↪Philosophim It depends what you mean by 'physical'. Plenty of people happily refer to subjective feelings as non-physical entities (qualia and such).

Then there is the question of what you mean by 'exist'. Numbers do not exist and nor does love (physically), and there is a vast array of abstract concepts that have no physical existence too. — I like sushi

And this is the problem. When I ask you to clearly point out what you mean by something that isn't physical, you instead put the onus on physical. If your idea of 'non-physical' is simply a doubt about the physical, you don't really have an actual testable idea, but a doubt. I'm looking for more than a doubt. Can you try to point to something non-physical that doesn't involve the physical?

Citations, please. — Wayfarer

No, not this time Wayfarer. You and I have discussed this plenty of times in the past, and I have provided citations. My claim is the norm. Feel free to cite me a brain surgeon that believes the brain isn't physical with evidence pointing to a clearly defined non-physical entity.

Your writing is fantastic by the way. This is not sarcasm, your posts are incredibly high quality and I thought you should know that your hard work in prose and communication have paid off. I'm not interested in deep diving too much with you as we've been down this road before. This is more to see if your viewpoints have evolved as well.

Many scientists are methodological physicalists for the purposes of doing their work, while remaining agnostic or noncommittal on the ontological status of consciousness. — Wayfarer

And there are scientists who believe in God. That doesn't change the scientific consensus that God's existence is a scientific consensus. Personal belief and hypothesis are not current fact.

Moreover, many philosophers of mind—including those working closely with cognitive science—do not regard physicalism as an adequate or complete explanation of consciousness. — Wayfarer

Going to stop you right there because you probably forgot. I am not a 'physicalist'. That's stupid. I simply note that rational science and fact allow us to know a reality that is physical. I have yet to see someone able to point out with conclusive proof the existence of something that is non-physical that is not simply a contextual language game. Science does not run on the idea that there is some type of non-physical substance out there that we can measure and create outcomes from. Well...I can think of a few but those never seem to come up in our conversations. Which tells me that your arguments are still simply the very human desire to have our beliefs and imagination reflect in reality.

But what is not explained by appealing to physical substrates is why and how such interaction results in semantic content, intentions, or meaning. — Wayfarer

Because I'm not including those in the example. That requires a few more additions. Lets hook up a human brain and body to that instrument that dictates how and why the air will be shaped. We can include the physical brain which intends to have an outcome by doing what it does. The sound interacts with their ears again, and they respond. Take a person who lacks the ability to hear and put them on the same instrument. They do not play the same. That is because their physical reality is different, thus their responses are as well.

To continue with the analogy: you can describe how a violin works in physical terms—strings, bow pressure, air movement—but that doesn’t explain what makes a musical phrase evocative, expressive, or meaningful. — Wayfarer

Again, because we didn't include the human in the example. What you are doing is introducing a physical human with emotions. We can evaluate their brain patterns when listening to music, their physical expressions, and sample different music for them. We might find for example that this particular human likes the key of C#. We might find they dislike vibratto and enjoy clear sounds. Dislike heavy metal. Humans are far more complex, but we can evaluate them and come to find patterns.

I think the problem Wayfarer is that you think understanding the underlying reason for why things work the way they are undermines emotion or wonder. They exist in parallel, not in conflict. I personally find that understanding how things works often times increases my wonder. Watching a rocket fire into the sky is cool. Understanding the monumental human effort and difficulties that had to be overcome to fire that rocket is also cool. Me understanding how it works doesn't diminish the awe I feel when I see a rocket, it only enhances it.

Semantic content is not a mere epiphenomenon of molecular motion. It’s a distinct order of intelligibility, one that involves interpretation, context, and intention—none of which are physical properties. They're not found in the particles or interactions. — Wayfarer

Really? Can you point to me interpretation, context, and intention that exists somewhere as a non-physical entity? In other words, these things must exist apart from a person. Can you show me where? Of course not. Without the physical human, you can't.

If you don't include the meaning, content, and intentions, then of course they aren't included. If you do, they are.
— Philosophim

This is tautological. — Wayfarer

And completely correct. Meaning I hope you understand why your point doesn't work.

To "include" meaning or intention in your description is not to reduce them to physics, unless you're simply smuggling them in and calling them physical. — Wayfarer

Again this word 'reduce'. You have an issue with thinking this gets rid of emotions. Of course it doesn't. Emotions are digests, compulsions, and energy. Have them. Just don't forget that just because we can talk with intention, beliefs, and emotions, those intentions beliefs and emotions do not override the underlying physical reality that it all exists under. Let me paint a different picture.

Physical reality is the thing you point to that exists.
Non-physical reality is the thing that you would point to if it exists.

Abstractly, the purpose of both is the same, its just we would use a different word for a different category. The problem is that all non-physical categories that are attempted are built upon physical categories that we point to. Its not that I have anything against a non-physical category, it just must not assert that it exists independently of physical categories without clear evidence. Since 'non-physical' is often interpreted as being completely independent from physical reality, its not a good category to use as it lead people into confusion by taking the meaning literally instead of understanding its real underlying purpose and meaning.

That’s what the “explanatory gap” and the “hard problem” are actually pointing to: not a temporary lack of data, but a categorical difference between the vocabulary of physics and the nature of conscious experience. — Wayfarer

Right, I have no objection to a different category of terms or logic where we lack detail. Quantum physics is literally built on the idea that our measuring tools impact the outcome of the experiment. But the term in that context of, 'Observation effect the outcome' doesn't mean that if I simply hoist my eyeballs in that direction that I'm affecting the outcome. Just because we don't have a full understanding of consciousness due to the fact we cannot measure subjective experience, means we throw away all of the objective understanding of the brain and consciousness either.

The question for you really Wayfarer, is are you against a physical context because you think its objectively wrong, or is it because you hope that rejecting it gives you hope that things that you want to be real are like spirits, eternal life, Gods, etc. Because if you reject the latter, I don't see much reason to reject the former.

I was not aware Russell had said that. Thanks :)

Quote from book or essay?

It’s an essay.

On The Notion of Cause

https://users.drew.edu/~jlenz/notion-of-cause/br-notion-of-cause.html

Numbers, Love, Annoyance, Or, Gravity, Yesterday, Next Week, etc.,.

In terms of this thread and Philosophy of Mind items like Desires and Beliefs are framed as Mental not Physical States. If you did not understand this mayeb I should have pointed it out more explicitly in the OP, but this is a philosophy forum and when talking about Mental to Physical causation most people who have reasonably braod understand of philosophy know what I am talking about.

So, that is the best I can give you I reckon? If you are asking if I believe in substance dualism, I do not. That said, I am more or less interested in the arguments surrounding this whole topic as none provide a conclusive answer.

I want to say that causality is not physical because causality is a principle and principles are not physical. — Leontiskos

That makes sense to me - and makes sense of many intuitions. I think properly, though, the word would simply be a description of a physical process (once fully understood). — AmadeusD

Okay good, but perhaps I should clarify that by "principle" I do not merely mean a mental construct. For example, the law of the conservation of energy would be a kind of principle operative within nature.

Regarding processes, I would say that processes are causal even though not every cause is a process. Still I don't see why I would call a process "physical," nor what the difference is between a "physical process" and a "non-physical process."

In general I see no reason to claim that causality is physical. Of course if someone is a physicalist then everything is physical, including causality, and so they must be committed to the idea that causality is physical. But if one is not a physicalist then I don't see any grounds for claiming that causality is physical. For example, in these billiard cases we are talking about the transfer of energy, and I see no good reason to claim that energy or its transfer is a physical phenomenon.

You're right, it doesn't. But they cannot be left out of the discussion — AmadeusD

That's true: distance cannot be left out of the discussion. But explanation and reasoning requires differentiated genera, and the difference between geometric objects and geometric measurements is one example of two differentiated genera that provide us with the power to reason. The way that causality abstracts from objects—physical or otherwise—and is situated in between objects (in their relationality) is another example of the way that two differentiated genera provide us with the power to reason. If energy were a physical object just like the two billiard balls, then we would have a flat sequence: billiard ball1 collides with energy which collides with billiard ball2. Homogenous genera such as this are incapable of producing understanding or intelligibility. The whole reason energy functions as a principle is because it is different from the billiard balls, and more precisely because it is not itself an intermediating efficient cause (the sort of which physicality is bound up with).

One reason we know this is because distance is infinitely divisible whereas physical objects are not infinitely divisible. — Leontiskos

That seems superficial: distance exists as a relation. The space which the distance describes is physical and reduces quite well into the standard theory. The distance is a ratio of sorts between the the position of the points and the next-considered points. The space which creates that ratio is fully real, in a physical sense. There is no distance without a physical medium. I do not htink it right to consider "distance" as some kind of property in and of itself. "the space between" is probably better. — AmadeusD

Even on that conception, "space" is metaphorical not physical, and also does not belong to the genus to which point/line/curve belong. I am thinking of distance as a measurement, and I explicitly identified it as mathematical. A mathematical distance-measurement is infinitely divisible, and yet physical matter is not infinitely divisible, and therefore a mathematical distance-measurement is not physical. Indeed, if distance were physical then we would have the same problem of one flattened genus.

It is, though. It describes the transfer of particles. — AmadeusD

But according to what source do you claim that the transfer of energy is the transfer of particles? I don't think this is the standard or predominant view.

You may have something with gravity, but (unknown to you, clearly) i've always been skeptical about gravity — AmadeusD

Yes, and gravity is an easier example. Gravity causes planetary movements, and yet it is hard to see how gravity is itself supposed to be physical.

I am saying that the proposition that causation is necessarily physical ought to be a conclusion rather than an assumption — Leontiskos

With this, I definitely agree. I am not entirely convinced against substance dualism, so I need to accept this line. — AmadeusD

Even apart from mental causation, what would be an argument in favor of the thesis that causality is physical? I think it is something like this:

1. Billiard ball1 causes billiard ball2 to move
2. Billiard ball1 and billiard ball2 are both physical
3. Therefore, the causation that occurs between the two billiard balls is itself physical

Also, I would say that the very fact that we can talk about causation without committing ourselves to physicalism (or to a physicalist account of causation) just goes to show that the concept is not inherently physical. — Leontiskos

We can also talk about things in totally incoherent terms elsewhere (if that's hte case, I mean). That we can talk about causation without being committed to physical looks to me more like a lack of knowledge. — AmadeusD

Are you claiming that when someone who is not committed to a physicalist account of causation talks about causation, they are "talking about things in totally incoherent terms"? Because that seems highly implausible. Physicalism has been around for thousands of years, and people have been talking about causation in non-physicalist terms for thousands of years. Indeed, I would say that the majority of talk about causation is in non-physicalist terms.

It at least seems fairly clear that energy is of a different genus than the two billiard balls. — Leontiskos

I am unsure this is reasonable. Sufficiently dense energy is physical matter, no? They are the same stuff on that account. ice/water/steam. — AmadeusD

Those are interesting theories, though certainly not proven. But I wonder if an equivocation on "energy" is occurring here. When we talk about transfer of energy between the two billiard balls, we are generally talking about the energy of the first being imparted to the second, without any material change in the two balls. So if we say that ball1 is energy-bundle1, and ball2 is energy-bundle2, and the imparted motion is energy-bundle3, then we are back to the flat ontological genus where energy is transferred in a purely univocal sense, with no differentiated explanatory genera.

You can do that if you want, but the folks who do it (such as C. S. Peirce) do not generally call the ubiquitous energy "physical" or "material," and thus are not considered physicalists or materialists. That form of ontological flattening is usually called monism, not physicalism. Furthermore, such thinkers concretize "energy" and shift the explanatory or causal burden to other terms, which is why I think this is an equivocation on what we were originally calling "energy" (in the context of the principle of the transfer or conservation of energy).

The energy is not physical; it is potential. — Leontiskos

Again, I don't think this is true. With all of that information (and some more whcih I assume you would allow) a correctly-trained physicist could give you the exact amount of force/distance/heat/noise etc... that car could make. — AmadeusD

Exactly: "that a car could make." It is potential. "Energy, in physics, the capacity for doing work" (Britannica).

What are your thoughts regarding Mental Actions as Causal Actions? — I like sushi

FWIW, one kind of Mental Causation is defined in the science of Cybernetics : "Cybernetics is the study of goal directed systems that receive feedback from their operating environment and use that information to self regulate."

In a guided missile or remote-control drone, the "Goal" or target or purpose originates outside the physical system, in the mind of the goal-setter. That Goal, once established in the system, sets-off a chain of cause & effect which guides the missile to its intended target. Likewise, in almost everything that humans do, a mental action (intention or inclination) is what initiates the subsequent chain of causation. It's a future-imagining Self that regulates the system, not necessarily by internally adapting to feedback, but by pointing beyond in the direction of the target, and by defining (setting values) what counts as on-track. :smile:

We can only experience causation physically — I like sushi

Petitio principii.

So if we are talking about the philosophy of mind we need to keep in mind that physical and mental acts are probably not best clumped together under a singular use of the term 'causal'. — I like sushi

Petitio principii.

I guess I could simply ask what kind of difference (if any) people see between physical and mental causes. If there is a difference then surely when we talk about mental acts causing physical act, or vice versa, then terminological use of 'causal' would necessarily have to shift? — I like sushi

A single word can describe two unidentical things. For example, "apple" can describe the fruit I bought last week and the fruit I bought today. It can also describe a green apple and a red apple. The same is true with "cause." That one cause is not identical to another cause does not mean that they cannot both be causes.

Again:

I don't really understand what you are asking. I'd say both are obviously true, and that 99.9% of all people accept both. To give two examples, the first occurs whenever someone forms a mental plan about the physical world and then executes it.

...

Again, 99.9% of people are going to say that the builder's mental plan of the house causes (in part) the finished house. So I think you have an enormous burden of proof to show that mental causation does not exist and that "causation is a physical term." — Leontiskos

1. The builder's plan is mental
2. The builder's plan is a cause of the house
3. The house is physical
4. Therefore, the mental can cause the physical

Are you in favour of substance dualism then or something? If so you cannot really explain the gap between the mental and physical acts. If not then I would be interested to see where you are coming from in order to understand what I am talking about i snot just about the words people use in day-to-day chit chat, I am talking about the dificulties of the philosophical jargon involved and how the Mental Act is conflated with the Physical act without underlining how these differ and shift (or not) depending on the philosophical approach.

A Substance Dualist would surely have to say there is a problem if we are moving from one substance to a wholly different other kind of substance - given that one of such substances is beyond empirical verification. A strong physical reductionist may state that all is physical and that the Mental Act is a kind of Physical/Material thing so the use of 'causation' is identical and it is just a matter of arbitrary demarcation - which then leads to the problem of how and why such Act are divided?

Do you see what I am getting at now?

Does mental to mental causation present itself to anyone like physical to physical causation does. I would say no. It does not. You can have a desire and think up a plan. Such mental acts have no existence to anyone else, or relevance, if they are not physically acted upon.

Petitio principii. — Leontiskos

All philosophical positions do. In this area the Hard Problem is called that because no one can solve it - and perhaps it cannot be solved and the approach is faulty (but no one can prove that either).

This kind of physicalist reasoning has been subjected to careful critique by philosophers and neuroscientists alike. A notable example is Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience by Max Bennett (a neuroscientist) and P. M. S. Hacker (a philosopher of mind and Wittgenstein scholar - review). They argue that many claims made in the name of neuroscience rest on category errors—particularly the idea that “the brain thinks,” “the brain interprets,” or “the brain understands,” when in fact it is persons who do these things. The brain is a necessary condition, yes—but not the experiencing subject. Treating the brain as a standalone thinking agent or process is not a scientific theory but philosophical confusion. — Wayfarer

Reading your exchange with @Philosophim I was tempted to jump in and mention precisely this book and argument by Bennett and Hacker. But you did.

Hacker's stance in the philosophy of mind is instructive. As it distinguishes what it is that brains do from what it is that persons (who have brains as parts) do, it stresses a sort of Aristotelian duality of form and matter, but not a dualism.

The forms that are intelligibly disclosed when we widen our focus from the material processes that take place in brains to the role that those processes play in enabling normatively structured behavior in the wider context of the life of an animal, or human being, aren't a separate substance. They are indeed the forms that matter (e.g. brains, bodies, ecological niches) takes when it is caught up in normative patterns of self-differentiating living activity. Looking at this activity closely, material causes contribute to explaining how it is enabled. Formal causes (like mental states or principles of physiology or ecology) contribute to explaining why this rather than that higher-level kind of activity (the actualization of a capacity) gets intelligibly exercised in such and such circumstances, and not normally in others, even though both normal and abnormal biological process, and both rational and irrational behaviors, happen consistently with physical laws.

In short, material/physical causation can't fully explain living processes or mental life because this sort of causation fails to disclose any sort of distinction between what should and what shouldn't happen from the standpoint of the organism, or its internal norms/forms of flourishing.

I should clarify that by "principle" I do not merely mean a mental construct. — Leontiskos

I understand. But if the principle reduces to "certain physical descriptions as between objects and processes are invariable" then it does hte same thing as I'm getting at. And, as I see, it can be reduced this way. Onward..

In general I see no reason to claim that causality is physical. — Leontiskos

I can't see that it could obtain if not. This is a really weird statement, for me. It's almost like saying "I can't see a reason, in general, to assume that heat causes hotness". I mean, causation happens in the physical world. We don't have other examples (ignoring some "hard problem" considerations that would beg the question on either side).

"physical process" and a "non-physical process." — Leontiskos

I'm unsure a non-physical entity can be a 'process' which happen in space and time, best I can ascertain.

But if one is not a physicalist then I don't see any grounds for claiming that causality is physical. — Leontiskos

This, also, real weird. It doesn't matter if you're a physicalist: If your thinking, from any angle, gets you no escape from the claim, then there's your bullet to either bite or set aside. You're right that hte physicalist, over others, wouldn't have any discomfort with this. Can't see that as particularlt relevant here.

and is situated in between objects — Leontiskos

I'm unsure it is, and I don't think physicalists at least would argue this. It is part and parcel of the relation between the objects, not between them. It only obtains upon the two objects (until we talk about physical trains like "hot from x causes particles in the air to heat and ferry that energy across to other particles which come into contact with y and pass on the high-energy particles etc.. etc.. et.etc.. but this would be to either ignore the problem, or solves it on a physicalist account lol). It doesn't obtain "between" the objects, in physical space. It only obtains "between" the objects in thought (like the "relationship" between two corporate entities. In reality, it is the "relationship of them - how the two relate).

If energy were a physical object just like the two billiard balls — Leontiskos

Hmm. I think this is both instructive, and confused. Energy is not a physical object, and no one claims it is. But this is instructive, in the sense that energy is a property. The concept describes several attributes that can variously be attributed to different physical objects and their ability to, what physicists call "do work". We don't understand this very well (in terms of the underlying establishing principles, but that's not here nor there for our discussion) but everything we have ever done to try to understand it, has reduced to the physical interaction between physical objects trading physical objects (particles etc..) between them. There doesn't seem to be any reason whatsoever to consider a non-physical basis for energy transfer yet. These are properties which we physically observe in physical objects.

The whole reason energy functions as a principle is because it is different from the billiard balls — Leontiskos

In light of the above, i think I need an elucidation here. It seems this has been answered adequately above: Yes, they are one-and-the-same but in concert, not considered individually. The energy of one ball is part and parcel of itself, and not something "other". The same true for ball 2. They then interact, physically, and pass physical matter between themselves causing "work" to have obtained. If the quibble is about "what about that matter passing between them causes that transfer to instantiate the result it seems to, then I think there's a fundamental misunderstanding. The matter, itself, is what causes certain excitations in the second ball (it has too much charge, which can be described physically) to stay in one place. Given it was acted on from a particular direction, it moves in te opposite due to its shape, and our medium of air, the felt, the cue tip etc.. etc.. but all can be calculated, as I understand. There doesn't seem to be a mystery.

Even on that conception, "space" is metaphorical not physical — Leontiskos

False, as I understand. We do not live in a vacuum. Space is made up of plenty of stuff. When I say space, I am talking about hte actual density of matter between object A and object B. Maybe this is naive? I can't see that though, seems to run in line with how we understand "space" at the highest levels of physics.

nd therefore a mathematical distance-measurement is not physical — Leontiskos

This is wrong as I see. The division is not physical. The division is artificial and, as you say, abstract. The measurement is entirely physical and rests on the actual physical limitations of point A in relation to point B and the physical space between them, along with our measurement methods which are also physical.

But according to what source do you claim that the transfer of energy is the transfer of particles? — Leontiskos

IN fairness, this was rough-and-ready and I'm technically misspeaking, even on my own understanding. Different forms of transfer require different descriptions, but something like this seems to work for your example. A version below:

"At the interface where the two objects meet, the faster-moving, higher-energy particles from the hot object collide with the slower-moving, lower-energy particles of the colder object."

At collision, "energy" which is read essentially as head or speed in this context, passes between the two objects, more-or-less replacing the hotter, faster particles in the moving object with colder, slower particles from the stationary object (again, not quite right - but the net effect is this).

An easier example is something like boiling (convection more broadly): less energetic particles are heated, move faster and spread about over a larger area, which causes them to move (as they cannot be as close to other particles when vibrating so fast, lest destruction occur) upwards and transfer that heat as essentially movement, to the more dense, less hot particles which they encounter. There's a purely physical explanation going on there.

Energy is just an assignment of value to the ability for a system to "do work" or affect other systems and objects. It's not claimed to be a "thing". Its a physical attribute, described very different across different media.

it is hard to see how gravity is itself supposed to be physical. — Leontiskos

I don't find it hard. But then, I include certain assumptions about "fabric" being involved in space-time. That there is a finite set of work that can be done within the Universe leads me to understand that all bodies will be affected by all other bodies. This will represent itself in a ubiquitous force exerted by everything, on everything else. I'm unsure its reducible in any way from that.

Even apart from mental causation, what would be an argument in favor of the thesis that causality is physical? — Leontiskos

I've made a couple above. And previously. I'll go with your example though:

1. Billiard ball1 causes billiard ball2 to move
2. Billiard ball1 and billiard ball2 are both physical
3. There is nothing else involved in the interaction
4. Therefore, the causation that occurs between the two billiard balls is itself physical — Leontiskos

Closer.

Are you claiming that when someone who is not committed to a physicalist account of causation talks about causation, they are "talking about things in totally incoherent terms"? — Leontiskos

Nope. I'm suggesting that running incoherent arguments about causation is possible. That's all that was on the table.

I would say that the majority of talk about causation is in non-physicalist terms. — Leontiskos

I agree. I think most of it is doomed to be self-contradictory, empirically untenable or down-right ridiculous (God did it, for instance).

without any material change in the two balls — Leontiskos

I do not think this is the case. This would be "empirically wrong" on the above ideas about people talking about causation in ways that wont work.

the capacity for doing work — Leontiskos

Physically deducible. If you want to get around this, you have to solve substance dualism.

Going to stop you right there because you probably forgot. I am not a 'physicalist'. That's stupid. I simply note that rational science and fact allow us to know a reality that is physical. I have yet to see someone able to point out with conclusive proof the existence of something that is non-physical that is not simply a contextual language game. Science does not run on the idea that there is some type of non-physical substance out there that we can measure and create outcomes from. Well...I can think of a few but those never seem to come up in our conversations. Which tells me that your arguments are still simply the very human desire to have our beliefs and imagination reflect in reality.

Yes, here is the language game (in bold), because you are requiring something non-physical to be demonstrated with physical apparatus/experiment.

I can offer a rational argument for an ethereal being, but I cannot show it to you under the microscope. Therefore it is a figment of my imagination

Here is the argument;
A physical humanity can perform all that is required to live as a human in the physical world without being conscious. (Just like a bat can perform everything required without the power of sight) Consciousness is not required for this, but consciousness is present, therefore it must be required for a different process (purpose). It could be argued, perhaps that it is pre-hensile, or some kind of unintended consequential, in some way. But that would be a bit hand wavey.

This different process is the evolution of an ethereal body, or being. A being hosted, maintained, sustained by the physical body. This ethereal body is a sentient conscious, self conscious entity with a rich experience of a subjective world, real experiences etc. But is entirely dependent on the physical processes in the physical body for its continued existence (in this world). It shares these processes with the physical body. This not only includes the chemical processes, but the processes of mind (x).

Now (x) can perform every mental action required for humanity to live in a material world. Without sentience, without self consciousness. After all, it is all computation. We know that computation can produce an intelligent body, because we have super computers and AI. All the senses in the human body can be responded to computationally without the body being conscious of them, experiencing them. They can be processed in the usual way, by the mental activity of the brain.

Now I will ask you, is there something that a human needs to do to live in this world which definitively requires conscious sentience to do?

As someone else mentioned supervenience may be a way to elucidate this misunderstanding further?

Correspondence Theory is one way of bridging the gap to some extent when considering possible worlds and how the term Water corresponds to chemical elements in all possible worlds.

As someone else mentioned supervenience may be a way to elucidate this misunderstanding further?

Thanks, a new word for me. I’m of the opinion that this is going on in the human body, as there are layers of complexity. There are lucid dreams and imaginary worlds, which appear to be experienced. But which don’t necessarily have a subvenient component. Suggesting that there is the supervenient component, that would be present if there were supervenience.

Supervenience in the philosophy of mind states that if a Physical property alters so to does the Mental property. A change in Mental property requires a change in the other, but not vice versa. A physical property can change without there necessarily being a change in mental properties.

Ok, this fits for my ethereal body. A change in the ethereal body requires an alteration in the physical body, (including mental alterations). But the physical body doesn’t require an alteration in the ethereal body. Although the ethereal body does/may experience that change.

I think that thoughts are singular. That quality of being one, is what seems unphysical to me as in nature it seems that everything is permanently connected.

Yes, here is the language game (in bold), because you are requiring something non-physical to be demonstrated with physical apparatus/experiment. — Punshhh

No, I am simply asking to show something apart from the physical that exists. "I believe in unicorns". "I believe in God." "I believe in non-physical reality." These all have the same thing in common. Its all a mental construct of imagination. None of them actually exist apart from this.

This different process is the evolution of an ethereal body, or being. A being hosted, maintained, sustained by the physical body. This ethereal body is a sentient conscious, self conscious entity with a rich experience of a subjective world, real experiences etc. But is entirely dependent on the physical processes in the physical body for its continued existence (in this world). It shares these processes with the physical body. This not only includes the chemical processes, but the processes of mind (x). — Punshhh

I have no objection to this. This is simply creating a category, but not denying its a physical process. You remove the physical process, this 'non-physical' thing does not exist independently as something real.

Now (x) can perform every mental action required for humanity to live in a material world. Without sentience, without self consciousness. After all, it is all computation. We know that computation can produce an intelligent body, because we have super computers and AI. All the senses in the human body can be responded to computationally without the body being conscious of them, experiencing them. They can be processed in the usual way, by the mental activity of the brain. — Punshhh

Yes, that's consciousness. Consciousness does not exist as some independent ethereal thing. Its simply a category of physical process from the brain. Much like music is the combination of an instrument, air, and tweaks to the instrument over time. But music does not exist without the physical process. It is not 'there' in reality apart from physical reality. Until someone can point out "That" over there is non-physical, or existing as completely independently from physical reality, any claims that non-physical reality exists as apart from physical reality is a claim of imagination, not reality.

is not physical a claim of imagination too?

You have just re-asserted your claim that anything that can’t be proved to exist is a figment of my imagination. You have proved my point for me.

What proof do you require?

Yes, that's consciousness. Consciousness does not exist as some independent ethereal thing. It’s simply a category of physical process from the brain.

That’s not consciousness, it’s computation. The brain performs computation, like a computer. Are computers (AI even) conscious? They can perform the same computation as the brain, surely.

Consciousness is something present in organisms which have a very primitive brain, or no brain. In genetics terms we are closely related to trees. They are more conscious than any super computer and yet they don’t have a brain.

What requirement does a brain have for consciousness? Computation will do all that is required.

This is simply creating a category, but not denying its a physical process.

I am denying it’s a physical process, it has a supervenient relation to the physical. It is hosted by the physical, but is itself not physical.

You remove the physical process, this 'non-physical' thing does not exist independently as something real.

Perhaps, but the physical being would not exist either, in this scenario, they are joined at the hip.

Philosophim is not physical a claim of imagination too? — Danileo

No. But maybe I don't understand what you mean by imagination. What does that mean to you?

You have just re-asserted your claim that anything that can’t be proved to exist is a figment of my imagination. You have proved my point for me. — Punshhh

What was your point?

Yes, that's consciousness. Consciousness does not exist as some independent ethereal thing. It’s simply a category of physical process from the brain.
That’s not consciousness, it’s computation. The brain performs computation, like a computer. Are computers (AI even) conscious? They can perform the same computation as the brain, surely. — Punshhh

No, consciousness is simply a more advanced form of computation. We observe consciousness with objective criteria, and subjective criteria. Subjective, or the experience of being conscious itself, is impossible to prove in anyone but yourself as you have to actually be 'that conscious thing' to know the subjective experience of what being conscious is like. Is AI subjectively conscious? Who knows? We never will. Just like I won't know what its like for you to be subjectively conscious as you are either.

As for objective forms of consciousness, yes, AI could be said to be conscious. Not to the level of a human, but more at the level of a bug or fish. We have robots and other forms of AI that have environmental awareness, self-modeling, and learning. Do they have subjective emotional feelings? Don't know. But a robot can have stress detectors and speed up or slow down rapidly to avoid obstacles it would consider it should avoid. Does that entire process gain an overall 'feel' like we do? Who knows.

This is simply creating a category, but not denying its a physical process.
I am denying it’s a physical process, it has a supervenient relation to the physical. It is hosted by the physical, but is itself not physical. — Punshhh

This just sounds like you're separating physical matter from 'physical matter in action and process'. If its not physical, what is it? This is always the problem. You have no real definition of non-physical that we can clearly point to that doesn't involve the physical. Can you explain non-physical apart from 'a physical process'?

You remove the physical process, this 'non-physical' thing does not exist independently as something real.
Perhaps, but the physical being would not exist either, in this scenario, they are joined at the hip. — Punshhh

Again, sounds like you're ascribing what is non-physical to a physical process.

So at this point I can see that in your opinion we can never ask, "What accounts for the ice's existence?," — Leontiskos

In fact, we never do ask such a question. That's not a speculative thesis, but an observation about actual causal talk.

• Under normal conditions, ice forms at 0C
• The window iced over because it is poorly insulated
• She likes her whiskey neat [that's negative causation, in case you are wondering]
• ...

You could continue this list ad infinitum, but what would be the point? Causal questions are only sensible and tractable when they are asked for a reason.

What was your point?

You are dismissing the ethereal being because it can’t to demonstrated physically to exist.

No, consciousness is simply a more advanced form of computation.

To the extent, perhaps, that a chemical reaction is a form of computation. But that does not encompass what consciousness is.
You seem to be about to declare that consciousness is emergent from computation alone. That if there is sufficient computation going on in a system, or body, then it will be conscious.

Is AI subjectively conscious? Who knows? We never will.

I don’t know why anyone would think that AI might be conscious. Perhaps they conflate intelligence with consciousness. They are not the same thing. Take the example of an old fashioned computer, indeed one could be made out of pulleys and rope. If big enough it could perform advanced computation. Would it at some point become conscious, Pulleys and rope?

Just like I won't know what its like for you to be subjectively conscious as you are either.

It’s not that difficult, we are near identical. In a sense humans are all clones of a common ancestor. Genetic variation does not alter that to any great extent.

As for objective forms of consciousness, yes, AI could be said to be conscious. Not to the level of a human, but more at the level of a bug or fish. We have robots and other forms of AI that have environmental awareness, self-modeling, and learning. Do they have subjective emotional feelings? Don't know. But a robot can have stress detectors and speed up or slow down rapidly to avoid obstacles it would consider it should avoid. Does that entire process gain an overall 'feel' like we do? Who knows.

Yes, that all makes sense, but it doesn’t capture consciousness, it’s all within the scope of computation and intelligence. A computer with sensory apparatus (stress detectors) measuring changes in its environment and able to control other apparatus which can perform physical tasks. Can be like a human, or a bug, or a fish. But it is still a mechanical machine, you know levers and rope.

Have you come across the idea of a philosophical zombie? There could be another universe like ours, but without any consciousness. There could be advanced life, indeed humans just like us. But no one is conscious. There would be no other difference.

This just sounds like you're separating physical matter from 'physical matter in action and process'. If it’s not physical, what is it? This is always the problem. You have no real definition of non-physical that we can clearly point to that doesn't involve the physical. Can you explain non-physical apart from 'a physical process'?

I don’t have a problem, because I’m not trying to prove the existence of an ethereal body using physical means and parameters. That’s for you to think about, as that’s what you are asking for.

As I said in my rational argument, there is not requirement in the world as described in physical terms for consciousness to exist (do tell me if there is?). Therefore its existence must be for another reason. Which is to evolve a subtle, or ethereal being. Naturally this cannot be measured physically, because it’s not physical.

Let me suggest a way of looking at this. When life was first evolving, that simple form of computation, chemical reactions, which I mentioned earlier. This developed until there were self replicated units. Primitive cells.
Once they were self replicating,( I am oversimplifying to make my point) they were able to evolve more sophisticated forms. All very well, they were like our philosophical zombie. But then something happened that was due to something in the chemicals, constituting these cells. Something not produced by the computation, but that was present in the materials they were made of. The electrical charge somehow became an electrical field encompassing the whole cell. Some cells adapted to this new phenomenon and found it enhanced their development and rate of survival in a competing pools of new organisms. Then at a later stage, this integrated organism with an electric field and properties became conscious. Not through the computation, but through the electrical activity involved in that computation.

So we have organisms with a form of consciousness based on metabolic reactions, including complex electrical interactions and states, out of which emerges a primitive consciousness. This is not emergent out of information processing. But an electrical metabolic process, where the process is about organising molecules into structures in the cell, so as to self replicate and compete in a competitive pool of organisms.

This would then develop into larger sentient beings, long before they developed brains and information processing like we see in the human brain.

Consciousness came before intelligence. Not the other way around.

Again, sounds like you're ascribing what is non-physical to a physical process.

No, they coexist in a supervenient relationship.

a mental construction, are not physics a theory and theories come from our minds

↪Philosophim a mental construction, are not physics a theory and theories come from our minds — Danileo

And our minds are the process of physical brains. Still not seeing a separation from physical process.

What was your point?
You are dismissing the ethereal being because it can’t to demonstrated physically to exist. — Punshhh

No, I'm dismissing it because you can't show that it exists. You need to explain what it is to have a non-physical thing exist, then demonstrate that such a thing actually exists in reality.

No, consciousness is simply a more advanced form of computation.
To the extent, perhaps, that a chemical reaction is a form of computation. But that does not encompass what consciousness is.
You seem to be about to declare that consciousness is emergent from computation alone. That if there is sufficient computation going on in a system, or body, then it will be conscious. — Punshhh

Yes, it is emergent from physical processes alone. No, the physical processes for consciousness must occur to have consciousness. This is why we can put someone under anesthesia and knock them unconscious. We stop the physical process of the brain responsible for consciousness.

I don’t know why anyone would think that AI might be conscious. Perhaps they conflate intelligence with consciousness. — Punshhh

I noted that objectively by some AIs actions, they have very low level consciousness. This is different from a subjective consciousness. A subjective consciousness is the experience of being what is. We can't know what its like to be a complex program, just like I can't know what its like to be you.

Just like I won't know what its like for you to be subjectively conscious as you are either.
It’s not that difficult, we are near identical. — Punshhh

Its incredibly difficult, and part of the hard problem of consciousness. Do you see green the way I do? We have color blind people who don't. What do they see the different colors as? Yes, we're observing the same wavelength of light, but what is that individual subjective experience of interpreting that light? There are people who cannot visualize. I can close my mind and 'see' images and replay experiences. There are some people who close their eyes and all they 'see' is the back of their eyelids. Can I know what that's like to subjectively live and think like that? No. We could perhaps gather objective data by having people of one type solve or think about problems and see how each camp handles them, but we can't know what its like to BE them.

Yes, that all makes sense, but it doesn’t capture consciousness, it’s all within the scope of computation and intelligence. — Punshhh

Can you define what you mean by consciousness? I think that's key to the discussion and if we don't have the same understanding of the definition, we'll talk over ourselves. There should be a definition that handles the objective, and one that handles the subjective.

But it is still a mechanical machine, you know levers and rope. — Punshhh

True, but that's what we are as well. Your brain is the combination of many individual cells. You are not 'one thing'. You are the combination of all of those processes that results in you having thoughts. One way to think about it is on a macro scale. Imagine a person, now imagine the entirety of a city. A person has an individual function, but when they're in a set of rules and processes like going to a job, going home, etc., the entire massive process can be identified and grouped as something unique from the processes of people. It doesn't mean that it exists apart from people or that its 'non-physical'. Its just the result of physical processes combining together.

Have you come across the idea of a philosophical zombie? There could be another universe like ours, but without any consciousness. — Punshhh

To be clear, without any subjective conscious. Its a fun thought experiment, but its essentially the 'evil demon' argument from Descartes or 'brain in a vat'. What if you're just a brain in a vat and this is all imagined? What if an evil demon is actually making you perceive reality differently? What if there are people who don't have subjective experiences? These are all fun things to think about, but the one thing they have in common is they are unprovable. We have absolutely no way of knowing one way or the other, so the reasonble thing is to say they are outside of what can be known, and the only logical solution is to rely on what can be known.

Once they were self replicating,( I am oversimplifying to make my point) they were able to evolve more sophisticated forms. All very well, they were like our philosophical zombie. — Punshhh

We cannot know that. For all we know, there is a subjective experience of being a single cell. Of being even something we don't consider life like an atom. After all, we are composed of atoms, so there is something in matter that causes a subjective experience. We just don't know fully what that is yet. Maybe when a group of cells gets together, there is some new subjective consciousness. Do you think all the cells of your brain know the experience of the group consciousness? Does a person working in the office know the experience of the city as a whole? We don't have the answer to what its like for something else to subjectively experience, therefore it is outside of what can be known.

Again, sounds like you're ascribing what is non-physical to a physical process.
No, they coexist in a supervenient relationship. — Punshhh

A physical process is a supervenient relationship to the physical entities involved in the process. You'll need to explain specifically why its not a physical process.

and a physical process can only produce physical theories?

↪Philosophim and a physical process can only produce physical theories? — Danileo

A physical process is still physical. It doesn't become some type of entity that is separate from what is physical. You can classify physical processes as, "Mental processes" when the physical process of an active brain occurs. But a 'mental process' is a type of physical process.

To demonstrate a non-physical existence, you need to show something that exists independently of the physical. You need to carefully define it, and demonstrate that it exists. If you cannot, then you've essentially created an undefinable word that cannot be experienced. If you cannot do so, then 'non-physical' describes nothing and is nothing.

You understand that this is one philosophical position. It is called physicalism.

If you claim you are not talking about physicalism just spit out what you are talking about to avoid confusion if possible. If you are not acquianted with the philosophical jargon someone else can probably point it out for you more clearly and give people a better opportunity to engage.

. Non-physicality is a way of describing not a object. I could do a reverse argument and say that what is physical is a construction of our mind and therefore is grounded on our mind. So the foundation of what exists occured in our mind and therefore all theories have the same validation in matters of how they are constructed (not talking on probability or proofs)