Perhaps you are suggesting that someone in Bob's position could never raise the child well? — ZhouBoTong

I'm suggesting that Bob isn't committed to the welfare of his offspring whom he's using to bribe his parents with in exchange for an inheritance (i.e. ca$h).

I would think we are impeaching the pres because his quid pro quo is illegal ...

No. The president was impeached, in part, because this particular quid pro quo had violated the public trust (i.e. jeopardizing national security in exchange for personal political gain) as stipulated in Article II, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution. Impeachment is a political 'checks and balances' proceeding and not a criminal prosecution; in other words, a constitutional officer (e.g. a president) can be impeached for lawful as well as unlawful conduct.

Is this like advanced physics or something where there is no simplifying?...

Not remotely.

... could a teenager embrace your philosophical views or does it require years of deep knowledge to adopt?

Both.

What about

I conceive of "virtue" as being developed by judgments or conduct which strive to prevent mitigate or relieve as much foreseeable harm (i.e. personal pain/deprivation or social frustration/conflict) as possible. — 180 Proof

is so difficult to grasp?

Apparently we're both negative consequentalists; I take a further step by proposing that the goal of minimizing harm / conflict consists in the skills learned & habits formed by such judging or conduct.

Just as a healthcare provider learns skills & forms habits for diagnosing & providing care by reflectively doing both and thereby improving / developing by repetition over the course of her career, so too, I think, a moral agent improves / develops over the course of her moral life through moral exercise & experience (i.e. reflection). That's the "virtue" part you referred to previously which I reformulate as "agent-based".

In my understanding, a 'moral system' that doesn't - or is not (reflectively) designed to - improve / develop moral agency (i.e. skills & habits - what function do "virtues" serve if not these?) via moral practices (e.g. preventing, mitigating or relieving (increases in) harm) is inadequate (i.e. susceptible to being akratic), merely arbitrary, & undisciplined.

I like the sound of this...but then realized I am not exactly sure what that means (likely my fault ). I would think that one could make moral decisions in a prudential manner? Perhaps you are viewing moral decisions as more dogmatic or as a list of rules/maxims....that doesn't seem quite right. I think I will just wait for your explanation as my guesses are likely to do us both a disservice. — ZhouBoTong

Well, I actually use somewhat unconventional definitions of terms “prudential” and “moral”. Prudentially is the element of decision making that I identify with self-interest while morality is the element of decision making concerned with the interests of others. I consider whether or not I should go to college as a prudential issue since it mostly concerns maximizing well being in my own life. Though, this might not be true in many cases. People who are trying to better support their family might have moral reasons to go to college since their decision now concerns people other than themselves. So, there’s actually a lot of overlap. Another decision that is normally treated as a prudential issue is whether or not one should have children. Most people mostly have selfish considerations when deciding whether or not to have children. This is true for both Pronatalists and Antinatalists. A prudential Antinatalist is kinda like a normal “child free” person who simply doesn’t want to have kids because they think it would be harmful to their own life interests. A moral Antinatalist is someone who thinks having children is bad mostly because it harms the child or other people in the world. I’m actually more interested in the selfish/prudential arguments for having children and against having children rather than the moral/selfless arguments(even though I made a thread on moral Antinatalism this time.). So basically, prudential decision theory is just the more selfish aspects of decision theory while morality is the more selfless aspect. I hope that made sense to you.

Nice. I think it would take me 10 days to even write a script for a 30 minute video. And my neurosis would never allow to make a video without entirely planning every word I was going to say. I will try to check them out, but I am unlikely to vastly improve your "hits" as I generally prefer learning from text...those incredible astronomy shows on the science channel(s) and any of the "Planet Earth" style nature shows are the exception...If you can do philosophy with that sort of production value, I may end up a regular viewer :grin: In any case, it is a worthy endeavor. — ZhouBoTong

I used to try to write a script and was over concerned with making minor mistakes. But, I realized that I’m actually about as good talking off the cuff as I am at writing a good script. I’m not the best writer but I tend to have pretty good improvisational public speaking skills. So, I just improvise my talks while occasionally pausing the recording to think. I don’t think it strongly impacts the quality of my videos but it greatly improves my productivity. I also save time by having my videos only include a slide that I made with the program Paint with the title of the video written on it. So, my videos definitely don’t have much production value. Oftentimes, I think the best way to create quality is with quantity. This is because a large number of videos created with minimum effort are often more likely to have a really interesting video in it than a small number of videos that are over-analyzed and over-produced. I suppose I’m more likely to say something stupid though. I had stopped even reviewing all of my own videos. But, I reviewed a couple and was satisfied with them. I also have a love for astronomy videos btw :smile:

because this particular quid pro quo had violated the public trust — 180 Proof

As someone who is very happy to see this particular president being impeached, I feel like this is a problem. Most of the people who currently support trump (it seems at least 30% of the country) would have said that Obama violated public trust. They don't trust black people so...? Libertarian types would have impeached FDR as they didn't trust his expansion of the size of government?

Violating public trust seems far too subjective.

Impeachment is a political 'checks and balances' proceeding and not a criminal prosecution; in other words, a constitutional officer (e.g. a president) can be impeached for lawful as well as unlawful conduct. — 180 Proof

I get this. And I know that "high crimes and misdemeanors" does not have to mean actual crimes. However, if we say we are impeaching the president purely for a violation of public trust then the half (or nearly) of the country that does trust the president is going to cry witch hunt. (don't get me wrong, I enjoy watching them writhe, but I worry the next group in power can then use similar justification for egregious actions)

What about

I conceive of "virtue" as being developed by judgments or conduct which strive to prevent mitigate or relieve as much foreseeable harm (i.e. personal pain/deprivation or social frustration/conflict) as possible.
— 180 Proof

is so difficult to grasp? — 180 Proof

I think I get that part, but that does not seem to be the entirety of your philosophy. Don't worry too much, I have had troubles in the past due to taking things over literally (I am not saying that is my problem here, but it could be a related problem of mine), for example, I absolutely refuse to believe that I can "imagine myself in someone else's shoes". I get the general sentiment of the statement, but in any philosophical discussion I would say that I have no clue what that means because it is impossible.

Apparently we're both negative consequentalists; I take a further step by proposing that the goal of minimizing harm / conflict consists in the skills learned & habits formed by such judging or conduct.

Just as a healthcare provider learns skills & forms habits for diagnosing & providing care by reflectively doing both and thereby improving / developing by repetition over the course of her career, so too, I think, a moral agent improves / develops over the course of her moral life through moral exercise & experience (i.e. reflection). That's the "virtue" part you referred to previously which I reformulate as "agent-based".

In my understanding, a 'moral system' that doesn't - or is not (reflectively) designed to - improve / develop moral agency (i.e. skills & habits - what function do "virtues" serve if not these?) via moral practices (e.g. preventing, mitigating or relieving (increases in) harm) is inadequate (i.e. susceptible to being akratic), merely arbitrary, & undisciplined. — 180 Proof

Thank you for taking the time to do this. It does help me understand. Now I think our big difference is your faith in all of mankind to reach your level of moral reasoning. Despite my idiocy on display in this thread, I am confident (based on past experience) that I will score in the top 10% of the population on any general knowledge test (yes, as part of the dominant culture - raised as upper middle class white male - I will be a bit "privileged" with the cultural knowledge portions...but that still places my brain as capable of absorbing more information than most). I would also point out that we (everyone on sites like this) are very interested in morals and moralizing. Many people want to be "good" people, but are bored and annoyed by detailed discussions of why anything is "good".

Prudentially is the element of decision making that I identify with self-interest while morality is the element of decision making concerned with the interests of others. — TheHedoMinimalist

Ok, that makes a lot more sense than some of my guesses :smile:

I think you are onto something in that I think most of the world is more interested in making good decisions for their personal lives. This could bode well for the youtube material. Unfortunately for me, people's personal lives are very uninteresting to me; but I do find most people to be the exact opposite (social media is a testament to this), so I think you will find plenty of interest.

Most people mostly have selfish considerations when deciding whether or not to have children. This is true for both Pronatalists and Antinatalists. — TheHedoMinimalist

Entirely agreed, although Pro-natalist will often not even be aware that there is a choice to be made and anyone who actually calls them self an anti-natalist at least believes they are doing it for societal reasons...I am not exactly sure how this matters, but felt the need to say it anyway:grimace:

A prudential Antinatalist is kinda like a normal “child free” person who simply doesn’t want to have kids because they think it would be harmful to their own life interests. — TheHedoMinimalist

Well that's me, so I fit nicely into one of your categories at least :grin:

A moral Antinatalist is someone who thinks having children is bad mostly because it harms the child or other people in the world. — TheHedoMinimalist

I think most people that actually call themselves an anti-natalist would be in this category.

I’m actually more interested in the selfish/prudential arguments for having children and against having children rather than the moral/selfless arguments(even though I made a thread on moral Antinatalism this time.). — TheHedoMinimalist

I will give you my reason(s) just because I think it will highlight why I am uninterested in the purely personal side of things:

Without children, life is easy and pleasant. I know all sorts of things that I enjoy doing and without kids, I can choose to do any of them, any time I want. I also have social inadequacies, so I struggle to treat humans differently based on who they are. A 7 year gets talked to just like a 47 year old. From that perspective, kids suck. They are dumb and have nothing interesting to say. Finally, IF I did have kids it would be all about molding them into some incredible figure...which seems borderline immoral. Worse than that, when the kid hits age twelve and says "screw you dad, I don't want your life", I can only agree that it is free to live its life any way it sees fit...but I am bored. I love you, I will support you, but leave me alone I am watching TV.

Notice there is basically zero morality in the decision, and very few factors to analyze. I don't want kids BECAUSE I don't want kids (I think deciding whether or not to go to college actually is more complicated). There is an acknowledge that once I have them, I am morally obligated to treat them well...but I can just choose to not have them.

So basically, prudential decision theory is just the more selfish aspects of decision theory while morality is the more selfless aspect. I hope that made sense to you. — TheHedoMinimalist

Yes, after that paragraph I feel like I get it perfectly :up: Examples and everything :grin: Definitely let me know if my responses suggest I am not getting it, haha.

I used to try to write a script and was over concerned with making minor mistakes. But, I realized that I’m actually about as good talking off the cuff as I am at writing a good script. I’m not the best writer but I tend to have pretty good improvisational public speaking skills. So, I just improvise my talks while occasionally pausing the recording to think. I don’t think it strongly impacts the quality of my videos but it greatly improves my productivity. I also save time by having my videos only include a slide that I made with the program Paint with the title of the video written on it. So, my videos definitely don’t have much production value. Oftentimes, I think the best way to create quality is with quantity. This is because a large number of videos created with minimum effort are often more likely to have a really interesting video in it than a small number of videos that are over-analyzed and over-produced. I suppose I’m more likely to say something stupid though. I had stopped even reviewing all of my own videos. But, I reviewed a couple and was satisfied with them. I also have a love for astronomy videos btw :smile: — TheHedoMinimalist

Sounds good to me. And I get what you are saying about creating quality through quantity. After you have been doing the channel for years, you can go through your masses of content and hone it down into what you think is best. Just writing is often a good way to get ideas out that can then be fine tuned (so just recording a video should work similarly :smile:). Additionally, the parts that you think are most beneficial may be different from what a certain viewer finds beneficial, so just putting a lot of content out can have benefits.

Fair enough, we can say that showing respect for other’s behavior is important. But, in the case of Bob, the consequence of his actions is REALLY good. — TheHedoMinimalist

I don't doubt that, but I don't think the rightness of an act is a always a function of the goodness of its consequences. Sometimes it is, sometimes it is not. Sometimes respect has to compete with outcomes, but sometimes respect prevents outcomes from mattering at all - it all depends on the context.

For instance, let's say we could make everyone happy forever after if we subject one person - Tom - to a life of endless torture. Should we do that? Is there some number of happy people that would justify it? 1million? 1 billion? 1 trillion?

No, the numbers don't matter. It'd be wrong to subject Tom to that life to give 10 others a life of pure happiness, and just as wrong to do so if it gave 10,0000 people a life of pure happiness.

Applying this to procreation: let's say that if Maddy has a child then the child will have a life of endless suffering because it will have a ghastly disease, however the disease in question is one that will - without causing the symptoms it causes in Maddy - sterilize all the rest of humanity, thus stopping the wrong of procreation from occurring in the future. Should Maddy have that child? I think not. That case seems relevantly analogous to the Tom case above. I agree that it would be good - extremely good - for 10,000 people to have lives of unalloyed happiness, but it is nevertheless wrong to subject Tom to a life of suffering in order to secure it; likewise I agree that it would be good - extremely good - if all humans ceased to procreate, but I think it would be wrong to subject one person to a life of suffering to secure it.

The case you describe is not quite like the above, but it seems relevantly similar.

So sometimes the numbers don't matter. Sometimes they do. Sometimes they don't. I don't think we can formulate a rule that will tell us when they do - and by how much - and when they don't. We have to trust our reason.

I don't think we can formulate a rule that will tell us when they do - and by how much - and when they don't. We have to trust our reason. — Bartricks

I don't think "reason" is the right word here. I think "intuition" is better. Reason makes it sound like there is a correct answer (and you're saying there isn't)

I disagree, for either 'intuition' is synonymous with 'deliverance of our reason', or it means something else. If it means something else, how would it have any probative force?

Reason makes it sound like there is a correct answer. — khaled

There is a correct answer. How could there not be?

There is a correct answer — Bartricks

So sometimes the numbers don't matter. Sometimes they do. Sometimes they don't. I don't think we can formulate a rule that will tell us when they do — Bartricks

These statements seem to contradict

They don't seem to me to contradict. "Sometimes the numbers matter; sometimes the numbers do not matter" are consistent statements.

These contradict: the numbers always matter. The numbers never matter.
These contradict: the numbers always matter. Sometimes the numbers do not matter.
But these don't: the numbers sometimes matter; the numbers sometimes do not matter.

what seems to contradict is:

There is a correct answer — Bartricks

I don't think we can formulate a rule that will tell us when they do - and by how much — Bartricks

How? They're different claims. In saying that there is a correct answer I am doing no more than expressing my belief that moral claims are truth apt. In expressing scepticism about whether we can formulate a rule about when such claims will be true and when false, I am simply expressing my belief in holism about morality.

For an analogy: there is a correct answer to the question "what is Bartricks thinking right now". But I do not think we could formulate any rule about it - that is, that on a Thursday at 5pm Bartricks thinks about butter".

For an analogy: there is a correct answer to the question "what is Bartricks thinking right now". But I do not think we could formulate any rule about it - that is, that on a Thursday at 5pm Bartricks thinks about butter". — Bartricks

Ok. But do you think we can formulate some function with respect to time to get what Bartricks is thinking? Example:
F(2019/12/20 1:11 pm) = walruses

In other words, do you think there is some method by which we can say "X is right" depending on some parameters, be it time or anything

I don't rule it out, I'm just sceptical that there is any such rule. I mean, I take it that a 'rule' that ends up just describing what is right or wrong in every particular situation is not, in fact, a rule (it is just a description). A rule needs to apply to a range of cases. I am sceptical that there is any such rule about the distribution of moral properties because I don't think moral truths are fixed across time and space.

I don't rule it out, I'm just sceptical that there is any such rule. — Bartricks

Ok. This to me sounds like "There is no right answer" which is why I was confused. So your position as far as I understand is: There is a right moral answer for situations, but you're not sure if there is some law or function that can give us these answers

Unfortunately for me, people's personal lives are very uninteresting to me — ZhouBoTong

Fair enough, I think the main reason why I got interested in mundane personal decision making is because I always felt that my philosophizing lacked any useful application in my own life. I always felt like being good at philosophy was more similar to being good at trivia than being good at fixing cars. It doesn’t help that I sometimes get mocked by my family for being bad at practical tasks like working on cars, doing basic home repairs, and cooking complicated meals. My family also knows that I’m like a walking encyclopedia of somewhat useless knowledge. This just makes me seem like a time waster who can’t be bothered to study things that might actually help me get a better job , save me money, and improve the quality of my life. Unfortunately, I just don’t enjoy learning practical skills. Even as a musician, I don’t like to hone my guitar and piano playing abilities. Instead, I prefer to hone my songwriting abilities instead and record the instruments in my songs with an app like Garage Band. This allows me to compose music with minimal technical ability. To get back to the topic at hand, I wanted to figure out how to make my philosophizing more like a useful skill than useless knowledge. I figure that I could probably make better decisions in life if I philosophized about them as much as I philosophized about less useful topics. I still enjoy doing more trivial philosophy but I try to have my philosophy be more than just a way to kill time.

I think most people that actually call themselves an anti-natalist would be in this category. — ZhouBoTong

Yep I agree, but it’s not clear to me why this term has adopted an exclusively moralized meaning though.

Without children, life is easy and pleasant. I know all sorts of things that I enjoy doing and without kids, I can choose to do any of them, any time I want. — ZhouBoTong

This is one of the big reasons why I’m not a fan of having children either. My life philosophy strongly revolves around keeping my own life relatively pleasant. Though, I would say that life is pretty difficult and unpleasant even if you don’t have kids. But, it’s even more unpleasant with kids.

I also have social inadequacies, so I struggle to treat humans differently based on who they are. A 7 year gets talked to just like a 47 year old. From that perspective, kids suck. They are dumb and have nothing interesting to say. — ZhouBoTong

Well, I think you probably have pretty good social skills. People with bad social skills are usually unaware of their problems. Lots of people don’t know how to talk to children. I agree that they are not the most interesting people to talk to. I usually play sports or board games with them instead if I’m in a situation where I have nothing better to do.

Finally, IF I did have kids it would be all about molding them into some incredible figure...which seems borderline immoral. Worse than that, when the kid hits age twelve and says "screw you dad, I don't want your life", I can only agree that it is free to live its life any way it sees fit...but I am bored. I love you, I will support you, but leave me alone I am watching TV. — ZhouBoTong

Yeah, that’s bound not to work out well. Kids tend to be resistant to this sort of molding.

Notice there is basically zero morality in the decision, and very few factors to analyze. I don't want kids BECAUSE I don't want kids (I think deciding whether or not to go to college actually is more complicated). There is an acknowledge that once I have them, I am morally obligated to treat them well...but I can just choose to not have them. — ZhouBoTong

I would disagree that there’s only a few factors to analyze. I had already made 3 videos on the prudence of reproduction and I’m planning on making at least 7 more. The first video was about the financial pros and cons of having children. This video mostly points out the costs of having children but also addresses some attempts by the Pro-Natalists that try to minimize the financial costs. This includes the argument that children might pay back some of the cost by supporting you when you get old. It also includes the argument that having children gives you great tax deductions and thus offsets some more of the cost. Finally, I also mention the argument that raising children will prompt you to be more responsible and work harder for their sake and this will have financial benefits. In addition, I point out the possibility that one also might have to raise their grandchildren if their children are unable to. In my second video, I talk about the social aspects of having children. This mainly includes the argument that having children alleviates a great deal loneliness. I argued that the impact on loneliness is only mildly in favor of the Pro-Natalist position for most people. Then, I talked about the social dysphoria which may come with having children and argued that for more introverted people or people who prefer the company of adults the dysphoria might be a serious consideration. Next, I talked about how having children will impact your ability to make adult friends, find a new romantic partner, or maintain a relationship with your current romantic partner. Then, I talked about the peak positive experiences that come with watching the birth of your child and forming precious memories with children. Then, I talked about the possibility of something tragic occurring to your child and how this might cause you to greatly suffer. In my third video, I talked about the pain and discomfort of pregnancy and why I think this is one of the strongest arguments against having children for women. I’m planning to make my fourth video about the argument that one should have children to be remembered after one dies. I will talk about why I’m not convinced that this a good reason for anyone to consider. So, as you can see, there’s definitely a lot of interesting things to analyze regarding this topic. I agree that analyzing the prudence of going to college is even more difficult though.

I would like to start by biting the bullets on the thought experiments that you had introduced to me. I actually think that it would be justified to subject Tom to a life of endless torture if it minimizes the combined suffering of
sentient beings in the long term. In addition, the procreation of Maddy is also justified it seems. So, how should we continue this discussion if I have different intuitions than you do? What reason do I have to consider your intuitions as being more reliable than mine? In addition, what reason do you have to abandon your moral intuitions in favor of mine? I can only try to answer the first and third question, but I would ask you to try to answer the second question for me. To answer the first question, I think we should continue this discussion by trying to give deeper reasons and better explanations for our intuitions. My intuitions revolves around the notion that every possible normative aim has some probability of being a good normative aim, and some probability of being a neutral or bad normative aim. The task is to make a hypothesis on which normative aims are more likely to be good to focus on. I believe that normative aims with superior comeasurability are more likely to be non-trivial aims to pursue. That is to say, normative aims which seem to have more non-arbitrary ways of figuring out how to formulate a basic hierarchy of outcomes in relation to the normative aim in question have better explanatory power and thus have a superiority as a theory. To give a concrete example, consider the normative aim of “minimizing suffering in the lives of sentient beings”. This is the normative aim which is pursued by Bob above any other normative aim. Does this normative aim have a high degree of comeasurability? To figure this out, we first need to figure out what we are comparing and measuring. In this case, we are measuring suffering. Suffering has some measurable properties like the intensity of the suffering, the frequency of the suffering, and the duration of the suffering. This means that it has some significant amount of comeasurability. Of course, we can never measure suffering precisely like we could with something simple like measuring the amount of water in a cup. But, we can formulate an elementary hierarchy of various actions which cause suffering by intuitively comparing the intensity of the suffering caused and the duration and frequency of the moments of suffering. So, there is some commeasurabilty and thus some non-arbitrary way of determining which actions are better at alleviating suffering and which action are better to avoid because they cause more suffering. On the other hand, let’s turn to the normative aim of “showing respect for others in one’s behavior”. Does this aim have a high degree of comeasurability? We first need to figure out what we are comparing or measuring. Well, it seems that we are comparing and measuring the wrongness of not showing respect for others in one’s behavior in various cases where the principle is violated. So, we would likely postulate that each action which violates the principle of showing respect has an intensity of violation, a duration of the violation, and the frequency of violation. This is the only way we could make valid intuitive judgements to distinguish cases of severe violations of the principle from the more mild violations. But, this is where problems arise for me. Does a case of violation of the principle really have an intensity of violation or a frequency of violation or a duration of violation? It’s certainly not as obvious as in the case of measuring suffering. I know from experience that some moments of suffering in my life are more intense than others. I also know that some moments of suffering last longer and some of my actions led to more frequent moments of suffering. Mental states seem to have measurable properties of this sort. On the other hand, it doesn’t appear that violations of a principle have an intensity that we can observe or a duration or a frequency. But, why do people believe that they have measurable properties then? Well, we usually measure the intensity of a principle violation by the intensity of the offense that we experience from thinking about the violation occurring. The mental state of being offended is comeasurable just like suffering is. This is a problematic comeasurability though. This is because we are not interested in measuring the offensiveness of a principle violation but rather the actual intensity of the violation. I imagine that you would think that Bob has wrongfully violated the principle of respecting others even if he lived in a world where no one would get offended at his principle violation. But, how could you determine the intensity of his principle violation without simply appealing to the intensity of the offensiveness that you experience from reading about Bob? I don’t have an answer to this problem and thus I’m inclined to be skeptical of your view. Without an ability to form even the most basic hierarchy of wrongness of cases in which the violation of the principle occurs, it seems like all claims of wrongness are simply arbitrary and have no normative significance. The explanatory difficulty of your view is just too great for me. Thus, I feel that the normative aim of minimizing suffering in the lives of sentient beings has a greater epistemic certainty of being a good normative aim to pursue. Though, I actually think there are even better normative aims to pursue but I won’t go into that. I apologize for the extreme wordiness and complexity of my comment but I have no simpler way of explaining my intuitions to you.

Now I think our big difference is your faith in all of mankind to reach your level of moral reasoning. — ZhouBoTong

Someone had probably said something like this when e.g. Aristarchus proposed that the earth went around the sun or Eratosthenes, by measuring the earth's circumference, demonstrated it's not flat.

Yes. Moral questions have correct answers (the proposition "This act is morally right" is either true or false) . But I am sceptical that there are any moral rules.

This is what I think about psychological questions as well - there are correct answers to questions about what psychological state someone is in, but I do not think there are any rules about what psychological state person is in, only rough and ready generalizations.

The evidence that morality is like this is that it appears to be. Sometimes consequences matter, sometimes they don't. Sometimes numbers matter, sometimes they don't. That is, sometimes an act is right because it brings about more good than the alternative; but sometimes an act is right regardless of whether it brings about more good than the alternative. It all depends on the situation.

I would like to start by biting the bullets on the thought experiments that you had introduced to me. I actually think that it would be justified to subject Tom to a life of endless torture if it minimizes the combined suffering of — TheHedoMinimalist

That's not the example I gave. Preventing suffering is different to promoting happiness and is typically much more important (which is partly why antinatalism is correct - more important to prevent the pain that a life contains than to promote its pleasures). So it may well be that torturing one person to prevent others from similar torture 'is' justified (though again, it would all depend and we must resist the urge the formulate a cast iron rule and trust our judgement instead).

In my example what we can do is maximise happiness by torturing one person. And now it seems to many that this would not be justified, and it really doesn't matter the number of people whose happiness will be maximised. A thousand, a million, a billion - keep adding noughts, and it makes no difference.

The example shows that sometimes the numbers don't count and so figuring out what's right is not - or not necessarily - a simple matter of summing the good versus the bad outcomes.

I agree, then, that it would be good if people stopped breeding, but my intuitions say that it would be wrong to subject a person to life here even if one knew that by doing so one could prevent others from doing so.

So, how should we continue this discussion if I have different intuitions than you do? — TheHedoMinimalist

Because morality isn't something we make up. It isn't made of your intuitions, or mine. It is something we have intuitions 'about'.

Now, most people do not share your intuitions about the kind of case I described (and note - you changed the example and told me your intuitions about the changed case, not the original). How do I know that? Because it is a common example used in the philosophical literature - it's taken from a book called 'The ones who left Omelas' or something like that - plus I've asked lots of people for their intuitions about such cases and they confirm that it seems to them wrong to subject one to endless torture even if will result in maximising the happiness of others.
Note, even those - such as hard-line utilitarians - who think one ought to torture the one to maximise the happiness of the many - accept that majority intuitions say otherwise (and they seek instead to discredit those specific intuitions).
So, it is beyond a reasonable doubt that most people's intuitions - most people who think soberly about such matters, are capable of understanding, and who are not in the grips of a dogma - deliver the verdict that it would be wrong to torture one to maximise the happiness of the many.

That doesn't mean they're right. But it is very good evidence that they're correct.

So how do you proceed? Well, first, conceding is proceeding. A true philosopher will change their view in light of reasoned argument. Many philosophers thought the 'justified true belief' view about when an agent has knowledge was true until counter-examples were developed that challenged that idea.

But anyway, what you need to do is try and discredit the intuitions I am appealing to. Not all intuitions. That's silly. But the specific intuitions I am appealing to. It is not enough simply to say you don't share them. The majority do share them, and so unless you think your intuitions are special, you need to provide good reason to think their intuitions do not count (as opposed to just appealing to your own).

In my example what we can do is maximise happiness by torturing one person. And now it seems to many that this would not be justified, and it really doesn't matter the number of people whose happiness will be maximised. A thousand, a million, a billion - keep adding noughts, and it makes no difference. — Bartricks

Well, I would still bite the bullet here and say that it would justified to torture Tom.

The example shows that sometimes the numbers don't count and so figuring out what's right is not - or not necessarily - a simple matter of summing the good versus the bad outcomes. — Bartricks

It seems to me that thought experiments about applied ethical issues cannot show that sometimes numbers don’t count. I think you need to have a deeper epistemic foundation that could demonstrate the reason why your intuitions about morality are more plausible than mine or anyone else’s. It seems that you can’t use an unpopular viewpoint in Applied Ethics as an argument against a Normative Ethical Theory. You could only rely on deeper metaphysical and epistemological theories. To use an analogy, a theoretical discipline like Physics could help us understand more about an applied discipline like Engineering. Engineering, on the other hand, cannot help us understand physics any better. So, more theoretical branches of philosophy supersede over the more applied branches. Thus, the applied ethical question of whether or not the torture of Tom is justified cannot be used as evidence against normative ethical theories like consequentialism. We could only use value ontology and value epistemology to argue for theories of normative ethics. So, we must go deeper instead of going more shallow into applied ethics.

So, it is beyond a reasonable doubt that most people's intuitions - most people who think soberly about such matters, are capable of understanding, and who are not in the grips of a dogma - deliver the verdict that it would be wrong to torture one to maximise the happiness of the many.

That doesn't mean they're right. But it is very good evidence that they're correct. — Bartricks

In what way does the popularity of a viewpoint make the viewpoint more plausible? I would like to point out that you also believe in many things that are counterintuitive to most people that you would regard as ”reasonable”. For example, antinatalism is itself counterintuitive to most people. In fact, it is sometimes used in thought experiments to argue against other viewpoints. For example, suppose that Frank and Susie are having a debate about the value ontology of life. They are trying to figure out if life contains more goodness or more badness. Frank makes an argument that life contains more badness than goodness and starts that argument by making an argument for Axiological Hedonism which states that the goodness of life should be defined only as the combined pleasure of life and the badness of life should be defined as the combined suffering. Then, he uses thought experiments relating to the phenomenology of pleasure and suffering to illuminate why he thinks that there is more suffering in life than pleasure. Susie responds to him by agreeing that his phenomenological thought experiments provide evidence that there’s more suffering in life than pleasure and she agrees with his hedonic theory of value but she argues that his viewpoint has a counterintuitive implication. Susie argues that Frank’s view implies that reproduction is usually a bad action and this implies that we either shouldn’t reproduce ourselves or we should prevent the reproduction of others. Susie argues that the vast majority of reasonable people would be unwilling to accept such an implication and thus this is evidence against Frank’s viewpoint. I think we can both agree that the unpopularity of Antinatalism doesn’t provide any evidence against it. On the other hand, Frank’s phenomenological thought experiments could count as evidence. Even if Susie bites the bullet on those thought experiments, Frank could speculate that the reason why she bit the bullet was because she doesn’t observe her experience of pleasure and suffering with enough accuracy. Even if his speculation is wrong, it would merely suggest that he has a reason to think that life is bad but Susie has a reason to think that life is good. Phenomenological disagreements are usually irreconcilable. This is because Frank cannot know anything about how Susie experiences pleasure and suffering. Similarly, Susie cannot know how Frank is experiencing his pleasures and suffering. Of course, it’s also possible to have superior and inferior ability to introspect about one’s own pleasure and suffering in life. Thus, it’s impossible to know who’s right about phenomenological issues and the disagreement cannot be resolved. Nonetheless, it seems that we have more reason to trust our own phenomenological intuitions.

But anyway, what you need to do is try and discredit the intuitions I am appealing to. Not all intuitions. That's silly. But the specific intuitions I am appealing to. It is not enough simply to say you don't share them. The majority do share them, and so unless you think your intuitions are special, you need to provide good reason to think their intuitions do not count (as opposed to just appealing to your own). — Bartricks

Well, I have accepted your challenge of discrediting the intuitions that you are appealing to. You can find my arguments in the top part of my comment. To summarize what I said above, I’m not trying to argue against all intuitions. Rather, I’m trying to argue that the intuitions about applied ethics cannot inform us about normative ethical questions. Rather, we may only use deeper Metaphysical and Epistemic intuitions as arguments for Normative Ethical Theories. Of course, it is possible for 2 people to have different intuitions about the deepest parts of epistemology and metaphysics. In that case, the 2 people would have an irreconcilable disagreement. This means that they should agree to disagree at that point since they both have a reason to doubt each other’s deepest intuitions. Of course, one of them may indeed be right and the other one may indeed be wrong, but intuition is too unreliable to give a definitive answer. We use intuition in philosophy for the same reason we use language in philosophy: there is simply no better alternative. Of course, we should be careful about not ending philosophical discussions prematurely due to a perceived irreconcilable disagreement. If we are talking about the morality of the actions of Bob, then we shouldn’t end this discussion until we reach the core of our Epistemic disagreement. I think we are getting closer to it since this discussion is getting more Epistemic in nature. But, I will have to wait and see if you are willing to bite the bullet on several of the thought experiments that I had given you. The first thought experiment is the case of Frank and Susie. Do you think that the unpopularity of antinatalism could be used as an argument against Frank’s view that life contains more badness than goodness? In addition, do you think that an applied discipline like Engineering could tell us something about a more theoretical discipline like Physics? Unless you are willing to say yes to both questions, it seems that you would have reason to abandon your intuition that thought experiments that relate to applied ethics can be used as evidence against normative ethical questions. If you are willing to say yes to both questions, then I will attempt to go even deeper with my intuitions but it might be an irreconcilable disagreement at that point unless you could make me concede. If you would like me to concede that thought experiments that relate to applied ethics can be used as evidence against normative ethical questions, then you should provide me with some more thought experiments that can better explain why you hold such an intuition.

I think you need to have a deeper epistemic foundation that could demonstrate the reason why your intuitions about morality are more plausible than mine or anyone else’s — TheHedoMinimalist

you keep attacking a straw man. Where on earth - where - did I say, or imply, that my intuitions are more plausible than anyone else's? That's clearly not - not - my view. I described my view. I explained how the intuitions are widely shared. That's why they count. Not because they occur in my mind. But because they occur in my mind and are widely shared by others who reflect on the same cases. It's you - you - who seems to think that if you don't share the intuitions then that's sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about their probative force.

There's a difference between trying to figure out what's true, and trying to figure out what your own opinions are. Now, what's actually true - that it is morally right to torture one person if that's the only way to maximise the happiness the others, or that it is wrong to do so?

Well, if the bulk of people who reflect on this kind of case in a disinterested way get the rational intuition that it is wrong, then that's extremely good evidence that it is wrong. If you get the intuition that it is right, then that's good evidence your faculty of intuition isn't 100% reliable (which is surely something you knew already because none of our faculties of intuition are 100% reliable).

This is the standard way of proceeding in matters ethical. What's your alternative? Arbitrarily alight on a principle that sounds good and then just apply it to cases?

Rather, I’m trying to argue that the intuitions about applied ethics cannot inform us about normative ethical questions. — TheHedoMinimalist

But where is your argument? It sounds like an article of faith. When it comes to any normative ethical theory, its credibility depends on how well it accords with our rational intuitions. Of course, some of those intuitions may be ones we have reason to be sceptical about. But then the credibility of a normative ethical theory will depend on how well it accords with those rational intuitions that we have no reason to be sceptical about.

I think we are getting closer to it since this discussion is getting more Epistemic in nature. — TheHedoMinimalist

I do not know what you mean by this. Again, our main source of insight into an act's morality are our rational intuitions. Some things seem, virtually to everyone, to be wrong. That's our evidence they're wrong. What other evidence could there be? You don't need to have read any Kant to know that rape is wrong and that it is wrong in no small part due to the fact the other person has not consented to what's being done to them. You don't need to be acquainted with utilitarianism to know that it is generally good to maximise happiness, and generally bad to promote pain.

Do you think that the unpopularity of antinatalism could be used as an argument against Frank’s view that life contains more badness than goodness? — TheHedoMinimalist

I would need to hear the argument. What's the argument? "Unpopular" doesn't mean "wrong", or even "appears wrong". So I am not clear what you're arguing.

Note too, antinatalism is not the view that life contains more bad than good. Some antinatalists may believe that. But it is not essential to the view and so you're attacking a straw man if you equate the two. For the record: I think life (in the main, anyway) contains more good than bad. But I still think it is wrong to breed.

I would like to point out that you also believe in many things that are counterintuitive to most people that you would regard as ”reasonable” — TheHedoMinimalist

Not many things and not most people. I believe in free will. So do most people. I believe in the soul. So do most people. I believe in a god. So do most people. I believe in morality. So do most people. I admit, I also believe that it is wrong to procreate, whereas most people - if they think anything about its morality at all - believe it is permissible to procreate.

For example, antinatalism is itself counterintuitive to most people. In fact, it is sometimes used in thought experiments to argue against other viewpoints. — TheHedoMinimalist

Yes, I agree. That is, I agree that the intuitions of most people probably represent procreation to be morally okay. Now, I don't think those particular intuitions count for very much. But I accept that it is reasonable to appeal to them and I accept that I have the burden of proof on this issue, precisely becusae procreation appears morally okay to most people.

Frank makes an argument that life contains more badness than goodness and starts that argument by making an argument for Axiological Hedonism which states that the goodness of life should be defined only as the combined pleasure of life and the badness of life should be defined as the combined suffering. — TheHedoMinimalist

Frank's case will not be a very powerful one. Hedonism isn't very plausible.

But again, I stress, antinatalism is the view that procreation is prima facie wrong. It is not the view that life contains more bad than evil.

I think we can both agree that the unpopularity of Antinatalism doesn’t provide any evidence against it. — TheHedoMinimalist

Yes. Although you seem to be equating 'unpopular' with 'counterintuitive'. Antinatalism is counterintuitive. And that - that, not its unpopularity - is prima facie evidence against it.

I should emphasise a few things. I am an antinatalist. But I am not a hedonist and I do not believe that life contains more bad than good. On the contrary, I think that - on the whole - it contains more good than bad.

I am an antinatalist on the basis of numerous pieces of evidence, not one. And although I accept that most people have rational intuitions that conflict with my antinatalist conclusion, I think those intuitions can be discredited.

But where is your argument? — Bartricks

Right here:

My argument revolves around the notion that every possible normative aim has some probability of being a good normative aim, and some probability of being a neutral or bad normative aim. The task is to make a hypothesis on which normative aims are more likely to be good to focus on. I believe that normative aims with superior comeasurability are more likely to be non-trivial aims to pursue. That is to say, normative aims which seem to have more non-arbitrary ways of figuring out how to formulate a basic hierarchy of outcomes in relation to the normative aim in question have better explanatory power and thus have a superiority as a theory. To give a concrete example, consider the normative aim of “minimizing suffering in the lives of sentient beings”. This is the normative aim which is pursued by Bob above any other normative aim. Does this normative aim have a high degree of comeasurability? To figure this out, we first need to figure out what we are comparing and measuring. In this case, we are measuring suffering. Suffering has some measurable properties like the intensity of the suffering, the frequency of the suffering, and the duration of the suffering. This means that it has some significant amount of comeasurability. Of course, we can never measure suffering precisely like we could with something simple like measuring the amount of water in a cup. But, we can formulate an elementary hierarchy of various actions which cause suffering by intuitively comparing the intensity of the suffering caused and the duration and frequency of the moments of suffering. So, there is some commeasurabilty and thus some non-arbitrary way of determining which actions are better at alleviating suffering and which action are better to avoid because they cause more suffering. On the other hand, let’s turn to the normative aim of “showing respect for others in one’s behavior”. Does this aim have a high degree of comeasurability? We first need to figure out what we are comparing or measuring. Well, it seems that we are comparing and measuring the wrongness of not showing respect for others in one’s behavior in various cases where the principle is violated. So, we would likely postulate that each action which violates the principle of showing respect has an intensity of violation, a duration of the violation, and the frequency of violation. This is the only way we could make valid intuitive judgements to distinguish cases of severe violations of the principle from the more mild violations. But, this is where problems arise for me. Does a case of violation of the principle really have an intensity of violation or a frequency of violation or a duration of violation? It’s certainly not as obvious as in the case of measuring suffering. I know from experience that some moments of suffering in my life are more intense than others. I also know that some moments of suffering last longer and some of my actions led to more frequent moments of suffering. Mental states seem to have measurable properties of this sort. On the other hand, it doesn’t appear that violations of a principle have an intensity that we can observe or a duration or a frequency. But, why do people believe that they have measurable properties then? Well, we usually measure the intensity of a principle violation by the intensity of the offense that we experience from thinking about the violation occurring. The mental state of being offended is comeasurable just like suffering is. This is a problematic comeasurability though. This is because we are not interested in measuring the offensiveness of a principle violation but rather the actual intensity of the violation. I imagine that you would think that Bob has wrongfully violated the principle of respecting others even if he lived in a world where no one would get offended at his principle violation. But, how could you determine the intensity of his principle violation without simply appealing to the intensity of the offensiveness that you experience from reading about Bob? I don’t have an answer to this problem and thus I’m inclined to be skeptical of your view. Without an ability to form even the most basic hierarchy of wrongness of cases in which the violation of the principle occurs, it seems like all claims of wrongness are simply arbitrary and have no normative significance. The explanatory difficulty of your view is just too great for me. Thus, I feel that the normative aim of minimizing suffering in the lives of sentient beings has a greater epistemic certainty of being a good normative aim to pursue. Though, I actually think there are even better normative aims to pursue but I won’t go into that. I apologize for the extreme wordiness and complexity of my comment but I have no simpler way of explaining my intuitions to you. — TheHedoMinimalist

You never responded to this part of my comment earlier so I assumed that you had difficulty understanding it. Feel free to ask me questions about this argument.

Yes, I agree. That is, I agree that the intuitions of most people probably represent procreation to be morally okay. Now, I don't think those particular intuitions count for very much. But I accept that it is reasonable to appeal to them and I accept that I have the burden of proof on this issue, precisely becusae procreation appears morally okay to most people. — Bartricks

Ok, I will accept the burden of proof if you like in the cases of Tom and Maddy. Did I not fulfill that burden in the argument above? Does my above argument not deserve a refutation? If I did not fulfill my burden of proof requirement, then what would I need to do to fulfill that requirement?

I would need to hear the argument. What's the argument? — Bartricks

I was talking about the argument that Susie made here:

Susie argues that the vast majority of reasonable people would be unwilling to accept such an implication and thus this is evidence against Frank’s viewpoint. — TheHedoMinimalist

I explained how the intuitions are widely shared. That's why they count. Not because they occur in my mind. But because they occur in my mind and are widely shared by others who reflect on the same cases. — Bartricks

I would like to point out that the intuitions that are commonly shared differ across different periods of time. In the past, people widely shared the intuition that homosexual sex was wrong. Today, much fewer people share that intuition. If you lived in the past, would it be your burden of proof to show that homosexual sex is not wrong? I would also like to point out that in the future, it is possible that most people will believe that it is justified to procreate Maddy or torture Tom. So, why should we assume that the intuitions of Homo sapiens living in the 21st century are more reliable than the intuitions of Homo sapiens living in the past or the possible intuitions of future Homo sapiens or the possible intuitions of intelligent aliens that are capable of moral reasoning?

Yes. Although you seem to be equating 'unpopular' with 'counterintuitive'. Antinatalism is counterintuitive. — Bartricks

What is the difference between unpopular and counterintuitive regarding cases of applied ethics?

I am an antinatalist on the basis of numerous pieces of evidence, not one. And although I accept that most people have rational intuitions that conflict with my antinatalist conclusion, I think those intuitions can be discredited. — Bartricks

How do you go about discrediting their intuitions then?

Note too, antinatalism is not the view that life contains more bad than good. Some antinatalists may believe that. But it is not essential to the view and so you're attacking a straw man if you equate the two. — Bartricks

I wasn’t trying to equate the two. I’m perfectly aware that there are other types of antinatalists out there. The view that life contains more bad than good was used in a context of my thought experiment with Frank and Susie. The 2 fictional people were debating whether or not life contains more bad than good. Susie argues that life must contain more good than bad because it’s too counterintuitive to think that having children is wrong. I then argued that this isn’t a very good argument.

Yes. Moral questions have correct answers (the proposition "This act is morally right" is either true or false) . But I am sceptical that there are any moral rules.

This is what I think about psychological questions as well - there are correct answers to questions about what psychological state someone is in, but I do not think there are any rules about what psychological state person is in, only rough and ready generalizations.

The evidence that morality is like this is that it appears to be. Sometimes consequences matter, sometimes they don't. Sometimes numbers matter, sometimes they don't. That is, sometimes an act is right because it brings about more good than the alternative; but sometimes an act is right regardless of whether it brings about more good than the alternative. It all depends on the situation. — Bartricks

Ok. I'm just curious what basis you would have to disagree with someone on a moral question then. If there are no hard rules, only rough and ready generlizations then how can you tell someone "Murder is wrong" if they just disagree. What basis do you have to have an arugment upon

☆HAPPY WINTER SOLSTICE & REASON'S GREETINGS☆

:death: :flower:

I’m actually more interested in prudential decision making than moral decision making. — TheHedoMinimalist

I agree with Aristotle who suggests (fuck if I can cite chapter & verse ... in the Nichomedean Ethics) that 'phronesis absent arete is insufficient for eudaimonia'. In other words, prudence, being a virtue, requires ethics as a method of reflective practice where the end is well being; prudence alone, or primarily, is an instrumental means of expedience - without an end of its own - thereby arbitrarily coopted by or captive to any goal that comes along whether that goal promotes or eviscerates well being. The stuff "end justifies means" & "just following orders" & "what they don't know won't hurt them" & "everybody does it" -type rationalizations are made of.

Well, I actually use somewhat unconventional definitions of terms “prudential” and “moral”. Prudentially is the element of decision making that I identify with self-interest while morality is the element of decision making concerned with the interests of others. — TheHedoMinimalist

So ... amoral egotism. :chin:

In the room, a child is sitting. It could be a boy or a girl. It looks about six, but actually is nearly ten. It is feeble-minded. Perhaps it was born defective, or perhaps it has become imbecile through fear, malnutrition, and neglect ... They all know it is there, all the people of Omelas. Some of them have come to see it, others are content merely to know it is there. They all know that it has to be there. Some of them understand why, and some do not, but they all understand that their happiness, the beauty of their city, the tenderness of their friendships, the health of their children, the wisdom of their scholars, the skill of their makers, even the abundance of their harvest and the kindly weathers of their skies, depend wholly on this child's abominable misery. — Ursula Le Guin, The Ones Who Walk Away From Omelas (1973)

... if the hypothesis were offered of a world in which Messrs Fourier's and Bellamy's and Morris' utopias should all be outdone, and millions kept permanently happy on the one simple condition that a certain lost soul on the far-off edge of things should lead a life of lonely torture. — William James, The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life (1891)

Imagine that you are creating a fabric of human destiny with the object of making men happy in the end, giving them peace and rest at last, but that it was essential and inevitable to torture to death only one tiny creature -- that baby beating its breast with its fist, for instance -- and to found that edifice on its unavenged tears, would you consent to be the architect on those conditions? — Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov (1880)

In the light of the above, reconsider this exchange:

Though, can you make a stronger argument for why the ends do not justify the means for those who are not convinced of this principle?
— TheHedoMinimalist

I don't accept "ends justify means" arguments in ethics. Means and ends must be adjusted to one another so that the latter is not undermined or invalidated by the former while the former is calibrated to enact the latter. A version of reflective equilibrium.

Mathematically speaking, it’s intuitive to suppose that if someone prevents 5 lives from existing and causes only 1 to exist, then they made a better impact on the world than a “passive” antinatalist who simply doesn’t reproduce.
— TheHedoMinimalist

Atrocities are what "mathematically speaking" gets you ... — 180 Proof

Arbitrary (thus, plutocratic/fascistic) scapegoating (re: "lifeboat" ethics / moral "triage" without the warrant of exigent circumstances). :eyes:

I believe that normative aims with superior comeasurability are more likely to be non-trivial aims to pursue. — TheHedoMinimalist

I do not see any reason to think that's true. You're assuming from the get go that morality is 'measurable'. Why make that assumption? Is it a self-evident truth of reason?

When it comes to any normative theory, if it is to be defensible it needs to appeal to our moral intuitions and show how it respects and unifies a large number of them. But then - and here's the rub - there will (for there has always been to date) some that it cannot accommodate. Either at that point you dismiss those intuitions on the grounds that they do not fit with your favourite theory (in which case the theory has taken over from the evidence), or you accept that the theory is false (and to date the majority of moral philosophers have considered every proposed theory false, and false precisely because of a failure to accommodate important and clear moral intuitions).

If one accepts that the theory is false on the basis of moral intuitions, then we didn't need the theory. We can just follow our moral intuitions. Normative theories are, then, at best redundant, and at worst positively misleading (for there will always be some - often many - who are seduced by the theory and the desire for neatness and so start following it, rather than the evidence).

So, again, why not just follow the intuitions? Why decide in advance that morality is neat, predicable, and amendable to codification? Those assumptions seem explicable in terms of human psychology, but they do not seem to be ones for which any good evidence can be provided.

If I did not fulfill my burden of proof requirement, then what would I need to do to fulfill that requirement? — TheHedoMinimalist

You need to find a rational basis for dismissing the widely shared intuitions I was appealing to. Consider a ufo sighting. A lot of people report seeing a UFO in the sky. Well, it would be dogmatic to insist that their visual faculties are malfunctioning on the grounds that 'there are not any UFOs'. But what if one found out that due to some error at the waterworks everyone in that area had just ingested drugged water, likely to induce hallucinations and to make people extremely suggestible? Well, now we have good reason to doubt the reliability of those visual reports, because although there are lots of them we have a better explanation of why they occurred.

Not all moral intuitions are created equal, and so when encountering some that seem incompatible with one's theory then what one needs to do is provide independent reason for being sceptical about their probative force.

Now my own view - that it is prima facie wrong to procreate - is one that I accept is counterintuitive. Most people, I think, have the rational intuition that there is nothing wrong with procreation, at least in regular cases. However, I think a good case exists for thinking those intuitions are of doubtful credibility. I accept that I 'owe' such a case, but I think there is one.

I would like to point out that the intuitions that are commonly shared differ across different periods of time. In the past, people widely shared the intuition that homosexual sex was wrong. Today, much fewer people share that intuition. If you lived in the past, would it be your burden of proof to show that homosexual sex is not wrong? — TheHedoMinimalist

Yes, moral intuitions have varied across different periods of time. That's the basis upon which I believe morality has varied over time. If 'acting in manner X' seemed wrong to most people in 1800, but seems right to most people now, then that's good evidence that it was wrong in 1800, but right today.

Obviously in many cases the intuitions that vary are ones whose probative force is doubtful. For instance, I would not argue that homosexuality was wrong in the 1950s but morally fine today. This is because I think the anti-homosexuality intuitions are ones we have independent reason to be sceptical about (the same kind of independent reason as casts doubt on the probative force of people's intuitions about procreation). So, I think that - most likely - homosexuality has always been fine, and intuitions to the contrary are of doubtful probative force.

The larger point, however, is that we should follow evidence, not theories. The idea that morality is fixed across time is a theory. The evidence indicates that it varies across time.

What is the difference between unpopular and counterintuitive regarding cases of applied ethics? — TheHedoMinimalist

An intuition is a mental representation. But for something to be unpopular is simply for people to be adopting a negative attitude towards it. My dislike for torture is not evidence torture is wrong. My intuition that torture is wrong is evidence it is wrong.

Our intuitions can be influenced by our feelings and vice versa. But they're distinct kinds of mental state.

How do you go about discrediting their intuitions then? — TheHedoMinimalist

I appeal to their adaptive value. Humans who have the moral intuition that procreation is morally okay will most likely procreate. That, I think, is the best explanation of why most humans have the moral intuition that procreation is morally okay.

Yes, moral intuitions have varied across different periods of time. That's the basis upon which I believe morality has varied over time. If 'acting in manner X' seemed wrong to most people in 1800, but seems right to most people now, then that's good evidence that it was wrong in 1800, but right today. — Bartricks

This seems to pose a contradiction to your argument though. This is because the view that something like slavery was permissible in 1800 but not permissible today is highly counterintuitive to the vast majority of people living in the 21st century. Most people living today have a moral intuition that people living in the past were morally misguided. Thus, according to your past comments, this is strong evidence that it is not the case that something could be permissible in 1800 and not permissible today. It is either the case that the moral intuitions of modern people that “the morality of the past was misguided” is wrong or the intuition that people living in the 1800s had that “slavery was permissible” is wrong. It can’t be both since that would be a contradiction. So, which one of the intuitions is wrong?

I appeal to their adaptive value. Humans who have the moral intuition that procreation is morally okay will most likely procreate. That, I think, is the best explanation of why most humans have the moral intuition that procreation is morally okay. — Bartricks

I would like to point out that a similar type of explanation could be given for the view that the torture of Tom is unjustified. In some countries like China, Colombia, and North Korea, most people would likely think that the torture of Tom is justified. This is because in those countries, the concept of human rights is much less respected by people. I could then say that the best explanation for why westerners report that they think the torture of Tom is unjustified is because they had been indoctrinated by the individualistic culture of the western world into believing in human rights. Thus, we have reason to doubt those intuitions. If you think that my argument here against the intuitions of people who are against the torture of Tom is weaker than your argument against the intuitions of most people regarding procreation, then what exactly makes my argument weaker?

An intuition is a mental representation. But for something to be unpopular is simply for people to be adopting a negative attitude towards it. — Bartricks

I’m still not understanding the distinction. It seems that negative attitudes are also mental representations.

I do not see any reason to think that's true. You're assuming from the get go that morality is 'measurable'. Why make that assumption? Is it a self-evident truth of reason? — Bartricks

I think you are misunderstanding my argument. I’m saying that all moral theories must make evaluative judgements. This is also true of deontological and other non-consequentialist theories. For example, A non-consequentialist philosopher like yourself likely does not believe that all wrong actions are equally wrong. This means that there must be a non-arbitrary way for you to say that some actions are more wrong than others. Comeasurability is defined by me as a non-arbitrary way to distinguish between moral actions, rules, virtues, or outcomes. I argued that you do not have a non-arbitrary way of saying that the wrongness of torturing Tom is more wrong than the wrongness of something like lying to your boss about being sick to avoid work. This is because there is no way to measure or compare the wrongness of different actions in relation to one another. You seem to think that there is though. You seem to think that the extent of wrongness of an action could be reasonably hypothesized by a weird mixture of people’s combined intuitions and a possible dismissal of some intuitions if they gave our ancestors an advantage in replicating their DNA in the past. I explained in my comments above why I am not convinced of this hypothesis.

When it comes to any normative theory, if it is to be defensible it needs to appeal to our moral intuitions and show how it respects and unifies a large number of them. But then - and here's the rub - there will (for there has always been to date) some that it cannot accommodate. Either at that point you dismiss those intuitions on the grounds that they do not fit with your favourite theory (in which case the theory has taken over from the evidence), or you accept that the theory is false (and to date the majority of moral philosophers have considered every proposed theory false, and false precisely because of a failure to accommodate important and clear moral intuitions). — Bartricks

Why should we consider conflicts with intuitions about issues in applied ethics as evidence that a normative moral theory is wrong instead of using intuitions about value theory as evidence? I consider intuitions about cases in value theory to be a more reliable evidence than intuitions about cases in applied ethics. Value theory is the study of the basic nature of goodness, badness, betterness, and worseness. Before we could figure out an answer to a complicated question like whether or not it is better to torture Tom or not, we must first be able to answer simple questions about value like the question of what makes something better than another thing. I argued that this requires a well defined notion of extent which implies the presence of a quasi-mathematical comeasurability between 2 things which are being put into a relation of betterness and worseness to each other. So, I’m using a bottom up approach to moral philosophy where basic intuitions about value supersede and determine answer to specific moral questions and any intuition held about a specific moral question prior to reflection on intuitions about basic values should be dismissed. You seem to be using a top down approach though. So, I’m curious why you think your approach to moral philosophy is better than mine. I think my approach is better because I think there needs to be a deeper explanation for why the torture of Tom is wrong. On the other hand, there doesn’t need to be a deeper explanation for why evaluation is quasi-mathematical. It’s just a basic observation about our understanding of the concept of evaluation.

If one accepts that the theory is false on the basis of moral intuitions, then we didn't need the theory. We can just follow our moral intuitions. Normative theories are, then, at best redundant, and at worst positively misleading (for there will always be some - often many - who are seduced by the theory and the desire for neatness and so start following it, rather than the evidence).

So, again, why not just follow the intuitions? Why decide in advance that morality is neat, predicable, and amendable to codification? Those assumptions seem explicable in terms of human psychology, but they do not seem to be ones for which any good evidence can be provided. — Bartricks

Well, I would like to point out that you are also following a normative ethical theory. Your normative ethical theory states that the morality of an action is determined by its ability to respect and unify our intuitions about cases in applied ethics. I don’t recall ever seeing an explanation from you about why we should be trying to unify and respect intuitions about cases in applied ethics instead of intuitions about basic value theory questions.

Ok. I'm just curious what basis you would have to disagree with someone on a moral question then. If there are no hard rules, only rough and ready generlizations then how can you tell someone "Murder is wrong" if they just disagree. What basis do you have to have an arugment upon — khaled

Well the 'controversial' cases are, by their very nature, ones about which we have conflicting moral intuitions. For example, torturing an innocent person for fun is intuited to be wrong by virtually everyone, which is why there is no serious dispute about its morality. But abortions, for example, are cases about which people have no very clear intuitions and thus are cases where people typically appeal to theories rather than intuition. As equally plausible theories deliver conflicting verdicts about such cases, disagreement reigns.

What to do? Well, we can't appeal to intuition, because intuitions are not clear. But we can appeal to imaginary cases (or real cases) that seem sufficiently similar and that elicit from us clearer intuitions. We can then infer from their similarity a conclusion about the controversial case.

This seems to pose a contradiction to your argument though. This is because the view that something like slavery was permissible in 1800 but not permissible today is highly counterintuitive to the vast majority of people living in the 21st century. — TheHedoMinimalist

First, I'd want to say that I think slavery has probably never been morally ok, but as I take the point and do not want emotive issues to get in the way, I will talk about 'activity X' instead (where 'activity X' refers to some activity that was once judged right by virtually everyone - and where we have no special reason to think that everyone's intuitions about that matter were mistaken - and is now judged wrong by virtually everyone, and we have no special reason to think our intuitions are mistaken).

So, by hypothesis, Xing seems wrong to virtually everyone today. Now - given my view (the view that morality can and does change over time) - that is excellent evidence that it is wrong today. Note, then, that I am not dismissing contemporary intuitions about the morality of xing - far from it, I am respecting them.

Note too that our moral intuitions give us insight into the current morality of actions. Just as my eyesight tells me about what's around me 'at the moment' and not last century, likewise our moral intuitions give us insight into what's right and wrong today, not right and wrong last century. To deny this is to beg the question. That is, it is to just assume - as an unargued for datum - that morality is fixed and thus that old intuitions are as good today as contemporary ones.

Most people, of course, are likely to insist that Xing was 'always' wrong. But here, I think, they are simply giving expression to how obviously wrong Xing currently is. Words like 'always' typically function in that way. We say "it is 'never' acceptable to behave in that way" as a way of emphasising our opposition to it. Likewise, when an activity is obviously wrong - and by hypothesis, Xing is obviously wrong - then we can expect most people to express this by saying "it's always wrong". After all, what harm is done by saying this? The bottom line, after all, is doing what's right now, not in the past. So although what they are saying is strictly speaking false, it doesn't particularly matter.

There's another way of bringing this out. Take my view. Many people, upon hearing it, ask me about slavery and homosexuality - examples that you too have used. And they point out to me that, given my view, it would seem I'm committed to having to say that slavery was morally ok in the past, and that homosexuality was morally wrong in the past.

That's false, of course. But even if it were true - I mean, let's imagine I agree and insist that slavery was indeed fine in the past, and that homosexuality was wrong in the past - most are going to think that this implies that I am not that opposed to slavery, and that I am a bit homophobic. That is, if you admit to thinking that morality changes, then people think you are not as opposed to things as if you'd said instead that they were 'always' wrong, or 'always' right.

So, I think slavery is wrong and that homosexuality is fine. I am very confident about both matters. But if I admit to thinking that slavery used to be fine, and homosexuality used to be wrong, most people will not think I am confident about their current moral status. How, then, do I transmit to others my confidence in the wrongness of slavery and the moral benignity of homosexuality? I say "slavery is wrong today and has always been wrong!!" and likewise "homosexuality is morally benign and has always been so!!"

The fact, then, that many people will agree that Xing is 'always' wrong is not good evidence that it is always wrong. It is good evidence that it is currently clearly and distinctly wrong.

So that's what I'd say. But now consider what 'you' have to say - or what someone who thinks morality is fixed has to say, if that's not you.

In the past it was intuitively obvious to virtually everyone that Xing was right. Now it is intuitively obvious to virtually everyone that Xing is wrong. Now, given your view one group is mistaken. Which one? Well, it would be quite arbitrary to just assume the past group was the mistaken one. I mean, why think that?? It is just as likely to be those around today who are mistaken. After all, given this variation across time - variation about something fixed - we know that our moral intuitions are quite unreliable. So, you - it seems to me - are now committed to having to say that it is just as likely that Xing today is wrong as it is that it is right.

Applied to something more emotive, then, such as slavery - if it was true that slavery appearing right to those in the past, but wrong to us today, then you must judge, if you are epistemically responsible, that it is just as likely right as wrong today. You are certainly not justified in being confident that it is wrong. For if morality is fixed, then a) you know from the variability of people's intuitions that intuitions are unreliable and b) you know that about this very issue entire populations got the intuition it was right, populations whose moral intuitions you've no reason to think any less reliable than ours today.

So, you have to be open minded about the morality of slavery under these circumstances. Compare that to me. Because I think morality varies, I am entitled to be confident that slavery is wrong. For it appears to virtually everyone today to be wrong. And although people in the past may have had the intuition it was right, those intuitions are completely irrelevant.

I would like to point out that a similar type of explanation could be given for the view that the torture of Tom is unjustified. In some countries like China, Colombia, and North Korea, most people would likely think that the torture of Tom is justified. — TheHedoMinimalist

Yes, but if that's true then that's good evidence that morality varies across space too. Now I'm sure we can debunk those intuitions. But let's imagine we can't. I stress, I think we can. But let's imagine we can't. That is, let's assume there is no reason whatsoever for thinking their intuitions about the morality torture are any less reliable than ours. That is, let's imagine that most of those in North Korea get the intuition that torture is justified in a far richer variety of circumstances than we in the west do. Okay, if that's true then I think that's evidence that torture isn't as wrong in some places as it is in others.

But what does someone who insists morality is fixed have to say? Well, they could just dismiss the intuitions of the North Koreans. But on what basis? Looks like a prejudice, plain and simple. By hypothesis, there is no more reason to think their intiuitions are unreliable than to think ours are. So, if morality is fixed and you are epistemically responsible you will have to conclude that torture may well be far more justified than we in the west typically think.