@Antinatalist Mean to have written NOT even slightly convinced by it.
NOTE: Anyone else reading these are NOT quotes from Antinatalist they are from David Benatar.
I'll break it down best I can ...
The absence of pain is good, the absence of pleasure is not bad. Therefore, the ethical choice is weighed in favor of non-procreation. — Antinatalist
Why not absence of either is impossible in life? Why not 'the absence of either pleasure or pain is not bad'? The absence of pain/pleasure is a given in a non-existing individual. Also, lacking pleasure is not exactly what I'd call 'not bad' if the opposite argument is that lacking pain is 'good'.
Let us view this differently ... less pain is better and less pleasure is worse. I think we can all agree with that.
So we can see that the 'ethical conclusion' (a nonsense term in my view for the most part) of favouring non-procreation is based on premises set up from a biased position, or rather a singular perspective.
The conslusion I come to from the opening paragraph is that existence is bad. You said you didn't believe that so you're probably not convinced by this kind of antinatalism in reality (do doubt there are various sectionings of this philosophical position?).
We have a moral obligation not to create unhappy people and we have no moral obligation to create happy people. The reason why we think there is a moral obligation not to create unhappy people is that the presence of this suffering would be bad (for the sufferers) and the absence of the suffering is good (even though there is nobody to enjoy the absence of suffering). — Antinatalist
The above is purely based of what I consider to be singular and unconvincing premises. If the foundation is flawed the conclusion is not going to be of any use. The process can be interesting though so I'll follow it through ...
For starters, why does he assume we're morally obliged to 'create' people without pain and suffering yet doesn't think we're morally obliged to 'create' happy people? That seems like a cognitive bias to push forward his unfounded conclusion. As an opinion it doesn't quite stand up to scrutiny yet.
It looks like he's saying gray is more black than white.
By contrast, the reason we think there is no moral obligation to create happy people is that although their pleasure would be good for them, the absence of pleasure when they do not come into existence will not be bad, because there will be no one who will be deprived of this good. — Antinatalist
Why? Because he says so? I think the mental hoodwinking going on here is confusing 'degrees' of pleasure and pain with some imaginary absolute.
As I stated previous less pleasure is bad and less pain is good. A lack of either, or will to lack either, is where nihilism and what I frame as 'buddhist mentality' collide. They are in denial of existing and or against existence - and often abstain from any idea of free will too. We can see this is the end of the sentence above where non-existence is placed above existence. And as I've stated a lack of 'pleasure' is bad in my eyes just as 'pain' is bad (using the terms in the broadest sense here rather than bothering with gettin into all that).
It is strange to mention the interests of a potential child as a reason why we decide to create them, and it is not strange to mention the interests of a potential child as a reason why we decide not to create them. — Antinatalist
FIrst question here is why? If we have a moral obligation to a potential child surely we need to take into account what the life of such a child could be like and how readily armed we believe we are to 'give them' (probably better to say, 'set them up for') a life they won't wish they'd ever lived. Nothing 'strange' there?
Maybe he is just referring to how people generally consider the responsibility of having children here? If so considering the downfalls isn't a steadfast peice of evidence for his argument. For people who enjoy life they wish to share it. Who better to share this perspective with than a new life. Makes perfect sense.
As previously stated we know that humans are overly optimistic in one sense yet there is pretty good evidence that we are, to put it simply, more 'loss adverse' than 'gain seeking'. It might be too much of a leap for some to parallel this with 'pain' and 'pleasure' as those are very loaded terms. In the realm of this discussion though I think it is more than worth consideration.
Next bit is a willful ignorance of 'worse'/'better' in favour of monadic 'good'/'bad' concepts ...
If it were the case that the absence of pleasure is bad even if someone does not exist to experience its absence, then we would have a significant moral reason to create a child and to create as many children as possible. And if it were not the case that the absence of pain is good even if someone does not exist to experience this good, then we would not have a significant moral reason not to create a child. — Antinatalist
Why? The absence of either means no more humans. I have no qualms with humanity to the point where I'd wish the existence of humanity away merely because I don't understand the ins and outs of the universe at large.
If there is no one to experience it then ... well, it's a pointless discussion that we cannot have because we're existing/living. Just like I cannot think outside of myself I cannot think outside of existence. These are quite basic principles in mainstream philosophy ... or so I thought
:D
Someday we can regret for the sake of a person whose existence was conditional on our decision, that we created them – a person can be unhappy and the presence of their pain would be a bad thing. — Antinatalist
NO NO NO! The presence of pain is a given. No one can live a life absent of pain. The presence of pain means they live. the DEGREE of pain is the moral issue being avoided here from what I can tell. This likely because when you dig in far enough some extrememly disturbing truths surface and most sane people shun them.
eg. How many people would you kill to save 1 million strangers? Let us assume such and such a person thinks one, then we shift the question about torturing them to death over decades ... would we rather kill two instantly than torturing one for decades?
The point being here NOT to make public statements about these kind of thoughts but to get to the most honest heart of yourself about how and what you feel about this then try to draw some loose conclusions from it.
You will hopefully find that all life is equal is not where you go at the end of the day. I'm not of the camp that not all lives are worth living (who am I to say!), but I readily accept that some lives must, almost certainly, be more worth living than others. Given that we only ever get to appreciate such a question at or aroundb our demise with any real kind of perspective - and an extrememly limited singular one - passing universal judgements over what lives are and aren't worth living seems quite naive/perverse. THAT is literally the only opening for an antinatalist doctrine I can establish, but it is far from convincing for all the above points made and many more I've not gotten into yet.
Someday we can regret for the sake of a person whose existence was conditional on our decision, that we created them – a person can be unhappy and the presence of their pain would be a bad thing. But we will never feel regret for the sake of a person whose existence was conditional on our decision, that we did not create them – a person will not be deprived of happiness, because he or she will never exist, and the absence of happiness will not be bad, because there will be no one who will be deprived of this good. — Antinatalist
Sounds like cowardice diguised as moral dignity. Shirking any ounce of responsibility towards others is just that. I'm not going to offer to help that person in the street because I might cause them harm ... this is precisely where an item common;ly referred to as 'wisdom' comes into play. I think the ancient Greeks did pretty well in marking out the grounds about 'bravery,' foolhardy' and other such psyhcological categories of human behaviour.
Abstaining is all too often pedestalled as moral. I don't buy it. Also, as mentioned by others as an argument about a purely 'parental spective' the above is extremely selfish in terms of avoiding responsibility. you may very well be 'dripriving a possible human of happiness' but this is somehow okay in balanced to 'depriving them of pain' ... just silly imo.
We feel sadness by the fact that somewhere people come into existence and suffer, and we feel no sadness by the fact that somewhere people did not come into existence in a place where there are happy people. — Antinatalist
Nope! We do, we just don't tend to consider it because it isn't a day to day thought. I'm sure many couples who've experienced miscarraiges would quite clearly state that the above is nonsense. We can also, I'm sure, appreciate that when someone we know has died (no longer 'existing') we wish they could 'be there for this/that'.
You could well argue that these people 'existed' but I'm not sure how this works for a miscarriage as that is more or less the idea of someone coming to exist. For those dead it is similar in that they did exist but don't any longer, so it is a 'potential' (albeit an unrealistic 'potential').
When we know that somewhere people came into existence and suffer, we feel compassion. The fact that on some deserted island or planet people did not come into existence and suffer is good. — Antinatalist
Why is this 'good'? Is the assumption that they merely suffered and died? No mention of 'pleasure' here for reasons unknown. Again, there is a DEGREE of these things. Would we wish away the potential existence of someone alone on a desert island who lived a rather ordinary life on the beaches waking up in morning, fishing and dancing around a fire at night merely because they suffering hardships and pain (physical and mental)? That said it is of course VERY easy to pass a quick judgement if the proposed scenario is painted as 'Born and suffered excruciating pain non-stop for several decades before dying in even more agony'.
As a little aside 'pleasure' can be painful too. A rather horrible tale about a study where elderly people in a home were given more volunteer visitors for month. Their well-being and sense of 'happiness' when through the roof. A follow up study though showed that for some time after (once they didn't have so many visitors) that overall the sense of well-being plummetted. They didn't know what they were missing, so when it was taken away they felt worse of for it.
I find that interesting because this a little parallel reversal of arguments for antinatalism mentioned by some here. Would they be better of without such 'pleasure'? Do we measure in a 'utilitarian sense' amounts of pleasure against pain. I'm not saying one or the other just pointing out how easily such views for one side of a position can be used against it. Plus, this is a singular situation of a myriad of human experience and life.
In conclusion ...
The fact that on some deserted island or planet people did not come into existence and suffer is good. This is because the absence of pain is good even when there is not someone who is experiencing this good. On the other hand, we do not feel sadness by the fact that on some deserted island or planet people did not come into existence and are not happy. This is because the absence of pleasure is bad only when someone exists to be deprived of this good." — Antinatalist
I'm disappointed that that is all David Benatar has. Someone can exist to be 'deprived of good' yet the thought of tyhem existing to be 'deprived of bad' is wholly ignored as well as th edegree to which said potential persons will experience and deal with 'pleasure' and 'pain'.
To sum up, the absence of either pleasure or pain is not a life and therefore to draw comparisons of a life purely 'painful' or purely 'pleasureable' is irrelevant AND a complete fantasy that makes so actual realistic sense. It seems like something has happened here that many scientists try hard to guard against. That is to have an idea then search for evidence to back it up.
What this has hopefully revealed more clearly is the problems surrounding any 'measurements'/'categories' of 'pleasure'/'pain' and what exactly these terms can/could mean in various different perspectives.
Broadly, when it comes to 'ethics,' I'm instantly suspicious of any/all ethical 'conclusions'. If we don't question and scrutinise our principles I don't see what use they are to us at all. Otherwise such 'principles' are like dead limbs we drag around and use to abstain more any sense of PERSONAL repsonsibility amoung/within/without the 'world' (weltenschuuang) at large.
So Antinatalist, can we perhaps get into how 'degrees' fits in here or is this entire antinatalist vie wbased solely on a hypothetical rigid extremity?
Is there anything I've said that is unclear? Do you have a harder position to put forward - perhaps in your own words with more nuance that those of Benatar?
Thanks either way
:)