I’ve been having a search around and there isn’t much said in terms of ‘art’ as a ‘utility’, but it does seem to fall vaguely into that category.

I think art is an exception to the kind of commodity production that Marx identifies as being the normal capitalist way of going on. Art is more akin to previous, less alienated modes of production. In any case, Marx wasn't remotely concerned with it in Capital, because it's atypical.

But if you're thinking of art production as a model of un-alienated production and exchange, then maybe you're on to something.

In Capital, as fdrake suggests, Marx identifies anything that we value as a use value before we consider whether and how it's being produced for and exchanged in a market. It doesn't matter for his purposes, in that work, in what way these things are useful or desired: they can be any kind of wanted things, not only necessities but also works of art, entertainment, gratification, etc.

By the way, don't mistake Marx's neglect here, in Capital, for a temperamental or moral neglect of art in general.

Thanks.

The most appropriate section I’ve come across to back this up is the following:

Although use-values serve social needs and therefore exist within the social framework, they do not express the social relations of production. For instance, let us take as a use-value a commodity such as a diamond. We cannot tell by looking at it that the diamond is a commodity. Where it serves as an aesthetic or mechanical use-value, on the neck of a courtesan or in the hand of a glass-cutter, it is a diamond and not a commodity. To be a use-value is evidently a necessary prerequisite of the commodity, but it is immaterial to the use-value whether it is a commodity. Use-value as such, since it is independent of the determinate economic form, lies outside the sphere of investigation of political economy. It belongs in this sphere only when it is itself a determinate form. Use-value is the immediate physical entity in which a definite economic relationship—exchange-value—is expressed.

After reading a little more I now see how some people espousing severe leftist ideologies have cherry-picked certain sections of Marx to justify claims that an hours labour by one person deserves the same pay as another.

It’s pretty badly written from my perspective. The concept of Value used alongside value and several other subcategories of ‘value’ hack the colloquial meaning to pieces - nothing new in terms of ‘business’ jargon having enough pomposity to make the theories sound authoritative and justified.

This could’ve been written more precisely and detailed with less words. The important definitions used don’t seem to have been given proper definitions. There is also what appears to be a forced position in regards to how to approach ‘skilled labour’ by reducing the argument to a point where all labour is viewed as ‘equal’ for some of his definitions - I understand the use of this to outline certain concepts, but it seems to have been carried through into other areas that have provided the kind of people I mentioned in the first paragraph with dangerous ammunition to make rather crazy claims about ‘labour’ and ‘value’.

All that said I can now see that when I was talking about ‘aesthetics’ it falls outside the circle of ‘commodity’ by Marx’s definition. I’m a little disappointed this important human trait (aesthetic sensibility) wasn’t given more thought.

Also, as I read another contradiction pops up. It is hard to see these contradictions as they’re obscured by the obtuse and ill-demarcated definitions.

Something appears to be lost in translation or am I mistaken about the ‘obtuse’ nature of the various categories of ‘value’ used. The capitalisation of Value is significant I feel in regards to how German is written (capitalised words are always nouns).

I’m curious if anyone has insight regarding this detail?

Note: Just checked another translation which shows ‘Values’ to mean ‘Commodity Values’.

It would help if you described the contradiction.

Now I’ve looked further it’s partly down to a poor translation.

One that does stick out is the term ‘useless’ where I can only assume that it should read ‘unused’? If not I’d appreciate if you could explain why and provide quotes - referring to end of section one:

Finally, nothing can be a value without being an object of utility. If the thing is useless, so is the labor contained in it; the labor does not count as labor, and therefore does not create value.

http://content.csbs.utah.edu/~ehrbar/cap1.pdf

People will only buy things they can use. Something needs to have a use value in order for it to have an exchange value. When both apply, an item is a commodity and it has value.

There can be use values produced without exchange values; or an item made which is not made to be sold for profit; like art can be in @jamalrob's take.

But what is a ‘useless’ thing? What had no ‘use value’? Nothing. So why not say ‘unused value’?

jamalrob’s take doesn’t work here because Marx has already made explicit that ‘wheat’ or ‘iron’ have ‘use value’ yet are we to assume the Earth itself as ‘making’ these items for us to use? I don’t see how that position can work given that raw materials are said to have ‘use value’. Whether or not an item is ‘produced’ for selling is irrelevant to it’s ‘use value’ - Marx states this clearly enough.

The exchange makes a ‘product’ a ‘commodity’ and then the ‘use value’ alters to ‘Value’. If I produce art with no intention of selling it and then someone steals it from me they can most certainly sell it regardless of my personal intentions.

I can only charitably assume ‘useless’ means ‘unused’. The other option is equivalent to closing my eyes and saying I’m blind. Is it at all reasonable to think that maybe, just maybe, there is a common error in translation here? It does say “nutzlos” though which is “useless” ... so I guess Oscar Wilde would be in agreement with his statement that ‘Art is useless’? What other ‘work’ or ‘product’ could be deemed absent of Value (even potential value)?

This would lead back to my initial concern. That Marx pays no attention to aesthetics, artistry, human value or social relationships in terms of ‘economics’. It seems like a deeply flawed approach to me when looking at economic structures and issues surrounding ‘value’.

That Marx pays no attention to aesthetics, artistry, human value or social relationships in terms of ‘economics’. — I like sushi

An odd claim, considering seeing money as a social form of exchange is central to the value theory.

The exchange makes a ‘product’ a ‘commodity’ and then the ‘use value’ alters to ‘Value’. If I produce art with no intention of selling it and then someone steals it from me they can most certainly sell it regardless of my personal intentions. — I like sushi

So there are two sources of profit. One is profit through exchange. One is profit through producing goods for exchange. The two unify into the operation of profit for capital. You can't produce profit through exchange without produced goods. Nor can you sell (things which have been created for private use or have no labour expended in their creation or application) without there being an economy capable of such exchange. Ultimately for Marx, all sources of profit come from labour expended in production (the creation of surplus value). He's explicit on this point in Theories of Surplus Value in his comment on Steuart:

(For Steuart) The price of goods therefore comprises two elements that are completely different from each other; firstly their real value, secondly, the profit upon alienation, the profit realised through their transfer to another person, their sale.

||221| This profit upon alienation therefore arises from the price of the goods being greater than their real value, or from the goods being sold above their value. Gain on the one side therefore always involves loss on the other. No addition to the general stock is created. Profit, that is, surplus-value, is relative and resolves itself into “a vibration of the balance of wealth between parties”. Steuart himself rejects the idea that surplus-value can be explained in this way. His theory of “vibration of the balance of wealth between parties”, however little it touches the nature and origin of surplus-value itself, remains important in considering the distribution of surplus-value among different classes and among different categories such as profit, interest and rent.

The overall picture is: you have a ledger with a piece of art in it worth x, the person you're selling it to has a ledger with x money in it. You exchange the good. You've now got x money. The other person has the piece of art. The total over all ledgers remains the same. Profit through exchange is a redistribution of value among participants, not value creative. It requires there to be a value structure to "immerse" the apparently independently produced commodity in. Once you exchange it, you establish "this piece of art is worth x".

Moreover, prices can diverge from values, and usually do. You can assign a price to things which are not products of value creative labour - like pieces of art and natural resources, so having 0 labour time embodied vs having a nonzero price.

Objects that in themselves are no commodities, such as conscience, honour, &c., are capable of being offered for sale by their holders, and of thus acquiring, through their price, the form of commodities. Hence an object may have a price without having value. The price in that case is imaginary, like certain quantities in mathematics. On the other hand, the imaginary price-form may sometimes conceal either a direct or indirect real value-relation; for instance, the price of uncultivated land, which is without value, because no human labour has been incorporated in it

I don't think you're studying patiently enough. If it helps, imagine the account so far as having all value coming from production of commodities for exchange. If there's some external thing - like a natural resource or a piece of art (anything which is created through private labour or is not created through labour at all) - it must be introduced to the economy through exchange; that is, it obtains a valuation consistent with the value form which is operative in the economy that exchange takes place within.

Something needs to have a use value in order for it to have an exchange value. — fdrake

Of course, because everything had ‘use value’ so why bother stating this? Unless Marx says otherwise somewhere that there is some ‘object’ that had no ‘use value’. Please show me where?

You seem to be avoiding the thrust of the issue here. WHAT is meant here:

If the thing is useless, so is the labor contained in it; the labor does not count as labor, and therefore does not create value.

What is a ‘useless’ thing? I’m simply suggesting this means ‘unused’ OR it’s a terrible way of saying ‘not value, but still use value’ meaning the ‘useless’ as ‘value’ not ‘use value’.

What comes later does concern me right now as this is within the opening section of the work. It’s needless obtuse or contrary.

So what you want from Marx is an analysis of what it means for something to be useful. Rather than more cursory remarks regarding how something has to be useful in order for it to be sold. I can't think of a particularly good definition of use value that doesn't require knowing how "use" works.

A use value is a thing's capacity to be used for a range of activities (including biological processes, aesthetic appreciation, social lubricant...). Use values depend on the thing's material properties and the role those material properties together play in the social contexts associated with the thing.

I say capacity because a spoon in a submarine wreck could still be used as a spoon even if it is not used as a spoon now. This comes from the social function of spoons as cutlery, and our propensity to consume food which is liquid.

Maybe this will do: a use value is a thing which can satisfy human want or need. We tend to produce things which do this. We tend to produce use values.

Are there things which cannot satisfy human want or need? Dunno, humans are pretty flexible. We'd probably be better off looking historically there (as Marx says, discovering use values is the work of history) - would a powdered egg shell be of use to anyone in 20,000BC? Maybe they'd still enjoy snorting it... maybe there're social customs that would develop based on snorting powdered eggs. Who knows.

What I wanted was the meaning of ‘useless’ explained. I was pretty explicit about the issue I had. If you cannot think of anything then I’ll just have to put that term down as a mistake or needless obtuse. Either way, something is off.

What I wanted was the meaning of ‘useless’ explained. — I like sushi

Satisfies no human want or need?

Can you at least see my issue here? The conflict of terms?

If a ‘use value’ becomes a ‘Value’ (commodity) then the ‘use value’ is covered up. So is he saying that both ‘Value’ is useless because ‘use value’ is out of sight, and/or that a kind of ‘unpotentialised use value’ is useless, because it is again out of sight.

For instances of these confusions:

So is also the establishment of social measures for the quantities of these useful objects.
The diversity of these measures of commodities originates in part from the diverse nature of the objects to be measured, and in part from convention.

The usefulness of a thing makes it a use-value.

But this usefulness does not dangle in midair. Conditioned by the physical properties of the body of the commodity, it has no existence apart from the latter.

The body itself of the commodity, such as iron, wheat, diamond, etc., is therefore a use-value or a good.

This characteristic of a commodity does not depend on whether appropriating its useful properties costs more or less labor.

Pay particular attention to the bold. I am saying there no thing that is wholly absent of ‘usefulness’ - there is no ‘useless’ item. As this is a key concept I have instant doubts about where this is going already as there is a lack of precision - repeated later with over simplification regarding skilled labour.

Also:

The commodity is at first an exterior object, a thing, which by its properties satisfies human wants of one sort or another.

The nature of such wants, whether they arise, for instance, from the stomach or from
imagination, makes no difference.

Nor does it matter here how the object satisfies these human wants, whether directly as object of consumption, or indirectly as means of production.

Can anyone suggest anything that doesn’t have the potential to satisfy ’human wants or needs’? It’s a chimera.

The last bold part does seem to suggest ‘self-entertainment’- but I’m being generous. The thrust of my point here is that producing something without the intent of it being open to the public as a utility doesn’t take away the ‘use-value’ as Marx defines. Yet as we’ve seen he is happy to later talk about something as ‘useless’ - which we both seem to assume means an object absent of ‘use value’ and further still he states that the ‘labour is not labour’.

The contradiction is well hidden I’ll grant that. I’m not against contradictions - I’ve read Kant - but these contradictions are presented in the same section it is not the case that he’s set up different sets of limitations and then set them out parallel to each other.

The problems continue:

Every useful thing, such as iron, paper, etc., is to be looked at under two aspects: quality and quantity.

‘Quality’ here means ‘utility’. The is the ongoing problem of human existence in many ways and an age old question. How to measure different ‘qualities’ against each other. To then dress up ‘quality’ as ‘utility’ is to say the quality of something has nothing to do with aesthetics as it is all about how an object can be utilized not about any direct consideration of ‘qualities’ just practical functions irrespective of any human sense of aesthetic taste.

I assume all he is trying to say here is that the ‘utility’ (‘use-value, not ‘quality’) of resources are Valued (as in ‘Value’) by how they function the production of a commodity. The ‘utility’ for every item conceivable is always present, yet not always fulfilled - by ‘wants or needs’ due to ignorance or knowledge.

There is NO ‘useless’ resource present in opposition to ‘use-value’. It’s a value dichotomy. There most certainly are unfulfilled ‘use-values’. The fulfilled ‘use-values’ inevitably embody an object with value regardless of whether this ‘value’ extends beyond the personal sphere into the public.

To return to the first quote and provide another translation:

But this usefulness does not dangle in midair. Conditioned by the physical properties of the body of the commodity, it has no existence apart from the latter.

The utility of a thing makes it a use value. But this utility is not a thing of air. Being limited by the physical properties of the commodity, it has no existence apart from that commodity.

This is wrong. There is ‘existence’ within the conscious human being. We don’t merely act upon the world as an exterior influence, we actively impose ourselves upon it. The ‘utility’ of resources don’t jump out to us like sentient beings. We have an intent, a sense of time and place, and go to play in the word of things directed partly by our aesthetic disposition not entirely as reactionary beings absent of agency.

The whole premise is actually based on this thought. We brought resources into a position where we can refer to them as ‘commodities’ to be exchanged, improved and engaged with. We simply have a drive to utilise our environment and the ‘Value’ is an aspect of measuring ‘efficiency’. Even this barely touching on the ‘utility’ of human interactions outside of what many consider ‘economics’. From what I’ve read Marx has done no more than sharpen the capitalist sword rather than offer a new means of engagement in the sphere of ‘economics’ - maybe I was expecting way too much :)

Anyway, maybe I’m not discussing what you wished to discuss in this thread? Either way I think my time would be better spent keeping my thoughts mostly to myself for now as I work my way through the text. I like the line of questions he presents even if I find the presentation wanting.

Anyway, maybe I’m not discussing what you wished to discuss in this thread? Either way I think my time would be better spent keeping my thoughts mostly to myself for now as I work my way through the text. I like the line of questions he presents even if I find the presentation wanting. — I like sushi

To be honest I think what you're saying is irrelevant to the argument.

Use value - (a use value is...) item that satisfies human wants or needs. Item considered under the aspect of human want or need satisfaction. The wants or needs a human can attempt to fulfil with the device (use value of...). These are facilitated by the properties of the object. If something can't be used for a specific purpose, it does not have that use value - it is useless for that task.

Exchange value - (an exchange value is) what a commodity trades for. (an exchange value of) What a commodity is of equal worth to.

Value - a system of valuation that gives specific values of a specific form to commodities in a network of exchange.

Also:

From what I’ve read Marx has done no more than sharpen the capitalist sword rather than offer a new means of engagement in the sphere of ‘economics’ - maybe I was expecting way too much :) — I like sushi

Value does come to cover up use value. Things are produced to be sold for profit rather than to be used. Value also comes to cover up social relationships. Commodity fetishism.

I tried to deal with that here with the proposition that this condition is changing due to what I guess we can call ‘status value’ being subsumed by ‘aesthetic value’.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/7076/marxs-commodity-fetishism/p1

I was mostly thinking out loud at the start of the thread, but I think the last 2-3 posts of that thread expressed my thoughts more concisely.

Anyway, thanks for the exchange :) it’s been extremely useful in helping me see what I mean and where I’m looking. Lots of things bouncing around my stupid little skull so I better vomit on some paper more before returning.

I quite like reading Marx as something of a metaphysician; what would metaphysics have to look like for what he's saying to be true? I enjoy reading him with that emphasis - as a social metaphysician as well as an economist.

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=eMJk4y9NGvE