Lots, like the last comment, "not discursively, but experentially", what the heck is this, where on earth did W say that, or even hinted??

I think that he is doing a good job, but partly. For the other part, its really bad: he makes his own views pass as W's, most commonly they appear at the end of a paragraph.

No, he seems to know what he is talking about. "A priori metaphysics" is somewhat superfluous and I'm still not sure what purpose was it suppose to serve. — Wallows

So you see now its purpose?

Most questions and propositions of
the philosophers result from the fact that we do not understand
the logic of our language.
(They are of the same kind as the question whether the Good
is more or less identical than the Beautiful.)

But later on...

(Ethics and æsthetics are one.)

So is the Good - ethics - more or less identical than the Beautiful - æsthetics??

It's just that I got the impression from you that you are lacking some basic knowledge in philosophy, when you utter things like "a priori metaphysics". I think that to disguise this blunder, you later said that you meant by that what is usually called "traditional metaphysics", the inquiry into the existence of God, the immortality of the soul and free will. But noone, as far as I can tell, would use and had actually used the term "a priori metaphysics" to describe this, this is just you, trying not to lose face, like they say. Because metaphysics is all a priori, so saying "a priori metaphysics" is like saying "round circle" or "unmarried bachelor". So, this leads me to believe that you know nothing, or very little, about metaphysics, or philosophy for that matter, and you are just doing guess work here. I mean, I could be wrong, it's a know fact after all that I've been wrong before, but this is my current impression, what can I say. Therefore I am sorry, but I won't be discussing anything more with you, not before you you do a bit of studying first at least, to get the basic philosophical concepts cleared out.

Sorry man, but this "a priori metaphysics" of yours got me laughing, and now I can't stop! :lol:

What are you talking about? Metaphysics is not divided into a priori and non-a priori, it is a priori only, part of its definition. Saying non-a priori metaphysics is like saying circular square.

Yes, follows Kant, who said that the metaphysical is a priori. So, the metaphysical self cannot be taken to be the subject who experiences, as you said earlier, that is what I've been trying to tell you! And since there are no experiences for the metaphysical self, the self in solipsism (that posits that only one's experiences are real), is shown to be non-existent, as it was taken to the world's and logic's limits and dissolved there. It is actually a dialectical process that W is describing here, in the mode of Hegel's philosophy, his aufheben, if you know what I mean.

But metaphysics, at the time of Wittgenstein at least, was supposed to be knowledge - or something anyway - beyond experience. If W wanted to redefine metaphysics, then why didn't he do so, as he did with logic and philosophy? Since he didn't, we must assume that he saw metaphysics as it had always been seen.

This is a translation from an excerpt of a greek poet's work that has something to do with anti-natalism:

"The pain that began with the resistance of matter to become a world, becomes a pain of matter that ceases to be a world anymore. You do not understand, I see, my poetic expressions are to blame: in the face of the act of my birth (which, irrespective of the fact that it is not an act of mine, it nevertheless is the most important event in the history of my being) is the only act of MINE that can stand at the same height because it has insurmountable power and tragedy.

What benefits me to exist for what it's worth, since at the moment that I did not ordain, but luck itself - the very power that gave birth to me, I should bend my head and die patiently, consoling myself that this is how the law of nature dictates, and what can I do?

A course that has a beginning and an end the command of a hostile law, totally and beyond alien to me - because neither my birth did I will (how could that be?), nor death do I accept - what is the point in that? Since I was not able to give birth to myself, I make an equivalent act: I destroy him. By taking life from my matter, I raise it against my mother - fate -, thus taking away from her the right to decide for my end; she decided for my beginning - I decide for my end - I equate my power with hers".

By do both do you mean give my own opinion? If so, the reason is that it muddies the water. Whether or not I agree with W. or anyone else must be secondary to the question of what it is that I am agreeing with. All too often someone will say I agree with this or that philosopher, but what they are agreeing or disagreeing with is their own misconception of what the person they are agreeing or disagreeing with said. — Fooloso4

Yes, this is what happens very often indeed. But there are also cases when one actually agrees with someone else, but thinks he disagrees. And this says something about the world, as Wittgenstein would say. But why is that? Here "why" has two different connotations: 1) the reason for this, as for example "why did the apple fall from the apple tree? 'cause it was heavy and there is this force of gravity bla bla bla", so cause and effect and natural sciences, and 2) as in "why do things like apples have to/are made to fall? why is the world like this and not some other where apples wouldn't fall? Why isn't there an accurate way of knowing whether I agree or disagree with someone? (not from a bio-logical/psycho-logical point of view) Is there a fundamental reason for this? Can we imagine, think of a world where this wouldn't happen? And how would that world be like?", questions like these don't have to do with the natural sciences, but rather relate to philosophy/ontology/metaphysics, and logic. And it so happens that many philosophers - but not only philosophers, everyone apparently, physicists, mathematicians, and other scientists, and the common people of course - conflate the two into one, or take evidence from the physical to "prove" the meta-physical positions, which is of course wrong and absurd, 'cause "everything we see could also be otherwise" (again, why is that - two different why's - and this says something about the world). So, to answer here your question as to what W is rejecting, I think he was trying to separate the two, so that one knows exactly with what kind of questions he would be dealing. And he pinpoints the problem in language, as the example hopefully showed, because even a simple "why" can mean two entirely different things, the "why" sign, I mean. The first "why" points somewhere in the world, whereas the second "why", where does it point? It doesn't point anywhere, it has been taken to the limits, not a part of the world.

So problems arise when we conflate these two different kind of questions into one, when we talk about the second with having the first in mind, and vice-versa.

Oh well, I guess something like that. :meh:

Not. If there is a metaphysics it is not a theory or doctrine. It is something that cannot be talked for such talk would be nonsense because it does not share the logical structure of the physical world and the language that represents it. — Fooloso4

Metaphysics has changed significantly since antiquity, since Aristotle first discovered it as a science, so it is difficult to say what it really is, or what it's subject matter is. However, a common characteristic in all its variants is that it is a priori, unrelated to experience, just like logic is, so some say they are essentially the same.

It is not clear whether you are asking what I think is meant by the metaphysical as used by Wittgenstein or by others or my thoughts on the metaphysical. The first is the only question that I think is relevant to the discussion. Here a further distinction needs to be made between the question of whether logical form and simple objects are meant to be a metaphysical ontology he accepts or rejects as nonsense, whether this is saying something metaphysical (6.53), and what he means by the metaphysical self.

I do not think the discussion of form and content is intended as a metaphysical theory, although it might serve as such if one were “doing metaphysics”. But Wittenstein is not. I think his intent is to mark the boundaries of the physical and sayable on the basis of logical structure. They are elucidatory. — Fooloso4

I was asking about your own thoughts, as you yourself were not very clearly whether these were your own opinions or the opinions concerning those in the Tractatus, when you said above: "The ethical, aesthetic, and metaphysical are also outside of the sphere of the logical. And so too lead to nonsense when one attempts to represent what is experienced". But why not do both?

Anyway, I think that Wittgenstein wants, maybe unknowingly, to dispose of the old and traditional metaphysics, only to replace it with another, as it is usually the case in the historical process of metaphysics.

As to the philosophical I, it is metaphysical self, the subject who experiences. — Fooloso4

But supposedly, metaphysics is void of experience, a priori, just like logic is. Or not?

The ethical, aesthetic, and metaphysical are also outside of the sphere of the logical. And so too lead to nonsense when one attempts to represent what is experienced. — Fooloso4

What is the metaphysical, to you, I mean?

I don't think this is right. It is because logic has nothing to do with an "I" that a logical I or logical self does not make sense. — Fooloso4

Whereas the philosophical I or philosophical self makes sense? What does that mean?

There is a great deal here that I am not addressing. My focus is on trying to understand what W. means in the preface and ending. It may be that one cannot hope to climb the ladder by skipping the rungs but if that is the case I hope someone will be able to identify those rungs by showing how they are necessary for the climb. — Fooloso4

I don't know whether you caught our conversation with dear Wallows from the beginning, but this is what I believe, I wrote it here:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/236523

The mystical, or the dionysean aspect of reality, the irrational, in contrast to the logical, the rational and the apollonian, if you know what I mean.

Yes, very confusing. I wonder what can that possibly mean, or do we just have to remain silent about the philosophical self? — Wallows

If this confuses somewhat, then maybe, in the relevant propositions we were discussing 5.631-5.641, you could replace the "philosophical" with the "logical", the "metaphysical" with the "logical", so that "metaphysical subject" becomes "logical subject", and re-read the passages again with that replacement in mind and place. e.g.

"The logical (philosophical) self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the logical (metaphysical) subject, the limit of the world".

So where is this logical I/subject to be found?

philosophical I = logical I . Purely logical I mean, unmarred and untarnished by the psyche - whatever that is. Non psycho-logical, as if you take away the psyche from it, only to end up with pure logic. Why then solipsism?

I don't know nor can I remember how we ended up talking about this in the first place, as I said, I want to take things for the beginning.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/242949

This is true with regard to objects and facts but the 'I' is not a thing, not an object or thing. — Fooloso4

Maybe you are confused as I were, still I am a little bit by the way - logic is like this, what can you do! :) - but my take is that Wittgenstein addresses the concept of solipsism to see if it is justified, or pure nonsense, and he finds out the former, that it is. But first you must bear in mind that philosophy and metaphysics deal with the world as a whole, or at least this is what is desirable for them, it is what they are striving to do. I mean, metaphysics does not want to talk about some particular cases, but describe and expose the totality of things. But by dealing with the whole, a peculiar thing happens, in that the self, the philosophical (non-psychological) "I" is taken to the world's limit, to its periphery, the boundaries. This, Wittgenstein says, has to do with how our world is structured, its logical form, the fact that propositions of logic are tautologies, that the world is my world, and so solipsism is directly derivable from all this.

As I understand it, his main concern is not with what is in the world, its content, but what stands outside of it. — Fooloso4

Yes, but W never says that there is actually something outside the world, I guess this does not make any sense for him. Being outside the world is equivalent to being at the world's limit.

The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world.
— T 5.632

This quote has been of my interest recently. Does it imply a form of solipsism? — Wallows

I think what he means is that for someone to be able to describe the world fully, as philosophers commonly purport to do/have done, he must go the world's limit, exit the world that is, and look at it from the outside, outside looking in, like they say. Which is why he says later:

5.64 Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with
pure realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless
point and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.

i.e. at the world's limit, at logic's limit, solipsism=realism, but this so-called equality holds only at that limit, and philosophers (the philosophical I) are or are striving to be solipsists.

If the limits of logic and the world are the same then by determining a limit to the world we can determine a limit of logic.

Here is the most important case:

The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world.
— T 5.632 — Fooloso4

Yes, presumably. However W says that we cannot determine a limit to either of them (rest of 5.61). We can only say that they have the same limit (because logic fills/pervades the world - so in that sense, they are one and the same), but there isn't any investigation we can make that could lead us finding that limit.

As to language:

What any picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it—correctly or incorrectly—in any way at all, is logical form, i.e. the form of reality.
— T 2.18

The propositions of logic describe the scaffolding of the world, or rather they represent it. They have no ‘subject-matter’. They presuppose that names have meaning and elementary propositions sense; and that is their connexion with the world. It is clear that something about the world must be indicated by the fact that certain combinations of symbols—whose essence involves the possession of a determinate character—are tautologies. This contains the decisive point.
— T 6.124 — Fooloso4

I think what he means by this is that logic rests on its head, so to speak, in a closed circle, a sphere rather, as I quoted T 5.4541 above: that the propositions of logic (and logic in general), being tautologies, can only describe/show/represent the structure, the form of the world, but they do not actually tell us absolutely anything about the world's content.

5.61 says that the limits of logic and the world are the same, the statement does not include language. Limits can be drawn (or set) to language, but not to logic.

The tractatus is all about limits: limits to language, to thought, to propositions, and as they play their role in probabilities. However, we dont see limits drawn (or set) to logic: we cannot think illogically, as he writes. And there is no mention of limiting logic either, as it is the case with language and thought. This is what i meant earlier.

but if thats the case, he would/should have said "set limits to what cannot be thought clearly". The ogden trans is worse, since it actually says "the unthinkable".

As for the illogical, we see the pattern here repeating, thinkable/unthinkable - logical/illogical. But i really doubt that W saw anything as illogical.

Exactly, proposition 4.114 I had in mind when I wrote above:

...But this assertion has commentators confused, since it seems that there are contradictory remarks in the Tractatus, the relation between logic, thought and sense, I mean. — Pussycat

I remember reading about this a while ago, some find it contradictory, others not. I don't know what to make of it, I just don't bother with thoughts in the Tractatus (what can be thought), but only with language (what can be said).

This is the second step in W.’s attempt to draw the limits of thoughts. — Fooloso4

The demarcation of logical space is essential to the limits of thought and language. — Fooloso4

Thus the aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather—not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts … It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn. — T Preface

So do you think that the Tractatus asserts that a limit to thought can be drawn, or should we take what he says in the preface, that the limit can only be drawn in language (and not in thought)?

How far my efforts agree with those of other philosophers I will not
decide. Indeed what I have here written makes no claim to novelty in
points of detail; and therefore I give no sources, because it is indifferent
to me whether what I have thought has already been thought before me
by another.

And so the Tractatus is one of the few philosophical works of the modern era, since the time that philosophy has been made into a system and standardised, since philosophers were obliged to give sources - by whom, is a question - that pays no or very little attention to sources, which can be seen as a sign of arrogance and impertinence on the part of the writer, but then again, others might see it differently.

I will only mention that to the great works of Frege and the writings
of my friend Bertrand Russell I owe in large measure the stimulation of
my thoughts.

Like master like man, like they say. :)

If this work has a value it consists in two things. First that in it
thoughts are expressed, and this value will be the greater the better the
thoughts are expressed. The more the nail has been hit on the head.—
Here I am conscious that I have fallen far short of the possible. Simply
because my powers are insufficient to cope with the task.—May others
come and do it better.

... or to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle. It seems that language games - proverbs and the sort - have always been part of Wittgensteinian thought since the beginning, but maybe he was too timid then, lacking in self-confidence, weak even, to promote and support them in his philosophical system, which he did at a later time when he had grown stronger. Nevertheless, he was always sincere enough to admit and confess that he had trouble coping with language: "My difficulty is only an - enormous - difficulty of expression", or blaming himself: "I work quite diligently and wish that I were better and smarter. And these both are one and the same". I explain myself so that I won't get misexplained, like they say.

Now, if I am allowed to cheat a little, I would like to quote some passages from later in the book:

4.003 Most propositions and questions, that have been written about
philosophical matters, are not false, but senseless. We cannot,
therefore, answer questions of this kind at all, but only
state their senselessness. Most questions and propositions of
the philosophers result from the fact that we do not understand
the logic of our language.

(They are of the same kind as the question whether the Good
is more or less identical than the Beautiful.)
And so it is not to be wondered at that the deepest problems
are really no problems.

So the issue for W is how can our language, or rather its use, become the clearest it can be. This examination ends up being an investigation into the logic that governs the world, and so the various language problems become logical problems, which he considers they are, or must be, the simplest of all:

5.4541 The solution of logical problems must be simple for they set the
standard of simplicity.

Men have always thought that there must be a sphere of
questions whose answers—a priori—are symmetrical and united
into a closed regular structure.

A sphere in which the proposition, simplex sigillum veri, is
valid.

The sphere to which he is referring brings a little bit of Parmenides, if anyone has heard of it/him.

While "simplex sigillum veri" means "simplicity is the sign of truth" in Latin. Or "Keep it simple, stupid" in English, which has KISS as an acronym, like the guys in the US Navy, being in a playful mood, commonly say.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KISS_principle

A minimalist approach, that is, an economy, like the "principle of least action" in the physical world, consisting of a small number of axioms or principles or concepts that everyone can understand.

True, I guess we will see that in the future.

But les us continue with the preface:

The book deals with the problems of philosophy and shows, as I
believe, that the method of formulating these problems rests on the misunderstanding
of the logic of our language. Its whole meaning could be
summed up somewhat as follows: What can be said at all can be said
clearly; and whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent.

How far my efforts agree with those of other philosophers I will not
decide. Indeed what I have here written makes no claim to novelty in
points of detail;

And indeed he was right not to claim novelty, for many of the thoughts and ideas in the Tractatus had already been expressed by others, basically idealist philosophers dealing in logic, figures like Aristotle and Plato among the ancients, Kant and Hegel among his near contemporaries, Frege and Russell among his peers, at least the ones I know of and have studied, more or less. But there were some fresh and new ideas as well. In any case, I think that his main idea - one that he never abandoned - was very clearly expressed, much more clear than any other thinker ever did. Which is, as he states above, that many, if not all, philosophical problems are not really problems, but only appear so due to the misuse of language, as if language has been compromised somehow. This reminds of Kant and his work, the "Critique of Pure Reason".

The book will, therefore, draw a limit to thinking, or rather—not to
thinking, but to the expression of thoughts; for, in order to draw a limit
to thinking we should have to be able to think both sides of this limit
(we should therefore have to be able to think what cannot be thought).

The limit can, therefore, only be drawn in language and what lies on
the other side of the limit will be simply nonsense.

So, according to the Tractatus, a limit to thinking cannot be drawn, since we have to think the unthinkable. A limit in thinking may as well exist, but we, as humans, wouldn't know what this limit is or where it lies. However, the same does not hold for language, the expression of thoughts that is, where we can draw a limit between things that make sense and others that do not - the nonsensical. But this assertion has commentators confused, since it seems that there are contradictory remarks in the Tractatus, the relation between logic, thought and sense, I mean.

Yes, there are differences, the main being, I think, that tractarian forms are essentially possibilities of object configurations, whereas in Plato, well I don't know what they are in Plato, I don't think it is made clear, but most probably platonic forms share the same level of abstractness as objects in the Tractatus. Whereas forms have been defined in the Tractatus in terms of objects, these objects remain unclear, just as the platonic forms remain unclear.

Very platonic the Tractatus, wouldn't you agree?

The Tractatus is an austerely beautiful and simple work. One would do well to read it instead of reading about it. To that end I will be following and perhaps contributing. — Fooloso4

Yes, like Nietzsche advises, read the original. Alas, my german is poor, but luckily Wittgenstein took care to provide an english translation!

Well! Despite all of Tractatus's problems and the author's later dismissal of his own book, it still, somehow, remains an important work on logic. But if we are to start at the beginning, just like the king said to the white rabbit in Lewis' Caroll book "Alice in Wonderland": "Begin at the beginning, and go on till you come to the end: then stop", then I think we should first see what Wittgenstein has to say in the preface:

This book will perhaps only be understood by those who have themselves
already thought the thoughts which are expressed in it—or similar
thoughts. It is therefore not a text-book. Its object would be attained
if there were one person who read it with understanding and to whom it
afforded pleasure. — Wittgenstein

So there are some prerequisites for understanding the book, because Wittgenstein spent a great deal of his time thinking about the connection of logic to language, most probably had long conversations about that with his supervisor Bertrand Russell, and it seems that he has aware of the progress that Gottlob Frege made on the matter, so the Tractatus can be seen as a response to thoughts expressed by these thinkers, and more. But what is interesting in the section above, is his last sentence concerning the book's object, seeking out just one person to both understand it and like it, so that it could be considered a success, a failure otherwise. But if we - analysts - are to remain loyal to Wittgenstein and the Tractatus, then I reckon that we should do and expect the same, that our goal would be accomplished should there be someone that reads our comments with understanding and takes pleasure from them, otherwise we would have failed to render the book's intended meaning.

(Here is a good place for someone to wonder - especially one that didn't take pleasure - whether pleasure is related to understanding, and vice versa).

Wallows! You there man?

yeah ok, they are the same. But how does this answer the question??? Of course it doesnt, because it is an answer to some other question that you had in mind, something like: "who are the modern scientists?", something irrelevant and indifferent that is.

haha, ok this seems reasonable. After all it's better to do a fresh start, like they say, I mean why on earth would you consider a start at, say, the poor condition we are in today, it's better to reshuffle the cards and hope for the best! Maybe you will get a better card this time, maybe not... But then again as Einstein said: "Stupidity is doing same thing and expecting different results". :)

Or is there something very special for that particular point?

But if the choice of start/end points is arbitrary, then why do we preferentially choose the Big Bang as a start?

But the circle of time must have had a beginning, right? Or is it beginning-less you say?

So entropy is not connected in anyway to time and vice-versa?

So one could say that the universe began at the point of the big bang, but this only appears to us so, it's not what really happens/happened: since time is circular, this process of big bang/crunch repeats itself indefinitely and eternally, right?

What I am saying is that if time moves in the direction of entropy increasing, then at the time of the Big Crunch, and as long as entropy is decreasing, time is running backwards: the universe is folding in itself, only to unfold again in the big bang. And the other thing that troubles me is that if time is circular and we are indeed on that circle, then at what point on that circle did the universe began, at the point of the big crunch/bang or someother?

so its like a dog following a tail, only to discover it is its own? Heads and tails in time, but we are certain that there is indeed a head at the front, with a tail at the back, and thus future is differentiated from the past. But if time is circular, how can we distinguish? Say an event A that is on the left hemisphere of the circle and an event B that is on the right, which one is older?

And also there is the problem with entropy: entropy is supposedly accumulating reaching to a maximum, then suddenly or rather abruptly, it drops down to zero, only to rise again. But for that to happen, it must mean for at least sometime, time is running backwards, correct?