For example, if we're creating some sort of slave caste, because we'd like others to serve us as slaves, this seems like "bad" motivation regardless of the fact that no slaves are yet around. Should we act with the intention to make other sentient being serve us? I'd say no. — Echarmion

Here you seem to be placing the child's wellbeing ABOVE the desire of the parents. So creating a slave caste is wrong because everyone in said caste will hate it, even if its creators will love it.

For example, you may want children so you can help create a new generation of compassionate and capable humans. — Echarmion

But here you place the parent's desire above any consideration for the child's wellbeing (as you don't mention it). Why is that? Where is this "hard line" coming from?

What if for example, you knew your next child was going to be severely disabled, would it still be ethical to have them? They WOULD contribute to making a generation of compassionate humans in all likelyhood, but does that justify the harm they will go through? Why or why not?

I am essentially saying that you do not account for a future child who will exist — schopenhauer1

But I do and have accounted for that. It's literally in the OP.

you do not seem to like the idea of generalizing the idea that suffering exists — schopenhauer1

I have no problems with this either. I'm fact I've said that everybody suffers at some point in their lives. This isn't relevant though because it's no proof for life being a sufficient condition for suffering.

and a child will be born that will almost certainly suffer — schopenhauer1

Yes. And? You already know how I treat both types (intrinsic and contingent) of suffering so I don't need to repeat myself do I?

Here you seem to be placing the child's wellbeing ABOVE the desire of the parents. So creating a slave caste is wrong because everyone in said caste will hate it, even if its creators will love it. — khaled

No that does not follow. — schopenhauer1

It does. It cannot be both no person and a person at the same time. That's the principle of non-contradiction, the most basic principle of logic.

Starting existence, there is no person to be harmed — schopenhauer1

Yes, exactly. Case closed.

If born, they will be harmed. — schopenhauer1

Contradiction in terms. You just said there is no person, so there cannot be a "they" here.

And yes, you can have it such that suffering is sufficiently bad enough to never have been, but life sufficiently good enough that once born, would not want one's interests obliterated. — schopenhauer1

I don't see how this could be the case. Run me through the thought process of some hypothetical soul about to be incarnated, and arrives at your conclusion here.

Here you seem to be placing the child's wellbeing ABOVE the desire of the parents. So creating a slave caste is wrong because everyone in said caste will hate it, even if its creators will love it. — khaled

It'd be wrong even if we also genetically engineer the slaves to like it, on the basis that the motivation is immoral.

What if for example, you knew your next child was going to be severely disabled, would it still be ethical to have them? They WOULD contribute to making a generation of compassionate humans in all likelyhood, but does that justify the harm they will go through? Why or why not? — khaled

So long as you could honestly judge having the child is in line with the maxim, having it would be ethical.

As I already said, it doesn't imply that such actions cannot be considered wrong or immoral. Only that the moral weight cannot come from the will or interest of the non-existent child. We haven't actually excluded that there is an overarching moral principle hat says to not have children when you cannot adequately support them. — Echarmion

What are such overarching moral principles based on, other than the well-being of would-be children?

You don't control the outcomes though. — Echarmion

Indeed. Isn't that a great reason to think twice before having children?

I don't have a problem with admitting that there are some things I still need to figure out regarding the moral weight of future people. But I nevertheless feel very confident that tying yourself into knots trying to somehow attribute personhood to unborn children while maintaining that they don't exist is the solution. — Echarmion

I'm not trying to attribute personhood. There's no need for it.

I'm challenging your suggestion that because a child is not yet born, one can do whatever they please in regards to its future.

Isn't it as simple as taking into account the consequences of one's actions prior to carrying them out?

It seems we're playing dumb, pretending that individuals decide to have children and when the child is born and has a will and well-being, we scratch our heads and wonder where all that came from?

It'd be wrong even if we also genetically engineer the slaves to like it, on the basis that the motivation is immoral. — Echarmion

So the motivation is the only determining factor?

So someone who is millions in debt with no home, who has a drinking problem, and 15 inheritable genetic disease should have children in his current state as long as he intends to try his best to raise them?

Sounds disgusting and backwards to me. Something akin to letting anyone perform surgery because they intend to do their best, without actually caring about whether or not they're qualified and without caring about the person being operated on.

If the motivation is not the only factor, then what else is?

So long as you could honestly judge having the child is in line with the maxim, having it would be ethical. — Echarmion

So as long as I can judge that the child will fulfill my arbitrary desire of them (in your case to create the next generation of compassionate people) then having them is ethical? Might as well say it's ethical in every situation, which I strongly disagree with, and you don't even have to be an AN to disagree with that one.

I'm not trying to attribute personhood. There's no need for it.

I'm challenging your suggestion that because a child is not yet born, one can do whatever they please in regards to its future. — Tzeentch

This is attributing personhood. A thing that doesn't exist, isn't a "child" and does not have the capacity of being "born" and it certainly doesn't have a future. Your "its" refers to nothing.

This is attributing personhood. — Benkei

It is not.

It is taking into account what will logically come about as a consequence of one's actions.

I think most people would say that I do NOT have a moral duty to steal and murder. — khaled


Had I been a moral objectivist I wouldn't have included the bolded area. I would have just outright said that you have a moral duty not to steal and murder. — khaled

But you used it in a line of argument. If you believe it has no normative value, then I'm afraid I'm at a loss to understand what point you were trying to make.

I could work from a commonly held premise to undermine a conclusion that does not follow from it by showing inconsistencies, or connections people have not noticed. Or I could show that some commonly held premises lead to contradictory conclusions. — khaled

That is a form of moral realism. To say that you can 'work out' what you 'ought' to believe with a few logical steps. It makes no sense otherwise, to have a premise which is entirely arbitrary and then strictly stick to logical conclusions which stem from it.

We also have a moral intuition that ending the human race would be wrong. — Isaac


You*. As I said, we don't agree here. — khaled

By 'we' I was (presumptively?) referring to those of us arguing against antinatalism, not all humanity.

Not that it detracts from the point. If you agree that moral intuitions have no necessary external source, then they are arbitrary (or multiply sourced). Given that, a project attempting to undermine one on the basis of logical inconsistencies with another makes no sense.

It is taking into account what will logically come about as a consequence of one's actions. — Tzeentch

Taking into account what will logically come about as a consequence of one's actions is insufficient to carry your case though. Doing that alone one could weigh the happiness one could create against the suffering and decide one has overall made the world a happier place.

To carry your case you need for these consequences to be considered as impositions right now (at point of conception) on a non-existent entity.

If it were just a matter of considering the consequences of one's actions then one would be allowed to weigh in every positive effect too, they are no less 'consequences'.

I disagree. One could come to the conclusion that the consequences of their actions cannot be sufficiently understood. A good reason to refrain from such an action.

One could come to the conclusion that the consequences of their actions cannot be sufficiently understood. A good reason to refrain from such an action, — Tzeentch

Why? Since inaction can have no less of a consequence in a dynamic environment, I don't see why you'd favour it over action in the face of uncertainty.

Notwithstanding that, hasn't your argument previously been exactly that we can satisfactorily predict the consequences of our actions?

What are such overarching moral principles based on, other than the well-being of would-be children? — Tzeentch

Ultimately in your recognition of yourself as a free subject in interaction with other subjects.

Indeed. Isn't that a great reason to think twice before having children? — Tzeentch

I am not arguing against "thinking twice".

I'm not trying to attribute personhood. There's no need for it.

I'm challenging your suggestion that because a child is not yet born, one can do whatever they please in regards to its future. — Tzeentch

I have never suggested one can do whatever one pleases. What I am saying is that unborn children cannot have standing as moral subjects.

Isn't it as simple as taking into account the consequences of one's actions prior to carrying them out?

It seems we're playing dumb, pretending that individuals decide to have children and when the child is born and has a will and well-being, we scratch our heads and wonder where all that came from? — Tzeentch

No, because we're deciding whether to bring about the consequence in the first place. You cannot decide by predicting what you will decide.

What you can - indeed must - do is to predict the consequences of possible decisions. In this sense, you can also predict that the child will have a will and interests. It'd just be a mistake to treat this prediction as current fact.

This is why I earlier wrote that the obligations parents have can feature in the decision. Because those are a predictable consequence. But it'd be false to then apply these obligations to the current decision as if they were already operative.

So the motivation is the only determining factor?

So someone who is millions in debt with no home, who has a drinking problem, and 15 inheritable genetic disease should have children in his current state as long as he intends to try his best to raise them? — khaled

"Intending to" isn't enough. You also need to be able to actually being the goal about. Which includes considering other outcomes.

So as long as I can judge that the child will fulfill my arbitrary desire of them (in your case to create the next generation of compassionate people) then having them is ethical? Might as well say it's ethical in every situation, which I strongly disagree with, and you don't even have to be an AN to disagree with that one. — khaled

Nothing I said had anything to do with "arbitrary desire". I said your reasons need to be moral. That's the opposite of allowing your arbitrary desire to rule.

Why? Since inaction can have no less of a consequence in a dynamic environment, I don't see why you'd favour it over action in the face of uncertainty. — Isaac

Not only is one forcing an individual to do something that has great consequences without their consent, but one is also incapable of estimating the outcome.

Notwithstanding that, hasn't your argument previously been exactly that we can satisfactorily predict the consequences of our actions? — Isaac

Some things can be satisfactorily predicted. Other things cannot. I think the possible quality of life of an unborn child belongs to the latter category.

"Intending to" isn't enough. You also need to be able to actually being the goal about. Which includes considering other outcomes. — Echarmion

Fair enough.

Nothing I said had anything to do with "arbitrary desire". I said your reasons need to be moral. That's the opposite of allowing your arbitrary desire to rule. — Echarmion

So just like Isaac, the only reason inflicting harm by having children is acceptable for you is because there is some "more worthy" goal which apparently justifies causing unwarranted harm. And just like Isaac, if that's your conclusion then fine, though it is completely unsatisfactory to me. I do not see how you justify causing suffering on a third party for your own desire, knowing full well they may not share your goal of creating the next generation of caring and capable humans, and knowing full well that they may come to despise their existence.

Are there many other situations where you impose harm on an innocent party for your own goals? This is not some moral condemnation, I'm just curious what your conditions are. We both just agreed that punching your neighbor in the face for fun isn't allowed but you've just shown that some forms of harm are okay to inflict, as long as your goal is "good enough" (and "for fun" isn't good enough). Where else do you employ that reaonsing? What makes a goal "moral" in other words?

Not only is one forcing an individual to do something that has great consequences without their consent, but one is also incapable of estimating the outcome. — Tzeentch

Where is this individual who's being forced?

without their consent — Tzeentch

You're all over the place. This whole argument arose from you claiming that issues over consent were unnecessary. Here you are back to consent again. Consent cannot possibly be given, there's no entity capable of consent. In all other situations where consent cannot possibly be given we make an assessment based on a weighing of the consequences. Why are you advocating a different course of action here?

Some things can be satisfactorily predicted. Other things cannot. I think the possible quality of life of an unborn child belongs to the latter category. — Tzeentch

Then how do we know that it will contain any meaningful degree of suffering?

What I am saying is that unborn children cannot have standing as moral subjects. — Echarmion

This is not what I have argued.

What you can - indeed must - do is to predict the consequences of possible decisions. In this sense, you can also predict that the child will have a will and interests. It'd just be a mistake to treat this prediction as current fact. — Echarmion

An unborn child developing into an individual with a will and well-being is (generally speaking) a logical consequence once one makes the decision to have children, thus should be taken into account prior to this decision. I don't see why this is controversial.

Where is this individual who's being forced? — Isaac

Who knows?

This whole argument arose from you claiming that issues over consent were unnecessary. — Isaac

That is not something I have claimed. Consent has been the core issue.

Consent cannot possibly be given, there's no entity capable of consent. — Isaac

Indeed. That is exactly the issue.

In all other situations where consent cannot possibly be given we make an assessment based on a weighing of the consequences. Why are you advocating a different course of action here? — Isaac

If I have to make a decision on someone else's behalf without their consent, my first question would be whether there is some dire need that would justify it. In the case of childbirth, I don't see that dire need.

Then how do we know that it will contain any meaningful degree of suffering? — Isaac

We don't. We know next to nothing about the quality of their life. It'd be nothing less than an experiment.

I do not see how you justify causing suffering on a third party for your own desire, knowing full well they may not share your goal of creating the next generation of caring and capable humans, and knowing full well that they may come to despise their existence. — khaled

Because we live in a community of generally like-minded people who rely intrinsically on each other for our mutual survival. So...

1) we do not function as individuals. As individuals we all die.

2) it's a reasonable presumption in the face of uncertainty that any new individual within that group will also feel that way (if anything like even a significant minority didn't we'd never have survived this long). If ever this is not the case it is the fault of the society, not the act of having children.

3) a tiny proportion of people end up despising their existence simply by virtue of being alive. Suicide is virtually unheard of in low-contact hunter-gatherers. The chances of such a situation are tiny compared with the chances of them generally getting something positive out of life. If ever this is not the case, again, it is the fault of the society, not the act of having children.

Are there many other situations where you impose harm on an innocent party for your own goals? — khaled

It depends what you mean by 'harm'. Some really trivial things have been listed as 'harms' by antinatalists. At the lower end simple social rules are impositions on innocent parties. We impose all sorts of harms on children for the sake of wider community goals. The criminal justice system denies people certain liberties (which they might otherwise feel they have a right to), again for the sake of wider community goals. Anything from social censure to full on imprisonment imposes harms on parties who may consider themselves innocent for the sake of the community. Seems to me it happens all the time.

The key thing is that because it happens all the time most people don't mind. It's worth it. It's a reasonable assumption any new life will come to feel that way to.

If they don't (en masse) then there's something wrong with the community we've made, not the act of procreation.

Where is this individual who's being forced? — Isaac


Who knows? — Tzeentch

What kind of answer is that? You said an individual was being forced into something. Now you're saying you don't even know where they are?

Then how do we know that it will contain any meaningful degree of suffering? — Isaac


We don't. We know next to nothing about the quality of their life. It'd be nothing less than an experiment. — Tzeentch

Then an assumption that they'd absolutely love it is as reasonable as an assumption that they'd hate it. Since we're in a position where we're uniquely unable to ask, what's wrong with taking a guess?

Consent has been the core issue. — Tzeentch

You said

Isn't it as simple as taking into account the consequences of one's actions prior to carrying them out? — Tzeentch

So your own answer to that question would be "no - it's not that simple because the central issue is consent, not consequences"?

So just like Isaac, the only reason inflicting harm by having children is acceptable for you is because there is some "more worthy" goal which apparently justifies causing unwarranted harm. — khaled

What's unwarranted about harm that results from following a "worthy goal"?

I do not see how you justify causing suffering on a third party for your own desire, knowing full well they may not share your goal of creating the next generation of caring and capable humans, and knowing full well that they may come to despise their existence. — khaled

I justify it by making the assumption that other humans are like me, are capable of reasons, and thus if I use my reason sufficiently well I will reach the same conclusions they would.

Are there many other situations where you impose harm on an innocent party for your own goals? — khaled

Any kind of punishment would seem to fit that bill. Like putting people in prison I judge to have violated the law (if I have that power), or boycotting a business I judge to be unethical.

An unborn child developing into an individual with a will and well-being is (generally speaking) a logical consequence once one makes the decision to have children, thus should be taken into account prior to this decision. I don't see why this is controversial. — Tzeentch

What's controversial is treating this prediction as if it was the state of affairs. To use another analogy: Let's say I developed a new flavor of ice-cream. Any given selection of ingredients will taste good to some people and bad to others. These are predictable consequences. But if I hand out my ice-cream to random customers, I cannot possibly attempt to only give my ice-cream to people that will like it.

What kind of answer is that? You said an individual was being forced into something. Now you're saying you don't even know where they are? — Isaac

I'm just being honest. Obviously, I don't know where they are. But I can say beyond a reasonable doubt that no one is born voluntarily.

Then an assumption that they'd absolutely love it is as reasonable as an assumption that they'd hate it. Since we're in a position where we're uniquely unable to ask, what's wrong with taking a guess? — Isaac

Would you jump out of a plane knowing there's a 25% chance your parachute wouldn't work? If not, what's wrong with taking a gamble? 75% chance for a positive experience.

So your own answer to that question would be "no - it's nit that simple because the central issue is consent, not consequences"? — Isaac

No.

What I sought to point out with that comment is that the question whether a child's will, well-being and ability to consent should be taken into account prior to the decision of having children, is a matter of considering the logical consequences of childbirth, which are them coming to be as an individual with those faculties.

What's controversial is treating this prediction as if it was the state of affairs. To use another analogy: Let's say I developed a new flavor of ice-cream. Any given selection of ingredients will taste good to some people and bad to others. These are predictable consequences. But if I hand out my ice-cream to random customers, I cannot possibly attempt to only give my ice-cream to people that will like it. — Echarmion

You don't force people to eat your ice cream.

You don't force people to eat your ice cream. — Tzeentch

The analogy isn't about consent. It's about predictions and decisions.

In the context of our discussion those things cannot be seen seperately.

Not being able to get consent for an important decision that is made on someone else's behalf would greatly impact how I would weigh predictions and make a decision, if I choose to make a decision at all.

If I come to the conclusion the decision is too important to be made without consent, then I have no issue with choosing non-action.

no one is born voluntarily. — Tzeentch

No one breathes voluntarily either. Is that a problem you feel we need to address?

Would you jump out of a plane knowing there's a 25% chance your parachute wouldn't work? If not, what's wrong with taking a gamble? 75% chance for a positive experience. — Tzeentch

Basic risk assessment. The experience would have to be really good. And yes, people who find the experience really good do take that risk for exactly those reasons so I'm not sure what you think that example shows.

What I sought to point out with that comment is that the question whether a child's will, well-being and ability to consent should be taken into account prior to the decision of having children, is a matter of considering the logical consequences of childbirth, which are them coming to be as an individual with those faculties. — Tzeentch

So we go back in time or what? How do we take into account a child's will and ability to consent when both of those things only come to exist after the decision we're supposed to be taking them into account in?

No one breathes voluntarily either. Is that a problem you feel we need to address? — Isaac

No one forces you to breathe, so I don't think this is a good comparison.

Basic risk assessment. The experience would have to be really good. And yes, people who find the experience really good do take that risk for exactly those reasons so I'm not sure what you think that example shows. — Isaac

Well, everyone is free to make such an assessment for themselves. Things get complicated when we force someone else to jump out of a plane with those odds, no?

So we go back in time or what? How do we take into account a child's will and ability to consent when both of those things only come to exist after the decision we're supposed to be taking them into account in? — Isaac

You cannot, which is exactly the issue.

No one forces you to breathe, so I don't think this is a good comparison. — Tzeentch

No one forces you to be born either. It's the involuntary action of oxytocin on the mother's physiology.

Well, everyone is free to make such an assessment for themselves. Things get complicated when we force someone else to jump out of a plane with those odds, no? — Tzeentch

At those odds yes. You'd previously admitted you have no idea what the odds actually are in life so why would you think such a comparison relevant.

You cannot, which is exactly the issue. — Tzeentch

Why is it an 'issue'. It doesn't seem to present any problem as far as I can see. We can't, so we don't. Seems simple.

At those odds yes. You'd previously admitted you have no idea what the odds actually are in life so why would you think such a comparison relevant. — Isaac

At what odds would it be acceptable to force someone to jump from a plane?

Why is it an 'issue'. — Isaac

One would be forcing an individual to experience life, without being able to ensure whether they want to. An anti-natalist would say this is sufficient reason to refrain from doing so.

It is not.

It is taking into account what will logically come about as a consequence of one's actions. — Tzeentch

Denying it doesn't make it so.

I'm challenging your suggestion that because a child is not yet born, one can do whatever they please in regards to its future. — Tzeentch

What does "its" refer to here?