Those data say things completely different from what you said — Jabberwock

Do they?

Ukraine was not worse than Russia since 1991 — Jabberwock

Not something I've ever mentioned.

its civic freedoms, while still quite imperfect, were on the higher level than Russia's at least since 2000, — Jabberwock

Again, not a claim I've ever contested.

The claims I've made are in the posts I've written. Not your head.

I'll repeat for clarity. In eight years (the time over which Russia occupied Crimea), Ukraine has gone from where Russia is now on the Human Freedom Index, to it's current state. Therefore Russia is capable, over the same time period, of the same improvement.

That is the claim. Nothing else you might want to make up about autocracy, or press freedom, or the state of affairs in 1991...

That claim is supported by the data showing that Ukraine eight years ago were in a very similar ranking to where Russia is now.

If that is so, then so would be the difference of .38 between Ukraine in 2015 and now - but the whole point of using that datapoint was to show 'evidence' for the remarkable growth that Ukraine has made in a few years? — Jabberwock

Again, try to restrict yourself to claims I've actually made. The extent to which the move was 'remarkable' is not a part of the argument. What is relevant is the difference between Ukraine and Russia (the two options available).

a handpicked data point — Jabberwock

The claim is based on a comparison of the damage done by Russian occupation. The only dataset we have of Russian occupation of Ukrainian territory in recent history is Crimea. They occupied Crimea for eight years. I picked the data from eight years ago. The data choice matches the claim. It's a relatively simple principle (or at least, I thought it was simple - my measure for what's 'simple' here may have to change).

the score from 2020 for Russia is not that relevant either, given the changes that have occurred since. I could give you a long list of those, but I will not. Do you know why? — Jabberwock

Because they'd all be speculative in effect as we don't have comparable datasets? No. I doubt that's the reason.

Odd claim though, seeing as your own data you've provided above shows a steady overall increase in the index score until 2018 whereafter the small drop is not even matched by the world ranking, which improves.

But do please provide 'the facts' which show conclusively that the last two years instigated policies which interrupted 20 years of minimal change in overall score.

Yes, I know those bits in blue, those are the exact links I have used to get the data I have so nicely presented. — Jabberwock

It's quite simple (though you seem to be having trouble with (4))

1. Open the CSV linked.
2. Go to line 316 - '2015 Ukraine'.
3. Read off column G 'hf-rank'.
4. Avoid then picking your own data from somewhere other than the link provided to show something different.

Ukraine score in 2015: 6.34 — Jabberwock

You know those bits in blue? They're links so you can check the actual data I'm using. You know, rather than pick your own data...

As if the difference between 6.34 and 6.01 somehow was even relevant to the argument on a scale of 1-10.

Not if the expected likely consequences are worse than if you did not take that action. — Jabberwock

we should compare options and their consequences — Jabberwock

We should abandon the discussion of consequences based on a single metric, like the body count, and consider the overall consequences. — Jabberwock

So explain to me why you previously wanted to completely ignore the consequences of continued war on Yemen, or future generations, or those at risk from escalation?

if people believed that oppression is better than risk of death, like you do, then there would be no armed rebellions at all. As you are unable to delineate the boundaries of concessions, we can assume that in all provided cases of liberation wars and revolutions you would argue for leaving the oppression as the better option (because your only metrics is the death count). — Jabberwock

If you want to continue to argue against an imaginary opponent, start a blog. If not, read what I've actually written and respond to that.

tell me when the armed fight with oppression would be preferable. — Jabberwock

When the likely gains outweigh the likely harms - including collateral damage. That is rarely an international land war. It is often a national rebellion (even an armed one).

If you want to discuss the consequences, let us do that. — Jabberwock

That's what I've been attempting to do, but you refuse to consider anyone who isn't Ukrainian.

But wait a minute... You wrote: 'An example might be the Human Freedom Index which had Ukraine ranking 134 in 2014, below Russia at 119'. But the very source you have provided says something else: Ukraine 114 (score 6.57), Russia 123 (score 6.24).

Did you really think I would not look at the data? — Jabberwock

Gods! It's like talking to five year olds.

I'll try and go through this one more time, really slowly.

I'm showing how a country can rise up from where Russia is now in terms of human freedom, to where Ukraine is now in terms of human freedom. To do that I'm showing that Ukraine has gone from below where Russia is now, to where Ukraine is now in the space of eight years (the length of time for which Russia has occupied Crimea).

I know this is really complicated, but stay with me.

I've picked the time period of eight years because it is a time period over which we know the death and damage from occupation by Russia, right? Any other time period would be questionable because you might say that Russia would do more damage over that timeframe. It's a means of establishing a measure of damage by Russia from occupation that we don't have to speculate on.

Eight years ago from now is 2015. I assume you can keep up with the basic maths.

So I'm comparing Ukraine in 2015 to Russia now.

Ukraine in 2015 was ranked 134 (score 5.84) https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2021-01/human-freedom-index-2018.csv

Russia in 2022 (latest published report) was ranked 119 (score 6.01) https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2023-01/human-freedom-index-2022.pdf

When you've had a crack at understanding that, maybe try a little more respect for your interlocutors.

Mapping, modelling, denoting, depicting, describing, representing, referring? What is it that is mapped, modeled, denoted, depicted, described, represented or referred to if not what is commonly experienced? — Janus

Experiencing is "mapping, modelling, denoting, depicting, describing, representing, referring", it is not subject of it.

Experiencing the world is to model it. That which is modelled therefore cannot be the experience.

to show that I just have to show culture as a viable and more plausible theory — schopenhauer1

And what is it in your story-telling so far that you think has given any measure of relative plausibility?

We all seem to agree that our drive to have sex was innate prior to the development of language, you now ask us to consider two options for what happened next;

1. It remained that way
2. Culture took over the job replacing it almost like for like with an identical acculturated desire whilst at the same time the original innate desire disappeared.

Demonstrating that (2) is possible is not the same as demonstrating that (2) is even likely, let alone something we ought accept over and above (1).

What I think we're all waiting for is your reasons for believing (2) is more likely than (1), not just your reasons for thinking (2) is possible.

I think you've equivocated between inheriting an identity and being subject to its systemic vectors of oppression when you count as it. If you look like a duck, people will treat you like a duck. — fdrake

Fair. I wasn't terribly confident in the analogy as I was writing it, but thought 'fuck it, it's going in anyway'. I don't think there is an analogy for gender because there's really no other protected characteristic that is determined by different people in different ways. In a sense, that's the problem the disambiguation the EHRC are suggesting is aimed at fixing.

There were so few non-overlapping elements in the public conception of things, anyway. Those instabilities were going to implode as soon as anyone shone light on them. I think it's a good thing this is happening. — fdrake

Yeah, me too. I think where me might differ is I don't see something like the trans movement as being part of that process so much as working against it. Replacing the false 'woman'='has a womb', with the equally false 'woman'='feels like a woman' doesn't get us where we need to be in terms of understanding the multi-faceted way the term is used and, to be realistic, is going to continue to be used. Human language is pretty resistant and will not be tamed. 'Woman' is going to continue to be a term used different ways in different contexts. We can profit by understanding that, or we can bang our heads against the wall trying to make it not so.

For example, I don't think "It's a girl" is something like a scientific categorisation by a midwife - it's a declaration, a use of the term 'girl' (she looked at the reproductive organs and used the word 'girl'). but when later that girl decides she expresses herself more like a man, then she'll use the word 'man' and ask others to do so too. That also is a use of the word. Both legitimate uses of a word which has different felicitous uses in different contexts. The midwife wasn't wrong, nor the trans man later in life. It's just that gender terms are not fixed to one use in one context. Nor do I see the slightest reason why they ought to be.

Aye. I think if this was a choice on the ballot, I would take it. More categories, more protective laws, more tailorable specificity.

I imagine you believe the same of masculinity, it's not an "all or nothing" thing? It's instead a big wibbly wobbly ball of manny-mascy stuff? — fdrake

Yep, absolutely. It's just a word, they're slippery beasts.

No, 'greater than zero' is not enough — Jabberwock

Of course it is, if your only other choice has zero chance of success, then you take the one that has slightly above zero. Your plan has zero chance of achieving the 'desired effect'.

If you had a plan that would provide us with global peace without any violence, but the chance of success was 1%, and the 99% was that the world would be plunged into tyranny, then nobody would pursue that course of action, even though the goal was so lofty. — Jabberwock

They would if the alternative had 0% chance of success and 100% chance that the world would be plunged into tyranny. Again, if you want to talk about probabilities, then you're comparing options and their consequences.

in this case it is a distinction without a difference. Neither Ukraine was authoritarian a few years ago, nor did it undergo any fast processes over the last few years. — Jabberwock

I've cited the data. It ranked lower than Russia in the Human Freedom Index. It now ranks higher. It made progress from lower to higher in eight years. That's all that's needed to show Russia can do the same.

No, I am arguing that you have failed to provide an argument that your proposed course of action would likely bring the result of avoiding war. — Jabberwock

Nor have you. In fact your proposed course of action 100% guarantees war. So neither of our options are distinguished by a guarantee to avoid war. I'm suggesting war could be avoided by not resisting (militarily) when tyrants attempt to occupy territory but instead focus on removing the tyrant from power so that it doesn't matter much which country owns what. You're suggesting we use war to contain tyrants in the country they're in and by losing said war, weaken their rule. As far as 'avoiding war', your strategy literally cites it as a tool, so it will 100% not avoid war. My strategy might avoid war. In that one simple metric 'avoiding war', it's clear that even if my strategy had only 0.000001% chance of working it's better than yours which has 0% chance of avoiding war seeing as it involves war.

This is, of course, a good reason not to use stupidly simplistic metrics like 'avoid war' or 'secure voting rights', but rather take a more holistic approach which tries to maximise human well-being throughout the reach of our consequences.

No, because it failed to provide any positive results — Jabberwock

It removed a dictator. How's that not positive? Again, pick a naively simplistic metric and you can make anything sound like a success. That's why intelligent people avoid naively simplistic metrics of success. Even our governments have more goals in mind than simply 'free the Ukrainians' when they determine policy, they balance that goal against others to come up with a strategy which meets most.

Oh, so the alternative is now thousands of deaths or decades of oppression. Think of the children, you said? If so, then it is even more understandable why Ukrainians would prefer the former. — Jabberwock

Oppression only works because most people prefer it to death. If most people preferred death to oppression then they would all resist it until dead and the oppressor would have no population left to oppress. If an oppressor puts a gun to your head and says "jump", you jump, because you prefer that to just saying "no" and getting shot. It's an absolute fact of human nature that we marginally prefer oppression to death because there's a chance of getting out of oppression. Crimea has been under Russian oppression for eight years. Why has the entire population not simply killed themselves to escape the oppression? Because they'd prefer to live, and hope.

It's not as if the Ukrainians have these two stark choices. Ukraine outside of Russia is hardly a bed of roses and with crippling debt and a destroyed economy, it'll be much worse. The human rights record of Ukrainian-occupied Donbas is practically identical to that of Russian-occupied Crimea. You might have bought into the propagandist fantasy that Ukraine was some beacon of democratic light before the invasion, but the evidence shows otherwise.

The choice faced (in the frame you've used above) is thousands more dead vs slightly worse levels of freedom).

If the country's electoral process is erratic, but not fully dominated by the regime, if the country has democractic judicial oversight (Ukrainian courts were instrumental both in the Kuchma case and Yushchenko revote), well established tradition of grassroot movements (at least since the Orange Revolution), local governments which are not hand picked by the central authority, press that enjoys more freedom, that is. It might help if the opposition politicians are not routinely murdered or jailed, journalists murdered or beaten up.

But Russia does not have any of that. — Jabberwock

The Human Freedom Index includes measures of

Rule of law
Security and safety
Movement
Religion
Association, assembly, and civil society
Expression and information
Relationships
Size of government
Legal system and property rights
Sound money
Freedom to trade internationally
Regulation — https://www.cato.org/human-freedom-index/2021

... as do most indices. Ukraine was worse than Russia around the time of Maidan. The factors you cite are already taken account of. Ukraine came from a situation where it was worse than Russia in all of those measures put together, to one where it was better than Russia, in eight years.

No, they are not, you have specifically excluded 'human freedom measures' from 'facts' - 'measures of autocracy and democracy are not objective'. — Jabberwock

I haven't excluded the measures, I've said that the categorisation is subjective. A measure of autonomy is objective (how many parties are on the ballot paper - for example), it is then subjective to say that fewer than two = 'autocracy'. An objective measure of democracy might be how many non-state-owned press outlets there are, a subjective judgement would be that more than five = 'democracy'. It is to avoid this very kind of subjective judgement that the indices of human freedom rank countries according the scores rather than simply divide them into two arbitrary camps. This really should be basic stuff. Objective - 'the probability is 72.5%'; subjective 'the probability is high'. Objective - 'there are six people in that car'; subjective - 'there are too many people in that car'. The human freedom indices are simply measures of factors usually associated with freedom (a subjective element), but the numbers are objective (if you trust their sources), categorising those numbers is subjective ('autocracy'/'democracy') ranking them isn't (119 is smaller than 134, that's not an opinion).

It's not about possibility and necessity. It's about "more likely". — neomac

Depends on the framing. As I said above...

Easy. The 'desired effects' are freedom for Ukrainians with fewer than a hundred thousand dead. Your proposal has zero chance of achieving that, so mine only has to have greater than zero. Are you arguing that mine also has zero, that Russia cannot shake off tyranny? — Isaac

...if you want to put it in terms of likelihood.

Sure, if your sole concern is the ability of Ukrainians to vote in an unimpeded election then maybe there'd be an argument about probability, but why the hell would anyone sane have that as their only goal.

you are supposed to argue that what the course of action you propose is likely to provide the desired effects. — Jabberwock

Easy. The 'desired effects' are freedom for Ukrainians with fewer than a hundred thousand dead. Your proposal has zero chance of achieving that, so mine only has to have greater than zero. Are you arguing that mine also has zero, that Russia cannot shake off tyranny?

If we are tracking transition from autocracy to democracy — Jabberwock

We're not. We're talking about freedom. Freedom is a lot more than just democracy.

you have to argue that your proposed course of action is likely to achieve that goal. — Jabberwock

What goal? 'Avoid war'? Are you seriously arguing that 'continue war' is more likely to avoid war than 'stop war'?

The former, because the chance of achieving the latter is low — Jabberwock

So ignoring completely all collateral damage? I suppose the Iraq war was OK by you too then?

the predicted outcomes offset the probabilities, but only to a small degree. — Jabberwock

Really? How small. Smaller than 10?

I understand that you are desperate to show that all perspectives are equal, but the simple truth is they are not. — Jabberwock

Your story is invalid because it does not cohere with the generally accepted view of historical processes. — Jabberwock

Ah! The Generally Accepted View™. Owned by the same company as The Facts™ if I recall correctly.

Is there a citation you could share for The Generally Accepted View™, it would sure resolve decades of disagreement between Marxist historians and Western scholars.

Do experts believe that quick and peaceful revolution in Russia leading to its democractization is likely? — Jabberwock

Who said quick? Measuring against the current death rate in the war and the Russian occupation of Crimea, they've got decades and would still come out on top. Are you arguing that not a single expert in the world thinks Russia could improve a few points (all Ukraine has done) in the next decade or so?

so far we have nothing to compare, because you have failed to present the argument — Jabberwock

Done so already, but again...

According to the Human Freedom Index, Ukraine, just before the Maidan Revolution ranked 134. Russia, at last measure ranked 119.

It is therefore possible for a country to (through non-military action) bring itself to the level of freedom Ukraine now enjoys from the level of freedom Russia now suffers in the space of eight years.

Eight years is also the time over which Russia has occupied Crimea with some few hundred deaths and similar restrictions of freedom currently active in Ukraine (and imposed by Ukraine in Donbas before this latest invasion)

Therefore it is plausible to believe that a country can get from Russia-now to Ukraine-now (in terms of freedom) in the space of eight years, suffering only the death and humanitarian toll seen in Russian-occupied Crimea.

These are all historical facts (the human freedom measures, the deaths and humanitarian situation in occupied Crimea). They can be used to support a narrative - one of popular struggle against oppression, anti-war.

I think that's true, but I'm not sure it's relevant from the perspective of what counts as a woman. — fdrake

Well, only that something of what counts as being a woman has to account for this, otherwise it is nowhere considered. We have to be able to ask "are women still suffering from systemic discrimination in childhood?", and mean by that 'biological women'. In order to do that we need, for example, birth certificates to register the biological sex (otherwise we can't even begin to gather data) and that is something the trans community have actively campaigned against. I think that's unhelpful.

There'd need to be an argument that past oppression experiences which are typical for women to experience are necessary for being a woman. Effectively this would exclude anyone trans. If it's treated as a theory of social identity as well as a legal classification. — fdrake

Yeah. Couch this in terms of race and see how it sounds. Does one need to have had the past oppression experiences of being black to suffer the loss of privilege associated with that experience? Yes. Without a shadow of a doubt. If I had some random medical condition which darkened my skin, it would not be the same as having been raised black, I don't inherit that identity, just by meeting the criteria currently - there's a history which informs our current identities. For women (biological) that history is their childhood. For trans women it cannot be. That creates two separate identities (insofar as the idea of identities makes any sense at all, which I'm not sold on)

Isn't this against the point you made earlier? About the definitions of an oppressed minority should not depend solely upon the oppressor? Did I misread? — fdrake

I didn't really come down on one side or the other in terms of oughts; the point I was trying to make was merely that this is the state of affairs. Oppressors do dictate the oppressed because it is the group they decide to act against. If a mass hatred of people with 'funny voices' were to develop, then what constituted a 'funny' voice as opposed to a normal one would be dictated by the oppressors, the victim group would be whomever they (the oppressors) decided had a 'funny' voice. It would not be possible for a person to think "hey, I think my voice is kind of funny, so I must be oppressed too". If the oppressors don't agree then they're not going to oppress you, and you, by definition, will then not be oppressed, not in the 'funny voice' gang, no matter how much you want to be.

I'm not actually sure about whether that state of affairs has a moral valence, I'd have to give that more thought.

Though I imagine we're having the frames discussion you highlighted at the end of your post. — fdrake

We are, yes.

Perhaps a decent angle to come at this from, giving charity to the "cancel culture brigade" is that the frame separations are also politically charged, perhaps precisely because it's difficult to tell when the frames have switched. — fdrake

Yeah, I think that's spot on. The way I see it working is that the very existence of frames can be a trial for trans people as it acts in opposition to the identity they're trying to have realised by their community. It's not an easy situation at all, but it's made harder by misunderstandings about other's motives, especially when (in both cases) those motives are genuinely not always good.

there'd be nothing stopping the a code from having trans misogyny guidelines which enable some of the same legal protections. — fdrake

Yeah, In the Equalities Act as we have it right now, gender reassignment is a protected characteristic. I'd like to see more gender identity types included than that. I think gender reassignment is too high a bar to qualify. Merely being trans should be enough, like being gay is.

It's a pretty fine line between an organisation allowing someone into a space because legally biological sex lets them preclude it vs not allowing someone into a space under that same law because they're not seen as who they are. You see what I mean? — fdrake

Yeah, absolutely, but I see some of this as the problem of the way trans identities are constructed. I know that this is perhaps a less popular notion these days, but I'm pretty much a thoroughgoing social constructionist. I don't hold to the notion of anyone's identity being self-discovered, all we've got going on inside is 'lights 'n buzzers', just a lot of axon firing and endocrine fluctuations. Making 'woman' out of that is a cooperative cultural exercise. And I think some of that exercise is being carried out in unhelpful ways right now, one of which is the idea that 'woman' is an all or nothing identity. 'Woman' always was a loose term which meant slightly different things in different circumstances, it never cropped up as an issue because there were so few non-overlapping elements, but the criteria for membership was never stable.

It's funny given the main anti-trans arguments are about 'woman' having a fixed meaning, I'd argue the opposite. It has (and always has had) a fluid meaning depending on circumstances. It's the (strong version of) the pro-trans campaign (and so also their opposition) who want to cement the term ('how I feel' vs 'what bits you've got'). I don't think either are useful.

I doubt it makes sense treat its vectors as independent. Since we already stipulated that there are plenty of times trans women will be the recipient of acts which would be called misogynist acts if they were directed toward a cis woman. That articulation necessitates an underlying construct - gender. — fdrake

It comes back to systemic effects, which trans women don't feel and cis women do. The vectors would be the same perhaps (though I'm still not sure - I suppose we'd have to ask some misogynists - and this, I think is where @Moliere's approach has some merit, looking at the outcomes, not the intent), but the victim group and their experiences are different, that necessitates a distinction which is at risk of being erased.

I did not present my views based on one instance. I have quoted many events from the history that support the view I propose. — Jabberwock

I was referring to your potted history of the USSR. The number of 'instances' you divide this into was not the relvan6part of that paragraph. The relevant part was that it is interpreted.

Unlike you. — Jabberwock

Are you seriously claiming that there exists not a single case of tyranny being overthrown by non-military? Because if not, then my case is already made. If we both agree that such cases exist then that is my argument. It is possible, therefore we ought strive for it. That case is undermined only by two counterarguments; a) it is not even possible, or b) we ought not strive for it. You've argued neither.

It was you yourself that proposed democracy indices as a measure of democracy. — Jabberwock

I proposed no such thing. I proposed "measures of human development", please respond to what I've written, not what you'd like me to have written.

An example might be the Human Freedom Index which had Ukraine ranking 134 in 2014, below Russia at 119.

Till now you have flatly refused to do that. — Jabberwock

O will do so if you claim that there are no instances at all in history, or that it is impossible. Otherwise we already agree on the facts of my case. We disagree about the conclusion.

You demand from your government that it takes a specific course of action instead of the course of action it is taking. To argue for that you have to present an argument that the specific course of action you propose is more likely to have the preferred result than the course taken by them. — Jabberwock

all I have to do is support an argument that war is more likely to produce the preferred results than other courses of action — Jabberwock

I presume we'd all rather avoid war. Therefore I only have to argue that it is possible to do so.

If I wanted to kill Putin, dropping 10 nuclear bombs on Moscow would be sure to do it. So is all I need to do to prove that increased likelihood of achieving the outcome? Of course not. We want to kill Putin, but we want to do so in the least harmful way (in terms of collateral damage). If you prefer we could set the outcome to be 'freedom for the people of Ukraine with minimum loss of freedom to others'. But under that metric, war has a high(ish) chance of securing freedom, but with massive losses, supporting revolution has a lower chance of securing freedom, but with minimal losses. So which wins?

Probability of success is not a sufficient metric, unless your 'preferred results' is wide enough to include avoiding undesirable collateral effects, in which case, you haven't made your case because you've only included 'freedom for Ukraine' as your result. I sincerely hope my government have more concerns than the freedom of Ukrainians.

I have already explained which historical events support my argument that peaceful revolution in Russia at this time is unlikely. — Jabberwock

No, they don't. Look, I'll try and give an example from your post above...

"... at the time where Western decadent societies were being established, Russians were still under equally despotic rule (monarchs and bourgeois factory owners are identical). The period of relative chaos after the Revolutions was quite short-lived and pretty soon the paternal care of Proletariat took over, although it was not so much 'proletariat' in charge as the party's dedicated verchushka. After that were fifty years of the steady party's rule, with a very short period of descent into capitalism under Yeltsin; then Putin came and fortunately strengthened the rule for the people again. The point I am making is that Russians have practically no traditions of decadence and are one of the few countries to overthrow the rule of bourgeois oligarchs, so they can do it again."

... I've not changed any of the facts at all. Just written it from a different perspective. You've not 'explained' anything. You've just told me what your preferred frame is.

I argue against it, because it is an invalid one, for which I gave my reasons. — Jabberwock

You've not given a single reason why my story is invalid. Presenting an alternative one isn't an argument that mine is invalid. You have to show that I can't think what I think (and remain coherent), not merely that there's an alternative which is also coherent.

Saying 'Oh, I can argue that Ukraine's transition was fast and recent, because I can interpret the facts that way!' has the exact same weight as 'Oh, I can argue that the Moon landing did not happen because I can interpret the facts that way!' — Jabberwock

No, it doesn't because I can show how it is virtually impossible to believe the moon landings were fake and remain coherent - the number of people who would need to be involved is inconsistent with the number of people who have been shown to be involved with any other conspiracy. It's not complicated. As I've shown above, you giving your preferred account of Russian history is not the same category of fact at all. It's really, really simple - do experts actually think the moon landings were faked? No. Do experts actually think war will be worse for Ukraine than occupation? Yes. That's literally all you need to do to determine which positions are off the 'crazy' end and which are to be taken seriously.

we have a reason to believe that the taken course of action is likely to produce the effects we expect (as you wrote yourself, it is a perfectly valid story). On the other hand, we have no reason whatsoever to believe that the course of action you propose is likely to produce the desired effects, beside your claim that your interpretation of events (which you refuse to share) tells you so. — Jabberwock

It's not that simple if one course of action is going to lead to the deaths of hundreds of thousands, we don't simple compare on likelihood of success, unless success includes the minimisation of collateral effects, in which case you haven't made your argument at all since you've not included that metric.

I'll save cluttering the thread with arguments written elsewhere. The arguments against historicism are discussed here https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14472/why-should-we-talk-about-the-history-of-ideas

You've presented a series of facts which, alone, do not demonstrate anything but your interpretation of what actually happened in one instance. What actually happened in one instance is neither a delimiter nor predictive of what will/could happen in another instance. It would be like me claiming that tall people are likely to hit you on the grounds that a tall person once hit me.

Historical facts are always already interpreted. They don't stand on their own.

For example...

that Ukraine in recent years went from autocracy to democracy quickly and by way of popular protests - that is also an ahistorical claim — Jabberwock

Measures of autocracy and democracy are not objective. When Ukraine (or Russia) started being an autocracy and when it stopped are not raw historical facts (which would be things like election methods, political arrest rates, etc). You've already interpreted historical facts in line with your preferred narrative and are attempting to pass off the interpretation as fact.

We're not dealing with facts, we're dealing with your preferred story, based on facts. I can't argue against it because it's a perfectly valid story. Nor have I any need to to support my argument.

You, however, to support an argument that war is necessary, have to show that alternatives are impossible (or highly improbable). That can't be shown by simply pointing to one plausible interpretation of events. An argument that war is necessary has to show that other interpretations are all implausible. You have to show that it is impossible to be of the opinion that Ukraine turned from a state similar to Russia's current one, to their current one in a few years. You haven't shown that, you've shown that it is possible to interpret events in such a way as to suggest not. But no one is arguing that is is not possible to do that. I'm arguing it is not necessary to do that. Do you understand the difference?

Nothing you've presented even addresses the argument that it is not necessary to interpret historical events in such a way as to support the notion that war is necessary to bring about freedom. You've shown it's plausible to think the opposite, not that it's implausible to think anything else.

While I can see the utility of it for the law, there was also some utility in leaving some points as it was. — fdrake

Yeah, a difficult decision, for sure, but as is pointed out, a trans woman who is discriminated against because of her womanhood will still be as to claim against the Equalities Act under the category of have had gender reassignment, so it doesn't leave her with no recourse. The alternative, however, would leave women without certain protections, so I think the advice wise still.

I'm sure you see the distinction between recognising an act of misogyny in the workplace and operationalising/defining terms in the law. — fdrake

I do, yes. I think I'd make a distinction between redress, suffering and abuse. At the event-level an act of abuse against women is going to affect a trans woman no less than a biological woman. As such the abuse does not distinguish and so there's no cause for us to either. But at the systemic level, clearly a biological woman (grown up as a woman) has been exposed to discrimination that a trans woman (grown up a man) has not. Likewise structurally, women's roles and expected behaviours shackle biological women (who might prefer to behave otherwise) but typically do not shackle trans women (part of whose trials are that they they wish to behave exactly that way).

So I don't think its so much a matter of law vs everyday. I this it's more about different frames within which different means of categorising become more or less appropriate.

With regards to the clash with traditional feminism, this fully exhausts the area of conflict. I don't think any of those branded Terfs argued that trans women shouldn't be treated as women in everyday circumstances (and that would include an act of misogynist discrimination). It is the insistence, from many in the trans movement, that the definition of woman include trans women in all those other frames too. For example the recent Scottish bill to have birth certificates changed, which Baroness Falkner argues would undermine attempts to monitor systemic discrimination against women (much of which takes place during childhood, education etc).

this appears quite distinct from studying "toxic" masculinity as a category of social style/personal identities, since identity of that sort is largely autonomous from the legal codes surrounding it. — fdrake

The connection was with @Moliere's earlier ...

functionally it wouldn't matter what the psychological type is if it results in misogyny either way. — Moliere

... where it seemed to me that defining toxic masculinity by result muddied the water between 'masculine' the sex characteristic, and masculine the behavioural set.

I was really just exploring the idea of a gender-related behavioural set acting against a sex-related set. The gender 'man' (here the subset of behaviour considered 'toxic'), carries within it an identification of an 'other', the object of its discrimination, which is sex-related.

In other words, the object of one group's discrimination is 'otherness' but their othering is based on sex. Does that make the groups self-defined as sex-based. Can we have 'masculinity' divorced from the male sex if we define 'masculinity' as containing elements of self-definition which are sex-based.

I think we run into trouble maintaining a narrative of gender as expressive act, whilst also including in the toxic elements of that gender a self-identification as a sex.

There exists a group who are misogynist. That group causes both systemic problems for biological women, and everyday problems for both biological and trans women. That group self identifies universally by sex-characteristics, not gender ones, so I don't see any justification for looking at their behaviour through the lens of gender. And, seeing as their victims fall into two district categories, I think its a mistake to view their victims through the lens of gender too.

Misogyny is largely about sex. The 'othering' is sex-based, the effects are heavily sex-based (reproductive rights, treatment of female children,..). The lens through which it's examined needs to match that.

I have to admit that I have seen no reasonable evidence in this thread of any poster being terminally stupid, uncaring or insane. — unenlightened

No. Neither have I. Which is why I...

do continue to engage with [them] — unenlightened

I have no reason to invoke the mods. The only person I've accused of anything except error is your completely hypothetical Ukrainian who isn't (I assume) under the mods' jurisdiction.

you use these sorts of epithets on a regular basis in an attempt to undermine people — unenlightened

Do I?

And yet...

the inconsistency I see in your posting: you are very free with these negative labels, but there is no good reason ever to address them to your interlocutors on the boards, rather you should point them out to the mods so that they can be remove the people we don't want to waste time talking to and the sensible fair-minded decent people can discuss freely. — unenlightened

...I've had no moderation requests. And here you are, engaging. If my gross application of such epithets is so egregious and persistent, then why are you still engaging rather than taking your own advice?

What argument?The rest of us call it ad hominem fallacy. — unenlightened

Is it ad hominem to take a medical professor's opinion about vaccine safety more seriously in discussion than the 16 year-old Proud Boy?

Of course not.

We take into consideration matters like qualification, basic social ethics, and intelligence (a minimum threshold of). These are not ad hominem, they're just reasonable entry requirements for discussion. Here, speaking English is one, for example.

I wasn't expecting that I'd have to actually repeat the arguments as to why one might not want to include racists and xenophobes in a discussion about how to settle international conflict.

If you want the full argument it was made in 1721...

Reasoning will never make a Man correct an ill Opinion, which by Reasoning he never acquired — Jonathan Swift

But you sure like calling them out, o fair-minded one! — unenlightened

Yes. That's right.

The argument here is not all people's opinions are equal. Of course they're not. It's an argument about what we ought take as reasonable grounds to take an opinion seriously. — Isaac

Or racist xenophobes. — unenlightened

Yes. Or racist xenophobes. I expect they have a different view as to how best to resolve the conflict too, but I've no interest in arguing with those. Likewise the terminally stupid, the uncaring, the insane... There are lots of categories of people who might have an opinion about how to resolve this conflict against whom I've no wish to argue, whose opinions I've no wish to hear.

We used to exclude those types of people from debate on the grounds of a lack of qualification, or of not meeting the basic requirements of civil society.

Now it seems, the measure of exclusion is likelihood of disagreeing on the very topic supposedly being discussed.

And that's progressive, apparently.

It would be absurd to argue that no-one is racist, or a xenophobe, or biased, or ill-informed... This is not about the possibility of any alternative opinion being one of those things. It's about the reasonableness of the criteria used to to judge that.

Jeffry Sachs is clearly not ill-informed. It would be ridiculous to suggest he is. He's clearly not malicious (he's spent his academic career fighting poverty). so it's unreasonable to suggest he is.

Your hypothetical Ukrainian espousing the idea that modern Russians have somehow inherited the evils of their forebears is xenophobic. It's literally the definition of the word - imputing on a nation some inherited 'characteristic', simply by virtue of origin. And Ukraine (alongside many of the nations in that region) is notorious for the strength of it's right-wing nationalism, particularly in the armed forces.

To put the implication that Jeffrey Sachs et al. are uninformed and uncaring on a par with the suggestion that an hypothetical Ukrainian repeating xenophobic tropes is, in fact, a xenophobe is nonsense.

The argument here is not all people's opinions are equal. Of course they're not. It's an argument about what we ought take as reasonable grounds to take an opinion seriously.

Perhaps, an attempt to make this more clear. The conflict between the idealist and the realist is not an equal one, it's asymmetric in terms of evidence. This is because the idealist argument is "we all want the world to be like X and actions a, b, and c can get us there", but the realist argument is not "we all want the world to be like ~X and actions d, e, and f can get us there", it is ""we too want the world to be like X but actions a, b, and c unfortunately cannot get us there, nothing can - we have to accept the lesser {not quite}X".

That's how these arguments are set.

Those arguing for continued war are not arguing "Yeah, war! Let's have more of that!" They are arguing that we unfortunately, reluctantly must have war, it's our only option. They'd love nothing better than a world without war, but their hands are tied and reality is such that it cannot be avoided.

Those arguing for non-war options are not arguing the opposite (that they'd love to have a war, but unfortunately our hands are tied and we just cannot). They are arguing that there is a way, that we can resolve conflicts without war, that we can oppose tyranny without having to first move it about the globe by way of border wars.

So the evidence required for each of these positions is different.

The first argument needs to show that war cannot be avoided, in other words, it needs to prove a negative - that no other way works.

The second argument has no such burden, we don't need to prove that war cannot work because no one wants war anyway. War is what we reluctantly accept when all other options are closed. so we don't have to prove a negative, we only have to disprove the opposition's attempts to do so. We only have to show that they've not sufficiently made their case that war is the only option.

What's happening here is an attempt to perversely change this around. To assume we want war and require those opposing it to prove that it won't work. That's a pretty inhumane position to have arrived at.

I have the impression that you are trying to paint Jabberwock as a bigot, which seems the sort of thing you deplore about woke cancel culture. — wonderer1

No. The sort of thing I hate about woke cancel culture is the assumption that everyone on the less popular side of a political position must be acting out of stupidity, or malice (the same assumption you've just made). That differences of opinion can no longer be the result of differences in value, or differences in analysis - but rather some nefarious objective to undermine The Truth™ which everyone apparently knows.

That is exactly the pattern being repeated here. Intelligent, well-informed people have a different view as to how best to resolve the conflict, but we can't just discuss the merits of each approach, those differing from the mainstream have to uniformed, biased, Putin-supporters, they must be informed of what is "in reality..." the case, or educated about "the facts...". It's a lame attempt to disguise ideological commitments (which we could talk about) behind the pretence that The Facts™ just so happen to lead directly to the conclusion they favour, and no ideology need enter into it.

It's bollocks. The Facts are literally everything that's ever happened, and selecting two of those things and claiming that they (rather than ideological preferences) lead to some conclusion about strategy is disingenuous at best.

's argument is absurd - as if producing two facts is sufficient to argue a complex case of geopolitical strategy in which many experts in the field disagree. It deserved nothing more than it got in response. If anyone wants to actually try and make the case that Putin could not be deposed by popular uprising, but very likely would be by losing a war, then that would be an interesting case to read, but...

1. Putin's rule has been practically unchallenged by peaceful protests for twenty years.
2. The events of the Ukrainian war have weakened Putin's regime. — Jabberwock

... isn't one. It's an argument that Putin has not yet been deposed by popular uprising, and might be weakening by losing a war.

But the argument above is not sufficient to hold ground as support for the position that alternatives to war are not viable. Supporting that position requires the stronger argument made above, and the facts very clearly do not support that stronger argument, only the weaker one.

This should not be difficult stuff, and were this a discussion about some uncontroversial matter, no-one of reasonable intelligence would have the slightest trouble telling the difference.

With the scenario of law, and in taking into consideration the wider system of patriarchy, I'd say that trans individuals are targeted by patriarchy as much as women. — Moliere

Do you mean trans women? With trans individual you're in danger of falling into the very caricature @Tzeentch was painting where 'patriarchy' is simply a rather misandrist catchall term for every bit of oppression going on, and misogyny likewise for just 'being a dick'.

The point of Baroness Falkner's argument, the point of the Equalities Act itself, is to protect a group of people who've been abused, both historically (and so in need of reparation) and currently. That group is defined by the abuser, not the abused, and it is based on biological characteristics (mostly to do with reproduction). That group need protection from that abuse, which means they need to be identified as a group.

Oddly, the mainstream left seem quite happy to accept the exact same argument about race. We ought be colourblind, but because the abuser identifies a group on the basis of skin colour, then in order to protect that group from that abuse we need to identify them - we cannot be colourblind.

It's exactly the same argument with 'women' but the politics are different, so a different result is promoted.

As to the difference between law and real conflict... If the law doesn't codify behaviour, doesn't act to resolve conflict, then what exactly is it for? The law might be unjust, but that's not what you seem to be arguing - you seem to be saying "the law's fine, but it's something separate to but conflict resolution which is another entirely". What purpose do you see the Equalities Act as having? Do you think it unnecessary?

Consider the same scenario where a trans woman is skipped over promotion because our misogynist believes the woman is a confused man. — Moliere

Misogynists can do other bad things motivated by other prejudices. Those who've undergone gender reassignment are also protected by the Equalities Act, people are also abusive to that group and as such that group , defined, again, by the abuser, need protection under the act.

You expect me to apologize that facts confirm my arguments and not yours? — Jabberwock

Ah well, if I'd known The Facts™ were involved, I'd have stayed schtum.

I would say that a bloody, unsuccessful war, with more than 100k dead and collapsing economy COULD be that impulse — Jabberwock

How convenient. The one thing that can end these otherwise impossible to shift tyrannies just so happens to be the one thing that is the solution you prefer anyway because of your personal allegiances.

What an entirely unbiased and rational pure coincidence!

Putin's grip on power seems to be slipping — Jabberwock

Really? Because a minute ago, when it better suited your narrative...

tyrannies have a strange habits of being quite resistant to change. — Jabberwock

The first option - 'fighting to free all Russia' is so unlikely that it is absurd - overthrow of the Communism took 50 years and happened mostly due to economic failure of the Soviet system. Tell me, how successful is the West in overthrowing the regime in Belarus? Not very, I would say? Why think that in Russia the result would be different? — Jabberwock

before the region is turned into a police state, as those are not that easy to overthrow as you believe them to be. — Jabberwock

all autocratic regimes oppose resistance and they often last quite long — Jabberwock

Funny how the solidity of Putin's grip on power seems to change depending on the purposes the argument is being put to.

Encourage more war - "Putin is weakening and could be overthrown any minute, just a few more bombs and we'll be there."

Encourage political action instead of war - "Putin is strong, it would take many decades to overthrow him"

Do get dizzy at all?

Source? — fdrake

Here https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/letter-to-mfwe-definition-of-sex-in-ea-210-3-april-2023_0.pdf

In particular...

The Gender Recognition Act 2004 provides that the gender of a person with a Gender Recognition Certificate (GRC) becomes the acquired gender ‘for all purposes’ and recognised as their legal sex, broadly equivalent to the way sex recorded at birth is recognised in law for other people. This concept of ‘legal sex’ has been confirmed by the courts in their interpretation of the meaning of the protected characteristic of sex in the EqA. The EHRC has consistently understood this to be the position in the law as it currently stands and we have based our guidance and interventions until now on that understanding. However, this raises questions in legal interpretation and in practice. Notwithstanding the existence of statutory exceptions permitting different treatment of trans people where justified, and our guidance to explain the law, it has not been straightforward for service providers and employers to apply the law, including in areas such as sport and health services.

we have come to the view that if ‘sex’ is defined as biological sex for the purposes of EqA, this would bring greater legal clarity

It is also telling that the chair of the Equalities and Human Rights Commission felt the need to conclude...

There is a clear need to move the public debate on these issues to a more informed and constructive basis. This would be welcomed by the many who do not take the polarised positions currently driving public debate.

...certainly a position I recognise.

The criteria by which people socially count as women can be quite different from those which correctly count women as women in accordance with a robust theory of identity. In that respect, what matters for being a recipient of misogynist acts isn't "being a woman" (in accordance with a robust theory of identity) it's "counting as one" for practical purposes. — fdrake

Right. So the problem arises when we want to take affirmative action, or protective action against the misogyny (or the effects of past misogyny - patriarchy). The victims are a group of people identified by the oppressor. If we create a space for women as victims of abuse, it's women defined by the abuser, not defined by themselves. If we want to take affirmative action to correct systemic issues caused by past misogyny, then the group who have been systemically mistreated are that group defined by the misogynists, not those who currently identify that way.

All of which leads pretty much to the same conclusion that the Equalities and Human Rights Commission recently reached. There needs to exist at least one definition of 'woman' (in the EHRC's case for the purposes of the Equalities Act), which is based on traditional criteria. Women (the oppressed grouping) are not having their protected characteristic adequately defended if they cannot be defined (in at least these areas) by visible biological sex traits - the traditional means by which the patriarchal system would have identified them as targets for unequal treatment.

Thanks, that helps clarify things.

Yes, I would rather help Ukrainians, possibly because I know more Ukrainians than Yemeni. — Jabberwock

All I really wanted to know.

People don't identify as misogynists, so that'd be problematic! — Moliere

That's what I thought.

If we were talking structural problems, like patriarchy, then it'd make sense to talk about a social determination -- but at the level of identity I don't think it makes sense to say that's a social determination. Or, at least, it's not the same — Moliere

Yes. I think that's the tension that many traditional feminists feel with the newer gender identity prescriptions. If there is a group that is oppressed in some way, it can't be a group that is self-identified because the oppressor does not ask questions about identity before oppressing, the object of their oppression is that group identified by them as deserving oppression and so the subject of any fight against oppression is the group the oppressor identified, not the one any other group identify.

Also I'm not sure that an identity is a trait as much as it's a manner of expressing traits. "Tall" is a trait that's relative to the group, being between such and such heights on average is a range of traits associated with some group, and expected behaviors are one step away from traits. But the manner of expression is what differs. — Moliere

That makes sense, yes.

I've been saying resentment too, which isn't the exact same as hatred. — Moliere

Yes, I agree with you there. I chose 'hatred' as it was the dictionary definition and I didn't want to get hung up on definitional differences, but I'm also happier with your idea of 'resentment'.

So it's a way of displaying one's manliness, or expressing one's manhood, or being a man that results in the hatred — Moliere

So here again it's unclear how a set of traits can be identified by an outside observer as expressing a property which is given by the person 'manhood'. There are traits/expressions/ways-of-being which result in hatred of an identified group (identified by the one doing the hating), but then you link those traits/expressions/ways-of-being to a property (manhood) which is self-identified. How is it that you (the third party) are doing the linking then?

---

To give a concrete example. Let's say a boss at a bank is traditionally toxicly masculine (bullying, competitive, and misogynistic). He favours the promotion of a man over an equally qualified female colleague because he somehow feels a man would be 'better for the job'. Later he finds out that the female colleague he overlooked identifies as a man.

What has happened in that instance? Has he, unbeknownst to him, not been a misogynist because he resented a man? Or has he been a misogynist all along, but the target of his misogyny is not self-identified?

"Woman", to the misogynist, probably has a collection of traits associated with it but I wouldn't be too keen on accepting the Type as the misogynist sees it either...

...it's the misogynist that's doing the identifying...

...So from my perspective the object of the misogynist's hatred is partly a fantasy. — Moliere

So if...

a toxic masculinity is an identity which results in misogyny. — Moliere

...but the object of misogyny is identified by the toxicly masculine person, then toxic masculinity has to be a feature identified by them as well.

A is a trait identified by an attitude toward B and B is identified by the possessor of A. That makes A a trait entirely identified by the possessor of A.

I promise to try and stay more on topic this time.

resentment of women as a type of person seems to get closer to the psychological type, but functionally it wouldn't matter what the psychological type is if it results in misogyny either way. — Moliere

So, in order to have misogyny, there has to be a 'gyny to mis', yes. The object of the hatred/mistreatment has to be an identifiable one, otherwise you're talking about misanthropy.

I suppose that's why you've got 'woman-as-a-type'. But back to identifiability, we could go with the modern trend toward self-identification, but that doesn't seem to fit with mis(anything); I can't determine to hate some category that I can't even identify without asking. So woman-as-type has to be some kind of identifiable group (even if only identifiable by the misogynist - maybe the rest of us don't agree such a group exists).

So I'm wondering who does the identifying here? Is it the misogynist ("I hate all people like this"), or the women (declare themselves to be such, and immediately become the object of hatred, like gravity), or society (but we have no end of trouble with society defining what a woman is)...

Simply put, who or what is the object of the misogynist's hatred?

What government are you assuming to be Jabberwock's? — wonderer1

Oh, I don't want to excessively personalise, so I don't suppose it matters. I'm treating them as a generic interlocutor, so assuming vaguely Western. If not then maybe no lobbying is needed, it sounds that way from the responses.

I assume (perhaps wrongly) that a wider audience are reading and would find an intimately specific conversation about individual actions quite boring...?

It would be interesting to get the perspective of a Brazilian, or an Ethiopian, or better yet a Russian, but none seem to be here (commenting at least).

so that no one cares which side of the border they're on — Isaac


Is this related to the "border/country free world" thing from earlier in the thread? — jorndoe

Yes. Borders cause wars. It is not noble or ethical to support their instatement or protection. It is the quality of the governments on either side that matters, not the location of the division between them. Where there is oppression, we should strive to reduce it, not move it to the other side of an arbitrary line.

That's what's being advocated here. That we support the expending of thousands of lives, not in reducing oppression, but in moving it. Putting it back within the borders of Russia where, presumably, it belongs...?

The bottom line still is, people have risked their lives for freedom throughout the history. — Jabberwock

Again, that metric is not the issue. The method is.

I have explained why I think that option is very unlikely. — Jabberwock

No you haven't. You said it's because the regime would oppose it. All autocratic regimes oppose resistance. Why are Russians uniquely unable to win out against that?

Ukraine lost its independence in 1921 and gained it again in 1991. How is this an example of 'simple' or 'faster'? — Jabberwock

As late as 2008, Ukraine was in roughly the same position as Russia on indices of freedom, corruption and human development. Whatever progress it's made relative to Russia, it has done in the last few years. I get your nationalist tendency to think the colour of the flag is the marker of independence, but most of the world have moved on from colonialism and consider more complex measures of human freedom than whether they like the flag.

I know the world's media would have us believe Ukraine are the world's most noble beaten down underdogs, but they're not. Until recently they were a hotbed of far-right nationalism, corruption, human rights abuses and black market arms trading. The people revolted against that. They did so over only a few years. There is no reason at all why Russians cannot do the same, they are coming from almost exactly the same position on indices of freedom.

You had no problems of presenting demands and likelihood of their fulfillment when you have described the hypothetical peace negotiations, but now you have no data. — Jabberwock

Yes, because you've given me no options. The offers and possibilities are real here. Occupation, neutrality, NATO membership... these are real negotiation points. You're asking me to measure hypothetical ones. I don't have the data on hypothetical demands. If you give me a real demand you think Putin might make, I'll do my best to find some figures to use.

The people threw that shackle off after 50 years when the USSR was economically collapsing and could not intervene, like it did in 1968 in Czechoslovakia or almost did in 1980 in Poland. So yes, the people did it, but the situation was quite favorable. — Jabberwock

See above, this is just wrong. The move from corruption to freedom is recent. Your obsession with the USSR being the cause of all oppression is not reflected in the data I'm afraid. The Ukrainian government did a perfectly good job of oppressing its own people up until very recently

I see, you donated. But if you sold all your possessions, leaving just the bare minimum, you would save even more Yemenis. That would be THE MOST HUMANITARIAN OPTION, would it be not? Yemenis give up their lives so that we can have smartphones, computers, and watch Netflix, that does not bother you that much? Somehow you do not feel obliged to relinquish all your comforts and do not demand that from all the people you know? Only Ukrainians should give up their freedom? — Jabberwock

This argument doesn't make any sense at all. I'm asking you why you choose to support the Ukrainians. Why do you choose to support your government spending billions on their war and not on protecting the Yemeni. It has nothing to do with what I'm asking Ukrainians, I'm not talking to a Ukrainian, I'm talking to you. Why do you choose to support Ukrainian freedom over and above Yemeni food supply?

Your government has a limited pot of money, why are you happy for them to spend it securing Ukrainian freedom at the expense of Yemeni food security.

You would prefer to force Ukrainians to go under Russian occupation and then somehow help them in other ways. Does that misrepresent your views in any way? — Jabberwock

I'm not forcing anything? Are you forcing people to starve because you're not actively helping them? Are you forcing people to live without shelter because you're not providing a home? Are you currently forcing Afghan women to live under the oppressive Taliban regime?

No. I'm responding to the situation Russia has put them in, in the context of all the other crises the world is facing.

As long as you have a smartphone, leave the Yemeni out of this. — Jabberwock

I have a Fairphone, but that's not the point. The point is that we face a choice as to which crisis we ask our governments to prioritise. I want a balance, you want Ukrainian freedom above all else. I'm asking why.

I am advocating that Ukrainians be able to decide in matters most related to them, exactly as I wrote. I would be extremely happy if Russian conscripts could decide for themselves, however, the West has little means to enable that choice. In the case of Ukrainians, we can. — Jabberwock

Yes. I know what you're advocating, I'm asking why. If giving Ukraine that option is bought at the expense of Yemeni food security, Ukrainian children's future, dead Russian conscripts, risk of nuclear war... Why are you advocating it? What is it about giving Ukrainians the options they want that trumps those other concerns for you?

There is no reason to limit the examples to invasion of one country by another, given that Ukraine does not and never planned to invade Russia. Why bring it up then? — Jabberwock

Because they are planning to invade Russian held territory. The legal paperwork doesn't change how many people die, nor how successful/necessary the operation is likely to be.

It is you who suggests that overthrowing Russian regime by peaceful methods would be somewhat trivial — Jabberwock

No I'm comparing the two options. I haven't declared either to be trivial, nor have I ignored either. It is the act of ignoring one to only look at the other that I'm disputing.

Forever, no, for a very long time, yes. At least as long as in Belarus, possibly as long as in the USSR. Why think it would be faster? — Jabberwock

Simple. Ukraine did it. So did several other states (as you only recently pointed out). If Ukraine can do it, why not Russia?

Putin wanted to take over the country and he did not — Jabberwock

This is disputed.

Unless you answer straight which Russian demands would need to be rejected, even under the threat of force, I am justified to assume that you would give up the whole Ukraine. If that misrepresents your view, give a straight answer: where is the limit. — Jabberwock

Nonsense. I don't have the data to make such a decision. I do have the data to show the current options are heavily in favour of occupation. Other potential demands would have to be weighed on their merits, but since there are no other demands right now, I can't see the point.

Russia is actively thwarting all attempts of democratizing of former republics, if it can, and it is quite open about it to discourage others — Jabberwock

So was Ukraine. The people threw that shackle off.

I have donated to several Ukrainian funds. But you do demand that Ukrainians give up their freedom to alleviate the hunger crisis, right? — Jabberwock

I've donated to several famine funds. But you do demand that Yemenis give up their lives to promote freedom in Ukraine, right? Where is this line of argument supposed to go?

Ukrainians can choose their future only if they have outside help. Without that help, their future is decided by Russia. You want to deprive them of that help — Jabberwock

Where have I said that I don't think we ought help Ukraine? The argument is about which methods we should be willing to support, not about whether we offer any support at all.

People who are most affected by the consequences of certain actions should have the most say about choices concerning those actions. — Jabberwock

OK, so in what way are we consulting the people in Yemen whose lives are put at risk by disruption to grain exports? You're not advocating a 'most effected, most choice' option, you're advocating a 'do everything the Ukrainians ask' option. Given the enormous death toll, I'd say ordinary Russian conscripts were pretty much the most affected (they seem to be being killed in higher numbers), so where are we considering them?

it is not the most humanitarian option ... What you fail to understand is that there are some things that people are willing to risk their lives for or even knowingly die for. — Jabberwock

I'll add it to the list. But also, specific to Ukraine. It's just a narrative that they're 'fighting for freedom'. You've no idea why they're fighting. We know a good deal are fighting out of nationalist sentiment, a good number from hatred of Russia, many for revenge. There's little evidence of a strong single unifying 'cause'.

Some answers we've already had...

"Giving in to Russia's territorial grabs will lead to more deaths in the long run."
We gave in to Russia's territorial grab in Crimea. It didn't. For 'in the long run' to mean much longer than a decade or so (Crimea has been occupied for eight years), we'd have to have an argument for why Russia cannot do what Ukraine did in ten years. There's no such argument that isn't pretty overtly racist.

"Giving in to Russia's territorial grabs will embolden other dictators so we have to include their actions in the consequent death toll"
Fine. We're facing off against nearly a thousand deaths a week. Plus potentially millions more from the disruption. Which other emboldened dictators would anyone like to include the death rate from. I doubt they'll even register a difference.

"Putin must be punished"
Good. The ICC plans to prosecute him for war crimes. His own generals seem more than a little murderous in intent, and his people (especially in the occupied regions) are not universally happy with him either. He's a pariah on the western world stage and has his foreign assets frozen. I very much doubt 'not getting Donbas' is particularly high on his list of punishment he fears right now.

"It's not our choice to make"
It is. I'm asking about our support for our government's actions in supporting one option over another. It is our choice. We can lobby our governments to provide more military aid to enable war, or we can lobby them to use their global influence to push for Ukraine to negotiate and cede territory if necessary. Our governments are acting right now, absolving us of responsibility isn't an option.

"We have to uphold international law"
Yes (Americans should take note). Nothing in international law specifies the response beyond investigation by the ICC and eventual prosecution. There is no legal requirement to resist invasion, nor to provide aid to those doing so. We do not have to uphold "what we reckon international law ought to be".

"People are willing to die for freedom"
The issue is not freedom vs non-freedom. It is war vs political resistance as a method of ensuring it. It's good that people are willing to risk their lives for other people's freedom. It's not quite so good that people are willing to risk other people's lives for their freedom. War tends to involve the latter. Political resistance the former.


Any more?

Let's make this simple. Here's a report from the OHCHR, whom I hope we can agree are pretty independant. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Countries/UA/Crimea2014_2017_EN.pdf

It details the Human Rights abuses in Russian occupied Crimea (occupied for eight years). It lists hundreds of 'disappearances' dozens of extrajudicial killings and a litany of freedoms lost.

The death rate in the Ukraine war currently stands at about 100 civilians and about 700 soldiers per week.

Ukraine turned from a path of corrupted oligarchy and right-wing nationalism to one of more freedom and European integration within just over a decade.

So it is clear that Russian-occupied territories (even the whole of Russia) can turn from corrupted oligarchies to free democracies within a decade (unless we're siding with the racist trope that Russians are somehow just worse people than Ukrainians).

It is also clear that a decade of Russian occupation leads to the deaths of dozens (perhaps hundreds if we include a generous allowance for unrecorded deaths), plus restrictions on freedoms (such as the freedom of association), and some thousands in refugee and asylum seekers.

It is also clear that even another six months of war will cause deaths in the tens of thousands, refugees in the hundreds of thousands, is already restricting freedoms (such as press freedom, freedom of movement and freedom of association), and result in billions in debt and damages. Not to mention the very real risk of millions facing starvation because of the disruption to grain and fertiliser harvests, and the risk of nuclear war.

So can you (or anyone) explain to me why they consider the most humanitarian option to be pursuing war to avoid occupation?

And if such an option is not the most humanitarian one (just the one that the Ukrainians have chosen) then can anyone explain why we should support our governments in supporting the lesser humanitarian option?

None of the oppressive regimes were overthrown by military action? Hmm, let me think: the American Revolution, the Haitian Revolution, the Greek War, the Irish War, the Indonesian War, the Algerian War, the Russian Civil War, the Afghanistan War. Funny how many of them have 'war' in the name? And remind me, was the Hitler's regime overthrown by a popular protest? Because I do vaguely remember some foreign soldiers were involved... Mussolini? Rings a bell? Did Saddam Hussein resign after peaceful protests? Gaddafi? Sorry, I do not have all day. — Jabberwock

I didn't mention anything about non-violence. I said military action. Action by the military. How many oppressive regimes were overthrown by one countries military invading territory held by another? Compare that to those overthrown by the actual population within that region (violently or not). Especially true if you set that as the motive (we had no intention, for example, of regime change in Nazi Germany, the intention was defence).

tyrannies have a strange habits of being quite resistant to change. It could be due to their tendencies to crush any opposition with brutal force, I guess. — Jabberwock

Seriously? Have you seen the images from the war? What in those does not seem to you like brutal force? You act as if the option of removing the Russians by land war was some kind of trivial paperwork exercise. Both options face brutal resistance. We're talking about historically which option has had the least. If you want to make the case that open war generally is met with less brutal force than popular uprising then be my guest, I'm all ears.

The first option - 'fighting to free all Russia' is so unlikely that it is absurd — Jabberwock

What a stupid thing to say. You're basically saying that Russia is screwed, condemned to be forever under tyranny. That's ridiculous, of course it isn't.

how successful is the West in overthrowing the regime in Belarus? Not very, I would say? — Jabberwock

How successful have Ukraine been at removing Russia militarily? Not very I'd say? If you only look at one side of an equation it's going to be impossible to draw an relative conclusions. We're comparing two options here, It's no good just dismissing one because it's unlikely. What matters is whether it's more likely than the other.

Giving up the whole Ukraine (because that is the option you really propose) — Jabberwock

Don't tell me what I really propose. If you want to discuss ideas with some imaginary opponent go start a fucking blog. This is a discussion forum, for people to discuss ideas with other real people, not to make up what they think.

most likely mean condemning them to the yoke of tyranny for many decades to come. — Jabberwock

Funny that, because we hear over and over in this very thread how it is wrong to bring up Ukraine's right-wing nationalism of the early 2000s because "things are so different now". You've cited Ukraine's path to freedom yourself (despite it being on a par with Russia only a few years ago). Now, all of a sudden it's somehow impossible for any Russian-controlled regions to follow the same path?

But let's say we do. Again, you're only comparing one side. What do the next decades hold for Ukrainians after another year of destructive war? A rosy utopia of freedom and prosperity? Their infrastructure is destroyed, they are entirely beholden to Western corporations and they have lost millions of citizens. What alternative future are you comparing this decades of tyranny to?

Please describe what exactly did you do to help in the world hunger crisis. It must have been a lot, if you demand that Ukrainians give up their freedom to alleviate it, right? — Jabberwock

What kind of a counter argument is that? Please describe what exactly did you do to help in the world campaign for freedom. It must have been a lot, if you demand that Yemenis give up their lives to support it, right?

Oh, so Ukrainians have no right to decide the future of their children, but you have the right to decide the future of Ukrainians. Right. — Jabberwock

Who said the Ukrainians had no right? We are all part of humanity and we're all responsible for each other in our part. When did that get wrong. I must have missed the memo were we all turned into nationalists.

Well, you feel you have the right to decide the fate of Ukrainians, because of the war, and disagreed that it is their decision to make, even though they are most affected by it. Why? — Jabberwock

I've just given my reasons. The war affects more than just Ukrainians and my governments are taking actions one way or the other and it's my duty as a citizen to hold them to account. That means that I must judge their actions based on the outcomes I think are right. Hiding behind someone else's decision won't cut it.

What is the matter in question? — Jabberwock

Whether "it is right to let them choose the path they want to take"? I don't see any argument from you why holding a Ukrainian passport makes one magically the only entity whose interests need to be considered by our governments when deciding how to respond to this crisis.

You seem to have a naive conviction that giving in to demands of a bully at the slightest show of his force will stop him exactly where he is. — Jabberwock

Where exactly have I advocated giving in?

what in Ukraine you would NOT give under the threat of war? — Jabberwock

That depends entirely on the likely consequences. If the aim isn't to protect human well-being, then what the hell is it? If concessions cause less damage to human well-being than war, then we ought choose concessions. If they cause more, we ought choose war. What other consideration would you have us include?

Oh, I have a quite good idea what negotiations are. Negotiations were involved in the Budapest Memorandum, quite a lot of them. Oops. And what about Minsk 1? Oh, how they negotiated, the guarantees they gave! Ouch. Wait, there was also Minsk 2! They negotiated there as well, so all the resolutions must have been fina and dutifully observed by both sides, right? Right? — Jabberwock

So because some negotiations fail the whole concept is thrown out?

The issue is, that you propose to give Russia anything to avoid war. — Jabberwock

Where have I proposed that?

We have every reason to think that Russia would thwart every effort to establish a full democracy in a country of its influence. — Jabberwock

So? Can we not fight that? Why are we suddenly disarmed of any means of resistance other than full-scale land war? Just look at the history of the overthrow of oppressive regimes and tell me how many were achieved through popular protest movements vs how many had to rely on military invasions. In fact, I'll save you the trouble - it's virtually all of them vs virtually none of them.

The idea that the only way to promote the freedom of the people of Donbas is to fight a bloody and destructive war to keep them under Ukrainian rule is ridiculous and ahistorical. Extraction from the yoke of tyranny has almost universally been won by the people, not governments invading each other.

For better or worse, Russia are now embedded in Donbas and Crimea. There are two choices; leave them there and fight to free the whole of Russia (including those regions) from tyranny, or expel them and continue Ukraine's progress toward the removal of tyranny in it's regions.

Option one will undeniably cause less bloodshed and has a better overall outcome for humanity. On the downside, it might not work.

Option two will definitely cause masses more bloodshed, may trigger a wider conflict, even a possible nuclear one, and has two possible routes to failure (Ukraine simply cannot shift Russia, or the toll of the war stymies Ukraine's progress away from tyranny).

So what is it about option two that's so attractive for you?

Are you seriously suggesting that Yemenis are as much affected by the war as Ukrainians? — Jabberwock

Yes. Your incredulity is not an argument. 50 million face starvation if grain and fertiliser exports continue to be disrupted, the total death toll in Ukraine stands at about 100,000. And I also talked about the children of the Ukrainians currently supporting war, did anyone ask them what future they want?

Are you seriously suggesting YOU are as much affected by the war as Ukrainians? — Jabberwock

Did I mention me?

Because it is right to let them choose the path they want to take. — Jabberwock

That's the matter in question. Begging the question seems to be an occupational hazard for you.

when we do not support them, then we are exactly 'offering Russia elements' that have very much to do with Ukraine, not with us. — Jabberwock

Russia are asking for elements which involve us, that's the point (matters such as membership of NATO, trade deals, political involvement, military collaboration...)

We let Russia decide Ukraine's fate, just because it is stronger. — Jabberwock

Do you seriously have that bad an understanding of what a negotiation is? Thank God you're not a diplomat.