So here again it's unclear how a set of traits can be identified by an outside observer as expressing a property which is given by the person 'manhood'. There are traits/expressions/ways-of-being which result in hatred of an identified group (identified by the one doing the hating), but then you link those traits/expressions/ways-of-being to a property (manhood) which is self-identified. How is it that you (the third party) are doing the linking then? — Isaac

In a way this is a re-expression of the question. How am I doing this linking? How do any of us do it? That's a good question.

The first thought in defense of my idea that I have is to say that the misogynist will identify as a man, at least, if not a misogynist -- but my honest reply is that I don't apply the golden standard of asking people what their gender identity is most of the time. In some spaces that's considered polite, but in most spaces which aren't hyper-aware of gender issues it's considered rude: "Can't you tell?!"

What I'd have to supply is some justification for being able to determine someone else's way-of-being aside from just asking them about their identity, which is all I've provided so far as a method for doing so.

But I'll just admit I don't have that theory in hand here. It's something I have to think about.

To give a concrete example. Let's say a boss at a bank is traditionally toxicly masculine (bullying, competitive, and misogynistic). He favours the promotion of a man over an equally qualified female colleague because he somehow feels a man would be 'better for the job'. Later he finds out that the female colleague he overlooked identifies as a man.

What has happened in that instance? Has he, unbeknownst to him, not been a misogynist because he resented a man? Or has he been a misogynist all along, but the target of his misogyny is not self-identified? — Isaac

Trying to parse the scenario: The boss is at least discriminating on the basis of sex because he identified the female colleague as a woman and then denied herhis* promotion for the reason of herhis perceived identity. And because the boss is a misogynist in the scenario we can conclude that it's due to a toxic masculine relationship to the type "woman".

So I'd go with your latter -- he has been a misogynist all along, but the target of his misogyny is not self-identified. The misogynist probably identifies women by their traits, and treats people with those traits accordingly.

*Luckily these are hypothetical people! But, as you can see, I still make that mistake, too.

So I'd go with your latter -- he has been a misogynist all along, — Moliere

That's a bit oppressive of you, isn't it? If your theory is also

People don't identify as misogynists — Moliere

The philosopher psychologist assumes the position of superiority, which is a power relation whereby even bosses are what we say they are. The man/woman at the centre of the hypothesis is a cypher, and we do not care a jot about their identity for themselves, or whether or not they even want promotion. Of course our power is also hypothetical here - our writs do not run the world. But they are to a great extent a product of the way the world is run.

I think the way out of this jungle is to see that oppression is power without love. The inequality between men and women or black and white or whatever, is one of power, and that is why it is always the boss who is oppressive in relation to his minions, even though they may all have equally uncaring and prejudicial views, and the minions may have their own pecking order.

Thus masculinity becomes toxic to the extent that it identifies itself with power, and femininity with love.

Thanks, that helps clarify things.

What has happened in that instance? Has he, unbeknownst to him, not been a misogynist because he resented a man? Or has he been a misogynist all along, but the target of his misogyny is not self-identified? — Isaac

Lemme see if I've got this right, the underlying contrast you're disambiguating is between two concepts of misogyny which look like:

1 ) An act A by an agent X is misogynist = when A is a prejudicial act directed toward a woman on the basis of their womanhood with a means of identifying womanhood W.

That's something like a correctness condition for an act being judged misogynist, where W is a supplementary correctness condition for identifying womanhood. Be it a "subjective" identity, a performative one or whatever. The two cases you highlight are different values of W. In that regard, whether someone is a misogynist or not turns on a correctness condition for what counts as a woman.

There's another option - rather than a misogynist act being directed toward a woman, a misogynist act I think could be construed thusly:

2 ) An act A by agent X is misogynist = when A is prejudicial and directed toward someone X identifies as a woman on A's basis of identifying them as such.

That's also a correctness condition for misogyny, but it removes the need for disambiguating the concept of womanhood, or whether the recipient of an act of prejudice counts as a woman by some theory of identity. 2 ) instead incorporates counting as a woman as part of A's judgement.

The utility of that conception is that a misogynist act can incorporate a misjudgement of someone's gender identity (as construed under a sensible theory of identity), and all that matters is that they count as a woman to the agent doing the act.

Yes. I think that's the tension that many traditional feminists feel with the newer gender identity prescriptions. If there is a group that is oppressed in some way, it can't be a group that is self-identified because the oppressor does not ask questions about identity before oppressing, the object of their oppression is that group identified by them as deserving oppression and so the subject of any fight against oppression is the group the oppressor identified, not the one any other group identify. — Isaac

I also think the above addresses the concern you raised here. The criteria by which people socially count as women can be quite different from those which correctly count women as women in accordance with a robust theory of identity. In that respect, what matters for being a recipient of misogynist acts isn't "being a woman" (in accordance with a robust theory of identity) it's "counting as one" for practical purposes. Like Game of Thrones Arya stark pretending to be a young boy when she was kidnapped.

In terms of someone being a misogynist, I'd guess that consistently doing misogynist acts counts someone among their number.

That's a bit oppressive of you, isn't it? If your theory is also — unenlightened

Yes I think so. It's a violent identification from the outside, that is, from me onto them. They aren't speaking about themself, I am speaking about them without asking. And I find myself nodding along with you here:

The philosopher psychologist assumes the position of superiority, which is a power relation whereby even bosses are what we say they are. The man/woman at the centre of the hypothesis is a cypher, and we do not care a jot about their identity for themselves, or whether or not they even want promotion. Of course our power is also hypothetical here - our writs do not run the world. But they are to a great extent a product of the way the world is run. — unenlightened

Guilty as charged. I am playing at being Hegel's phenomenologist while simultaneously believing that to be an impossible position.

I think the way out of this jungle is to see that oppression is power without love. The inequality between men and women or black and white or whatever, is one of power, and that is why it is always the boss who is oppressive in relation to his minions, even though they may all have equally uncaring and prejudicial views, and the minions may have their own pecking order.

Thus masculinity becomes toxic to the extent that it identifies itself with power, and femininity with love.

I agree with the conclusion -- that's getting close to the phenomena. But there is a counter-example I can't let go of when I think of your opening here -- the oppression that is a loving power. A person can be cruel and mean, and that's what we've been talking about when it comes to toxic masculinity, and I think identifying oneself as a powerful person (and especially not a loving person) would cause all kinds of internal conflicts that seems to fit the bill.

But sometimes there is the loving oppression which is paternalistic in nature. It comes from a place of love, but the power differential matters if the loving person is ignorant in some way of their amor's needs. To take this far, far back to first wave feminism, some would argue that women don't need to vote because their husbands would vote for them and had their interests at heart (plus, being men of the world, they knew better anyways)

But I don't think that's a toxic masculinity. So it's a bit of a side show to the original question of identifying the conditions under which we know there to be a toxic masculinity.

Thus masculinity becomes toxic to the extent that it identifies itself with power, and femininity with love. — unenlightened

I think this is the main reason women might be expected to present themselves as childish. I'm thinking more about Japanese culture where women are simultaneously ridiculed for behaving childishly, but the women themselves say they have to behave that way for acceptance and career advancement.

burikko

... the loving oppression which is paternalistic in nature. It comes from a place of love, but the power differential matters if the loving person is ignorant in some way of their amor's needs. — Moliere

Why do you call it paternalistic rather than maternalistic? Don't confuse paternal with patriarchal here.

The infant is helpless, so the power relation is real and necessary and its neglect would be the abuse. But even here, the nature of love is communicative - one does not force feed the infant, though one does force clean them because one literally does know better.

Interesting that in your example 'ignorance' is expressed as 'knowing better'. Something to look out for, along with infantilising language. But voting is for adults, and one does not marry one's father, so that particular 'knowing better' is patriarchal rather than paternal, I think. I treat my children as children, until they become adult, and then love has to grow towards respect and equality. I recall there was a radio 4 disability series called "Does he take sugar?" — a gentle reminder of how easily one can fall into that kind of ignoring, belittling ignorance. Sometimes, of course, a disability is a communication difficulty, but a communication difficulty is necessarily mutual in this sense:- one expresses inadequately and the other understands inadequately; although in the other direction of communication there may be no difficulty.

I think this is the main reason women might be expected to present themselves as childish. I'm thinking more about Japanese culture where women are simultaneously ridiculed for behaving childishly, but the women themselves say they have to behave that way for acceptance and career advancement. — frank

Childishness is performed subservience. Reminds me of a thing I noticed about some US women - voices like the Chipmunks. Cute indeed! My ignorance of Japanese culture is profound, but a powerful woman is liable to be a witch, a harridan, a harpy, or if persistent, a nightmare, in this culture. A threat to the masculine identity. But girls just wanna have fun.

Why do you call it paternalistic rather than maternalistic? Don't confuse paternal with patriarchal here. — unenlightened

Good point. I should intead say "chauvinism" as a better description -- something that can be practiced by paternals and maternals. That's basically what I mean, and I agree that it's important to keep paternal separate from patriarchal. I think the English speaking world associates fathers with the system of paternalism, and so we have these locutions, but I agree with the need to keep paternal distinct from patriarchal.

The infant is helpless, so the power relation is real and necessary and its neglect would be the abuse. But even here, the nature of love is communicative - one does not force feed the infant, though one does force clean them because one literally does know better. — unenlightened

True!

Interesting that in your example 'ignorance' is expressed as 'knowing better'. Something to look out for, along with infantilising language. But voting is for adults, and one does not marry one's father, so that particular 'knowing better' is patriarchal rather than paternal, I think. I treat my children as children, until they become adult, and then love has to grow towards respect and equality. I recall there was a radio 4 disability series called "Does he take sugar?" — a gentle reminder of how easily one can fall into that kind of ignoring, belittling ignorance. Sometimes, of course, a disability is a communication difficulty, but a communication difficulty is necessarily mutual in this sense:- one expresses inadequately and the other understands inadequately; although in the other direction of communication there may be no difficulty.

Makes sense.

heh, but again, chauvinism in popular discourse is associated with men -- I suppose I just have to stipulate I'm talking about the system here, something that men and women can do -- the way that a country can be chauvinistic towards another country. That's the sort of chauvinism I mean.

That's perfectly clear in politics. Women can be just as committed to their bliblical understanding of gender roles as the men they marry and whose children they raise.

There are milder versions of it too. My mother worked as a secretary of one sort or another for most of her life, and worked for a number of men she deeply respected, but toward the end of her career she had female bosses sometimes and never got along with, or thought well of, any of them.

chauvinism in popular discourse is associated with men — Moliere

And boars. And bores.

I just have to stipulate I'm talking about the system here, something that men and women can do -- the way that a country can be chauvinistic towards another country. That's the sort of chauvinism I mean. — Moliere

Well yes. we're back to power here, are we not? Puissance — what (any)one can do: which is a function of culture (the system) rather than a literal trial of strength (the pecking order is not literally physical in human society). Patriarchy empowers men and endorses power as a masculine virtue, thereby declaring itself virtuous. Therefore...

The criteria by which people socially count as women can be quite different from those which correctly count women as women in accordance with a robust theory of identity. In that respect, what matters for being a recipient of misogynist acts isn't "being a woman" (in accordance with a robust theory of identity) it's "counting as one" for practical purposes. — fdrake

Right. So the problem arises when we want to take affirmative action, or protective action against the misogyny (or the effects of past misogyny - patriarchy). The victims are a group of people identified by the oppressor. If we create a space for women as victims of abuse, it's women defined by the abuser, not defined by themselves. If we want to take affirmative action to correct systemic issues caused by past misogyny, then the group who have been systemically mistreated are that group defined by the misogynists, not those who currently identify that way.

All of which leads pretty much to the same conclusion that the Equalities and Human Rights Commission recently reached. There needs to exist at least one definition of 'woman' (in the EHRC's case for the purposes of the Equalities Act), which is based on traditional criteria. Women (the oppressed grouping) are not having their protected characteristic adequately defended if they cannot be defined (in at least these areas) by visible biological sex traits - the traditional means by which the patriarchal system would have identified them as targets for unequal treatment.

All of which leads pretty much to the same conclusion that the Equalities and Human Rights Commission recently reached. — Isaac

Source? Sounds a good read.

Source? — fdrake

Here https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/letter-to-mfwe-definition-of-sex-in-ea-210-3-april-2023_0.pdf

In particular...

The Gender Recognition Act 2004 provides that the gender of a person with a Gender Recognition Certificate (GRC) becomes the acquired gender ‘for all purposes’ and recognised as their legal sex, broadly equivalent to the way sex recorded at birth is recognised in law for other people. This concept of ‘legal sex’ has been confirmed by the courts in their interpretation of the meaning of the protected characteristic of sex in the EqA. The EHRC has consistently understood this to be the position in the law as it currently stands and we have based our guidance and interventions until now on that understanding. However, this raises questions in legal interpretation and in practice. Notwithstanding the existence of statutory exceptions permitting different treatment of trans people where justified, and our guidance to explain the law, it has not been straightforward for service providers and employers to apply the law, including in areas such as sport and health services.

we have come to the view that if ‘sex’ is defined as biological sex for the purposes of EqA, this would bring greater legal clarity

It is also telling that the chair of the Equalities and Human Rights Commission felt the need to conclude...

There is a clear need to move the public debate on these issues to a more informed and constructive basis. This would be welcomed by the many who do not take the polarised positions currently driving public debate.

...certainly a position I recognise.

Once the scenario is changed to one of law, rather than a conflict I can see, I feel my intuitions turn about. Consider the same scenario where a trans woman is skipped over promotion because our misogynist believes the woman is a confused man. Then the harm is directly because of the misogynist's mistaken categories, but we can still see this as a reflection of patriarchy.

With the scenario of law, and in taking into consideration the wider system of patriarchy, I'd say that trans individuals are targeted by patriarchy as much as women.

Well yes. we're back to power here, are we not? — unenlightened

Yes! Power differentials -- or as the anarchists put it, hierarchy -- is a common root to oppression. Or at least a pretty good abstraction of the various kinds of oppression.

The part I'm uncertain about is onboarding love to the general theory of oppression -- that it is power without love. In the case of a toxic masculinity I think you make sense here:

Thus masculinity becomes toxic to the extent that it identifies itself with power, and femininity with love. — unenlightened

But the main reason I'm uncertain about love is that while it is at least on the positive side of the spectrum, it is also a deeply violent emotion if what we love is threatened. Power combined with love can lead us to the most terrible, and justified, violence. That's the thought in the back of my mind at least.

, it is also a deeply violent emotion if what we love is threatened. — Moliere

Ah, I see. There is some ambiguity in the word 'love'. I'm not referring to the emotion in that sense. Would you be happier if I used 'care', or 'affection'?

"Affection" works, especially with the clarification that we're not meaning it like that.

Yeah I meant love that takes pains, not that gives pains. Old-fashioned Christian life-laying-down love. "He ain't heavy, he's my brother."

Got it.

We can continue using "love" with this clarification. I'm a little uncertain that the two kinds are unrelated, but I believe as we are more aware of the violence that can come from love we're also more able to choose the peaceful love rather than the violent love: There's a distinction to be made even if they are related emotions.

So, back to the theory -- oppression is power without the love that takes on pains, the love of laying down one's life for another, or brotherly love in the sense of taking on the pains of your brother despite the pain.

Toxic masculinity is an identity of the masculine which identifies itself with power, and the feminine with love, and denies itself the feminine. If you feel love, the feminine, then that is a weakness which the powerful wouldn't need to succumb to, and insofar that you feel love you should act to purge it to become a real man.

I like this because "should" finally entered the theory -- I really believe this is a topic in ethics more than ontology/epistemology! But it's hard to get there.

With the scenario of law, and in taking into consideration the wider system of patriarchy, I'd say that trans individuals are targeted by patriarchy as much as women. — Moliere

Do you mean trans women? With trans individual you're in danger of falling into the very caricature @Tzeentch was painting where 'patriarchy' is simply a rather misandrist catchall term for every bit of oppression going on, and misogyny likewise for just 'being a dick'.

The point of Baroness Falkner's argument, the point of the Equalities Act itself, is to protect a group of people who've been abused, both historically (and so in need of reparation) and currently. That group is defined by the abuser, not the abused, and it is based on biological characteristics (mostly to do with reproduction). That group need protection from that abuse, which means they need to be identified as a group.

Oddly, the mainstream left seem quite happy to accept the exact same argument about race. We ought be colourblind, but because the abuser identifies a group on the basis of skin colour, then in order to protect that group from that abuse we need to identify them - we cannot be colourblind.

It's exactly the same argument with 'women' but the politics are different, so a different result is promoted.

As to the difference between law and real conflict... If the law doesn't codify behaviour, doesn't act to resolve conflict, then what exactly is it for? The law might be unjust, but that's not what you seem to be arguing - you seem to be saying "the law's fine, but it's something separate to but conflict resolution which is another entirely". What purpose do you see the Equalities Act as having? Do you think it unnecessary?

Consider the same scenario where a trans woman is skipped over promotion because our misogynist believes the woman is a confused man. — Moliere

Misogynists can do other bad things motivated by other prejudices. Those who've undergone gender reassignment are also protected by the Equalities Act, people are also abusive to that group and as such that group , defined, again, by the abuser, need protection under the act.

There is a clear need to move the public debate on these issues to a more informed and constructive basis. This would be welcomed by the many who do not take the polarised positions currently driving public debate. — Isaac

...certainly a position I recognise. — Isaac

Same. Charity can often be absent. I like to hope TPF is a bit less reactive in this manner. Whether that makes it more of a cess pool than some other places is, of course, to taste.

There needs to exist at least one definition of 'woman' (in the EHRC's case for the purposes of the Equalities Act), which is based on traditional criteria. Women (the oppressed grouping) are not having their protected characteristic adequately defended if they cannot be defined (in at least these areas) by visible biological sex traits - the traditional means by which the patriarchal system would have identified them as targets for unequal treatment. — Isaac

While I can see the utility of it for the law, there was also some utility in leaving some points as it was. The article concludes that maintaining the biological sex definition of woman as a marker for the protector group clarifies some issues but makes others ambiguous or unintuitive. Explicitly, a trans woman with a gender recognition certificate would be able to appeal to protective laws for women under a social or subjective theory of gender identity but not under the sex one. Even if they were dismissed or undermined as a woman would be in the workplace.

If I understood the article correctly, a major source of the ambiguities in the EHRC's protected categories legislation is that they are currently revising the document. The document did not distinguish between sex and gender, so it will be unclear conceptually and practically which conception to use in which place. Perhaps it is considered elsewhere, but it I did not consider something more disjunctive or case based.

Something like "you can appeal to (protected category of womanhood) in (this circumstance) if you (have woman as a biological sex or have a gender recognition certificate that you are a woman". Notably this isn't considering legislation considering trans as a distinct protected human rights category. Which, practically, might dodge these issues.

Regardless, I'm sure you see the distinction between recognising an act of misogyny in the workplace and operationalising/defining terms in the law. It is difficult to conclusively establish that any individual act is born out of personal prejudice. And I don't believe we've established a reason that legal definitions of womanhood as a protected characteristic should behave as the criteria for recognising misogyny in interpersonal acts. The ability of a trans woman to experience interpersonal misogyny as well as transphobia is evidence of this. Surely you wouldn't contest that someone who counts as a woman for social purposes experiences misogyny too?

Also, this appears quite distinct from studying "toxic" masculinity as a category of social style/personal identities, since identity of that sort is largely autonomous from the legal codes surrounding it. Hence the article being written, it's revising a 2010 draft, and notes society has changed considerably in its gender dynamics and conceptualisations since then.

Whatever space of concepts that latter "gender dynamics" and "conceptualisations" lays in is the one relevant to the concerns of this thread, I believe, not the law.

While I can see the utility of it for the law, there was also some utility in leaving some points as it was. — fdrake

Yeah, a difficult decision, for sure, but as is pointed out, a trans woman who is discriminated against because of her womanhood will still be as to claim against the Equalities Act under the category of have had gender reassignment, so it doesn't leave her with no recourse. The alternative, however, would leave women without certain protections, so I think the advice wise still.

I'm sure you see the distinction between recognising an act of misogyny in the workplace and operationalising/defining terms in the law. — fdrake

I do, yes. I think I'd make a distinction between redress, suffering and abuse. At the event-level an act of abuse against women is going to affect a trans woman no less than a biological woman. As such the abuse does not distinguish and so there's no cause for us to either. But at the systemic level, clearly a biological woman (grown up as a woman) has been exposed to discrimination that a trans woman (grown up a man) has not. Likewise structurally, women's roles and expected behaviours shackle biological women (who might prefer to behave otherwise) but typically do not shackle trans women (part of whose trials are that they they wish to behave exactly that way).

So I don't think its so much a matter of law vs everyday. I this it's more about different frames within which different means of categorising become more or less appropriate.

With regards to the clash with traditional feminism, this fully exhausts the area of conflict. I don't think any of those branded Terfs argued that trans women shouldn't be treated as women in everyday circumstances (and that would include an act of misogynist discrimination). It is the insistence, from many in the trans movement, that the definition of woman include trans women in all those other frames too. For example the recent Scottish bill to have birth certificates changed, which Baroness Falkner argues would undermine attempts to monitor systemic discrimination against women (much of which takes place during childhood, education etc).

this appears quite distinct from studying "toxic" masculinity as a category of social style/personal identities, since identity of that sort is largely autonomous from the legal codes surrounding it. — fdrake

The connection was with @Moliere's earlier ...

functionally it wouldn't matter what the psychological type is if it results in misogyny either way. — Moliere

... where it seemed to me that defining toxic masculinity by result muddied the water between 'masculine' the sex characteristic, and masculine the behavioural set.

I was really just exploring the idea of a gender-related behavioural set acting against a sex-related set. The gender 'man' (here the subset of behaviour considered 'toxic'), carries within it an identification of an 'other', the object of its discrimination, which is sex-related.

In other words, the object of one group's discrimination is 'otherness' but their othering is based on sex. Does that make the groups self-defined as sex-based. Can we have 'masculinity' divorced from the male sex if we define 'masculinity' as containing elements of self-definition which are sex-based.

I think we run into trouble maintaining a narrative of gender as expressive act, whilst also including in the toxic elements of that gender a self-identification as a sex.

There exists a group who are misogynist. That group causes both systemic problems for biological women, and everyday problems for both biological and trans women. That group self identifies universally by sex-characteristics, not gender ones, so I don't see any justification for looking at their behaviour through the lens of gender. And, seeing as their victims fall into two district categories, I think its a mistake to view their victims through the lens of gender too.

Misogyny is largely about sex. The 'othering' is sex-based, the effects are heavily sex-based (reproductive rights, treatment of female children,..). The lens through which it's examined needs to match that.

But at the systemic level, clearly a biological woman (grown up as a woman) has been exposed to discrimination that a trans woman (grown up a man) has not. — Isaac

I think that's true, but I'm not sure it's relevant from the perspective of what counts as a woman. I'd bet that oppression experiences don't uniquely characterise womanhood, they just apply to womanhood. Whether we can imagine a womanhood resembling the current one without characteristic oppression experiences I suppose is an issue. Your mileage may vary on whether the kind of subjectivity (womanhood) produced in tandem with oppression experiences of that sort (systemic discrimination against women) has an autonomous existence from those oppression experiences (womanhood simpliciter, possibly without oppression experiences).

Regardless, the expression you gave is tensed, right. There'd need to be an argument that past oppression experiences which are typical for women to experience are necessary for being a woman. Effectively this would exclude anyone trans. If it's treated as a theory of social identity as well as a legal classification. I think this also interfaces with the radfem/terf/feminist points you raised.

Isn't this against the point you made earlier? About the definitions of an oppressed minority should not depend solely upon the oppressor? Did I misread?

Though I imagine we're having the frames discussion you highlighted at the end of your post.

With regards to the clash with traditional feminism, this fully exhausts the area of conflict. I don't think any of those branded Terfs argued that trans women shouldn't be treated as women in everyday circumstances (and that would include an act of misogynist discrimination). It is the insistence, from many in the trans movement, that the definition of woman include trans women in all those other frames too. For example the recent Scottish bill to have birth certificates changed, which Baroness Falkner argues would undermine attempts to monitor systemic discrimination against women (much of which takes place during childhood, education etc). — Isaac

Perhaps a decent angle to come at this from, giving charity to the "cancel culture brigade" is that the frame separations are also politically charged, perhaps precisely because it's difficult to tell when the frames have switched. I doubt we'd be having this discussion if which operationalisations of gender are appropriate in which context are a settled matter. In that regard, being particularly militant about it makes a lot of sense. Especially when whether you count as the person you are is up for grabs. Like your rights.

That said there'd be nothing stopping the a code from having trans misogyny guidelines which enable some of the same legal protections. And try to clear up the entry to spaces issue. It's a pretty fine line between an organisation allowing someone into a space because legally biological sex lets them preclude it vs not allowing someone into a space under that same law because they're not seen as who they are. You see what I mean? I'd be fucking terrified of whatever precedents are set here. No wonder people get mad.

Misogyny is largely about sex. The 'othering' is sex-based, the effects are heavily sex-based (reproductive rights, treatment of female children,..). The lens through which it's examined needs to match that. — Isaac

On the level of systemic oppression, a trans person is going to have different hurdles than a cis one. This be true. A woman is going to have different hurdles than a man. A trans woman is going to have different hurdles than cis woman, a cis man or a trans man. Those things could have different categories ascribed to them yeah.

If you want to call cis women's oppression misogyny, trans women's oppression trans misogyny as a matter of nomenclature, I think that's fine. Though I doubt it makes sense treat its vectors as independent. Since we already stipulated that there are plenty of times trans women will be the recipient of acts which would be called misogynist acts if they were directed toward a cis woman. That articulation necessitates an underlying construct - gender.

Which is part of why that remains a useful category. In what frame? An explanatory one for acts of prejudice, independent of its an identity theory for it.

There exists a group who are misogynist. — Isaac

Though perhaps I misinterpreted you, it seems you've talked about a group of misogynists (I guess "the set of all misogynists", what a colourful lot!), do you see this group as the origin of systemic oppression of women?

I think that's true, but I'm not sure it's relevant from the perspective of what counts as a woman. — fdrake

Well, only that something of what counts as being a woman has to account for this, otherwise it is nowhere considered. We have to be able to ask "are women still suffering from systemic discrimination in childhood?", and mean by that 'biological women'. In order to do that we need, for example, birth certificates to register the biological sex (otherwise we can't even begin to gather data) and that is something the trans community have actively campaigned against. I think that's unhelpful.

There'd need to be an argument that past oppression experiences which are typical for women to experience are necessary for being a woman. Effectively this would exclude anyone trans. If it's treated as a theory of social identity as well as a legal classification. — fdrake

Yeah. Couch this in terms of race and see how it sounds. Does one need to have had the past oppression experiences of being black to suffer the loss of privilege associated with that experience? Yes. Without a shadow of a doubt. If I had some random medical condition which darkened my skin, it would not be the same as having been raised black, I don't inherit that identity, just by meeting the criteria currently - there's a history which informs our current identities. For women (biological) that history is their childhood. For trans women it cannot be. That creates two separate identities (insofar as the idea of identities makes any sense at all, which I'm not sold on)

Isn't this against the point you made earlier? About the definitions of an oppressed minority should not depend solely upon the oppressor? Did I misread? — fdrake

I didn't really come down on one side or the other in terms of oughts; the point I was trying to make was merely that this is the state of affairs. Oppressors do dictate the oppressed because it is the group they decide to act against. If a mass hatred of people with 'funny voices' were to develop, then what constituted a 'funny' voice as opposed to a normal one would be dictated by the oppressors, the victim group would be whomever they (the oppressors) decided had a 'funny' voice. It would not be possible for a person to think "hey, I think my voice is kind of funny, so I must be oppressed too". If the oppressors don't agree then they're not going to oppress you, and you, by definition, will then not be oppressed, not in the 'funny voice' gang, no matter how much you want to be.

I'm not actually sure about whether that state of affairs has a moral valence, I'd have to give that more thought.

Though I imagine we're having the frames discussion you highlighted at the end of your post. — fdrake

We are, yes.

Perhaps a decent angle to come at this from, giving charity to the "cancel culture brigade" is that the frame separations are also politically charged, perhaps precisely because it's difficult to tell when the frames have switched. — fdrake

Yeah, I think that's spot on. The way I see it working is that the very existence of frames can be a trial for trans people as it acts in opposition to the identity they're trying to have realised by their community. It's not an easy situation at all, but it's made harder by misunderstandings about other's motives, especially when (in both cases) those motives are genuinely not always good.

there'd be nothing stopping the a code from having trans misogyny guidelines which enable some of the same legal protections. — fdrake

Yeah, In the Equalities Act as we have it right now, gender reassignment is a protected characteristic. I'd like to see more gender identity types included than that. I think gender reassignment is too high a bar to qualify. Merely being trans should be enough, like being gay is.

It's a pretty fine line between an organisation allowing someone into a space because legally biological sex lets them preclude it vs not allowing someone into a space under that same law because they're not seen as who they are. You see what I mean? — fdrake

Yeah, absolutely, but I see some of this as the problem of the way trans identities are constructed. I know that this is perhaps a less popular notion these days, but I'm pretty much a thoroughgoing social constructionist. I don't hold to the notion of anyone's identity being self-discovered, all we've got going on inside is 'lights 'n buzzers', just a lot of axon firing and endocrine fluctuations. Making 'woman' out of that is a cooperative cultural exercise. And I think some of that exercise is being carried out in unhelpful ways right now, one of which is the idea that 'woman' is an all or nothing identity. 'Woman' always was a loose term which meant slightly different things in different circumstances, it never cropped up as an issue because there were so few non-overlapping elements, but the criteria for membership was never stable.

It's funny given the main anti-trans arguments are about 'woman' having a fixed meaning, I'd argue the opposite. It has (and always has had) a fluid meaning depending on circumstances. It's the (strong version of) the pro-trans campaign (and so also their opposition) who want to cement the term ('how I feel' vs 'what bits you've got'). I don't think either are useful.

I doubt it makes sense treat its vectors as independent. Since we already stipulated that there are plenty of times trans women will be the recipient of acts which would be called misogynist acts if they were directed toward a cis woman. That articulation necessitates an underlying construct - gender. — fdrake

It comes back to systemic effects, which trans women don't feel and cis women do. The vectors would be the same perhaps (though I'm still not sure - I suppose we'd have to ask some misogynists - and this, I think is where @Moliere's approach has some merit, looking at the outcomes, not the intent), but the victim group and their experiences are different, that necessitates a distinction which is at risk of being erased.

Yeah. Couch this in terms of race and see how it sounds. Does one need to have had the past oppression experiences of being black to suffer the loss of privilege associated with that experience? Yes. Without a shadow of a doubt. If I had some random medical condition which darkened my skin, it would not be the same as having been raised black, I don't inherit that identity, just by meeting the criteria currently - there's a history which informs our current identities. For women (biological) that history is their childhood. For trans women it cannot be. That creates two separate identities (insofar as the idea of identities makes any sense at all, which I'm not sold on) — Isaac

I think you've equivocated between inheriting an identity and being subject to its systemic vectors of oppression when you count as it. If you look like a duck, people will treat you like a duck. I think I can agree with you that the socialisations are different - if you're currently a trans woman, you might've been socialised partly as a man, partly as a trans person, in a queer fashion and so on. As you say, the boundaries are blurry.

'Woman' always was a loose term which meant slightly different things in different circumstances, it never cropped up as an issue because there were so few non-overlapping elements, but the criteria for membership was never stable. — Isaac

There were so few non-overlapping elements in the public conception of things, anyway. Those instabilities were going to implode as soon as anyone shone light on them. I think it's a good thing this is happening.

Yeah, In the Equalities Act as we have it right now, gender reassignment is a protected characteristic. I'd like to see more gender identity types included than that. I think gender reassignment is too high a bar to qualify. Merely being trans should be enough, like being gay is. — Isaac

Aye. I think if this was a choice on the ballot, I would take it. More categories, more protective laws, more tailorable specificity.

I imagine you believe the same of masculinity, it's not an "all or nothing" thing? It's instead a big wibbly wobbly ball of manny-mascy stuff?

Reminds me of a thing I noticed about some US women - voices like the Chipmunks — unenlightened

I haven't seen that. They just talk like humans for the most part. But just today a woman said that the last time she gave birth she told the doctor she wanted her tubes tied and the doctor said he'd have to consult with her husband. That's sexism.