No, Eugenics assumes we know which human qualities best serve human flourishing, and it turns out, who could have guessed, the people who want to make these sorts of decisions tend to conclude their own qualities, even their own race, are the best. But for sure there is a lot of promise in gene therapies. — Thomas Quine

What you describe here might well be "eugenics gone wrong". But since you rely on science for flourishing and consequently morality, you must rely on some form of "flourishing eugenics", giving the best chances to the individual for individual flourishing, eg. being born the smartest, healthiest that can be, as one cannot imagine anyone dumb and weak to accomplish anything at all in life.

There's a lot of disagreement about population control, I tend to think we need to leave these decisions to the individual, and as it turns out countries with an adequate social safety net, so people don't have to rely on the support of children in their old age, show a falling birth rate. — Thomas Quine

Reading this, the movie "Idiocracy" comes to mind.



In all, I think that your concept of "flourishing" bears a resemblance to Nietzsche's "life affirmation", although I doubt that N. thought of it as being equivalent to anything moral.

Hasnt science already settled the matter for human flourishing, in terms of eugenics and population control? Eugenics ensures that only the healthiest, brightest, strongest etc will be born, while pop control that there will be enough resources, food, jobs etc for everyone. What better alternative is there for human flourishing? But why are they not enforced, since it is the right, the moral thing to do?

With philosophical topics like this one, i dont see how anyone can flourish, well not even blossom! :yum:

And we may not in practice be able to eliminate all bias, but me can move arbitrarily far in the direction of less bias, and have a notion of the unbiased ideal we are moving toward. — Pfhorrest

When we say that someone is biased (about something), we also mean that they are wrong, right? Or can a biased person somehow be right?

Thing is that there is no real criterion for bias, neither one can know whether they are biased. This is what I think anyway. And so, for me, objective, as you put it, is empty, or wishful thinking, at best. And so I prefer to think of objective and objectivity as "devoid of any value judgment", biased or not, right or wrong.

Objective" just means "without bias": correct or incorrect without regard to any point of view. (But not without regard to the contents of the state of affairs being evaluated: who or what you're talking about, when and where they are, etc, can make a difference in what is correct or incorrect to say about them. But whatever is correct to say about them, is correct for everyone to say about them, and incorrect for anyone to say contrary). — Pfhorrest

Can something that is objective be, at the same time, incorrect?
Is there such thing as "without bias"?

i told you that by objectively, i mean descriptive, and so to describe objectively i take it to mean describe descriptively :joke: Describe is just describe, like science does, in contrast to prescribe. But lets say that there are a number of ways to describe, what would those be? (Hope you had enough already! :eyes: )

:grin:
I dont think we can describe anything accurately, but even if we did, we would be talking about a correct/right description, and not a correct/right answer or evaluation. What does a right answer even mean or look like, in terms of love like you ask, anyway???

Objectivity doesnt have to do with right or wrong, it just means descriptive.

Hard really to say that philosophy has made any real progress, since in the current phield of quantum mechanics, there are all these bunch of interpretations that mirror all the various philosophies that have been proposed at various times, since antiquity.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interpretations_of_quantum_mechanics

The sheer fact that there exist so many interpretations, is an embarrassment to philosophy, and most probably to physics, ie both. But philosophers just sing their tune, as usual, unperturbed. It's a shame really, not so for philosophy, since we are used to philosophy being shameless, but for physics, to degenerate to a kind of theology, where there are lots of interpretations, like there are lots of religions, heresies and cults.

I mean seriously, where is the progress here, are we kidding ourselves? Is philosophy just a way to make ourselves seem smart and wise and *deep*, where we are most definitely not?

Make TPF great (again) :cry:

But yet another definition of philosophy:

the discipline which makes idiots and fools seem like brilliant, most probaly that is why it was invented. It's all look-alike, what do you think? We were good before philosophy came into being, or not?

Lovers of wisdom is of course ridiculous, cause a fool cannot be a lover of anything.

Give the word philosophy is in the very title of this forum, it seems like a fairly straightforward question, "What is philosophy?"

The term itself, as we know, means "love of wisdom" from the Greek. But that doesn't help much until we know what "wisdom" means.

Interested in hearing various interpretations. — Xtrix

Philosophy is the belief system that takes it for granted that you can reason your way through everything.

There is no need to abolish logic, only the need to see that it is not perfect or ideal. Notice the analogy with measuring. So long as we get consistency in the results, it serves the purpose. So logic is nothing other than another way of using language, if it serves the purpose, we keep doing it in a similar way, and there is consistency in the results, just like measuring. But there is nothing to indicate the logic being used, (or the system for measuring), provides the perfect or ideal way of doing things. — Metaphysician Undercover

If Logic is what makes languages and speech possible (transcendental), then speaking any language would show and reflect it (Logic). This is what I think he meant in the Tractatus by "propositions show the logical form of reality". Coming later to the realization that (most) propositions are form-less (there is no general propositional form) and/or that language does not consist solely in propositions, he saw this as a threat to Logic, that it undermines it somehow, what happens to Logic now, he wondered. For how can you get from something that has no form - propositions - to something that has (form) - Logic? The solution was to abandon "form" altogether: Logic is still being reflected in language, sometimes having form, while other times, huh, not so much; having or not having form has nothing to do with it. The requirement of form (form and content said the german idealists, form and content he repeats in the Tractatus) in Logic and language both, but also in everything else, comes from a very long and deep tradition, this tradition that exalts "ideals" and "perfection", which is a very natural and strong tendency in all of us: the ideal way to think, the ideal way to act, to talk, to write, to make science, to philosophize, to live, to cook, to have sex etc. It seems that young Wittgenstein was caught up, like a fly, in its net, being led to dogmatism, while later he disavowed any connexions to it, the PI was an attempt to shake it off, not an easy thing to do since after two millenia it has spread its roots deep to everything. But anyway, if we would have to restate the tractarian "propositions show the logical form of reality", we could say "language shows Logic".

It's not that he changed his views on what Logic is, it's that he changed his views on reality, recognizing that there is no such thing as the logical form of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps, but it would be interesting to examine this, I think, by comparing the Tractatus to the PI on this particular issue. Regretfully, I don't have enough time at the moment for a proper discussion. Anyway, I find these excerpts from the PI pertinent:

108. We see that what we call "sentence" and "language" has not the formal unity that I imagined, but is the family of structures more or less related to one another.——But what becomes of logic now? Its rigour seems to be giving way here.—But in that case doesn't logic altogether disappear?—For how can it lose its rigour? Of course not by our bargaining any of its rigour out of it.—The preconceived idea of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning our whole examination round. (One might say: the axis of reference of our examination must be rotated, but about the fixed point of our real need.)

242. If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments. This seems to abolish logic, but does not do so.—It is one thing to describe methods of measurement, and another to obtain and state results of measurement. But what we call "measuring" is partly determined by a certain constancy in results of measurement.

I think that Wittgenstein was afraid that if what he calls "formal unity" of language had to be dismissed, in as "there is no general form of proposition", then this would imply some bad things happening to logic as well. Also, if there is no agreement in neither definitions nor judgments, as it so happens, then this would mean that logic would have to be abolished. But it seems to me that he solves this problem by insisting on his tractarian view on logic, that it is transcendental, nothing more but just supplying the conditions for anything to be said. From 242 above, if "measurement" is the result of saying or judging something, then the fact that there is a certain constancy in it, would owe this constancy to logic, irrespective of whether someone agrees to it or not. And so, everything that we say or judge shows this transcendental logic, or Logic - in order to discriminate it from its other variations, when playing a particular language game.

and that logic shows the form of reality — Metaphysician Undercover

Why did you translate "propositions show the logical form of reality" into "logic shows the form of reality", it's not the same. But anyway, I doubt that later Wittgenstein changed his views on what Logic is than the tractarian one.

Phhhht. A term invented by people who don't like being told about their prejudices. — Banno

Regardless who or what they are, I just wanted to say that one way of imposing your worldview, would be via language, a most effective method, the reason for its effectiveness most likely being that language mirrors logic. This happens all the time in history, words are given new and different meaning, with the previous one completely shunned.

It's a family affair. There's coherence within the family. God only knows what kind of glue coheres the family. It's definitely not anything logical. — Metaphysician Undercover

The coherence is not logical?? What then? The relations between members of the family, are they internal or external?

So I think you're looking in the wrong direction, thinking you can determine something logical by looking at a particular group of people's use of language.

According to Wittgenstein, "propositions show the logical form of reality", this is what I'm looking at here, whether it is so.

Here today, gone tomorrow. :cry:

But you can see for example our age of "political correctness", what these guys and gals are trying to do, they are trying to enforce correct use of language, eg humankind vs mankind: mankind is proscribed and condemned as a relic of a past and long-gone patriarchical civilization, something to abhor. But they are not just changing the language, but the logic of the world as well, something fundamental that is. Fascism is another example, all fascists were proud to be called so in the past, look at them now. In general: change the language, you change the logic, you change the world. But it runs bothways: recover the changes made to language, you recover a lost and obscured world.

The only bit I found difficult was:
...the logic that people used in various historical periods...
— Pussycat
My predilections and prejudices pull me overwhelmingly towards coherence as a foundation to language. So I bristle at anything that might even slightly undermine that. Even though Pussycat isn't suggesting the acceptability of incoherence, I'm proceeding with exuberant caution... — Banno

I don't understand what you mean by 'coherence' as that is applied to language. But anyway, what I am saying is this: it seems to me that Wittgenstein in the Tractatus is making the correlation between language and logic, as if they were interchangeable; the limits of logic are the limits of language, and vice-versa, or maybe language delimits logic, and vice-versa, they are one and the same, let's say they are different modes of something yet unnamed. And so, an analysis or critique of language is also an analysis and critique of logic, and the opposite. Furthermore,

5.6 The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.
5.61 Logic fills the world: the limits of the world are also its limits. — w

Therefore if you want to discover what "logic people used in various historical periods", all you have to do is look at their language in that period, their world would have been limited by their employed language, mirrored by it. Which is why I said that linguists are in fact logicians, although I didn't have your average-linguist in mind when saying that, but an augmented one, the one that would trace every word, its meaning and use, back to its roots, and examine closely its evolution, why it meant what it meant then, and why did it change, under what circumstances and conditions. In all, a history of language is a history of logic.

I am not talking about any proscriptions.
— Pussycat

No, I am. — Banno

Cool! :cool: So what do you proscribe then?

My purpose here is to show you guys that you would philosophize a lot better if your comments were accompanied with songs.

Logic is just grammar. Linguists describe grammar, they don't proscribe it.

Logicians proscribe. — Banno

I am not talking about any proscriptions. Take for example the "infinitive".

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Infinitive

When did it appear, when did it fall out of favour, and why, etc? Does its use have anything to do with the logic of the world?

As was Austin. Here's his defence of ordinary language:

Our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connexions they have found worth marketing, in the lifetimes of many generation; these surely are likely to be more numerous, more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of the survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonably practical matters, than any that you or I are likely to think up in our arm-chairs of an afternoon - the most favoured alternative method. — Banno

True, ordinary language embodies a lot of history, all of humanity's history actually. But if you link logic to language as Wittgenstein does, then this means that you can examine, by studying language, the logic that people used in various historical periods. Which would make linguists the authorities in logic, and in philosophy as well.

So, another radical approach to Logic in the Tractatus was that it doesn't say anything about the world: logical propositions, or propositions of logic, laws of logic etc, are just tautologies, they don't say anything about what things are, or should be, they don't treat of something real. They just provide the grounds, the scaffolding with the help of which various (non-logical) propositions are built. Logic is transcendental, following Kant's phraseology. Moreover, Wittgenstein says that logic fills the world. And so, there is really no reason to make a list of those logical propositions or explain them to someone, since they already know them, or maybe they don't really know them or are aware of them, but they are nevertheless embodied of them, language itself and its structure is filled with all logic, as in we are children of logic, one cannot speak illogically, no matter how hard they tried. If there is anything that Logic wants, this is clarity, and not to be conflated with people's psychology, what people want it to be for their own reasons, it does not belong to anyone, but is shared by everyone.

Anyways, Wittgenstein believed and said that his work had been grossly misinterpreted. We can find this in various parts:

1. In the prologue made for the PI, that ended up in his notes known to us as "Culture and Value":

This book is written for those who are in sympathy with the spirit in which it is written. This spirit is, I believe, different from that of the prevailing European and American civilization. The spirit of this civilization the expression of which is the industry, architecture, music, of present day fascism & socialism, is a spirit that is alien & uncongenial to the author. This is not a value judgement.

...

Even if it is clear to me then that the disappearance of a culture does not signify the disappearance of human value but simply of certain means of expressing this value, still the fact remains that I contemplate the current of European civilization without sympathy, without understanding its aims if any. So I am really writing for friends who are scattered throughout the corners of the globe. It is all one to me whether the typical western scientist understands or appreciates my work since in any case he does not understand the spirit in which I write.

2. In the prologue of the PI:

Up to a short time ago I had really given up the idea of publishing my work in my lifetime. It used, indeed, to be revived from time to time: mainly because I was obliged to learn that my results (which I had communicated in lectures, typescripts and discussions), variously misunderstood, more or less mangled or watered down, were in circulation. This stung my vanity and I had difficulty in quieting it.

...

I make them public with doubtful feelings. It is not impossible that it should fall to the lot of this work, in its poverty and in the darkness of this time, to bring light into one brain or another—but, of course, it is not likely. I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But, if possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own. I should have liked to produce a good book. This has not come about, but the time is past in which I could improve it.

3. As reported by Von Wright, student, friend and alleged authority on Wittgenstein:

He was of the opinion ... that his ideas were generally misunderstood and distorted even by those who professed to be his disciples. He doubted he would be better understood in the future. He once said he felt as though he were writing for people who would think in a different way, breathe a different air of life, from that of present-day men.

Therefore, if we believe his sayings, we can say that his song came out completely wrong, due to misinterpretation. Nevertheless he tried to write a good book, with not much success as he admits. But that's okay, maybe one day we'll get rich! :)

Book 3 of Locke's Essay would be a start. — Snakes Alive

Thanks, you finally gave me something, something I could work with I mean. From here:

https://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/locke1690book3.pdf

It seems to me that you have greatly misunderstood the Tractatus, which is why you believe Wittgenstein is, and I quote, "just one out of very many philosophers, in a very long tradition, many of whom long before and after him said similar things". Now how the hell to explain this. Hmm, perhaps Russell's introduction would be of some use. I quote:

In order to understand Mr Wittgenstein’s book, it is necessary to realize what is the problem with which he is concerned. In the part of his theory which deals with Symbolism he is concerned with the conditions which would have to be fulfilled by a logically perfect language. There are various problems as regards language. First, there is the problem what actually occurs in our minds when we use language with the intention of meaning something by it; this problem belongs to psychology. Secondly, there is the problem as to what is the relation subsisting between thoughts, words, or sentences, and that which they refer to or mean; this problem belongs to epistemology. Thirdly, there is the problem of using sentences so as to convey truth rather than falsehood; this belongs to the special sciences dealing with the subject-matter of the sentences in question. Fourthly, there is the question: what relation must one fact (such as a sentence) have to another in order to be capable of being a symbol for that other? This last is a logical question, and is the one with which Mr Wittgenstein is concerned. He is concerned with the conditions for accurate Symbolism, i.e. for Symbolism in which a sentence “means” something quite definite. In practice, language is always more or less vague, so that what we assert is never quite precise. Thus, logic has two problems to deal with in regard to Symbolism: (1) the conditions for sense rather than nonsense in combinations of symbols; (2) the conditions for uniqueness of meaning or reference in symbols or combinations of symbols. — Russell

In terms of how Russell laid out these 4 problems regarding language, it should be obvious that Locke, in his essay, was solely concerned with the first 3, while the fourth, the purely logical one, completely eluded him. Somewhere you write: "I think the question of intelligibility is interesting, but how words come to mean things, and what they mean or can mean, is a complicated topic not seriously addressed by the Tractatus". This is it right here! You were expecting something different from the Tractatus, or maybe you mistook his symbolical and logical approach to language to be doing something similar like his predecessors, Locke for example in his essay, or the so-called empiricists. I reckon that all your confusion and misunderstanding stems from this simple fact. The middle chapters of the Tractatus, of which I am certain that they are either of no interest to you, or you don't understand them at all, contain Wittgenstein's ideas regarding language, how you can treat it from the point of view of logic alone, using symbolism. And therefore W., in the Tractatus, has to make an exposition of logic as well. But of course, if someone takes logic to be what was traditionally thought to be, then they will understand completely nothing, if they try to make the new concepts and notions to somehow fit the old ones, because they don't, they don't fit, I mean.

But in general, Wittgenstein saw things differently, his POV was quite weird and unique, and so to say that he somehow fits in the philosophical tradition, is plain silly, he is more likely to be a philosophical freak, le freak, c'est chic. You can see for example his take on the philosophy of mathematics, which Banno is now exploring.

Anyway, just something to note regarding Locke's essay. He writes towards the end, in the chapter titled: "Chapter xi: The remedies of those imperfections and misuses":

2. I would cut a ridiculous figure if I tried to effect a complete reform of the language of my own country, let alone of the languages of the world! To require that men use their words always in the same sense, and only for determined and uniform ideas, would be to think that all men should have the same notions and should talk only of what they have clear and distinct ideas of; and no-one can try to bring that about unless he is vain enough to think he can persuade men to be either very knowing or very silent!. . . . — Locke

This echoes with W's last remark: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent". The difference is, and a great one, that for W., the one who knows keeps silent, and not as Locke puts it, that there are those who know and should/can use language correctly, and the others that don't and misuse it. And of course, for Wittgenstein there are no remedies. But then again, the methodologies of these two thinkers were totally different, and so were their conclusions.

So perhaps you could re-read the Tractatus in a different light.

Philosophy, as it stands, eats of any leftovers that science might throw at it. Thus the king, or rather the queen, is naked, believing to be in the driver's seat, but in reality it plays second fiddle, if any at all. But philosophy and science have been apart for quite some time now, it makes you wonder whether they were even together at some point. They are like married old couples that stick with each other out of habbit or out of fear, or for any reason regardless, other than the one that brought them together in the first place. I believe that it's a shame, really, and that if we want to learn and unlock the secrets that both science and philosophy hold dear and not go around chasing our own tails with guesses in some cold play, we should, like good scientists that we are, go back to the start, something that is extremely difficult of course, but no one ever said it would be easy.



And so, it doesn't reallly matter why all philosophers disagree with each other all the time, since their point or points of disagreement are hetero-determined by something that is not philosophy, science in this case.

Is this the thread where we are dropping shit to philosophers and philosophy? I was getting ready to dump a good one, but somehow lost interest! :blush:

I'm just suggesting that you have an inflated view of his importance, because you're reading too narrowly. He does not 'give us anything,' he is not Jesus Christ. He was just one out of very many philosophers, in a very long tradition, many of whom long before and after him said similar things. — Snakes Alive

Yer suggestions were duly noted, but were subsequently rejected. Reason: insufficient information. Similar is not what I want, I am after same. Everything is the same, if you don't love them. So, Mr. Readmore, do you have anything to offer, other than recopulations of the same that is?

They seem like nice people.

I'm in the middle of WoW I've lost interest in philosophy. :lol: I need a break. People in here take themselves to seriously, including moi. — Sam26

:razz: I am sorry, I didn't know u were in serious business, or else I wouldn't have imposed! But everyone needs a break, once in a while. Maybe you'll come back, like Wittgenstein did. Take care.

I don't remember him saying anything about it. I don't think there is much to it. It seems silly to me. — Sam26

Well maybe it's not, but vital to really understanding the Tractatus. After all, it seems like a combination of epistemology and a proposition that has sense.

The motto, yes. What does Fann say about it? What? Nothing? Why is that, you think?

No, before that, I was talking about the motto.

The page that starts with the title, "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus", and then continues with "DEDICATED".

You left out the first page of the Tractatus, the most important part.

Then why does Wittgenstein talk about pictures? — Metaphysician Undercover

I dunno why, I guess this was his way.

Ah, you make me search now. Wasn't it you that said those things:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/394275

I think this survives in the way 'western civilization' in general seems to simply value talking, even to no end.There is some bizarre idea that no matter what is being discussed, and no matter to what end, discussion is a kind of good in of itself. We're always 'having conversations,' and 'democracy' is sacrosanct even beyond any material benefits it might provide or fail to provide.

And so Wittgenstein says that talking about certain things, philosophical things, just won't do, due to the nature of talking, the nature of language. What to tell you, I would think that you, apart from everyone else, would embrace it, or relate to it, or at least take it seriously, or otherwise see it critically. But obviously you didn't do any of these things, but you outright ridicule and discard it. I dunno, but I think that there is something wrong here.

I mean, he gives what you want, isn't it, why you won't just take it?

I am not sure, but most probably you are thinking of a state-of-affairs as a snapsnot of the world, like for example a picture/snapshot we capture with our phones, something static that is, some picture where time is stopped. This was shown by Zeno to be problematic, most ptobably this concept has helped us to evolve in someway, but here we are talking about something else. But I doubt that Wittgenstein thought of a state-of-affairs like this. A tractarian state-of-affairs could be a horse running from A to B. Think of the tractarian world of what everything happens in the world.