The 'other standard' would be - what? What do 'naturalistic moral standards' amount to? Which school of philosophy, or what philosopher, represents that? — Wayfarer

Hard to keep up with your non seqs sometimes.

We were talking about epistemic standards by which to judge whether the source of an reported religious experience is natural or supernatural. The charge against what you'd said was that you applied naturalistic epistemic standards in one case of a reported religious experience, but rejected naturalistic epistemic standards as insufficient for other cases, which you judged to be authentically religious. I understand what naturalistic epistemic standards are, but I don't know what standards you employed in your judgment that certain cases really are authentically religious. So I can't answer your question about what the other standard you used would be.

In Western culture, moral philosophies coalesced around the Bible which certainly does embody moral standards. 'Do to others as you would have them do to you', 'love neighbour as self', 'care for the poor and needy', to mention only a few. What are the naturalist equivalents for them? Recall, upthread, the discussion about how Richard Dawkins on the one hand, laments the implications of Darwinian theory on moral philosophy, but then has devoted considerable time to attacking the traditional sources of morality.

What's your suggestion to resolve this dilemma?

Well, my meta-ethical position is moral nihilism. I think what people call morals are just societal norms they've adopted. And these are historically and culturally situated and parsed, rather than absolute in any sense.

And I think that characterizing your examples as rooted in revealed scripture has it backwards. Such moral notions made it into scripture in the first place in those societies becasue they arose out of those societies (and many other societies) and were subsequently ascribed to Yahweh or whoever.

A morality doesn't have to be divinely revealed, it just has to work to promote the kind of society the people want, as evolution in moral beliefs about slavery, women, sexual orientation, politics, economics, religious toleration, etc. over the ages resdily reveals,

It seems to me, that if a belief is producing favourable results, then we need something more than the possibility that the belief is false, in order to reject that belief. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure.

But neither do we know that the belief is true in any sense other than that it works. Thus, all we need (and imo all we acrually have access to) are beliefs that work to achieve our purposes. Whether or not any such belief also is absolute is not something that we can determine, even in principle.

Now I understand what you're saying. No, it's not a double standard, it's a judgement. — Wayfarer

Yes, it's a judgment.

And judgments are based on... drum roll... some standard or other.

In one case you judged according to a naturalistic standard, and explain that the woman's religious experience was caused by a psychiatric pathology, but in other cases that you approve of as genuinely religious, you dismiss the naturalistic standard as "insufficient" and judge by some other standard.

Thus, a double standard. One standard for some cases and a different standard for others.

The limits of science are the limits of the human mind on a good day.

The limits of stupidity, dysfunction, and ignorance, on the other hand, are the boundaries we push the rest of the time.

Creationists readily recognize the conflict between their explanations and evolution. (And it is they, not scientists, who make much public noise about the conflict.)

Their responses are instructive, and perhaps can be generalized so they apply to other conflicts between supernatural agent vs. naturalist explanations.

One avenue of resolving the conflict is simply to deny the naturalistic explanation--deny evolution. Either attack it epistemically, denying the validity of the evidence and logic, or just ignore the actual argument presented, and wave the very notion away wholesale as the absurd imaginings of deceived secularists under the influence of "the enemy" (that is, Satan.)

Another move is to acquiesce to some degree. This is the "Well, micro-evolution occurs, but not macro evolution" crowd.

Another move is to accept evolution as proposed by science, and simply assert that evolution is just a description of God's method, a process which he drives and intervenes in. This does not save the assertion that God created the species in one day as narrated in Genesis, but it saves the existence of God the Creator and Designer. Though one attempt to save the Genesis account involves a favorite apologist rhetorical more--redefine the terms. Such as "day," in which a day for God is not a human day, so when Genesis says God created all the various species in one "day" that doesn't mean a 24-hour period, it should be understood to mean an undefined stretch of God-time. And "Adam" who named teh animals doesn't mean one guy, it means all of humankind over the ages.

In general this entails a shift to a more metaphorical, less literal, interpretation of the scriptures, which fundamentalists see as the dreaded "slippery slope" that can ultimately result only in anything goes interpretations, rather than the plain Truth, so they resist it, and characterize it as "liberal" theology.

Note that regarding descriptions of spiritual experiences, we see both literalistic and metaphorical descriptions, in which God is portrayed in some as the Yahweh of the Old Testament, or as "a loving presence" or "the ground of being" and the like.

But I think the issue is whether or not there is an absolute good, not exactly what such a good would be. If we are of the opinion that there is an absolute good, we can forever seek higher goods, always in pursuit of that absolute good. But if we are of the opinion that there is no absolute good, then the good determined today, or yesterday, as the highest good, might be continually forced upon us, into the future, as the highest good, denying the possibility that we could discover higher goods, And if we allow that there are higher goods, how would we create any hierarchical system without any direction toward an assumed absolute good? — Metaphysician Undercover

This reasoning strikes me as an appeal to consequences.

Sure, our beliefs have consequences, sometimes consequences that are widely judged to be positive, inspiring, life enhancing--as indeed many religious beliefs are. But desirable consequences do not entail that the proposition driving the behaviors is true, they indicate simply that belief that the proposition is true motivates behavior.

I just want to point out that this conflict only arises if one subscribes to a non-instrumentalist view of science. If you take scientific instrumentalism to be the case, then there is no conflict between say believing god created the world in seven days, and using the theory of evolution to explain the biodiversity in the world. — dukkha

Seems to me that if it is not logically possible to subscribe to both explanations, then they are in conflict.

Either one subscribes to the explanation that God created all the various species in one day (and brought them before Adam to name them), or one subscribes to evolution, or neither. But not both. These explanations strike me as mutually exclusive, conflicting.

And similarly for all cases in which one explanation posits the cause to be a supernatural agent, and another explanation posits only naturalistic causes. I don't see how the conflict is resolved just because the naturalistic argument is apprehended as instrumental.

Nope, because in claiming that the religious experience of the murderous mother is but a psychiatric case you're employing naturalistic explanations to make sense of her religious experience. That's a double standard — Πετροκότσυφας

I'll leave you to your musings, — Wayfarer

Cognitive dissonance is a bitch, ain't it, Wayfarer?

I'd like to mention, too, that though we are attracted to and readily influenced by charismatic personalities, a charasmatic personality is not an indicator of the truth of the charismatic person's beliefs and claims--as we can see in numerous cases of such personalities in history, politics, business, entertainment, and religious leadership. As a matter of fact, sociopaths often have a charismatic personality.

Simply, there are domains of experience beyond science and naturalism. All I can do on that is express a view, which you have taken issue with. I can't see that there is anything further to discuss. — Wayfarer

So you subscribe to some hypothesis that's unverifiable, unfalsifiable, untestable, and offers no independebtly confirmable predictions--and provides no way, even in principle, to resolve dispute with other such unverifiable hypotheses that explain the matter differently.

So you beieve that nothing that can't be explained by science, is a factor or cause in human's lives? — Wayfarer

If there are factors or causes in human lives that science can't explain, even in principle, then what else is there besides (1) they remain unexplained, or (2) you subscribe to some hypothesis that's unverifiable, unfalsifiable, untestable, and offers no independebtly confirmable predictions--and provides no way, even in principle, to resolve dispute with other such unverifiable hypotheses that explain the matter differently?

I have tried to analyse the significance of religious experience in a broader way than that offered by religious apologetics, by saying that it is indicative of a core of insight into areas that can't be plumbed by naturalism, which is found in many diverse wisdom traditions. And your answer is given in terms of 'scientism' and moral relativism, which I see as the exact predicament of the modern secular intelligentsia. That's my point. So thanks, I think we've cleared that up.

What does asserting that there really are absolute values achieve if all you can do is express your opinion that the particular value at issue really is one of those absolutes?

But on purely philosophical grounds it can be argued that 'naturalistic explanations' will never necessarily culminate in discovery of any kind of fundamental ground or first cause for the phenomena we observe. — Wayfarer

If naturalistic explanations cannot explain something, then what else is there besides (1) it goes unexplained, or (2) we subscribe to some hypothesis that's unverifiable, unfalsifiable, untestable, and offers no independebtly confirmable predictions--and provides no way, even in principle, to resolve dispute with other such unverifiable hypotheses that explain the matter differently?

For instance, above, there was some debate about what 'scientific laws' are. What scientific laws are, is not a scientific question at all! There are some science popularisers around, like Lawrence Krauss, who appear not to realise this, and instead get themselves into a complete muddle attempting to explain how science explains everything (for which read David Albert's review of his book.) But the bottom line is that, science is limited in scope, method and outcome; it has to be, because scientific method operates by exclusion.

Of course science is limited in scope, method and outcome.

What's your point?

Hence the deficiency of naturalism as a philosophy: it treats humans as only parts of nature, i.e. basically as a species. And then the only basis for ethical principles becomes one or another form of utilitarianism, what is 'useful' for that species in terms of surviving and getting along. Sam Harris has demonstrated that, in his forays into ethical philosophy (and kudos to him for trying.) But it amounts to declaring that the only real good is 'human floushing' because there is no conception of a higher or absolute good, knowledge of which is salvific, as found in all of the religous cultures; it can't encompass such ideas, for obvious reasons.

Right, science cannot identify, explain, or prove an asdolute good.

And neither can you or anybody else. You can just express your opinion, your own value judgement that something is an absolute good. And your defense of your belief can consist in nothing more than reasoned argument--which, by the way, is also part of what science does.

I don't accept a necessary conflict between religion and science. I think there's an obvious conflict between scientific materialism and religious fundamentalism. — Wayfarer

Conflict between science and religious fundamentalism arises over conflicting explanations for certain phenomena--such as species, in the current ID v evolution dispute. But there are other conflicts, and they're not limited to fundamentalism.

Conflict arises whenever science proposes naturalistic explanations for phenomena that religion explains via supernatural agency of some kind. Historically, such conflict has occurred numerous times, (as I've already noted somewhere upthread) from the dreaded thunder god and other meteorological events, to disease and healing, to famine, warfare, to the divine right of kings, to astronomical events, to demon possession, etc. Presently, and surely in the future, science proposes alternative naturalistic explanations for morality/ethics, allegations of supernatural encounters (including visitations, revelations, inspirations, prophecies, ecstacies ...)--essentially any experiences people report and understand to be religious or spiritual.

What science can address and propose is--not information about the alleged supernatural agent or ineffable mystery itself--but, rather, naturalistic causes and conditions for such experiences, for how it comes to be that people believe such experiences are of the supernatural. And such naturalistic explanations are inherently in conflict with religion's supernatural explanations.

... or more to the point, nothing to worry with. — Bitter Crank

Exactly.

Neither a "me" nor "I."

You better crank up your karma, dukkha.

What is this "me" and "I" notion you keep mentioning?

Americans are, perhaps, more individualistic, more inclined to a git-er-done attitude and self-reliance (improvise-adapt-overcome), anti-intellectual, and really, really like to shoot bad guys and blow shit up.

One would first accept some sort of validity to the religious experiences described, as a premiss to a claim, if that were the basis of the dispute. — mcdoodle

Sure, we take the person's word for it that he had what he believes to have been a religious experience.

Isn't this an idealised version of scientific claims? I'm just studying a module on metaphysics of mind, for instance, where the claims for 'physicalism' and 'causal closure of the physical' are extrapolations from metaphysical claims arising from studies other than the one in hand. This is not to knock extrapolation as such: i we weren't often using extrapolation, in biology for instance, we'd never get things done. — mcdoodle

Perhaps idealized, but I think the vast majority of established scientific claims satisfy those criteria. That's how they got to be "established."

Because the arguments appeal to observable aspects of nature in order to bolster their case for the existence of God (as opposed to relying upon revelation or pure logic-chopping as with the ontological argument and its ilk), something Wayfarer claimed that "real" believers don't do.

Hypotheses or theories, not arguments make (or entail) testable predictions. Arguments simply purport to derive a conclusion from one or more premises, which is what those propounding the cosmological argument and the others attempt to do. — Arkady

I think the distinction you're making between argument and hypothesis here is a red herring.

A hypothesis is a proposed explanation for phenomena. For a hypothesis to be empirical, it has to be observable or testable. In these arguments, God is the hypothesis proposed as the logically necessary explanation for nature.

P1: Nature
P2: Nature entails a supernatural Designer/Creator
C1: Therefore, a supernatural Designer/Creator
P3: The only supernatural Designer/Creator is God
C2: Therefore God

The alleged knowledge of the conclusion is arrived at by armchair deductive reasoning devoid of empirical data--rationalist knowledge.

Then you and I have a different notion of empiricism and rationalism. — Arkady

Well, I may well be mistaken.

Can you explain?

The argument from design, including the ID incarnation, and the cosmological argument allege to explain empirically observable phenomena, but do not themselves entail any empirical consequences or predictions. They are, therefore, quintessentially rationalist--not empirical--arguments.

If you agree with the logic of the argument I've presented then yes. If not, why not? — Wayfarer

In order to be epistemically consistent, a scientist's religious beliefs would have to satisfy the same criteria he requires his science claims to satisfy.

The epistemic criteria for scientific claims typically require independently observable empirical corroboration, specifically rule out intervention by supernatural agents, and entail independently observable predictions.

If the religious claims a scientist believes in do not satisfy these standards, then his epistemic standards for accepting or rejecting religious claims is inconsistent with his epistemic standards for science claims.

Yes. — dukkha

Excellent.

People commonly come to the logically fallacious conclusion that if one's view of science is not that it is about the Real Truth, it's, therefore, anything-goes-relativism.

"science" is a hyperobject, or is an umbrella term for a large conglomerate of institutions, individuals, and practices. It subsumes, implicitly whatever anyone thinks it does when they hear the word, and also connotes different things depending on which camp your allied with.

Which philosophers of science have you read? I'm thinking of Feyerabend and Kuhn respectively. The former for my view that "science" cannot be demarcated from any of form of solving problem activity in any substantial way, and Kuhn with respect to the history of science, and the methodological trends, and theoretical frameworks operated within are "normal science", kind of drudgery, and then there is revolutionary extraordinary science which makes a breaks the rules, rather than follows them.

There was also a super awesome book that I forget the title and author of now (herhaps someone will know?), but it was written by a journalist, about the history of scientists themselves, what quirky crazy fucks most of them were, and how much infighting posturing, and tribalism is present among scientists, for some reason I remember the author being on a plain... or something... but anyway, it was a sweet counter-balance to the distancing/denotative/former language scientists like to use by focusing on the people themselves. — Wosret

Seems to me that one could substitute the term "religion" for "science" here, and it would fit quite seamlessly--including "the quirky crazy fucks most of them were, and how much infighting posturing, and tribalism is present."

The dispute in this thread is not about people's experiences, it's about the propositional claims--such as the existence and action of a supernatural agent source--of their experiences.

Your understanding of science is mistaken. You're describing instrumentalism, which is a philosophical interpretation of claims such as scientific claims. Science itself (that is, the received view, or the vast majority consensus in the field) has no commitment to an instrumentalist interpretation versus a realist/truth-bearing/ontological-commitment interpretation.

Scientists tend to have the latter (realist etc.) interpretation of many claims, although they'll easily focus on pragmatism instead in some situations, with that pragmatism not being exactly the same as an instrumentalist interpretation. For example, they tend to see Newtonian mechanics as "correct in some situations," or as "close to true, and close enough for this situation."

Most scientists seem put off by a strictly instrumentalist approach, and a strictly instrumentalist approach usually has to be explained to them, as the idea is odd to them (and they also do not typically recognize the term "instrumentalism").

Heck, it even seems like a majority of scientists are mathematical platonists. — Terrapin Station

True that.

What I'm saying is that scientific analysis doesn't extend beyond its domain into such questions as whether or not the Universe is meaningful, or whether there is a 'first cause'. Such questions are by definition not amenable to scientific analysis. So, for the materialists, the bad news is, they can't appeal to science to prove that there is no God; but the good news is, the other side can't appeal to it to prove the opposite.

Theistic evolution differs from 'intelligent design' in that it doesn't appeal to a God as part of a scientific hypothesis. Believers obviously accept that God is the reason that there is a world in the first place but that itself is not something that can be proven or disproven by science. That is why, contrary to all the bitter new atheists polemics, it is possible to be both a religious believer and a natural scientist. Only fundamentalists cannot accept that. — Wayfarer

Of course, it is possible to be a religious believer and a scientist.

The question is: Is it epistemically consistent to be a believer and a scientist?

Scientific laws themselves, which arise from the observation of regularities and their translation into principles, are not themselves explainable by science. Science assumes the existence of such lawful regularities, indeed can't do otherwise. But it doesn't explain them. — Wayfarer

What do you think "explain" entails beyond reliable and predictive descriptions of observed regularities and properties and interactions?

I am quite sure that at least Harris, whom I've heard speak to the issue, and the others are not so benighted as not to understand that science theories are simply our best current constructs and models consistent with the data, and subject to revision.

Here's my personal background in this debate. Grew up in the 1960's in Australia, on a solid digest of Time Life books about nature. I was always fascinated by dinosaurs, fossils, 'cave men' and evolution. It never occured to me for a single second that Bible stories were literally true. I didn't hear of the existence of 'creationism' until I was an adult, and just thought it was idiotic, and also pathetic. My first reaction was, how sad it is that people have to believe in the literal truth of those ancient myths and that they must have a very insecure faith.

It wasn't until people like Dawkins started tub-thumping that I paid any attention to the issue, as it has never been prominent in Australia. (Ken Ham, the notorious young-earth creationist, is from Australia, but notice he had to re-locate to Kentucky to find an audience.) But my reaction to Dawkins is that he is just about as silly as the creationists. If you understand that 'creation mythology' is just that - mythology - then the fact that it didn't literally occur has practically zero bearing on the religious account.

I don't know if I mentioned it before, but the early Church fathers were dismissive of biblical literalism. Origen said there were three levels of meaning in the texts, Augustine was scathing in his dismissal of anything like 'creation science' - and that was in 400 A.D. But of course this is all invisible to those who see the whole thing as the titanic battle of Enlightened Science vs Supersitious Religion. — Wayfarer

This does not even address the question I asked in response to your assertion that Dawkins et al are "making false claims that the empirical evidence proves the case one way or the other."

Of course I agree that creationism ought not to be taught as science, but neither should the science be presented as 'proving' anything about the existence or otherwise of God. 'There is a separation between Church and state, but none between science and state', observed Paul Feyerabend.

If I was to teach evolutionary biology or paleontology I would never have reason to even discuss religious beliefs about the issue, but if it came up, I would make it clear that the accounts operate on different levels; that the religious accounts are intended to convey moral and existential truths about life, which are not dependent on them being literally true, in the way the scientific account is. If the students can't understand that, they've got problems, but the science classroom would not be a place to address them. — Wayfarer

Again I refer you to the context in the U.S., where evolution is a hot-button political issue in which creationists are numerous, sometimes the majority, and wield power and influence. Besides what I've already noted about the incessant parade of creationist publications, sermons, and media presentations, there are uncounted public schools in the U.S. where to avoid conflict, the teachers minimize or entirely avoid teahing evolution. In fact, it is not unheard of that science teachers disparage evolution and express sympathy for creationism in some places. It is not uncommon for college students in some parts of the country to walk out of class at the very mention of evolution. Politicians roitinely waffle on, or deny belief in evolution. Past President G.W. Bush is on record as saying: "Atheists should not be considered citizens." No admitted atheist holds an elected high office in the national government. No admitted atheist would be nominated by a president or approved by Ccngress for the position of Supreme Court Justice.

Since Dawkins was the University of Oxford's Professor for Public Understanding of Science, it was his job to push back against the popular ignorance of creationism.

One of the issues The New Atheists repeatedly speak to is epistemological--the problem of justification for belief without evidence. Religion both explicitly and tacitly teaches people to accept authority, claims of spontaneous revelation, and faith, rather than evidence. Dawkins and company see this epistemic failure, and it's attendant distrust and repression of science, as one of the world's great evils, with innumerable negative consequences for society.

I am not saying 'dogmatic atheists are responsible for the non-acceptance of evolution by many Americans'. But I am saying, the Dawkins/Dennett/Coyne style of argument contributes to that, by making false claims that the empirical evidence proves the case one way or the other. — Wayfarer

Are you saying that the empirical evidence (fom biology, chemistry, physics, genetics, geology, climate science, oceanography, radioactive dating, paleontology, anthropology, molecular biology, etc.) is insufficient to warrant subscription to the theory of evolution as the best explanation of species, or are you saying that they do not "prove" evolution in some absolutist sense?

The only thing that the fossil evidence proves is that biblical creationism can't be true. But if you've never believed biblical creationism to be true, then the fact that it's not true has no bearing on whether God exists or not.

But, as I've already noted, one of Dawkins' primary targets is Biblical creationism. His book is titled "The Blind Watchmaker," remember? Realize that the context in the U.S. is one in which creationists have repeatedly attempted to get creation taught in the public school as a scientifically legitimate alternative to evolution.

The recalcitrance of evangelicals to accept evolution is transparently because they don't like what it entails about their literalistic reading of the Bible, especially the Book of Genesis. The existence of all the world's species, in their worldview, is evidence for the existence of the biblical Creator. So, if, as evolution demonstrates, no creator is required, then they have much less evidence for their religious beliefs, and must either reject the science, or reject or significantly reinterpret what their Bible says. Ultimately, they surely will eventually morph into reinterpreting Genesis less literally, and redefine the Creator as one who intervenes and directs evolution--as, in, fact, some have already done.

For the record, I find the New Atheist debates, with the possible exception of Sam Harris, quite off-putting, even obnoxious, discourteous, and disrespectful. But this refers to personality and rhetorical style, not substantive content.

I have been trying to advocate a middle-path approach which is neither fundamentalist nor materialistic, apparently without success. — Wayfarer

Ah, a middle path.

As in "The New Atheists Are a Bloody Disaster" and "the decline in Americans' general critical thinking ability is partly because of New Atheist arguments" (which you misrepresent as alleging to "prove" God doesn't exist.)

I bet most religious folks I know would be unacquainted with that, too. — Terrapin Station

Indeed.

What the believers in the pews actually reveal they believe is notoriously at odds with the theologians. One fascinating book about this is "Theological Incorrectness--Why Religious People Believe What They Shouldn't" By "shouldn't" here, he means what is inconsistent with the formal theology and even doctrines of their faith

Yeah, portraying themselves as "persecuted" by some secular humanist position or other is a continually repeated rhetorical ploy among American evangelicals.

And they long enjoyed priveleged immunity from any pushback regarding their claims. One of the points of teh New Atheists was that religious propositions are not priveleged, and should be submitted to the same kind of scrutiny, open discussion, and challenge as any other propositions. So, of course, the evangelicals portray challenge as religious "persecution."

@Wayfarer

The number of outspoken "New Atheists" can be counted on one hand.

Meanwhils, literally thousands of sermons, Sunday school lessons, Bible College lectures, book and tract piblications, radio and TV broadcasts and internet sites regularly disparage science (from biology to astrophysics to anthropology to geology to climate science to archeology to psychology to textual criticism ... that they judge to be inconsistent with their dogma. There is, and has always been, a characteristic strain of anti-intellectualism in American evangelicalism--they use the word "expert" disparagingly. They annoint their own experts (often self-appointed wannabe pseudo scholars, or sometimes off-the-chart outliers in secular sdcholardship) in various fields, and repeatedly allege widespread conspiracy among the conventional experts in any given field when they inevitably reject the claims of the annointed experts.

What I dispute is your charge that Dawkins and company allege to "prove" that God doesn't exist.

Stating that there probably is no God is not alleging to have proven that God doesn't exist.

It's also very important to understand that far more Americans believe in God, than in the literal account of evolution. And I think this is a real problem - it is one of the indicators of the general decline in general critical thinking ability. But that is at least partially because the evangelical atheists - and you can't deny they exist - use the arguments we are discussing here to 'prove' that God doesn't exist. This is not only unjustifiable on any scientific grounds, but it is dangerous to the social fabric. — Wayfarer

I dispute your charge that Dawkins and company allege to "prove" that God doesn't exist. Any citations?

And your charge that the decline in Americans' general critical thinking ability is partly because of their arguments is preposterous.

I am disputing Dawkins' understanding of God as 'super-engineer'. I say that every description of God that Dawkins provides, indicates misunderstanding of the term even from a viewpoint of the philosophy of religion. — Wayfarer

The "Watchmaker" argument, a Christian apologetics argument, is widely rehearsed by contemporary apologists defending ID.

It's this argument that Dawkins' specifically disputed. Note that his book was titled "The Blind Watchmaker."

None of that seems to be saying "would have to be more complex than the complexity it allegedly explains" though. — Terrapin Station

You're right.

In the Blind Watchmaker, he does not specify that the designer would have to be more complex than his design, but rather would be "vastly complex." He may have said "more complex" elsewhere, perhaps in one of his many debates, or I may just be mistaken.

However, whether the designer is more complex or not is irrelevant to his argument.

I doubt religious folks would object to saying that God must be complex, by the way.

Sure, the believer in the pew readily accepts that God is complex, but some theologians insist that God is simple. Though using this notion of simplicity as a counter to what is meant by complex in Dawkins' argument strikes me as equivocation.