But philosophically speaking, a lot of philosophers take the I to be a representation of the will, or Will, and to be one and only. And so there is this notion of "my will", pointing to something definite, if not quite. But of course, if there is a multiplicity of I's or Will's, then it makes no sense to talk that way. — Pussycat

sure, Schopenhauer it sounds like. What do you understand by 'will'?

sure, Schopenhauer it sounds like. What do you understand by 'will'? — csalisbury

By 'will', we normally think of what we want to do, but I think it is what we think is right, right to do, right in an absolute sense. When we are absolutely certain that a course of action, or thinking, was the correct one and could not be otherwise. But when we ponder on the same situation and think otherwise, then this conflict of wills becomes evident.

By 'will', we normally think of what we want to do, but I think it is what we think is right, right to do, right in an absolute sense. When we are absolutely certain that a course of action, or thinking, was the correct one and could not be otherwise. But when we ponder on the same situation and think otherwise, then this conflict of wills becomes evident. — Pussycat

I think that's right. And I think, in that stroke, the whole idea of 'will' becomes void, like you said. Still. We live, and see what we do, and then reflect, and think we want to realign in a certain way, act in a better way. But if you self-tyrannize, and will yourself to will the right thing, that tends to backfire. So there's a new situation?

A new situation? What do you mean? I guess there is always a new situation, you can't step into the same river twice, like they say. But I don't think that there is a "right thing", there are just different perspectives, interpretations, or 'wills', that try to be rational about stuff, that strive to rationalize and justify their own, their behaviours, each on its own right. But in the core, everything is pretty irrational, or mystical, I believe, there can be no rational dispute over foundational attitudes or stances or worldviews, since they are ulta rationem.

But this brings us back on topic, because I think that philosophy, as it has been developed, perceives everything to be rational or logical, and fails to see the ... how to call it, the irrational aspect. Most probably this is why Schopenhauer was so pissed with Hegel! :)

If Schopenhauer was pissed with Hegel on those terms, he wouldn't have written WWR! A system is a system is a system. He was probably more upset with a lack of attention. Imagine two kids building two lego structures. Two prodigies at building lego structures building lego structures.

Yes, well Arthur was always upset, upset with something, a hard man to please, I wouldn't have invited him for supper, that's for sure. But do you think he suffered from an attention deficit disorder?

But yeah, let us entertain that thought, that philosophers are no truth seekers, no wisdom seekers either, that truth and wisdom are in fact myths promulgated by them, because in essence what they really are is attention seekers, what say you sally?

But yeah, let us entertain that thought, that philosophers are no truth seekers, no wisdom seekers either, that truth and wisdom are in fact myths promulgated by them, because in essence what they really are is attention seekers, what say you sally? — Pussycat

I'd been drinking the last time we talked. Looking back, I was surly and projecting. I'm an attention-seeker myself, so I'm probably more likely to diagnose others with the same. Still, even if I use philosophy as way of getting attention, I genuinely enjoy reading difficult texts alone, working them out., putting thoughts in order. So there's the attention-seeking aspect, and the material itself. The material can be used to get attention, but its almost like one subself using the work of another subself, the way a wheeler and dealer will leap on the work of a creative for his own gain. I guess that's the same with all things, and the relative weight of either part depends on the individual in question.

I would still say that the thing of doing philosophy is something different than the pursuit of wisdom, though they may both be tributaries of something upstream. As has been said on this thread, there's a strong litigious element to much of philosophy. I also think there's a strong public-wrestling aspect to it. You see that even today in the most dry and academic of philosophy. There's an strong agonistic aspect that I think might be more central than the widsom-seeking aspect. Still, I don't necessarily think most philosophers are disingenuous in the sense they claim to do one thing, while secretly knowing what they're really doing. Analagously : a lot of finance guys probably really do believe the hayek-derived approbation of the freemarket and that allows them to do one thing, in real life, while telling themselves a parallel story that explains themselves to themselves in agreeable terms.

I'd been drinking the last time we talked — csalisbury

Well, I am drinking most of the time, especially when engaging in conversation, so I'm really ok with that. :cheers:

Looking back, I was surly and projecting — csalisbury

Really, I wouldn't have noticed!

I'm an attention-seeker myself, so I'm probably more likely to diagnose others with the same. Still, even if I use philosophy as way of getting attention, I genuinely enjoy reading difficult texts alone, working them out., putting thoughts in order. So there's the attention-seeking aspect, and the material itself. The material can be used to get attention, but its almost like one subself using the work of another subself, the way a wheeler and dealer will leap on the work of a creative for his own gain. I guess that's the same with all things, and the relative weight of either part depends on the individual in question. — csalisbury

I think that the magnitude of the attention-seeking is important, normal people normally seek attention from their surroundings - the poeple they interact with -, whereas philoshophers seek attention from the whole, which is normal, if you think of it, since philosophy, traditionally speaking, has to do with the whole: philosophers do not speak to normal or common people, but to this notion of the whole. Whoever undestands this, is on the same page with them, whoever not, is considered inadequate or simply not ready yet.

I would still say that the thing of doing philosophy is something different than the pursuit of wisdom, though they may both be tributaries of something upstream. As has been said on this thread, there's a strong litigious element to much of philosophy. I also think there's a strong public-wrestling aspect to it. You see that even today in the most dry and academic of philosophy. There's an strong agonistic aspect that I think might be more central than the widsom-seeking aspect. Still, I don't necessarily think most philosophers are disingenuous in the sense they claim to do one thing, while secretly knowing what they're really doing. Analagously : a lot of finance guys probably really do believe the hayek-derived approbation of the freemarket and that allows them to do one thing, in real life, while telling themselves a story that explains themselves to themselves in agreeable terms. — csalisbury

Well maybe philosophers are so cunning that they managed to cun themseleves, being storytellers and all.

I think that the magnitude of the attention-seeking is important, normal people normally seek attention from their surroundings - the poeple they interact with -, whereas philoshophers seek attention from the whole, which is normal, if you think of it, since philosophy, traditionally speaking, has to do with the whole: philosophers do not speak to normal or common people, but to this notion of the whole. Whoever undestands this, is on the same page with them, whoever not, is considered inadequate or simply not ready yet. — Pussycat

For sure. I feel like this is the source of the infamous arrogance of philosophers. I think it applies to a lot of types, but philosophers can be some of the worse offenders. At its simplest, its a devaluation of those around you combined with an over-valuation of the thing you're into. And then valuing or devaluing others depending on how well they can do the thing you're into. Again, I think this applies to all sorts of things, but I also think its true people into philosophy often do this more intensely (myself included, though I hope I'm getting better.)

I do think @Snakes Alive's characterization of philosophy as a folk tradition is helpful, in this respect, because it helps brings everything down to earth.

For sure. I feel like this is the source of the infamous arrogance of philosophers. I think it applies to a lot of types, but philosophers can be some of the worse offenders. At its simplest, its a devaluation of those around you combined with an over-valuation of the thing you're into. And then valuing or devaluing others depending on how well they can do the thing you're into. Again, I think this applies to all sorts of things, but I also think its true people into philosophy often do this more intensely (myself included, though I hope I'm getting better.) — csalisbury

Yes, I think that philosophers have made an art out of devaluating others, especially ethical philosophers. But if they are so arrogant and offending, would that justify us to repay them with their own medicine?

I do think Snakes Alive's characterization of philosophy as a folk tradition is helpful, in this respect, because it helps brings everything down to earth. — csalisbury

Ah, it's been days since his last appearance, maybe he was eaten alive by snakes?? But I am still not sure what he means by "folk tradition", why doesn't he just say "tradition", what are these little folkers doing there?

But I am still not sure what he means by "folk tradition", why doesn't he just say "tradition", what are these little folkers doing there? — Pussycat

It's a diminutive of course. Non-virtue signalling, if you will.

Derogatively you mean? Folk used as in "peasant"?

Yeah.

Ah, it's been days since his last appearance, maybe he was eaten alive by snakes?? But I am still not sure what he means by "folk tradition", why doesn't he just say "tradition", what are these little folkers doing there? — Pussycat

A folk tradition is highly particular to a certain civilizational circumstance, that's all. There is nothing derogatory about the term.

The reason it's important for phil. is because it often imagines itself to be something else (concerned with 'general inquiry,' and so on, which is untrue). So it's a substantive fact about what the discipline really is (something different from what it imagines itself to be).

If asked to give an answer as to what philosophy is, and what it studies, those in the folk tradition will give answers provided by that very tradition (the 'believer' can only argue from within). But those answers will not be the same as the answers given by those outside of it, who don't need to adhere to that tradition's idiosyncratic cultural boundaries.

A folk tradition is highly particular to a certain civilizational circumstance, that's all. There is nothing derogatory about the term. — Snakes Alive

Right, cause StreetlightX made me think it in terms of peasants and peasantry, in a diminishing way that is. And then we could say stuff like, philosophers are floggin a dead horse, or milking a dead cow even, so that to be, u know, to be in line with the rustic environment. But we cannot say these things now.

The reason it's important for phil. is because it often imagines itself to be something else (concerned with 'general inquiry,' and so on, which is untrue). So it's a substantive fact about what the discipline really is (something different from what it imagines itself to be). — Snakes Alive

So if it's not that (the general inquiry), what is it then?

If asked to give an answer as to what philosophy is, and what it studies, those in the folk tradition will give answers provided by that very tradition (the 'believer' can only argue from within). But those answers will not be the same as the answers given by those outside of it, who don't need to adhere to that tradition's idiosyncratic cultural boundaries. — Snakes Alive

Ah, the power of tradition, folk or otherwise, is pretty strong, and overly underestimated, I think, the power it exerts, that takes hold of us, habits are hard to change, like they say.

Right, cause StreetlightX made me think it in terms of peasants and peasantry, — Pussycat

That's off the mark – but then, it's not like there's anything wrong with peasants.

So if it's not that (the general inquiry), what is it then? — Pussycat

It's a kind of conversational play plus cognitive loop that was discovered due to the litigious nature of Greek society and the idea that one defended oneself by talking. This got transposed to the world, so that anything could be defended against, or questioned, by talking about it. It comes from the sophistical notion that one can 'talk about anything.' Roughly, the idea is that the techniques of the courtroom get transferred to the world, so that it is 'questioned' or 'put on trial.' This results in the quasi-magical belief that anything can be learned about by interrogating it in a conversation.

Something like that.

It's a kind of conversational play plus cognitive loop that was discovered due to the litigious nature of Greek society and the idea that one defended oneself by talking. This got transposed to the world, so that anything could be defended against, or questioned, by talking about it. It comes from the sophistical notion that one can 'talk about anything.' Roughly, the idea is that the techniques of the courtroom get transferred to the world, so that it is 'questioned' or 'put on trial.' This results in the quasi-magical belief that anything can be learned about by interrogating it in a conversation. — Snakes Alive

Rhetoric, you mean, or even sophistry, but both in a neutral way? Is this an epistemological position you are putting forward here, as in the limits of knowledge, or, I don't know, the limits of talking with regards to learning, I do not understand. Or are you just criticising philosophical methods?

Yeah, philosophy is closely related to rhetoric and sophistry. It's not even really clear that there is a clear distinction between the three – the idea that there is comes from a public relations campaign on the part of early philosophers, but the public (perhaps rightly) never saw it that way in Athens, and thought of the philosophers as sophists and rhetoricians.

Is this an epistemological position you are putting forward here, as in the limits of knowledge, or, I don't know, the limits of talking with regards to learning, I do not understand. Or are you just criticising philosophical methods? — Pussycat

No, it's a social / historical claim about what philosophy actually is, how it developed, & what it does.

It's worth noting that, through the mouth of Socrates, Plato pleads that philosophers are different from lawyers because they have as much time as they want to talk.

This shows that (i) there was some debate, or public perception, that philosophers were using lawyers' methods, such that the philosophers themselves needed to address this perception, or likely were even confused themselves about what the difference is; and (ii) the answer was precisely that philosophy was lawyering freed of material constraints (which also, though, defeats its purpose and possibly its effectiveness). Lawyering can work on a witness – it's not clear that reality is a 'witness' that can be cross-examined in this way, but that's basically what the Socratic method tries to do (in early Socratic dialogues, the witness is confused – is it reality, or is it the interlocutor?).

I also suspect that the very idea of a syllogism, or any kind of deductive argument set out in premises that implies a conclusion, has its roots in courtroom procedure. People noticed in getting people to make statements, that multiple statements, due to their natural semantics, had commitment relations to each other, and noticed that if you said one thing, you then had to say another, on pain of contradiction. This then became a model of reasoning.

Yeah, philosophy is closely related to rhetoric and sophistry. It's not even really clear that there is a clear distinction between the three – the idea that there is comes from a public relations campaign on the part of early philosophers, but the public (perhaps rightly) never saw it that way in Athens, and thought of the philosophers as sophists and rhetoricians. — Snakes Alive

I have no idea what the public thoughts of philosophers in ancient Athens were, but most likely there was a mixed opinion, if any at all, I bet some were even clueless of their existence. Like a material in abscence of a magnetic field.

It's a kind of conversational play plus cognitive loop that was discovered due to the litigious nature of Greek society and the idea that one defended oneself by talking. This got transposed to the world, so that anything could be defended against, or questioned, by talking about it. It comes from the sophistical notion that one can 'talk about anything.' Roughly, the idea is that the techniques of the courtroom get transferred to the world, so that it is 'questioned' or 'put on trial.' This results in the quasi-magical belief that anything can be learned about by interrogating it in a conversation. — Snakes Alive

I still say this both misrepresents what philosophers actually do and misconstrues it as an arbitrary, contingent thing.

First, in the absence of deference to any authoritative font of supposed truth, any people collaboratively investigating anything together will need to converse about the investigation and convince each other with arguments in order to build a consensus on the truth between themselves. (It's either that, force some authoritative decree, or go without any consensus at all). This will have to involve establishing what counts as evidence, who has the burden of proof, and so on. Athenian-style legislation is a specific case of that general process; philosophy isn't an over-generalization of legislative process.

Secondly, once that kind of stuff is established, the conversation turns to the actual presentation of evidence; both in actual legislation, and in ancient philosophy. Nowadays, we consider that stage to be something separate from philosophy, "science", but back in the day that was considered a branch of philosophy, "natural philosophy". And scientists to this day continue writing arguments to each other about what evidence they have to offer and what the implications of that evidence is: that's what a science journal is, a publication of such writings. Philosophy today is limited more to the equivalent of "legislating about the legislative process", though as that self-limitation was not immediate it also is not universally agreed-upon, and some philosophers continue to dispute the process used by scientists, try to apply different processes to their more substantive (vs procedural) investigations, or try to apply the scientific process to philosophy itself. But the trend over time is clear that the actual presentation of evidence is becoming a separate thing, science, and the quibbling over the argumentative process itself (standards of evidence, burdens of proof, etc) is the remaining domain of philosophy.

It's worth noting that, through the mouth of Socrates, Plato pleads that philosophers are different from lawyers because they have as much time as they want to talk.

This shows that (i) there was some debate, or public perception, that philosophers were using lawyers' methods, such that the philosophers themselves needed to address this perception, or likely were even confused themselves about what the difference is; and (ii) the answer was precisely that philosophy was lawyering freed of material constraints (which also, though, defeats its purpose and possibly its effectiveness). Lawyering can work on a witness – it's not clear that reality is a 'witness' that can be cross-examined in this way, but that's basically what the Socratic method tries to do (in early Socratic dialogues, the witness is confused – is it reality, or is it the interlocutor?).

I also suspect that the very idea of a syllogism, or any kind of deductive argument set out in premises that implies a conclusion, has its roots in courtroom procedure. People noticed in getting people to make statements, that multiple statements, due to their natural semantics, had commitment relations to each other, and noticed that if you said one thing, you then had to say another, on pain of contradiction. This then became a model of reasoning. — Snakes Alive

In one platonic dialogue, with Socrates as mouthpiece, rhetoric is praised, and in another it is diminished, what are we to make of this? And in another, Socrates seems to be well informed of lawyers methods, as he enlists them, one by one, to his interlocutor, but then goes his own way. So it seems more likely that Socrates/Plato were into "knowing thy enemy", into espionage, or as collectors of thoughts, so that to be more effective into deflecting attacks, for their own ends of course. So maybe philosophy was born out of necessity, in a reaction against the action and need for "lawyering" everything, which is why it resembles it so much, as in "to defeat your enemy you have to fight him in his own battlefield". And the invocation of this fictitious witness you mention, on behalf of Socrates/Plato, was to show the illusion of the lawyer. But then philosophy witnessed its own defeat, as the lawyers won, and philosophy was, with the death of them, assimilated into lawyering.

I also suspect that the very idea of a syllogism, or any kind of deductive argument set out in premises that implies a conclusion, has its roots in courtroom procedure. People noticed in getting people to make statements, that multiple statements, due to their natural semantics, had commitment relations to each other, and noticed that if you said one thing, you then had to say another, on pain of contradiction. This then became a model of reasoning. — Snakes Alive

Ah yes, forgot about this one. Socrates (in)famously never reaches a conclusion, but all his argumentation results in the so-called "aporia", which in greek means "not-knowing", for which he was strongly critisized by later philosophers, they said that he was mocking them, that he somehow knew but wouldn't tell them, or that his method was fallible. But courtrooms always reach to a conclusion, as later philosophers do, which I think shows the aforementioned assimilation of philosophy into so-called lawyering.

And syllogisms are of Aristotle, there are no syllogisms in Plato. This is most likely where the brink happened, where the age of logic supplanted the age of enchantment. Speaking of (meta)philosophical phases. But there was before as well, the presocratic age, I mean, when argumentation was a no-issue, those guys spoke in aphorisms, they saw no need for argumentation.

I also suspect that the very idea of a syllogism, or any kind of deductive argument set out in premises that implies a conclusion, has its roots in courtroom procedure. People noticed in getting people to make statements, that multiple statements, due to their natural semantics, had commitment relations to each other, and noticed that if you said one thing, you then had to say another, on pain of contradiction. This then became a model of reasoning. — Snakes Alive

That would make a lot of sense.

Another thought: I think you can marry the agonistic and litigious aspects of philosophy in the general idea of laying claim to something. People compete to lay claim to truth. First, in the sense of legally establishing a claim to this or that.But also in the sense that one jousts, as as a show of strength or skill, to lay claim to the king's favor. (or the adulation of a teacher, or the public etc) think those two aspects ave been joined in philosophy for most of its history.

Definitely. I think that part of the fun of doing philosophy is that its participants implicitly know they aren't really arguing about anything, so it allows them to do this claim-staking purely: it is pure verbal skill or show of intellectual force, unhindered by the world bearing on its claims or conclusions.

I think this is a rather naive, or better simplistic and superficial, view that you have of philosophy, that doesn't take into account of all the facts. In all, I am sorry snakes, but I'm not convinced, not at all indeed! :yum:

A word on aporia above:

It's possible that aporia was used as a clever literary and intellectual device by Socrates, and to some extent maybe by Plato as well (though as I said above, I think Plato is largely disingenuous in using it, and any decent reader will see he clearly favors a side, or has an agenda distinct from the options presented, and which he intimates quite heavily).

But it's important to realize that there is a foundational reason why philosophical debates end in aporia, regardless of the literary use to which that result is put: it is because philosophical reasoning does not work. In other words, aporia is the only option for a philosophical dispute, and while one might think this is because of the grandeur or mystery of the subject matter, it is more likely because the technique simply doesn't inquire into things in an effective way or yield any results. In other words, you have to use aporia like this, because you have no other choice, since you cannot get anything but an aporia using the method, by design.

I should also note that in practices, especially religious practices, where an initial bold claim is made, and then falsified, its practitioners often retreat to some other claim rather than abandon the belief. They will often say the claim really did come true, just in some non-obvious way, or insist they never really meant the original, but that the original was proxy for some more esoteric thing. This tends to happen with philosophy: it purports to answer substantive questions about which people are curious, and failing this retreats, claiming that the aporia reached has its own value, was the point all along, or the real point is for philosophy to act as a 'multiplier of thought,' or whatever. Compare the Jehova's witnesses saying the world did end in 1914, but what we meant by that was... This is a classic pattern of these practices that don't have any efficacy.