Ideally default positions have arguments for them IMO. But I doubt we need to get into it here. — fdrake
Fair enough. I suppose I'd argue for it in terms of not creating new models where old ones are adequate. we already have a model of societal intolerance creating pressure to conform, we do not already have a model of how brains might create identities out of what are seemingly social categories which are nonetheless clash somehow with the body. If I can explain the phenomena using existing models, I'm not sure I need to go looking for a new one.
I'm wary here of p-hacking on a massive scale. We wouldn't want to start with the notion that trans identity
has to be such as to be resolved by sex-change and
then go searching for data sets that might show that.
like "passing" there's a question about whether this is even an atypical response to particularly salient and fundamental norms about society. You can find similarly strong norms about race, disability and sexuality. There is a third possibility, which I think unenlightened is close to (though please correct me if I'm wrong), in which all identity works like passing, and passing is nevertheless expressive. — fdrake
Yes, the models of identity I typically work with take this as a stating point - I mean, at one time I was working on the social construction of
perception, so I'm pretty heavily invested in the notion of social construction in general (perhaps too heavily to get a sufficiently detached picture, I'll grant). As we've discussed before with perception though, the space within which social construction works is itself
constrained by an external world which imposes limits on what can be believably constructed. Likewise I'm sympathetic to your raising the idea (reading your exchange with
@unenlightened) that identity construction might be similarly constrained by biological factors (both somatic and psychological).
It's just that, as above, there doesn't appear to be a need for such constraints en masse insofar as the phenomena is already explained by well-trodden models of social acceptance. I needn't theorise that some, as yet hidden, genetic constraint limits the selection of identities from the 'supermarket shelf' of society's offerings in such an alarming way that one's own body must be rejected and replaced with another in order to make a satisfactory choice. It's plausible, but seems unnecessary.
If we think of passing as a moral imperative, that "if you are X then you ought to behave as expected of X", it raises the question of where those expectations are coming from. I don't think it's reasonable to explain the imperative to conform to cisgender+heteronormative gender norms as arising from trans activist pressure to pass, transition etc - that expectation arises from a social consensus. — fdrake
Absolutely. If I had a complaint about the mainstream trans movement it would be of being overly conservative, of undermining the hard-won progressive achievements of feminism over the last decades which finally allowed a slightly wider range of societal roles for natal women.
Society as a whole imposes the notion that some of it's smorgasbord of identities are available only to those with breasts, or only to those with penises (as well as other such restrictions). Thus anyone whose internal biological constraints might limit their choice of socially constructed identity to only those society makes available to the female form will be stuffed if they happen to have a male body. The solution is for more people to choose those options anyway. It is not for people to change their body to comply with society's arbitrary criteria as to who can have what identity.
As I said to
@Benkei above, one option here is that people, quite understandably, not able to cope with the conflict this creates, choose the easier route. But then the appropriate response is one of sympathy for the individual and anger at society. That's not the message we're getting from groups like Mermaids who are pushing medical transition as the end goal, not as an unfortunate necessity for many because of the weight of social pressure (which needs to stop), but as an 'affirmation' of who they 'really' are. It's this narrative that I think is dangerous insofar as it reinforces these arbitrary restrictions on choice. It attempts to replace the notion that these restrictions are societal with a medicalisation of them. It makes the problem one of an individual's biology, not of a society's arbitrary sex-based role assignments.
It is majorly affirming to have something which you identify as a core aspect of your being affirmed socially. Not just for "fleeing shame", but by skilfully controlling an aspect of your presentation to better perform your identity. — fdrake
Yes. I can see an argument for this. No different to getting a tattoo. Essentially a 'modelling' of one's body to match an idea one has of it as an aesthetic construction - an art project. I don't see any issue with that. I don't doubt that some small quantity of plastic surgery falls into that camp too. but that wouldn't pathologise the problem. No child is traumatised by their inability to get a tattoo despite feeling strongly that they want to present that way. Individual ideas about presentation may drive some gender expressions (and include bodily re-forming), but it's society which renders the inability to achieve that traumatic, as opposed to merely frustrating.
Again we're in danger of searching out data to match the theory here. It's
possible that people's need to express their body image is so great that the trauma is internally generated (or partially so), but it's not
necessary. There's already explanations with existing models which don't in any way fail to capture the nature of the phenomena.
if we're talking about whether it's permissible to surgically transition or delay puberty, we've got informed consent for that right? — fdrake
Well, yes, but that's not how we handle other similar issues. We don't use such an approach with other medical interventions on offer, for example. We have strong systems in place to control recommendations based on efficacy, cost, and other factors. We don't simply give patients the Pfizer catalogue and say 'take your pick'. Consent to drugs and/or surgery is not like consent to some act (like sex, or skydiving). One hands over a good deal more trust to the medical professional given that details of the potential consequences are not generally part of public knowledge. As we've seen at Tavistock, that trust can be interfered with by social pressure and campaigns. That's not a good thing.
Furthermore, the whole issue is about societal pressures, which, if real,
precede consent. One consents to that which one feels one
ought to consent to. If society is creating unhealthy pressures then it will act on consent as much as any other choice made. Women were not, centauries ago, dragged kicking and screaming into loveless marriages of servitude. They consented to them. They consented because society imposed, from birth, the idea that they
ought to consent.
I'd side with yes if we're comparing it to unestablished future risks vs established reports that individuals tend to be satisfied and have low levels of regret for surgery , but I don't think I've got a fortress of an argument for that claim. — fdrake
That's understandable. As I said, I think there's arguments for both sides and the evidence is far from clear either way (one of the main criticisms of the Care Quality Commission was the lack of data gathering meaning we could not reach properly informed decisions here). If, as has been established in the Tavistock case, medical professionals are in fear of their livelihoods if they do not conform to certain narratives, then we're in even more of a position of wariness than usual when it comes to results from a handful of small trials with (usually) methodological holes you could drive tank through.
The issue, though, is one of framing. Framed as a concerned political debate about the efficacy of medical treatments, the direction society ought to take to be as inclusive and just as possible... in that context I think the jury is out on how we ought proceed. But that's not the framing. One only need read a few comments here (but more pervasive in wider society) to see that it is framed as progressives vs bigots, as The Science™ vs 'conspiracy theory'. In essence that's a bigger problem because if that toxic approach to disagreement can't be surmounted then the idea of any future direction being hashed out between concerned parties for the best might as well go out of the window.