So you beieve that nothing that can't be explained by science, is a factor or cause in human's lives? — Wayfarer

If there are factors or causes in human lives that science can't explain, even in principle, then what else is there besides (1) they remain unexplained, or (2) you subscribe to some hypothesis that's unverifiable, unfalsifiable, untestable, and offers no independebtly confirmable predictions--and provides no way, even in principle, to resolve dispute with other such unverifiable hypotheses that explain the matter differently?

I have tried to analyse the significance of religious experience in a broader way than that offered by religious apologetics, by saying that it is indicative of a core of insight into areas that can't be plumbed by naturalism, which is found in many diverse wisdom traditions. And your answer is given in terms of 'scientism' and moral relativism, which I see as the exact predicament of the modern secular intelligentsia. That's my point. So thanks, I think we've cleared that up.

What does asserting that there really are absolute values achieve if all you can do is express your opinion that the particular value at issue really is one of those absolutes?

Simply, there are domains of experience beyond science and naturalism. All I can do on that is express a view, which you have taken issue with. I can't see that there is anything further to discuss.

Simply, there are domains of experience beyond science and naturalism. All I can do on that is express a view, which you have taken issue with. I can't see that there is anything further to discuss. — Wayfarer

So you subscribe to some hypothesis that's unverifiable, unfalsifiable, untestable, and offers no independebtly confirmable predictions--and provides no way, even in principle, to resolve dispute with other such unverifiable hypotheses that explain the matter differently.

It's not 'an hypothesis', it is an entire set of disciplines, literature, and ideas, and one which you show no interest in exploring. Basically whatever I put up is interpreted as some form of religious apologetics, and the argument then follows a preditable course.

↪Brainglitch Simply, there are domains of experience beyond science and naturalism. All I can do on that is express a view, which you have taken issue with. I can't see that there is anything further to discuss. — Wayfarer

When people say things like this, they seem to be saying that there are organs and faculties that apprehend things that are silent, unmoving, insubstantial, and invisible. Science can't observe or understand these mysterious emanations of the divine, but ordinary people can--and believers can not explain how.

First-hand experience of religion tells me that we imagine that we have got hold of these emanations of the divine. If we don't recognize the imagined, then we think it real. The same thing happens when someone who is afraid of the dark fears the horrid things that are lurking there. They run in terror, because they don't 'imagine' that they are 'imagining' the monsters, they think them real.

The reverse is the same: If we don't recognize a swelling heart, and feelings of elation as the imagined movement of the Holy Spirit, then we are filled with confidence about the reality of all the things of the spirit.

It's not a simple trick we play on ourselves, it's a very complicated ritual that when done properly helps those who desire the divine feel like they have touched the divine. Is this harmful? No -- generally not. Indeed, I would think it was an enormous comfort. But that doesn't make it real. Those who are afraid of the dark and what might be lurking there (devils and monsters of various kinds) have completed a ritual too that leads to highly unpleasant results that aren't real, but the unreality doesn't help those who are hyperventilating with fear. What relieves their fear is the recognition that imagined monsters are "nothings" that we can and ought to dismiss.

Religious comforts are as "nothing" as monstrous fears, they are just more pleasant -- but no more real.

But it also might be much simpler than that. Science doesn't know all kinds of really basic stuff about how we actually go about our daily lives. There was a book published by a science journo a couple of years back, 13 Things that Don't Make Sense: The Most Baffling Scientific Mysteries of Our Time, Michael Brooks (https://amzn.com/0307278816). But a lot of the things science doesn't understand are much more quotidian than those. If you had to stay alive knowing only what science now knows about how your actual metabolic processes work, you would die very quickly.

What is science anyway? It is a way of abstracting mathematical and measurable regularities discoverable through observation and reasoning, and also the principles that lie under them, so as to make predictions and create mathematical models. It is hugely effective across all kinds of domains. But it is not all-knowing, and I don't mean that in any mysterious sense beyond the fact that it is a process of mathematical abstraction and quantification. And as one of the best in that game said

I am very astonished that the scientific picture of the real world around me is deficient. It gives a lot of factual information, puts all our experience in a magnificently consistent order, but it is ghastly silent about all and sundry that is really near to our heart, that really matters to us. It cannot tell us a word about red and blue, bitter and sweet, physical pain and physical delight; it knows nothing of beautiful and ugly, good or bad, God and eternity. Science sometimes pretends to answer questions in these domains, but the answers are very often so silly that we are not inclined to take them seriously. — Erwin Schrodinger

But the point is, 'scientific thinking' has now occupied the place formerly occupied by religion. It tells educated people how they ought to think. Steve Pinker's New Republic essay of a couple of years back Science is Not Your Enemy was a perfect statement of that. But that understanding doesn't see how historically conditioned that attitude is. It's actually an attitude, an intellectual structure, which pervades the entire culture. We see things from that, or rather, it provides the spectacles through which we see everything. Whereas I think a critical philosophy says you have to look at those spectacles, instead of only through them.

After writing the above response, I thought I should add another point, which strictly speaking ought to have gone first:

Religious comforts are as "nothing" as monstrous fears, they are just more pleasant -- but no more real. — BitterCrank

That is basically a psychoanalytical account; instead of 'angry-sky-father' god, it is 'unconscious-fear-abatement' god, of the kind suggested by Sigmund Freud. But it is still basically reductive or dismissive.

I think people certainly have religious visions of sacred figures and deities and it's true that some of those people might be suffering from delusions. But again, as I have said throughout this thread, I don't think on those grounds that it is at adequate to simply dismiss mankind's religious heritage as a product of delusion. It does no justice to the foundational role of religious ideas in culture. (Note that when I said that, it was also dismissed as 'mere apologetics'.) I think, from shall we say an anthropological perspective, that many such visions can be interpreted as representations of the archetypes coming from the collective unconscious. That doesn't mean they're simply hallucinations or delusions, but neither are they physically real; they are, you might say, psychically real.

So the responses I have been giving throughout this thread are not 'religious' in the sense implied by BitterCranks' posts. My interests are more concerned with a kind of critical spiritual enquiry into the nature of being. Nowadays we will automatically say 'ah, nature of reality you mean. Isn't that the domain of physics or at least natural philosophy?' So I am criticizing that attitude on the basis that in this kind of matter, it reveals more than it conceals.

Do you really say that science can't tell us that God did not order a mother to slaughter her child? — Πετροκότσυφας

That sounds to me a matter for psychiatry.

It's sometimes very difficult to tell genius from divine inspiration or from madness. Besides, in Eastern Europe and Asia, there are many stories of the 'holy madmen'.

I haven't been referring to the (now mythical) founder of this thread, but the general idea of 'the varieties of religious experience'. Actually the first thing I said in this thread was 'that OP doesn't constitute an argument', but it's a topic that interests me, so that is why I have contributed to it. But I agree that the OP is a flimsy reed on which to argue.

Ok, but that does not answer the question. If there are times where it's difficult to tell divine inspiration from madness and times where it is not, how do these instances differ epistemologically? What makes the one difficult to tell and what makes the other easy to tell? — Πετροκότσυφας

I think in the case of meeting persons who are esteemed as possessing religious insights, generally they don't appear mad. Some of them might be eccentric, and some religious cultures may accomodate behaviours considered strange, but I never encountered much literature about such cases when I studied the subject. So, maybe there are some cases where it's hard to determine whether a subject is religiously inspired or psychotic, but I don't think they're common. In the case that was mentioned before, if it did involve murder of an infant by its mother - I didn't read it - then I would be surprised if it were anything other than criminality or insanity.

That is to say, epiphanies or religious experiences which promote the well-being (as socially defined) of the experiencer and/or others should be treated respectfully while those that are not should be treated accordingly to the harm they produce.

No, I don't agree with that, because it's reductive - it is basically saying that the social consensus of what constitutes 'normal behaviour' or 'beneficial behaviour' is the measure. Actually I think it is very rare to encounter those who really have such experiences, especially in modern culture, but it would have to be dealt with case by case. But that is why I referred to William James' book, Varieties of Religious Experience, which is considered a classic in the area (although I read it about 40 years ago). But I did study Comparative Religion, and quite a lot of that subject is concerned with how to appraise, understand or classify those experiences. The tendency I am critical of, is the tendency to assume that such experiences can be explained in psychological, cultural or social terms, as that is invariably reductive; it is always saying that the primary datum of the experience is something other than what the subject claims it to be.

well, pardon me, but I think that is nonsense.

Because Mengele was a doctor, therefore doctors are evil. Scientists create weapons, so science is evil.

Cases of what? Cases of persons who murder children because of some purportedly religious reason?

If what you're asking is, what is done for supposedly religious reasons, ought to be judged according to whether it doesn't harm another - then, the answer would be 'yes of course'.

To whom and according to which criteria they don't appear to be mad?

//edit// - I'm not sure how to respond to this question, or what it is asking.

Have you ever met a charismatic spiritual teacher?

If the question is, 'how do we determine whether a person who claims to have had a religious vision/experience is bona fide?', then the answer would be, ask them questions, investigate what others say about them, generally scrutinize the person and try and assess their claims.

However, persons who have undergone a genuine spiritual experience are sometimes possessed of a quality, called 'charisma'. It is obviously a difficult characteristic to quantify or measure.

So overall, it's a difficult question to answer.

So, either you reject naturalist explanations and their implied epistemology for all cases, or this is just a case of special pleading where you accept an experience as epistemically legitimate based on your feelings about the consequences of this experience. — Πετροκότσυφας

Or, I reject naturalistic explanations of such experiences, because they are among many examples of the kinds of things for which naturalistic explanations are insufficient.

But the same could be said of many areas of human endeavour. Are there naturalistic criteria for determining who is a superior historian? Pianist? Artist? How are we to judge such cases? So the same caveats apply to many aspects of human experience, not just religious experience. But many would like single out religious experience, because it is obviously contradictory to naturalism, insofar as it suggest the reality of what is called (and dismissed as) 'supernatural'. So if religious experiences have real referents, then woe betide naturalism.

Incidentally I looked up the etymological definition of Charisma, which is interesting:

charisma (n.)
"gift of leadership, power of authority," c. 1930, from German, used in this sense by Max Weber (1864-1920) in "Wirtschaft u. Gesellschaft" (1922), from Greek kharisma "favor, divine gift," from kharizesthai "to show favor to," from kharis "grace, beauty, kindness" (Charis was the name of one of the three attendants of Aphrodite) related to khairein "to rejoice at," from PIE root *gher- (5) "to desire, like" (see hortatory). More mundane sense of "personal charm" recorded by 1959.

Earlier, the word had been used in English with a sense of "grace, talent from God" (1875), directly from Latinized Greek; and in the form charism (plural charismata) it is attested with this sense in English from 1640s. Middle English, meanwhile, had karisme "spiritual gift, divine grace" (c. 1500).

I'll leave you to your musings, Rock Thrush. X-)

But I think the issue is whether or not there is an absolute good, not exactly what such a good would be. If we are of the opinion that there is an absolute good, we can forever seek higher goods, always in pursuit of that absolute good. But if we are of the opinion that there is no absolute good, then the good determined today, or yesterday, as the highest good, might be continually forced upon us, into the future, as the highest good, denying the possibility that we could discover higher goods. And if we allow that there are higher goods, how would we create any hierarchical system without any direction toward an assumed absolute good? — Metaphysician Undercover

If you deny the possibility that we could discover higher goods, in light of the discovery of this highest good, then that can only reasonably mean that you either think that this highest good is an absolute good, or that there is, or might be, an absolute good which we can't discover. But both of those contradict the opinion that there is no absolute good. So, if that was intended as a criticism of the position that there is no absolute good, then it is a very poor one, since it is easy to avoid making such a contradiction.

And, in answer to your last question, the ability to judge and to form hierarchies are natural human abilities that don't depend on there being an absolute of any kind whatsoever, nor even on it being possible, which is all that really matters.

If you are of the opinion that there is an absolute good, then you can never reasonably seek goods higher than that. But you can seek goods higher than others whether you believe that there is an absolute good or not.

@Πετροκότσυφας

http://youtu.be/83GgOhBhxqI

Nope, because in claiming that the religious experience of the murderous mother is but a psychiatric case you're employing naturalistic explanations to make sense of her religious experience. That's a double standard — Πετροκότσυφας

I'll leave you to your musings, — Wayfarer

Cognitive dissonance is a bitch, ain't it, Wayfarer?

I'd like to mention, too, that though we are attracted to and readily influenced by charismatic personalities, a charasmatic personality is not an indicator of the truth of the charismatic person's beliefs and claims--as we can see in numerous cases of such personalities in history, politics, business, entertainment, and religious leadership. As a matter of fact, sociopaths often have a charismatic personality.

I just want to point out that this conflict only arises if one subscribes to a non-instrumentalist view of science. If you take scientific instrumentalism to be the case, then there is no conflict between say believing god created the world in seven days, and using the theory of evolution to explain the biodiversity in the world. — dukkha

Seems to me that if it is not logically possible to subscribe to both explanations, then they are in conflict.

Either one subscribes to the explanation that God created all the various species in one day (and brought them before Adam to name them), or one subscribes to evolution, or neither. But not both. These explanations strike me as mutually exclusive, conflicting.

And similarly for all cases in which one explanation posits the cause to be a supernatural agent, and another explanation posits only naturalistic causes. I don't see how the conflict is resolved just because the naturalistic argument is apprehended as instrumental.

It seems to me that defining religious experiences so as to exclude all the cases of claimed religious experiences you don't feel comfortable with is both bad science and bad philosophy. — Πετροκότσυφας

Amen. But the alternative of being consistent by biting the bullet and including them is also pretty dire, so it's a lose/lose situation.

I just want to point out that this conflict only arises if one subscribes to a non-instrumentalist view of science. If you take scientific instrumentalism to be the case, then there is no conflict between say believing god created the world in seven days, and using the theory of evolution to explain the biodiversity in the world. — dukkha

Seems to me that if it is not logically possible to subscribe to both explanations, then they are in conflict.

Either one subscribes to the explanation that God created all the various species in one day (and brought them before Adam to name them), or one subscribes to evolution, or neither. But not both. These explanations strike me as mutually exclusive, conflicting.

And similarly for all cases in which one explanation posits the cause to be a supernatural agent, and another explanation posits only naturalistic causes. I don't see how the conflict is resolved just because the naturalistic argument is apprehended as instrumental. — Brainglitch

As explanations, they are in conflict. As beliefs, they would also be in conflict. But if one is merely using one of the explanations for some other purpose, then they are not necessarily in conflict. Although, if this purpose is not made explicit, then it can be misleading. And if it is used as if one did actually believe it, then that can seem disingenuous or intellectually dishonest.

But I think the issue is whether or not there is an absolute good, not exactly what such a good would be. If we are of the opinion that there is an absolute good, we can forever seek higher goods, always in pursuit of that absolute good. But if we are of the opinion that there is no absolute good, then the good determined today, or yesterday, as the highest good, might be continually forced upon us, into the future, as the highest good, denying the possibility that we could discover higher goods, And if we allow that there are higher goods, how would we create any hierarchical system without any direction toward an assumed absolute good? — Metaphysician Undercover

This reasoning strikes me as an appeal to consequences.

Sure, our beliefs have consequences, sometimes consequences that are widely judged to be positive, inspiring, life enhancing--as indeed many religious beliefs are. But desirable consequences do not entail that the proposition driving the behaviors is true, they indicate simply that belief that the proposition is true motivates behavior.

Creationists readily recognize the conflict between their explanations and evolution. (And it is they, not scientists, who make much public noise about the conflict.)

Their responses are instructive, and perhaps can be generalized so they apply to other conflicts between supernatural agent vs. naturalist explanations.

One avenue of resolving the conflict is simply to deny the naturalistic explanation--deny evolution. Either attack it epistemically, denying the validity of the evidence and logic, or just ignore the actual argument presented, and wave the very notion away wholesale as the absurd imaginings of deceived secularists under the influence of "the enemy" (that is, Satan.)

Another move is to acquiesce to some degree. This is the "Well, micro-evolution occurs, but not macro evolution" crowd.

Another move is to accept evolution as proposed by science, and simply assert that evolution is just a description of God's method, a process which he drives and intervenes in. This does not save the assertion that God created the species in one day as narrated in Genesis, but it saves the existence of God the Creator and Designer. Though one attempt to save the Genesis account involves a favorite apologist rhetorical more--redefine the terms. Such as "day," in which a day for God is not a human day, so when Genesis says God created all the various species in one "day" that doesn't mean a 24-hour period, it should be understood to mean an undefined stretch of God-time. And "Adam" who named teh animals doesn't mean one guy, it means all of humankind over the ages.

In general this entails a shift to a more metaphorical, less literal, interpretation of the scriptures, which fundamentalists see as the dreaded "slippery slope" that can ultimately result only in anything goes interpretations, rather than the plain Truth, so they resist it, and characterize it as "liberal" theology.

Note that regarding descriptions of spiritual experiences, we see both literalistic and metaphorical descriptions, in which God is portrayed in some as the Yahweh of the Old Testament, or as "a loving presence" or "the ground of being" and the like.

Either one subscribes to the explanation that God created all the various species in one day (and brought them before Adam to name them), or one subscribes to evolution, or neither. But not both. These explanations strike me as mutually exclusive, conflicting. — Brainglitch

Because if you take scientific instrumentalism to be the case, then you wouldn't 'subscribe to evolution'/take evolution to be true, because scientific theories for you are not true or false descriptions of reality.

At the same time you could also be religious and take the account in genesis to be true/believe in it.

I'm not actually religious I'm just pointing out that a lot of what's being argued in this thread rests on an unstated subscription to a non-instrumentalist view of science. The conflict between evolution and creation only comes about when one subscribes to scientific realism.

But that is why I referred to William James' book, Varieties of Religious Experience, which is considered a classic in the area (although I read it about 40 years ago). — Wayfarer

I read it about 40 years ago too. What I mostly remember are his thoughts about finding a psychological equivalent to war. I don't remember whether he talked about this, but one of the Varieties of Religious Experiences is losing one's former secure faith.

Like having faith, losing it comes in a variety pack. Honestly, losing my Protestant flavored faith in God was a far more strenuous spiritual experience then getting or keeping it in the first place. It took a good 20 years of serious effort. What I settled upon was that 'faith in the existence of god'--religion--is our most distinguished cultural achievement. In the beginning we took mud and we fashioned gods after our own likeness, and imagined a cosmos over which god(s) ruled, and it was good.

It was, to be more precise, both good and bad, because we are both good and bad. We were proud enough of bashing the heads of infants against the stones to have God instruct us to do it. That's one version of the gods. Jesus and Buddha were kinder, representing the less bellicose angels of our character.

Believing that God is real is a great cultural achievement--and I say that without sarcasm. Faith is one of the great jewels in our cultural crown. I am willing to credit faith, ritual, prayer, contemplation, sacrifice, as very valuable cultural property. I can't credit them with being our creations and being independently real at the same time. We can cast wonderful idols out of gold, but believing the idol is a god requires delusion. Madness isn't required; all we need is ordinary, earnest delusory thinking.

Moses' encounter with God on Mount Sinai came from the same foundry as Baal. Same goes for Aeron, Ahura Mazda, Apollo, Artemis, Athena, Belatucadros, Dionysus, Freyja, Frigg, Heimdall, Hera, Yggdrasil, Zeus, et al. We could suppose (it has been supposed) that the numerous gods of many peoples are all reflections of one cosmos-pervading divinity.

Of course, we have more cultural achievements than just religion. Some say science ties with religion for largest cultural crown jewel, some say it exceeds it. I don't know. Both science and religion offer a way of apprehending the world, though on very different terms, and to some extent they are not mutually exclusive--unless one is a fundamentalist. But even fundamentalists generally prefer to be healed by doctors who studied science, rather than by a ranting preacher casting out malignant devils.

Creationists readily recognize the conflict between their explanations and evolution. (And it is they, not scientists, who make much public noise about the conflict.)

Their responses are instructive, and perhaps can be generalized so they apply to other conflicts between supernatural agent vs. naturalist explanations.

One avenue of resolving the conflict is simply to deny the naturalistic explanation--deny evolution.) — Brainglitch

Yeah, most creationists seem to subscribe to scientific realism, hence the conflict. I'm just saying it's not mandatory, and you can resolve the conflict another way - subscribing to scientific instrumentalism.

So, being a creationist you'd take religious accounts to be true/false. Whereas you wouldn't take scientific theories to be true/false descriptions of reality. Therefore there's no conflict.

because in claiming that the religious experience of the murderous mother is but a psychiatric case you're employing naturalistic explanations to make sense of her religious experience. That's a double standard. — Πετροκότσυφας

Now I understand what you're saying. No, it's not a double standard, it's a judgement.

Have you heard the expression 'the devil's advocate'? That office originated in proceedings of the Catholic church to determine the suitability of candidates for canonization. In order to be canonized, there need to be two bona fide reports of miracles. And the devil's advocate role was precisely to cast doubt on supernatural or miraculous explanations for the miracles or other elements of the candidates' life. So the Catholic Church goes through a very rigorous process of assessing whether such claims of supernatural causation can be validated. They will call on medical and other scientific experts to validate or refute the claims.

Physician/historian Jacalyn Duffin has examined Vatican sources on 1400 miracles from six continents and spanning four centuries. Overwhelmingly the miracles cited in canonizations between 1588 and 1999 are healings, and the majority entail medical care and physician testimony.

These remarkable records contain intimate stories of illness, prayer, and treatment, as told by people who rarely leave traces: peasants and illiterates, men and women, old and young. A woman's breast tumor melts away; a man's wounds knit; a lame girl suddenly walks; a dead baby revives. Suspicious of wishful thinking or naïve enthusiasm, skeptical clergy shaped the inquiries to identify recoveries that remain unexplained by the best doctors of the era. The tales of healing are supplemented with substantial testimony from these physicians.

Medical Miracles: Doctors, Saints, and Healing in the Modern World , Jacalyn Duffin

Both science and religion offer a way of apprehending the world, though on very different terms, and to some extent they are not mutually exclusive--unless one is a fundamentalist. But even fundamentalists generally prefer to be healed by doctors who studied science, rather than by a ranting preacher casting out malignant devils. — BitterCrank

See the above. They're not mutually exclusive, but as a matter of historical fact, science has tended to replace religion as a guide to what intelligent people ought to believe. Which is all well and good, up to a point, that point being that science excludes, not just what is obviously 'supernatural or religious' but a good deal else besides. Scientific materialism is the de facto philosophy in the secular academies, and I think it operates as a form of cultural dogma.

Another move is to acquiesce to some degree. This is the "Well, micro-evolution occurs, but not macro evolution" crowd. — BrainGlitch

Theistic evolution asks the question, why did life evolve in the first place? You have a basically inert planet orbiting the sun, and then over several billions of years, progressively more intelligent forms of life evolve, to the point of rational self-awareness. Is that something that can be understood wholly and solely through the lens of evolutionary biology? This is where perfectly respectable science becomes reductionist philosophy, and you don't have a to be a creationist to say that.

regarding descriptions of spiritual experiences, we see both literalistic and metaphorical descriptions, in which God is portrayed in some as the Yahweh of the Old Testament, or as "a loving presence" or "the ground of being" and the like. — BrainGlitch

There are different layers or levels of both meaning and interpretation in religious texts. Not understanding that is one of the main causes of 'literalistic' interpretations which try and interpret such accounts as a literal scientific theory.

Now I understand what you're saying. No, it's not a double standard, it's a judgement. — Wayfarer

Yes, it's a judgment.

And judgments are based on... drum roll... some standard or other.

In one case you judged according to a naturalistic standard, and explain that the woman's religious experience was caused by a psychiatric pathology, but in other cases that you approve of as genuinely religious, you dismiss the naturalistic standard as "insufficient" and judge by some other standard.

Thus, a double standard. One standard for some cases and a different standard for others.

The 'other standard' would be - what? What do 'naturalistic moral standards' amount to? Which school of philosophy, or what philosopher, represents that?

In Western culture, moral philosophies coalesced around the Bible which certainly does embody moral standards. 'Do to others as you would have them do to you', 'love neighbour as self', 'care for the poor and needy', to mention only a few. What are the naturalist equivalents for them? Recall, upthread, the discussion about how Richard Dawkins on the one hand, laments the implications of Darwinian theory on moral philosophy, but then has devoted considerable time to attacking the traditional sources of morality. Leaving us with - what, exactly? Grayling and Harris as new moral exemplars?

What's your suggestion to resolve this dilemma?

And, in answer to your last question, the ability to judge and to form hierarchies are natural human abilities that don't depend on there being an absolute of any kind whatsoever, nor even on it being possible, which is all that really matters. — Sapientia

This may be the case, that we can make such subjective judgements without the need for an absolute, but that's not "all that really matters". What really matters is the capacity to make objective judgements, and it is the absolute which allows such judgements to be objective rather than subjective.

So take for example, temperature, we can subjectively judge something as warm or cold, but not until we produce a scale, which is an absolute, do we have an objective judgement of temperature. Likewise with any measurement, we make a subjective judgement of big or small, but when we produce a scale, we have an absolute which acts to give us objectivity.

If you are of the opinion that there is an absolute good, then you can never reasonably seek goods higher than that. But you can seek goods higher than others whether you believe that there is an absolute good or not. — Sapientia

How would you know whether one good is really higher than another, unless you assume a principle for comparison? Such a principle is an absolute, and it is the assumption of the absolute which allows you to know that one is higher than the other. Otherwise it is just your subjective opinion that one good is higher than the other.

This reasoning strikes me as an appeal to consequences. — Brainglitch

Isn't that what morality is all about, consequences? I think it would be odd to attempt to base moral principles on something other than an appeal to consequences. Don't you?

Sure, our beliefs have consequences, sometimes consequences that are widely judged to be positive, inspiring, life enhancing--as indeed many religious beliefs are. But desirable consequences do not entail that the proposition driving the behaviors is true, they indicate simply that belief that the proposition is true motivates behavior. — Brainglitch

Well, you and I both know that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether any particular belief is actually "true". We can justify a belief, but this doesn't necessarily mean that it is true. The scientific method is to accept the theories which have favourable results, predictability. It would be a demonstration of inconsistency if we were to dismiss ethical beliefs which have a favourable result but a possibility of falsity, while keeping scientific beliefs which produce favourable results, but may not be true.

It seems to me, that if a belief is producing favourable results, then we need something more than the possibility that the belief is false, in order to reject that belief.

It seems to me, that if a belief is producing favourable results, then we need something more than the possibility that the belief is false, in order to reject that belief. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure.

But neither do we know that the belief is true in any sense other than that it works. Thus, all we need (and imo all we acrually have access to) are beliefs that work to achieve our purposes. Whether or not any such belief also is absolute is not something that we can determine, even in principle.

The 'other standard' would be - what? What do 'naturalistic moral standards' amount to? Which school of philosophy, or what philosopher, represents that? — Wayfarer

Hard to keep up with your non seqs sometimes.

We were talking about epistemic standards by which to judge whether the source of an reported religious experience is natural or supernatural. The charge against what you'd said was that you applied naturalistic epistemic standards in one case of a reported religious experience, but rejected naturalistic epistemic standards as insufficient for other cases, which you judged to be authentically religious. I understand what naturalistic epistemic standards are, but I don't know what standards you employed in your judgment that certain cases really are authentically religious. So I can't answer your question about what the other standard you used would be.

In Western culture, moral philosophies coalesced around the Bible which certainly does embody moral standards. 'Do to others as you would have them do to you', 'love neighbour as self', 'care for the poor and needy', to mention only a few. What are the naturalist equivalents for them? Recall, upthread, the discussion about how Richard Dawkins on the one hand, laments the implications of Darwinian theory on moral philosophy, but then has devoted considerable time to attacking the traditional sources of morality.

What's your suggestion to resolve this dilemma?

Well, my meta-ethical position is moral nihilism. I think what people call morals are just societal norms they've adopted. And these are historically and culturally situated and parsed, rather than absolute in any sense.

And I think that characterizing your examples as rooted in revealed scripture has it backwards. Such moral notions made it into scripture in the first place in those societies becasue they arose out of those societies (and many other societies) and were subsequently ascribed to Yahweh or whoever.

A morality doesn't have to be divinely revealed, it just has to work to promote the kind of society the people want, as evolution in moral beliefs about slavery, women, sexual orientation, politics, economics, religious toleration, etc. over the ages resdily reveals,