Yeah, I'd thought about doing one on Ramsey's 'Truth and Probability' (seemed pertinent to some of the discussion we'd recently had), but the problem is still that which opened this discussion. Although, as Baden pointed out, my concerns were apparently wrong with regards to Massimo, they still apply in my own case. Good exegesis is hard work and, in my case more than likely to be wrong in many places. I've been extremely fortunate in my career to have access to, and in some cases worked with, some philosophy professors, and in such a community my first pass at a text has been thoughtfully (and occasionally entirely!) corrected. Such commentary makes the effort worthwhile (as has been very much the case in a select number of discussions here, I should add). But, whether reasonably or not, I baulk at the effort of posting such work here only to have it flooded with a series of banal one-liners barely related to the subject... or that God did it... or some other variation on the ever-popular delusion that because a thing seems that way to someone it must therefore be the case.

Unlike in the academic world, no one here has directly asked anyone's opinion, so anything written is in the realm of "...what do you think?", it's like asking a room full of people for their thoughts on your understanding - it matters who's in the room (or at least, it does to me), not in terms of the nature of the response, but in terms of the self-justification for the effort in the first place.

Anyway, too much psychology already and not enough philosophical content. Tl:Dr Maybe one day, but heavily dependent on the types of response I think I'm likely to receive.

Yeah, you're probably right, you've more experience with this community than I have. Having the good fortune to be (semi-)retired I've a bit more freedom to indulge in whatever interests me at the time. Having said that, I like to think there's a happy medium between operose exegesis and some of the ad hoc reckons that seem to so inexcusably annoy me. I thought something like that might still be worth filtering out into one place, but not if the disadvantages you mentioned are going to be too onerous.

Making this about reading only academic papers from other people, would take any personal creative element out of the mix. — schopenhauer1

Two things. Firstly, I'm not talking about making anything 'only' about academic papers, I was only suggesting a category dedicated to it. Secondly, I think the sort of personal creative element you're talking about here just doesn't lend itself very well to forum discussion. You may well have a perfectly lovely idea about the way the world is (or should be) but there it will stop. Discussion either goes to "oh that's nice", or "I don't think so" (often less pleasantly put).

Any matter where there's real depth to be gotten into, 99% if the time someone's already written about it.

All it takes is for a few people to dedicate their effort and time. There have been lots of suggestions for reading groups over the past few months, mainly by Wallows, but nothing has come of them. — jamalrob

I don't mean to be overly pessimistic here (it's a known character flaw), but doesn't the second sentence rather just indicate that there's simply no one available (for whatever reason) to put in the requisite 'time and effort'? If that is indeed all it takes, then the groups would not have come to nothing if there were such people here would they?

I've already dug myself too deep here so I might as well see it through now, but my take would be that there is a sufficient number of interesting, dedicated people to carry off a great discussion going through some text, but such discussions just seem to get wearyingly hijacked by a certain kind of post (chiefly of the the 'I've not read the text but here's wot I rekon' type, followed closely by the '...and so there is a god' type). The main contributors get fed up and just stop.

Stopping that requires a lot more moderation (not just by official moderators) and I can see now good reasons why that can't happen, so we have already, perhaps, the best compromise.

There's been a good Philosophical Investigations reading group within the last while. We never finished the book, though. — fdrake

Yeah, I took part in that. It was quite good in places, but I'm thinking here about the reasons why such a promising start seemed to fade out. The people involved didn't just stop posting, so it's not a matter of their having trouble setting the time aside. I very much doubt such passionate people simply decided they were no longer interested in Wittgenstein. If we want to keep threads like that going it would be useful to know why they stopped wouldn't it?

Check the section called "Learning Centre". — Metaphysician Undercover

Not quite what I had in mind, not so much requests for help with papers, or guidance with reading. I was more thinking about grouping those threads which are based on a paper or book and, crucially, intend to stick to the discussion of it.

I think, on reflection, the idea wouldn't work anyway. It's just another way of saying the same thing - namely I've lost enthusiasm for trawling through the garbage to find the content. Probably more my problem than anything wrong with the forum. It is what it is, it's just maybe not for me, that's all.

I get what you're both saying. I don't know if my comment came across the way I intended it, but I didn't necessarily mean we should ban a load of people (although I can think of plenty...!). I really just meant exactly what Sushi said...

It is then clear to see who the culprits are and they’ll eventually be ignored, smarten up, and/or weed out other such people so we can readily ignore them too. — I like sushi

When I talked about control over post quality, I didn't mean to imply the mods should swoop in and delete, or ban, anyone who transgresses a strict code of standards. I'm quite sure I'd have been banned if that were the case. I meant exactly what is mentioned above, I just don't find it to be happening.

Recently I flagged a post which, in no uncertain terms, endorsed the murder of women who commit adultery (as the just the latest in a string of heavily misogynistic posts). The mods decided the post was not inflammatory enough to break the rules - which was their call to make, but more worryingly everyone else just carried on engaging with the guy as if he were just normal. It's the lack of reaction from the community as a whole that concerned me, not the lack of policing.

Same for Bartrick's threads (which I'm sure we all know about). His childishness is not ignored to the point that he gets the message that this is a more mature forum for discussion than that. People still engage with the argument, as if there was anything more than massaging a narcissist at stake.

Maybe I'm just getting less tolerant in my old age (I hate to be a cliche, but it's a known trend). On the off-chance that I'm not, however...

@Baden,@fdrake - Feeling bad about complaining without any concrete suggestion. So... Would it be possible, and desirable, to create a section/category for discussing actual papers or works of philosophy (or perhaps even papers on closely related topics)? As far as I'm aware, every post has to be put into the right category anyway, so policing this would not take much more moderation effort? It would be easy then for ornery old grumps like me to simply turn off all the other categories (as I already have done with Philosophy of Religion), and have a forum which appears dedicated to discussing more serious matters than the latest 'proof' of God from our seemingly endless supply of undiscovered geniuses.

Basically we'd have a way of pushing the less serious posts to one side without having to delete or ban anything or anyone. Just in the way that the less serious posts are already pushed to the lounge, anything not discussing the paper in question can be gently pushed over to one of the 'general' categories.

As I said, I'm only speculating in the absence of any evidence to the contrary. If you're happy with Massimo's given reasons then I stand corrected. I should say that I'm talking about a very recent deterioration in the quality of threads, so whilst I'm pleased that such a luminary found some of our posts engaging, but it's not really the same content I'm primarily concerned about.

if you, Isaac, or anyone wants to help increase quality, please flag discussions you feel are unworthy of the place. — Baden

Yeah, tried that. If advocating the murder of adultresses isn't going to make the grade I don't think me flagging Bartricks' childishness, for example, (which seems entirely benign by comparison) is going to achieve anything.

(1) users can selectively respond and read, like the under used "following" posters option in profiles — fdrake

Well, I should enjoy my conversations with the two spambot's currently following me... Just waiting for them to post something...

Seriously, I get what you're saying here, but what I was suggesting might be a problem was more about community than individual posts, after all, if there's no filter we might as well just be Twitter.

(2) people's interest in philosophy usually starts long before researching much of it, and it's a valuable space for learning for that user type — fdrake

This may well be true, but that's not the problem here. The problem is with people who don't seem to have any interest in learning at all, the recent spate of threads have just been increasingly shrill versions of am-I-right?

(3) less restricted posting stimulates discussion — fdrake

You'd have to explain how you see that working, I'm not sure I get it.

(4) increasing content standard to make the place more attractive to seasoned academics would simultaneously reduce our attractiveness for having a large and relatively high standard (for the internet) of discussion. — fdrake

Not sure I get this either. Are you saying that increasing standards would reduce involvement to a level that would be more detrimental than the improvement in the first place?

---

It's not really a big deal, it's your forum (meaning the owners/mods in general) so I'm not here trying to convince you to run it one way or another, probably should have just kept my mouth shut. It's just that, flawed as it is, this place seems to be the best of its kind. The few email and slack groups I'm involved in professionally don't have anywhere near the breath of interest somewhere truly open like this place does, so I've some interest in it's standards, but, if it's going to continue the way it's then I'll just have to put up with it.

I'm hesitant to speculate about another's motives, but as I don't suppose the professor will have any interest in divulging his reasons (nor should he) we will be left guessing, nonetheless, why it didn't work out as we'd expected.

I was concerned from the start about how much Prof. Pigliucci might actually know about the Internet's top philosophy forum (according to Google). It certainly wasn't what I was expecting when I first joined. Take a look at the discussions currently on our front page. Many are banal, childish and deeply insulting to the topic. I don't want to get involved with them, and I'm not even a philosopher. Did we really expect a professional (and well-known) philosopher to get involved with the kind of crap that seems to inevitably dominate even the most promising of discussions?

The questions themselves, I thought, were mostly very well thought out, but I'm not in the least surprised about the professor's lack of enthusiasm for the project as a whole. Answering serious questions is one thing, getting involved in a discussion which (for all he knows) is likely to deteriorate into the sort of nonsense exemplified by the "what is truth" discussion, is another matter entirely.

I know it's not my place to say, it's not my forum, but if there's a desire to attract involvement from serious academics then somehow (and I understand it's a lot of work) there's going to need to be more control over post quality.

It could, of course, just be that he's busy, and all this is just completely off the mark, but I've wanted to mention my concerns about quality for a little while and this seemed as good an opportunity as any.

We are the bodies that struggle to live, and struggle to live from conception. Consent is inherent in the striving to live and thrive. There is no fetus that has not consented to life. — Coben

Nicely put.

I define ownership as things that you worked for, and "worked" excludes any action that infringes on the rights of others. — Harry Hindu

What 'rights of others' does this work need to avoid the infringement of?

I ask because if one of those rights is the right to property, then your argument is circular, if not, then where do these 'rights' come from such that they exclude the right to property (which seems to be listed in quite a number of 'bills of rights')?

And then, yes, there can be no evidence that this Value X is the most important, or even more extreme, outweighs any other value. — Coben

Yes, and I think that's what's being missed here. @schopenhauer1 is arguing entirely on the basis that some interlocutor might dislike the consequences of their position (namely perceived inconsistency - not that I'm convinced there really is any), yet when people (quite rightly) baulk at the consequence of the extinction of all humanity, we're told we must just put up with that feeling.

If the point of arguing here is...

... by picking out elements that you disagree with and seeing what it is that you would disagree about that and then seeing if at the end you really disagree with it, or you disagree with some of its consequences. If you do disagree with it, then it can be shown that what you disagree with has implications that you may also not like and maybe reconsider the original. — schopenhauer1

... then any foundational belief which ends with "... and so we ought to wipe out the human race" is as good a candidate as any I can think of for revision.

What possible purpose could there be to wanting to avoid suffering, but not minding if all creatures capable of suffering cease to exist? I mean, I known filling in tax returns is a bit of chore, but the extinction of the human race is a bit of an overreaction, no?

The first principles to do no harm and to not force others would be respecting the individual as an autonomous being that might have choices (like not wanting to be forced or harmed). — schopenhauer1

Which would just be another first principle, of course.

it is individuals where ethics is ultimately realized — schopenhauer1

Is this just another first principle, or are you claiming this to be objectively the case?


I still don't understand where you're going with this. If all you have are some unsupported first principles which (on the face of it) are quite odd, and so unlikely to be shared, then what purpose could possibly be served by stating them?

You can't realistically hope to convince others to hold them too - after all, you can forward no rational argument for having them in the first place. You can't expect anyone to be drawn by the consequences - the extinction of the human race. So what is it that compels you to keep writing this stuff?

My feeling with all these antinatalist arguments is that they're putting the cart before the horse. They name some ethical principle which (unless you're religious) can only have been derived from some aspect of human nature. Then they use this one ethic to suggest we should ignore a whole series of other aspects of human nature (the desire to procreate, a feeling of belonging, a sense of community etc).
I just want to know - why pick that one.

It's axiomatic in his system.
For good or for ill. — Coben

I'm getting that. What seems odd about his approach, which is what I'm trying to draw out, is that he wants to question the ethical axioms of others, in terms of more simple foundations, but then present his own axiom as a fait accompli.

Yes. Why avoid causing suffering?

So I'm just wondering what the point would be. Why not cause suffering?

I just asked if you felt an individual has a duty to alleviate suffering. I'm aware that you also think individuals should not force others to do stuff without their prior consent. I already stated my strong disagreement with the universal application of that. I'm wondering specifically if you have any other ethics or if this radical non-aggression principle is your only aim.

It would be my position not to use people in present generations (cause conditions of harm for them) for future generations to be better off. — schopenhauer1

So no one has any duty to alleviate suffering?

Ha!

Of course, your introducing a Dirac prior joke at this point just confirms my expectations!

The equivalence is ironically still true because both are false; the duck is not wearing a black-band and nor is the rabbit. — fdrake

Clever. I thought I had you there. I'll have to appeal to selective black-band-blindness the refusal to accept that rabbits can wear black bands, but an enthusiastic belief that ducks always do.

The rabbit wears a black band on its neck if and only if the duck wears a black band on its neck. — fdrake

Not if you're 'black-band-blind'. When was the last time you saw your own nose? It's constantly in your field of vision, your brain just refuses to see it. In some unfortunate cases of brain injury, this effect gets shifted an the patient can't see any noses at all!

Another way of saying this is that propositional content occurs in the same way as perceptual features; they are of the same ontological order/stratum/regional ontology. They're all events under some representation that tracks some generating conditions, so long as the conditions which generate the propositional content are tracking (strongly informationally constrain or are accurately modelled by) the conditions which generate the perceptual features; differences in one track differences in another, content in one track content in another, changes in hidden states in one track changes in hidden states in another, we're in a relative accord whereby we can state truths of what is modelled by counting it as a model output. — fdrake

This sounds very promising (in that it gives a model of Tarski in terms that Davidson could use) but I'm concerned about the reification of' propositional content here. I take it by 'propositional content' you mean the meta-language half of a Tarski truth-theory sentence. But Tarski limited it to formal language and you're extending it to ontology.

So let's say propositional content exists, but is different from perceptual features. I perceive "the cat is on the mat", and 'the cat is on the mat', therefore my perception (turned into a statement) is true.

So what kind of a thing is propositional content? It's not the way the world really is (that would be direct realism with correspondence theory). It's not the way I believe the world is to any degree (we're wanting to see if we can eliminate belief talk). It's not the shared belief, perceptions or any other agreement (if it were then dissent wouldn't be 'false' except by some appeal to authority). It's not semantics (those would apply to the first half, the statement itself). It's not logical complexes (see Ramsey's proof that complexes lead to problems of meaning).

So I've got what they're not. But I don't feel any clearer as to what they are than if you'd told me that flumpkins were an ontologically distinct occurrence.

Why would it need to be impossible? What's the reasoning behind (N1)? — fdrake

Basically, if it's not impossible we've no grounds to say there aren't incommensurable conceptual schemes, only that there don't seem to be any, which is quite a different claim. If I wish (as I do) to make a claim that we cannot judge two competing models on the basis of their proximity to reality, we can only do so by proxy - how well they work, the counter to that claim, from a Davidsonian position, would only work in two circumstances.

1. The two models are really fitting/organising the same features of reality, and we can translate them by reference to these features. Or

2. The two models are really fitting/organising the same perceptual features (fallibly linked to reality - but this is irrelevant) and we can translate them by reference to these features.

I can't see 1 (direct realism, I suppose) being the case, and I'm guessing you don't either, so we're talking about 2.

You're saying that our behaviour and our language give us good cause (albeit fallible) to accept 2. That the principle of charity should direct us to accept 2, even where we have doubts.

I'm with you so far, but it seems unwarranted to extend this to literally all cases, just on principle. And 'fleshing out the contexts' in which differences might be actualized, is a good aim, but again seems unwarranted to assume will be possible in all cases. That essentially back to where necessity matters in your N1. Only necessity here (which is lacking) would warrant a universal presumption covering all cases.

Am I way off in saying that the majority of our difference here comes down to how much latitude we think reality gives us to model it accurately - what the chances are of two wildly different models being both within those parameters - what the chances are of two language-sharing humans creating models based off radically different aspects of reality?

we can find defeater contexts for every model, we can clearly revise our knowledge. — fdrake

What if they're not 'defeater' contexts, but just indeterminable alternative contexts. That matters I think, because we'd have no reason to revise our knowledge, but we'd have reason to accept other, equally valid alternatives.

Plus also - as a matter of simple pragmatics, this does seem to be the way perception works, it just gets very difficult to frame and progress with questions about that interface (perception - causes of perception) without being able to talk about alternative models.

It isn't necessary that I believe the cat is on the mat if and only if the cat is on the mat in order for the cat to be on the mat (the cat could be on the mat and I could be out of the house and believing the cat is outside) — fdrake

This is where partial belief comes in. To say you 'believe the cat was outside' would be to act only that way. You have a hundred people at your disposal searching for the cat (which you've suddenly acquired an urgent need for) and you send all of them looking outside. If you send even one of them to the mat, then you at least partially believe that the cat is on the mat.

If it's not something you at least partially believe (even to the tiniest degree) then how could the question even arise? This is what Ramsey means by saying we'd have to be God-like to be 100% certain of all true propositions.

That which my perceptual features aggregate into "my cat" counts as the cat, but the represented entity also counts as my cat. This "counting as" works both ways - it's relational. — fdrake

Yes, I think I'd agree with that, but is it commensurable? Is it impossible for someone else to have a different set of hidden states combine to make a slightly different entity? If so, their entities (and relations) may be incommensurable with yours because, despite the fact that we're happy to accept whatever aggregate we perceive as real, we cannot refer to the simples constituting it (they're hidden). So if someone did have a different aggregate it would not be possible to translate it by reference to shared simples.

Again, just to emphasise, I think Davidson is right the vast majority of the time, but just not all cases.

What I'd replace the notion of necessity with is (fallible) accord of (fallible) perceptual features; then treat the perceptual features as real objects with regularities that (fallibly, contextually) ensure the (fallible) accord. — fdrake

Yep, totally with you on this one too, but this doesn't lead to an impossibility of alternative models does it? More than one set of perceptual features could be no less in (fallible) accord? Treat them as real objects, yes. Admit that their regularities are in accord with something (and so must in some way reflect that something), yes to that too. But if their accordance does not exhaust all the possible ways of being in accord, then you'll end up, by this means, with more than one reality.

Does this seem about right? — fdrake

Yes, I think so. I sense there's a commitment resulting from this that I'm not going to like, so I'm wary of the fact that it's not exactly how I would word it (laying out my escape route early on!), but yes,. It's related to the same answer I would give to Banno, so I've put them in the same post.

What about adopting the view that what counts as a simple depends on what one is doing? That something can be simple in one way, complex in others? — Banno

Let's take "the Cat is on the Mat" (in the meta language - the second part of a Tarski Theory). I could also say "a Cat-Mat exists" where a Cat-Mat, to me, is what you'd call a complex of the simples Cat and Mat, but to me, it's just a simple Cat-Mat. You'd claim three relational propositions (after Ramsey)

1. The cat is on the mat
2. The cat has the complex property {being on the mat}
3. The mat has the complex property {having the cat on it}

I'd claim only one - the Cat-Mat exists.

Both models are within the constraints set by reality - if you want to stroke the cat, you can reach out to where the mat is and your belief about the location of the cat will be justified. If I want to take my Cat-Mat to vet/carpet-cleaner (who in my world are the same person), I reach out to where my Cat-Mat is and my belief that it exists is justified by my interaction with it.

Both models could potentially be wrong, evidenced by our failure to interact with them object(s) in the way we were expecting.

But crucially, each model makes demonstrably different logical constructs in any truth claim. This, for Ramsey, makes it very difficult to say they have the same meaning.

Davidson, it seems, would like to say that in all cases anyone's Cat-Mat can be translated in terms of Cats and Mats. It might seem as weird as me talking to you about Cat-Heads and Cat-Bodies as if they were two different things, but it's essentially doable. I agree for most cases. Where I disagree is when we indirectly reference hidden states. Here you have a Cat-Mat, I have a Feline-Rug and we can't talk directly about the simples either complex is constructed from because we don't have referential access to them, but we can infer (from the various psychological and neuroscientific experiments with perception) that such simples exist.

Again, I think Davidson would like these to 'drop out' of the conversation on the grounds of a lack of reference, but I think they do have a reference in the same way as I can refer to "the things I don't know" - no direct object-reference relation, but I can nonetheless infer there must be such things.

Ownership requires upkeep, just as we’re to blame, to some degree (depending on control), if we put on weight, drink too much or smoke. — I like sushi

Does it? If I own a car and just let it crumble into a pile of dust, do I not still own it? I suppose once it's completely disintegrated, it's no longer a car so I've lost ownership of it, but that;'s not unique to ownership.

I cannot cut my arm off and lend it to you for a week then get it back again — I like sushi

I think you could. No matter what state it's in on it's return, people would still say "here's your arm", not "here's an arm".

Legal ownership is relative to where you live, or even nonexistent, but human behaviour is pretty ubiquitous regardless of its various manifestations of dealing with the appropriation of material resources. — I like sushi

Ii think that's the matter that should be addressed first, if you want to look at the origins of ownership. On what grounds do you say "human behaviour is pretty ubiquitous regardless of its various manifestations of dealing with the appropriation of material resources"? Is it the result of some study you've done into human behaviour in this regard?

If outputs of whatever system of belief formation we have actually were probability statements, rather than being realisations of probability models, we'd have an easier time eliciting our own priors. This is a distinction between sampling from what is most probable in realising an active perception from a model and those samples being probability statements. — fdrake

I agree with you here so I'm not sure I picked up on the point you were making before correctly. The probability I'm suggesting you have is in your disposition to act. In Ramseyan terms, it's something like the number of times you would take some action over another in repeated circumstances. In neuroscience terms its more interesting because when you look at the staccato action of neural signals related to the timing of backward modulating actions, you do genuinely get a probability out of neural structures. So it's entirely feasible that a belief (neural structure) is genuinely a probability of some response (and an exhaustive probability of all other possible responses). That is the framework in which I mean that you do have a number, not in the sense that you might add it to your statement.

The model says look left (disposition) and then we look left (event). — fdrake

Same unresolved issue here I'm afraid (are we getting anywhere?). It's only our expectation-mediated perception which tell us what that output is (that we did indeed look left), it's still only a reflection of what we are disposed to see/feel, constrained by what actually is happening, but not in any way necessarily 'true' to it. Take phantom limb. They're not 'really' moving their arm, but their perception is telling them they are, and without contrary input, that's exactly the 'event' they'll perceive. Not what we'd want to call the real event at all, simply what they were expecting to perceive without any contrary evidence to deal with. Faced with conflicting contrary evidence the brain will make up all kinds of stories to marry the two sources, any or none of which may actually reflect reality.

Upon what basis do you believe that necessity is relevant at all for vouchsafing a representative connection between external stimuli and output states of active perception models? — fdrake

I don't. But necessity is relevant for theories of truth based on the objects thereby referred to. To consider sense objects as simples is fine in most cases and the necessity of those simples is irrelevant. But to claim (as Davidson seems to) that those simples are all there is, universally shared... That seems to me to be making a claim for their to be necessarily that way, and that claim I think, can be refuted.

how can it necessarily be the case that "Saturn" is a model of something when we cannot imbue necessity into any model output? — fdrake

Yeah, fair point. I'd have to dial back my use of the term, not sure how it affects the argument though? Surely without that necessity, you still cannot go from there to reify 'Saturn', simply on the grounds that it is not necessarily a model?

Does a stimulus constrain perceptual features associated with it? If it did not constrain perceptual features associated with it, where does all this accord come from? — fdrake

Yes, but in a number of ways, only some of which will be relevant to our form of life at any one time, hence the possibility to have more than one accord with our perceptual features. The chances of it being the case that something like 'the cat' could really be both on and off something like 'the mat' at the same time depending on how you look at it are very slim, which is why I think Davidson is right most of the time. But with more fundamental perception, or with less concrete objects, it is perfectly possible that their form, properties or constitution really are different depending on how you perceive them, and yet that final perception is all we have access to to give a name.

Prior to all written law there was still some concept of ‘ownership — I like sushi

That seems to be putting the cart before the horse. Hadn't we better establish if there was such a concept prior to all written law? I can see how, logically, there must have been immediately prior to written law (in order for said law to write about it) but that's still influenced by the intent to make a law.

in day-to-day speech, what it means to ‘own your thoughts/actions’. — I like sushi

I never say such a thing in day-to-day speech, nor have I ever heard anyone do so, so I'm probably the wrong person to ask about that.

Prior to socially decreed laws people still have a sense of ‘having’ and ‘not having’. — I like sushi

Probably, but I don't think that's the same as 'owning'. I might 'have' a library book. I don't 'own' it.

I only ‘own’ you in such a sense as you’re willing/able to play along dependent upon your own sense of ‘control’ under the influence of some law. — I like sushi

Well, that's one way of looking at it, but we could equally say (if slavery were legal) that you continue to 'own' me even if I don't play along. You just now 'own' a very recalcitrant slave.

The ‘laws’/‘rules’ merely fit around our sense of limited control, which are effectively where a sense of ownership lays in part. I’m not suggesting this is all there is to it, but it seems hard to deny it is a significant point right? — I like sushi

So you're saying that the limits of our powers must constrain what we can make law and so examining those limits tells us something about those laws? OK, I can see that being a useful exercise.

I agree, in that respect, the extent to which we can 'control' something is the maximum extent to which we can make a law conferring ownership. Is there any more fine-grained constraint than that? The extent to which others in our community are prepared to allow the exercise of such control perhaps? Maybe that's why we no longer have slavery.

Prior to the existence of written law. That is why I mentioned ‘origin of inequality’ - a long running anthropological question. — I like sushi

Do you have any examples of 'ownership' being used prior to written law? My etymological dictionary has it as being from ""one who owns, one who has legal or rightful title," first used in the mid 14th century.

In this, as in so much else, the Law rules. What is the difference between "I have" and "I own"? Merely the difference between having something and having the legal right to something. — Ciceronianus the White

Exactly.

Which makes the all referents of such perception-talk and model-dependent realism socially mediated... doesn't it? — creativesoul

Not with inderect reference it doesn't. We can (and do) refer to 'hidden states' without directly identifying objects within them.

Or, put another way, the cat being on the mat causes (or strongly probabilistically promotes) my belief that the cat is on the mat. — fdrake

I don't think we'll ever see eye to eye on this (unfortunately!). We seem to keep coming back to the same disagreements. In my view, something causes my belief that the cat is on the mat, but not necessarily a cat, a mat and the spatial relation 'on'.

Statements are still true or false simpliciter. "The cat is on the mat" is either true or false. Nevertheless, belief must come in degrees of probability. — fdrake

Again, this distinction relies on 'cat,' mat', and 'on' being simples outside of my belief in them - again, not my belief in an external world - I don't see any sense in denying that - just my belief in the division and relations.

A logic of belief in Ramsey's would look like Bayesian computation. — fdrake

Yes - you see the link between Ramsey, Friston and my interest in psychology.

It looks to me that the best bet would be "There are more than 3 bodies currently in orbit around Saturn", but I don't have an explicit probability assigned to the statement. — fdrake

But in Bayesian terms you do. Ramsey's system for measuring belief is really complicated. I don't think I could do it justice in a single post. Plus it has quite a few flaws - not enough to slay it, in my opinion, but due to Ramsey's untimely death, it was never properly ironed out. A topic for a thread, but I don't sense a strong community of Ramsey fans here to go through it with me. As such we might just have to leave that one hanging.

why would my predisposition towards any of the statements in the list be necessary for there to be a given number of bodies in orbit around Saturn? — fdrake

Not an easy question to answer.

Simple version - 'Saturn', 'number', 'bodies', and 'orbit' are all themselves models of something, but are not necessary models of that something, they could be other than they are. What they are is a property of your mind and so any adjustment to that model (say by observing a fourth body orbiting Saturn) that would impact on whether it is the case ('is true') that only three bodies orbit Saturn, is a property of your belief.

Complicated version -

I've gone through a bit of this with Banno above, so there'll be a bit of repetition. No framework is without its problems. One of the things I love about Ramsey's writing is that he's so acutely aware all the time of the other possibilities, he even at one point splits his whole essay into what might be the case if there were complex entities and what would be the case if there weren't, never deciding which. Anyway, here I think there are simply more problems with the alternatives.

Say there really are three bodies orbiting Saturn and ignore for now my concerns about those terms - let's just say they're simples. For us to say "it's true that there are three bodies orbiting Saturn" is the same as simply saying "there are three bodies orbiting Saturn", which is the same as saying "it's a fact that there are three bodies orbiting Saturn" - I think we agree on this. But it's not the same as saying "there are four bodies orbiting Saturn". So the simple 'Saturn' has an existent complex property {having three bodies orbiting it}. Also the simples 'the three bodies' have the property {being in orbit around Saturn}, all the while 'there are three bodies orbiting Saturn'. All three say the same thing, they have the same meaning, but they do not have the same logical structure (one has three elements, the others only two. So we have something with a different logical structure having nonetheless the the same meaning. Ramsey thinks this is deeply problematic for logic and so rejects the existence of such complexes. It's just that the consequence of this is that 'there are three bodies orbiting Saturn' no longer exists as an entity, so Ramsey relegates it to the success of a belief that it is so.

It's very possible I've misunderstood Ramsey. He's right at the edge of my comfort zone when it comes to logic and mathematics, so all this is to be taken tentatively - just in case that doesn't come across in my writing.

Arguing over what some given law dictates doesn’t seem to do a great deal if we’re to get to the heart of what ‘ownership’ means. — I like sushi

If I say "I own that", I'm most of the time talking about legal ownership. There's no 'heart' of what ownership means. It means whatever it is used for in an expression, and most of the time it is used to assert a legal right.

With regards to the other questions, I admit they're interesting to a point, but rare. I rarely have to claim I own my body, or my actions, these seem very unusual language uses to me. Even with something like organ donation after death, the claim of ownership would still be a legal one.

I'm honestly struggling to think of examples where the word might be used in a non-legal sense, perhaps you have some?

The state would only decide to not defend my ownership of something if I acquired it by infringing on the rights of others. — Harry Hindu

But the question was "what makes something yours" not "how is your claim currently protected". We're looking for a property attached to the object you claim is yours which makes it yours. If you say that property is {having acquired it without infringing the legal rights of others} then it would be impossible to ever aquire the first possession - legal rights came after property ownership. Also, your criteria doesn't account for ownership between countries - whose law would the 'rights' be considered from?

Most importantly though, the argument is circular. If you are going to claim that the right to property is derived from a lack of infringement of rights in acquisition, then one of those rights must surely be the right to property. A right can't be established on the basis of its own existence.

When we say that some statement is true, we do not mean the same thing as when we say that it is believed. — Banno

Nor doe the truth theory imply this. Only that truth must, in some cases, be a property of beliefs, not that being believed is the same as being true.

there are things that are not believed and yet true. — Banno

If truth is a property of propositions, then you don't escape this - we might no less want to say "there are things which are true and yet have no propositions formed about them". The only way out of this, if you want to be able to make those kinds of assertions, is to have truth a property of facts. But then you have to be a realist about facts and this causes all sorts of other problems which have caused philosophers (like Ramsey) to question this line also. People like Ramsey haven't forwarded the idea of truth being a property of belief on a whim without realising the consequences.

Say 'the cat is on the mat' is a fact (a true one), then being on the mat must be a complex property of 'the cat', which, being true, must also be a fact. But 'having the cat on it' is also a complex property of 'the mat' which must also be real as it is also a true fact. Yet there is only one thing that is the case 'the cat is on the mat', but we have three facts which are now real (in order for them to be true). They are not logically identical (they cant be because one contains three logical elements, the others only two), yet they are equivalent (only the case by virtue of the others). Basically, the three say the same thing, and so presumably have the same meaning, but they cannot have the same meaning because they are different logical constructs.

Likewise, if want truth to be a property of propositions, there are problems.We end up being unable to make sense of "He said something true" without invoking the proposition and the name for that proposition in the same language. We could surmount that problem by treating "he said" as a complex, Something like (∃α)(∃β)(∃ℜ) [He asserted (αℜβ), and αℜβ], but then here no property is mentioned at all. Truth becomes an incomplete symbol, which may well be an adequate position (Ramsey certainly thought so), but it doesn't solve the problem you had originally.

I don't think so. Rather, it acknowledges that some are not. Whereas, you seem to be taking a hard line stance that we have no direct access to any referents at all; Have I misunderstood? — creativesoul

Not quite. The issue that originally drew me into this conversation was one about the model-dependant nature of perception. It is well-evidenced that we do not have direct access to the referents of perception-talk. As such we need to be able talk in terms of model-dependant realism in order to discuss the matter. Once outside of that realm, and into the realm of socially-mediated objects, I think Davidson is right - there are simples which are sufficiently common to all language users as to render 'conceptual schemes' about them completely translatable and therefore redundant. Once outside of this realm the other direction - theoretical theories in physics, we again, need to be able to talk about simples which are not shared, which are present in some schemes and not in others and whose presence can sometimes make the schemes incommensurable.

Why should people be used like this? What you are saying is that we must be pressured to violate negative ethics in order fix some X situation. Two wrongs don't make a right. — schopenhauer1

Exactly. As stands now (and always did stand) as a complete summary of your posts

"if you believe all of my ethical positions you will also believe my conclusions as to what range of actions they lead to". — Isaac

Your argument here is only valid if you agree that your particular non-aggression ethic is a reasonable constraint on behaviour but the need to act to avoid significant harm is not a reasonable constraint on behaviour. I don't share that belief.

Because there ARE people that do not fit the mold. People are not cookie-cutters. — schopenhauer1

I didn't ask you how you know there are such people. I asked you how you know there 'always will be' such people, which is the claim required in order to support your position.

If you are breaking negative ethics (non-aggression/non-harm) in order to fulfill some positive ethics (I think this is better for you, this is better for society), then something has been violated. — schopenhauer1

Exactly. So this adds nothing to the very simple proposition that "if you believe all of my ethical positions you will also believe my conclusions as to what range of actions they lead to". This has already been established, and repeating it is not yielding anything new.

Forcing someone to be born because society MUST benefit from children of certain parents (which is just odd to me anyways in your argument), would be wrong. — schopenhauer1

Why say "society must benefit"? If society is going to continue to exist (which all the evidence seems to indicate it will) then its not a matter of any ideological positive commitment at all, any more than if a refugee came to your house you would be obliged to feed them. You didn't cause the problem, but you're obliged to make it better.

There will be another generation, that generation will have problems to solve. Those are not ideological commitments, they're just inductive beliefs. I have two choices - have children and raise them to help solve those problems, or not have children and leave those problems to someone else to deal with. I can't see any sound ethical position which supports the latter. It sounds like nothing but selfishness.

there will always be people that don't fit — schopenhauer1

I'm asking how you know this.

I am not saying that ethics does not apply to many individuals at once. Rather, what I am saying is ethics does not apply to some third-party entity or concept (e.g. humanity, the species, society, the greater good principle, life for life's sake, the pursuit of happiness, etc.). — schopenhauer1

What is 'society' other than 'many individuals'?

I don't know where you get that last part about generations. All generations would be constrained by the negative ethical principles of non-aggression and non-harm. — schopenhauer1

I'm pointing out that this new tack of 'experimentation' does not add anything new to your previous approaches. If one agrees with your ethical foundation, then it leads to the position you hold. If one has different ethical foundations, they lead to different positions. Your argument that we should not 'experiment' on future generations does not hold if we hold to certain duties (which would then apply also to future generations). If, rather, we only hold to a radical non-aggression principle, your argument stands, but if we hold to such a position, your other arguments stand too, this latest adds nothing.

Again, it is hubris to think we know with surety such outcomes. We simply don't. Even if there is a tendency, and even if we can define and agree upon what "positive outcomes" are, there will certainly be those who don't fit the mold. Thus, there will always be collateral damage. The experimentation aspect is still there. — schopenhauer1

Why is it hubristic for me to state that we know how to make people happy, but not equally hubristic for you to say you know there will always be those who don't fit. How do you access knowledge of the human condition which is hidden from me?

This attempt to turn "some procreation is bad" into "all procreation is bad" just falls flat in every regard. — Tzeentch

Good point - 'experimentation' suggests raising happy (as opposed to distressed) children is an unknown quantity. We know plenty about how to raise happy children, we know plenty about how to make happy adults. The fact that we're not doing either is social and political, nothing to do with procreation.

disagree that ethics is at a social level. The ACTUAL entity affected by any decision isn't a social entity, but the individual within that society. So any decision "socially" made is affecting the individual. If you want to talk about politics or social policy that is one thing, but in terms of ethics, anything that overlooks the individual for an amorphous collective would be missing the target. — schopenhauer1

So you have duties to another single individual, but not duties to a number of individuals collectively. That seems like rather an odd ethical position. Which individual should we pick when more than one is going to be effected by our actions?

It is using of people for the greater good. — schopenhauer1

I can't make any sense of this. Either we all simply do as we please (complete respect for autonomy) or we accept duties which constrain our behaviour with respect to the welfare of others. Given the former, there's nothing stopping us having children, given the latter (presuming they are an inherent part of being human) then any children, real or potential, are going to have those duties too. You seem to want to constrain the current generation with ethical considerations, but absolve the next generation of all responsibilities.