3.032 To present in language anything which “contradicts logic” is as impossible as in geometry to present by its co-ordinates a figure which contradicts the laws of space; or to give the co-ordinates of a point which does not exist.

From this, it appears how Wittgenstein understood the relationship between logic and language: anything that is said or can be said is automatically logical; the essence of language is logic, or rather, language is intertwined and imbued with logic. And then we have to conclude that to understand logic, one simply needs to look at language, its history, and its evolution, like linguists do. The work becomes much easier because instead of dealing with abstract and purely logical concepts of content and form, which often are not getting anywhere, one can do just as well with something specific: by examining the rules of language, syntactical and grammatical, and seeing how language unfolds, develops, and evolves throughout history, the results of this investigation will simultaneously be results of an examination of the logic of the world, its essence. The role and purpose of linguists are often downplayed or sidelined, but it seems to me that they are doing just that.

3.0321 We could present spatially an atomic fact which contradicted the laws of physics, but not one which contradicted the laws of geometry.

Whatever language is to logic, coordinates/points/shapes are to geometry/space: language develops within logical space, just as various shapes develop within geometric space. And just as there can be no shape without geometric space, there cannot be a linguistic shape without logical space. However, there can be a linguistic shape that contradicts the laws of nature, such as all the heroes in comic books: there, the description of heroes adheres to the laws of logic - how could it be otherwise if everything is logical - so we can understand them without further clarification, given that we are logical beings. However, their powers surpass the laws of physics, as we know them at least; they are supernatural. Yet, the supernatural nature of the thing does not abolish the logic of the shapes in comics. Therefore, the flying unicorn is something logical but supernatural. Here also what was previously said about linguists, can be said about comic book artists.Their creations are essentially a work on the logic that governs the world. They are Logicomix.

3 The logical picture of the facts is the thought.
3.001 “An atomic fact is thinkable”—means: we can imagine it.
3.01 The totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world.
3.02 The thought contains the possibility of the state of affairs which it thinks.
What is thinkable is also possible.
3.03 We cannot think anything unlogical, for otherwise we should have to think unlogically.
3.031 It used to be said that God could create everything, except what was contrary to the laws of logic. The truth is, we could not say of an “unlogical” world how it would look.
3.032 To present in language anything which “contradicts logic” is as impossible as in geometry to present by its co-ordinates a figure which contradicts the laws of space; or to give the co-ordinates of a point which does not exist.
3.0321 We could present spatially an atomic fact which contradicted the laws of physics, but not one which contradicted the laws of geometry.
3.04 An a priori true thought would be one whose possibility guaranteed its truth.
3.05 We could only know a priori that a thought is true if its truth was to be recognized from the thought itself (without an object of comparison).

Here, he connects the thought with the logical picture.

Therefore, from the above, it may become apparent how Wittgenstein defines the logical, logic: anything we can think of, anything that is conceivable. If, for example, we can think of a flying unicorn, then this flying unicorn is logical, being an image [3, 3.001]. If, however, this image we formed with our mind, with our thought, is true - meaning it corresponds to reality - then we say that this image is a part of the world, not just an image, but an image of the world [3.01]. Anything we can think of is logical because in our thought lies the possibility of what we are thinking, regardless of whether it is simultaneously true; there is, according to Wittgenstein, a dimension between the possible and the true: for anything we have the ability to form an image, that is a logical possibility, part of the logic of the world [3.02], while the truth of this image is something else, unrelated to logic (which he discusses later). [Although not so unrelated in the end, since the image was formed through logic].

Therefore, we cannot think of anything illogical because then we would have to think illogically [3.03]. Consequently, what we call "illogical" does not exist; everything is logical, as possibilities of our thought. And a "non-logical" or "illogical" world is something we cannot even conceive. So the propositions of Tractatus 3.03 and 3.031, "It was once said that God can create everything except what would be contrary to the laws of logic. We could not say, therefore, what an 'illogical' world would look like," are essentially tautologies, as he will later say that all logical propositions are, propositions of logic. Why is it a tautology? Because he says that anything that appears logical to us is also logical. And that even God, as we imagine Him, would have to submit to the laws of logic, as they appear to us.

But there is also a problem when we say that something - a proposition - is a tautology because from this tautological proposition, no information can be extracted about the world. So, if all possible logical propositions are indeed tautologies, this tells us nothing about what is logical, what logic is, and how it is defined. If, for example, in response to the question "what is logical?" the answer is "everything is logical" - since we cannot think illogically - then what conclusion can one draw about logic? No conclusion can be drawn, except one: that logic cannot be defined through logic itself, and if we want, for some reason [why?], to find out what it is, then we must turn elsewhere, to other means.

Anyway, the Tractatus does not directly deal with the definition of logic, although it makes some useful observations about it; nor does it talk about what is true. Instead, it provides the theory needed for one to be able to properly understand what is being said to them, as well as what they themselves are saying, when they speak clearly, and when they make mistakes, whether they are in or out of tune, like with music. I think that what he's saying is equivalent to music theory, but now applied to the theory of language/logic. Challenging things, for sure, but perhaps with a little help from our friends, we can make some progress.

What would you think if I sang out of tune,
Would you stand up and walk out on me?
Lend me your ears and I'll sing you a song,
And I'll try not to sing out of key.



However, the fact that we can think of something does not necessarily mean that this something is true; therefore, a comparison between the image we formed with our thought and reality will be needed to determine its truth. The possibility of what we are thinking falls under logic [3.02, 3.03].

Well, it seems that this ongoing reading group is off for a while now, I will try to put it on track again.

Nah, I'm joking, I just want to publish some old thoughts of mine, lest they are thrown out in the bin. :gasp: I will augment them with recent developments, with the hope that someone may want to discuss.

Hm, they seem to be scattered here and there, where should I begin??

This seems appropriate.

5.4541 The solution of logical problems must be simple for they set the
standard of simplicity.

Men have always thought that there must be a sphere of
questions whose answers—a priori—are symmetrical and united
into a closed regular structure.

A sphere in which the proposition, simplex sigillum veri, is valid.

"simplex sigillum veri" is latin for "simplicity is the sign of truth". Or "Keep it simple, stupid", or KISS as acronym, a principle that was also adopted by the blokes in the American Navy.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KISS_principle

A minimalist approach, that is, an economy consisting of a small number of principles or concepts that everyone can understand.

Of course, Occam's razor first comes to mind here, but this also goes back to Aristotle and Aristotelianism, even before that, perhaps Parmenides. As the AI puts it:

"Aristotle believed that circular motion should be favored for celestial bodies, such as planets and stars, because he thought it represented the most perfect and divine form of motion. In Aristotle's cosmology, the Earth was at the center of the universe, and he proposed a series of concentric spheres to explain the motion of celestial bodies.

Circular motion, according to Aristotle, was considered perfect and unchanging. He associated it with the divine and eternal nature, contrasting it with linear motion, which was associated with the mundane and imperfect nature of the Earth. Aristotle believed that the heavens, being perfect and unchanging, must move in a perfect and unchanging manner, which he thought was circular motion."

And so it seems that the early Wittgenstein, on the basis of his elementary propositions, was caught up by the same "divine" notion of simplicity, symmetry, unity and sphericity as the very early philosophers. Later, he changed his mind by saying "Just think of the equations of physics—how tremendously complex their structure is. Elementary propositions, too, will have this degree of complexity".

Me too, I find the concept of symmetry and unity very enticing, but this I think is due more to a psychological nature and inclination rather than anything else, this KISS principle. Simple things, sealed with a kiss, like the song goes.

I am afraid it is true, philosophy is just idle talk, well for the most part. The resort to Hegel doesn't help either, much more idle talk there.

Philosophy has turned to a monstrosity, it is unrecognizable, even to herself, when did this happen, has it always been like this, don't think so. A historical investigation might shed light into this.

Until there is a remedy, I suggest to depose philosophy from her throne of queen of sciences, and replace her, as Nietzsche suggested, with psychology.

Dont be silly, even if theres no meaning in life, one can easily create one with the technique of (auto) suggestion, u can read all about it in the news.

For sure, doubt is central to Socratic philosophy. That the dialogues often end in aporia is no coincidence, not a bug but a feature, as we would say.
However, there are quite a lot of certainties.
And besides, Socrates own doubt is the case here, and not whether Socratic philosophy has elements of doubt.

I find that the painting of Socrates as a man devoid of doubt, with no fear of death, no regrets (presumably no guilt either) and looking forward to the afterlife (if any), very foreign to me, it actually reminds me of messianic figures, mystics, or madmen, but maybe they are all the same. Rather dogmatic, won't you think?

Don't know whether Plato had any hits, but he was definitely a hitman! :smile:

As for Socrates:

Aargh, what a terrible thing has befallen me in my last hours, to have me doubt my life's work!
Did I misinterpret the music-dream? What about other dreams? And what of the signs?
What of the people I persuaded, did I point them in the wrong direction?
But no! I won't drag myself into self-doubt, not now, at the very end.
And anyway, it's not like I left anything written, it's all hearsay, thank god for that!

often in my past life the same dream had visited me, now in one guise, now in another, but always saying the same thing: "Socrates,'' it said, "make music and practise it." Now in earlier times I used to assume that the dream was urging and telling me to do exactly what I was doing: as people shout encouragement to runners, so the dream was telling me to do the very thing that I was doing, to make music, since philosophy is the greatest music. (61a)

And so it seems that Socrates, on the false premise that philosophy is the greatest music, went about to produce a philosophy completely devoid and stripped of music, totally amusical. But just to be on the safe side, he sloppily put together some words and fables from here and there, and got it over with. Ah, how amusing!

In exchange for giving up its nuclear weapons, Ukraine received financial compensation, as well as the security assurances of the Budapest Memorandum. — wiki

Therefore Ukraine is rationally looking for alternatives (e.g. security guarantees, NATO membership and the like — neomac

good luck with that!

i dont know about philosophy or whether russia's hand was forced, but i believe people want this war over quick so that they return to their normal lives, that was disrupted, double, if you count covid. The quickest way would be for ukraine to surrender, rather than to embark on a long term war. If someone also recognises the russian win as a defeat of the west, and is against the west, well then this would be a double win for them.

Hey, when a country invades another, u would expect that common people would support the defending country and chastise the invading one. This doesnt seem to be the case here. What does the most intelligent person on the planet have to say about this?

sorry tldr, so did we reach a conclusion and consesus as to what metaphysics is?

A mathematician, a statistician and a fool observe a roulette table where black has come 20 times in a row, and think about betting.

The mathematician assumes that the next outcome is independent of the previous ones, and that either black or red has a chance of approx 48% to turn up. Unsatisfied by the odds, the mathematican chooses not to bet.

The statistician, seeing that there is a 20-streak of black, believes that the roulette has some "construction bias" that favors blacks. The statistician bets on black.

The fool bets on red.

:rofl:

--- something I had read a long time ago ---

What good is it to lose oneself in pointless arguments? I guess it helps pass the time, avoid real problems, before you die.

Wow, these topics regarding philosophy - metaphilosophy - keep springing up like mushrooms, huh, maybe it's this time of the season.

On topic now, philosophy does not need proof, but @180 Proof ! :halo:

Moreover, if all morality is grounded on human flourishing, and someone does not contribute to this 'flourishing', then this means and implies that they are morally indifferent, or even immoral. This can't be right, can it?

No, Eugenics assumes we know which human qualities best serve human flourishing, and it turns out, who could have guessed, the people who want to make these sorts of decisions tend to conclude their own qualities, even their own race, are the best. But for sure there is a lot of promise in gene therapies. — Thomas Quine

What you describe here might well be "eugenics gone wrong". But since you rely on science for flourishing and consequently morality, you must rely on some form of "flourishing eugenics", giving the best chances to the individual for individual flourishing, eg. being born the smartest, healthiest that can be, as one cannot imagine anyone dumb and weak to accomplish anything at all in life.

There's a lot of disagreement about population control, I tend to think we need to leave these decisions to the individual, and as it turns out countries with an adequate social safety net, so people don't have to rely on the support of children in their old age, show a falling birth rate. — Thomas Quine

Reading this, the movie "Idiocracy" comes to mind.



In all, I think that your concept of "flourishing" bears a resemblance to Nietzsche's "life affirmation", although I doubt that N. thought of it as being equivalent to anything moral.

Hasnt science already settled the matter for human flourishing, in terms of eugenics and population control? Eugenics ensures that only the healthiest, brightest, strongest etc will be born, while pop control that there will be enough resources, food, jobs etc for everyone. What better alternative is there for human flourishing? But why are they not enforced, since it is the right, the moral thing to do?

With philosophical topics like this one, i dont see how anyone can flourish, well not even blossom! :yum:

And we may not in practice be able to eliminate all bias, but me can move arbitrarily far in the direction of less bias, and have a notion of the unbiased ideal we are moving toward. — Pfhorrest

When we say that someone is biased (about something), we also mean that they are wrong, right? Or can a biased person somehow be right?

Thing is that there is no real criterion for bias, neither one can know whether they are biased. This is what I think anyway. And so, for me, objective, as you put it, is empty, or wishful thinking, at best. And so I prefer to think of objective and objectivity as "devoid of any value judgment", biased or not, right or wrong.

Objective" just means "without bias": correct or incorrect without regard to any point of view. (But not without regard to the contents of the state of affairs being evaluated: who or what you're talking about, when and where they are, etc, can make a difference in what is correct or incorrect to say about them. But whatever is correct to say about them, is correct for everyone to say about them, and incorrect for anyone to say contrary). — Pfhorrest

Can something that is objective be, at the same time, incorrect?
Is there such thing as "without bias"?

i told you that by objectively, i mean descriptive, and so to describe objectively i take it to mean describe descriptively :joke: Describe is just describe, like science does, in contrast to prescribe. But lets say that there are a number of ways to describe, what would those be? (Hope you had enough already! :eyes: )

:grin:
I dont think we can describe anything accurately, but even if we did, we would be talking about a correct/right description, and not a correct/right answer or evaluation. What does a right answer even mean or look like, in terms of love like you ask, anyway???

Objectivity doesnt have to do with right or wrong, it just means descriptive.

Hard really to say that philosophy has made any real progress, since in the current phield of quantum mechanics, there are all these bunch of interpretations that mirror all the various philosophies that have been proposed at various times, since antiquity.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interpretations_of_quantum_mechanics

The sheer fact that there exist so many interpretations, is an embarrassment to philosophy, and most probably to physics, ie both. But philosophers just sing their tune, as usual, unperturbed. It's a shame really, not so for philosophy, since we are used to philosophy being shameless, but for physics, to degenerate to a kind of theology, where there are lots of interpretations, like there are lots of religions, heresies and cults.

I mean seriously, where is the progress here, are we kidding ourselves? Is philosophy just a way to make ourselves seem smart and wise and *deep*, where we are most definitely not?

Make TPF great (again) :cry:

But yet another definition of philosophy:

the discipline which makes idiots and fools seem like brilliant, most probaly that is why it was invented. It's all look-alike, what do you think? We were good before philosophy came into being, or not?

Lovers of wisdom is of course ridiculous, cause a fool cannot be a lover of anything.

Give the word philosophy is in the very title of this forum, it seems like a fairly straightforward question, "What is philosophy?"

The term itself, as we know, means "love of wisdom" from the Greek. But that doesn't help much until we know what "wisdom" means.

Interested in hearing various interpretations. — Xtrix

Philosophy is the belief system that takes it for granted that you can reason your way through everything.

There is no need to abolish logic, only the need to see that it is not perfect or ideal. Notice the analogy with measuring. So long as we get consistency in the results, it serves the purpose. So logic is nothing other than another way of using language, if it serves the purpose, we keep doing it in a similar way, and there is consistency in the results, just like measuring. But there is nothing to indicate the logic being used, (or the system for measuring), provides the perfect or ideal way of doing things. — Metaphysician Undercover

If Logic is what makes languages and speech possible (transcendental), then speaking any language would show and reflect it (Logic). This is what I think he meant in the Tractatus by "propositions show the logical form of reality". Coming later to the realization that (most) propositions are form-less (there is no general propositional form) and/or that language does not consist solely in propositions, he saw this as a threat to Logic, that it undermines it somehow, what happens to Logic now, he wondered. For how can you get from something that has no form - propositions - to something that has (form) - Logic? The solution was to abandon "form" altogether: Logic is still being reflected in language, sometimes having form, while other times, huh, not so much; having or not having form has nothing to do with it. The requirement of form (form and content said the german idealists, form and content he repeats in the Tractatus) in Logic and language both, but also in everything else, comes from a very long and deep tradition, this tradition that exalts "ideals" and "perfection", which is a very natural and strong tendency in all of us: the ideal way to think, the ideal way to act, to talk, to write, to make science, to philosophize, to live, to cook, to have sex etc. It seems that young Wittgenstein was caught up, like a fly, in its net, being led to dogmatism, while later he disavowed any connexions to it, the PI was an attempt to shake it off, not an easy thing to do since after two millenia it has spread its roots deep to everything. But anyway, if we would have to restate the tractarian "propositions show the logical form of reality", we could say "language shows Logic".

It's not that he changed his views on what Logic is, it's that he changed his views on reality, recognizing that there is no such thing as the logical form of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps, but it would be interesting to examine this, I think, by comparing the Tractatus to the PI on this particular issue. Regretfully, I don't have enough time at the moment for a proper discussion. Anyway, I find these excerpts from the PI pertinent:

108. We see that what we call "sentence" and "language" has not the formal unity that I imagined, but is the family of structures more or less related to one another.——But what becomes of logic now? Its rigour seems to be giving way here.—But in that case doesn't logic altogether disappear?—For how can it lose its rigour? Of course not by our bargaining any of its rigour out of it.—The preconceived idea of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning our whole examination round. (One might say: the axis of reference of our examination must be rotated, but about the fixed point of our real need.)

242. If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments. This seems to abolish logic, but does not do so.—It is one thing to describe methods of measurement, and another to obtain and state results of measurement. But what we call "measuring" is partly determined by a certain constancy in results of measurement.

I think that Wittgenstein was afraid that if what he calls "formal unity" of language had to be dismissed, in as "there is no general form of proposition", then this would imply some bad things happening to logic as well. Also, if there is no agreement in neither definitions nor judgments, as it so happens, then this would mean that logic would have to be abolished. But it seems to me that he solves this problem by insisting on his tractarian view on logic, that it is transcendental, nothing more but just supplying the conditions for anything to be said. From 242 above, if "measurement" is the result of saying or judging something, then the fact that there is a certain constancy in it, would owe this constancy to logic, irrespective of whether someone agrees to it or not. And so, everything that we say or judge shows this transcendental logic, or Logic - in order to discriminate it from its other variations, when playing a particular language game.

and that logic shows the form of reality — Metaphysician Undercover

Why did you translate "propositions show the logical form of reality" into "logic shows the form of reality", it's not the same. But anyway, I doubt that later Wittgenstein changed his views on what Logic is than the tractarian one.

Phhhht. A term invented by people who don't like being told about their prejudices. — Banno

Regardless who or what they are, I just wanted to say that one way of imposing your worldview, would be via language, a most effective method, the reason for its effectiveness most likely being that language mirrors logic. This happens all the time in history, words are given new and different meaning, with the previous one completely shunned.

It's a family affair. There's coherence within the family. God only knows what kind of glue coheres the family. It's definitely not anything logical. — Metaphysician Undercover

The coherence is not logical?? What then? The relations between members of the family, are they internal or external?

So I think you're looking in the wrong direction, thinking you can determine something logical by looking at a particular group of people's use of language.

According to Wittgenstein, "propositions show the logical form of reality", this is what I'm looking at here, whether it is so.

Here today, gone tomorrow. :cry:

But you can see for example our age of "political correctness", what these guys and gals are trying to do, they are trying to enforce correct use of language, eg humankind vs mankind: mankind is proscribed and condemned as a relic of a past and long-gone patriarchical civilization, something to abhor. But they are not just changing the language, but the logic of the world as well, something fundamental that is. Fascism is another example, all fascists were proud to be called so in the past, look at them now. In general: change the language, you change the logic, you change the world. But it runs bothways: recover the changes made to language, you recover a lost and obscured world.

The only bit I found difficult was:
...the logic that people used in various historical periods...
— Pussycat
My predilections and prejudices pull me overwhelmingly towards coherence as a foundation to language. So I bristle at anything that might even slightly undermine that. Even though Pussycat isn't suggesting the acceptability of incoherence, I'm proceeding with exuberant caution... — Banno

I don't understand what you mean by 'coherence' as that is applied to language. But anyway, what I am saying is this: it seems to me that Wittgenstein in the Tractatus is making the correlation between language and logic, as if they were interchangeable; the limits of logic are the limits of language, and vice-versa, or maybe language delimits logic, and vice-versa, they are one and the same, let's say they are different modes of something yet unnamed. And so, an analysis or critique of language is also an analysis and critique of logic, and the opposite. Furthermore,

5.6 The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.
5.61 Logic fills the world: the limits of the world are also its limits. — w

Therefore if you want to discover what "logic people used in various historical periods", all you have to do is look at their language in that period, their world would have been limited by their employed language, mirrored by it. Which is why I said that linguists are in fact logicians, although I didn't have your average-linguist in mind when saying that, but an augmented one, the one that would trace every word, its meaning and use, back to its roots, and examine closely its evolution, why it meant what it meant then, and why did it change, under what circumstances and conditions. In all, a history of language is a history of logic.

I am not talking about any proscriptions.
— Pussycat

No, I am. — Banno

Cool! :cool: So what do you proscribe then?

My purpose here is to show you guys that you would philosophize a lot better if your comments were accompanied with songs.

Logic is just grammar. Linguists describe grammar, they don't proscribe it.

Logicians proscribe. — Banno

I am not talking about any proscriptions. Take for example the "infinitive".

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Infinitive

When did it appear, when did it fall out of favour, and why, etc? Does its use have anything to do with the logic of the world?

As was Austin. Here's his defence of ordinary language:

Our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connexions they have found worth marketing, in the lifetimes of many generation; these surely are likely to be more numerous, more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of the survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonably practical matters, than any that you or I are likely to think up in our arm-chairs of an afternoon - the most favoured alternative method. — Banno

True, ordinary language embodies a lot of history, all of humanity's history actually. But if you link logic to language as Wittgenstein does, then this means that you can examine, by studying language, the logic that people used in various historical periods. Which would make linguists the authorities in logic, and in philosophy as well.