The Tractatus is a lot like any other work – the technical development that was lying around at the time was taken for a key to the universe. This time, it was the truth-functional propositional calculus.

Seen in retrospect it's a profoundly silly thing, but then I guess most things are. — Snakes Alive

Yes, but this - the truth-functional propositional calculus as you put it, applies only to matters of fact and the natural sciences, not to everything.

It seems to me that much of what W says, or at least the gist of it, is correct when limited specifically to descriptive propositions, words being used to indicate something about how the world is; but, as you rightly point out, words can also be used to do a lot more than that, they can mean things other than “the world is such-and-such way”. Talk about what words mean, like this message or the Tractacus itself, falls outside that limited scope of describing the world, but still clearly has nother kind of meaning. — Pfhorrest

You are correct, I think, the Tractatus conveys a meaning but with it being senseless. "sense", in the Tractatus has to do with the facts, descriptive propositions like you say, on "how" the world is, the propositions of natural science. All the propositions in the Tractatus are senseless, huh, in that sense.

Right, when you get to the end of the book, Wittgenstein admits that it's all wrong, and advises you to throw it all away. He basically says I've given you a demonstration of the wrong approach, now move along and find the right approach. But when you see from the very beginning, that it's all wrong, as Sam26 says, "Wittgenstein holds to the traditional view at this point in his life, that names refer to objects.", it makes a very boring read. — Metaphysician Undercover

He doesn't admit that it's all wrong, he says it is 'senseless', which is a different thing than 'wrong'. Philosophical propositions, as well as "elucidating" propositions referring to the nonsensicality of those, are neither right or wrong, they are just senseless: they don't make sense as language is normally supposed to do. But they do convey meaning. In the Tractatus, there is a difference between meaning and sense, really hard to tell, and besides, it's all lost in translation. Bedeutung und Sinn. Sense and Meaning, or otherwise. I mean, in english, sense and meaning may be taken to be the same, but in the Tractatus, they are most definitely not. See also "Über Sinn und Bedeutung" by Frege. Wittgenstein sort of responds to Frege with the Tractatus, there is a reference to him therein. In order to understand the Tractatus better, we should see it in its historical reference.

When you "demonstrate to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions", you presumably do so using language. That does not seem to be a use of language for natural science, though. Is it therefore an abuse of language to show someone they are abusing language? — Pfhorrest

For sure. Which is why W. immediately after writes:

6.54 My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)
He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly.

Remember I'm talking mainly about the Tractatus, and it's clear if you read what he said about that book, that he believed he solved all the major problems of philosophy. It's in the Tractatus that Wittgenstein puts forward his theory of truth-functions, which I'll be talking more about as we go along. — Sam26

Yes, he believed he had solved them at the time, but how, is the question. He says so at 6.53:

The right method of philosophy would be this. To say nothing except what can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science, i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy: and then always, when someone else wished to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions. This method would be unsatisfying to the other—he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy—but it would be the only strictly correct method. — w

The truth-functions have to do with the propositions of natural science, not with philosophy or metaphysics. Philosophy/metaphysics shouldn't, cannot have any propositions at all, language is solely used for the natural sciences. Using language to say something philosophical or metaphysical is an abuse of language, you understand?

Because you said that he solved all philosophical problems by analyzing propositions via their truth-functions. Philosophical propositions, pertaining to philosophical problems, and according to him, do not have a truth-function, they are neither true or false, right or wrong, but nonsensical, and so the best one can do with them, is to get rid of them. For example, the critique of pure reason by Kant, is a fine example of a nonsensical book.

The logic in the Tractatus contains an exactness that is disposed of in the PI (at least for the most part). It’s this exactness, I believe, that leads Wittgenstein to believe that he has solved all the philosophical problems (in the T.) in one fell swoop. How has he solved all the philosophical problems? Well, if as Wittgenstein supposes one can analyze all propositions via their truth-functions (more on this later), and these line up with facts in the world, then we can determine what’s true and what’s false based on Wittgenstein’s a priori analysis. This is probably why Russell thought that Wittgenstein was creating a logically perfect language. — Sam26

I think that the way he solved all the philosophical problems was by showing, or at least hoping to show at a later time, that these problems were not in fact problems, but pseudo-problems, arising from bad and mis-understanding of language. Just like he says somewhere regarding the problem of the left-right hand posed by Kant, that this is not a philosophical problem, but a purely geometrical/mathematical one: it can be "solved" by transforming the coordinates in 4-d space. And so his method is not one of "solution", but of "dissolution", just like Alexander the Great did with the gordian knot. The knot was entangled in an unorthodox way, the only way to untie it or "solve" it, was to employ an equally unorthodox method, pertinent to its nature, cut it through.

image does not display.

Violent delights have violent endings, or so they say.

But I think that the book "Who Killed Homer: The Demise of Classical Education and the Recovery of Greek Wisdom" by Hanson and Heath, gives some insight into the matter. I found a sort of a summary here:

https://stanfordmag.org/contents/who-killed-homer

IMV the story of philosophy demonstrates discontinuity. Compare Dewey and Plotinus. Philosophy looks roughly like big-picture thinking. Just as humans vary considerably in their fundamental visions of the world, so do the specialists who carefully articulate and argue for such views. — jjAmEs

True, one could find discontinuities and dissimilarities as easily as one would find continuities and similarities, depending on the POV and the semantics of same and different. So I think it's pretty useless this method of investigation, as it would lead to any possible conclusion. So I think it's better to go to the beginning, where it all started, and try to notice any divergence there.

I can't remember how much Durant goes into it, but he does end the book with American pragmatism. — jjAmEs

I hadn't heard of Durant, well at least not Will, cause I had heard of Kevin! Reading a summary of his work 'The story of Philosophy', I think that he sees a continuation, or better a continuity, in philosophy, and therefore, irrespective of whether he is right or wrong, he will not do in this topic, since we are trying to spot and find discontinuities: we do not want people to tell us how similar philosophy is throughout all of (its) history, but how dissimilar.

To me it seems that the professionalization of philosophy is the key issue. Personally I think scholars like Lee Braver are great. — jjAmEs

Key issue, for what? But anyway, yeah, early philosophers were not scholars, pro's or academics, they were just people doing philosophy for ... for, dunno, maybe just for the fun of it? I am not sure, but I think that their reasons were very different than contemporary ones. Just like early footballers and basketballers had different reasons for playing football and basketball than the nowdays millionary professionals. I mean the game is still much the same, chase a ball and score, but it is different to watch poor folk chasing a ball, than watching millionaires do the same.

Haven't heard of Lee Braver either, Paul Graham neither, William James rings a bell, oh right he was that bloke that founded psychology, we in europe have Freud for that.

And so snakes' view paints philosophy as a power-mongering activity or enterprise, wishing to devour everything in its path, just like the game 'snake', in order to grow.



or even a snake eating its own tail.

I think that what snakes is saying is something like this:

Philosophy, since its infancy, attempts to meddle in everything and in everyone's affairs. It does this by a method of appropriation/assimilation: on one hand, it appropriates and assimilates everything that it likes, that it finds worthy, and on the other, it outrightly rejects and discards as aphilosophical/unworthy everything that it doesn't like. An example of this, is so-called "natural philosophy" and the sciences, which philosophy made it appear to be its child. And so in this way, everything of value is philosophical, and vice-versa, everything philosophical is of value, a win-win situation for philosophy in any case. Any attempts to criticize or chastise philosophy for its wrong-doings, if any, sooner or later are appropriated and assimilated into philosophical thinking. This is what happened to analytic anti-philosophy, some time after the tractarian Wittgenstein posited to have solved all philosophical problems by saying that they were mere nonsense, a product of bad understanding and usage of language: it became part of the philosophical tradition, changing to analytic philosophy instead.

Regardless, what we are talking about here is "significant phase changes in philosophy". Having read Durant's book, what would you say these changes are? Does Durant notice of any changes?

Anyway, just waiting on drake's response, but I think there is a passage from Plato's dialogue, "Protagoras", that relates to what we nowadays call metaphilosophy, as it clearly shows a significant phase change in philosophy. It all starts with Socrates trying to analyze Simonides's poem.

Come up with another response! — Snakes Alive

Who me?

Do you object then? Alright then, objection sustained!

Tell you what snakes, I'm with you, with you all the way, I also believe that there is something wrong with philosophy, I said so myself, so maybe we can forge an alliance, albeit a temporary, an unholy one!

But, for argument's sake, and so that I can promote my own, I would like to play the devil's advocate, like they say. Should you have any objections, please take them to the judge and jury.

I mean, I don't want to show contempt of court, but you've been #2ing and traditionally folking around all over the place! We cats you know, we like our place clean!

Another way to say this: It's possible that most of what's going on in this thread is well within the folk tradition. It increasingly seems that way to me. — csalisbury

Yeah, I think that what we're doing here is unambiguously metaphilosophy (I mean, it's in the title! ;)), which on my account at least is the philosophy of philosophy, a subfield of philosophy, and not something outside of it. (I'm aware that there is historical disagreement about whether metaphilosophy is within or outside philosophy, or even if there is such a thing). — Pfhorrest

haha, this is what I wanted to write, well actually something similar like, "where are we? in the philosophy forum, so we are doing philosophy!".

But I think that snakes is doing what he's accusing others of doing, these #2's I mean, for some reason thinking that his thinking is somehow exempt from the philosophical tradition, where in fact he never left it.

Why would anyone that doesn't believe in 'conversation', that it won't lead to a definite conclusion, indulge in such a practice, defending their own conclusions?? :lol:

I think this is a rather naive, or better simplistic and superficial, view that you have of philosophy, that doesn't take into account of all the facts. In all, I am sorry snakes, but I'm not convinced, not at all indeed! :yum:

And syllogisms are of Aristotle, there are no syllogisms in Plato. This is most likely where the brink happened, where the age of logic supplanted the age of enchantment. Speaking of (meta)philosophical phases. But there was before as well, the presocratic age, I mean, when argumentation was a no-issue, those guys spoke in aphorisms, they saw no need for argumentation.

I also suspect that the very idea of a syllogism, or any kind of deductive argument set out in premises that implies a conclusion, has its roots in courtroom procedure. People noticed in getting people to make statements, that multiple statements, due to their natural semantics, had commitment relations to each other, and noticed that if you said one thing, you then had to say another, on pain of contradiction. This then became a model of reasoning. — Snakes Alive

Ah yes, forgot about this one. Socrates (in)famously never reaches a conclusion, but all his argumentation results in the so-called "aporia", which in greek means "not-knowing", for which he was strongly critisized by later philosophers, they said that he was mocking them, that he somehow knew but wouldn't tell them, or that his method was fallible. But courtrooms always reach to a conclusion, as later philosophers do, which I think shows the aforementioned assimilation of philosophy into so-called lawyering.

It's worth noting that, through the mouth of Socrates, Plato pleads that philosophers are different from lawyers because they have as much time as they want to talk.

This shows that (i) there was some debate, or public perception, that philosophers were using lawyers' methods, such that the philosophers themselves needed to address this perception, or likely were even confused themselves about what the difference is; and (ii) the answer was precisely that philosophy was lawyering freed of material constraints (which also, though, defeats its purpose and possibly its effectiveness). Lawyering can work on a witness – it's not clear that reality is a 'witness' that can be cross-examined in this way, but that's basically what the Socratic method tries to do (in early Socratic dialogues, the witness is confused – is it reality, or is it the interlocutor?).

I also suspect that the very idea of a syllogism, or any kind of deductive argument set out in premises that implies a conclusion, has its roots in courtroom procedure. People noticed in getting people to make statements, that multiple statements, due to their natural semantics, had commitment relations to each other, and noticed that if you said one thing, you then had to say another, on pain of contradiction. This then became a model of reasoning. — Snakes Alive

In one platonic dialogue, with Socrates as mouthpiece, rhetoric is praised, and in another it is diminished, what are we to make of this? And in another, Socrates seems to be well informed of lawyers methods, as he enlists them, one by one, to his interlocutor, but then goes his own way. So it seems more likely that Socrates/Plato were into "knowing thy enemy", into espionage, or as collectors of thoughts, so that to be more effective into deflecting attacks, for their own ends of course. So maybe philosophy was born out of necessity, in a reaction against the action and need for "lawyering" everything, which is why it resembles it so much, as in "to defeat your enemy you have to fight him in his own battlefield". And the invocation of this fictitious witness you mention, on behalf of Socrates/Plato, was to show the illusion of the lawyer. But then philosophy witnessed its own defeat, as the lawyers won, and philosophy was, with the death of them, assimilated into lawyering.

Yeah, philosophy is closely related to rhetoric and sophistry. It's not even really clear that there is a clear distinction between the three – the idea that there is comes from a public relations campaign on the part of early philosophers, but the public (perhaps rightly) never saw it that way in Athens, and thought of the philosophers as sophists and rhetoricians. — Snakes Alive

I have no idea what the public thoughts of philosophers in ancient Athens were, but most likely there was a mixed opinion, if any at all, I bet some were even clueless of their existence. Like a material in abscence of a magnetic field.

It's a kind of conversational play plus cognitive loop that was discovered due to the litigious nature of Greek society and the idea that one defended oneself by talking. This got transposed to the world, so that anything could be defended against, or questioned, by talking about it. It comes from the sophistical notion that one can 'talk about anything.' Roughly, the idea is that the techniques of the courtroom get transferred to the world, so that it is 'questioned' or 'put on trial.' This results in the quasi-magical belief that anything can be learned about by interrogating it in a conversation. — Snakes Alive

Rhetoric, you mean, or even sophistry, but both in a neutral way? Is this an epistemological position you are putting forward here, as in the limits of knowledge, or, I don't know, the limits of talking with regards to learning, I do not understand. Or are you just criticising philosophical methods?

We are judging all the time, by being both judge and jury, executioner maybe as well, hell, we could say that human is the being that makes value judgements, so that to discriminate ourselves from other species that do not do that, at least not so much, not so sophisticated and complicated judging.

As Detective Rust put it:

Look, as sentient meat, however illusory our identities are, we craft those identities by making value judgments: everybody judges, all the time. Now, you got a problem with that... You're livin' wrong. — Rust

So, according to the above, our identites are shaped by our value judgments. But it is not at all clear how each of us judges. Modern psychology speaks of the subconscious, that there is something there, unbeknown to us, that drives us, which implies that we are judging and acting without knowing the real reason why. And so, an introspection is needed, psychological, if nothing else, to find out how this shaping took place. Huh, like true detectives that we are, as truth seekers, I don't think we have a choice.

A folk tradition is highly particular to a certain civilizational circumstance, that's all. There is nothing derogatory about the term. — Snakes Alive

Right, cause StreetlightX made me think it in terms of peasants and peasantry, in a diminishing way that is. And then we could say stuff like, philosophers are floggin a dead horse, or milking a dead cow even, so that to be, u know, to be in line with the rustic environment. But we cannot say these things now.

The reason it's important for phil. is because it often imagines itself to be something else (concerned with 'general inquiry,' and so on, which is untrue). So it's a substantive fact about what the discipline really is (something different from what it imagines itself to be). — Snakes Alive

So if it's not that (the general inquiry), what is it then?

If asked to give an answer as to what philosophy is, and what it studies, those in the folk tradition will give answers provided by that very tradition (the 'believer' can only argue from within). But those answers will not be the same as the answers given by those outside of it, who don't need to adhere to that tradition's idiosyncratic cultural boundaries. — Snakes Alive

Ah, the power of tradition, folk or otherwise, is pretty strong, and overly underestimated, I think, the power it exerts, that takes hold of us, habits are hard to change, like they say.

Derogatively you mean? Folk used as in "peasant"?

For sure. I feel like this is the source of the infamous arrogance of philosophers. I think it applies to a lot of types, but philosophers can be some of the worse offenders. At its simplest, its a devaluation of those around you combined with an over-valuation of the thing you're into. And then valuing or devaluing others depending on how well they can do the thing you're into. Again, I think this applies to all sorts of things, but I also think its true people into philosophy often do this more intensely (myself included, though I hope I'm getting better.) — csalisbury

Yes, I think that philosophers have made an art out of devaluating others, especially ethical philosophers. But if they are so arrogant and offending, would that justify us to repay them with their own medicine?

I do think Snakes Alive's characterization of philosophy as a folk tradition is helpful, in this respect, because it helps brings everything down to earth. — csalisbury

Ah, it's been days since his last appearance, maybe he was eaten alive by snakes?? But I am still not sure what he means by "folk tradition", why doesn't he just say "tradition", what are these little folkers doing there?

I'd been drinking the last time we talked — csalisbury

Well, I am drinking most of the time, especially when engaging in conversation, so I'm really ok with that. :cheers:

Looking back, I was surly and projecting — csalisbury

Really, I wouldn't have noticed!

I'm an attention-seeker myself, so I'm probably more likely to diagnose others with the same. Still, even if I use philosophy as way of getting attention, I genuinely enjoy reading difficult texts alone, working them out., putting thoughts in order. So there's the attention-seeking aspect, and the material itself. The material can be used to get attention, but its almost like one subself using the work of another subself, the way a wheeler and dealer will leap on the work of a creative for his own gain. I guess that's the same with all things, and the relative weight of either part depends on the individual in question. — csalisbury

I think that the magnitude of the attention-seeking is important, normal people normally seek attention from their surroundings - the poeple they interact with -, whereas philoshophers seek attention from the whole, which is normal, if you think of it, since philosophy, traditionally speaking, has to do with the whole: philosophers do not speak to normal or common people, but to this notion of the whole. Whoever undestands this, is on the same page with them, whoever not, is considered inadequate or simply not ready yet.

I would still say that the thing of doing philosophy is something different than the pursuit of wisdom, though they may both be tributaries of something upstream. As has been said on this thread, there's a strong litigious element to much of philosophy. I also think there's a strong public-wrestling aspect to it. You see that even today in the most dry and academic of philosophy. There's an strong agonistic aspect that I think might be more central than the widsom-seeking aspect. Still, I don't necessarily think most philosophers are disingenuous in the sense they claim to do one thing, while secretly knowing what they're really doing. Analagously : a lot of finance guys probably really do believe the hayek-derived approbation of the freemarket and that allows them to do one thing, in real life, while telling themselves a story that explains themselves to themselves in agreeable terms. — csalisbury

Well maybe philosophers are so cunning that they managed to cun themseleves, being storytellers and all.

But yeah, let us entertain that thought, that philosophers are no truth seekers, no wisdom seekers either, that truth and wisdom are in fact myths promulgated by them, because in essence what they really are is attention seekers, what say you sally?

Yes, well Arthur was always upset, upset with something, a hard man to please, I wouldn't have invited him for supper, that's for sure. But do you think he suffered from an attention deficit disorder?

But this brings us back on topic, because I think that philosophy, as it has been developed, perceives everything to be rational or logical, and fails to see the ... how to call it, the irrational aspect. Most probably this is why Schopenhauer was so pissed with Hegel! :)

A new situation? What do you mean? I guess there is always a new situation, you can't step into the same river twice, like they say. But I don't think that there is a "right thing", there are just different perspectives, interpretations, or 'wills', that try to be rational about stuff, that strive to rationalize and justify their own, their behaviours, each on its own right. But in the core, everything is pretty irrational, or mystical, I believe, there can be no rational dispute over foundational attitudes or stances or worldviews, since they are ulta rationem.

sure, Schopenhauer it sounds like. What do you understand by 'will'? — csalisbury

By 'will', we normally think of what we want to do, but I think it is what we think is right, right to do, right in an absolute sense. When we are absolutely certain that a course of action, or thinking, was the correct one and could not be otherwise. But when we ponder on the same situation and think otherwise, then this conflict of wills becomes evident.

But philosophically speaking, a lot of philosophers take the I to be a representation of the will, or Will, and to be one and only. And so there is this notion of "my will", pointing to something definite, if not quite. But of course, if there is a multiplicity of I's or Will's, then it makes no sense to talk that way.

Yeah well, look on the bright side, you'll never be alone! :smile: But you could trick it, and as a diversion, could try doing all those things that you find contemptible or even despicable, all those that common people do, I mean.

There is this thing called the 'I', as in an I for an I, for long thought to be one and in unity with itself. But then came Nietzsche and said that this I is not a simple, but a multiplicity of things. Anway, what do those untimely meditations of yours have to say?

I think this survives in the way 'western civilization' in general seems to simply value talking, even to no end. There is some bizarre idea that no matter what is being discussed, and no matter to what end, discussion is a kind of good in of itself. We're always 'having conversations,' and 'democracy' is sacrosanct even beyond any material benefits it might provide or fail to provide. — Snakes Alive

I think that 'western civilization' has its roots on Aristotle, after all aristotelianism has dominated most of the world for some 2k years, and we are still under its influence. Talking, as well, as in "in the beginning was the word". Most probably because this is what discriminates us as a species from those poor hairy things, the animals, unable to speak their minds, to communicate, unlike us. Logos, having been exalted to .. dunno where, to the heavens, we take great pride in it. Maybe it's all that, pride. What do you think.

And sure, it's a hybrid, and has elements of mystery cults, ancient cosmological speculation, hucksterism, and primitive mathematics thrown in (these are all around today in some form under the umbrella of 'philosophy'). But there is a central thread, so I claim, which is what really drives it and causes it to survive. That thread runs through the rise of litigation, to the development of rhetoric, to sophistry, to the Socratic method (where it roughly stops developing). — Snakes Alive

Pride or not, the Socratic method has been dead for quite a long time, when was the last time it was practised?