However, the labor market doesn’t determine worth in any moral sense—it merely assigns value based on economic factors like demand, supply, and efficiency. — Benkei
But it does if employers act as you state here:
In an ideal ethical framework, all things being equal, an employer should prioritize hiring the individual who is most in need of income. — Benkei
I am sure some do. The problem is then about negative discrimination. I have heard of some people trying to find work but being turned away for being 'over qualified'. There are many psychological factors to consider here as those more capable than their managers will be looked at as a threat to some and so they will do what they can to belittle them in the belief that they are being undermined.
Also, an employer probably wants a stable workforce rather than to hire someone who will work below their paygrade as once the labour market changes and allows the opportunity for those more capable to move on to pastures greener, they will.
As an interesting aside question here; is it 'better' to hire someone over qualified for a job above someone with the perfect level of qualification IF the former has been refused work on the job market for months whilst the latter has only been looking for a week? The 'moral obligation' in any given situation is extremely nuanced, so how much interest should employers be paying when it comes to the personal lives of their potential employees and those already in employment?
So ...
if we acknowledge the importance of need in labor contracts, then it follows that income should not be viewed as an absolute right. If individuals are hired based on their needs, the resultant income is not merely a reward for their labor but also a response to their vulnerability. — Benkei
This seems to be how things pan out overall - with some obvious fluctuations.
To the meat of your point regrading 'income' as an 'absolute right' I am still a little puzzled. I guess this comes down to my views on 'rights' being a construct not an actual 'right' by some universal law of nature.
If you mean something more like people do NOT deserve more than others, then I can only disagree. No one 'derserves' anything in some sense of the word ... this again harks back to essentialist views.
For the hiring and firing of staff people act in accord to their own morals. You cannot enforce 'moral behaviour' because that is a complete contradiction. You can argue for fairer systems that are better refined to protect individuals but they will only be enforced to any reasonable degree if people are willing to take responsibility and/or the overall outcome suits them (see above regarding the benefit of hiring those who NEED the work).
When we center the discussion on worth, need and just production it becomes clear that individuals do not have an unqualified moral right to all of their income. Market outcomes, contractual agreements, and economic success do not inherently reflect moral entitlements. Rather, they are contingent on broader social, ethical, and political contexts. Worth is often arbitrary, need is ignored, and production is more often than not exploitative and unjust.
In light of these factors, a moral right to income cannot be reasonably held. Instead, it is merely a legal right. — Benkei
Of course [for bold text]. The rest I am sceptical about for the reasons outlined previously.
What you also have to consider is Nozick's closing point regarding the liberty of an individual in a minimal state:
The minimal state treats us as inviolate individuals, who may not be used in certain ways by others as means or cools or instruments or resources; it treats us as persons having individual rights with the dignity this constitutes. Treating us with respect by respecting our rights, it allows us, individually or with whom we choose, to choose our life and to realize our ends and our conception of ourselves, insofar as we can, aided by the voluntary cooperation of other individuals possessing the same dignity. How dare any state or group of individuals do more. Or less.
Nozick,Anarchy, State and Utopia, (1999, pp. 333-334)
Note: I have not read the section covering his 'entitlement theory' so will go over that when I have time to look.