The medical and technological issue is that the vaccine has not been tested for efficacy at reducing either transmission or hospitalisation, nor has it been tested for safety on key demographics. — Isaac

Which key demographics are you referring to? — ssu

The elderly, the immunocompromised, the chronically ill, ethnic minorities, very young children...

And more importantly, I think one should refer here to distinct vaccines, or is it really alleged that all various vaccines now studied have been dealt in similar way? — ssu

Yes. The testing methodology is publicly available - if you haven't even looked at it in all this discussion then that really shows what level of blind faith we're working with. Someone raises an issue with the testing methodology as cited in a reputable medical journal and you construct an argument that no such omission exists without even looking?

Further testing is now being carried out. They will plug the gaps in those demographics eventually, that's not the point. The point is the amount of money going into it without any assurances as to its likely efficacy contrasted with the complete lack of investment (cuts even) in services which have a far better evidence base for reduction in both transmission and severity, for this virus, and all it's future strains, and any future virus.

And you'd like me to believe that the massive investment in an industry which spends more on lobbying than any other, and industry with representatives and shareholders in the highest positions in government, is all just a sound level-headed strategic decision?

The community is not bearing the brunt of what it means to live out a life. It is simply a notion in the head of the actual people living out life. It is the individuals which are what are being prevented from suffering. — schopenhauer1

Both individuality and suffering are just notions in certain heads too, so I don't see how this is anything concrete to work with.

That seems way less obvious with how common it is for everyone to bash their own governments and communities, and how prevalent depression is. And I’m not seeing how studies about food sharing solve the issue. — khaled

Well, a) I'm not sure how what seems to you to be the case has any bearing on what actually is the case in the light of a disagreement, and b) if you're not sure how it relates, then I'm not sure how to help beyond your actually reading the material I've provided.

Why would they be relevant to the moral case? — Isaac


Why would it not? Premises. — khaled

So it is a moral premise of yours that whatever is the law or social norm is morally relevant? How, in your world, do laws and social norms get changed?

The community. You and them — Isaac


But in the case of having children there is no “them” or did you forget? That was your whole point. If no one is harmed by being brought into the world then no one is benefited either. So it’s you and the community in that case, but definitely not them. That I find problematic. — khaled

No. Some might be making that point, but it's not mine. I'm quite comfortable with imagining a future child and acting in what I imagine to be it's best interests.

Here:

This seems to be the perennial trick of the idealists and woo-merchants. To point out that empirical data has flaws (subjectivity, the necessity of an observer etc) and then for some reason assume this counts as an argument in favour of alternative methods of discussion. — Isaac — Olivier5

Really? I'm not sure I can help you if your comprehension is genuinely that bad, but I'll have go.

First of all that sentence says that subjectivity is a flaw, not that it itself is flawed, secondly it is attributing such a view to a rhetorical opposition, not claiming it as my own, and thirdly it is claiming an equality with other approaches, which negates any context in which I would claim any superior approach exists (not that I wouldn't).

Perhaps, next time you're going to argue against your own invented cliches you should do a little more work constructing them than simply to look back over the thread for any sentence in which the key words appear regardless of their syntactic role?

That would depend on the net gains you foresee. If you can see net gains, then you have no choice but to pursue them in the environment you have available. — Isaac


Net gains for who? You or them? — khaled

The community. You and them. It's telling of this neo-liberal infection that you don't even consider that possibility.

How could you determine this from your position of moral relativity? — Isaac


Social contracts. Laws and such. — khaled

Why would they be relevant to the moral case?

So do you have a citation for me for your assertion? — Isaac


That if everyone in a community harms for their own desire that the community would break down? No. — khaled

Then why mention it in the same post as you seemed to imply that evidence was required for such claims?

Why? — Isaac


People should come to their own conclusions rather than be forced to accept what would be good for the community to accept. Why? That’s just a premise of mine. No further explanation. — khaled

Fair enough then.

We learn how to use moral language from other people, but we don't necessarily learn how to be moral in the same way — SophistiCat

So how is it that you imagine we do learn how to be moral?

We acquire a common language, but we don't generally acquire a common morality with all language users - which, of course, is what makes moral disagreement possible. — SophistiCat

Definitional disagreements are common too, so I don't see the presence of disagreements as an indicator on it's own of a radically different process.

The problem that you are pointing at is that of persuasion. How persuasion happens is not simple and straightforward, but we know that it does happen. — SophistiCat

I was actually referring to the individual themselves (although I suppose you could still see this a 'persuading oneself' but that seems a little schizophrenic). Writing a spiel about one's moral process is not indicative that one actually makes moral decisions that way. The overwhelming weight of evidence is to the contrary.

You presented or assumed subjectivity as flawed. — Olivier5

Where?

I was not even talking of qualia. I was just explaining to Isaac that his cherished objectivity stems from subjectivity, rather than being the opposite of subjectivity. — Olivier5

I don't recall making a claim about objectivity. Could you quote me that post?

I would say this is justification not to risk harming people for your own desires. That tends to break down the community if everyone does it. — khaled

Highly doubt this. What’s your evidence? — khaled

We can both play that game.

For my part...

I suggest "Towards a Broader View of Hunter-Gatherer Sharing" Edited by Noa Lavi & David E. Friesem. I've found a few chapters are online if you Google it.

This paper goes through the current theories with regards to the evolution of food sharing.

This one broadens out to social networks in general.

But for a better grasp of the issues I recommend "Foundations of Human Sociality" by Joseph Henrich.

So do you have a citation for me for your assertion?

Putting someone in imperfect conditions, and them getting harmed as a result is your fault, not just the conditions. — khaled

That would depend on the net gains you foresee. If you can see net gains, then you have no choice but to pursue them in the environment you have available.

We impose all sorts of harms on children for the sake of wider community goals. — Isaac


Not really. We impose them for the children’s own sakes. What you’ve described is brainwashing. I think it’s unethical for example, to push religious beliefs on children too strongly. Even though often those beliefs would benefit the community greatly if everyone shared them. — khaled

Why?

It doesn’t matter whether or not they feel innocent. It matters whether or not they are. — khaled

How could you determine this from your position of moral relativity?

At what odds would it be acceptable to force someone to jump from a plane? — Tzeentch

I think that would depend on the person doing the pushing - presuming we're in a situation where consent cannot, under any circumstances, be obtained. A relatively high gain, low risk. For example a soldier at war who's too nervous to make the jump where every person is needed to defend the area against something demonstrably bad (say Nazism), and I'd personally checked his parachute was OK. Something like that.

Why is it an 'issue'. — Isaac


One would be forcing an individual to experience life, without being able to ensure whether they want to. An anti-natalist would say this is sufficient reason to refrain from doing so. — Tzeentch

That's not the 'issue' we're talking about. You're not following the conversation. You said...

How do we take into account a child's will and ability to consent when both of those things only come to exist after the decision we're supposed to be taking them into account in? — Isaac


You cannot — Tzeentch

That's the issue in question. I'm asking you why it is an issue. We cannot possibly take a will into account which does not yet exists, so we don't. I'm asking why that's a moral problem. We can't morally be required to do something which it is impossible to do. Your answer doesn't address this, it just repeats the same refrain we're trying to analyse. Just repeating it doesn't help.

No one forces you to breathe, so I don't think this is a good comparison. — Tzeentch

No one forces you to be born either. It's the involuntary action of oxytocin on the mother's physiology.

Well, everyone is free to make such an assessment for themselves. Things get complicated when we force someone else to jump out of a plane with those odds, no? — Tzeentch

At those odds yes. You'd previously admitted you have no idea what the odds actually are in life so why would you think such a comparison relevant.

You cannot, which is exactly the issue. — Tzeentch

Why is it an 'issue'. It doesn't seem to present any problem as far as I can see. We can't, so we don't. Seems simple.

no one is born voluntarily. — Tzeentch

No one breathes voluntarily either. Is that a problem you feel we need to address?

Would you jump out of a plane knowing there's a 25% chance your parachute wouldn't work? If not, what's wrong with taking a gamble? 75% chance for a positive experience. — Tzeentch

Basic risk assessment. The experience would have to be really good. And yes, people who find the experience really good do take that risk for exactly those reasons so I'm not sure what you think that example shows.

What I sought to point out with that comment is that the question whether a child's will, well-being and ability to consent should be taken into account prior to the decision of having children, is a matter of considering the logical consequences of childbirth, which are them coming to be as an individual with those faculties. — Tzeentch

So we go back in time or what? How do we take into account a child's will and ability to consent when both of those things only come to exist after the decision we're supposed to be taking them into account in?

Consent has been the core issue. — Tzeentch

You said

Isn't it as simple as taking into account the consequences of one's actions prior to carrying them out? — Tzeentch

So your own answer to that question would be "no - it's not that simple because the central issue is consent, not consequences"?

Where is this individual who's being forced? — Isaac


Who knows? — Tzeentch

What kind of answer is that? You said an individual was being forced into something. Now you're saying you don't even know where they are?

Then how do we know that it will contain any meaningful degree of suffering? — Isaac


We don't. We know next to nothing about the quality of their life. It'd be nothing less than an experiment. — Tzeentch

Then an assumption that they'd absolutely love it is as reasonable as an assumption that they'd hate it. Since we're in a position where we're uniquely unable to ask, what's wrong with taking a guess?

I do not see how you justify causing suffering on a third party for your own desire, knowing full well they may not share your goal of creating the next generation of caring and capable humans, and knowing full well that they may come to despise their existence. — khaled

Because we live in a community of generally like-minded people who rely intrinsically on each other for our mutual survival. So...

1) we do not function as individuals. As individuals we all die.

2) it's a reasonable presumption in the face of uncertainty that any new individual within that group will also feel that way (if anything like even a significant minority didn't we'd never have survived this long). If ever this is not the case it is the fault of the society, not the act of having children.

3) a tiny proportion of people end up despising their existence simply by virtue of being alive. Suicide is virtually unheard of in low-contact hunter-gatherers. The chances of such a situation are tiny compared with the chances of them generally getting something positive out of life. If ever this is not the case, again, it is the fault of the society, not the act of having children.

Are there many other situations where you impose harm on an innocent party for your own goals? — khaled

It depends what you mean by 'harm'. Some really trivial things have been listed as 'harms' by antinatalists. At the lower end simple social rules are impositions on innocent parties. We impose all sorts of harms on children for the sake of wider community goals. The criminal justice system denies people certain liberties (which they might otherwise feel they have a right to), again for the sake of wider community goals. Anything from social censure to full on imprisonment imposes harms on parties who may consider themselves innocent for the sake of the community. Seems to me it happens all the time.

The key thing is that because it happens all the time most people don't mind. It's worth it. It's a reasonable assumption any new life will come to feel that way to.

If they don't (en masse) then there's something wrong with the community we've made, not the act of procreation.

Not only is one forcing an individual to do something that has great consequences without their consent, but one is also incapable of estimating the outcome. — Tzeentch

Where is this individual who's being forced?

without their consent — Tzeentch

You're all over the place. This whole argument arose from you claiming that issues over consent were unnecessary. Here you are back to consent again. Consent cannot possibly be given, there's no entity capable of consent. In all other situations where consent cannot possibly be given we make an assessment based on a weighing of the consequences. Why are you advocating a different course of action here?

Some things can be satisfactorily predicted. Other things cannot. I think the possible quality of life of an unborn child belongs to the latter category. — Tzeentch

Then how do we know that it will contain any meaningful degree of suffering?

One could come to the conclusion that the consequences of their actions cannot be sufficiently understood. A good reason to refrain from such an action, — Tzeentch

Why? Since inaction can have no less of a consequence in a dynamic environment, I don't see why you'd favour it over action in the face of uncertainty.

Notwithstanding that, hasn't your argument previously been exactly that we can satisfactorily predict the consequences of our actions?

I see we've devolved into irrelevancies. I'll leave you to it since my part in the conversation is having no effect whatsoever on your jeremiad you may as well carry on without interruption.

It is taking into account what will logically come about as a consequence of one's actions. — Tzeentch

Taking into account what will logically come about as a consequence of one's actions is insufficient to carry your case though. Doing that alone one could weigh the happiness one could create against the suffering and decide one has overall made the world a happier place.

To carry your case you need for these consequences to be considered as impositions right now (at point of conception) on a non-existent entity.

If it were just a matter of considering the consequences of one's actions then one would be allowed to weigh in every positive effect too, they are no less 'consequences'.

I think most people would say that I do NOT have a moral duty to steal and murder. — khaled


Had I been a moral objectivist I wouldn't have included the bolded area. I would have just outright said that you have a moral duty not to steal and murder. — khaled

But you used it in a line of argument. If you believe it has no normative value, then I'm afraid I'm at a loss to understand what point you were trying to make.

I could work from a commonly held premise to undermine a conclusion that does not follow from it by showing inconsistencies, or connections people have not noticed. Or I could show that some commonly held premises lead to contradictory conclusions. — khaled

That is a form of moral realism. To say that you can 'work out' what you 'ought' to believe with a few logical steps. It makes no sense otherwise, to have a premise which is entirely arbitrary and then strictly stick to logical conclusions which stem from it.

We also have a moral intuition that ending the human race would be wrong. — Isaac


You*. As I said, we don't agree here. — khaled

By 'we' I was (presumptively?) referring to those of us arguing against antinatalism, not all humanity.

Not that it detracts from the point. If you agree that moral intuitions have no necessary external source, then they are arbitrary (or multiply sourced). Given that, a project attempting to undermine one on the basis of logical inconsistencies with another makes no sense.

For me that depends on an odd sort of private language (maybe not 'private', but oddly technical). To claim that one's process is addressing 'moral' decision-making, one must already know what type of decision-making is 'moral' as opposed to any other sort. And to know if one's process works, one must know what a 'good' decision should be, which again one would learn from experience.

So in order to understand the meaning of 'morality' and 'morally right' one must have learnt it by example from other people, and the evidence we have of the process other people are using is varied in the manner I described. Thus one is inevitably talking about the decision-making we actually do.

One could, I suppose, having learnt how to use the terms say "scrap all that and decide thus", but what would make anyone do so aside from their moral desires, the satisfaction of which has just been described.

It would seem like setting out an algorithm which we've no intention of following to solve a problem we already have the answer to.

But yes, you're right in that my comment is of no consequence to such a project.

there needs to be an acceptance of the relativistic framework. — Isaac


There is. And I've repeatedly said there is. On multiple threads. — khaled

What I'm referring to is when you say...

if I grew up in a neighbourhood where theft and murder are the norm, and I was reprimanded for not participating, I think most people would say that I do NOT have a moral duty to steal and murder. — khaled

...you imply there's a moral duty beyond that which any community merely 'think' is a moral duty. Again, basic equivocation is all that carries this argument. When we say people consider social censure to be equivalent to moral duties you play the objectivist and point to negative examples. When we say that morality is about more than just consent and harm reduction you play the relativist and say "not for me it isn't". It's disingenuous to keep switching as it suits your argument. @schopenhauer1 is far worse than you, but it's nonetheless a feature of antinatalist argument it seems.

How would one argue as a moral relativist in your book if "you wouldn't do X would you?" is somehow indicating moral naturalism. I would think a moral naturalist would say "You shouldn't do X". He won't ask what you think because that is irrelevant to him, within his framework he already knows he's right.

I don't think there is anything that implies that the speaker there is a moral naturalist. I think you have a bad habit of reading what you want into what others write. — khaled

Anything which attempts to work forward from some premise to undermine an already held position is a form of moral realism.

We have a moral intuition that we should not cause unnecessary harm without consent. We also have a moral intuition that ending the human race would be wrong. The task of any moral relativist might be to document and maybe explain both those sentiments. It is only the task of a moral realist to attempt to show one to e 'wrong' by use of the other.

Maybe despite being relativistic, I am trying to see whether or not there are people who share the same premises but don't end up with the same conclusion, and if so how they do it, just out of personal interest. — khaled

Fair enough, but your comments often bely this approach.

Right. But it's the technological and medical aspects that I've provided professional cited sources taking issue with. The political argument is whether the money is being spent on vaccine research at the expense of community health care. The medical and technological issue is that the vaccine has not been tested for efficacy at reducing either transmission or hospitalisation, nor has it been tested for safety on key demographics. So claims that it will do so are without sufficient scientific support. That's not a political opinion. It's just a fact. Those tests simply have not been carried out, end of story.

No, because what you remember of an experience is yet another form of experience. Therefore experience still precedes any report, and can never be fully described by reporting. — Olivier5

I haven't disagreed that experience can never be fully described by reporting. In fact I've said exactly that, so I'm unsure as to what point you think you're making here. The argument was about whether discussion of neurology of of experience has primacy on some given point (say perception of colour). The point there still stands - that anything you say from a phenomenological perspective about your experience of colour is only selective and filtered data from your memory of having that experience, which is no more accurate than interpreted data from third parties. Pointing out that memories are experiences too doesn't make any difference, the reporting in a discussion of such 'experiences' would still themselves be memories, and so flawed.

This seems to be the perennial trick of the idealists and woo-merchants. To point out that empirical data has flaws (subjectivity, the necessity of an observer etc) and then for some reason assume this counts as an argument in favour of alternative methods of discussion. Pointing out that one approach is flawed does not count as support for another unless you can show that it is not similarly flawed, and in this case you can't.

And what you are talking about, just like above "But fuck, I don't think Pfizer have quite enough money yet. Perhaps we could shut a few more clinics and rustle up a couple of million more for them." and earlier has absolutely nothing to do with any article in the Lancet or the British Medical Journal. — ssu

Well, not 'absolutely nothing', no. It is a political opinion based on solid cited evidence. Are all political opinions that you don't agree with to be branded conspiracy theories now? We've seen that move before.

Are you referring to dual process theory? — Pinprick

Not necessarily. It could be a single process at a given time (though I do think dual process theory has it's place). It's only that there's no single method we use to determine a course of action in moral dilemmas, we use different approaches as the context changes. Any moral 'system' which tries to claim moral decisions are based on a single metric is just pointless armchair speculation without any reference to the real world in which this simply doesn't happen.

I also explained above how knowledge always stems from subjective experience, and therefore experience is primary to knowledge — Olivier5

Yep. But what we're talking about here is your memories of the experiences which preceded knowledge, not the actual experiences themselves. You no longer have direct access to those seconds after you've had them, so their causal primacy is irrelevant.

I don't remember anyone making arguments from objectivity. — khaled

There have been, but that's not the point. I said that there either needs to be such arguments, or there needs to be an acceptance of the relativistic framework. It's one or the other. What we actually have is equivocation between the two when it suits the argument. It starts with "you wouldn't do X would you?", as if a moral naturalist, then when we say "we wouldn't end the human race either" it turns to "well, your feelings are wrong here, paternalism and/or humanity are not allowable moral goals now". Either we're moral naturalists, or deontologists, or moral relativists, but we can be whatever suits the argument at the time.

You've argued strongly that you should not impose a chore or trial on another without their consent, yet doing so (for the purposes of continuing the human race, among other things) is considered morally acceptable by most moral systems. So if you're going to argue for a moral principle which is not upheld as such by any moral system you need to argue from moral objectivity (all those systems have made some mistake), or else you're just writing the equivalent of your favourite flavour of ice-cream, which is pointless on a public philosophy forum.

I don't see much point in talking about what "society considers moral" in the first place if by that you mean what we are socially pressured to do. As that is not constant across a society, much less across the world, so why should we care? — khaled

The thread is about antinatalism, which makes a moral claim. So we're talking about morality in some form. Since no moral claims are constant (shared across a society or the world), then antinatalism has to either demonstrate the source of its objectivity, or make arguments from within the relativistic framework, or just stop.

None of that has anything to do with what has primacy in a philosophical investigation of mind. All of those factors apply equally to a purely phenomenological discussion.

In fact, they apply more because it only takes a few honest people to admit to certain thoughts during fMRI and then I'd have a pretty good idea from your scan that something was going on, regardless of your willingness to admit it. An advantage that pure philosophical discussion cannot claim.

Therefore the "assumption" that they're not interchangeable is warranted. — khaled

It is when we're talking about morality in general. There, assumptions about the general case are entirely appropriate.

But this is all getting very much besides the point as my synonymous use was very specific and need not be generalised. The point is that you cannot assume people would act as they do in isolation from the social pressures around them and some of those social pressures are the expression of what society considers to be moral duties.

if I grew up in a neighbourhood where theft and murder are the norm, and I was reprimanded for not participating, I think most people would say that I do NOT have a moral duty to steal and murder. — khaled

But those doing the reprimanding would consider it your moral duty to participate (gang loyalty, or whatever).

Not that I'm saying all social censure is in the form if moral duties - something like etiquette would be an example - but the expression of a communities moral duties largely takes the form of social censure, not legal recourse.

what we have between the ears IS indeed primary, as a matter of fact, because it is necessary for any knowledge to accrue. — Olivier5

Is it? Not what's in your guts, or your heart. Both of which were once thought to be the seat of various conscious phenomenal experience?

To even say it's 'between your ears' is already to treat it as an object of study. To even say "this is what I thought" is to go back through your memories as one would a library of source material.

You can do nothing to escape from the fact that you have no more privileged access to your original thought processes than a suitability dedicated third-party has. All you have is your memories of those processes, which can be put into words and transferred to a third party with no less fidelity than that with which they were stored (which is, not a lot).

Because you are using them interchangeably. — khaled

I meant to ask where you're getting the assumption that they're not interchangeable.

And the second I thought was common sense. — khaled

Right. Well that's the source if a lot of confusion. I don't think any if the other commentators here are using the term in that way, but more in the manner it's used in moral philosophy.

https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/dec/13/chicago-mercy-hospital-closure-covid-19

But fuck, I don't think Pfizer have quite enough money yet. Perhaps we could shut a few more clinics and rustle up a couple of million more for them.

to a nihilist, nothing you could say would make any difference. If it could make a difference, then they wouldn't be nihilist, because something - i.e. what you said - would matter. — Wayfarer

I thought it quite clear that 'moral nihilism' was being referred to, not universal nihilism. But maybe that was not as clear as it seemed to me.

You seem to be conflating "moral duty" with "social censure" — khaled

moral duties typically lead to laws. — khaled

Where are you getting this stuff from?

where did I imply that there was no need for societal pressure to make me act kindly? — khaled

I don't understand why whenever I share this view [that we do not need moral obligations] people worry that it will somehow suddenly make people cold and uncaring towards each other. — khaled — Isaac

And what does that have to do with my argument? — khaled

You are arguing that moral obligations to, say, give to charity, are unnecessary. Part of that argument relies on the fact that society would not stop doing kind acts (like giving to charity) if it were not a moral duty to do so. I'm saying you have no justification for that assumptions because the mere fact that adults now don't require a moral duty to perform acts of kindness does not mean that a world in which such moral duty did not exist would continue to behave that way.

But I see from your other posts that a lot of this hinges on your idiosyncratic conflation of 'moral duty' with 'law'. If you're going to make up your own meanings for terms it's going to be very difficult to have a conversation using them.

As I said, I assumed you'd prefer a world in which there were kind people. If I'm wrong about that, and you just simply don't care whether we're kind to each other or not, then let me know.

So it appears to me, that what you are lacking is confidence in your own capacity to judge metaphysical principles. — Metaphysician Undercover

I cannot assert this with 100% certainty, but I have a high level of confidence that - at best - metaphysics is a form of poetry in which people attempt to express vague feelings — EricH

No, you've misunderstood what @Metaphysician Undercover is saying. He's saying that you lack the confidence to arrive at the the same judgements he's arrived at. If only we could all be so confident as to agree with MU - we can but dream...