only type of evidence that we have to answer questions about cases of applied ethics -> (Your L2 arguments are supported by what appears to be pretty good rational intuitions that you hold but these intuitions may be irrational if there is a good argument against either your L1 and L2 arguments. I have argued against your L1 arguments just now with my John, Jack, and Tiffany thought experiment and with all the argumentation charts which are designed to show that intuitions can operate on different levels of argumentation and I argued that they are more reliable if they operate on that deeper level. Ironically enough, your argumentation is actually just as deep as mine if not more and so you also seem to think that your beliefs about Tom’s torture are probably better than that of other people if you have deeper arguments to support them. So, it seems to me that if you thought that intuitions are just as reliable at L1 then you would of just said that there’s no deeper reason for why you disapprove of Tom’s torture and this is just an intuition that you hold. But, you seem to recognize that L1 intuitions would amount to nothing more than an attitude and thus you felt that you needed to give a deeper explanation to me for why you think that the torture of Tom is unjustified and I respect you for doing that.)

Axiological hedonism is easily refuted - there are abundant refutations of it. For instance, here's one:

1. If Axiological hedonism is true, then it is as wrong for me to cause myself harm as it is to cause someone else an equal amount of harm
2. It is not as wrong for me to cause myself harm as it is to case someone else an equal amount of harm. (For instance, if I hit myself in the face that's not as wrong as hitting someone else in the face, even if the amounts of pain the act causes - both physical and emotional - happen to be identical)
3. Therefore axiological hedonism is false. — Bartricks

I would argue that both premise 1 and 2 of your argument are false. This is because nothing can be said to be morally right or wrong. Rather, there is only a spectrum of better and worse actions that one could take at any given time. One factor that determines betterness or worseness of an action is the degree of confidence by which a person could say that an action is instrumentally bad. Actions can only be instrumentally bad if they cause something that is intrinsically bad or eliminate something that is intrinsically good. Something is intrinsically bad if it is bad in a final sense rather than bad because it leads to something else that is bad. For example, having a disease is usually thought of as being instrumentally bad. This is because having a disease is only bad because it leads to something else that is bad like it causes you to suffer for example. The most obvious candidate for something that is intrinsically bad is your own suffering from your own point of view. This is because the suffering of a particular person is bad from the point of view of that same particular person in the most obvious way imaginable and there isn’t a deeper explanation for why it is bad. It is just bad for its own sake. The suffering of a particular person is more obviously bad to that particular person than the suffering of other people. It is possible for an extremely skeptical person to doubt that the suffering of others should be consider bad from their point of view but even the most skeptical people cannot deny that their own suffering is intrinsically bad for them and that they have reason not to hurt themselves pointlessly. Thus, any action that causes you to suffer pointlessly has the greatest degree of confidence of being an instrumentally bad action to some extent. Any action that causes others pointless suffering, on the other hand, has a smaller degree of confidence of being an instrumentally bad action to some extent. Thus, we have more reason to minimize suffering in our own lives than we do to minimize suffering in the lives of others. But, in cases where we could either reduce the suffering in our own lives by a little bit or reduce the suffering of the world by a lot, it may be rational to choose to benefit the world. This is why I have donated to Project Prevention despite the fact that I’m mostly an egoist. I might have more reason to prevent the existence of an entire lifetime of suffering than to reduce a little bit of my own suffering with the money that I donated. But, ultimately, I have more reason to minimize my own suffering all things consider equal.

1. If axiological hedonism is true, then equal amounts of pleasure matter equally
2. Equal amounts of pleasure do not matter equally (for example, if two people - one innocent and the other guilty of horrific crimes - are equally happy, their happiness is not equally good, indeed the happiness of the guilty party is arguably positively bad)
3. Therefore, axiological hedonism is false — Bartricks

Once again, both premises are false. The first premise is false because my own pleasure counts for more than the pleasure of others since I’m mostly an egoistical hedonist. The second premise is false because no person is more deserving of pleasure than another person. This is because the extent to which someone deserves a pleasure is completely incomeasurable(remember my comeasurability requirement that I explained earlier) and therefore it is impossible to even formulate a reasonable non-arbitrary hypothesis of what kinds of people deserve pleasure more and what kinds of people deserve pleasure less.

I think it is undeniable that in both cases the second premises enjoy overwhelming intuitive support and the only basis you are going to find to reject those intuitions is that they conflict with axiological hedonism (which is question begging). — Bartricks

I don’t think my degree of confidence argument and my comeasurability requirement argument are question begging so I would have to disagree.

I have not done that. I take a 'normative theory' to be a theory about what all morally right/wrong acts (and good/bad deeds, traits and states of affair) have in common - if anything - apart from being right/wrong. My moral particularism is the view that they have nothing in common apart from being right/wrong. That's a normative theory, at least on my usage. By contrast a 'metaethical' theory would be a theory about what the rightness itself is. — Bartricks

Well, in your moral particularism, there’s something else that you think all wrong actions have in common: they are all “intuitively considered wrong by the rational intuitions of at least one person”. Is that not something that all wrong actions share? If that’s the case, then I don’t understand how my theory is more pattern based than your theory.

So, I think your axiological hedonism is false on its face - it flies in the face of powerful and widely shared moral intuitions that we have no reason to discount. — Bartricks

Well, your phrase here that hedonism “flies in the face of “powerful” and widely shared moral intuitions that we have “no reason to discount”” seems to demonstrate why I think your approach to moral philosophy is extremely prejudice against unpopular opinions like the one I happen to uphold. It’s almost like I have to fight an uphill battle for you to even consider my arguments. First of all, how could a group of people who have never even heard of my degree of confidence argument or my comeasurability requirement argument have “powerful” objections to arguments they never even heard. It’s possible that if I could convince the entire world to sit down and study all of my arguments for an hour a day for a year and also give them a pill that makes them smart enough to understand my arguments perfectly then a lot of people might agree with me. Alas, I cannot do that and I don’t really want to. My point here is that most people are simply not even familiar with the best arguments in support of hedonism just as many hedonists might not be aware of the best arguments against hedonism. I have studied the topic of Axiology extensively by reading lots of academic journals on the topic and related topics. I have also spent about 2-3 hours a day in the last 4 years philosophizing about this topic and other philosophical topics. I’m not even claiming to be right about my views on Hedonism though. There are plenty of really good Axiologists who are more dedicated than I am who might have really good objections to my arguments. But, I find it laughable that my arguments could defeated by normal people who never even heard of my arguments or philosophized about the topics that I have philosophized about. It’s kinda like saying that the Multi-Verse theory in physics is false because it’s so counter-intuitive to most people. The Multi-Verse theory might be false and many physicists object to it but you can’t use the intuitions of non-physicists to say that it’s wrong. So, why could we use the intuitions of non-philosophers to say that the premises of your arguments against hedonism are true? They might actually be true but I would want to hear a complicated defense for the truthfulness of those premises by a seasoned philosopher who can provide it.


This post has gotten pretty long so I will address the rest of your post in another post later on.

However in terms of your first critique,you've seemed to bite the bullet and completely attempt to eliminate duty by adopting a new language (not necessarily grounding the truth of said belief ontologically) that fits with this teleonomical (only apparently purposeful) reality of atheism. — Shushi

I got a question for you regarding whether or not you think I need to provide some kind of an ontological argument for my “duty eliminativism”. Isn’t it enough for me to argue that duties appear not to exist and are not necessary for discussing moral decision making? I understand that you most likely think that they are necessary but I just want to see if our disagreement is about the necessity of recognizing the concept of duty or is it simply about whether or not duties actually exist. I’m willing to grant that some people might perceive something that they think could be classified as a duty but I just never found that concept useful when discussing decision making. So, I just think it’s not worth talking about.

You only critiqued Objective Moral Duties or Prescriptive Moral terms (Ought), but not necessarily Objective Moral Values (Value) or Normative Statements (the focus of teleonomical vs teleological relates to the is/ought, which in effect logically impacts fact/value as there not being any goal for nature or us means that there aren't duties for us, which the share biological natures that we share aren't values, but only facts, which would be disconnected with our moral experience which acknowledges values, and that they are objective and grounded in an approximately relationally source that is related to us, otherwise your assumptions don't seem self evident, but rather arbitrary although they are commendably consistent but I'd argue doesn't exist, but only seems to be theoritically true). — Shushi

Ok, so I think I should also point out that I also don’t recognize the fact/value relationship as you do. I understand facts to be a series of linguistic choices which allow our private mental understanding of something to be transferred to another person in their mental understanding. For example, consider the fact that “The Earth is the 3rd planet from the sun”. The truthfulness of that fact is contingent on the linguistic choices that we make. For example, we have to define the term “planet” a certain way in order for this fact to be deemed true. If we define our moon and the asteroids between Earth and Venus as planets then it would not be true that the Earth is the 3rd planet from the Sun. This reveals that facts are actually reliant on linguistic choices. But, what determines what linguistic choices that people make? Well, people usually just make the linguistic choices that they were taught to make by their culture but there are some individuals who are linguistic renegades who choose to define a particular word differently than most people would define it. Usually, linguistic renegades are influenced by some moral or political belief. For example, you might have a feminist activist who argues that pornography “silences“ women. Well, she would be using the term “silences” in a pretty unconventional manner and thus creating a fact that is not recognized by most with a simple linguistic trick . Ultimately, the linguistic choices that people make seem to be influenced by their mental understanding of value and evaluation. This implies that the truthfulness of a fact is dependent on the betterness and worseness of the various linguistic choices of the terms contained in the expression of the fact. I believe that there are objectively better and worse ways to define a particular word and there’s probably an absolutely best way to define a word. But, there isn’t a “proper” way to define a word. So, you might be wondering, doesn’t my view suggest that values are subjective since people have different mental understanding of value? I would say that it doesn’t because it is entirely possible for objective betterness and worseness to exist even if most people do not even perceive it correctly. Also, I think meta-ethical subjectivism is somewhat of a self-defeating position in my ontology. This is because if I were to hypothetically believe that all mental understanding that a person has is perfectly accurate for the person who has it, then by the logic of this comprehensive “mental understanding” epistemological subjectivism, a person’s belief in meta-ethical subjectivism is only their mental understanding of meta-ethics and thus meta-ethical subjectivism is only true for people who have a mental understanding that morality is subjective. But, this would be contradictory and incoherent. This would imply that “mental understanding” subjectivism and meta-ethical subjectivism cannot both be true. So, going back to my main explanation... To bring my ontology of facts to statements that we normally associate with morality, take the phrase “murdering an innocent person would be a bad action even if it’s the only way to save multiple lives”. This statement is often thought of as being an opinion rather than a fact. But, what exactly is the difference between opinions and facts? Well, opinions are just more controversial and speculative facts. Just like facts, their goal is to merely transfer a mental understanding of something to another person through language. Describing the mental understanding that murder is a bad action even if it rescues people is quite difficult though. It’s possible that this mental understanding is simply a disgust towards the action without the actual perception that the action is bad. It’s possible that it’s influenced by the perception that the action eventually leads to unintended consequences and a slippery slope towards hell. My point is that there are a variety of “non-linguistic mental reasons” that someone might have for thinking that the action is bad. So, an evaluative statement is actually just an attempt of describing those non-linguistic reasons and thus it could be thought of as a kind of descriptive statement. To summarize my views, facts and opinions are both just methods of communicating mental understanding of various things including values. Objective Values are timeless, spaceless, and non-experienced entities that we often have some mental understanding of. But, that mental understanding could be completely inaccurate. So, you might be wondering, how could values exist as timeless, spaceless, and non-experienced entities? Well, I don’t think it is a safe assumption that everything that exists must have some sort of presence in a mental state or space and time. I don’t think we necessarily have to imagine some sort of a Platonic realm in which values have a presence. Rather, we could posit that the standard view that everything that exists must have a presence is false. Rather, some things exist as what I might call “properties of meta-reality”. Meta-reality is the reality of the existence of a hierarchy of better and worse descriptions of reality. Meta-reality could be described in terms of certain properties such as the objective evaluative properties of betterness and worseness of certain things. Though, I suppose we could also just posit a Platonic realm as well but I’m not sure if that’s more plausible.

Besides these points, as long as in the real world, as long as there has existed at least one single instance of a command from one personal agent to another, it seems to me that the reality of your view seems to crumble, and at best is an inapplicable theory to our reality. — Shushi

How would the existence of a command make my view crumble? If I command you to do something, does this necessary imply that I ought or must do what you say? Does it imply that I should disobey your command? It seems that the statement “I command you not to murder” could be translated to English 2.0 as “I would like persuade you not to murder and it would be better for you to get persuaded or else there will be consequences that have a greater value significance than the rewards of doing what I don’t want you to do”. It’s entirely possible that we use prescriptive language only because it’s sometimes a shorter way of saying things. This doesn’t imply that there’s an ontological reality behind the objective existence of prescriptive properties though.

I have already addressed it by stating that I personally believe that all thick statements are really thin, but are different from other thin propositions either because they are externally or indirectly related to what is instrinsic or a desired end — Shushi

I would say that there is a spectrum of better and worse intrinsic normative aims that one can pursue. I must also point out that I’m not denying the existence of end goals or pursuits. Rather, I’m denying that the existence of better and worse end goals to pursue implies the existence of properties of prescription. In some ways, I would actually just define properties of prescription as linguistic tools that allow us to explain convoluted statements in English 2.0 to simpler English statements that a normal person could understand better. It’s kinda how your biology teacher might describe a mitochondria as “the powerhouse of the cell”. A mitochondria is obviously not an actual house that holds power but simply a reification of something that is unfamiliar to our everyday lives to something that we can better understand.

Here are some important distinctions to understand regarding Hedonism:

Axiological Hedonism vs Motivational Hedonism: Axiological Hedonism argues that pleasure is the only type of thing that could make an individual life or the world better and suffering is the only kind of thing that can make those things worse. Motivational Hedonism argues that we are only motivated by pleasure and suffering.

Hard Hedonism vs Soft Hedonism: Soft Axiological Hedonism argues that there might be other types of things that impact the quality of a life besides pleasure and suffering but pleasure and suffering are the most important things to consider. Soft Motivational Hedonism argues that other things motivate us but pleasure and suffering are the main motivators.

Prudential Hedonism vs Folk Hedonism: Folk Hedonism is a lifestyle that is stereotypical of hedonists(ie sex, drugs, and rock music). Prudential Hedonism is more like Epicureanism which focuses on maximizing pleasure and minimizing suffering in one’s own life.

Prudential Hedonism vs Hedonic Utilitarianism: Prudential Hedonism is only concerned with one’s own hedonic well being. Hedonic Utilitarianism is concerned with the hedonic well being of the entire world. Of course, there’s also a whole bunch of different positions in between the 2 extremes.

Positive vs Negative Hedonism: positive hedonism focuses more on pleasure. Negative hedonism focuses more on suffering.

Quantitative Hedonism vs Qualitative Hedonism: Quantitative Hedonism argues that the importance of a pleasure can be quantified while qualitative hedonism tends to think that different pleasures have radically different degrees of quality. I honestly only consider quantitative hedonism to be a form of hedonism.

Internal Hedonism vs External Hedonism: Internal Hedonism argues that pleasure and suffering are experiences while external hedonism considers them to be something else. Once again, I really don’t consider external hedonism to be a form of hedonism.

A library catalogue tells you what works are in a library. It may - almost certainly will - contain some mistakes. Nevertheless, if you want to find out whether a work is in the library, consulting it is a good bet. — Bartricks

I don’t think it is necessarily a good bet to consult a library catalog. It is possible for a library catalog to be so disorganized and out of date that you would be better off not consulting it. For example, suppose that a library catalog’s software has a bug in it which excludes results between the letters M and Z. You come to the library looking to get a book that starts with the letter R. You decide that the catalog is reliable enough that you only need to consult it and you need not search through the whole library itself. But, it turns out that the software is actually extremely misleading because it tells you that the book you wanted to get isn’t there but it actually was there all along. In that case, we would say that the catalog is far more misleading than helpful. Going back to your analogy between the library catalog and what you see as “rational intuitions” about moral cases, why assume that people’s moral intuitions are like a relatively good library catalog instead of an extremely misleading one? Of course, I actually don’t think that people even have intuitions about cases like the torture of Tom. Rather, they either have intuitions about the deeper reasons for why they think Tom’s torture is unjustified or they simply have a negative gut reaction towards it. There doesn’t seem to be any kind of a “rational mental representation” that people have towards moral cases of Applied Ethics.

Imagine a detective says that his approach is to look at the crime scene and follow the evidence. Does that approach imply that everyone is guilty? No, of course not. But it does not foreclose the possibility that anyone is guilty, that's all. Not foreclosing such a possibility is not at all equivalent to implying it.

My approach - which is just to use our moral intuitions as our guide (except where we have good independent reason to discount the moral intuitions in question) - is like the detective's. It is true that such an approach does not foreclose the possibility that some form of individual moral relativism may be true. But that is not equivalent to it 'implying' it. — Bartricks

Well, to make an analogy between your approach and the approach of a detective, it is possible for a detective to confuse his gut instinct or the gut instincts of other people that someone is guilty as evidence that someone is guilty. Similarly, I believe that you are likely confusing the gut instincts that other people have against the torture of Tom as evidence when it is really just a moral dislike that most people share.

And in fact it is a great virtue of my approach that it permits the truth of such views to be discovered, if true they be. Compare that to your approach - you have assumed such views are false, and so your whole approach will never be able to recognise their truth. That's a serious flaw. Not because individual relativism is true - I am not saying it is true - but because it 'may' be, and your approach has put its falsity beyond negotiation. — Bartricks

I think we shouldn’t confuse my approach regarding normative ethics with my approach regarding meta-ethics. I have never assumed that individual relativism is false. Rather, my views against individual relativism are influenced by my views on Axiology which are influenced by my views on the philosophy of mind and epistemology. I believe that individual relativism is most likely false because I think that Axiological Hedonism is true. I have made several arguments for Axiological Hedonism which are influenced by my philosophy of mind and views on epistemology. If my arguments for Hedonism do not work to make my theory plausible, then I might also be wrong about individual relativism. So far, I have never heard a good objection to my views on Axiology so I have no reason to suppose that my arguments do not work to properly support Hedonism.

But many norms are universal in nature, as our intuitions themselves tell us. — Bartricks

But, how do we know that universally held moral norms are not simply biologically programmed attitudes against certain moral cases? It’s possible that people have moral disgust towards the torture of Tom because human beings evolved to experience moral empathy towards someone getting tortured while not evolving to experience extra strong happiness towards billions of happy people that come as a result. This is because our pre-historic ancestors had no survival advantage by being happy about a world full of billions of happy people who are not their relatives. On the other hand, they had evolved a capacity for empathy towards the pain of a stranger because it made them better at forming cooperative relationships. So, there could actually even be an evolutionary explanation for the disapproval of Tom’s torture as well. Even if there isn’t an evolutionary explanation, we could argue that the gut instinct was simply what Steven Jay Gould might call a spandrel or an accidental by product of the right genes coming together at the right time to form the dislike of using Tom to make everyone happy. As long as this dislike is not harmful to survival and reproduction, it’s possible that an accidental evolutionary trait ends up lasting. There are plenty of human traits that appear completely accidental. For example, I think the enjoyment that humans have for art, music, philosophy, and even oral sex is probably just accidental and has no survival advantage. Yet, those things are still universal to human nature. So, why not assume that people simply have a lot of accidental moral attitudes?

But if we stick to the actual evidence, rather than hypothetical evidence, then it is fairly obvious to most that we 'all' have a moral obligation not to torture innocents for fun. Some may not have that intuition - but then it is more reasonable to think that's because their catalogue contains an error than to think that the catalogues of the rest of us contains the error and that theirs is the correct edition. — Bartricks

Why is it more reasonable to think that one person’s intuitions are mistaken than to think that everyone’s intuitions are mistaken? There are certainly plenty of cases where one person got it right and everyone else got it wrong. In fact, every great scientist from Galileo to Issac Newton to Albert Einstein to Charles Darwin have argued for theories that almost every other scientist thought was wrong at the time. I think your approach to morality actually makes it very difficult for a Galileo of moral philosophy to come along and challenge everyone else’s gut instincts towards moral cases. This is because he will be continuously dismissed by philosophers like you for arguing for an unpopular opinion regardless of how good his own arguments are.

Morality does not 'have' to be universal - it's prescriptions do not have to apply to us all - but most of them do seem to have that character, and the evidence that they do is that they appear to. — Bartricks

I’m not understanding how they “appear” to have universal character on your view. I think it would be quite easy for a moral non-cognitivist to argue that people hold attitudes towards moral cases without actually having a rational intuition that says anything about the actual morality of the action. Given this, they could argue that what’s right and wrong is simply relative to our personal taste. I think the best way to argue against non-cognitivism is to argue that certain actions can be good or bad based on how it impacts people’s hedonic well being. This seems like a more plausible claim to me than claiming that people have some kind of a rational intuition towards the case of Tom without being able to even provide a deeper reason for why they are against the torture of Tom.

It isn't plausible and I've already argued for my view. You must just make an assumption - an assumption that there is a fixed pattern to morality - and go from there, but that assumption is precisely what I dispute. — Bartricks

When did I say that there is a fixed pattern to morality? Would you mind showing me a quote that I wrote which suggested that I believe that there is a fixed pattern to morality. First of all, I’m not sure what you even mean by pattern here. I would define a pattern as being something that allows us to make inferences about something else. In that sense, I do think that there is a pattern to morality but you seem to think that there is a pattern in that sense as well. You seem to think that you can make inferences about moral cases by learning about people’s intuitions. I would call that a type of pattern recognition on your part. So, how is my pattern recognition different from yours here?

There is no evidence that there is such a pattern (if there was a fixed pattern, why has no one discovered it?). There is, by contrast, prima facie evidence that morality is unpatterned. Namely, it appears not to be patterned. The appearances in question are 'intuitions'. — Bartricks

It seems that your view does not argue that morality is unpatterned. If it was truly unpatterned then I don’t think it would be possible for you to formulate a moral hypothesis. This is because the formulation of an educated guess requires some sort of pattern recognition. Are you not observing patterns in the intuitions of other people regarding moral cases?

I do not 'assume' that intuitions are our most important source of evidence. I have argued for this. Here is that argument. First, it is by intuition that we are aware of moral norms and values in the first place. We do not see, touch, smell, taste or hear morality, do we? It is by reason that we are aware of it. That is to say, by rational intuition. So, given that this is how we are primarily aware of morality, this is our most important source of evidence into the morality of an action. — Bartricks

I would argue that most people have sometimes rational and sometimes irrational intuitions about value theory and form beliefs about applied ethics on the basis of these intuitions. Some people simply hold attitudes about morality and their opposition to cases like the torture of Tom is entirely emotive in nature. So, I think you are making an assumption that you haven’t defended that people have moral intuitions about cases in applied ethics directly instead of holding intuitions about the reasons for why they hold the opinion that they do in those moral cases. I also think you are overly quick to dismiss the possibility of many of these so-called “rational intuitions” simply being emotional gut reactions.

I think that an atheist could argue for the existence of an Objective morality by attacking the following 2 assumptions:

A1: Prescriptive properties of Oughtness and Mustness exists separately from the evaluative properties of Goodness, Betterness, Worseness, and Badness.

A2: Morality should be understood as something more than just a vaguely defined sub-category of decision making.

I would argue that both assumptions are fundamentally false. Starting with the first assumption, many philosophers often argue that there is a difference between saying that an action is really good and saying that you have a duty to perform that action. Sometimes, they might even insist that there’s a difference between saying that an action is the best possible action to perform at a particular time and saying that you ought to perform that action at that time. In order to demonstrate why I don’t think there is such a distinction, I would like to create a new version of the English language that I call “English 2.0”. English 2.0 is exactly the same as the normal English language except it eliminates the use of words such as “ought”, “should”, “must”, “duty”, “obligation”, and “prohibition”. Phrases that use these words in normal English will be substituted with phrases that use evaluative language words. For example, the phrase “you ought not murder” translates to “murder is a pretty bad action to do” in English 2.0. It could also translate to “the action of murder is among the worst actions that one can perform at any given time”, “ murder is something which produces more harm than benefit” and many other similar statements. Similarly, we can translate the phrase “ you have a duty not to murder an innocent person” to “murdering an innocent person would be really bad” or “murdering an innocent person is so bad that it would be good for you to pretend as though the action is physically impossible for you to perform”. In my opinion, there is no reason to suppose that English 2.0 would be inferior in any way to normal English in the matters of discussing moral decision making. In fact, it would be superior because it would encourage people to make more precise statements which describe the goodness or badness of a particular action. Thus, it would be helpful for us to eliminate the use of words like “ought” and “duty” from the English language. It would also be helpful for us to think of moral actions as existing on a spectrum of supererogatory betterness and worseness. So, it might be argued that this would imply that morality is simply a branch of decision making and many people find that understanding of morality counterintuitive. This brings us to A2.

Most people assume that morality exists as highly disjunctive to the normal decision making of everyday life. A moral decision to avoid having an abortion is very different from a mundane decision to eat a salad for lunch instead of cake. I would argue that there are 2 important similarities between the 2 types of decisions:

1. Both decisions could impact our own well being.
2. Both decisions could impact the well being of others.

In the case of choosing not to have an abortion, this has the possibility of both positive and negative effects for the mother. The positive effects is that it allows the mother to avoid experiencing negative emotions that some people believe may come with choosing to abort. The negative effects is that the mother might have to endure the severe pain of pregnancy and there might be negative emotions associated with giving your child up for adoption. Of course, choosing to eat a salad also has potential positive and negative effects for the person. On one hand, it’s good for your health. On the other hand, it tastes worse than cake. Choosing to eat a salad also could impact the lives of others. It might make you more attractive to your romantic partner in the future which would lead to greater sexual satisfaction for your partner in the future. Obviously, abortion could also be bad for someone other than yourself. Usually, the fetus or the other family members of the fetus could be thought of as being victims of someone choosing to have an abortion. So, what makes us think that some decisions relate to morality while others don’t? Well, some decisions are more emotionally charged than others. Abortion is thought of as a moral decision simply because it makes some people upset and angry that someone might choose to have an abortion. So, does this imply that morality is not objective? Well, not really. On one hand, it is true that whether or not a decision making dilemma is a moral dilemma is subjective. On the other hand, the fact that there are objectively better and worse decision options that one may select suggests that the decision to murder someone or have an abortion falls on an objective spectrum of better and worse things that one can do at a particular time. Thus, it doesn’t matter what is considered moral decision making versus amoral decision making. What matters is that all decision dilemmas have better and worse solutions.

My answer to this question is certainly biased towards my own philosophical interests but I would start by trying to find answers to the questions in life that everyone needs to address. I think those important questions include the following:
1. Should I have children?
2. Should I get married?
3. What kind of career should I pursue?
4. What does it mean to say that one’s quality of life is good?
5. Do I have any duties towards anyone and what are those duties?
6. Is being alive a good thing overall for you?
7. If not, could you do something to make it a good thing?
8. If not, is it worth trying to commit suicide?
9. If being alive is a good thing overall right now for you, could it ever become a bad thing overall?
10. If so, how?
11. Is there an independent badness to death that is unrelated to the badness of the process of dying or the badness of losing out on more of the good things in life?
12. What kind of house should you buy?
13. Is it preferable to try to work harder or is it better to focus more on trying to save more money?
14. What kind of romantic relationship, if any, should one pursue?
15. When is it acceptable to take on financial debt?
16. What kind of friendships should you try to develop?
17. Do you have any bad habits that you should eliminate?

It’s kinda difficult to try to find philosophical content that deal with those questions. Because of this, I started a YouTube channel a while back that focuses on these types of questions. I would also strongly recommend Shelly Kegan’s lecture series on the subject of Death on YouTube. This lecture series has been most influential to me since it introduced me to Axiology. Here’s some other good lecture series that I recommend:

1. Robert Sapolsky’s Human Behavioral Biology series
2. Robert Shiller’s Financial Markets series

A mental representation 'represents' something to be the case, and is thereby capable of being accurate or inaccurate. By contrast 'disliking' something can't be accurate or inaccurate. So, although negative attitudes - such as dislike - are mental states, they are not 'representations'.

An 'intuition' is a representation. Moral theorizers are not appealing to feelings - for that would make moral philosophy a branch of psychology - but to intuitions. — Bartricks

I would argue that people do not actually have prima facie mental representations or intuitions as you call them about moral cases in applied ethics like the case of whether or not the torture of Tom is justified. Rather, they either hold attitudes or beliefs about the case. This is because most people would likely give a deeper explanation for why the torture of Tom is wrong. For example, they might say that it violates God’s will or it violates Tom’s inalienable rights or it is not something that a virtuous person would do or even as simple as saying that it is always wrong to harm people. All these deeper reasons could be argued to constitute a normative ethical theory. Even if their theories are contradictory and not well developed, they are still theoretical reasons that people give for thinking that an action is wrong. I would define a normative ethical theory as a framework of explanations for why some actions are better than others. But, what if someone doesn’t give a deeper explanation for why they think that the torture of Tom is unjustified? In those cases, it seems more plausible for me to suppose that they simply hold a negative attitude about the torture of Tom. This is because mental representations can only exist in 2 forms: sensory perception and imagination. There is no sensory perception that can be responsible for “seeing” that the torture of Tom is wrong. Otherwise, we would be saying that there are 6 senses instead of 5(though, there’s technically more than 5 senses but none of them relate to moral beliefs either way.). We could also have mental representations through our imagination. Imagining something involves us creating a mental representation of that thing. It also doesn’t appear that people who give no deeper explanation for their disapproval of Tom’s torture are imagining Tom getting tortured and everyone being happy as a result in a relatively impartial manner and then concluding that it “appears” wrong. Rather, it seems that they are imagining those things and that imagination prompts them to have an emotional response which forms into a positive or negative attitude towards the case of Tom. Thus, I would argue that without a deeper reason given for disapproval of Tom’s case, we should assume that the disapproval is emotive and fundamentally non-cognitive.

So, what's the best evidence that killing an innocent for fun is wrong? Is it that so-and-so theory says it is wrong? no, it is that it appears to be wrong. — Bartricks

How does it “appear” wrong? Most people have a deeper reason for why they think that killing is wrong. If they don’t have a deeper reason, then it just “feels” wrong to them. I don’t think the intuitions that you think that people have about murder really exist in reality. People only have beliefs or attitudes that certain actions are wrong. People could only have rational intuitions about the deeper reasons for why they might think an action is wrong.

Note, no theory is needed here. And most people - I mean, everyone I have met to date - lack normative theories, yet seem perfectly good moral judges. — Bartricks

I think you have a different definition of normative ethical theories than me. Normative ethical theories are frameworks of reasons that one gives for thinking that certain actions are wrong. Most people do have normative ethical theories. They are just not as comprehensive, coherent, well informed or well articulated as the theories of your typical moral philosopher. A perfect example of a simple normative ethical theory is saying that something is wrong because it harms someone. A person might say that murder is wrong because it harms someone. Of course, this is a bad explanation for why murder is wrong. This is because there are plenty of cases where harming someone is justified. But, someone might think that the simple normative theory that simply says “harming is bad” is prima facie correct. Note that saying that murder is wrong because it harms someone implies that one believes that murder is wrong. Whereas, stating that murder is wrong because it appears wrong seems to imply that one only holds an attitude that murder is wrong. I also disagree that most people are perfectly good moral judges without a good foundation in value theory and a well developed normative ethical theory.

First, I'd want to say that I think slavery has probably never been morally ok — Bartricks

I understand that you wish to avoid talking about the emotive issues but I’m actually kinda curious about what reason would you have to dismiss the intuitions of past people regarding slavery. You managed to dismiss the intuitions that people have about procreation being permissible and the intuition that people had in the past about homosexuality by appealing to something akin to an evolutionary bias explanation for why people hold that intuition. It seems that you can’t use the evolutionary bias explanation for dismissing the past intuitions that people had about slavery. At the very least, it is not entirely obvious that thinking that slavery is permissible has evolutionary advantages.

Note too that our moral intuitions give us insight into the current morality of actions. Just as my eyesight tells me about what's around me 'at the moment' and not last century, likewise our moral intuitions give us insight into what's right and wrong today, not right and wrong last century. — Bartricks

Well, if we are going to make an analogy between eyesight and “moral sight” then morality is not only relative to the time period and the culture in which you live but also the immediate space around you. This would imply individual moral relativism instead of cultural relativism. This is because you only have moral sight about your own moral intuition and you might not understand the moral intuitions of others. This implies that you only have insight about your own intuitions and you can’t actually have any idea about what others believe unless you take the time to read surveys that people answer about their moral opinions. This would imply that a person who is living under a rock would have no reason to consider the intuitions of others since he only “has sight” about his own intuitions. This would imply that our own intuitions are accurate representations of right and wrong for us but not for anyone that disagrees with us. I actually consider individual relativism to be a superior theory to the cultural relativism which you implied later in your comment. Though, I do not support this theory completely, I think it has no problem that your culturally relative theory doesn’t have. I would like to proceed this discussion by trying to convince you that maybe you should consider adopting this closely related theory instead of your current theory. It would be a philosophical improvement on your part in my opinion.

So, by hypothesis, Xing seems wrong to virtually everyone today. Now - given my view (the view that morality can and does change over time) - that is excellent evidence that it is wrong today. Note, then, that I am not dismissing contemporary intuitions about the morality of xing - far from it, I am respecting them. — Bartricks

I have another hypothesis that could explain why different people might have different intuitions about Xing and the case of Tom. It is possible that this simply implies that individual relativism instead of cultural relativism is true. You have a certain way of seeing moral actions and I have a different way of seeing moral actions. This implies that the torture of Tom is justified for me but not justified for you. Just as it can be justified for a North Korean and not justified for an American. It seems that you had opened up this door for individual relativism to be true by arguing that morality is relative to space as well. Why not argue that morality is relative to the immediate space around you instead of being relative to nationality? After all, the isn’t a technically correct way to divide up space and cultures. Within a “main” culture there could be sub-cultures and sub-sub-cultures. Eventually, we can simply argue that each individual has his own unique “culture”. It could be argued that I’m not just an American but also a Russian American and I’m also part of the culture of my extended and nuclear family. But, I also have disagreements with my family on certain moral intuitions so maybe I just have my own unique culture that is different from everyone else’s culture. Thus, the concept of culture could only be divided ultimately to the individual himself.

Most people, of course, are likely to insist that Xing was 'always' wrong. But here, I think, they are simply giving expression to how obviously wrong Xing currently is. — Bartricks

I would disagree. It is not uncommon for people to hold time specific intuitions about cases of applied ethics. For example, most modern people might think that an action called “Ying” is wrong at Time A but not Time B. So, what would be an example of such “Ying” type action? Well, most people might think that it’s wrong for me to force an employee of mine to come to work during Christmas unexpectedly and have him do non-urgent work he could easily complete the day after. Even if the employee agreed to those conditions prior to accepting his job offer, it might be wrong for the boss to unexpectedly have the employee come to work and do trivial tasks during the most important time of the year for him. Because people are usually able to consider timing as a factor for their intuition, I don’t think it’s plausible to interpret the expression that “Xing is always wrong” to “Xing is obviously wrong today”. It may be argued that people are simply unable to imagine themselves growing up in the 1800s and thus their moral intuitions about Xing in the 1800s are simply unreliable. But, this logic could be applied to every individual case as well. I might argue that most people do not know what it’s like to be me and have my intuitions and thus their intuitions about my moral beliefs are simply unreliable. When someone says that it would be wrong for TheHedoMinimalist to torture Tom to make everyone happy, they are really just saying that it’s obviously wrong to them. Thus, it would be more plausible for you to say that people’s intuitions are reliable for their own moral judgements but not reliable for the moral judgements of others.

In the past it was intuitively obvious to virtually everyone that Xing was right. Now it is intuitively obvious to virtually everyone that Xing is wrong. Now, given your view one group is mistaken. Which one? Well, it would be quite arbitrary to just assume the past group was the mistaken one. I mean, why think that?? It is just as likely to be those around today who are mistaken. After all, given this variation across time - variation about something fixed - we know that our moral intuitions are quite unreliable. So, you - it seems to me - are now committed to having to say that it is just as likely that Xing today is wrong as it is that it is right. — Bartricks

Well, you seem to be assuming that intuitions about cases of applied ethics are the most important cases for determining morality. I had already given you my argument that certain normative aims are more plausible than others if they have better comeasurabity. If my argument for “The Comeasurability Requirement” is plausible then any moral position which is incompatible with that value theory intuition is false. Of course, you might be wondering what if some people have different intuitions than me on value theory? Well, I tend to think that value theory is a pretty technically complicated topic more so than applied ethics. Because of this, most people have little to no intuitions about value theory. If the majority of philosophers with a strong interest in value theory disagrees with me on value theory, then this is not necessarily strong evidence that my views are wrong. This is because value theory is a pretty complicated topic and it’s possible for even an expert to be mistaken about their own intuitions. The vagueness of language also makes it difficult to make the implicit intuitions that we hold about basic values explicit. Thus, it’s entirely possible that there are universal intuitions about value theory which suggests that some normative aims are better than others. We simply do not have complete access to them and must form theories to help better understand them. It’s also possible that if people fully understood that their intuitions about cases of applied ethics contradict their intuitions about value theory cases, then they would be willing to change their mind about their intuitions about cases of applied ethics.

But what does someone who insists morality is fixed have to say? Well, they could just dismiss the intuitions of the North Koreans. But on what basis? Looks like a prejudice, plain and simple. — Bartricks

Fair enough, but this would also suggest that we shouldn’t dismiss the intuitions of individuals who are renegades towards the morality of their own culture. If I disagree with some of the intuitions of my society, then why assume that I’m probably wrong for doing so? After all, if there’s a North Korean who dislikes the moral intuitions of the people living in his country, then we wouldn’t say that the intuitions of the people living in his country are evidence against his own moral intuition. Similarly, why would you imply that the fact that my intuitions about Tom are counterintuitive to most people living in the west that this gives someone strong reason to reject my intuitions? To borrow your phrase, I think this is simply a prejudice, plain and simple :wink: . It seems that individual relativism would make more sense than cultural relativism here. I actually used to be an individual relativist in the past and I still consider the theory to be somewhat plausible so I definitely can’t be sure that there is a fixed and universal morality. But, I think “time period” relativism and cultural relativism are far less plausible viewpoints.

Yes, moral intuitions have varied across different periods of time. That's the basis upon which I believe morality has varied over time. If 'acting in manner X' seemed wrong to most people in 1800, but seems right to most people now, then that's good evidence that it was wrong in 1800, but right today. — Bartricks

This seems to pose a contradiction to your argument though. This is because the view that something like slavery was permissible in 1800 but not permissible today is highly counterintuitive to the vast majority of people living in the 21st century. Most people living today have a moral intuition that people living in the past were morally misguided. Thus, according to your past comments, this is strong evidence that it is not the case that something could be permissible in 1800 and not permissible today. It is either the case that the moral intuitions of modern people that “the morality of the past was misguided” is wrong or the intuition that people living in the 1800s had that “slavery was permissible” is wrong. It can’t be both since that would be a contradiction. So, which one of the intuitions is wrong?

I appeal to their adaptive value. Humans who have the moral intuition that procreation is morally okay will most likely procreate. That, I think, is the best explanation of why most humans have the moral intuition that procreation is morally okay. — Bartricks

I would like to point out that a similar type of explanation could be given for the view that the torture of Tom is unjustified. In some countries like China, Colombia, and North Korea, most people would likely think that the torture of Tom is justified. This is because in those countries, the concept of human rights is much less respected by people. I could then say that the best explanation for why westerners report that they think the torture of Tom is unjustified is because they had been indoctrinated by the individualistic culture of the western world into believing in human rights. Thus, we have reason to doubt those intuitions. If you think that my argument here against the intuitions of people who are against the torture of Tom is weaker than your argument against the intuitions of most people regarding procreation, then what exactly makes my argument weaker?

An intuition is a mental representation. But for something to be unpopular is simply for people to be adopting a negative attitude towards it. — Bartricks

I’m still not understanding the distinction. It seems that negative attitudes are also mental representations.

I do not see any reason to think that's true. You're assuming from the get go that morality is 'measurable'. Why make that assumption? Is it a self-evident truth of reason? — Bartricks

I think you are misunderstanding my argument. I’m saying that all moral theories must make evaluative judgements. This is also true of deontological and other non-consequentialist theories. For example, A non-consequentialist philosopher like yourself likely does not believe that all wrong actions are equally wrong. This means that there must be a non-arbitrary way for you to say that some actions are more wrong than others. Comeasurability is defined by me as a non-arbitrary way to distinguish between moral actions, rules, virtues, or outcomes. I argued that you do not have a non-arbitrary way of saying that the wrongness of torturing Tom is more wrong than the wrongness of something like lying to your boss about being sick to avoid work. This is because there is no way to measure or compare the wrongness of different actions in relation to one another. You seem to think that there is though. You seem to think that the extent of wrongness of an action could be reasonably hypothesized by a weird mixture of people’s combined intuitions and a possible dismissal of some intuitions if they gave our ancestors an advantage in replicating their DNA in the past. I explained in my comments above why I am not convinced of this hypothesis.

When it comes to any normative theory, if it is to be defensible it needs to appeal to our moral intuitions and show how it respects and unifies a large number of them. But then - and here's the rub - there will (for there has always been to date) some that it cannot accommodate. Either at that point you dismiss those intuitions on the grounds that they do not fit with your favourite theory (in which case the theory has taken over from the evidence), or you accept that the theory is false (and to date the majority of moral philosophers have considered every proposed theory false, and false precisely because of a failure to accommodate important and clear moral intuitions). — Bartricks

Why should we consider conflicts with intuitions about issues in applied ethics as evidence that a normative moral theory is wrong instead of using intuitions about value theory as evidence? I consider intuitions about cases in value theory to be a more reliable evidence than intuitions about cases in applied ethics. Value theory is the study of the basic nature of goodness, badness, betterness, and worseness. Before we could figure out an answer to a complicated question like whether or not it is better to torture Tom or not, we must first be able to answer simple questions about value like the question of what makes something better than another thing. I argued that this requires a well defined notion of extent which implies the presence of a quasi-mathematical comeasurability between 2 things which are being put into a relation of betterness and worseness to each other. So, I’m using a bottom up approach to moral philosophy where basic intuitions about value supersede and determine answer to specific moral questions and any intuition held about a specific moral question prior to reflection on intuitions about basic values should be dismissed. You seem to be using a top down approach though. So, I’m curious why you think your approach to moral philosophy is better than mine. I think my approach is better because I think there needs to be a deeper explanation for why the torture of Tom is wrong. On the other hand, there doesn’t need to be a deeper explanation for why evaluation is quasi-mathematical. It’s just a basic observation about our understanding of the concept of evaluation.

If one accepts that the theory is false on the basis of moral intuitions, then we didn't need the theory. We can just follow our moral intuitions. Normative theories are, then, at best redundant, and at worst positively misleading (for there will always be some - often many - who are seduced by the theory and the desire for neatness and so start following it, rather than the evidence).

So, again, why not just follow the intuitions? Why decide in advance that morality is neat, predicable, and amendable to codification? Those assumptions seem explicable in terms of human psychology, but they do not seem to be ones for which any good evidence can be provided. — Bartricks

Well, I would like to point out that you are also following a normative ethical theory. Your normative ethical theory states that the morality of an action is determined by its ability to respect and unify our intuitions about cases in applied ethics. I don’t recall ever seeing an explanation from you about why we should be trying to unify and respect intuitions about cases in applied ethics instead of intuitions about basic value theory questions.

But where is your argument? — Bartricks

Right here:

My argument revolves around the notion that every possible normative aim has some probability of being a good normative aim, and some probability of being a neutral or bad normative aim. The task is to make a hypothesis on which normative aims are more likely to be good to focus on. I believe that normative aims with superior comeasurability are more likely to be non-trivial aims to pursue. That is to say, normative aims which seem to have more non-arbitrary ways of figuring out how to formulate a basic hierarchy of outcomes in relation to the normative aim in question have better explanatory power and thus have a superiority as a theory. To give a concrete example, consider the normative aim of “minimizing suffering in the lives of sentient beings”. This is the normative aim which is pursued by Bob above any other normative aim. Does this normative aim have a high degree of comeasurability? To figure this out, we first need to figure out what we are comparing and measuring. In this case, we are measuring suffering. Suffering has some measurable properties like the intensity of the suffering, the frequency of the suffering, and the duration of the suffering. This means that it has some significant amount of comeasurability. Of course, we can never measure suffering precisely like we could with something simple like measuring the amount of water in a cup. But, we can formulate an elementary hierarchy of various actions which cause suffering by intuitively comparing the intensity of the suffering caused and the duration and frequency of the moments of suffering. So, there is some commeasurabilty and thus some non-arbitrary way of determining which actions are better at alleviating suffering and which action are better to avoid because they cause more suffering. On the other hand, let’s turn to the normative aim of “showing respect for others in one’s behavior”. Does this aim have a high degree of comeasurability? We first need to figure out what we are comparing or measuring. Well, it seems that we are comparing and measuring the wrongness of not showing respect for others in one’s behavior in various cases where the principle is violated. So, we would likely postulate that each action which violates the principle of showing respect has an intensity of violation, a duration of the violation, and the frequency of violation. This is the only way we could make valid intuitive judgements to distinguish cases of severe violations of the principle from the more mild violations. But, this is where problems arise for me. Does a case of violation of the principle really have an intensity of violation or a frequency of violation or a duration of violation? It’s certainly not as obvious as in the case of measuring suffering. I know from experience that some moments of suffering in my life are more intense than others. I also know that some moments of suffering last longer and some of my actions led to more frequent moments of suffering. Mental states seem to have measurable properties of this sort. On the other hand, it doesn’t appear that violations of a principle have an intensity that we can observe or a duration or a frequency. But, why do people believe that they have measurable properties then? Well, we usually measure the intensity of a principle violation by the intensity of the offense that we experience from thinking about the violation occurring. The mental state of being offended is comeasurable just like suffering is. This is a problematic comeasurability though. This is because we are not interested in measuring the offensiveness of a principle violation but rather the actual intensity of the violation. I imagine that you would think that Bob has wrongfully violated the principle of respecting others even if he lived in a world where no one would get offended at his principle violation. But, how could you determine the intensity of his principle violation without simply appealing to the intensity of the offensiveness that you experience from reading about Bob? I don’t have an answer to this problem and thus I’m inclined to be skeptical of your view. Without an ability to form even the most basic hierarchy of wrongness of cases in which the violation of the principle occurs, it seems like all claims of wrongness are simply arbitrary and have no normative significance. The explanatory difficulty of your view is just too great for me. Thus, I feel that the normative aim of minimizing suffering in the lives of sentient beings has a greater epistemic certainty of being a good normative aim to pursue. Though, I actually think there are even better normative aims to pursue but I won’t go into that. I apologize for the extreme wordiness and complexity of my comment but I have no simpler way of explaining my intuitions to you. — TheHedoMinimalist

You never responded to this part of my comment earlier so I assumed that you had difficulty understanding it. Feel free to ask me questions about this argument.

Yes, I agree. That is, I agree that the intuitions of most people probably represent procreation to be morally okay. Now, I don't think those particular intuitions count for very much. But I accept that it is reasonable to appeal to them and I accept that I have the burden of proof on this issue, precisely becusae procreation appears morally okay to most people. — Bartricks

Ok, I will accept the burden of proof if you like in the cases of Tom and Maddy. Did I not fulfill that burden in the argument above? Does my above argument not deserve a refutation? If I did not fulfill my burden of proof requirement, then what would I need to do to fulfill that requirement?

I would need to hear the argument. What's the argument? — Bartricks

I was talking about the argument that Susie made here:

Susie argues that the vast majority of reasonable people would be unwilling to accept such an implication and thus this is evidence against Frank’s viewpoint. — TheHedoMinimalist

I explained how the intuitions are widely shared. That's why they count. Not because they occur in my mind. But because they occur in my mind and are widely shared by others who reflect on the same cases. — Bartricks

I would like to point out that the intuitions that are commonly shared differ across different periods of time. In the past, people widely shared the intuition that homosexual sex was wrong. Today, much fewer people share that intuition. If you lived in the past, would it be your burden of proof to show that homosexual sex is not wrong? I would also like to point out that in the future, it is possible that most people will believe that it is justified to procreate Maddy or torture Tom. So, why should we assume that the intuitions of Homo sapiens living in the 21st century are more reliable than the intuitions of Homo sapiens living in the past or the possible intuitions of future Homo sapiens or the possible intuitions of intelligent aliens that are capable of moral reasoning?

Yes. Although you seem to be equating 'unpopular' with 'counterintuitive'. Antinatalism is counterintuitive. — Bartricks

What is the difference between unpopular and counterintuitive regarding cases of applied ethics?

I am an antinatalist on the basis of numerous pieces of evidence, not one. And although I accept that most people have rational intuitions that conflict with my antinatalist conclusion, I think those intuitions can be discredited. — Bartricks

How do you go about discrediting their intuitions then?

Note too, antinatalism is not the view that life contains more bad than good. Some antinatalists may believe that. But it is not essential to the view and so you're attacking a straw man if you equate the two. — Bartricks

I wasn’t trying to equate the two. I’m perfectly aware that there are other types of antinatalists out there. The view that life contains more bad than good was used in a context of my thought experiment with Frank and Susie. The 2 fictional people were debating whether or not life contains more bad than good. Susie argues that life must contain more good than bad because it’s too counterintuitive to think that having children is wrong. I then argued that this isn’t a very good argument.

In my example what we can do is maximise happiness by torturing one person. And now it seems to many that this would not be justified, and it really doesn't matter the number of people whose happiness will be maximised. A thousand, a million, a billion - keep adding noughts, and it makes no difference. — Bartricks

Well, I would still bite the bullet here and say that it would justified to torture Tom.

The example shows that sometimes the numbers don't count and so figuring out what's right is not - or not necessarily - a simple matter of summing the good versus the bad outcomes. — Bartricks

It seems to me that thought experiments about applied ethical issues cannot show that sometimes numbers don’t count. I think you need to have a deeper epistemic foundation that could demonstrate the reason why your intuitions about morality are more plausible than mine or anyone else’s. It seems that you can’t use an unpopular viewpoint in Applied Ethics as an argument against a Normative Ethical Theory. You could only rely on deeper metaphysical and epistemological theories. To use an analogy, a theoretical discipline like Physics could help us understand more about an applied discipline like Engineering. Engineering, on the other hand, cannot help us understand physics any better. So, more theoretical branches of philosophy supersede over the more applied branches. Thus, the applied ethical question of whether or not the torture of Tom is justified cannot be used as evidence against normative ethical theories like consequentialism. We could only use value ontology and value epistemology to argue for theories of normative ethics. So, we must go deeper instead of going more shallow into applied ethics.

So, it is beyond a reasonable doubt that most people's intuitions - most people who think soberly about such matters, are capable of understanding, and who are not in the grips of a dogma - deliver the verdict that it would be wrong to torture one to maximise the happiness of the many.

That doesn't mean they're right. But it is very good evidence that they're correct. — Bartricks

In what way does the popularity of a viewpoint make the viewpoint more plausible? I would like to point out that you also believe in many things that are counterintuitive to most people that you would regard as ”reasonable”. For example, antinatalism is itself counterintuitive to most people. In fact, it is sometimes used in thought experiments to argue against other viewpoints. For example, suppose that Frank and Susie are having a debate about the value ontology of life. They are trying to figure out if life contains more goodness or more badness. Frank makes an argument that life contains more badness than goodness and starts that argument by making an argument for Axiological Hedonism which states that the goodness of life should be defined only as the combined pleasure of life and the badness of life should be defined as the combined suffering. Then, he uses thought experiments relating to the phenomenology of pleasure and suffering to illuminate why he thinks that there is more suffering in life than pleasure. Susie responds to him by agreeing that his phenomenological thought experiments provide evidence that there’s more suffering in life than pleasure and she agrees with his hedonic theory of value but she argues that his viewpoint has a counterintuitive implication. Susie argues that Frank’s view implies that reproduction is usually a bad action and this implies that we either shouldn’t reproduce ourselves or we should prevent the reproduction of others. Susie argues that the vast majority of reasonable people would be unwilling to accept such an implication and thus this is evidence against Frank’s viewpoint. I think we can both agree that the unpopularity of Antinatalism doesn’t provide any evidence against it. On the other hand, Frank’s phenomenological thought experiments could count as evidence. Even if Susie bites the bullet on those thought experiments, Frank could speculate that the reason why she bit the bullet was because she doesn’t observe her experience of pleasure and suffering with enough accuracy. Even if his speculation is wrong, it would merely suggest that he has a reason to think that life is bad but Susie has a reason to think that life is good. Phenomenological disagreements are usually irreconcilable. This is because Frank cannot know anything about how Susie experiences pleasure and suffering. Similarly, Susie cannot know how Frank is experiencing his pleasures and suffering. Of course, it’s also possible to have superior and inferior ability to introspect about one’s own pleasure and suffering in life. Thus, it’s impossible to know who’s right about phenomenological issues and the disagreement cannot be resolved. Nonetheless, it seems that we have more reason to trust our own phenomenological intuitions.

But anyway, what you need to do is try and discredit the intuitions I am appealing to. Not all intuitions. That's silly. But the specific intuitions I am appealing to. It is not enough simply to say you don't share them. The majority do share them, and so unless you think your intuitions are special, you need to provide good reason to think their intuitions do not count (as opposed to just appealing to your own). — Bartricks

Well, I have accepted your challenge of discrediting the intuitions that you are appealing to. You can find my arguments in the top part of my comment. To summarize what I said above, I’m not trying to argue against all intuitions. Rather, I’m trying to argue that the intuitions about applied ethics cannot inform us about normative ethical questions. Rather, we may only use deeper Metaphysical and Epistemic intuitions as arguments for Normative Ethical Theories. Of course, it is possible for 2 people to have different intuitions about the deepest parts of epistemology and metaphysics. In that case, the 2 people would have an irreconcilable disagreement. This means that they should agree to disagree at that point since they both have a reason to doubt each other’s deepest intuitions. Of course, one of them may indeed be right and the other one may indeed be wrong, but intuition is too unreliable to give a definitive answer. We use intuition in philosophy for the same reason we use language in philosophy: there is simply no better alternative. Of course, we should be careful about not ending philosophical discussions prematurely due to a perceived irreconcilable disagreement. If we are talking about the morality of the actions of Bob, then we shouldn’t end this discussion until we reach the core of our Epistemic disagreement. I think we are getting closer to it since this discussion is getting more Epistemic in nature. But, I will have to wait and see if you are willing to bite the bullet on several of the thought experiments that I had given you. The first thought experiment is the case of Frank and Susie. Do you think that the unpopularity of antinatalism could be used as an argument against Frank’s view that life contains more badness than goodness? In addition, do you think that an applied discipline like Engineering could tell us something about a more theoretical discipline like Physics? Unless you are willing to say yes to both questions, it seems that you would have reason to abandon your intuition that thought experiments that relate to applied ethics can be used as evidence against normative ethical questions. If you are willing to say yes to both questions, then I will attempt to go even deeper with my intuitions but it might be an irreconcilable disagreement at that point unless you could make me concede. If you would like me to concede that thought experiments that relate to applied ethics can be used as evidence against normative ethical questions, then you should provide me with some more thought experiments that can better explain why you hold such an intuition.

I would like to start by biting the bullets on the thought experiments that you had introduced to me. I actually think that it would be justified to subject Tom to a life of endless torture if it minimizes the combined suffering of
sentient beings in the long term. In addition, the procreation of Maddy is also justified it seems. So, how should we continue this discussion if I have different intuitions than you do? What reason do I have to consider your intuitions as being more reliable than mine? In addition, what reason do you have to abandon your moral intuitions in favor of mine? I can only try to answer the first and third question, but I would ask you to try to answer the second question for me. To answer the first question, I think we should continue this discussion by trying to give deeper reasons and better explanations for our intuitions. My intuitions revolves around the notion that every possible normative aim has some probability of being a good normative aim, and some probability of being a neutral or bad normative aim. The task is to make a hypothesis on which normative aims are more likely to be good to focus on. I believe that normative aims with superior comeasurability are more likely to be non-trivial aims to pursue. That is to say, normative aims which seem to have more non-arbitrary ways of figuring out how to formulate a basic hierarchy of outcomes in relation to the normative aim in question have better explanatory power and thus have a superiority as a theory. To give a concrete example, consider the normative aim of “minimizing suffering in the lives of sentient beings”. This is the normative aim which is pursued by Bob above any other normative aim. Does this normative aim have a high degree of comeasurability? To figure this out, we first need to figure out what we are comparing and measuring. In this case, we are measuring suffering. Suffering has some measurable properties like the intensity of the suffering, the frequency of the suffering, and the duration of the suffering. This means that it has some significant amount of comeasurability. Of course, we can never measure suffering precisely like we could with something simple like measuring the amount of water in a cup. But, we can formulate an elementary hierarchy of various actions which cause suffering by intuitively comparing the intensity of the suffering caused and the duration and frequency of the moments of suffering. So, there is some commeasurabilty and thus some non-arbitrary way of determining which actions are better at alleviating suffering and which action are better to avoid because they cause more suffering. On the other hand, let’s turn to the normative aim of “showing respect for others in one’s behavior”. Does this aim have a high degree of comeasurability? We first need to figure out what we are comparing or measuring. Well, it seems that we are comparing and measuring the wrongness of not showing respect for others in one’s behavior in various cases where the principle is violated. So, we would likely postulate that each action which violates the principle of showing respect has an intensity of violation, a duration of the violation, and the frequency of violation. This is the only way we could make valid intuitive judgements to distinguish cases of severe violations of the principle from the more mild violations. But, this is where problems arise for me. Does a case of violation of the principle really have an intensity of violation or a frequency of violation or a duration of violation? It’s certainly not as obvious as in the case of measuring suffering. I know from experience that some moments of suffering in my life are more intense than others. I also know that some moments of suffering last longer and some of my actions led to more frequent moments of suffering. Mental states seem to have measurable properties of this sort. On the other hand, it doesn’t appear that violations of a principle have an intensity that we can observe or a duration or a frequency. But, why do people believe that they have measurable properties then? Well, we usually measure the intensity of a principle violation by the intensity of the offense that we experience from thinking about the violation occurring. The mental state of being offended is comeasurable just like suffering is. This is a problematic comeasurability though. This is because we are not interested in measuring the offensiveness of a principle violation but rather the actual intensity of the violation. I imagine that you would think that Bob has wrongfully violated the principle of respecting others even if he lived in a world where no one would get offended at his principle violation. But, how could you determine the intensity of his principle violation without simply appealing to the intensity of the offensiveness that you experience from reading about Bob? I don’t have an answer to this problem and thus I’m inclined to be skeptical of your view. Without an ability to form even the most basic hierarchy of wrongness of cases in which the violation of the principle occurs, it seems like all claims of wrongness are simply arbitrary and have no normative significance. The explanatory difficulty of your view is just too great for me. Thus, I feel that the normative aim of minimizing suffering in the lives of sentient beings has a greater epistemic certainty of being a good normative aim to pursue. Though, I actually think there are even better normative aims to pursue but I won’t go into that. I apologize for the extreme wordiness and complexity of my comment but I have no simpler way of explaining my intuitions to you.

Unfortunately for me, people's personal lives are very uninteresting to me — ZhouBoTong

Fair enough, I think the main reason why I got interested in mundane personal decision making is because I always felt that my philosophizing lacked any useful application in my own life. I always felt like being good at philosophy was more similar to being good at trivia than being good at fixing cars. It doesn’t help that I sometimes get mocked by my family for being bad at practical tasks like working on cars, doing basic home repairs, and cooking complicated meals. My family also knows that I’m like a walking encyclopedia of somewhat useless knowledge. This just makes me seem like a time waster who can’t be bothered to study things that might actually help me get a better job , save me money, and improve the quality of my life. Unfortunately, I just don’t enjoy learning practical skills. Even as a musician, I don’t like to hone my guitar and piano playing abilities. Instead, I prefer to hone my songwriting abilities instead and record the instruments in my songs with an app like Garage Band. This allows me to compose music with minimal technical ability. To get back to the topic at hand, I wanted to figure out how to make my philosophizing more like a useful skill than useless knowledge. I figure that I could probably make better decisions in life if I philosophized about them as much as I philosophized about less useful topics. I still enjoy doing more trivial philosophy but I try to have my philosophy be more than just a way to kill time.

I think most people that actually call themselves an anti-natalist would be in this category. — ZhouBoTong

Yep I agree, but it’s not clear to me why this term has adopted an exclusively moralized meaning though.

Without children, life is easy and pleasant. I know all sorts of things that I enjoy doing and without kids, I can choose to do any of them, any time I want. — ZhouBoTong

This is one of the big reasons why I’m not a fan of having children either. My life philosophy strongly revolves around keeping my own life relatively pleasant. Though, I would say that life is pretty difficult and unpleasant even if you don’t have kids. But, it’s even more unpleasant with kids.

I also have social inadequacies, so I struggle to treat humans differently based on who they are. A 7 year gets talked to just like a 47 year old. From that perspective, kids suck. They are dumb and have nothing interesting to say. — ZhouBoTong

Well, I think you probably have pretty good social skills. People with bad social skills are usually unaware of their problems. Lots of people don’t know how to talk to children. I agree that they are not the most interesting people to talk to. I usually play sports or board games with them instead if I’m in a situation where I have nothing better to do.

Finally, IF I did have kids it would be all about molding them into some incredible figure...which seems borderline immoral. Worse than that, when the kid hits age twelve and says "screw you dad, I don't want your life", I can only agree that it is free to live its life any way it sees fit...but I am bored. I love you, I will support you, but leave me alone I am watching TV. — ZhouBoTong

Yeah, that’s bound not to work out well. Kids tend to be resistant to this sort of molding.

Notice there is basically zero morality in the decision, and very few factors to analyze. I don't want kids BECAUSE I don't want kids (I think deciding whether or not to go to college actually is more complicated). There is an acknowledge that once I have them, I am morally obligated to treat them well...but I can just choose to not have them. — ZhouBoTong

I would disagree that there’s only a few factors to analyze. I had already made 3 videos on the prudence of reproduction and I’m planning on making at least 7 more. The first video was about the financial pros and cons of having children. This video mostly points out the costs of having children but also addresses some attempts by the Pro-Natalists that try to minimize the financial costs. This includes the argument that children might pay back some of the cost by supporting you when you get old. It also includes the argument that having children gives you great tax deductions and thus offsets some more of the cost. Finally, I also mention the argument that raising children will prompt you to be more responsible and work harder for their sake and this will have financial benefits. In addition, I point out the possibility that one also might have to raise their grandchildren if their children are unable to. In my second video, I talk about the social aspects of having children. This mainly includes the argument that having children alleviates a great deal loneliness. I argued that the impact on loneliness is only mildly in favor of the Pro-Natalist position for most people. Then, I talked about the social dysphoria which may come with having children and argued that for more introverted people or people who prefer the company of adults the dysphoria might be a serious consideration. Next, I talked about how having children will impact your ability to make adult friends, find a new romantic partner, or maintain a relationship with your current romantic partner. Then, I talked about the peak positive experiences that come with watching the birth of your child and forming precious memories with children. Then, I talked about the possibility of something tragic occurring to your child and how this might cause you to greatly suffer. In my third video, I talked about the pain and discomfort of pregnancy and why I think this is one of the strongest arguments against having children for women. I’m planning to make my fourth video about the argument that one should have children to be remembered after one dies. I will talk about why I’m not convinced that this a good reason for anyone to consider. So, as you can see, there’s definitely a lot of interesting things to analyze regarding this topic. I agree that analyzing the prudence of going to college is even more difficult though.

I like the sound of this...but then realized I am not exactly sure what that means (likely my fault ). I would think that one could make moral decisions in a prudential manner? Perhaps you are viewing moral decisions as more dogmatic or as a list of rules/maxims....that doesn't seem quite right. I think I will just wait for your explanation as my guesses are likely to do us both a disservice. — ZhouBoTong

Well, I actually use somewhat unconventional definitions of terms “prudential” and “moral”. Prudentially is the element of decision making that I identify with self-interest while morality is the element of decision making concerned with the interests of others. I consider whether or not I should go to college as a prudential issue since it mostly concerns maximizing well being in my own life. Though, this might not be true in many cases. People who are trying to better support their family might have moral reasons to go to college since their decision now concerns people other than themselves. So, there’s actually a lot of overlap. Another decision that is normally treated as a prudential issue is whether or not one should have children. Most people mostly have selfish considerations when deciding whether or not to have children. This is true for both Pronatalists and Antinatalists. A prudential Antinatalist is kinda like a normal “child free” person who simply doesn’t want to have kids because they think it would be harmful to their own life interests. A moral Antinatalist is someone who thinks having children is bad mostly because it harms the child or other people in the world. I’m actually more interested in the selfish/prudential arguments for having children and against having children rather than the moral/selfless arguments(even though I made a thread on moral Antinatalism this time.). So basically, prudential decision theory is just the more selfish aspects of decision theory while morality is the more selfless aspect. I hope that made sense to you.

Nice. I think it would take me 10 days to even write a script for a 30 minute video. And my neurosis would never allow to make a video without entirely planning every word I was going to say. I will try to check them out, but I am unlikely to vastly improve your "hits" as I generally prefer learning from text...those incredible astronomy shows on the science channel(s) and any of the "Planet Earth" style nature shows are the exception...If you can do philosophy with that sort of production value, I may end up a regular viewer :grin: In any case, it is a worthy endeavor. — ZhouBoTong

I used to try to write a script and was over concerned with making minor mistakes. But, I realized that I’m actually about as good talking off the cuff as I am at writing a good script. I’m not the best writer but I tend to have pretty good improvisational public speaking skills. So, I just improvise my talks while occasionally pausing the recording to think. I don’t think it strongly impacts the quality of my videos but it greatly improves my productivity. I also save time by having my videos only include a slide that I made with the program Paint with the title of the video written on it. So, my videos definitely don’t have much production value. Oftentimes, I think the best way to create quality is with quantity. This is because a large number of videos created with minimum effort are often more likely to have a really interesting video in it than a small number of videos that are over-analyzed and over-produced. I suppose I’m more likely to say something stupid though. I had stopped even reviewing all of my own videos. But, I reviewed a couple and was satisfied with them. I also have a love for astronomy videos btw :smile:

I am an antinatalist of Bob's kind (that is, I think procreation is prima facie immoral, but may nevertheless be justified in many cases). — Bartricks

That’s interesting, in what cases do you think that procreation is justified?

But that's not all that matters. It is also important to show respect for others in one's behaviour, and respect for free choice. — Bartricks

Fair enough, we can say that showing respect for other’s behavior is important. But, in the case of Bob, the consequence of his actions is REALLY good. It only costs about $400 to give a drug addict long term contraception. PP pays drug addicts $300 and also probably takes some of the money to cover administrative costs. $400 is meant to be a pretty conservative estimate I think. If Bob donates like 2 million dollars to the organization, then he would be responsible for applying long term contraception to about 5000 drug addicts. The average drug addict that signs up for this program usually gets pregnant or gets someone else pregnant about once every 2 years or so. But, they are usually women who are already in their late 20s or early 30s. So, I would make a conservative estimate that each implementation of long term contraception would prevent 2 children from being born. Thus, Bob likely prevented around 10,000 children from being born to drug addicted parents. These are children that are often born addicted to drugs and they get taken away to abusive foster homes. So, their lives probably contain more suffering than average. They are also less likely to be vegan and avoid the consumption of countless of factory farm animals(this is because veganism is more common among the privileged in western countries.). This leads to more reproduction of sentient beings and more suffering. In addition, they are more likely to grow up as drug addicts and create drug addicted children of their own. So, Bob is probably preventing like a million of sentient beings from coming into existence(if we include factory farm animals.). It’s possible that factory farming will soon be obsolete with the creation of affordable cultured meat. Nonetheless, Bob probably prevented around 100,000 miserable people from being born across multiple generations while only potentially creating like 10 privileged people across multiple generations(though this estimate is almost certainly wrong if the human species survives uninterrupted for more than a hundred years. The difference would be even larger then). Given the magnitude of Bob’s positive impact, wouldn’t this justify violating the rights of just 1 person who is his child? I don’t think we have to be pure consequentialist to think that an enormously good consequence could justify one pretty bad action.

Once I identify an ideal, I am not going to lower it just because I am not sure if anyone can live up to the ideal. That is why it is an ideal, not "how we normally act". — ZhouBoTong

I agree that we should not be discouraged from thinking that an action is good just because we can’t find the mental strength to perform the action. For example, I would consider sacrificing my life in a relatively painless manner to rescue many people from suffering to be a good decision option but it’s unlikely that I will have the bravery to act on that decision option. I don’t think this should be construed as evidence that I actually don’t think that it’s a good decision option deep inside. I think we might be psychologically unable to act on what we honestly consider good because of incontinence.

That's fair. I think I even started typing something about..."if the dictated morals are too repulsive then they would not be accepted", but then I thought it would be more accurate to say..."if the dictated morals are too repulsive, then they will gradually be phased out over a few centuries"...which suggests that culture changed that caused people to view things as repulsive that were previously just accepted (like stoning adulterers). But I will certainly agree with a bit of both. — ZhouBoTong

It’s actually an interesting point that I haven’t thought about yesterday. Why were Christians supporting capital punishment in the past and continue to do so
today? Wouldn’t this suggest that my theory that Christians are using the Bible to support life affirmation be wrong? Well, ironically enough, I actually think that capital punishment is strangely life affirming. To imply that bad people should be killed is to imply that life is valuable and death is harmful. Suicide, on the other hand, is like a philosophical rebellion against the affirmation of life. This is why I think it was more offensive to Life Affirming Christians than killing bad people as a punishment. Ironically enough, having a botched suicide attempt used to be a crime and it was punishable by death! You can’t make this shit up :lol: !

This actually captures a lot of my views on morality. Most of it is either grey area or so insignificant that the "right" decision doesn't matter. I enjoy philosophy and testing my decisions in hypothetical situations with the hope that I will make the "correct" moral decision in the one or two moments of my life where there is a difficult and important moral decision. — ZhouBoTong

I agree. I’m actually more interested in prudential decision making than moral decision making. I’m trying to figure out if I should rent or buy a house once I move out of my mom’s place. I’m also trying to figure out if I should ever go back to school considering that I graduated with an Associate’s Degree that I never ended up using. These are very interesting and difficult philosophical questions for me. My preferred method for making progress on those issues is a pros and cons list which I continuously review and adjust for perceived inaccuracies. I also devised other decision making methods but I never managed to use them in an actual life decision. I also learned a thing or two about decision making by reading books by Nassim Taleb who I strongly recommend. I recently started a philosophical YouTube channel called Hedonic Minimalist in which I plan to eventually discuss all of my ideas on prudential theory and other topics. So far, I only have 8 videos made which average about 30 minutes in length but I should be able to release many more since making a 30 minute YouTube video usually only takes me like 50 minutes.

Well, you are obviously at a higher level, but it sounds like we do this philosophy stuff for similar reasons :smile: — ZhouBoTong

Well, thank you :blush: . I appreciate the compliment!

Feel free to point out (i will just view it as a learning experience) any time I misrepresent or misunderstand established theories. I have almost zero formal philosophy education (shocking, I know). I do take the time to look up definitions, but some of these ideas require a deep understanding before they really make sense. — ZhouBoTong

I actually think you have a pretty good grasp of many ideas. You understood my very wordy comments quite well. I kinda have a bad habit of using too much philosophical jargon. Though, I actually also never took a real class on philosophy in an actual university in my life. I mostly learned this stuff by listening to lectures on YouTube and reading academic philosophical journals on philarchive.org . Though a lot of jargon that I use was just created by me but often influenced by existing jargon. I think Philosophy is more about philosophizing than studying philosophy though. I spend a lot more time pacing around my house and thinking about certain ideas than actually studying the ideas of others. I often use philosophical journals as mere thought provokers when I have nothing to think about. I think you have quite a talent for philosophizing though. I was quite impressed by the objections that you gave for 180 Proof’s arguments :smile:

Whenever someone starts defending or drawing false equivalences to pedophilia, I bow out leaving things at let's agree to disagree about the topic at hand. Apparently, THM, you're looking to score points rather than (re)examine (the assumptions of) your position, if only for discussion's sake, in light of my objections to it. I'm not interested in debating points. Maybe other fish will take your bait ... — 180 Proof

To be fair, I felt that you were making false equivalences of my ideas to the Nazis (you did call certain ideas that I kinda supported as “nazi bs” .) I don’t think that the language that I used was more harsh than the language that you used. I generally match the tone of the person that I’m speaking to on this forum. If someone is trying to be really nice then I’m guaranteed to be really nice back. But, you were making some fiery comments in your response so I felt it was appropriate for me to do the same. I wasn’t trying to score points either. I was honestly trying to have an intellectually honest discussion with you. I’m sorry if it didn’t appear that way to you. My analogy to pedophilia was not meant as an insult to your position or a straw man of it. I’m honestly having a difficulty of understanding why reproduction by a drug addict which is accompanied by abandonment of the child is considered less harmful than child molestation. I’m not even sure if normal reproduction is less harmful than child molestation. A lifetime of suffering could certainly be considered more significant than one single really bad period of suffering like in the case of child molestation. Maybe this view is just too radical for you to consider but it was not meant to be a dismissal of yout position. I was trying to explain why I consider your ideas to be counterintuitive and I probably didn’t do a very good job of showing appropriate respect for our disagreement. In my defense, I’m was pretty tired from work when I wrote my comment to you and this caused me to rush in my thinking and wording. It took me a long time to respond to your long and thought provoking comments and also to the comments of Zhou. So, I was a bit overloaded on this thread. I apologize if you feel that I wasted your time but I promise you that I only had the best intentions for our discussion.

I am not a fan of this type of moralizing. One could define their behavior to be perfectly moral no matter how one behaves. Murder is wrong. Unless the person deserves it.

This mindset could lead to every negative that 180 Proof mentioned. Only the poor, stupid, and weak are denied children while "I" as a valued citizen can reproduce at will. — ZhouBoTong

Well yes, one could define their moral behavior to be perfectly moral no matter how one behaves. But, I don’t see how this an exclusive critique of “License to Sin” Utilitarianism. One could develop a deontological Divine Command Theory in which God allows you to murder certain individuals who you happen to dislike. In addition, one could develop a virtue ethics theory in which murdering bad people is virtuous. Even Kantians do not seem to be completely immune(although, I’ll grant that they are more immune than the other theories.). A “golden rule” Kantian may justify murdering someone by reasoning that they would want to get murdered too if they were as disgusting as the person that they want to murder. Thus, they wouldn’t be violating the golden rule if they murder “disgusting” individuals. My point being is that we can’t single out “license to sin” utilitarians here. I’ll grant that there might be a greater danger involved but this would only be an argument against promoting the theory to others. One could be a “license to sin” utilitarian themselves while being careful about making sure that the benefit does indeed appear to outweigh the harm.

I think this is great...unfortunately most of the world has their morality dictated to them from magical books....but now reading your objection to deontology, maybe you still view those people as choosing their morality? — ZhouBoTong

Well, it’s actually not clear to me if magical books dictate morality to religious people or if religious people dictate their magical books to their morality. I think it’s a bit of both. On one hand, it’s undeniable that magic books influence some of the moral principles that are held by the societies that adhere to them. Circumcision is a perfect example. I doubt anybody is instinctually drawn to the idea of cutting off the foreskin off of the penis or the hood of a clitoris. Those ideas seem to be influenced by the magic books. On the other hand, there are plenty of beliefs that religious folks have that are not mentioned in their magic books. For example, there’s no explicit prohibition of abortion or suicide in the Bible. Nonetheless, Christians are often strongly opposed to those things while atheists are more likely to be
pro-choice on these matters. My theory for why this is so is that some people have been biologically selected by evolution to have a strong sentiment towards survival and reproduction. This is often encapsulated into the belief in “The Sanctity of Life”. If one has a strong sentiment towards anything then they are more likely to promote that thing on a sociocultural level. This is why you see so many suicide hotlines and posters of dead fetuses. Though, I actually think that my explanation might be flawed since it’s not clear why abortion is considered more immoral than sterilization or simply choosing not to reproduce. Though, in the past, I think abortion was as controversial as any other form of contraception. All contraception used to be extremely controversial in the past. So, it kinda supports my theory. So, why are people who believe in the sanctity of life more likely to be religious? Well, it’s pretty difficult to defend their views through secular reasoning since it’s not clear why life should be valued for its own sake. The Bible is vague enough that it can be used as an easy defense for this view. Sometimes one might use a metaphysical theory to defend their beliefs about value and ethics that they refuse to abandon. I suspect that the Bible is often used as a convenient way of explaining and justifying one’s already deeply held intuitions about certain values.

I think this is the problem that would be seen a lot...however, the more complicated the math equation, the more factors it could include (and therefor the less ambiguity it would have). — ZhouBoTong

I actually don’t think that it’s particularly important to resolve the ambiguity in those cases. If 2 decision option are pretty close in goodness then you might as well just flip a coin and not over-analyze the decision. It will save you a lot of needless worry :smile:

While you could find a lot of agreement on these points, it would almost never be unanimous. I do not think this invalidates your ideas, it just suggests a type of limited usefulness (and to be fair nothing has universal usefulness, so that is not necessarily a substantial problem). — ZhouBoTong

I agree that my decision theory is highly unpersuasive and extremely exclusive. I make a ton of controversial claims and try my best to defend all of them. This marginalizes any audience that I might have. But, my specific ideas are more designed for my own life and deciding what decisions I should make. On this thread, I defended theories that I don’t fully support like Agent Neutral Utilitarianism and “License to Sin” Utilitarianism because they are close relatives to my complicated theory. So, I need not only promote my specific theory.

No much of a counter because it misses the large social point, namely that no politician or bureaucrat or committee is "clear-headed" enough to decide upon and implement sterilization policies of marginalized a demographic or community especially if they don't belong to the targetted group. Plenty of recent historical evidence bears this out. — 180 Proof

Well, it seems that we trust politicians and bureaucrats to make all kinds of policies that potentially harm a marginalized demographic. For example, we lock pedophiles up for child molestation. Pedophiles are a marginalized demographic. We are willing to use direct force as punishment for their actions. Wouldn’t it be better to pay pedophiles to get castrated before they commit a crime instead? Similarly, we lock up drug addicts for mistreating or neglecting their children. Are we not just protecting them from legal consequences by paying them to get sterilized? Also, you mentioned that there is historical evidence that sterilization didn’t work or had negative consequences. Would you mind showing me some links to that historical evidence? In addition, does this evidence only apply to legally mandated sterilization or does it also apply to paying a willing drug addict? PP has already got over 3,000 drug addicts sterilized and there haven’t been any negative consequences yet it seems.

And the vast majority of homo insapiens (& hominin cousins) for the last 2.5 million years too and currently still do. So? — 180 Proof

There are 3 important differences here:

1. Drug addicts are more likely to have their procreation be accidental and thus it is really rare for them to intentionally reproduce.

2. Drug addicts do not adequately take care of their accidental offsprings

3. Drug addicts are known to have litters of offsprings. I think if someone reproduces 4 times and abandons every one of their offspring then this is an act that is more harmful than murder and child molestation. Given this, it is justified to lock them up in prison for a long time. If it justified to lock them up in prison then it justified to pay them not to reproduce.

I don't accept "ends justify means" arguments in ethics. Means and ends must be adjusted to one another so that the latter is not undermined or invalidated by the former while the former is calibrated to enacted the latter. A version of reflective equilibrium. — 180 Proof

So, would you say that arresting criminals is justified? It seems to me that throwing people in prison is never a good means to prevent harm but it’s justified given the positive ends.

Atrocities are what "mathematically speaking" gets you:

“If only one man dies of hunger, that is a tragedy. If millions die, that’s only statistics.”
~Uncle Joe of Georgia

or more familiarly

"Explain to me why it is more noble to kill 10,000 men in battle than a dozen at dinner."
~Lord Tywin of Casterly Rock — 180 Proof

Well, we are already dealing with an atrocity. Is it not an atrocity that we have suffering children created by drug addicts? If you consider individuals like Mao Zedong and Joseph Stalin to be mathematical utilitarians then there’s much to be criticized. I would challenge their value theory and their speculation that their starvation plans would eventually pay off. Just because there are bad mathematics utilitarians doesn’t mean that there are no good mathematical utilitarians. Bad mathematical utilitarians sometimes commit atrocities but non-utilitarians are good at preventing us from preventing and alleviating atrocities. Non-utilitarians are the reason why we spend $700,000 a year on a comatose patient rather than spending that money to alleviate the suffering of hundreds of sentient creatures. Non-utilitarians are good at making themselves look innocent though while pointing the finger at the mathematical utilitarians and blaming them for every atrocity.

Well, you're right, something must be done; what's proffered here, however, causes as many or more problems than it solves. — 180 Proof

What are the problems that are caused? What’s the worst that could happen if PP becomes a hundred times more popular and sterilizes 300,000 drug addicts instead of 3,000 drug addicts? It seems to me that you are mostly concerned with legally mandated sterilization of drug addicts. So, why would the consequences of PP paying drug addicts to get sterilized be bad in any way? Are you afraid of some kind of a slippery slope that eventually leads to mandated sterilization?

Mary's decision to fulfill a species need to procreate and a personal desire to parent children wagers on her being able to (as much as possible) protect from harm as well as nurture her child(ren) in order to give them the best of odds of the living with the least suffering while simultaneously working to support the antinatalist movement. She's not "justifying" her decision to procreate, rather she's trying to precede in a way that doesn't invalidate or undermine either the prospect of parenting or working for the movement. — 180 Proof

I know this comment wasn’t intended for me but it’s related to our discussion. Mary could fulfill her desire to parent children by adopting them instead of reproducing. Given this, why is it not wrong for her to procreate given that she could fulfill her parenting needs by adopting a child. If she also wants to fulfill her reproductive needs then she should not use her child as a means to an end to do so(unless you agree with me that the ends of her preventing people from being born gives her a license to sin.)

That's wrong. Bob doesn't have a species need - biopsych programming - to live any better than his ancestors did during the last great ice age. He's a freeloading, child-exploiting grifter. Also, he doesn't have a fundamental need to promote antinalism (or any abstrat notion). Maybe some neurological issues there (e.g. sociopathy) ... but not a fundamental drive, shared by almost every other (nonpathological) human being, that would disable or kill him if not satisfied or periodically maintained. — 180 Proof

So, reproduction is justified if you have a strong biological urge to reproduce? What if a pedophile also has a strong biological urge to molest children? Does this justify his child molestation?

Yes, but "EVERYTHING" doesn't equally determine or drive us to decide whether or when or with whom or even how to fulfill our species need - programming, or hormonal drive - to procreate. If more fundamental drives like metabolic, procreative, fight or flight, intentional agency attribution (e.g. theory of mind), etc weren't primary, and social or personal desires secondary, the current human species would very likely be extinct today. — 180 Proof

I think it’s safe to say that the sexual drive of a pedophile is as “primary” as the need to reproduce for someone who has that desire. Both sexual and procreative desires are considered to be physiological needs under Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs model(I’m assuming that this is the model that you prefer.). Both pedophiles and people who wish to procreate are often willing to sacrifice their safety to do so. Thus, there’s no reason to suppose that pedophilia is less programmed into pedophiles as the desire to procreate.

Thats called "license to sin" in psychology and it makes no sense. She could've donated the same amount if not more if she didn't have a child

I think Bob's case is moral though — khaled

Fair enough, though “license to sin” utilitarianism could be thought of as a more egoistic version of “agent neutral” utilitarianism but not completely egoistic one. Bob could be described as an agent neutral utilitarian since he believes that he should strive to minimize suffering in the world as much as possible. This can be starkly contrasted with a purely egoistic form of utilitarianism which is usually called something like Prudential Hedonism or Egoistic Hedonism. These views were mostly popularized by the Ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus who was mostly concerned with only minimizing suffering in his own life. Epicurus was a major influence on Jeremy Bentham who was the father of agent neutral Utilitarianism. Bentham agreed on the focus on pleasure and suffering that Epicurus had but decided that we should not prioritize our own interests above anyone else’s interests. This led to the radical conclusion that we have no reason to prioritize the interests of our loved ones or ourselves above the interests of a stranger. Mary’s “license to sin” utilitarianism could be though of as a compromise between Agent Neutral Utilitarianism and Prudential Hedonism. It argues that one only has a duty to have their existence produce a positive impact on the world overall. Mary doesn’t think that she has a duty to prevent as many people from being born as possible(unlike Bob). She thinks that it’s rational for her to only benefit herself and avoid harming herself as long as she does more good than bad for the world. Her only moral requirement is to atone for the harms that she causes to the world. Of course, there are many people that would find such a view repugnant. I’m personally unconvinced by this view and I’m also unconvinced by Agent Neutral Utilitarianism but I support the actions of both Bob and Mary. My view is yet another version of Hedonism/Utilitarianism and it’s probably repugnant to many people as well. I consider minimizing suffering in my own life to be my primary goal. Maximizing my own pleasure is my secondary goal. Minimizing the suffering of others and maximizing my own life satisfaction are my tertiary goals. So, I would usually prioritize my higher order goals over my minor goals but if I can make a bigger impact on my tertiary goals than on my primary goal with a particular action then I would think that it’s rational for me to prioritize the tertiary goal over a primary goal. So, it’s kinda like a complicated version of hedonism/utilitarianism and there are many different and interesting versions of hedonist and utilitarian ethics that one could devise.

I think I am in between, personally, I plan to have NO children. But I do not feel an urge to convince others. And intellectually, I can see merits to both sides of the argument. — ZhouBoTong

Fair enough, I think it’s reasonable to argue that one doesn’t really have a duty to promote what they believe to be good and sometimes it’s better to have a high degree of confidence that what you think is good is actually good before you act on what you think is good. Some people are too quick to act on their beliefs without properly reflecting on them first. On the other hand, it might be argued that the point of moral reflection is to eventually help make the world a better place. If preventing people from being born is considered by someone to be the best way to make the world a better place, then it would seem appropriate for one to make donating to PP their top priority.

Mary is going to have some serious cognitive dissonance. What else has she labelled as unquestionably immoral that she still wants to do? But other than her internal contradictions, I don't have a problem with the actions. — ZhouBoTong

Well, I actually wrote that Mary thought that having children was only prima facie immoral which means it only appeared unquestionably immoral to her at first before further philosophical examination. After philosophical examination, Mary realized that it’s only immoral if she creates more lives than she prevents. So, it seems that there wouldn’t be an internal contradiction. Though, I suppose that some moral psychologists might argue that humans generally cannot view their actions in such calculating mathematical terms and thus the utilitarians might feel guilty and ashamed about some of the things that they had done in their “ends justify the means” approach to morality. Though, this would apply to Bob as much as it does for Mary.

I am not sure we can always simplify moral decisions with math...but I have to run and have not thoroughly reviewed your last two posts...so don't take that criticism seriously until I have time to read everything :smile: — ZhouBoTong

Fair enough, this is something that most people agree with you on. I would have to go into a pretty deep explanation myself to explain why I tend to view all normative decision making in quasi-mathematical terms whether it is moral or everyday prudential decision making or an interesting cross between the two which aims at deciding if you should benefit yourself or others. I tend to think of morality as the element of decision making theory which explores the benefits and harms that a decision option has for someone other than yourself. Prudentiality is an element that explores the benefits and harms for yourself. Sometimes there might also be conflicts between prudentiality and morality and this is a different element of decision making which I have not named yet. It is the element that is explored in the debate between ethical egoists and altruists and all the positions in between. I tend to exclude using Deontic language(ie words such as “permissible”, “prohibited”, and “obligatory”) when talking about decision making theory because I view decision making as being purely evaluative and never Deontic in nature. Evaluation is a quasi-mathematical activity which relies on the creation of a hierarchy of things which are on a spectrum of better and worse. For example, if I’m evaluating a group of songs, I’m putting them into quasi-mathematical categories such as “great songs”, “good songs”, “decent songs”, “bad songs” and “terrible songs”. Similarly, letter grades given at school are quasi-mathematical evaluative categories designed to create a hierarchy of betterness and worseness. Of course, there is often ambiguity in the hierarchy if 2 things fall within the same quasi-mathematical categories. For example, if I put both Song A and Song B in the category of “decent songs” then it might be hard for me to say which song is better. Decision options seem to work the same way. There are better and worse ways that I could spend my next hour. This involves all the possible actions or decision options that I could take during the hour. Of course, we would have to decide what evaluative criteria we should use to determine which of the possible ways of spending my next hour are superior and inferior. This would get us into the discussion of what types of things are intrinsically good or good in a final sense by which they can be used as appropriate quasi-mathematical points for the evaluation of decision option outcomes. This is a complicated topic which I will refrain from addressing to avoid making this post wayy too long.

I think selective antinatalism is simply eugenics. While, I agree that situational anti-procreation is justified (debilitated drug addicts shouldn't have kids), antinatalism as I see it is mainly about not causing harm or aggression towards a future person. In other words, you can perfectly respect the autonomy of the individual by not enabling conditions of harm for a future person, and by not "forcing their hand" and violating non-aggression by affecting an individual by bringing them into the world in the first place. — schopenhauer1

But, why do you think that there’s a greater reason to not cause harm rather than alleviate the harm of others? I’m curious because many people including myself do not find these claims to be obvious and feel that there needs to be a stronger defense of these claims. I’m also willing to provide a stronger defense of the actions of Bob and Mary. Mathematically speaking, it’s intuitive to suppose that if someone prevents 5 lives from existing and causes only 1 to exist, then they made a better impact on the world than a “passive” antinatalist who simply doesn’t reproduce. The existence of the “passive” antinatalist probably made an overall bad impact on the world. This is because even if the passive antinatalist tries his best to avoid harming sentient beings, he probably has done at least some harm to the world. He probably ate meat before becoming a vegan for example. This led to the birth of possibly thousands of animals(especially if he liked chicken). It would be hard to justify that harm with any good deed except if he donates money to prevent another person from being born or if he donates to cultured meat research. The notion of atonement of sin is also quite popular and intuitive in our society. It’s refreshing to know that if you had done awful things in the past, then there’s something you can do to make up for that. “Active” antinatalists like Bob and Mary have not only atoned for their sins but also greatly benefited the world in addition to that. In the case of Bob, even though he used his child as a means to an end, why not view this as a good thing that Bob’s child should be proud of? After all, if my existence helped prevent countless of suffering children from being born, I would be proud to be the tool that let that happen. What I’m not proud of is the fact that my existence was probably an accident in the bedroom and there was no deliberation about bringing me into existence at all. I think that’s a much more humiliating circumstance to be born under and it applies to slightly more than 50 percent of all people born.

Not good. Even as an antinatalist I can see that targeting addicts clearly exploits their joneses and is wrong. If the choice not to procreate is coerced in any way, then it's not freely chosen and thereby inflicts harm on the "already born". The end doesn't justify the means especially where 'prevention of inevitable harm' is an end brought about by doing harm in the first place. — 180 Proof

This is a common criticism that Project Prevention receives. Their counter-argument to this criticism is to point out that if you think that drugs addicts are unable to make clear-headed decisions to get paid to get sterilized then why would you think that they can make a clear headed decision to procreate. It seems that the vast majority of drug addicts have children on accident and then those children get taken away from them and they end up in a terrible foster home while suffering from opioid withdrawal. It also costs the taxpayer $500,000 to treat one infant with opioid withdrawal plus the costs of foster care.

No. Bob procreated in order to use the child to bribe his parent not disinherit him. No end doesn't justifies using the child as the means. — 180 Proof

I’m surprised that you support the actions of Mary but not the actions Bob. Though, can you make a stronger argument for why the ends do not justify the means for those who are not convinced of this principle?

It’s seems that God could of simply removed the capacity for us to suffer without changing possible human behavior and thus preserving free will in a world with no suffering. For example, imagine that humans are still capable of sinning but no one will suffer because of the sin because no one has the capacity to suffer. A Christian might argue that suffering is sometimes beneficial but why would God not turn off the capacity to suffer in cases when it is clearly not beneficial.

If we start from a place where we have no idea what's "really" good or bad, or if anything at all even is "really" good or bad, we can at least ask ourselves "what seems good or bad?" That seeming-good-or-bad just is hedonic experience, pleasure or enjoyment, suffering or pain. I like to call the faculties that produce such experiences "appetites — Pfhorrest

I agree that if you start from a place of initial ignorance then you are likely to recognize the goodness of pleasure and the badness of suffering first. I actually used to be pretty skeptical and agnostic about value claims and I wasn’t particularly sure what I should do with my life. Later on, I had this realization that if there’s anything that I have reason to do in this life, it is to increase the pleasantness of my life. At that time, I wasn’t studying philosophy seriously so I didn’t know what the opinion I held on this topic was called. I called my new idea Sensationalism at the time because I thought that life value consisted of positive and negative sensations which ironically enough I never thought about simply calling pleasures and pains. I guess it was mostly because I had a more narrow definition of what pleasure and pain was. Later on, I learned that my viewpoint was called hedonism and that pleasure and pain are often used as more inclusive descriptions of positive and negative experiences.

...likewise what initially seems good to our limited hedonic experience may later seem bad upon further experience, but since that seeming-good-or-bad is all we have to go on, we should build our picture of what's actually good out of increasingly in-depth examination of our hedonic experience, from many different perspectives and in many different circumstances. — Pfhorrest

I agree that we should try to create more detailed hedonic accounts to try to help us make good decisions in life. I have actually devised several hedonic analysis methods which I use to explore the merits of various decisions in life. One such method involves simply writing down a list of every type of pleasure and suffering that you can think of. Then, you apply it to an important decision in life. For example, I like to think about the hedonic consequences of having children for myself. I’m much more concerned with suffering than I am with pleasure so I would usually only do an analysis of the suffering caused by having children vs the suffering alleviated by having children. I start the analysis with a list of suffering: physical pain, itchiness, foul smell, anxiety, loneliness, sexual frustration, grief, and so on. There’s like 20 or more different types of suffering that I would want to analyze. Then, I try to see how having children would impact these different types of suffering. I find this method helpful because it helps break down the suffering into something that it’s easy to think about. This allows me to consider things about having children that most other people might not consider. For example, if I think about specifically the grief involved in having children, then I could observe that I might suffer from grief if I have children and something bad happens to them. This would reveal a downside to having children which would not be revealed otherwise. Similarly, if I think about the romantic frustration involved in struggling to find a romantic partner who also doesn’t want to have kids and can meet other important criteria, then this reveals a downside to the child-free life which is often overlooked.

Well, how would you distinguish suffering from non-suffering? It seems that in order to even identify an experience as being unpleasant one must make a value judgement about that experience. For example, how do you distinguish the feeling of anxiety from the feeling of excitement? Both excitement and anxiety are characterized by a fidgety and heightened state of mind. So, what’s the difference between the 2 experiences? Well, excitement feels good while anxiety feels bad. Thus, by making a value judgement about those experiences, you can distinguish them. Otherwise, anxiety and excitement would pretty much feel the same way. I’m essentially arguing that unpleasantness is a felt property of badness and that our past experiences with unpleasantness is evidence of the existence of that felt property.

I actually don’t particularly disagree with anything you said there. I agree that we should try to maximize pleasure and minimize pain in the long term.

The words "goodness" and "badness" are troublesome here.

Your premise, more precisely put, reads: P4: The intrinsic pleasurefulness of pleasure and the intrinsic unpleasurefulness of suffering are observed within our inner subjective experiences and thus there is credible introspective empirical evidence that pleasure is intrinsically pleasureful and suffering is intrinsically unpleasureful.

Goodness and badness are judgments added to prima facie observations of pleasure and suffering. — ZzzoneiroCosm

But, how would you distinguish between pleasurable experiences and non-pleasurable experiences in your mind? It’s seems like you could identify pleasurable experiences by a feeling of unambiguous and undeniable goodness. Similarly, you could only distinguish suffering from non-suffering only by observing the badness of some experiences. Also, the experience of suffering could often compel you to regard it as intrinsically bad. For example, if you put your hand on a hot stove and it hurts, then you would be compelled to think that the hurting sensation is intrinsically bad for at least a moment upon the identification of the experience. No other type of thing aside from pleasure and suffering seems to universally compel us to regard it as intrinsically good or bad. For example, I’m not compelled to regard practical accomplishments as intrinsically good. Even after an initial exposure to something that I define to be a practical accomplishment, I’m not psychologically forced to accept its intrinsic goodness. The same goes for knowledge, satisfied preferences, survival, and other things which can be considered intrinsically good. Essentially, I would argue that properties of pleasurefullness are actually properties of intrinsic goodness and that also partly explains why might refer to a pleasant state of mind as “feeling good”. On the other hand, we can understand properties of other supposedly intrinsically good things like knowledge without presupposing an intrinsic property of goodness in knowledge. I could distinguish knowledge from non-knowledge without implying that one is better than the other, but I cannot distinguish pleasurable experiences from non-pleasurable experiences without implying that one is better than the other one. Thus, I would argue that there must be an observed goodness in pleasure.

the mind is not separate from the environment. so real answers to questions will include both the mind and the environment and their relationship together in the explanation. — OmniscientNihilist

What do you mean when you say that the mind is not separate from the environment?

so "good" and "bad" are nothing but fleeting words. metaphysically they dont exist. metaphysically all things including pleasure and pain simply are what they are. they are neither good or bad but simply exist as aspects of being itself.

"good" and "bad" are just labels used temporarily for pragmatic purposes by the mind. — OmniscientNihilist

Well, aren’t all words just labels used temporarily for pragmatic purposes by the mind? For example, if I say that I’m lying on a bed right now, then my use of the word “bed” is meant to an easy way of describing the collection of atoms that I’m laying on. Similarly, if I say that’s it’s raining outside, “raining” is also just a label used to describe the process of lots of H2O molecules falling on the ground. So, do beds and rain also not exist metaphysically under your view? Are they not just a collection of atoms rather than unified objects or events?

as for hedonism the mind will always move towards pleasure and away from pain based on its beliefs of where they are. those beliefs come from past experience or extrapolations from past experience.

choice is a deterministic cost benefit analysis run in split seconds by your subconscious mind to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. humans are basically pleasure seeking robots, whether they know/admit it or not. — OmniscientNihilist

That sounds like an argument for Motivational Hedonism which states human action is motivated by the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain. I’m not a proponent of such views but I’m also not an opponent of them. I’m more interested in the question of “what should we pursue or avoid?” rather than “what do we pursue or avoid?”. Whether or not determinism is true, I don’t think it gives us a reason to not philosophize about issues relating to value and decision making. Also, I don’t think we make every choice in split seconds in our subconscious. For example, if I was unsure what I was gonna be my major in college until I spend 2 hours doing extensive research on all majors, then wouldn’t this imply that I spend 2 hours making that decision consciously?

am pretty sure that Aristotle, in writing on happiness, was not talking about sensation/pleasure. He referred to it in at least one place as being an assessed quality, assessed near the end of life (if it's the question of whether the life was a happy one), and as can be no surprise, he measured it against possibilities. That is, if a bunch of characteristics were in play, then the life was happy. These included (if memory serves) luck, many and good children, health, and so forth. — tim wood

So, why would having many and good children be valuable for its own sake? What if someone doesn’t want to have children?

I myself would go further - and it's possible that I got this from Aristotle or elsewhere and don't remember where; i.e., no claim here of originality - that if you can die happy, then you were happy. - and this covers a lot of possibilities. — tim wood

So, if I was unhappy for the first 99% of my life span and then was happy for just the last 1% of my life span, would say that I lived a good or happy life?

So, why ought the slave be freed despite his comfort and acceptance of his fate? It's because there is a standard that demands that people strive for higher intellectual satisfaction and not live as animals. The religious would refer to this as living out to the extent of one's creation. — Hanover

How do you know that there is a standard that demands that people strive for higher intellectual satisfaction and not live as animals?

I think that's the case because if you agree that this is an entirely interpretative and subjective evaluation (and will always be) then this method is just another of the potentially infinite number of ways that one could choose to evaluate the quality of a life. The only thing that separates those and this one is the opinion of us humans. — Judaka

Well, I would actually like to point out that my method for evaluating lives is relatively unpopular among humans. I think it’s probably more popular among farm animals :lol: . But, I have a question. If there is an infinite number of ways to evaluate lives, does this necessarily suggest that each method is equally reasonable? Is there not a hierarchy of reasonability among their various methods of evaluation? Surely if we had 2 life evaluators, and one evaluates life quality by comparing suffering in various lives while the other evaluates life by comparing practical accomplishments in various lives; it would seem to make sense to try to figure out if it’s more important to focus on attaining practical accomplishments or minimizing suffering. It also seems like there might be more reason to focus on one end goal over the other one. One such reason might be that there appears to be greater epistemic certainty that suffering is bad to some extent than that accomplishments are good to any extent.

This way of evaluating the quality of a life is not particularly absurd or unreasonable but since truth isn't a factor, I would start to look at utility and appeal which would be a hard deviation from the topic. — Judaka

I am certainly free to make a hard deviation from the topic if this relevant to distinguishing how we can know whether someone has made a good or bad decision in life. I think the goodness of a decision should be judged by the outcome of the decision option. This is why I think it is important to evaluate outcomes and lives.

Quality doesn't exist without interpretation - as things just are and they are not measured. It's not different if instead of from a person's mouth, it's by rules they created or criteria they established. — Judaka

Well, I actually find it quite helpful to use a numerical criteria for evaluation. For example, if I was a teacher grading essays or tests, then it would make more sense to apply a numerical score in addition to a letter grade. Measurements of quality are meant to be helpful guides to allow us to evaluate things in a relatively consistent manner. They are not meant to be precise but could still be thought of as having a greater objectivity than simply evaluating using your feelings. This is partly why we would find it unfair to have an English professor grade an essay without a rubric simply on the basis of how much she likes the paper. The rubric is designed to show us how to get a good grade on an essay. It is not designed to precisely measure writing ability. But, the goal of the rubric should not be trivialized since it is important for us to have a clearly stated objective even if the objective cannot be perfectly defined. Similarly, we should not trivialize the pursuit of creating a criteria which distinguishes good and bad outcomes of decisions and ultimately distinguishes good and bad decisions which we could make in our life. Even if such criteria is never perfectly precise, it is more useful to us than just naked intuition.

Without a truth value, there needs to be some other kind of value and I've yet to see an appeal for that. Since there is no need to evaluate the quality of other peoples' lives and I have yet to see any benefit for people who choose to evaluate the quality of others' lives in this way, I don't see the point of the whole thing.
11h — Judaka

I have personally seen the value for such evaluation in my own life and in the lives of others. For example, I had decided to reduce my alcohol consumption after making a pros and cons list for drinking alcohol. This list could be thought of as an evaluation of 2 possible lives that I could live: the 1st life is the life I live if I decide to continue drinking while the 2nd life is under the circumstances of my reduced alcohol consumption. While I cannot be certain that I would benefit from a reduced alcohol consumption, making this list reminded me of various disadvantages of alcohol that I had never thought about prior to making the list such as the suffering involved in alcohol withdrawal and alcoholism. Prior to making the list I thought the main disadvantage was just if you were a bad behaving drunk(which I’m actually a pretty pleasant drunk). In regards to evaluating the lives of other people, this project may be useful in moral and political philosophy. I have a tendency to ignore moral and political issues in favor of prudential issues which concern benefiting my own life in the long term. Even in those cases, it might be appropriate to evaluate likely outcomes of potential decision options. These decision options might include the decision to have children, marriage, deciding to go to college, and so on.

Fair enough, I agree that coming up with original theories which are actually good is extremely difficult. This is why I’m often hesitant to criticize other people’s theories unless I have heard of a better theory or there is a pretty obvious contradiction. It’s easy to be a critic of other people’s theories but it’s difficult to watch your own theory get criticized. To me, a great philosopher is one that dares to make their own theories and be willing to try demolish the credibility of their own theories to the best of their ability. Only if the theories survive the onslaught in the eyes of the theorist with great intellectual honesty, should this theorist continue to support any of his theories. I have personally abandoned many theories that I have created after realizing that they are flawed. It’s not always easy since you almost feel like those theories are like your children. It’s tempting for a philosopher to hold on to them despite their flaws.