As I understand it, his main concern is not with what is in the world, its content, but what stands outside of it. — Fooloso4

Yes, but W never says that there is actually something outside the world, I guess this does not make any sense for him. Being outside the world is equivalent to being at the world's limit.

The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world.
— T 5.632

This quote has been of my interest recently. Does it imply a form of solipsism? — Wallows

I think what he means is that for someone to be able to describe the world fully, as philosophers commonly purport to do/have done, he must go the world's limit, exit the world that is, and look at it from the outside, outside looking in, like they say. Which is why he says later:

5.64 Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with
pure realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless
point and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.

i.e. at the world's limit, at logic's limit, solipsism=realism, but this so-called equality holds only at that limit, and philosophers (the philosophical I) are or are striving to be solipsists.

If the limits of logic and the world are the same then by determining a limit to the world we can determine a limit of logic.

Here is the most important case:

The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world.
— T 5.632 — Fooloso4

Yes, presumably. However W says that we cannot determine a limit to either of them (rest of 5.61). We can only say that they have the same limit (because logic fills/pervades the world - so in that sense, they are one and the same), but there isn't any investigation we can make that could lead us finding that limit.

As to language:

What any picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it—correctly or incorrectly—in any way at all, is logical form, i.e. the form of reality.
— T 2.18

The propositions of logic describe the scaffolding of the world, or rather they represent it. They have no ‘subject-matter’. They presuppose that names have meaning and elementary propositions sense; and that is their connexion with the world. It is clear that something about the world must be indicated by the fact that certain combinations of symbols—whose essence involves the possession of a determinate character—are tautologies. This contains the decisive point.
— T 6.124 — Fooloso4

I think what he means by this is that logic rests on its head, so to speak, in a closed circle, a sphere rather, as I quoted T 5.4541 above: that the propositions of logic (and logic in general), being tautologies, can only describe/show/represent the structure, the form of the world, but they do not actually tell us absolutely anything about the world's content.

5.61 says that the limits of logic and the world are the same, the statement does not include language. Limits can be drawn (or set) to language, but not to logic.

The tractatus is all about limits: limits to language, to thought, to propositions, and as they play their role in probabilities. However, we dont see limits drawn (or set) to logic: we cannot think illogically, as he writes. And there is no mention of limiting logic either, as it is the case with language and thought. This is what i meant earlier.

but if thats the case, he would/should have said "set limits to what cannot be thought clearly". The ogden trans is worse, since it actually says "the unthinkable".

As for the illogical, we see the pattern here repeating, thinkable/unthinkable - logical/illogical. But i really doubt that W saw anything as illogical.

Exactly, proposition 4.114 I had in mind when I wrote above:

...But this assertion has commentators confused, since it seems that there are contradictory remarks in the Tractatus, the relation between logic, thought and sense, I mean. — Pussycat

I remember reading about this a while ago, some find it contradictory, others not. I don't know what to make of it, I just don't bother with thoughts in the Tractatus (what can be thought), but only with language (what can be said).

This is the second step in W.’s attempt to draw the limits of thoughts. — Fooloso4

The demarcation of logical space is essential to the limits of thought and language. — Fooloso4

Thus the aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather—not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts … It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn. — T Preface

So do you think that the Tractatus asserts that a limit to thought can be drawn, or should we take what he says in the preface, that the limit can only be drawn in language (and not in thought)?

How far my efforts agree with those of other philosophers I will not
decide. Indeed what I have here written makes no claim to novelty in
points of detail; and therefore I give no sources, because it is indifferent
to me whether what I have thought has already been thought before me
by another.

And so the Tractatus is one of the few philosophical works of the modern era, since the time that philosophy has been made into a system and standardised, since philosophers were obliged to give sources - by whom, is a question - that pays no or very little attention to sources, which can be seen as a sign of arrogance and impertinence on the part of the writer, but then again, others might see it differently.

I will only mention that to the great works of Frege and the writings
of my friend Bertrand Russell I owe in large measure the stimulation of
my thoughts.

Like master like man, like they say. :)

If this work has a value it consists in two things. First that in it
thoughts are expressed, and this value will be the greater the better the
thoughts are expressed. The more the nail has been hit on the head.—
Here I am conscious that I have fallen far short of the possible. Simply
because my powers are insufficient to cope with the task.—May others
come and do it better.

... or to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle. It seems that language games - proverbs and the sort - have always been part of Wittgensteinian thought since the beginning, but maybe he was too timid then, lacking in self-confidence, weak even, to promote and support them in his philosophical system, which he did at a later time when he had grown stronger. Nevertheless, he was always sincere enough to admit and confess that he had trouble coping with language: "My difficulty is only an - enormous - difficulty of expression", or blaming himself: "I work quite diligently and wish that I were better and smarter. And these both are one and the same". I explain myself so that I won't get misexplained, like they say.

Now, if I am allowed to cheat a little, I would like to quote some passages from later in the book:

4.003 Most propositions and questions, that have been written about
philosophical matters, are not false, but senseless. We cannot,
therefore, answer questions of this kind at all, but only
state their senselessness. Most questions and propositions of
the philosophers result from the fact that we do not understand
the logic of our language.

(They are of the same kind as the question whether the Good
is more or less identical than the Beautiful.)
And so it is not to be wondered at that the deepest problems
are really no problems.

So the issue for W is how can our language, or rather its use, become the clearest it can be. This examination ends up being an investigation into the logic that governs the world, and so the various language problems become logical problems, which he considers they are, or must be, the simplest of all:

5.4541 The solution of logical problems must be simple for they set the
standard of simplicity.

Men have always thought that there must be a sphere of
questions whose answers—a priori—are symmetrical and united
into a closed regular structure.

A sphere in which the proposition, simplex sigillum veri, is
valid.

The sphere to which he is referring brings a little bit of Parmenides, if anyone has heard of it/him.

While "simplex sigillum veri" means "simplicity is the sign of truth" in Latin. Or "Keep it simple, stupid" in English, which has KISS as an acronym, like the guys in the US Navy, being in a playful mood, commonly say.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KISS_principle

A minimalist approach, that is, an economy, like the "principle of least action" in the physical world, consisting of a small number of axioms or principles or concepts that everyone can understand.

True, I guess we will see that in the future.

But les us continue with the preface:

The book deals with the problems of philosophy and shows, as I
believe, that the method of formulating these problems rests on the misunderstanding
of the logic of our language. Its whole meaning could be
summed up somewhat as follows: What can be said at all can be said
clearly; and whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent.

How far my efforts agree with those of other philosophers I will not
decide. Indeed what I have here written makes no claim to novelty in
points of detail;

And indeed he was right not to claim novelty, for many of the thoughts and ideas in the Tractatus had already been expressed by others, basically idealist philosophers dealing in logic, figures like Aristotle and Plato among the ancients, Kant and Hegel among his near contemporaries, Frege and Russell among his peers, at least the ones I know of and have studied, more or less. But there were some fresh and new ideas as well. In any case, I think that his main idea - one that he never abandoned - was very clearly expressed, much more clear than any other thinker ever did. Which is, as he states above, that many, if not all, philosophical problems are not really problems, but only appear so due to the misuse of language, as if language has been compromised somehow. This reminds of Kant and his work, the "Critique of Pure Reason".

The book will, therefore, draw a limit to thinking, or rather—not to
thinking, but to the expression of thoughts; for, in order to draw a limit
to thinking we should have to be able to think both sides of this limit
(we should therefore have to be able to think what cannot be thought).

The limit can, therefore, only be drawn in language and what lies on
the other side of the limit will be simply nonsense.

So, according to the Tractatus, a limit to thinking cannot be drawn, since we have to think the unthinkable. A limit in thinking may as well exist, but we, as humans, wouldn't know what this limit is or where it lies. However, the same does not hold for language, the expression of thoughts that is, where we can draw a limit between things that make sense and others that do not - the nonsensical. But this assertion has commentators confused, since it seems that there are contradictory remarks in the Tractatus, the relation between logic, thought and sense, I mean.

Yes, there are differences, the main being, I think, that tractarian forms are essentially possibilities of object configurations, whereas in Plato, well I don't know what they are in Plato, I don't think it is made clear, but most probably platonic forms share the same level of abstractness as objects in the Tractatus. Whereas forms have been defined in the Tractatus in terms of objects, these objects remain unclear, just as the platonic forms remain unclear.

Very platonic the Tractatus, wouldn't you agree?

The Tractatus is an austerely beautiful and simple work. One would do well to read it instead of reading about it. To that end I will be following and perhaps contributing. — Fooloso4

Yes, like Nietzsche advises, read the original. Alas, my german is poor, but luckily Wittgenstein took care to provide an english translation!

Well! Despite all of Tractatus's problems and the author's later dismissal of his own book, it still, somehow, remains an important work on logic. But if we are to start at the beginning, just like the king said to the white rabbit in Lewis' Caroll book "Alice in Wonderland": "Begin at the beginning, and go on till you come to the end: then stop", then I think we should first see what Wittgenstein has to say in the preface:

This book will perhaps only be understood by those who have themselves
already thought the thoughts which are expressed in it—or similar
thoughts. It is therefore not a text-book. Its object would be attained
if there were one person who read it with understanding and to whom it
afforded pleasure. — Wittgenstein

So there are some prerequisites for understanding the book, because Wittgenstein spent a great deal of his time thinking about the connection of logic to language, most probably had long conversations about that with his supervisor Bertrand Russell, and it seems that he has aware of the progress that Gottlob Frege made on the matter, so the Tractatus can be seen as a response to thoughts expressed by these thinkers, and more. But what is interesting in the section above, is his last sentence concerning the book's object, seeking out just one person to both understand it and like it, so that it could be considered a success, a failure otherwise. But if we - analysts - are to remain loyal to Wittgenstein and the Tractatus, then I reckon that we should do and expect the same, that our goal would be accomplished should there be someone that reads our comments with understanding and takes pleasure from them, otherwise we would have failed to render the book's intended meaning.

(Here is a good place for someone to wonder - especially one that didn't take pleasure - whether pleasure is related to understanding, and vice versa).

Wallows! You there man?

yeah ok, they are the same. But how does this answer the question??? Of course it doesnt, because it is an answer to some other question that you had in mind, something like: "who are the modern scientists?", something irrelevant and indifferent that is.

haha, ok this seems reasonable. After all it's better to do a fresh start, like they say, I mean why on earth would you consider a start at, say, the poor condition we are in today, it's better to reshuffle the cards and hope for the best! Maybe you will get a better card this time, maybe not... But then again as Einstein said: "Stupidity is doing same thing and expecting different results". :)

Or is there something very special for that particular point?

But if the choice of start/end points is arbitrary, then why do we preferentially choose the Big Bang as a start?

But the circle of time must have had a beginning, right? Or is it beginning-less you say?

So entropy is not connected in anyway to time and vice-versa?

So one could say that the universe began at the point of the big bang, but this only appears to us so, it's not what really happens/happened: since time is circular, this process of big bang/crunch repeats itself indefinitely and eternally, right?

What I am saying is that if time moves in the direction of entropy increasing, then at the time of the Big Crunch, and as long as entropy is decreasing, time is running backwards: the universe is folding in itself, only to unfold again in the big bang. And the other thing that troubles me is that if time is circular and we are indeed on that circle, then at what point on that circle did the universe began, at the point of the big crunch/bang or someother?

so its like a dog following a tail, only to discover it is its own? Heads and tails in time, but we are certain that there is indeed a head at the front, with a tail at the back, and thus future is differentiated from the past. But if time is circular, how can we distinguish? Say an event A that is on the left hemisphere of the circle and an event B that is on the right, which one is older?

And also there is the problem with entropy: entropy is supposedly accumulating reaching to a maximum, then suddenly or rather abruptly, it drops down to zero, only to rise again. But for that to happen, it must mean for at least sometime, time is running backwards, correct?

so the big crunch causes the big bang, but not the other way round? Time is circular, but yet one-directional? Or is it bi?

Time causes itself?? It is its own cause?

so that makes the last effect into the first cause. But what then is the first cause?? What happens to it?

so what is the cause of the first cause?

From the beginning yes, always a good place to start, if you find it though! So, preface is next, but I dont have the time now, probably later today.

Nietzsche' s "Last Man" is antinatalist, right? While the "Ubermensch" is life affirming, life-wanting, despite all the pain and agony of life???

Basically, the main antinatalist argument is: we are all gonna die sometime, so why not sooner, why not being born at all? What is gained by "living"?

And what is this scientific conception of reality?

As it is now, scientists are dazed and confused, and sound like theologians!!

I dont understand what you mean, but I got the impression that you have something seriously wrong here. Anyway, this will be dealt with when treating the Tractatus. My point in making the above comments was to show that there can be different interpretations leading to completely different conclusions: one reading was that of the now dead logical atomism.


I think it mostly depends on what the "silent things" are thought and taken to be, if they are false propositions, logical propositions, directive and prescriptive, or ethical and metaphysical etc.. And secondly what are we supposed to do with/in the silence.


So much confusion because of the 7th proposition, like its a 7th seal or something. For someone that wanted to clarify and elucidate thoughts, not very succesful, is it?

But why do you think that W was praised so much and admired in the circle of Vienna?

But bipolarity has to do with propositions that have sense and can be either true or false, which is why they are called bipolar in the first place. The "That which we cannot talk about must pass over in silence", refers to non-bipolar propositions, in the realm of the nonsensical.

Depending on whether you adopt the principle of bipolarity, not so much. — Wallows

What does bipolarity have to do with this? But it's like these Viennese "philosophers" said in the comix above:

What we cannot speak of, we must pass over in silence. Where "speak" naturally mean "speak logically!". Your work gave us the means to expel religion, metaphysics, ethics etc from rational discourse. Since "what cannot be spoken about logically" is, quite literally, non-sense, and, obviously, beneath the dignity of serious minds!

Only to get the answer from Wittgenstein:

Just wait a minute! The meaning of the "Tractatus" has completely escaped you! Its point is the exact opposite: the things that cannot be talked about logically, are the ones which are truly important!!

Only a comic, one would say, perhaps mirroring the views of its writer. However, Wittgenstein, at a later time, in his lecture on ethics to the Heretics Society at the university of Cambridge, closes his speech thus:

"My whole tendency and I believe the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language. This running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be no science. What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense. But it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it".

http://sackett.net/WittgensteinEthics.pdf

Or as he says elsewhere:

Don't for heaven's sake, be afraid of talking nonsense! But you must pay attention to your nonsense.

or in PI:

My aim is: to teach you to pass from a piece of disguised nonsense to something that is patent nonsense.

So I think that the Tractatus gave the wrong impression, thus giving birth to trends like analytic philosophy and logical positivism, where ethics, and metaphysics in general, are either seen as meaningless or treated with contempt. This is what I meant when I wrote that "it can lead to completely different conclusions and worldviews".

But what do you think about all this?

Leading antinatalist nowdays is Les Knight, I don't think he was mentioned.

http://www.vhemt.org/les.htm

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voluntary_Human_Extinction_Movement

Apparently he was voluntarily vasectomised at the tender age of 25, and it seems that he campaigns a lot.



So I think we should see what he has to say, as he is an active antinatalist, not some theorist.

Yes, but this most famous proposition is a bit ambiguous, isn't it? There are a few different interpretations I mean, which can lead to completely different conclusions and worldviews, as it seems.

But what kind of "work" you mean?

Well I don't know, really, but I would like to explore that possibility, enjoy it even, I mean in logic it's all about possibilities, isn't it?

Huh, googling for the term, I came up with this:

https://ludwig.guru/s/enjoy+the+possibilities

I see it like in Logicomix, I don't know if you know about it or read it, but you might enjoy it as I did.

My point was what I said above about what I think he was trying to do: to find a way to dissolve language, so that the inexpressible, the mystical like he says, or whatever this is, could either be expressed or show itself (6.522), to shine its way through, that is my take on Wittgenstein. But you know, we can be pretty harsh sometimes, cruel even, asking for trouble, mostly in cases where our love is involved, when it cannot be shown or appreciated, when someone or something stands in our way, and this is what I think happened to him, and why he was like this.

But we can see here, between us two I mean, how language can lead to the greatest misunderstandings.

haha, I doubt that he was, but then again, people say things about him. Anyway, that was not my point.

It may, or it may not, but certainly it is a possibility that we cannot dismiss. I mean, have you read about his life? A most troubled one, for sure, which I think shaped his philosophy, so I think we should see his work in tandem with his life, so that to understand better what he was on about.

In the wiki quotes, I read a statement of the physicist Freeman Dyson, mostly famous for the Dyson sphere, if you know about that, but anyway here it is:

Finally, toward the end of my time in Cambridge, I ventured to speak to him. I told him I had enjoyed reading the Tractatus, and I asked him whether he still held the same views that he had expressed twenty-eight years earlier. He remained silent for a long time and then said, “Which newspaper do you represent?” I told him I was a student and not a journalist, but he never answered my question.
Wittgenstein’s response to me was humiliating, and his response to female students who tried to attend his lectures was even worse. If a woman appeared in the audience, he would remain standing silent until she left the room. I decided that he was a charlatan using outrageous behavior to attract attention. I hated him for his rudeness. Fifty years later, walking through a churchyard on the outskirts of Cambridge on a sunny morning in winter, I came by chance upon his tombstone, a massive block of stone lightly covered with fresh snow. On the stone was written the single word, “WITTGENSTEIN.” To my surprise, I found that the old hatred was gone, replaced by a deeper understanding. He was at peace, and I was at peace too, in the white silence. He was no longer an ill-tempered charlatan. He was a tortured soul, the last survivor of a family with a tragic history, living a lonely life among strangers, trying until the end to express the inexpressible. — Freeman Dyson

Freeman Dyson, "What Can You Really Know?", The New York Review of Books (November 8, 2012)

So this inexpressible might as well have been an expression of love and affection, something that appears easy, but apparently is not, as it has been obscured by language. And it might be that Wittgenstein's critique of language, and why he was so obsessed with it, was to expose this aspect, in order to arrive to the things that really matter the most in this world, feelings and love that is.