Thanks. It’s much appreciated.

In terms of politics I was just referring to its historical use for this or that cause in this or that country. The main thrust of my perspective is about the raising of aesthetic sensibilities through marketing aimed at groups and eventually filtering into marketing based on individuals.

I was more interested in the ‘how’ of these items in terms of how they function.

Basically more of an essay rather than bullet-point responses.

Feels like you’re teasing me :) would like to see more of your working/evidence if possible. Thanks

I tried to deal with that here with the proposition that this condition is changing due to what I guess we can call ‘status value’ being subsumed by ‘aesthetic value’.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/7076/marxs-commodity-fetishism/p1

I was mostly thinking out loud at the start of the thread, but I think the last 2-3 posts of that thread expressed my thoughts more concisely.

Anyway, thanks for the exchange :) it’s been extremely useful in helping me see what I mean and where I’m looking. Lots of things bouncing around my stupid little skull so I better vomit on some paper more before returning.

Does it? If I own a car and just let it crumble into a pile of dust, do I not still own it? I suppose once it's completely disintegrated, it's no longer a car so I've lost ownership of it, but that;'s not unique to ownership. — Isaac

You answered yourself. You’ll have to tell me why it matters about this or that being unique. Either way you don’t seem to have gotten the point that ‘ownership’ - close relation to - objects and/or people means you generally tend to them as they’re of use/value.

A farmer may claim ownership over a pile of manure and you’d be happy they did too if you had it piled up next to your bed. Think of refuse in general. Do you ‘own’ it? Is it your responsibility or do you ‘disown’ it? How would this go down in a community with no laws or government? Would you be ‘disowned’/‘exiled’?

No matter what state it's in on it's return, people would still say "here's your arm", not "here's an arm". — Isaac

So what? That has nothing to do with the thrust of my point. Which was that different items of ownership are different in many regards. Even so, if I grew attached to your arm and moved to a country where ‘ownership of arms’ wasn’t an illegal item then would the arm be mine or yours if it’s legal where I live to own an arm. I imagine you’d prefer I used you rather than just your arm so you wouldn’t have to literally part with it for any period of time.

Figuratively and literally speaking their are items in our lives (physical or otherwise) that we’re more or less attached to. Point being the sense of ‘ownership’ is wrapped up in this not merely the dictates of governments and their ability to enforce a set of rules you never signed up for and to some degree will disagree with.

I think it makes more sense to address the OP:

While many of us understand that our body parts are ours, it may not be that simple as to why we can claim ownership of things that are not part of yourself. How did we get all the way from, "these are my hands", to "this is my house."? What is the connections between the two? — Wheatley

In anthropology there has been a long interest in how ‘ownership’ arose. This is often referred to as the rise/origin of inequality where groups of humans accumulate goods of symbolic value above practical use. Jade blades or other such ritual items that possess no physical utility - status symbols maybe? In hunter gatherer societies clashes certainly happened, but so did mutually beneficial exchanges (women, partaking in social events/rituals and/or mutual protection from nature/hostile tribes). In this sense the idea of ‘ownership’ was present most strongly through tribal/family ties where material goods were certainly of import not by no means necessarily of more import than the producer (skilled hunter, gatherer, storyteller or tool-maker).

The domestication of humans following Sedentary Living meant human control became more specifically orientated to ‘pieces of land’ rather than in a hunter gather society where ‘the land’ was a whole made of parts rather than of parts made of a whole - a perspective shift brought about by creation of a static space. Where previously humans scope of control lay within themselves and between each other as the most prominent component of their existence ‘in the world’ - rather than an extraneous to it - now there was a field of play in which the environment could be brought under direct human control. In this sense humans began to play at ‘god’ within the limited bounds of what we now call ‘houses’. Here they had a cosmos with which they held almost complete sway over. The ‘house’ became ‘owned’ because it was an item crafted with the purpose of setting boundaries and creating and dictating rules of play.

For a bibliography try Eliade, Levi-Strauss, Renfrew, Rousseau and/or Geertz for a more anthropological look at this kind of thing.

If you wish to go deeper there are multiple avenues to take in this respect that include language, religious practice, shamanism and knowledge exchanges through mnemonic means. Further still there is the neurological data to consider in how we sense our surroundings, how we learn, and the less substantial area of psychology that highlight our social proclivity. Politically there is also how the division of labour from a mobile life altered with sedentary living and how specialisation likely intensified with this alongside necessity and needs for basic survival. There is also family units, communities and items like sanitation that arise along with brining more than just dogs into our circle of living - horses and cattle.

As for the general question of how ‘ubiquitous’ humans are, didn’t mean much more than something like every language possesses the same concepts, and by ‘material resources, cultures that have a similar environment generally share a common set of problems - flora and fauna as well as general climate.

I most certainly don’t think ‘Ownership? Ah, it’s just a legal term. Where’s my dictionary ... yep, or as good as. Next question?’ ;D

Can you at least see my issue here? The conflict of terms?

If a ‘use value’ becomes a ‘Value’ (commodity) then the ‘use value’ is covered up. So is he saying that both ‘Value’ is useless because ‘use value’ is out of sight, and/or that a kind of ‘unpotentialised use value’ is useless, because it is again out of sight.

For instances of these confusions:

So is also the establishment of social measures for the quantities of these useful objects.
The diversity of these measures of commodities originates in part from the diverse nature of the objects to be measured, and in part from convention.

The usefulness of a thing makes it a use-value.

But this usefulness does not dangle in midair. Conditioned by the physical properties of the body of the commodity, it has no existence apart from the latter.

The body itself of the commodity, such as iron, wheat, diamond, etc., is therefore a use-value or a good.

This characteristic of a commodity does not depend on whether appropriating its useful properties costs more or less labor.

Pay particular attention to the bold. I am saying there no thing that is wholly absent of ‘usefulness’ - there is no ‘useless’ item. As this is a key concept I have instant doubts about where this is going already as there is a lack of precision - repeated later with over simplification regarding skilled labour.

Also:

The commodity is at first an exterior object, a thing, which by its properties satisfies human wants of one sort or another.

The nature of such wants, whether they arise, for instance, from the stomach or from
imagination, makes no difference.

Nor does it matter here how the object satisfies these human wants, whether directly as object of consumption, or indirectly as means of production.

Can anyone suggest anything that doesn’t have the potential to satisfy ’human wants or needs’? It’s a chimera.

The last bold part does seem to suggest ‘self-entertainment’- but I’m being generous. The thrust of my point here is that producing something without the intent of it being open to the public as a utility doesn’t take away the ‘use-value’ as Marx defines. Yet as we’ve seen he is happy to later talk about something as ‘useless’ - which we both seem to assume means an object absent of ‘use value’ and further still he states that the ‘labour is not labour’.

The contradiction is well hidden I’ll grant that. I’m not against contradictions - I’ve read Kant - but these contradictions are presented in the same section it is not the case that he’s set up different sets of limitations and then set them out parallel to each other.

The problems continue:

Every useful thing, such as iron, paper, etc., is to be looked at under two aspects: quality and quantity.

‘Quality’ here means ‘utility’. The is the ongoing problem of human existence in many ways and an age old question. How to measure different ‘qualities’ against each other. To then dress up ‘quality’ as ‘utility’ is to say the quality of something has nothing to do with aesthetics as it is all about how an object can be utilized not about any direct consideration of ‘qualities’ just practical functions irrespective of any human sense of aesthetic taste.

I assume all he is trying to say here is that the ‘utility’ (‘use-value, not ‘quality’) of resources are Valued (as in ‘Value’) by how they function the production of a commodity. The ‘utility’ for every item conceivable is always present, yet not always fulfilled - by ‘wants or needs’ due to ignorance or knowledge.

There is NO ‘useless’ resource present in opposition to ‘use-value’. It’s a value dichotomy. There most certainly are unfulfilled ‘use-values’. The fulfilled ‘use-values’ inevitably embody an object with value regardless of whether this ‘value’ extends beyond the personal sphere into the public.

To return to the first quote and provide another translation:

But this usefulness does not dangle in midair. Conditioned by the physical properties of the body of the commodity, it has no existence apart from the latter.

The utility of a thing makes it a use value. But this utility is not a thing of air. Being limited by the physical properties of the commodity, it has no existence apart from that commodity.

This is wrong. There is ‘existence’ within the conscious human being. We don’t merely act upon the world as an exterior influence, we actively impose ourselves upon it. The ‘utility’ of resources don’t jump out to us like sentient beings. We have an intent, a sense of time and place, and go to play in the word of things directed partly by our aesthetic disposition not entirely as reactionary beings absent of agency.

The whole premise is actually based on this thought. We brought resources into a position where we can refer to them as ‘commodities’ to be exchanged, improved and engaged with. We simply have a drive to utilise our environment and the ‘Value’ is an aspect of measuring ‘efficiency’. Even this barely touching on the ‘utility’ of human interactions outside of what many consider ‘economics’. From what I’ve read Marx has done no more than sharpen the capitalist sword rather than offer a new means of engagement in the sphere of ‘economics’ - maybe I was expecting way too much :)

Anyway, maybe I’m not discussing what you wished to discuss in this thread? Either way I think my time would be better spent keeping my thoughts mostly to myself for now as I work my way through the text. I like the line of questions he presents even if I find the presentation wanting.

Looking to develop my own. — MountainDwarf

What for?

I have my own little Venn diagram that is much more applicable than yours I believe - but it isn’t a category of subjects.

The ‘poles’ are order an disorder (roughly speaking ‘science’ and ‘art’): as science is empirical and objectively more discernible than art. The orthogonal ‘pole’ to this one would be ‘belief’ and ‘non-belief’ (to accept and to question): I roughly frame these as ‘religion’ and ‘philosophy’.

Where these circles of interest intersect there are items like ‘ritual’, ‘myth’, ‘imagination’ and ‘action’.

Maybe I can find it ... [img][/img] nope, cannot download image. Don’t do ‘links’.

“Truths” are necessarily dependent upon limits. We don’t know a ‘truth’ that has no bounds.

My view of ‘knowledge’ is pretty much in line with what you’ve stated though. I see ‘knowing’ as the realisation - directly or otherwise - of what isn’t known. The only concrete truths we possess are those bound within manmade rules. Some are far more impactful than others in certain fields of play (mathematics being the most obvious example).

I think you’ll find philosophers are more interested in ‘questions’ than answers. When enough answer arise measurements begin and then you’ve got a science.

Selecting questions is the art of philosophy as well as exploring their applications and limits. Everything else is science or mysticism in terms of ‘knowledge’.

How does this happen? Again, I’m still having an issue with the depth of answers here. Could you possibly go further about how this ability to convince others functions? What essential aspects of persuasion make this possible?

Thanks

What I wanted was the meaning of ‘useless’ explained. I was pretty explicit about the issue I had. If you cannot think of anything then I’ll just have to put that term down as a mistake or needless obtuse. Either way, something is off.

So you're saying that the limits of our powers must constrain what we can make law and so examining those limits tells us something about those laws?(1) OK, I can see that being a useful exercise.

I agree, in that respect, the extent to which we can 'control' something is the maximum extent to which we can make a law conferring ownership. Is there any more fine-grained constraint than that? The extent to which others in our community are prepared to allow the exercise of such control perhaps?(2) Maybe that's why we no longer have slavery. — Isaac

1) I never said ‘power’ as far as I recall? I said something along the lines of being limited, having limited control in all aspects of life, yet our primary sense of control being felt strongest in our own thoughts and actions - both of which can fool us into believing our ‘control’ is greater or lesser than what it appears to be.

2) Yes, and individuals in a community act upon the their perceptions of their own reach of control and the limited effects of their thought/action. A slave owner can take your life but they cannot prevent your death - the limit of control plays into the use and effect of ownership. Ownership requires upkeep, just as we’re to blame, to some degree (depending on control), if we put on weight, drink too much or smoke.

Other items to think about is whether something can be owned yet never given away or loaned out? I cannot cut my arm off and lend it to you for a week then get it back again whilst I can lend you a hammer and have it returned without serious change - in fact it would be better for me to be your slave for a week than cut away part of my body. This ties into ownership in regards to items that a ‘whole’ rather than ‘parts’ - in terms of time and/or space.

These may seem like quite silly examples on the surface but if you consider ‘ownership’ only as a legal tern and you own a loaded gun it doesn’t matter if the law says it’s your gun when I pick it up and shoot your with it. Legal ownership is relative to where you live, or even nonexistent, but human behavior is pretty ubiquitous regardless of its various manifestations of dealing with the appropriation of material resources.

Something needs to have a use value in order for it to have an exchange value. — fdrake

Of course, because everything had ‘use value’ so why bother stating this? Unless Marx says otherwise somewhere that there is some ‘object’ that had no ‘use value’. Please show me where?

You seem to be avoiding the thrust of the issue here. WHAT is meant here:

If the thing is useless, so is the labor contained in it; the labor does not count as labor, and therefore does not create value.

What is a ‘useless’ thing? I’m simply suggesting this means ‘unused’ OR it’s a terrible way of saying ‘not value, but still use value’ meaning the ‘useless’ as ‘value’ not ‘use value’.

What comes later does concern me right now as this is within the opening section of the work. It’s needless obtuse or contrary.

That’s not what I meant. Prior to all written law there was still some concept of ‘ownership’. I’m asking about the initial circumstances for ownership and, in day-to-day speech, what it means to ‘own your thoughts/actions’. Prior to socially decreed laws people still have a sense of ‘having’ and ‘not having’.

That is why I referred to a sense of ownership being about our personal reach of control, perceived or actual, as the possible heart of the issue as put forward by the OP regarding ‘owning’ your body. If you want me to make this more concrete then think of levels of labour where I may own you, partially as decreed by a labour contract, or fully as a slave - I only ‘own’ you in such a sense as you’re willing/able to play along dependent upon your own sense of ‘control’ under the influence of some law.

I can make a law that says it is illegal for you to die whilst you’re working fir me ... meaningless law. The ‘laws’/‘rules’ merely fit around our sense of limited control, which are effectively where a sense of ownership lays in part. I’m not suggesting this is all there is to it, but it seems hard to deny it is a significant point right?

Sorry, the title got me! If it wasn’t ‘problematic’ they’d be no such thing as morality.

Seriously though, ‘morality’ to me is about me. It is a deeply personal thing that tends to become diluted when explicated in public sphere. The true heart of my ‘morals’ lies in the darkest parts of myself and keeps me wishing to ‘adhere with rules’ rather than be ‘moral’.

For me the ‘purest’ moral act comes down to committing a hideous act knowingly for what you believe to be implicitly an overarching good - and this is done knowing you’ll become ‘lesser’ and suffer as a consequence. Of course this is merely hypothetical as there is no ‘implicit good’ we can see or a ‘pure’ moral act imaginable in the sense I outline. Basically I just mean to do good whilst expecting to suffer indefinitely. When the chips are down it appears enough of us humans do step up, but I don’t assume for a second I would but I know I wouldn’t like to - who would other than those with a desire to suffer?

But what is a ‘useless’ thing? What had no ‘use value’? Nothing. So why not say ‘unused value’?

jamalrob’s take doesn’t work here because Marx has already made explicit that ‘wheat’ or ‘iron’ have ‘use value’ yet are we to assume the Earth itself as ‘making’ these items for us to use? I don’t see how that position can work given that raw materials are said to have ‘use value’. Whether or not an item is ‘produced’ for selling is irrelevant to it’s ‘use value’ - Marx states this clearly enough.

The exchange makes a ‘product’ a ‘commodity’ and then the ‘use value’ alters to ‘Value’. If I produce art with no intention of selling it and then someone steals it from me they can most certainly sell it regardless of my personal intentions.

I can only charitably assume ‘useless’ means ‘unused’. The other option is equivalent to closing my eyes and saying I’m blind. Is it at all reasonable to think that maybe, just maybe, there is a common error in translation here? It does say “nutzlos” though which is “useless” ... so I guess Oscar Wilde would be in agreement with his statement that ‘Art is useless’? What other ‘work’ or ‘product’ could be deemed absent of Value (even potential value)?

This would lead back to my initial concern. That Marx pays no attention to aesthetics, artistry, human value or social relationships in terms of ‘economics’. It seems like a deeply flawed approach to me when looking at economic structures and issues surrounding ‘value’.

Now I’ve looked further it’s partly down to a poor translation.

One that does stick out is the term ‘useless’ where I can only assume that it should read ‘unused’? If not I’d appreciate if you could explain why and provide quotes - referring to end of section one:

Finally, nothing can be a value without being an object of utility. If the thing is useless, so is the labor contained in it; the labor does not count as labor, and therefore does not create value.

http://content.csbs.utah.edu/~ehrbar/cap1.pdf

Prior to the existence of written law. That is why I mentioned ‘origin of inequality’ - a long running anthropological question.

If you look at the OP the question is far more delicate than this. Do you ‘own’ your body? Is it okay for me to ‘claim’ your body? Are your actions yours? Do you, in this sense, ‘own’ your actions?

Arguing over what some given law dictates doesn’t seem to do a great deal if we’re to get to the heart of what ‘ownership’ means. The issue of ‘rights’ is another part of this problem alongside the ‘social contract’.

Anyway, I’m curious what people think about the origins of inequality in terms of ‘property’ and ‘property rights’? How did this arise? Has ‘ownership’ always been a function of social bodies (tribes, hunter gatherers, etc.,.)?

Exactly what does that mean? Single word ‘answers’ are not even slightly convincing. How do you know Maw means the same thing as you? Does ‘power’ always mean the same thing to everyone anymore than ‘ownership’ does? Why/ why not? What are the possible applications and uses of analysing these concepts?

It could perhaps be assessed according to degree of attachment you feel to an object. What would hurt you more, the loss of your car or your wife? The answer would be what is more yours. — Congau

An obvious yet an important point. The emotional weight attached to items (due to love, hate and/or habituation) plays strongly into our sense of ‘ownership’. This would still tie into my broad view as being ‘thought’, which then shows us the use of clarity of thought when understanding how far our reach extends in terms of ‘control’.

I think it is fair to say the more negative perception of ‘power’ extends from a need to feel like we have control. Attaching a sense of greater control to situations where we have little to no control will inevitably create distress - possibly culminating in delusion, aggression and hatred.

This is an idea cut from another - not sure who said it exactly but the principle is simple enough. What we have the most control over we are in possession of. In this case we have a large degree of ‘ownership’ over our bodies but in reality we’ll grow old, become ill and die. In this sense all ‘ownership’ is necessarily limited.

My thoughts and actions are the primary source of my sense of ‘complete ownership’ - these are of course embodied so my body is entwined with the limits of my actions, and as a consequence also my thoughts.

Others senses of ‘ownership’ are based on social interactions and what is and isn’t mutually beneficial. I’m not sure what the two first replies of ‘power’ mean exactly but I guess to me ‘power’ in this framework means ‘efficiency of control’. I say this because someone with more limited control is not necessarily less ‘powerful’. In the sense of it’s not about what you’ve got it’s about what you do with it.

I’m just hoping their view of ‘power’ has more depth then a reduction to merely meaning ‘oppressive force’ - if ‘power’ meant that then we’d just call it ‘oppression’ not ‘power’. I hope their thoughts were more in line with mine?

What does ‘power’ mean then?

My understanding of what Marx is calling the mysterious quality of what is produced does not come from stuff being put on a market but from producers of things being commodities in their own right. — Valentinus

I’ve been reading this more closely and comparing translations. I think this is wrong - in the opening at least - as he appears to be talking about objects of production holding ‘commodity value’ due to the labour embodied in them (obscure as in the more thorough trans. I’ve looked at ‘embodied’ isn’t used and he instead says ‘crystalised’ but we can take it to mean roughly the same (?). Seems needlessly obscure though if this is the case).

I don’t see anything that points directly to ‘producers’ as ‘commodities’. In fact he appears to be more concerned with stating that ‘stuff put on the market’ makes something a ‘commodity’ yet this is a little contrary due to other delineations he has set out previously - ‘use value’ and ‘labour value’.

I don’t really like the translation. Also, it may be worth noting that “commodity” is a poor translation imo. The German is ‘ware’ which is equivalent to Enlgish ‘ware’ (as in goods/wares). ‘Commodity’ is a French rooted perversion of the term that puts greater emphasis on ‘use’ so ironically ‘use value’ would be more fitting for ‘commodity’ and ‘ware value’ more fitting for ‘commodity value’.

It’s clear enough for me now to tread extremely cautiously as this is a text that has been purposefully/mistakenly mistranslated and sprouted several different political functions to suit the politics of the reader.

In short, it’s a bloody mess!

Also, as I read another contradiction pops up. It is hard to see these contradictions as they’re obscured by the obtuse and ill-demarcated definitions.

Something appears to be lost in translation or am I mistaken about the ‘obtuse’ nature of the various categories of ‘value’ used. The capitalisation of Value is significant I feel in regards to how German is written (capitalised words are always nouns).

I’m curious if anyone has insight regarding this detail?

Note: Just checked another translation which shows ‘Values’ to mean ‘Commodity Values’.

After reading a little more I now see how some people espousing severe leftist ideologies have cherry-picked certain sections of Marx to justify claims that an hours labour by one person deserves the same pay as another.

It’s pretty badly written from my perspective. The concept of Value used alongside value and several other subcategories of ‘value’ hack the colloquial meaning to pieces - nothing new in terms of ‘business’ jargon having enough pomposity to make the theories sound authoritative and justified.

This could’ve been written more precisely and detailed with less words. The important definitions used don’t seem to have been given proper definitions. There is also what appears to be a forced position in regards to how to approach ‘skilled labour’ by reducing the argument to a point where all labour is viewed as ‘equal’ for some of his definitions - I understand the use of this to outline certain concepts, but it seems to have been carried through into other areas that have provided the kind of people I mentioned in the first paragraph with dangerous ammunition to make rather crazy claims about ‘labour’ and ‘value’.

All that said I can now see that when I was talking about ‘aesthetics’ it falls outside the circle of ‘commodity’ by Marx’s definition. I’m a little disappointed this important human trait (aesthetic sensibility) wasn’t given more thought.

Interesting question. I’ll state the obvious so apologies if someone else has touched on this already.

Any institution that lasts has a set of rules/laws. These are necessarily held in place by conservative attitudes not by more libertarian ideas. I think you’ll find conservatism is the mainstay across religions - which ones don’t hold strong conservative values?

I guess you could argue that buddhism is more inclined toward ‘socialism’ but it would be a soft cell. Rigor and repetition are what holds religious institutions together.

What is banal to one person is insightful to another. A ‘banal’ comment I know :)

The category of ‘ethics’/‘morality’ is something very much part of ‘philosophy’. Stoicism is certainly about ‘ethics’/‘morality’. You may as well be saying ‘ethics’ isn’t philosophy or have I missed something?

If I’m wrong can you express why Stoicism isn’t related to ethics? You seem to be trying to parcel stoicism off as part of psychology rather than as part of ethics?

Note: I’m not trying to put words into your mouth just trying to understand where you place these items in relation to each other and why.

Thanks

Philosophy of Justice and Morality

The Meaning of Morality
What do prescriptive claims, that attempt to say what is moral, even mean?

Bonus question: What do aesthetic claims, about beauty and comedy and tragedy and such, mean, and how do they relate to prescriptive claims about morality?

The Objects of Morality
What are the criteria by which to judge prescriptive claims, or what makes something moral?

The Methods of Justice
How are we to apply those criteria and decide on what to intend, what prescriptive claims to agree with?

The Subjects of Morality
What is the nature of the will, inasmuch as that means the capacity for intending and making such judgements about what to intend?

The Institutes of Justice
What is the proper governmental system, or who should be making those prescriptive judgements and how should they relate to each other and others, socially speaking?

Bonus question: How do we get people to care about governance and justice and morality to begin with?

The Importance of Justice
Why does is matter what is moral or not, good or bad, in the first place?


Bonus question:
What is the meaning of life? — Pfhorrest

I can pretty much sum up my perspective on all these matters in a ‘simple’ way.

Any public, or even internal declaration is opposed to, and dependent upon social apparatus. Our worded thoughts declare an expression of communicated ideas and expressions and only partly hold a grain of ‘independence’ yet this is only possible due to the dichotic perspective we have an only talk of independence in light of interdependence.

Moralistically speaking if one wishes to hone their sense of morality they necessarily have to address themselves in different situations that cloud their moral judgement. When I speak, like I am now, I shouldn’t be fooled into thinking I’m being ‘genuine’ to the reader as each public declaration is a kind of performance fro both my sense of self and how I perceive myself to be perceived. To truly explore my ‘moral content’ I believe it best that I try to disassociate myself as much as possible from making a public declaration. This is by no means an ‘absolute’ solution as I am then left to struggle with the communicable language (my social apparatus) with necessarily holds many emotional parts.

You may think such an impossible task does no more than instill doubt and hesitation rather than honing a sense of morality and action. It depends on how far you push and what risks you’re willing to take.

From this approach I can only say that it has turned me more to thinking about my emotions and feelings toward others as being reflections of what I frame as ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Meaning if I see ‘love’ I like it as it shows me I am capable of ‘love’ by recognising it. Likewise when I feel negatively about something I also know it as my possession - this is harder to stomach as it basically means when I state that such and such an act as ‘horrific’ I know it because I know I am capable of it.

What I am talking about here is something akin to ‘empathy’. The difference is the ‘feelings’ I am referring to are those we don’t wish to admit as our possessions. We don’t tend to see ourselves as the perpetrator of a murder or rape because we’re more inclined to associate the experience with the victim. The disgust we feel is ‘disgust’ because we know we are capable of being the one causing pain and hurt yet we’re never willing to take on that role in - for want of a better term - ‘mal-empathetic’ way. This is probably for the better in most circumstances because to take a long journey down that road is going to cause some damage without a serious attitude.

When we experience something beautiful it is because we see our own beauty, and when we experience something ugly it is because we see our own ugliness. We obviously lean more toward one than the other, yet to actively ignore one or the other doesn’t seem like a sensible course of action for any prolonged period of time.

The problem with this ‘declaration’ is that it is a declaration. So if everyone agreed with my point it would merely play into the ‘social apparatus’ and refute the inner sense of being. For me this is as ‘true’ as anything can be ‘true’. If I’m antagonised or frustrated by someone then it is because I know I am also antagonising and frustrating in my manner.

We necessarily operate within limits. Pushing ourselves to the point where the lines blur is where we can establish and/or destroy a better sense of selfhood. It’s dangerous and I doubt this thought should remain anywhere but on the periphery of conscious thought - and that is conveniently where it must lie as ‘worded thought’ tends to damped our sense of self by playing to certain social situations and further feeds the sense of ‘independent’ thought even though such worded language is an approximation of our experiential being.

Those that ‘disgust’ us the most represent that aspect of ourselves we least wish to explore, that part of ourselves we dread and fear within. To ‘think’ about being so ‘disgusting’ would fracture our sense of self and potentially our sense of ‘fortitude’ against becoming like that ‘disgusting’ person.

This is the ‘simple’ version. Something I have tried to highlight previously with an approach to the use of hypotheticals. The reactions given in those threads were interesting.

Interesting take. I certainly agree with Peterson’s use of ‘post-modern’ speech. Overall though I think Peterson has done more good than harm and I’m certainly bored of watching the whole conflated media heist that was (it’s done for now it seems) Peterson’s contributions to pop-social science and the social media frenzy that explodes whenever anyone is vaguely offended by someone they disagree with..

No one is completely right and no one is completely wrong.

I’m sure stoicism is a great approach for some people, but I truly believe it is naive to assume to suits all, or even most, personalities. I’m interested to learn more about the modern take on stoicism with the questions posed. I’ve only read sections of Epi., Aur. and Sen. I’m generally opposed to wholesale ‘ethical’ positions, yet I do think they are useful for communicating individual moral stances and exploring ideas about innate morality and law and order.

I’m not sure Stoicism is against grief. I think the issue is more about grieving the death of someone who is still alive. Once they are dead then grief is faced.

I get what you’re saying overall though. I just don’t think it sensible to take any perspective on life to an extreme view - this is why I remain suspicious of buddhist ideas.

I don’t think Stoicism is primarily about ignoring human emotions and being a lump ‘living in the moment’. My general take is that it’s about a rational means of keeping emotions in check, rather than bring numb, making choices based on what is possible, rather than fanciful, and understanding and accepting your own limitations. The later is something I’m not convinced about tbh as I think humanity is able to achieve so much because we believe beyond our own abilities and occasionally surpass ourselves.

Thanks.

The most appropriate section I’ve come across to back this up is the following:

Although use-values serve social needs and therefore exist within the social framework, they do not express the social relations of production. For instance, let us take as a use-value a commodity such as a diamond. We cannot tell by looking at it that the diamond is a commodity. Where it serves as an aesthetic or mechanical use-value, on the neck of a courtesan or in the hand of a glass-cutter, it is a diamond and not a commodity. To be a use-value is evidently a necessary prerequisite of the commodity, but it is immaterial to the use-value whether it is a commodity. Use-value as such, since it is independent of the determinate economic form, lies outside the sphere of investigation of political economy. It belongs in this sphere only when it is itself a determinate form. Use-value is the immediate physical entity in which a definite economic relationship—exchange-value—is expressed.

I’ve been having a search around and there isn’t much said in terms of ‘art’ as a ‘utility’, but it does seem to fall vaguely into that category.

Just curious, does Marx ever bother to mention aesthetic value or something like it in Das Kapital?

As a bonus question that is not something that anyone tends to ask anyone in interviews (surprisingly!).

The short version:

What is the most outrageous/unconventional idea/thought you’ve ever had in your field of interest?

The longer version:

What is your most whacky, speculative and/or contentious opinion/view/interest? Basically what ‘out there’ thought do you carry around that you wouldn’t necessarily put reasonable weight behind, but that nevertheless holds a place at the back of your mind?

I guess people don’t ask this one much because people generally don’t like to have themselves associated with an idea/view that is considered ridiculous by their peers.

Just want to say this is strange and strangely interesting thread. Keep it going :)

These are my two attempts. I could probably be more explicit with the first question, but fear it would turn into a mini essay with too many obscure points. I’m assuming it will make enough sense if he’s reasonably familiar with Husserl’s Crisis - if not I doubt it’ll make a whole lot of sense as I’m looking spceifically at Husserl’s view of psychology being consumed by ‘objective’ science and thus embedding its main line of engagement with ‘subjective’ being in a method based around a discipline of reducing ‘subjectivity’ - an obvious ‘bias’ (if it ca be called ‘bias’) as the heart of experimental science.

Question 1 (can refine - see above):

Regarding the limitations of science and Husserlian Phenomenology

As science is orientated around producing experimental data that actively absconds from ‘subjectivity’ what is there for scientific disciplines (such as psychology) to offer in terms of shining a light on ‘subjective’ contents?

This question is based on Husserl’s critique of modern psychology and his attempts to point toward a ‘subjective science’ as opposed to, but NOT in opposition to, the objectivity of science.

And/also, I heard an interview on Philosophy Now where the question of ‘science’ and ‘logic’ was touched on briefly. As Husserlian Phenomenology was concerned with the ‘origin’ of logic how exactly do you relate logic/mathematics to science? Is this essentially the area that defines the ‘limitations’ of what is and isn’t ‘science’?

I was also a little confused by someone stating in that interview (not yourself, yet you seemed to be in some agreement) that some ‘phenomenological’ approach was ‘illusionary’ and ‘silly’. Granted this appears to have been in reference more or less to more ‘literary’ ideas rather than Husserlian Phenomoenlogy, but clarification on this point would be nice.

Note: I view Husserl as making attempts to undercover a rational means of finding a ‘subjective’ measurement of phenomenal items that fail to fall into regular means of ‘measuring’ - meaning as an approach to delineate subjective contexts. As a brief example as a way of distinguishing Mental Movement from Physical Movement. By this I mean when I pick up a chair the environment ‘mentally moves’ around this focus of attention, where physically the ‘movement’ is the chair within the environment, or as another example looking ‘into’ a mirror being differentiated from looking ‘at’ the mirror - the point being the empirical data in both circumstances is identical yet the conscious experiences highlighted are delineated.

OR

Question 2:

Regarding the use of philosophy for science and the application of dichotomies and magnitudes

As you appear to have stated in the discussion with Dennett and Krauss, you believe the use of philosophy to be how to examine questions and sort out what questions are of use and what limits a question may or may not have. In terms of experience what has philosophy to say outside of the Husserlian Phenomenological approach and leaving aside its function as a means of putting worded questions into hierarchies of importance/use? My view here is is that philosophy is generally engaged in demarcating, and selecting, different and vague dichotomies and magnitudes - in linguistics choosing what ‘antonym’ (the ‘gradable’, ‘complimentary pair’, and/or ‘relational pair’) fits and how/if measurements can be made in an accurate/‘universal’ enough manner.

I’m not considering the ‘labour’ here. Marx makes a point to ignore this too by saying:

The different proportions in which different sorts of labour are reduced to unskilled labour as their standard, are established by a social process that goes on behind the backs of the producers, and, consequently, appear to be fixed by custom. For simplicity’s sake we shall henceforth account every kind of labour to be unskilled, simple labour; by this we do no more than save ourselves the trouble of making the reduction.

...

While, therefore, with reference to use value, the labour contained in a commodity counts only qualitatively, with reference to value it counts only quantitatively, and must first be reduced to human labour pure and simple. In the former case, it is a question of How and What, in the latter of How much? How long a time? Since the magnitude of the value of a commodity represents only the quantity of labour embodied in it, it follows that all commodities, when taken in certain proportions, must be equal in value.

I’m concerned about the ‘qualitative’ aspect of these economic interactions, and furthermore the qualitative value embedded within the commodities that cannot be given monetary value in such a way that it is a fungible item.

The clash not mentioned yet is the mass production combined with individual wants and needs (practically and as status symbols - fashions and trends), and the sense of individual identity and ‘worth’.

Note the bold above. Here we have a simplistic reduction that points out ‘labour’ as representing the ‘value’ - the time spent as the intrinsic ‘value’. The ‘proportions’ mentioned are essentially the means of a fungible function which is founded in a universal system (money). The problem, as I see it, is that the ‘worth’ associated with commodities and labour is merely brought about by measuring only what we can measure with reasonable universal agreement dictated by market demands and the distribution of resources. The ‘Commodity Fetishism’, as far as I can see, is that ALL sense of ‘value’ is put into this idea of ‘resource’ (material only) and its extraction (’simple labour’ only), with no serious regard put to finding a way of tackling the extremely difficult problem of less measurable items of human interaction, such as basic appreciation, security, artistic expression, experience (skill and talent), and human attitudes and beliefs.

The way I see it ‘money’ is certainly a useful and highly applicable means of distributing resources based on wants and needs, but it clearly isn’t a universally fungible function - I cannot literally ‘buy’ anything I wish for or need with money alone. The issue with economics, since its modern inception, is the adherence to ‘resources’ as ‘monetary’ and nothing more than that. There is no workable system of measuring human emotions that integrate with current economic systems because there is historical a system of mass production, franchising, and interest in material gain above and beyond personal development - even the educational institutions are set up in this manner; historically speaking.

My point is that for pretty much the first time inhuman history citizens of Earth can communicate over vast distances almost instantaneously and that these vast webs of human interactions are able to individualise the ‘market place’. It doesn’t take a genius to see that there are individuals around the globe that used to think they were alone and now they find themselves able to interact with hundreds or thousands of like-minded people that they never knew existed before. An example is this site and others that delve into all manner of personal interests and hobbies. The days of the internet being open only to a select few are pretty much over too.

This means that, in accord with the original post, that ‘Commodity Fetishism’ will lessen because what becomes important to people in their exchanges is the personal element. There is also a constant demand for ‘new’/‘original’/‘novel’ items, driven by a combination of aesthetic taste and ‘trends’/‘fashions’ related to “Status Fetishism“ - meaning the drive to fit in conflicting with the drive to stand apart from - which, no matter how it pans out, will drive creativity and choice destroying ‘mass production’ in favour of ‘personalised production’. Such an increase will turn people away from ‘having’/‘owning’ what someone else has and become more about personal expression overall. This is the essence of why I am saying ‘Commodity Fetishism’ will reduce and arguably already is reducing, because people are being exposed to each other and the inherent value of living among people on an economic front that is essentially encouraging intrapersonal collaboration and emotional interactions. Today it is not simply the super-rich that can affordably interact with someone to produce a custom made item.

Couple the above argument up with technological advances and we’re firmly in unknown territory even more so than what we are right now with what little we do know and can vaguely appreciate about he dynamic changes to global society.

People are not machines for labour nor or they consumers of items. The whole modern perspective on economics is so completely delusional that I’m surprised this hasn’t been mentioned more prominently before. I’m not saying it hasn’t been mentioned, but I guess the difficulty inherent is that there is no means of ‘measuring’ the important aspects of being human and that ‘Commodity Fetishism’ is an example of this disjoint where ‘value’ is only associated economically to what can be measured in a ‘monetary’ sense.

I’m not offering this as a ‘solution’. It is a critique of economics at large I guess.

Whatever there is that can create a better economic environment for every one I strongly feel that it will take the form of enhanced opportunities to experience and an educational framework within which people are actively supported and encourage to explore possible opportunities and take part in experiences outside of their usual social spaces.

I stick to the proposal that current ‘marketing’/‘advertising’ techniques are being consumed by personal online exchanges and that, with some irony, the large corporations are breaking themselves apart by funding independent ventures based on ‘personal exchanges’ rather than on scheme for ‘mass production’ and flooding the market. The internet has certainly made artists of all sorts able to make a respectable living where in the past they’d have had to give up their passions in favour of eating To having a roof over their heads.

Really this thought all stems from aesthetic appreciation and how those that wish to ‘own’ an item to present some kind of ‘status symbol’ will inevitably fall under the spell of aesthetic valuation above and beyond the initial (and perhaps subconscious) ‘status’ function of popular items. You may call this ‘branding’ but if there is no ‘brand’ we’re no longer presenting ‘brands’ only something of intrinsic aesthetic value to those who look on.

Articles such as this

https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ch/Documents/consumer-business/ch-en-consumer-business-made-to-order-consumer-review.pdf

Show there has been a push in marketing to ‘entice consumers’. My belief is that this drive for personalised items will increase further and further to the point that ‘brands’/‘labels’ will become hidden and then eventually disappear. In the above article 46% said they would prefer choice within a ‘brand’, but I don’t see this holding up for long as the item made by a known person/s holds more weight of trust than one made on a production line (both in terms of quality and customisation). The only obvious point here, that I’m not avoiding, is the cost of products. This will mean that some items will remain more or less the realm of mass production to some degree as functional items are not generally ‘custom made’ for obvious reasons. I’m not suggesting that ‘mass production’ is necessarily a bad thing only that today there is an inevitable shift away from generic goods that are attached to aesthetic quality more than say a metal screw or a hammer.

How far will the aesthetic need reach into the ‘consumer world’? I don’t know. Maybe it won’t go much further than what it already has? Given a world where 3D printers for all manner of goods may as ordinary as sending an email or text I’m not really sure what the limitations of this could be.

Anyway, thanks for the comments. Please expand your thoughts further if you wish. As yoi can see from the body of text this has numerous areas and applications to a whole array of ideas and questions about global economics and resource management - I’ve only briefly managed to touch on the potential power behind an increased public interest in aesthetic quality (by way of pursuing status symbols) and what potential positive/negative repercussions this could have on society at large - locally, globally, in terms of communications, and politically in terms of laws and national rule.

Tbh I probably should have done more reading up on this subject for a few months and pondered its possible applications more thoroughly. The idea gripped me quite strongly though and had to try and express it as best I could.

Okay, I’ll try and figure out a way to word my question that is broad and specific enough in regards to the limits of science.

Thanks