In the face of an immeasurably expanded society and the progress of positive cognition of nature, the conceptual structures in which, according to philosophic mores, the totality is supposed to be housed, resemble remnants of simple commodity society amidst industrial late capitalism. The meanwhile completely mismatched relationship (since degraded to a mere topos) between each Spirit and power, strikes the attempt to comprehend this hegemony by those inspired with their own concept of the Spirit with futility. The very will to do so betokens a power-claim which countermands what is to be understood.

A lot has changed since Hegel and Marx. The classes of Victorian era don't exist anymore. Back in those days, a merchant, no matter how wealthy, could hardly compete with a bankrupt aristocrat, there was discrimination. Whereas nowadays, money talks, in a language that we all understand. Markets were mostly small and isolated, no comparison to today's global economy. The world expanded to the moon and beyond. Science and technology, population, and much much more. It is futile to try to understand today's world using outdated concepts, since they no longer fit, it is merely a power move that won't yield any knowledge.

Now, as much as Adorno calls thinking and theorizing an activity, simply thinking is really not doing anything. So Adorno seems to request a balance between the Marxist's call for action, and the logical requirement of theory. To avoid irrational acts we must make rationality into an act itself, so that it can qualify as virtuous. — Metaphysician Undercover


I am not sure whether this is a correct assessment. First of all, I don't understand what it is you are saying here. What do irrational acts have to do with theory? It only makes sense to me if you mean that all actions are irrational.

As far as I understand, but of course I could be wrong, Adorno is saying that there are people whose thought system is deeply non-identical, like it is and feels natural for them, without much effort: these are the true artists. Adorno realizes that himself is no artist, for example he cannot write poetry or paint, however, he has a knack for theory. And so he wants to provide the theoretical framework. — Pussycat

After having read the SEP article on Adorno and more specifically this:

Principles of rational morality, as in Kant, are tailored to the self-reflection in which the modern autonomous subject engages, which simultaneously separates insight from action, exemplified, for Adorno, by Hamlet.

I have to say that for Adorno theory and praxis are two completely different things. Hamlet, deeply knowledgeable of the intricacies and perplexities of his situation, was still unable to decide on a proper action. And so it seems that, for Adorno, knowledge, even if complete, does not necessarily inform on action, this has to be treated separately, theoretically again. For example, the revolutionaries in his time looked up to him and expected him to lead the revolutionary movement against establishment. How must they have been disappointed, to say the least, when he decided to turn them down, only to lend a hand to established educational systems. So there is a difference between knowing and acting upon this knowledge, my guess is that Adorno anticipates this, and he will have a lot to say about that.

Yes, I think that's the point. Such a principle of universality of "use" would necessarily be false, because actual use is inherently formed to match the uniqueness of the circumstances. So this would in a sense, misrepresent each particular instance of use, in order to fit it into the universal. That's representative of "identity thinking", which neglects aspects of the true identity of the individuals, in order to identify the individual conceptually. — Metaphysician Undercover

Could we say that the above critique applies to all universal principles, irrespective of their content?

There is more to meaning than simple use. That is exemplified by ambiguity. The person who speaks, or writes, is the user of the words, and proper "use" is attributable to the author's purpose. The audience however must interpret, and this itself is an assignment of "meaning". This assignment of meaning s not a matter of "use". it is what Adorno would call a mediated act, whereby the immediate would be the social structures which trained the individual to interpret the way that one does. — Metaphysician Undercover

Got it, I think! So instead of "meaning is use", you would replace it with "my meaning is my use", right?

But suppose there were indeed such a principle that would claim universality as to what meaning is, then I guess that would be a perfect example of identity thinking, as it would not fully represent the whole spectrum of meaning. Additionally, it could easily turn out to be and become totalitarian and dominative, strangulating other voices that think otherwise. Correct?

I see no problem with this. And, think that it s likely that the non-identical here is the irrational. — Metaphysician Undercover

In general, I am thinking of the non-identical more as the non-dominating aspect of nature, rather than the irrational.

There's a type of activity, which is sort of passive, what Wittgenstein called idling. Wittgenstein criticized this, but he was wont to demonstrate in his use of words, what he criticized with the meaning of his words, in a sort of hypocritical way. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are saying that Wittgenstein was a hypocrite? That the famous "meaning is use" is invalid, not because there isn't a correspondence between meaning and use, but because Wittgenstein's true intention was hidden behind this principle?

Now, as much as Adorno calls thinking and theorizing an activity, simply thinking is really not doing anything. So Adorno seems to request a balance between the Marxist's call for action, and the logical requirement of theory. To avoid irrational acts we must make rationality into an act itself, so that it can qualify as virtuous. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not sure whether this is a correct assessment. First of all, I don't understand what it is you are saying here. What do irrational acts have to do with theory? It only makes sense to me if you mean that all actions are irrational.

As far as I understand, but of course I could be wrong, Adorno is saying that there are people whose thought system is deeply non-identical, like it is and feels natural for them, without much effort: these are the true artists. Adorno realizes that himself is no artist, for example he cannot write poetry or paint, however, he has a knack for theory. And so he wants to provide the theoretical framework.

I used to think so too, but now I’m not so sure. Is one pointing at the same thing when one says it's unsayable as when one says that concepts are distorting it by the exclusion of particularity? One is pointing at the unrepresentable, while the other is pointing at the misrepresented. The former is transcendental, the latter is immanent. So their differing views on what to do about it can be seen as presuming different ontologies, i.e., a different "it".

Take the example of pain. Adorno would say that the pain scale does conceptual violence to pain by reducing particular suffering to numbers—the pain as experienced is nonidentical with pain as measured (this is not to say he was against its use in medicine). But Wittgenstein would not say that pain is unsayable or mystical; that one cannot “say” one's private experience is unproblematic, because that's not what language does.

I’ve alluded in this post to both early and late Wittgenstein without distinguishing them. It might matter but I’m not sure. — Jamal

Yes, you are right, I think I misspoke when I said "same" or "similar", hmm "closely related" might be more appropriate, as this is ambiguous enough to leave room for interpretation and representation.

I am attempting a syncretism of various quite different schools of thought, the result of which is, more than often, dubious, not to say ridiculous.

Nonetheless, I didn't have pain in mind, or other such private and subjective experiences, but was alluding to the original concepts from the TLP, like values, beauty, meaning, the sense of the world as a whole. Are these misrepresented or unrepresentable? More importantly, what happens if we lump them into the same category as pain?

If we ask, "oh, but what is pain", LateW would tell us: "don't ask 'is' questions, see how pain is being employed in context". But if we try to divide pain into different kinds, then we could say there are 3 kinds of pain: physical, psychological and intellectual (Or maybe a 4th - as existential). I take it that identity thinking is when an experienced pain in each kind is being reduced to a measure or number. Even worse, when pains from different kinds are mixed together in the one and same concept of Pain. This reduction of pain, and thereby reality itself, to a system, fails to do (it) justice. And with no justice, there can be no vindication, for anyone or anything. And Lord Pain goes on laughing in our face.

But is it identity thinking when an unspeakable tooth- or heartache, is treated the same as matters of beauty, by virtue of their common unspeakability?

That's roughly right as far as it goes, but I think it probably minimizes vast differences, between (a) the nonidentical and the mystical, and of course (b) what to do about it. — Jamal

Sure, there are differences, first and foremost because they belong to different traditions.

However, both thinkers seem to be pointing to the same thing or structure, each from their own perspective, and each demand that it is recognized as the most important.

Wittgenstein, in TLP, suggests that once every sayable, scientific, and logical question is resolved, when language reaches its limit, what remains is not nothing, but the mystery itself, which is not expressed - because it is beyond propositional knowledge - but revealed, shown. This might explain his insistence on linguistic clarity.

Adorno, on the other hand, thinks that a thing can never be fully grasped by a concept, the non-identical is the residue, what remains, of whatever is beyond the limit of its own concept, which is revealed through negation and critique.

They are both playing with limits and are in the business of demystification.

What to do about it is certainly different, Adorno is active, whereas (early) Wittgenstein is passive. I think that early Wittgenstein was/became disillusioned with philosophy, that it cannot be salvaged, believing in its purely epistemological/scientific nature. This of course later changed in his Philosophical Investigations. Whereas Adorno never lost faith, believing that philosophy can be restructured so as to yield what it was always meant to and promised, negative dialectics being the way forward.

But this particular mention of Wittgenstein is not actually one of the egregious ones, and it highlights important differences between them. Adorno is unwilling to give up on philosophy's great goals (in some strange version anyway), whereas for Wittgenstein philosophy helps to fix bad thinking but the really important stuff is outside of its domain, except to achieve clear description. For Adorno, the meaningful in life remains a matter for theory, but for Wittgenstein it doesn't. — Jamal

Isn't Adorno's non-identical similar to Wittgenstein's mystical, in that both resist conceptualization?

Wittgenstein, early at least, suggests quietism, while Adorno believes it will be revealed via negative dialectics.

I think it is the kind of promise that is central to faith. Faith involves an unspoken, invisible promise, one that is not made by ourselves, but by the other, e.g. god, science, philosophy, tradition, institutions, other people etc. Evidence is circumstantial or, better, just informative, in that it helps shape, understand or explain the faith in something. Also, given the immense ambiguity and subjectivity of what counts as evidence in such cases, I would discard evidence altogether from any definition of faith.

Of course, faith can be broken, for example when a trusted friend proves to be a fraud. No matter if the friend promised that they would be forever loyal to us, we assumed and believed that such a promise was made in silence, and therefore it is this promise that is in fact broken, puting at risk our faith in friendship in general.

I think that faith is linked to some promise.

Ok, far tooo long for a response, and I am sorry.
Moreover, I forgot what I was going to say...
Anyway, here goes.

I don't doubt that in the text Socrates is depicted as one fearless to death and remorseless about the live he has lived, having lived it as best as is humanly possible. What I do doubt though, is if there can ever be such a man. The belief in his existence is what I call dogmatic, which, as it seems, follows necessarily from the whole of socratic/platonic philosophy. Have we been misled into believing that there is even a slightest chance that all this is possible and true, with Socrates as the main perpertator of this misleading? Is Socrates, in our eyes - and not in his, deified, having reached a status of apotheosis? In Socrates' own eyes, isn't his own deification a hubris?

Socrates, suddenly plagued by the thought that he might’ve misunderstood the daimonion, the divine whisper. That he may have mistranslated the music-dream. What if his whole life's pursuit of dialectic, of reason, was a grand detour? What if the divine meant not logos, but lyre? Not reason, but rhythm?

Aargh, what a terrible thing has befallen me in my last hours, to have me doubt my life's work!
Did I misinterpret the music-dream?

“Make music, Socrates. Make music.”

I thought the search for truth was song enough.

But what if it wasn’t?
What if the gods spoke plainly, and I—clever fool that I am—interpreted instead of listening?

What if they asked for song, and I gave them syllogisms?
What if they meant laughter, and I gave them logos?

I persuaded so many…
Turned the youths from the poets to the philosophers, from the myths to the arguments.
Did I lead them away from the chorus, from the dance?

But no! I won't drag myself into self-doubt, not now, at the very end.
The daimon never told me what to do—only what not to do.
And he was silent all through this path.
That must mean something. Doesn’t it?

And thank the gods I left no writings.
So that my truth may live as rumor, echo, myth.
Living inquiry is better than dead scripture, anyway. — Socrates

SHADE:
Hello, Socrates. Long have we awaited your return.

SOCRATES:
...

SHADE:
I am sent here to inform you that you are to stand trial for your crimes. I hope that you have fully recovered from your earthly trial, regain your strength my friend, you 're going to need it.

SOCRATES:
Why? What are the charges?

SHADE:
The charges are numerous, but they all stem from this:
That you gave philosophy a bad name—for all time.
And as you yourself once said, it’s better to pull out one’s eye than to lose one's name.

SOCRATES:
What! You can’t possibly pin that on me!
Just because I talked to a few blokes in the Agora, doesn't mean—

SHADE:
I’m afraid we can.
And we have ample evidence.
Tell me—do you remember a man named Plato?

SOCRATES:
Plato? Of course. Nice fellow. Didn’t talk much.
A bit of a recluse, if you ask me. Always lurking in the back. No friends around.
He hardly even looked at me.

SHADE:
Yes, well… that may be because he was recording you.
He developed a system of stenography. Quite advanced.
He recovered, wrote, and distributed most of your talks.

SOCRATES:
Wait, he did what?
That sneaky basterd!

It goes in both directions. The property of matter that makes it produce something also makes it respond to that same thing. At least when it comes to gravity and electrical charge. If there's a property of matter that gives it consciousness, then there's no way to rule out the possibility that that property can also make matter susceptible to consciousness. — Patterner

In physics, the mass of an elementary particle is believed to be generated by its passing through a Higgs field:

A vacuum Higgs field is responsible for spontaneous symmetry breaking the gauge symmetries of fundamental interactions and provides the Higgs mechanism of generating mass of elementary particles.

And

In the Standard Model of particle physics, the Higgs mechanism is essential to explain the generation mechanism of the property "mass" for gauge bosons. Without the Higgs mechanism, all bosons (one of the two classes of particles, the other being fermions) would be considered massless, but measurements show that the W+, W−, and Z0 bosons actually have relatively large masses of around 80 GeV/c2. The Higgs field resolves this conundrum. The simplest description of the mechanism adds to the Standard Model a quantum field (the Higgs field), which permeates all of space.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Higgs_mechanism

Do you think that something similar happens with consciousness, with matter passing through a field to rise?

Babysteps, besides we are also talking about experiences and feelings, apart from consciousness. An objective map of all feelings to physical processes would be nice to have.

I just wanted to point out what he sees as

an obvious problem that plagues the development of a theory of consciousness

: the paucity of objective data. But by monitoring the general population, this problem is solved. Why not invest time and effort in doing that, instead of theorizing? Well maybe Chalmers has a theoretical inclination, but why should the rest of us?

If you look further into the David Chalmers famous essay Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness ...

Thanks.

I sort of skimmed through Chalmers' essay. At some point he says:

There is an obvious problem that plagues the development of a theory of consciousness, and that is the paucity of objective data. Conscious experience is not directly observable in an experimental context, so we cannot generate data about the relationship between physical processes and experience at will. — Chalmers

Can't we monitor people's physiology - brain activity, heart etc - with specialized equipment designed specifically for this purpose, in relation to various stimuli, thereby building a huge database correlating physical processes with experiences? Can't it be done in a controlled environment, like a lab, or in everyday life, via the use of wearables - wrist watches, holter equivalents, helmets etc? Subjects must be sincere to report their feelings of course.

Do you think that we can safely rule out reductionism, as far as consciousness is concerned?

Wow, that was quite a ramble! :smile: What on earth was I thinking, where was my consciousness at? Lots of it is was not even readable. Also co-pilot didn't do well in translating.

Anyway! Maybe it goes to show the effects of being out of tune.

6.5 For an answer which cannot be expressed the question too cannot be expressed.
The riddle does not exist.
If a question can be put at all, then it can also be answered.
6.51 Scepticism is not irrefutable, but palpably senseless, if it would
doubt where a question cannot be asked.
For doubt can only exist where there is a question; a question
only where there is an answer, and this only where something
can be said.
6.53 The right method of philosophy would be this. To say nothing
except what can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science,
i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy: and then
always, when someone else wished to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions. This method would be unsatisfying to the other;he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy;but it would be the only strictly correct method.

This is like the Gordian Knot, that Alexander the Great thought untiable, and so he just cut through it with his sword, problem solved. Same is with philosophical problems. Just as some may not see Alexander as truely untying the knot, just the same many may feel that the problem was not really solved.

Hegel certainly thought very highly of himself. But how could he not? I mean, his discussion of world-historical figures, combined with the confidence in the validity of his system - as representing the culmination of philosophical thought and a comprehensive understanding of reality - necessarily leads to him being the greatest of great. And so Hegel crowned himself king, he must have been very proud, absolutely. This pompousness, like you say, certainly puts some people off, to the point of disregarding him completely. But not you, apparently. What is it that you saw in Hegel, despite of his arrogance and lack of shame, that prompted you to invoke this thinker? And to answer your question with yet another question, don't you think we are flogging a dead horse?

Mythical creatures like dragons also constitute a reality, a logical reality, and not a physical one And usually, dragons are admired, as in the song from the movie "Flight of Dragons" performed by the renowned artist Don McLean, for being free and unencumbered, undisturbed to fly in the skies and go wherever they want. The form presented here is similar to the form sought by the logician when he says that he wants to explore all possibilities of thought within the realm of logic, dissolving any illusions or pseudo-problems, restoring certainty and order where confusion and chaos reign. Thus, the dragon, as the pilot of imagination, carries this symbolism.



Or for a more instrumental version



I feel that the logician wants to put herself in the eye of the dragon. But what is the dragon, really?

And finally,

From all of the above, it seems that in the realm of logic, there is an unrestricted freedom of movement, or at least much greater than in any other space. This freedom is constrained and restrained, like (in) a funnel, the opposite of the Big Bang, as we move "down" to the other two spaces, while the mouth and end of the funnel can be considered as physical reality. Because many of the things that logic encompasses, ie whatever we can think of, do not exist in the natural world, just as many of the things described by geometry about the nature of space do not. However, logic, much like geometry, can examine everything, all possible states of affairs, without commitments and limitations, as long as it is bound only by itself, which doesn't tell us much, or rather, absolutely nothing.

And so, if anything conceivable is logical, anything we can think of, then the illogical has no place in our world; since we cannot think of anything illogical, but if we can conceive it, it automatically becomes logical. With such a broad definition of logic, no person is illogical, ever. But then, what about all those people that are confined, or not, to institutions, that seem to have lost their minds? Are they illogical? By our previous analysis, certainly not.

If we were to make an assumption in accordance with the above, we would say that their problem is not the lack or absence of logical thinking, but rather an abundance, or rather an overabundance of it: they are overly logical. Similar problems are faced by individuals with autism. Just as an autistic person absorbs a huge volume of information from the natural environment without being able to process it adequately to be what we call functional, similarly, someone labeled as "crazy" absorbs a massive amount of information from the realm of logic but cannot correlate that information received there to things and situations seen and felt in the realm of nature. Thus, they are not functional either, but rather constantly confused. Essentially, the confusion arises from the movement of thought as it moves between logical-geometric-physical space. But not only confusion, but all other feelings and emotions, such as fear and security, joy and sorrow, hate and love, interest and indifference, etc., can be explained in the same way. For example, when faced with the unlimited choices and possibilities as mentioned in the case of someone considered "crazy," they may feel fear at the prospect of this boundless freedom, a fear at some existential level, from which other things arise, such as a kind of mania. Therefore, we could say that they are not ultimately becoming illogical, but rather they are thoroughly logical, although I do not know how much this would help them. Laughter might also arise from the mixture of different logical forms among themselves or with natural forms, the result of which appears funny as they blend together. Art and music effectively does the same for us sane people, however under (some) control, because they both have the ability to move our thoughts to anything that can be conceived, along old or new paths, offering e-motions, thereby expanding our world.

Now, the mechanism or mechanisms behind all this, do not fall under, and are neither the scope of the science of logic, to find and expose them, but rather of other sciences. For instance, psychology will talk about how what is called the human psyche is influenced when thought moves from one object to another, what happens within us, what is the psychological relationship between what we say, what we think, and what we mean, why and how various psychological compulsions are created, etc. Or a biologist/pharmacist will search to find the materialistic mechanism/organ in the human body that makes people think, sometimes more or less logically, constructing substances and drugs to address problems. Such inquiries do not concern the logician, at least not in its pure form. For this reason, Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, did not delve into psychology, biology, or the theory of evolution because he wanted to insist and remain in a purely logical analysis of phenomena, considering it rather the most important, and that anything else follows this or can be reduced to it, as if it doesn't make much sense to explore secondary issues. In his later work, Philosophical Investigations, however, he leads the reader to the same or different ideas through a psychological experiment conducted there. The therapeutic character, both of his early and later work, has been highlighted many times, by many thinkers, because, as they say, many of the problems that humans have, are ultimately dissolved, with his method, into being pseudo-problems. Through philosophy and the critique of language, as he uses them, functioning as therapy, a kind of speech therapy.

Therefore, as long as the various spaces are distinguished and hierarchically arranged as defined above, we can say that geometric space is constrained by its dimensions, physical space constrained by the aforementioned geometrical space, as well as of all the properties of physical reality, while logical space is the only unlimited one that encompasses all those possibilities expressed in the other two spaces plus anything imaginable. Mathematicians explore geometry by creating spaces with any number of dimensions and different curvatures, while physicists have their theories, attempting to explain the interaction between bodies with various field theories. When it comes to logical space, one way to study it, is when it is examined independently of physical sciences and mathematics. This is done, for example, by science fiction authors, comic creators, poets, and artists. According to our analysis, what we call fictional or imaginative must directly draw its examples from logical space. Like it happens in dreams, where natural and geometric laws are lifted.

But also, the consciousness of someone with, say, a vivid imagination, who ponders all imaginable possibilities, it is in logical space where it floats. Similarly, individuals on the autism spectrum, for whom it is said that they have an inability to focus on something specific, their minds may well constanlty contemplate logical space, unable to do anything else, overwhelmed by information.

I am sorry Banno, I am on a mission :grin: to finish this, won't take long.

3.04 An a priori true thought would be one whose possibility guaranteed its truth.
3.05 We could only know a priori that a thought is true if its truth was to be recognized from the thought itself (without an object of comparison).

Thought, as the logical image of events defined earlier, contains only the possibility for that thought to be true. According to Wittgenstein's system, a fact can be either right or wrong, true or false; there is no middle ground, the principle of bivalence holds. Thus, thought, by itself, cannot determine the truth of its events. Within logical space, everything appears - and is - logical; everything exists as possibilities in logical space. What thought knows is that something will either be correct or incorrect, true or false. If thought wants to see which of these possibilities holds true, it needs to leave logical space and go to some other space, the space of geometry or of natural science. There, it will discover what happens in relation to the new space it finds itself in. The object of comparison is already in these new spaces. In the case of geometry, it could be a coordinate system or coordinates, while in the case of physics, it could be the various physical laws presupposing the physical system, such as the law of energy conservation.

In summary, the hierarchy of these spaces, as presented by Wittgenstein, is as follows:

a. Logical space, logical image, logic, science of logic
b. Geometric space, geometric image/shape, geometry, mathematics/geometry
c. Physical space, physical image, physics, physical sciences

The lower spaces contain the forms of the higher ones: geometric space includes logical forms/possibilities, while physical space includes both geometric and logical forms. Altogether, they exist under the dominant and primary sphere of logic, the all-encompassing logic.

Below, we see inspector Gadget doing his thing, perfectly logical, albeit somewhat paradoxical, in his attempt to apprehend his counterpart, Dr. Claw, and his organization, MAD.

3.032 To present in language anything which “contradicts logic” is as impossible as in geometry to present by its co-ordinates a figure which contradicts the laws of space; or to give the co-ordinates of a point which does not exist.

From this, it appears how Wittgenstein understood the relationship between logic and language: anything that is said or can be said is automatically logical; the essence of language is logic, or rather, language is intertwined and imbued with logic. And then we have to conclude that to understand logic, one simply needs to look at language, its history, and its evolution, like linguists do. The work becomes much easier because instead of dealing with abstract and purely logical concepts of content and form, which often are not getting anywhere, one can do just as well with something specific: by examining the rules of language, syntactical and grammatical, and seeing how language unfolds, develops, and evolves throughout history, the results of this investigation will simultaneously be results of an examination of the logic of the world, its essence. The role and purpose of linguists are often downplayed or sidelined, but it seems to me that they are doing just that.

3.0321 We could present spatially an atomic fact which contradicted the laws of physics, but not one which contradicted the laws of geometry.

Whatever language is to logic, coordinates/points/shapes are to geometry/space: language develops within logical space, just as various shapes develop within geometric space. And just as there can be no shape without geometric space, there cannot be a linguistic shape without logical space. However, there can be a linguistic shape that contradicts the laws of nature, such as all the heroes in comic books: there, the description of heroes adheres to the laws of logic - how could it be otherwise if everything is logical - so we can understand them without further clarification, given that we are logical beings. However, their powers surpass the laws of physics, as we know them at least; they are supernatural. Yet, the supernatural nature of the thing does not abolish the logic of the shapes in comics. Therefore, the flying unicorn is something logical but supernatural. Here also what was previously said about linguists, can be said about comic book artists.Their creations are essentially a work on the logic that governs the world. They are Logicomix.

3 The logical picture of the facts is the thought.
3.001 “An atomic fact is thinkable”—means: we can imagine it.
3.01 The totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world.
3.02 The thought contains the possibility of the state of affairs which it thinks.
What is thinkable is also possible.
3.03 We cannot think anything unlogical, for otherwise we should have to think unlogically.
3.031 It used to be said that God could create everything, except what was contrary to the laws of logic. The truth is, we could not say of an “unlogical” world how it would look.
3.032 To present in language anything which “contradicts logic” is as impossible as in geometry to present by its co-ordinates a figure which contradicts the laws of space; or to give the co-ordinates of a point which does not exist.
3.0321 We could present spatially an atomic fact which contradicted the laws of physics, but not one which contradicted the laws of geometry.
3.04 An a priori true thought would be one whose possibility guaranteed its truth.
3.05 We could only know a priori that a thought is true if its truth was to be recognized from the thought itself (without an object of comparison).

Here, he connects the thought with the logical picture.

Therefore, from the above, it may become apparent how Wittgenstein defines the logical, logic: anything we can think of, anything that is conceivable. If, for example, we can think of a flying unicorn, then this flying unicorn is logical, being an image [3, 3.001]. If, however, this image we formed with our mind, with our thought, is true - meaning it corresponds to reality - then we say that this image is a part of the world, not just an image, but an image of the world [3.01]. Anything we can think of is logical because in our thought lies the possibility of what we are thinking, regardless of whether it is simultaneously true; there is, according to Wittgenstein, a dimension between the possible and the true: for anything we have the ability to form an image, that is a logical possibility, part of the logic of the world [3.02], while the truth of this image is something else, unrelated to logic (which he discusses later). [Although not so unrelated in the end, since the image was formed through logic].

Therefore, we cannot think of anything illogical because then we would have to think illogically [3.03]. Consequently, what we call "illogical" does not exist; everything is logical, as possibilities of our thought. And a "non-logical" or "illogical" world is something we cannot even conceive. So the propositions of Tractatus 3.03 and 3.031, "It was once said that God can create everything except what would be contrary to the laws of logic. We could not say, therefore, what an 'illogical' world would look like," are essentially tautologies, as he will later say that all logical propositions are, propositions of logic. Why is it a tautology? Because he says that anything that appears logical to us is also logical. And that even God, as we imagine Him, would have to submit to the laws of logic, as they appear to us.

But there is also a problem when we say that something - a proposition - is a tautology because from this tautological proposition, no information can be extracted about the world. So, if all possible logical propositions are indeed tautologies, this tells us nothing about what is logical, what logic is, and how it is defined. If, for example, in response to the question "what is logical?" the answer is "everything is logical" - since we cannot think illogically - then what conclusion can one draw about logic? No conclusion can be drawn, except one: that logic cannot be defined through logic itself, and if we want, for some reason [why?], to find out what it is, then we must turn elsewhere, to other means.

Anyway, the Tractatus does not directly deal with the definition of logic, although it makes some useful observations about it; nor does it talk about what is true. Instead, it provides the theory needed for one to be able to properly understand what is being said to them, as well as what they themselves are saying, when they speak clearly, and when they make mistakes, whether they are in or out of tune, like with music. I think that what he's saying is equivalent to music theory, but now applied to the theory of language/logic. Challenging things, for sure, but perhaps with a little help from our friends, we can make some progress.

What would you think if I sang out of tune,
Would you stand up and walk out on me?
Lend me your ears and I'll sing you a song,
And I'll try not to sing out of key.



However, the fact that we can think of something does not necessarily mean that this something is true; therefore, a comparison between the image we formed with our thought and reality will be needed to determine its truth. The possibility of what we are thinking falls under logic [3.02, 3.03].

Well, it seems that this ongoing reading group is off for a while now, I will try to put it on track again.

Nah, I'm joking, I just want to publish some old thoughts of mine, lest they are thrown out in the bin. :gasp: I will augment them with recent developments, with the hope that someone may want to discuss.

Hm, they seem to be scattered here and there, where should I begin??

This seems appropriate.

5.4541 The solution of logical problems must be simple for they set the
standard of simplicity.

Men have always thought that there must be a sphere of
questions whose answers—a priori—are symmetrical and united
into a closed regular structure.

A sphere in which the proposition, simplex sigillum veri, is valid.

"simplex sigillum veri" is latin for "simplicity is the sign of truth". Or "Keep it simple, stupid", or KISS as acronym, a principle that was also adopted by the blokes in the American Navy.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KISS_principle

A minimalist approach, that is, an economy consisting of a small number of principles or concepts that everyone can understand.

Of course, Occam's razor first comes to mind here, but this also goes back to Aristotle and Aristotelianism, even before that, perhaps Parmenides. As the AI puts it:

"Aristotle believed that circular motion should be favored for celestial bodies, such as planets and stars, because he thought it represented the most perfect and divine form of motion. In Aristotle's cosmology, the Earth was at the center of the universe, and he proposed a series of concentric spheres to explain the motion of celestial bodies.

Circular motion, according to Aristotle, was considered perfect and unchanging. He associated it with the divine and eternal nature, contrasting it with linear motion, which was associated with the mundane and imperfect nature of the Earth. Aristotle believed that the heavens, being perfect and unchanging, must move in a perfect and unchanging manner, which he thought was circular motion."

And so it seems that the early Wittgenstein, on the basis of his elementary propositions, was caught up by the same "divine" notion of simplicity, symmetry, unity and sphericity as the very early philosophers. Later, he changed his mind by saying "Just think of the equations of physics—how tremendously complex their structure is. Elementary propositions, too, will have this degree of complexity".

Me too, I find the concept of symmetry and unity very enticing, but this I think is due more to a psychological nature and inclination rather than anything else, this KISS principle. Simple things, sealed with a kiss, like the song goes.

I am afraid it is true, philosophy is just idle talk, well for the most part. The resort to Hegel doesn't help either, much more idle talk there.

Philosophy has turned to a monstrosity, it is unrecognizable, even to herself, when did this happen, has it always been like this, don't think so. A historical investigation might shed light into this.

Until there is a remedy, I suggest to depose philosophy from her throne of queen of sciences, and replace her, as Nietzsche suggested, with psychology.

Dont be silly, even if theres no meaning in life, one can easily create one with the technique of (auto) suggestion, u can read all about it in the news.

For sure, doubt is central to Socratic philosophy. That the dialogues often end in aporia is no coincidence, not a bug but a feature, as we would say.
However, there are quite a lot of certainties.
And besides, Socrates own doubt is the case here, and not whether Socratic philosophy has elements of doubt.

I find that the painting of Socrates as a man devoid of doubt, with no fear of death, no regrets (presumably no guilt either) and looking forward to the afterlife (if any), very foreign to me, it actually reminds me of messianic figures, mystics, or madmen, but maybe they are all the same. Rather dogmatic, won't you think?

Don't know whether Plato had any hits, but he was definitely a hitman! :smile:

As for Socrates:

Aargh, what a terrible thing has befallen me in my last hours, to have me doubt my life's work!
Did I misinterpret the music-dream? What about other dreams? And what of the signs?
What of the people I persuaded, did I point them in the wrong direction?
But no! I won't drag myself into self-doubt, not now, at the very end.
And anyway, it's not like I left anything written, it's all hearsay, thank god for that!

often in my past life the same dream had visited me, now in one guise, now in another, but always saying the same thing: "Socrates,'' it said, "make music and practise it." Now in earlier times I used to assume that the dream was urging and telling me to do exactly what I was doing: as people shout encouragement to runners, so the dream was telling me to do the very thing that I was doing, to make music, since philosophy is the greatest music. (61a)

And so it seems that Socrates, on the false premise that philosophy is the greatest music, went about to produce a philosophy completely devoid and stripped of music, totally amusical. But just to be on the safe side, he sloppily put together some words and fables from here and there, and got it over with. Ah, how amusing!

In exchange for giving up its nuclear weapons, Ukraine received financial compensation, as well as the security assurances of the Budapest Memorandum. — wiki

Therefore Ukraine is rationally looking for alternatives (e.g. security guarantees, NATO membership and the like — neomac

good luck with that!

i dont know about philosophy or whether russia's hand was forced, but i believe people want this war over quick so that they return to their normal lives, that was disrupted, double, if you count covid. The quickest way would be for ukraine to surrender, rather than to embark on a long term war. If someone also recognises the russian win as a defeat of the west, and is against the west, well then this would be a double win for them.

Hey, when a country invades another, u would expect that common people would support the defending country and chastise the invading one. This doesnt seem to be the case here. What does the most intelligent person on the planet have to say about this?

sorry tldr, so did we reach a conclusion and consesus as to what metaphysics is?

A mathematician, a statistician and a fool observe a roulette table where black has come 20 times in a row, and think about betting.

The mathematician assumes that the next outcome is independent of the previous ones, and that either black or red has a chance of approx 48% to turn up. Unsatisfied by the odds, the mathematican chooses not to bet.

The statistician, seeing that there is a 20-streak of black, believes that the roulette has some "construction bias" that favors blacks. The statistician bets on black.

The fool bets on red.

:rofl:

--- something I had read a long time ago ---

What good is it to lose oneself in pointless arguments? I guess it helps pass the time, avoid real problems, before you die.

Wow, these topics regarding philosophy - metaphilosophy - keep springing up like mushrooms, huh, maybe it's this time of the season.

On topic now, philosophy does not need proof, but @180 Proof ! :halo:

Moreover, if all morality is grounded on human flourishing, and someone does not contribute to this 'flourishing', then this means and implies that they are morally indifferent, or even immoral. This can't be right, can it?