The democratic institutions had to fight Hitler in WWII. The costs were of course appalling beyond all imagining, but the alternative would have been worse. — Wayfarer

Well you've no counterfactual by which to show that, so it's irrelevant to the argument. There's no world in which we didn't fight Hitler militarily but instead concentrated on popular opposition to his rule in any country he took over. So you've no way of knowing which method would have been quicker or had fewer lives lost. I surely don't need to tell one so well-versed as yourself in philosophical traditions (particularly religious ones) that there are many arguments in favour of pacifism and they didn't all just collapse with the advent of WWII.

I don't for one minute expect a democratic revolution in Russia — Wayfarer

Then I'm confused by your metric of probability. You said...

Putin cannot afford to be seen retreating — Wayfarer

So why is Ukrainian victory likely, but democratic overthrow not?

Why do you have such faith in military power but so little in people?

And what is it about "we support every single opposition movement in your country and make your leadership virtually impossible to carry out on the world stage, until you're finally deposed, then we arrest you for war crimes" that isn't a punishment?

When we punish criminals we typically don't focus mainly on taking their stuff off them.

Punishment is not the issue. we can punish in a number of ways. but Black Rock stand to profit massively if those fertile lands remain in Ukrainian hands, and not if they become Russian. So tell me @Wayfarer, you're the CEO of Black Rock, you stand to make millions from the reconstruction of Donbas if it's Ukrainian, you stand to make nothing if it's Russian. You own controlling shares in most media outlets. Which solution are you going to push for?

That's why the public narrative is all about stuff, not punishment. We don't care if Putin's punished or not. We don't care who dies, or how many suffer. We just want the stuff he wants. We want the benefits of investing in Ukraine, not let Putin have them.

appeasing the dictator will only empower him to continue on his path of militarist aggression. — Wayfarer

Why? If life under Putin is so awful, why would those under him be less likely to oppose his rule just because he got more land? It doesn't make sense. In fact the opposite would seem to be more likely as the new total population of Russia would be shifted slightly more in the direction of openly opposing Putin's rule. One only need look at the strength of opposition in Russian occupied territories. They hate him (and with good reason). How would bringing these areas officially under Russian rule make the newly expanded population less likely to revolt?

And Putin is still accused of war crimes. He still faces international condemnation. There's way more effective sanctions we can place on his leadership than denying him land. And most of those don't costs thousands of lives just to have the hope of doing.

I just find it truly bizarre that in a world of democratic institutions who've successfully fought for years to expand the reach of Human Rights to some of the most difficult areas in the world, all of a sudden the only way we can think of to oppose aggression is with more aggression.

Typical of the hawks; if you've got a problem "bomb it".

Putin cannot be rewarded for his crimes. — Wayfarer

At what cost? Why is punishment more important than the strategy which saves most lives? And what's wrong with the ICC? And what about being deposed isn't punishment?

I'll answer my own question. That strategy prioritises people's well-being over profit.

So, yes? — Wayfarer

What? I've no idea what you're talking about.

You mean, to appease Putin? — Wayfarer

Is there something unclear about "save the thousands of lives" that's causing uncertainty about my motive?

it's likely this situation will be at a stalemate for a long while, with Ukraine harrying the enemy for small gains on the ground and Russia regularly destroying civilian targets with air-power. A glimmer of hope is that the Russian economy contracts so badly that even the poor brainwashed citizens of that country begin to chafe under the boot, although even that is a long way from open rebellion. — Wayfarer

Yes, I agree to a point. The only way out of this situation is regime change (and accompanying material condition change) for the people currently under Putin's rule. I don't think history is on your side thinking economic contraction will do it. Can you think of many examples where extreme poverty has lead to populations electing less authoritarian leaders?

If removing the leader of a country and replacing him with a more egalitarian one is the only "glimmer of hope" (and I agree it is), then why are thousands dying to prevent that leader from occupying land? Why not save the thousands of lives, give him the land, then pursue (with the billions invested currently in war) replacing him with a better leader so that no one cares which side of the border they're on?

I'll answer my own question. That strategy prioritises people's well-being over profit.

Sovereignty for Ukraine is a way to steer away from Russian-style authoritarianism. — Jabberwock

War does not equal sovereignty. War equals massive indebtedness, economic collapse, and often an accompanying risk of increases in extremist politics, particularly nationalism. You read my quotes from Yuliya Yurchenko? If you're concerned about sovereignty and steering away from authoritarianism, the best route is one which promotes economic independence, equality, and respect for everyone in your community. War is just about the worst course of action.

Nobody else but them is able to decide whether it is worth the war and destruction, because they will suffer through it. — Jabberwock

Nonsense. We're all just people. There are rich Ukrainians who'll not suffer a scratch from war and there are poor Yemenis who'll more likely suffer painfully slow deaths from hunger the longer it continues. There's powerful arms manufacturers and their investors who'll benefit from a protracted war, there's the Russian conscripts and their families. There's the children and grandchildren of the current Ukrainians who were never asked if they wanted their future sold out to Black Rock. and there's the rest of the world who might take umbrage at the prospect of being wiped of the face of the earth by the ensuing nuclear war.

I realise it's like rule one in your playbook (when cornered say it's up to the Ukrainians), but it's just isn't.

Notwithstanding that, the question is about whether we continue to supply weapons, whether we write off debt, whether we push for negotiations (or block them), whether we offer Russia elements it wants (elements to do with us, not Ukraine). These are all decisions for Western powers (and so presumably Western electorates) to make. Why are we obliged to simply follow the Ukrainians on any of those decisions?

Isaac successfully Mao'd over the thread. — fdrake

?

Now the war is over one year old and much has happened then. That was my point. — ssu

I get your point. It's a valid one. Holding a different one doesn't make one uniformed, biased, nor a putin-supporter. We all want an end to this war we just have a difference of opinion as to how.

what was the likelyhood of Russia to negotiate a peace when it was still wanting to denazify Ukraine, when it was still engaged in the battle of Kyiv and war enthusiasm was very high? — ssu

I don't know, it's not my area of expertise. Obviously people better informed than me thought it possible so that's good enough for me to consider it a reasonable option. Obviously, if possible, its the better one.

What would have been the peace deal then? — ssu

On the table, I believe, was a neutral Donbas, and, non-NATO Ukraine. Russia believes it has a right to a 'sphere of influence' in the region. Had nuclear disarmament and general demilitarization of international relations been successful, had the power of international law been respected and strengthened, we might might well have been able to tell them where to stick their beleif. But it wasn't, so we can't. Instead we have to deal realistically with the fact that a very powerful actor in the region wants something. If we outright deny it, they will try to take it by force.

We either meet that force (by some substantial margin), or we negotiate a deal where they get a bit of what they want and we get less risk of war.

What we don't want, literally the worst outcome, is a drip feed of weapons designed to keep the two sides just about even so that neither side is incentivised to negotiate since both sides think they might win and everybody loses - except those who make money out of war, which is the point.

I do not believe that the distinction between a full-blown autocracy and a full-blown kleptocracy is that important in case of Russia. The point is that Ukraine wants to be less than Russia. — Jabberwock

So. The argument you were supposed to be countering was about how far Ukraine might be from Russian-style authoritarianism. The answer is, not far. The question wasn't about recent direction of travel.

It is not my consideration to make, it is what Ukrainians have decided. — Jabberwock

Then why were you presenting an argument at all? It's a bit disingenuous to present an argument and then when your reasoning is challenged claim its not your decision anyway.

What difference doesn't make to the argument that the Ukrainians have decided? If the Ukrainians decided to kill everyone of Russian descent would you have nothing to say on the matter because "it is what Ukrainians have decided"?

We can discuss the opinions, the viewpoints themselves quite easily. — ssu

We evidently can't. You preface everything you say with "in reality..." as if you alone had access to the truth, and everyone who disagrees with you is either a supporter of a war criminal, or uniformed, or some.other insult to their intelligence. So no... Apparently we cannot discuss the viewpoints and opinions quite easily. It's proving to be virtually impossible to just have a discussion about the opinions and viewpoints, largely because of your refusal to accept the validity of anyone's but your own.

it is not always nice to hear what you say — unenlightened

Well, it turns out...

I have prejudices and ignorance to spare. — unenlightened

there have been no cases of well established democracies turning into full-blown autocracies in half a year. — Jabberwock

Ukraine is not a well established democracy and Russia is not a full-blown autocracy. There are several independent measures of human development, in every single one Ukraine is not far from Russia.

Sovereignty gives Ukrainians a chance to be not-Russia. Sure, they might have squander that chance, especially if the West abandons them, they can turn into an awful copy of Russia. Still, they would have that chance. On the other hand, at this time, giving up sovereignty to Russia practically deprives them of a chance to be a democratic, well-governed, prosperous country. Sovereignty for Ukrainians is a way to better their lives, not an end in itself. — Jabberwock

Is there some reason you're treating years of bloody war and destruction as if it were a minor additional consideration to weigh in?

No, it is not, it takes a bit more than that. — Jabberwock

OK, what?

at this particular time those under Russian influence have it worse than those without it, even if they are under the terrible boot of the EU. That is why Ukrainians are trying to get out. Possibly, EU might change into Russia in half a year and the other way round and that would turn out to be a mistake, but that does not seem to concern them that much. Maybe because the probability of that happening seems to be rather low. — Jabberwock

I don't see what any of that has to do with a war over sovereignty. As if war was the only way to decide on leaders...

You say negotiation, others say appeasement. — unenlightened

I'm aware of what others say. I've had it 'said' at me at some length. It might be nice to hear what you say, and why you might say it?

even if you had been right in your facts, that is flimsy evidence on which to base an accusation of racism and xenophobia. — unenlightened

The racism and xenophobia were your hypothetical Ukrainian's failings. The failure to condemn them, yours.

there is a social inheritance that is expressed for example in nationalism, and ethnic identification, because people have memories and some have been known to hold grudges. — unenlightened

Possibly, but one cannot have one's cake and eat it here. Ukrainians have a very strong history of right-wing nationalism with it's associated racism and criminality (still the region's main black market arms centre). But we really want to say that Ukraine have changed. We don't need to worry any more about right-wing nationalism, that was way back on 2008 - who remembers that? We don't need to worry about the massive human rights abuses, they were all the way back in the 90s. So where now is the idea that we need be wary of inherited national cultures? Abandoned when it's inconvenient to the narrative. When I said Ukraine could be Russia, it's as true of Ukraine as it is anywhere. There's no safety in sovereignty if we hold to the notion of historical cultural inheritance, the historical culture of Ukraine is nothing to feel good about.

I expressed some sympathy for, and possible explanation of, the reluctance of Ukrainians to negotiate. — unenlightened

Exactly. Negotiation is how we stop this God awful bloodbath. Sympathy for those who oppose it, especially by invoking xenophobic tropes, should be handled with reservation. Yours was your only post for pages. It's not as if, after pages of pushing for humanitarian-focused solution, you just happened to mention in passing that there's a history here.

Russians openly call for genocide and subjugation of former republics (and other countries) on their official channels not because of their genetics, but because their current authorities specifically tout ideologies quite similar to those that caused Holodomor. — Jabberwock

That's right. A single populist election is all it takes. Sovereignty is no defence against that. And driving a country into the ground economically is a sure fire way to push in the direction of making that more likely.

What possible defence against the sort of autocratic nightmare that Russia is in do you think an utterly destroyed, massively indebted, weapon-flooded and resentful Ukraine is going to be against populism just because it's got the right colour flag over the Duma?

For anyone wanting to educate themselves about what sovereignty really means, some words from Yuliya Yurchenko, researcher in political economy, on debt.

On how debt has been used by creditors to keep Ukraine dependent and poor...

There’s a theoretical component and, intimately intertwined with that, a practical one. Theoretically speaking, it is an instrument of external control and expropriation of national wealth, diluting the sovereignty of the state and its decision-making. As is well-documented in literature on international financial institutions, debts are structured so that they’re not easy to repay.

On EU integration...

it’s the latest stage and the extension of what we’ve just talked about. It involved more privatizations, a more market-based approach across all sectors, and the erosion of sovereignty of decision-making, economically but also on more ideological themes. You have quite a limited menu of what you can do as a politician in Ukraine.

But of course flag-waiving jingoists don't care about actual sovereignty.

if I were a Ukrainian and my father had whispered this story at all, I would not be very keen now, to negotiate away an inch of sovereignty. — unenlightened

Which just about explains most of why we're here. Fucking xenophobic, racist claptrap like that. Everyone who carried out the Holodomor is dead. Russians haven't genetically inherited a likelihood to commit war crimes, they're not all warped by racial tendencies toward atrocity, there's no magic line from Rostov to Kursk east of which everyone is a monster.

It's material conditions which breed monsters and support for them, not flags.

So your hypothetical Ukrainian would be foolish to think his 'sovereignty' is going to do jack shit to prevent another Holodomor. Ukraine could be Russia in six months, as could we all. The colour of your flag doesn't stop it, your refusal to dehumanise your fellow man is what does it, refusal to buy the idea that one group are lesser than another and don't belong, denial of the pernicious idea that borders and countries and flags, and 'sovereignty' are more important than the people those ideas are supposed to serve.

Great. I look forward to hearing what you think.

I've enjoyed the reflections you've shared. — Moliere

Thanks. I've enjoyed having a space to reflect them in (or on - whatever the right term is for the object of a reflection).

still looking for the loop back -- but I can see the relation due to the timing of trans issues becoming more prominent in popular discourse aligning with changes in norms of discourse. This not really talking about trans issues but rather the media form which all of these political views get disseminated through. — Moliere

Yes. That's was my plan (he says, rapidly post hoc justifying what was actually a meandering ramble often completely forgetting what the title of the thread even was!) I appreciate your tolerance.

Also, also...

Why?

In your little story of Sachs the partisan, why is he doing this? He's a very intelligent man (I hope we can all at least agree on that, won several awards for his work in economics and international relations). So what's his game plan here? Write a few articles with such glaringly obvious mistakes that ordinary people on an internet forum can spot them (not to mention the three hundred academics), trash his career, lose his credibility, and have no-one believe him anyway because the mistakes were so obvious - all of which someone of his intelligence could easily have foreseen (he's written hundreds of theses and reports in this time). For what? To what end?

Which is most likely?

One of the world's foremost campaigners for democracy, international law and sustainable development suddenly decided one day to campaign for Russia (and to do so so badly that even layman could see the errors), giving up all he's worked on for the last few decades...

Or, you've misunderstood.

I was pointing out that his reporting might be biased, and I was write. — Jabberwock

Whether you were right or not is the matter under discussion, it can't be brought in as evidence for the case.

Bennett says it is what a joint decision of the Western countries and Sachs reports it as 'The US did it'. It significantly changes the meaning of what he said. — Jabberwock

It does. It uses him as a source in an argument. I don't understand what you're finding so difficult about this concept of using what people say as support for arguments. I think you've got the whole concept confused. Quotes are not used in the vein of '...and so-and-so agrees with my thesis', they are used to provide support to particular aspects despite the possibility that the person cited might disagree with the final thesis. Sachs's thesis is that the US blocked the peace talks. Bennett's quote supports that thesis by naming the US as one of the parties he recognised as doing so. The whole thesis is not carried by that support, one needs to include also concepts about US influence over Europe, the particular relationships regarding this issue, the balance of leverage in those negotiations. But a clear witness that the party you accuse did indeed do what you claim is good support for your thesis. It's not bias to include it and it's not bias to omit other things that source might also believe.

there is a fact of the matter as to how significant the interference was, as anyone familiar with the events is aware of. — Jabberwock

Sachs is familiar with the events and doesn't think so. So that disproves your theory right of the box. A lot of your arguments purporting to show Sachs is biased rely on you already believing Sachs is biased. This one is a case in point.

"Sachs is biased, he overplays the significance of the US involvement in Euromaidan"
"How so"
"Well everyone knows the involvement was only minor"
"Sachs disagrees"
"Yes, but Sachs is biased"
> return to the start

people are biased in general and the views they hold tend to sway their perception of other information they acquire. We tend to confirm our views rather than challenge them. It takes much more arguments to change one's view than to confirm it. — Jabberwock

I was asking about why you made your choice. Why the pro-American side?

I do not question his partisanship. However, I would still put more weight on his expertise as opposed to Sachs. — Jabberwock

Why? You've just admitted he's partisan. Why would you put more weight on the words of someone you admit is partisan? You said...

having particularly strong views on the issue might influence his account, — Jabberwock

... does that not apply to Arestovych? Why not advocate the same degree of caution?

The article lists many transgressions of the US which might have influenced Russia's decision of the invasion. It would be inexplicable to omit it, if Sachs thought then that NATO expansion was the central one of such transgressions. — Jabberwock

He didn't omit it, but the article was about International Law. It's right there in the title "Ukraine and the Crisis of International Law". So why would he list transgressions that were not violations of international law in an article about violations of international law?

Also...

Jeffrey Sachs from the very beginning of the conflict blamed it on the US and claimed that the only reason for the war is the NATO expansion. — Jabberwock

it seemingly was also not the cause of the 2014 war, because it was not mentioned by Sachs then. So which war was the expansion of NATO cause of, according to Sachs? — Jabberwock

Damned if he does, damned if he doesn't...

"Have a consistent theory throughout? Obvious sign of bias - proves he's wedded to one ideological position"

"Have an inconsistent position over time? Obvious sign of bias - proves he changes his views to suit his ideological position"

Is anything not a sign of bias for you?

Sure, he is independent and biased. — Jabberwock

So @Tzeentch was not wrong to call him 'independent' then. And your labelling him as 'biased' was not an act of dispassionate information-sharing, but one of partisan rhetoric. Rather than addressing the arguments, you just smear the source.

Yes he did. Tzeentch has already corrected you on that. — Isaac


Lol. No, he did not. — Jabberwock

Here

He said that Bennet said that the US stopped it, which is not what Bennett said. — Jabberwock


It's exactly what he said:

Naftali Bennett: Everything I did was coordinated down to the last detail, with the US, Germany and France.

Interviewer: So they blocked it?

Naftali Bennett: Basically, yes. They blocked it, and I thought they were wrong. — Tzeentch

I've underlined the relevant words. "They blocked it (they including the US)", "Yes"

Of course the foreign interference would have to be significant to name it as the cause of Russian reaction. It was not. — Jabberwock

Now you're claiming 'significance' as fact. There is no fact of the matter as to how 'significant' the interference was. Expert opinion varies. Disagreeing with you is not bias.

The US involvement, while present, was negligible, so it is very unlikely to cause the Russian reaction. — Jabberwock

Again. Sachs disagrees. Disagreement is not bias.

of course I am biased! Guilty as charged. — Jabberwock

Right. so the more interesting question which we should have been discussing from the start is "why?". Given two competing narratives, why are you biased in favour of one? What is it that appeals to you about it?

And please don't start the whole charade again about it being the more accurate, or you having carried out some 4D-chess-level analysis of the data... You've read some articles and decided to trust one side. I'm genuinely interested in why.

Do we agree then that Arestovych is better informed on Ukrainian issues than Sachs? — Jabberwock

Yes, within that frame (not necessarily about Russia's intentions, for example, he has no more a read on Putin than Sachs does). My point was that what he knows and what he says are going to be two different things because it's his job to present the facts in a way that promotes Ukraine (particularity his political movement within it). He may know a lot, but what we have is the subset of all he knows which he chooses to say.

it seemingly was also not the cause of the 2014 war, because it was not mentioned by Sachs then. — Jabberwock

I've just been through that. The article wasn't about the causes at all and where he does allude to them he talks about NATO's actions in Kosovo and Libya, how Russia cited them as reasons for it's actions in Crimea, and the talks about Russia's goal of maintaining the balance of power in the region. All of that is completely consistent with the idea the NATO expansion (increase in it's power in the region) motivated Russian actions. Sachs may have changed his mind, it's possible, but if so, this article doesn't show it.

Feel free to chime in. What is your analysis of Sach's argument in the article being discussed?

I have singled out Sachs because he was presented as supposedly 'independent' witness of the events. — Jabberwock

He is independent. He represents neither Ukraine, nor Russia, nor America. 'Independent' doesn't mean 'not having an opinion one way or the other'.

his reporting was inaccurate, as Bennett did not say what he claimed he did. — Jabberwock

Yes he did. @Tzeentch has already corrected you on that.

had he described the actual scale of the protests, his argument would be extremely weak. — Jabberwock

His argument is that foreign agencies got involved. It would only be weakened if foreign agencies hadn't got involved. His argument is not about proportion.

A reader who is not familiar with the disproportion of the causes might get the impression that the US scheming was a major factor, therefore the cause of the Russian reaction. — Jabberwock

I don't think Sachs can be held accountable for the stupidity of some potential readers. The argument is not about proportion, never even mentions proportion and does not rely on it. If people are stupid enough to nonetheless think proportion has anything to do with it, I don't see why that's Sachs's problem.

I have already conceded that other sources might be equally biased. — Jabberwock

Yes. After you were pressed to. You volunteered Sachs's bias. That is, you are biased in which sources you voluntarily point out the bias of.

You answered 'No' to my question whether Arestovych is better informed on the issues than Sachs. Is there more than one way to read that? — Jabberwock

Yes. By continuing to read the rest of the paragraph. This from the person complaining about taking quotes out of context. Stop pretending I didn't say anything else!

So explain how 'NATO non-involvement would NOT lead to war' is different than 'NATO enlargement is at the center of this war' AND 'the war could have been avoided'. — Jabberwock

I bolded the words, I'm not sure what more I can do. If you can't understand the difference between this war and any war, I think it'll take more than a forum post to help out.

Well, ACTUALLY he says: 'a big war with Russia and joining NATO after victory with Russia', so it makes perfect sense that the alternative he would not prefer would be a war with Russia and Russian takeover. — Jabberwock

Yeah, right. And in what way does that interpretation makes sense? What is the difference between the two scenarios in that sense?

Why not, if you are? — Jabberwock

So you can read minds now?

The bottom line is that he did quote him out of context — Jabberwock

...in your opinion. Sach's obviously thought the context was fine. It was to support the proposition that Ukrainian leaders knew NATO membership would provoke Russia into war and the quote supports that. What else he said is irrelevant to supporting that proposition. We don't, in adding quotes, typically list all the other things people said that might be of interest.

So this war, which, by Sachs' own words, continues from 2014, was not provoked by NATO expansion, because Sachs' article from 2014 about the causes of Russian invasion does not even mention it. Correct? — Jabberwock

No. 'This war', and 'the occupation of Crimea' are two different things. At best one is a stage within the other. Also Sach's 2014 article is not really about causes, but rather lamenting the breakdown of international law. In it he says...

Without diminishing the seriousness of Russia’s recent actions, we should note that they come in the context of repeated violations of international law by the US, the EU, and NATO.

...

The US and its allies have also launched a series of military interventions in recent years in contravention of the United Nations Charter and without the support of the UN Security Council. The USNled NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999 lacked the sanction of international law, and occurred despite the strong objections of Russia, a Serbian ally. Kosovo’s subsequent declaration of independence from Serbia, recognized by the US and most EU members, is a precedent that Russia eagerly cites for its actions in Crimea

...

There have long been skeptics of international law – those who believe that it can never prevail over the national interests of major powers, and that maintaining a balance of power among competitors is all that really can be done to keep the peace. From this perspective, Russia’s actions in the Crimea are simply the actions of a great power asserting its prerogatives.

This is his only allusion to causes at all, and it clearly states that Russia acted because of a perceived need to keep in great powers in balance. It certainly doesn't contradict anything he says in the later article.

That's a very well thought out theory. I have some sympathy with the general idea. At a gut level, I definitely get the feeling that people are defending something they know is nonsense but are somehow frightened of letting go of. I agree about these people's faith in The Truth. I don't think it's all that strong, and shows cracks pretty quickly. You see an awful lot more "I'm not going to engage with this..." than we used to. If that was just exasperation, or dignity, I'd understand, but (I'm thinking of this site now, I've no real experience elsewhere), the same people who say they'll 'refuse to engage' with someone on one topic will be producing machine gun frequencies of retorts on other topics against someone they think is obviously a lunatic. It sure doesn't sound like exasperation - it sounds more like what you describe. They think they've got a chance with the 'lunatic', they're frightened of being shown the cracks in the other thread.

That said, I have a couple of quibbles too.

Firstly, the way I view our understanding of the world is that it is all already interpreted, there's no understanding that isn't framed by a narrative (we won't go into why I believe that, here, as that really would totally derail the thread, and I suspect we're on thin ice in that regard already!). So the issue I have is how you might de-couple what you're calling 'ideology' from what you're calling 'sense of self'.

For me, an ideology is just a narrative, a story with which to make sense of data which is otherwise ambiguous (which is virtually all of it). We have this information which could be interpreted one of several ways, we have to choose which, we can't do so on the basis of the evidence itself (it under-determines), so we do so on the basis of it fitting a narrative we like - an ideology. I also don't believe we can 'suspend judgement' on most matters (but again, not the place to go into why).

If you want to make the case that one could pin one's self-esteem to an ideology, or not (ie not just choosing ideologies, but having the option to choose none), then I'm not sure what method one might use to choose between interpretations of under-determining evidence - stuff that could be taken one way or another and you can't tell which just by looking at it.

An ideology, in my sense, is just a collection of choices about the interpretation of ambiguous data that coheres (a tendency to always interpret ambiguity in one direction, or toward one end). I think we all have such a tendency, it helps us navigate an otherwise very confusing world full of uncertainty.

So to make sense of your theory within my framework (not that we need to do that, but I like your idea, so I'm going to try), We'd have to have 'ideology' as something more than just narrative, something which becomes more hooked into self-esteem than mere narrative does.

I think you allude to this possibly in your post (when you talk about 'superiority'), as does @Srap Tasmaner. In the ideology, you are the hero. In the narrative you're maybe just the protagonist (but the plot is not so clear that you're the hero). It may be something to do with the suffusion of social media into people's lives, but the big issues seem to take on an importance that invites a hero narrative. I think this is what has changed. The enemy used to be big business, government, the Russians, ...pick your poison, but whatever story one held, the enemy were very big and very far away. We were not even foot-soldiers. We were the support staff at best.

Now, with 'disinformation', the enemy is anyone who doesn't agree with The Truth. We can all be foot-soldiers at least, heroic commanders, even. Because we now have direct access to the enemy. They're right here on this forum!

So maybe the self-esteem link (which I think you're right to highlight) is about letting oneself see one's role as being 'fighting the disinformation trolls' as opposed to merely 'waiving the flag', or 'wearing the badge', or making the right donation. That raises the stakes if you seem to be losing that fight.

Any sense that some of these folks have taken such a view of themselves? — Srap Tasmaner

It's really interesting you brought this up, my first post in a while was provoked by this very thought...

What's worse is that the direction of modern discourse is to make the truth even more pedestrian. In just a few years it's gone from the golden light at the end of the long tunnel of scientific enquiry to being easily accessed from the pages of the New York Times, or the lips of the government spokesman. Now we have 'disinformation experts' who's only truth-o-meter is to check what the government website says... — Isaac

(having a go a the whole quoting myself lark - see, I learn)

It's this that I think is the source of your new breed of superheroes. They actually know the actual hand-on-Bible, God's-honest, Truth. Not just a theory, not just fighting it out in the grubby boxing ring of politics... the Truth.

Imagine the power trip that produces. The idea that you don't have to worry about actually supporting your position like we used to have to do, you don't need to understand the facts and do all that hard work anymore because we've moved on from arguing about what's true to 'countering disinformation'. The narrative has changed from one of discovering the truth by dialectics, to merely 'defenders' of that truth which has already been discovered - a much more heroic role. Guardians of Truth (already bought the film rights by the way, gonna be a hit - "In a world where some people still disagree with each other about stuff, one man stands between Truth and other-things-people-might-believe, the last great battle between what-some-people-on-Twitter-think and what-the-Governement-website-says...").

So we should assume that all those academics, including Sachs, are biased? OK, that is all that I have claimed. — Jabberwock

I clearly isn't, and anyone can read the evidence to that effect. You've singled out Sachs as being biased because he doesn't support your preferred narrative and have not even mentioned the bias in any of the sources used in pro-american posts. Even at the end of this very post to which I'm responding you start some sarcastic diatribe about Sachs of which there's no equivalent for other academics. It is undeniable that you're claiming something of Sachs that you are not claiming of more pro-american academics

For his theory to work he would have to explain why he believes Russia would NOT intervene if it was just the unrest. But he has no such explanation — Jabberwock

Of course he does. He's talking about Russian security in international affairs. His whole argument is about how they have something to fear from NATO and the larger players. A little popular unrest in a neighbouring country is clearly not that. Again, you might disagree, but there's no need to disparage him. It smacks of a lack of confidence in your own ideas that you can't just disagree, you have to impute dishonesty into anyone with a different opinion.

All he does is he demonstrates that foreign interference might be one of them, as he has no way to conclude that Russians would not intervene without it, just as a reaction to the unrest. — Jabberwock

Of course not. Do your preferred authorities have more than 'might be'? These are theories of international politics. They're not amenable to that level of proof. Sachs is working on the very reasonable and well established principle that global powers are more concerned about the intervention of others massive global powers than they are about a bit of political unrest next door.

Does he prove that? No. Does anyone prove the opposite? Also no.

Omitting the other factor allows him to argue the causal link, especially before a reader who does not know any better. — Jabberwock

What do mean "a reader who does not know any better"? A reader who doesn't know that other possible causes exist? Is Sachs's article making an appearance in the country's playgroups? Who, above the age of five, is going to be reading that article thinking that no other possible causes could even exist?

And again, you're requiring a standard of these sources that you do not demand of the pro-american ones. You've not raised any issues throughout your involvement in this thread with any of the sources others have used to promote the American position, despite the fact that none of these sources spend any time pointing out all the potential counter-evidence to their positions either.

A political advisor and an intelligence officer who spent most of his professional life on Ukrainian issues is worse informed on the issues of Ukrainian and Russian politics than Sachs, who occasionally dabbles in it? Now you are just being absurd. — Jabberwock

Try reading what I wrote and then have another shot at responding.

Sachs' argument is that NATO non-involvement would NOT lead to war. — Jabberwock

No it isn't.

Regarding the Ukraine War, the Biden administration has repeatedly and falsely claimed that the Ukraine War started with an unprovoked attack by Russia on Ukraine on February 24, 2022. In fact, the war was provoked by the U.S. in ways that leading U.S. diplomats anticipated for decades in the lead-up to the war, meaning that the war could have been avoided and should now be stopped through negotiations.

Read more carefully before launching into ad hominem denunciation.

He lists them in the linked interview? At which point? And why think that Ukrainians would fall for any of that? The very point he is making is that the mistake of Crimea would not be repeated, which is exactly what happened. — Jabberwock

The interviewer asks him "So, on balance, which is better" (referring to the NATO-provoked war or Russian takeover - the "crossroads"), and he answers "of course, a big war with Russia".

On what grounds could that answer possibly make sense if both options were "a big war with Russia"? He treats " a big war with Russia " as only one of the options, the 'preferable' one.

Ignoring it in his argumentation is 'pretending he never said it'. — Jabberwock

Don't be daft. I don't pretend people never said all the things I don't directly quote them as saying. Your post contains selected quotes from mine. Are you pretending I never said all the rest?

in 2014 Jeffrey Sachs did not even mention expansion of NATO as a cause for Russian annexation of Crimea. — Jabberwock

So? What kind of bizarre argument is that. "If it's a reason in 2022 it has to have been one in 2014"? That doesn't make any sense. Sachs explains the rising importance of NATO enlargement.

In the immediate lead-up to Russia’s invasion, NATO enlargement was center stage. Putin’s draft US-Russia Treaty (December 17, 2021) called for a halt to NATO enlargement. Russia’s leaders put NATO enlargement as the cause of war in Russia’s National Security Council meeting on February 21, 2022.

is there a reason to think that the 'wisdom of crowds' doesn't merit serious consideration here? — wonderer1

I've some sympathy with the idea, but here's my few issues with it;

Firstly, it assumes errors are the result of noise and I don't buy that in general. errors are the result, largely, of methodological failings which themselves are the result of foundational commitments, paradigms, which don't work. Usually, the stats simply churn out the answer, we don't exactly 'do the math' ourselves, so if the answer's wrong, it's the experimental design that's mistaken. In short, failings are usually ideological or paradigmatic.

Secondly, I think it assumes calculation is random - ie set 100 people calculating the answer and they'll all get it right bar the noise of error. But this isn't how expertise works. The reason we consult experts is that some people are better than others at some field of calculation (better informed, more insightful, whatever). So it's simply an outcome of this that the majority will be more likely minorly wrong. They sit in the middle of the Gaussian distribution. It's the minority who'll be either spectacularly wrong, or have it uniquely right (either being at the worst end - just about good enough to qualify) or the best end (genius in their field).

Thirdly, it ignores the countering effect of conformity bias. You'll be aware perhaps of Asch (and his detractors), who first demonstrated the effects of conformity on answer confidence. Whether it be social group pressures, or simple economic ones (job prospects), people are less likely to stick their necks out on a result which looks heterodox than they are to underplay radical differences in exchange for the safety in numbers of saying the same thing most others are.

So. To bring this back to topic (though the broader subject is way more interesting). Consider the responses here to pro-american posts. Pretty much universally accepted as the 'intelligent, balanced and steady' position to hold. Why? Because everyone else holds it. It's self-fulfilling in that sense. To hold an alternative is to be radical, naive (and other far less pleasant labels). So if you're an expert and you've had a good long think about all the data you have, and it comes out (as data usually does) somewhat on the fence, which way are you going to be more inclined to jump? Which way keeps you your job, the respect of your colleagues? All ambiguity is going to be resolved in favour of positions which conform and that adds up over time to a pretty much entrenched conformist and very popular position.

Add to that the effect of media and institutional bias, both of which are heavily influenced (if not completely controlled) by economic forces which have no particular interest in the 'right' answer, but do have a strong interest in the answer which best serves their interests. No one here has conducted a poll of all foreign policy experts. We gauge popular support by what we read and what we read is controlled by institutions who have a vested interest in a particular viewpoint seeming most popular.

Your arguments from authority have a certain flaw: Sachs is a respected academic, but only a tiny minority of foreign policy experts agree with him on this issue. — Jabberwock

Excellent. We're getting into the meat of it. I'll try not to disappoint. In what way is it a flaw? Your claim is that Sachs is biased, right? Presumably not randomly biased, but rather biased according to his cultural group ideology etc. So we've established that it is possible for academics to be biased and when they are it's likely to be ideological. So what have the three hundred academics done with their data that makes them more likely to be right, just because there are three hundred of them? Three hundred and one pairs of eyes have seen the raw data. Three hundred and one ideologically biased brains have processed it. And three hundred have come out one way, one the other. What how does their three-hundred-ness connect to the way the world really is such that they are more likely to right by virtue of being three hundred.

Surely they're more likely to be simply in a more popular ideology. Looked at the popular way, the facts seem like this, looked at the less popular way, the facts seem like that. Popularity of ideology doesn't seem to have any hook into reality to make the more popular theory more likely to be right.

If the 99% of cause of the overthrow is the popular rising and 1% is US scheming, then considering the 99% is irrelevant is not just a matter of opinion. — Jabberwock

Of course it is. Sachs's question isn't 'what caused the revolution in Ukraine', it's 'what caused Russia to invade Ukraine'. His answer to that is the threat of foreign interference in Ukraine, his evidence is the foreign interference in the revolution. To demonstrate that point he need only show that there was indeed foreign interference in the revolution. He does not have to show what proportion of the revolution's cause it was because his argument isn't that "Russia were provoked by over 56.98% foreign interference". It is that Russia were provoked by foreign interference. Any value above zero demonstrates that possibility.

presenting a minor factor and describing it as a cause while omitting a major factor which might also be a cause is biased. — Jabberwock

He's not even assessing the relative causes. He's demonstrating that foreign interference was one of them.

you have to admit that Arestovych is much better informed in the matters than Sachs, the economist, right? — Jabberwock

Not really, no. He'll have a very specific window. But that's not the point. He's a political advisor. He's going to be very, very biased. It's literally his job.

providing a quote that completely changes the meaning of what he said is something different. — Jabberwock

It doesn't change anything. Sachs provided it in support of the argument that people knew NATO involvement would lead to war, and it demonstrates that without any change in meaning. That is exactly what Arestovych meant by it. You seem to be having great trouble with the notion of providing support related the points being made in an argument. Have you ever written a thesis?

And what else do you imagine the 'takeover' to be — Jabberwock

Coups, election interference, propaganda, territorial grabs (such as Crimea), stoking insurrection. Arestovych pretty much lists them.

The fact that he provided the link does not change the fact that he selected a part of a quote so that it distorts its meaning to support his view which would not be supported by the whole quote. — Jabberwock

That's not your claim though is it? Your claim was that he was "pretending he never said it". Providing the link in which he said it, is not pretending he never said it.

I try to get information from various, possibly opposing sources, which are likely to present different facts. — Jabberwock

Then why are you suggesting we dismiss Sachs?

But also because pronouns are just easier right? — Srap Tasmaner

You'd have thought... But how long did it take for women to have an option accepted for an address that didn't declare their marital status to world?

We don't seem to be that good at 'easy'.

I probably picked a bad example. The fight over puberty blockers might have been better, or affirmative action on race, or the bill to have birth certificates reflect chosen gender, or ... These were not easy. And we could compare them to even the slightest progress on monetary reform like restrictions on the issue of fiat currency, or limiting stock buybacks, or just putting the tax rate up.

I'm not really disagreeing with you. I'm just highlighting that what's 'easy' is also a function of what people will accept, which itself is driven, in part, by the very process you've outlined.

Sachs' thesis is that if not for 'agressive NATO push by the US', everything would be peaceful. — Jabberwock

No it isn't. If it were it would be ridiculous and Jeffrey Sachs is a well respected academic, named one of the "500 Most Influential People in the Field of Foreign Policy" by the World Affairs Councils of America. Does he sound like the sort of person who is likely to propose a ridiculous theory that a complete layman such as yourself is able to spot the flaws in?

Seriously. Which is more likely; you've misunderstood the argument, or one of the most influential people in the world, in the field of foreign policy has made a ridiculous argument?

that is exactly what bias is - accepting only those facts that support your thesis and rejecting all other facts as irrelevant. — Jabberwock

No. Nobody in the world simply includes 'all the facts there are' in every thesis. That's absurd. Every person selects the facts they consider relevant. You disagree with Sachs about which facts are relevant. And again, in such a disagreement, who is most likely to be right, given Sachs's qualifications?

he reneged on that promise AGAINST the public opinion, not in line with it, contrary to what Sachs says. — Jabberwock

Sachs does not make the argument that reneging on the promise of neutrality was inline with public opinion.

Presenting ONLY those facts that support your thesis and ignoring the outweighing facts that significantly question it is not 'focus'. — Jabberwock

The argument is that Russia reacted to foreign interference. Local protest is not foreign interference, so it has no bearing on that argument. It's just some other thing that's also true. Theses do not routinely list all other things that also happen to be true.

No, Sachs explicit point is that if the US did not seek agressively Ukraine's NATO membership, there would be no war. Arestovich says just the opposite in the very quote he provides. — Jabberwock

No, he doesn't. He describes Russian takeover. In the context of pro-Russian policies that does not necessarily mean war. Notwithstanding that interpretation, nothing in that makes it untrue that the US's actions provoked this war, which is Sachs's argument.

In what form of ethics is, say, murder condoned on the grounds that "someone else was going to murder them later anyway". Sachs is making the argument that the US provoked this war and could have not. What else Russia might have done in 10 years is irrelevant to that argument. It is possible that US actions could also help (or hinder) the chances of this 'takeover'.

The fact that not joining NATO would LEAD TO WAR ANYWAY is irrelevant to Sachs' main thesis: 'The key to peace in Ukraine is through negotiations based on Ukraine’s neutrality and NATO non-enlargement'? — Jabberwock

Yes. Sachs obviously disagrees with the certainty of Arestovych's prediction (which is about takeover, not necessarily war). Something he is perfectly qualified to do being an expert in foreign affairs. A judgment you are not qualified to make being no such expert. As a partisan political adviser, it is entirely appropriate that Sachs filter what he says. If you're looking for biased sources, the chief political adviser from one of the parties in the conflict is about as good as you'll get.

And whilst we're on the subject of bias... Where exactly does Arestovych say "war" either way, as you repeatedly misquote him doing?

He pretends he never said that. — Jabberwock

Selecting part of a quote is not 'pretending he never said' the rest of it. You're being absurd. One does not have to repeat entire conversations verbatim to avoid bias. The only reason you know all this is because Sachs cites the whole fucking interview. In whst crazy world is providing a direct link to the entire interview "pretending he never said that"?

You and he disagree as to what is relevant. As above, when you disagree about foreign policy with one of the most influential figures in the world on the subject, who is most likely to be right?

---

But let's says Sachs is biased. He's selectively ignored facts which don't match his theory.

You're not engaged in primary research. So from where do you get your information? Are you confident that an equal assessment of your chosen sources is going to show them revealing all facts (even those which work against their arguments)?

Let's have an example of an unbiased source you use and see where they treat data that doesn't match their theory.

he ignores the fact that Russia maintains agressive and divisive policy toward all of former USSR republics that try to leave its sphere of influence, such as Moldova (which is not seeking NATO membership, as its neutrality is included in its constitution) in exactly same way, by stirring up unrest among the Russian minorities and sending troops to 'protect' the breakaway enclaves. It does it exactly the same way whether the former republic seeks membership in NATO or not - it is Russia's way of keeping them in its sphere of influence. — Jabberwock

And maintaining a strong 'sphere of influence' is a perfectly rational response to having that sphere threatened. If someone threatens to steal my car, I'm going to chain up my bike too in case I need it. I'm not here even promoting this a s a reason. I'm showing how you can't use the consistency of someone's theory to indicate bias. Just because Sach's theory makes sense in one particular frame, it doesn't indicate bias.

It goes back to the promises of non-expansion of NATO in 1991, completely ignoring the fact that since then Russia and NATO have established several cooperation frameworks - the latest in 2002 (with Putin), which ended in a joint declaration and establishment of the NATO-Russia Council. — Jabberwock

Again, he doesn't ignore it, he just doesn't share your view of the significance of such absences. He is of the view that uncertainties in agreements are not going to be poked at until and unless they become a risk. Putin had no particular reason to keep banging on about NATO expansion until it reached the tipping point with the risk of Ukraine. Once more. Your opinion about what is relevant is not an indicator of bias, it's just the means by which parties disagree. Relevance is not a 'fact' like gravity, or historical events, it's an opinion.

He claims that 'During 2010-2013, Yanukovych pushed neutrality, in line with Ukrainian public opinion'. That is simply not true - Yanukovych was obliged by the popular vote and by his promises to seek integration with the EU (European Union–Ukraine Association Agreement). — Jabberwock

Yanukovych promised a "balanced policy, which will protect our national interests both on our eastern border – I mean with Russia – and of course with the European Union".

That was what sparked the protests, not the US scheming. The 'scheming' was the nervous reaction, as the US was clearly caught off the guard. Sachs writes 'weeks before the violent overthrow', which sounds ominous if you do not add that it was months after the protests have started. — Jabberwock

Sach's point is not about the other factors. He's not an historian, he's not writing a textbook account. He's criticising the US, so what matters is what shouldn't have happened, particularly from the point of view of Russia. It's not relevant if the protests were 99% instigated by popular feeling because Russia would have no complaint against a major foreign power in that case. What matters to Sach's argument is the 1% (or whatever) that is down to a foreign power interfering. Focus is not bias, it's how arguments are presented. If I say "It's raining so I'm going to take my umbrella" you don't accuse me of bias because I haven't mentioned that I have hands, and that's one on the most important aspects of carrying an umbrella. It's just not relevant to my argument.

One of his most telling omissions is the quote from Arestovich: 'that our price for joining NATO is a big war with Russia'. He forgot to add that in the next sentence Arestovich adds: 'And if we don't join NATO, it is gonna be Russian takeover within 10-12 years'. It does change the meaning a bit, does it not, when it is not the choice between war and peace, as Sachs maintains, but war and war? — Jabberwock

No. again Sach's point isn't how hard it was for Ukraine trapped between a rock and a hard place, In a different article for a different purpose, maybe he could have waxed lyrical about what a difficult choice they faced. His point in using that quote was that people were aware joining NATO would lead to war. The fact that not doing so might lead to something else undesirable is irrelevant, Sach's isn't criticising the decision, he's criticising the lie that no-one thought NATO involvement would aggravate Russia.

Russia has invaded Crimea unprovoked, breaching Ukraine's sovereignty and the Budapest Memorandum (which Sachs, conveniently, of course does not mention). It had also nothing to do with NATO. — Jabberwock

Now you're getting ridiculous. 'Unprovoked' and 'nothing to do with' are the very questions at hand. As I've mentioned before bias doesn't mean 'disagrees with me'.

just pointing out that I have good reasons for MY OPINION that he is clearly biased. — Jabberwock

You don't. You have good reasons to disagree with him (including about which facts are most relevant). That's not the same thing. Not everyone you disagree with is biased.

QAnon looks a lot like the satanic panic, looked at one way. Hounding Kathleen Stock into retiring looks a lot like McCarthyism in almost every way -- or the Cultural Revolution, jesus. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes. It chimes with...

That's part of why revolutions are fascinating to historians -- they are the moments when the everyday is suspended — Moliere

From the Reign of Terror, the Cultural Revolution, the Great Purge. there's been a dark side to revolution which fixates of stifling not opposition, but collaborators, parties seen as weakening the message, usually either with nuance or with incompatible strategy.

I guess most of that is born of fear. Once a little power is felt, there's a fear that if one doesn't use it with iron fist right now, the opportunity will be lost. I think that's a strong motivating force behind a lot of the inter-faction warring, like as if trans-activists just let Kathleen Stock have her say, they'd lose the opportunity to push for the changes they want in the noise that such nuance would generate.

But again, I come back to how incredibly useful all this is to corporate power and refusing to see that as mere fortunate happenstance. We have 'warring' tribes, sure, but look at which 'tribes' are winning in terms of changes to the socio-economic system. It's not a random selection. It's not neither side (a pox on both your houses), it's universally the side that promotes a good steady increase in consumer culture, doesn't make a fuss about corporate lobbying, lets the militaristic control of foreign policy and trade carry on untouched... It's not an accident that Occupy has fallen silent with absolutely zero impact whilst there are actual workplace regulations about pronouns. It's because the former threatened Money, and the latter didn't. So if Money had control over the media (and they clearly do) are they going to sit on their hands and just hope for the best when it comes to which gets more air time?

My concern is that this phenomenon isn't new, it's just out in public. The "Effeminist Manifesto" was written partly in response to perceptions of prejudice between anti-patriarchy groups, and you can see the weaponisation of the rhetoric of liberation for infighting in "Trashing, the Dark Side of Sisterhood". My impression is that the same dynamic is just louder now and is a public spectacle. Which is why I've been making the point that it's the same identity fragmentation dynamic as before. Just looks different due to the social form of organisation. We can see the factionalism out in public, so the representativeness heuristic is going to tell us the groups within movement are getting more factionalised than they were before and that this is stymying progress. Whereas, with BC, what we're actually observing is the same "post left" period that there has been since Occupy, with the same characteristics of failure, just that the grievances get aired in public. — fdrake

Also the following very much addresses your posts too, so I'm going to save repeating, if that's OK.

That's certainly true, but I think you're underestimating the ratcheting effect of this on the beliefs and behaviours of the groups receiving that representation. It may well be that in step one completely normal and pervasive splits between groups are aired and are just as you say, louder and more public now. But then there's an effect of that on the actual function of those dynamics. It would be odd in the extreme if the almost complete suffusion of the public discourse with these 'normal' splits were to have no effect on the people embedded in those discussion spaces would it not?

We see, in other areas, the ratcheting effect of constant positive feedback in social belief construction. So how could these factions remain immune to it?

So yes, I don't think something is generating unusual amounts of factionalism in left-wing politics - just the ususal. But then the very act of airing that factionalism in the one form of media over which almost all social communication takes place these days, the hyper-selection of conflict in that media's filtering process, has an effect on the beliefs of those engaged with it. They become more factionalised, and each faction becomes more opposed to the other because that's the narrative they're being presented with 24 hours a day.

And academics, though we'd love to think otherwise, are not so strong-willed as to be immune from this - which will affect their work, if only incrementally. And academic work, whilst it may not be popular, is not quarantined from public discourse, nor, more importantly, are the Tweets, Facebook posts and Media appearances of those academics who, in those formats, are going to be speaking a lot less guardedly than in their papers.

I've been at the periphery of the 'war' between factions of feminism and trans-activists, but even at this periphery, we can see the unguarded interventions of academics through social media ramping up some of the rhetoric (although it reached its peak with Covid which was an absolute bloodbath - not intersectional, but still very much a left-wing torch). Again, It'd be a miracle of human stoicism if these researchers went back to their labs/offices after an evening's diatribe on Twitter and then conducted the same dispassionate and impartial research they would have done had the previous evening contained nothing but a documentary on elephants. So with regards to...

So when I'm saying same shit different day, I'm saying ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) are the major drivers. ( 3 ) is essentially the dirty laundry which never aired in public. ( 4 ) is something we can quibble about, but there's no way it's working as the kind of driver ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) are. — fdrake

I don't see how any normal human can engage in the kind of 24/7 airing of dirty laundry, amped up to the max by the media platform for several moths/years and not have that show any significant amplification effect on (3). Essentially, I think (3) is underplayed in it's effects on (1) and in the likelihood of people who otherwise wouldn't have considered (4), turning to it.

And I don't see why the corporation who have complete control over this amplification tool would do us the favour of not investing heavily in anything which has the effect of dismembering meaningful opposition. We've seen far more insidious strategies which we know for a fact were discussed and planned at that level to undermine solidarity (see the breaking of the unions in the 80's). I just don't see why corporate powers wouldn't take maximum advantage of this effect.

it is more productive to engage in respectful and constructive discussion. — schopenhauer1

It's funny how often this is levied. You opened a thread dismissing an entire field of enquiry on the basis of some stuff you reckon about it. In what way do you think that is 'respectful' to the decades of work those researchers have put in to their study. Do you have any idea how much work it takes to produce a paper for publication? And it takes that much work because we spend a considerable amount of time checking sources, checking methodological commitments and ensuring the results are meaningful. Of course we fail at that a lot of the time, but doing so shows a damn sight more 'respect' for our reader's intelligence than the sorts of posts we so frequently see here thinking they've dismantled the whole thing from their armchair... because philosophy.

Ahhh!!! The deep insightful wisdom of Jeffrey Sachs, Mearsheimer & co.

We are not worthy! — ssu

Have you been to Ukraine? No
Have you spoken to the negotiators? No
Have you seen the documents involved? No
Were you there at the time of any of the relevant events? No

So give up this stupid pretence that you're not relying on sources too. This is all about trust in sources for us. None of us are dealing with first hand information. None of us are even dealing with second hand analysis of raw materials. We're all of us dealing with third hand filtered, selected and interpreted analysis of data, and all annalists have agendas.

Being flippant about acknowledging sources doesn't help you sound more sensible.

I like this less abstract approach of considering what sorts of cognitive departments an organism might develop and then looking at what those could conceivably do and what that would look like. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes. It gets complicated when we get into redundancy and duplication, but I don't think either need disrupt this project right now, it's still reasonable to say that the brain is hierarchical and that those hierarchies are based on physiology primarily.

I did not hallucinate the objects moving, there is no interruption of the visual stream, which still shows the lawnmower in the same place, but it "feels" like I'm seeing it move. It's like hypothetical movement does fire the extra "what this means" pathway but stays off the main "what I'm seeing pathway", almost like the reverse of Capgras delusion. — Srap Tasmaner

There was some work a little while back by Paul Allen at Kings reviewing data on hallucination in schizophrenia where he pointed to the regular importance in studies of the inhibitory networks (and even the actual neurotransmitters used to carry out these inhibitory functions). Even though the causes of schizophrenia seem to remain multiple, there is a trend toward a combination of hyperactivity on sensory processing regions, and lack of inhibitory function in the anterior cingulate and subcortical regions. Basically, all the stuff telling you that the visual pathway you stimulated by imagining the moving lawnmower was you doing it, not the outside world.

Back to filtering again... removing from the working memory of scene creation, the hypotheses about potential futures where they are just noise, like all the things you could say are just noise in the production of what you actually do say. We produce a lot of crap, it's a miracle of ruthless editing that anything sensible results at all.

His previous declarations and articles, such as this one. — Jabberwock

What about them is biased? I can't believe I'm having to explain this to grown adults, but simply saying things you don't agree with isn't bias.

Of course, in my opinion. — Jabberwock

Right. So are you smarter or better informed than Jeffrey Sachs. Which is it? What makes you think your personal opinion on a matter you're not even qualified in makes a person you've never met "clearly" biased?

You do realise how ridiculous you sound here, wading into the complexities of international negotiations as if you've got a better grasp of the situation than someone who actually spoke directly to sources involved in it.