Do you equate beauty to goodness? — Rob J Kennedy

Yes, in that they are each conceptions in aesthetic judgements concerning relative quality.

No, in that the objects of the former are to be appreciated; the objects of the latter are to be respected.

Could just be a turn of phrase…. — Moliere

Oh absolutely. It’s those cursed turns of phrases in the Kantian corpus that instigates his successors to find contradictions. The most infamous being that gawd-awful noumena/phenomena thing. (Sigh)

Anyway, ever onward.
————

….it's the individual, rather than the group, that's more important in thinking through whether a maxim can be universalized, or an act is moral. — Moliere

Agreed. Given the possession of practical reason by humanity in general, then, all else being equal, each member would be individually conditioned by it with respect to his moral disposition, as long as it is the case practical reason is sufficient for the job, which, of course, the Esteemed Professor sought long and hard to prove.

The c.i. merely stipulates the necessary criterion for the worthiness of being happy, from which follows that disregard for it, is to be immoral, which is nothing more than even if some action willfully determined from your own version of pure practical reason makes you happy, you damned sure didn’t deserve to be. You’ve disrespected something along the line, perhaps without even knowing what it was. Or, which is more commonly witnessed, given human nature itself, one does know, but acts in disregard anyway. Either way, we all recognize this feeling we get from one or the other, hence the two primaries….pleasure or pain.

Excellent dialectical theme you’ve created here; I appreciate the thought-provoking aspect, even without total mutual accord.

Individuals will maxims…. — Moliere

I’m sorry, but I just don’t get that. A maxim is a subjective principle; how do we will a principle?

The will is the faculty of right action, or, volition. I can see acting on a principle, or in accordance with a principle, but I don’t see the willing of one.

In the lines just before your quote, is this…..

“…. As I have deprived the will of every impulse which could arise to it from obedience to any law, there remains nothing but the universal conformity of its actions to law in general, which alone is to serve the will as a principle, i.e., I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law. Here, now, it is the simple conformity to law in general, without assuming any particular law applicable to certain actions, that serves the will as its principle and must so serve it, if duty is not to be a vain delusion and a chimerical notion….”

…..in which, to my understanding, just says the will is properly served iff one acts only in conformity to law in general universally, or, which is the same thing, without impulse from inclination or regard to consequence.

Notice as well, he says we will THAT our maxims, which just seems to indicate it is already presupposed.

It’s the little things, donchaknow. Our maxim is to act in a certain way, to will THAT our maxim is obtained, is to will a certain act, which makes much more sense within the theory as a whole.

Dunno…..maybe it’s just me. What say you?

It’s all good. It’s better to have taken the time to digest this philosophy, then to argue over differences in interpretations of it, perhaps from differences in primary sources. You seem to favor CpR, the philosophy concerning the empirical part of ethics, while I draw from Groundwork, which concerns the non-empirical parts, re: morality proper. Actually, you might find a mix of the two, but I kinda don’t.

I'm of the opinion that the three formulations are not "really the same" as Kant claims. — Moliere

An opinion to which you are certainly entitled, but I would offer that Kant, being the non-stop dualist he admits to being, wants it understood the c.i. also has a dualistic nature, re: its form and its content. As such the form is always the same, insofar as commands of reason cannot be self-contradictory, whatever be the act determinable by the formula of its content, which only expresses the relation between an imperfect subject and the objectively necessity…..lawful…..object of his will.
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….aiming to universalize principles…. — Moliere

Granted that a maxim is a subjective principle, is it the principle, or the law of nature which necessarily follows from it, to which universalizing is aimed? I don’t think that which is predicated entirely on subjective constitution has the power of universality as stipulated by the conception of law, especially regarding nature, which in Kant is the totality of all possible things, which in turn manifests as any act by any other moral agent.

If a principle could be universalized, why go through all the trouble of objectively acting as if the mere subjective will, in which the principle resides in the form of pure practical reason, is sufficient causality for all rational beings to follow suit? It is, after all, respect for the law which grounds the interest of the will relative to itself, hence it is respect for the law as universally willed by one, that subsequently becomes the duty of another’s to endorse. In a perfectly moral world, of course, as determined by pure a priori metaphysics.
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quote="Moliere;909588"]….an act can follow the moral law and so be legal….[/quote]

Be…..legal? An act that follows the moral law, is good, a tacit description representing the worthiness of being happy, whether or not such act is in accordance with jurisprudence.

I’m pretty sure you didn’t mean to implicate contingent administrative codes, but…..legal?? I just had to bring that one up, donchaknow. I’d beg forgiveness for quibbling, but I ain’t like that. (Grin)

…..let me know what you think. — Moliere

Regarding the SEP article, an informative compendium of opinions, as are most encyclopedic entries of this particular subject matter.

Regarding the SEP article’s effect on my opinions relative to the subject matter, it informed in a supplemental manner, but not sufficiently enough to alter my understanding of fundamental Kantian moral philosophy.

Kant is adamant that his thesis is not for popular consumption, therefore it fascinates me that folks reference a popular source for their definitive information.

Kant is adamant that his thesis is not for the common understanding, but my understanding is very specific, insofar as it is mine alone, thus it is hardly common. Why do you think he was so derisive of the “…. the arrogant pretensions of the schools…”?

Kant wanted his thesis to be understood; I doubt he figured it important, for that understanding, to also incorporate a familiarity with the affectations of his developmental environment. He wants to be known his reasons grounding what he says, as befits a proper theory, regardless of the conditions by which what he says, came about, except with respect to arguments relative to his peers or predecessors.

I don’t care one whit for his religious background, or even if there was or was not one to care about. I want to know if his epistemological and moral philosophies reflect my personality, or are that by which I may judge otherwise.

That is, when push comes to shove, precisely what a theoretical metaphysical philosophy is supposed to do, re: be subject, or object, in a logical cognitive system predicated on relations.

That’s what I think. Nothing all that special about it, in the Grand Scheme of Things, I admit.

you affirmed <this claim> — Leontiskos

C & P the claim.

The constant refrain that I am hearing from you and Mww is the dogmatic claim that Kant's philosophy simply did not have religious influences. — Leontiskos

You did not hear any such thing from me. Actually, I don’t know what you heard, but I know I never said any such thing.

…..it is a different matter altogether to read it out of him. — tim wood

I like it.

Putting aside the liberties taken with my statements, yes.

Oh. Ok. Thanks.

I'm still hesitant, and starting to see how this is a technical question in the philosophy of religion more than about Kant at all — Moliere

I feel the same way, but perhaps from a different point of view. I don’t think we have the authority to suggest for Kant anything he didn’t admit for himself.

I’m not saying he never mentioned the influence his religious upbringing may have had on the formulation of his moral philosophy, only that I’ve yet to find out about it. And from that it follows necessarily at least I have no warrant for understanding such philosophy as if it were conditioned by it.

…..the sort of conflict Kant mitigates with his philosophy. — Moliere

He sure had this proclivity to reduce a concept further than the average philosopher even considered. Who woulda thought general reason had so many qualified reductions, and it’s not that easy keeping them properly separated.

Ever notice, of all the tables of this and that Kant comes up with to facilitate his metaphysical intent, he doesn’t create one for reason? Like a pyramid…..reason at the apex, under it is branched pure/empirical, under pure is transcendental/practical, under empirical is theoretical/speculative. Or something like that.

But maybe he didn’t, because there aren’t any qualified reductions; there is only reason, and its singular role in a tripartite cognitive system. But, while it does have such singular role, it has it only in that kind of system, but is not restricted to that role in the entirety of it applicability, insofar as it is itself the originator of ideas, which rely nonetheless on the cognitive system for their representations.

It can get very confusing.
————-

But regarding the thread title and its ramifications, I’m really not that interested in it. While he does say morality inevitably leads to religion, albeit in his post-critical prime, hence the possibility of leading to Protestantism, if one studies his moral philosophy in and for itself alone, he doesn’t need to find out how it leads to religion.

….being a religious man is not in conflict with being a rational, scientific man. — Moliere

But one would conflict with the other, without sufficiently critical examination of the differences in the conceptions and principles by which each obtains its respective truth.

“…. it is only in this way that the doctrine of morality and the doctrine of nature are confined within their proper limits. For this result, then, we are indebted to a criticism which (…) establishes the necessary limitation of our theoretical cognition to mere phenomena….”

…and to be confined to its own limits just indicates, by extension, our own cognitive limits, relative to the possibility of experience of any of the objects of one or the other, science or morality. Experience being, of course, the final arbiter of empirical knowledge, all else being merely logical inference.

…..to understand Kant as Kant writing Kant, we should pay heed to his religious background….. — Moliere

If Kant doesn’t implicate his own religious background for the a priori pure metaphysics of his moral philosophy, why do we need to pay heed to it?

I think Kant writing Kant wanted Kant to be understood as a pure rational being, “….worthy to be a legislative member in the kingdom of ends….”, rather than a religious man.

But then, the conditions which grant the moral good may not adhere in rational beings in general, but only specify how he is necessarily so.

It's not so much about the baptism into community but about how God influences your ethical life as an individual rational being. — Moliere

I’d say this is pretty close to a Kantian ethical perspective, but I’d hesitate to call it Protestant.

“…. Accordingly he would feel compelled by reason to avow this judgment with complete impartiality, as though it were rendered by another and yet, at the same time, as his own; whereby man gives evidence of the need, morally effected in him, of also conceiving a final end for his duties, as their consequence. Morality thus leads ineluctably to religion, through which it extends itself to the idea of a powerful moral Lawgiver, outside of mankind, for Whose will that is the final end (of creation) which at the same time can and ought to be man’s final end…”
(Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, 1793, in Greene/Hudson, 1960)

Still, while morality leads inevitably to religion by means of pure speculative reason, pure practical reason, the ground of morality writ large, has no need of such inevitability, and thereby no need of religion as such.

It should be clear, the dichotomy between whether religion grounds our morality, the rationality of organized church domains generally, or, individual morality grants personal religious inclinations, the merely subjective philosophical approach.
————

Deontology - and his categorical imperative(s) - are reason based. — tim wood

Absolutely; couldn’t be otherwise and still have Kant authorship. Still gotta be careful though, insofar as just reason isn’t quite enough, there being both theoretical and speculative reason and thereby the cognitions and principles derived from each. Only speculative reason, albeit of pure practical interest, justifies Kantian moral philosophy, subsequently deemed as deontological, as reason-based.

….granting too much to the given…. — Manuel

As in, Sellars, the myth of? Faith in…holding to….sense-data theories of direct empirical knowledge?

I know I would, and I think you would, disagree with that, rather holding to representational, that is, indirect, knowledge theories.

….the fantastic advance of the sciences….. — Manuel

Ahhhh….sorta like, video killed the radio star.

one can spend one's whole career studying the neuron of a squid, without knowing much more about biology. — Manuel

Ahhhh…..sorta like OLP: it’s enough that everybody speaks without having to think about how there came to be words.

Which is worse for Mr. or Mrs. Thinking Subject, not caring, or being too lazy to care, about what goes on between the ears that doesn’t require test equipment to discover.

…..it could be that one system is "closer to truth" than another one. But we have no possible way of finding out which one is correct. — Manuel

Do you think maybe that accounts for the rise of the analytic doctrine, the non-systemic program? If one system is no more provably correct than another, why hold with systemic metaphysics at all?

“…. It is positively painful to see bow utterly his opponents, Reid, Oswald, Beattie, and lastly Priestley, missed the point of the problem….”

You’re right: in defense of Hume in particular contra British/Scottish empiricism in general.

Ironic, innit? Hume termed his empirical cause/effect conditions “constant conjunction”, which Kant translated into “habit”, and Kant was himself the epitome of habit, given the anecdotal evidence of his contemporaries.

….not by appealing to it as an oracle when one has no rational arguments to offer. — Manuel

Ill-disguised poke at British/Scottish empiricism in general?

Oh, I metaphysics too. Quite a lot. — Manuel

“…. Time was, when she was the queen of all the sciences; and, if we take the will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far as regards the high importance of her object-matter, this title of honour. Now, it is the fashion of the time to heap contempt and scorn upon her…”

Maybe it’s still fun because we heap no contempt, instead just let it play out.

“…..Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind. (…) The arena of these endless contests is called Metaphysics…”

Looks like the problem-solvers just don’t bother with that sphere of cognition in which the mysterians find their endless contests.

Maybe we’re all problem-solvers from a practical point of view, but mysterians otherwise.

If you’re one I wouldn’t hesitate to join up.

What’s a mysterian?

IT is required to speak about what we currently know as to a relationship between the brain an experience. — AmadeusD

Language is required to speak; dualism is that by which a functional relationship between the real and the abstract, is possible.

For dualism to be inherently incoherent is to prove with apodeictic certainty the relation between brain dynamics and, e.g., its empirical manifestation as experience. To propose a “perfect” model of the brain as being sufficient to provide that proof, violates the principle of induction, insofar as it is impossible to anticipate that the construction of the model won’t destroy the possibility of what it’s trying to prove. Which is immediate sufficient reason for an established doctrine represented as dualism to be left intact as an explanatory device, which contradicts the proposition that it is inherently incoherent.

The problem is quite obvious: the apodeictic certainty of the relation between brain dynamics and its manifestation…..won’t be of experience, in that the natural law of physical dynamics only determines conditions according to natural law, to which experience does not abide. While this seems to eliminate the abstract from the initially proposed functional relationship, the whole purpose of the “perfect” model to begin with, it just leaves us with that which in general we will refuse to accept, and we’ve succeeded wonderfully in making things that much worse.

I don't think such things are a threat to people's humanity. — Apustimelogist

Yeah, me either, truth be told. I suspect a “perfect” model is altogether impossible, and a relatively perfect model doesn’t tell us what we want to know.

There is nothing in cognitive science that would lead us to predict conscious experience from the underlying structure of, lets call it awareness, which is in turn strictly tied to (theoretically) the underlying physical relational structure of information processing in the brain. — Apustimelogist

…..and yet, methodological dualism is still not granted as necessarily the case with respect to human intelligence.

….unfolding on the same experiential space with the same category of underlying explanation very broadly in terms of brain dynamics. — Apustimelogist

…..and yet, there is currently no plausible explanation for experiential space in terms of sufficiently reduced brain dynamics.

So someday some scientific genius figures out how the brain’s dynamics functions right down to a gnat’s ass, and all “I”’s disappear. It shall be known there never was an “I”, never an experiential space that wasn’t legislated by the empirical cause/effect of natural law, and no one really registers the cognition of “broccoli” without this many neurotransmitters crossing this many clefts in this network in this region, neuroplasticity be damned.

Yea. Wonderful. Let’s all stop being human for the sake of facts by science. Probably best to kill off those that remain insisting on cognition by personality rather than cause/effect by activation potential.

(Sigh)

But their "thing in itself" is as unknowable as that of an apple. — ENOAH

That object which was initially unknown became “apple”, hence to say that object is unknowable, is a contradiction. The thing-in-itself, on the other hand, never becomes anything at all, so can be said to be, and remain, unknowable.

Both are known already mediated, and there is no inherent difference in what they are in our experience. — ENOAH

The thing-in-itself is not mediated, hence the difference in what they are relative to our experience, in that only the mediated object, in this case called “apple”, is one.
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We" as in the particular form human Mind took, constructed logic no more or less than it constructed apple. — ENOAH

Somewhat more or less, but I get your point. The constructed apple is the synthesis of empirical conceptions grounded by the categories. Logic is the a priori transcendental deduction of relations in the form of principles, for which the categories have no application.

And what these two are independent of our constructions are equally not knowable. — ENOAH

And what I just said relates to this, because logic cannot be independent of our constructions, insofar as the human intellect just is logical, whereas all that is naturally real, can.
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Really real in Kant is the affect of things on our senses.
— Mww

Is that a settlement he necessarily reaches given his empirical approach? — ENOAH

The point of the treatise, given from its title, is to describe what the system does when it is left to its own internal machinations, which can only arise in juxtaposition to what it does when it is affected by external influences. So it isn’t so much a settlement he reaches, as the simplest, easiest place to begin.

That is, is he saying, What things are, I cannot know…. — ENOAH

He’s obviously not saying that; we do know what things are. We tell them what they are by the properties we think as belonging to them.

…..so I can only express positions on them as appearances — ENOAH

This seems to mistreat appearance as “what it looks like” when it should be “when it makes its presence felt”.

Or, is he saying reality is its effects? (…) reality was the affecting. — ENOAH

Yes, by definition, that is in principle what he’s saying:
“…. reality is concerned only with sensation, as the matter of experience…”
“… reality is the conjunction of the thing with perception.…”

it sounds more like Schopenhauer's Will being that which drives all activity of being. And perhaps Kant just stayed clear of that — ENOAH

Oh HELL yeah he stayed clear!! Kant wouldn’t let will be the equivalent of, or synonymous with, reality, no way, no how. In Kant, reality is a pure conception of the understanding, a category, but will is a pure transcendental faculty from which arise moral volitions. Reality is a necessary condition for knowledge a posteriori; will is a necessary functional component for aesthetic judgements a priori. One can never sub for the other.
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It's well-known that Schopenhauer despised Hegel…. — Wayfarer

And was severely critical of the “Young Hegelians” who followed him blindly. Not one to pull his punches, ol’ Arthur.

'noumena' and 'ding-an-sich' (which are not the same but often confused with each other) — Wayfarer

Whew!! Finally. Music to my ears. The text says treated the same as, cognized the same as, which the inattentive consider as being the same as.
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In traditional (pre-modern) philosophy, wasn't it the case that 'intelligible objects' were known immediately, i.e. knowledge of them was unmediated by sense? That when you know an arithmetical principle or proof, you 'see' it in a way that you can't see a sense-object? — Wayfarer

You’d be more familiar with that than I, but I’d say, in Kant, the immediacy of knowledge a priori is relative to the principles upon which it rests, in particular, the LNC, which he calls analytical or explicative judgement and we call tautological truths.

….the noumenal as still mediated reality; though posited as unknowable because its constructed source is ambiguous; that which remained unspoken of by Kant — ENOAH

If noumena are mediated reality, why do we have phenomena? We know….theoretically…..what phenomena are mediated by, re: sensation, but what mediates noumena when we don’t even know what a noumenon would be? And whatever it may be, it certainly isn’t a sensation for us.

It isn’t posited as unknowable because of its source, for it is possible for a priori knowledge to arise from understanding alone, re: mathematics, or, the logical laws of rational thought.

It’s unknowable not because of what it is or what its source is, but because of what it isn’t and what its source is not; it isn’t that which appears to human sensibility and therefore its source is not intuition.

that which remained unspoken of by Kant (…) as really real…. — ENOAH

Really real in Kant is the affect of things on our senses.

….though neither philosopher made compelling arguments for how they described/why they "ignored" it.) — ENOAH

I suppose you could say he failed to describe affects on our senses. He made a brief reference to the ontology of things, but in a treatise on epistemology, things just need to be given, where they come from and what they are be what they may. Where they come from doesn’t matter, and we’re going to say for ourselves what they are anyway, as befits our kind of intelligence, so……

Cool thing about speculative metaphysics: you can see across the board any way that makes sense to you.

….either extremely honest or extremely convenient. — ENOAH

Maybe, but with respect to a theory predicated on sound logic, honesty and convenience don’t have much sway. At its simplest explanation, noumena cannot be known because they are what are called intellectual objects meaning they have no possibility of being represented in intuition. Only that which is intuited can be phenomenon from which arises experience, which is the same as being known as a certain something.
—————

….that which really is unknowable…. — ENOAH

How do we distinguish between the unknowable and the really unknowable?

I'm not sure if Mww is trying to convey this but..
Noumena is a speculative notion that are the "objects-themselves" or the "things-in-themselves" - a reference to the "entity" non-cognized, but as it is "in itself". — schopenhauer1

I’m not, in keeping with the definitions incorporated in the thesis. While it is true noumena are speculative notions, by definition a notion is “….a pure conception, in so far as it has its origin in the understanding alone, and is not the conception of a pure sensuous image….”.

The solution to what noumena entails, arises from why is there no sensuous image. And while it is the same reason for noumena as it is for things-in-themselves, re: neither are ever appearances to sensibility, that does not make the one the same as the other, but they remain nonetheless conceptually interchangeable with each other given their respective origins both reside in understanding alone.

The difference is the starting point. For us, we start with the thing’s appearance to our senses, then understand that which appears does not have to appear, and if it doesn’t, we understand that thing still remains as it is in itself. Noumena, on the other hand, originate, not in its affect on sensibility but in understanding, and from its conception we immediately comprehend why it cannot ever be an appearance.

(“….intuition cannot think, and understanding cannot intuit…”///“…. Thoughts without content are void; intuitions without conceptions, blind….”)

For what that’s worth…..

Is there a "direct reality" for Kant? Does he even get into that? — ENOAH

Not as such, no. There’s serious conceptual diversity between him and his successors, in that for Kant, the only realism is empirically conditioned, as opposed to that pseudo-realism which is technically only logical validity, while the only empirically direct, which he terms “immediately given”, is perception. So it is that the only directly real is that which is perceived, but that has nothing to do with direct reality, which, pursuant to reality’s inclusion in the table of categories, is neither directly real empirically nor perceived. “Direct reality”, then, reduces to a metaphysical non-starter.

On the other hand, reality, as such, is directly deduced transcendentally as a pure conception, pure meaning without a definitive conception subsumed under it, more commonly termed a universal, from which follows that this form of the real, first, belongs to reason rather than sensibility, and second, is real only insofar as without it all a priori cognitions become impossible. Which presents a kinda quasi-contradiction, in that if the real is only that which is empirically conditioned, then pure transcendental deductions cannot be real, but they are real insofar as they are and can only occur as objects of pure thought.
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What were the "opposing" "realities" in his dualism? — ENOAH

He states for the record his dualism resides in that which is experienced as opposed to that which is thought. Whether these are realities is questionable, considering how these conceptions are defined in accordance with the theory to which they are the ground.

And to nip the inevitable in the bud, no, noumena are not one of the opposing realities. While it is a valid conception, insofar it is not self-contradictory, it remains only that, a mere conception, hence is very far from an empirical reality for human intelligence.

Yea? Nay? Maybe, who knows?

I appreciate your comment, and I offer these rejoinders just to demonstrate a conformity.

S says…..The difference between abstract and intuitive cognition, which Kant entirely overlooks…..
K says……(to cognize) as attested by experience, or à priori, by means of reason…..

To cognize by experience is intuitive; to cognize by pure reason is abstract, hence the difference is not entirely overlooked.
———-

S says….the opposition and incommensurability between these terms….
K says…. inasmuch as, if this condition is removed, all significance, that is, all relation to an object, disappears, and no example can be found to make it comprehensible what sort of things we ought to think…

One says they are opposed and incommensurable; the other had already acknowledged the case and says why it is so.
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Wiki says…..the object of an act of thought….
K says….the understanding (…) takes for granted that an object (…) must be capable of being thought (…) and is thereby led to hold the perfectly undetermined conception of an intelligible existence….

One must already grant that understanding just is the faculty of thought, without which the comparison doesn’t work.
————

Feser says…..For any mental image of a triangle is necessarily going to be of an isosceles triangle specifically, or of a scalene one, or an equilateral one….

K says….. No image could ever be adequate to our conception of a triangle in general. (…) the image would always be limited to a single part of this sphere.

While it is true we think in images, as soon as we present to ourselves a representation of a triangle in general, it is a particular instance of a universal idea. In no other way than by means of principles, is it possible to think things in general, the backbone of pure transcendental cognitions.
———-

it seems to me that 'noumenon' as 'intelligible objects' in the sense of those two quotations make sense to me, but that does not seem to be what Kant meant by the term, as Schopenhauer said. — Wayfarer

“…. The division of objects into phenomena and noumena, and of the world into a mundus sensibilis and intelligibilis…”

“…. I find, however, in the writings of modern authors, an entirely different use of the expressions, mundus sensibilis and intelligibilis, which quite departs from the meaning of the ancients—an acceptation in which, indeed, there is to be found no difficulty, but which at the same time depends on mere verbal quibbling….”

Kant wanted noumena to be understood only as intelligible objects, and the conception of strictly intelligible objects in general does make sense, insofar as Kant was an admitted dualist, so if we can come up with this, then we damn well better be able to come up with non-this but that, other than as a form of mere negation. But the fact remains, it is impossible to cognize a noumenal object, no matter how much sense the notion makes.

I always wondered….who is doing the quibbling? Those who question his use of the terms, or himself for using them as he does?

I bow to your expertise on all things Schopenhauer. And thanks for not rippin’ me a new one for misconstruing his philosophical value.
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Y….is mediated reality. X…..is direct reality.

KANT: Noumena(X)-->Phenomena(Y) — ENOAH

The others I leave to others, but in Kant, while phenomena as mediated reality is correct, it is not the case noumena represents direct reality. Noumena are nothing more than a conception understanding thinks on its own accord, for no other reason than there is no reason it can’t.

“…. In order to cognize an object, I must be able to prove its possibility, either from its reality as attested by experience, or à priori, by means of reason. But I can think what I please, provided only I do not contradict myself; that is, provided my conception is a possible thought, though I may be unable to answer for the existence of a corresponding object in the sum of possibilities….”

“…. I call a conception problematical which contains in itself no contradiction (…) but whose objective reality cannot be cognized in any manner. The conception of a noumenon, that is, of a thing which must be cogitated not as an object of sense, but….solely through the pure understanding…..is not self-contradictory, for we are not entitled to maintain that sensibility is the only possible mode of intuition….”.

If noumena are instances of direct reality, why is it there is never an example of a noumenal object? Everybody talks of noumena as a general kind of thing but no one ever gives a name to what a particular noumenon might be. Because no one can, under the auspices of Kantian transcendental idealism pursuant to a posteriori cognitions, re: experience.

Anyway….in trying to help sort it out I might have just made it worse.

your standards (of which I've always considered to be extremely high). — Manuel

And I, yours even moreso. One had better appreciate and respect those with far greater formal training than himself.

Do you have a valid objection to what I wrote? — creativesoul

Of course I do, to some of what you wrote. We call it a mere difference of opinions, but that reduces to a disparate sets of logical inferences, which are, in my case, themselves the valid objection. Just as are yours relative to me.

No harm no foul?

Unless the thing K said we couldn't possibly "know" we simply "are". — ENOAH

Empirically, to know is to represent phenomenally. That which we simply “are” cannot be represented phenomenally, insofar as such representation is given from sensation alone, and we obviously cannot sense that which has no perceivable matter or substance.

On the other hand, derived from a long convoluted transcendental argument, if we think of ourselves as subject to which all representation belong, united under a single consciousness, we cannot possibly discover a conception by which it becomes possible to know “what” we are. It is then the case we, thought as subjects, can never be objects, which is the same as never knowing ourselves as such. So it is that we must be content to know we are nothing more than a mere transcendental idea which functions as subject. All this because when we try to know as something, the very thing that knows anything, we are met with an impossible situation.

Thing is, in juxtaposition to S, re: questions about knowledge of the world and that which is unknowable in it, these are strictly empirical questions, which cannot include mere transcendental ideas. So it is that a quite similar notion, unknowable as the what we “are” that is unknowable, which gets us to the mistake I hold S to have made, for he wants to force a purely transcendental idea into a necessary ground for a strictly empirical domain.

Furthermore, S couldn’t have even forged his personal philosophy if he didn’t de-construct what Kant intended the ding an sich to be. The thing-in-itself, in Kant, is a real existence, unknowable merely from the fact that thing has never been an appearance to our sensibility, has never run the gauntlet of the human cognitive system. As soon as the thing-in-itself is presented to sensibility, it is no longer -in-itself, it becomes a yet undetermined thing -in-us, and we can intuit, thus represent it as phenomenon, subsequently experience it and know it as a certain thing. S, on the other hand, wants all things as representations of will, which removes the very construct of representation from the cognitive system itself. Under these conditions, and in anticipation of Kant’s concept that no knowledge is at all possible for that without representation, we find the thing that was unknowable because it wasn’t representable, now is the very representation that was formerly unavailable to us.

Instead of things being given to sensibility, it is representations that are so given, which leaves the gaping explanatory hole in the form of…..how the HELL can a mere representation be of physical substance???????? How does a sensation follow from a representation, in the same manner as a sensation follows from a real physical object’s affect on the sensory apparatuses?

And if S’s representations are conditioned by space and time in order to make them appear real for our senses, as Kant’s things appear to us, then it remains questionable how the will can be a source of such conditions insofar as will is the origin of them. And if will doesn’t originate space and time, in that they still belong to the subject as pure a priori intuitions of transcendental deduction….S hasn’t done anything Kant didn’t already do.

Kant took Plato’s forms from the external instances of universals and made them internal a priori content of the mind; S took Kant’s internal representations as content of faculties of mind and made them external objects of will. Turn-about is fair play? If he can do it so can I, kinda thing? Dunno, but maybe….

Anyway….opinion. I’m entitled to mine no matter how misguided….prejudiced….it may be. (Grin)

Hey you…..

Would I have preferred S not to write? Great big emphatic no; it’s not for me to say.

From a personal point of view, would I have preferred he not write what he did? From the perspective of German idealism…the philosophy of the day, so to speak….what he wrote was inevitable; it’s what happens when one guy sets the world on fire, but the next guy wants to say something to make a name for himself by either making the fire bigger and better, or by demonstrating the ease of extinguishing it.

If S didn’t write what he did, somebody else would have written something; the enemy you know is easier to combat than the enemy you never met.

Ok, so…what. There’s an Enlightenment-era paradigm shift in metaphysics. It’s recorded history, not open for debate. The philosophical world is on fire. Every peer group member says to himself….why the HELL didn’t I think of that??? Ironic that Einsteins’s physics’ paradigm shift had to wait 30 years to be sustained because the technology of the day wouldn’t allow it even given the understanding of the primary ground, re: the math, but Kant’s metaphysics took 30 years to obtain even a respectable glimmer of comprehension because the peer group of the day couldn’t wrap their collective heads around even the basic conditional predicates.

If one has a background in K before studying S, he should recognize that S understood K pretty damn well, above and beyond the fact that S merely says he does.

Odd, innit, that a paradigm shift in metaphysics with a predication on empirical knowledge, logically proves as irreducibly the case that there is something the human intellect doesn’t know, and never can?

Given a system by which all empirical knowledge is possible, then defeat that system by making it impossible to know this something….why not make it so that something unknowable, actually is? Well, shucks, it can’t be the same as the unknowable thing, so what best to be exchanged for the unknowable, than the absolutely knowable, without question or exception, logically proved by the conclusion that the negation of such knowledge is impossible?

Those with sufficient exposure are already familiar with what the unknowable is in K, and also just as much what erasure of the unknowable is in S. Bottom line….if we know our will indubitably, and if it is possible to make the will, as it is known, to represent what K stipulated as unrepresentable, then the thing K said we couldn’t possibly know, just disappears, and with it the entire Kantian epistemological dualism.

My bitch? Kant’s will, re: the very thing we know best of all, can never do the job S’s will is called upon to do, re: replace what we don’t know at all. Kant’s will belongs to moral philosophy, and has nothing whatsoever to do with German transcendental idealism writ large, hence can never be, as a perfectly well-known conception, a substitute for a perfectly unknown conception.

But, you know as well as I the pervasiveness of cognitive prejudice. Pretty hard to dislodge what’s first absorbed.

Your proposal has several layers of complexity; several layers of existential dependency. We're looking for a bare minimum form of meaningful experience. We start with us. We set that out.
— creativesoul

I agree we start with us, because “us” is what we know, it is that by which all else is judged. When we examine “us”, we find that the bare minimum form of experience is the very multi-layered complexity of the human cognitive system. — Mww

In the examination of “us” as the bare minimum form of the possibility of experience is itself a multi-layered complexity.
————

My own view (….) allows much simpler iterations/forms of human experience than yours can.
— creativesoul

Mine doesn’t have form at all — Mww

In the first exchange, the subject was “us”; in the second exchange the subject is…..I understood to be….experience. I guess I figured you’d distinguish the first as the form of the possibility of experience, that is, the necessary conditions for it, while the latter presupposed experience as given. Dunno how to think a form into that which either is or is not.
————

I’m never going to be happy with that approach.
— Mww

Individual personal happiness is not necessary. — creativesoul

C’mon, man. Really? Would you rather I said…..here is an perfect example of an aesthetic judgement of mine in complete irreconcilable discord with a phenomenal observation?
————-

Picking oranges on a rainy day is neither an abstraction nor a mental construct. It's an experience — creativesoul

There is a physical activity understood by a certain relation; the relation is then cognized as picking oranges, and THAT is the experience.
————

Certainly, at numerous times prior to the emergence of humans, oranges were picked. — creativesoul

No, there was not. Never before humans were there oranges; there was, after humans, only non-contradictory inference for the existence of a certain kind of thing, eventually cognized post hoc as an orange by a human. Conception of a thing is not proof of existence.

Picking an orange implies intentionality. Before humans, from whence would intentionality in fact arise such that picking oranges was an existential activity?
————

All abstract conceptions are existentially dependent upon language use. — creativesoul

No, they are not; they are entirely dependent on deductive thought alone, from which they obtain their logical validity whether or not there ever is any existential representation at all.
————

Where there has never been language, there could have never been any notion of "picking oranges". — creativesoul

Notions, insofar as the conceptions representing them are predicated on sensuous image, re: phenomenal intuition, don’t need language anyway. The notion of “picking oranges” makes no sense to me; we pick oranges or we don’t. Picking oranges makes explicit we know what we’re doing; “picking oranges” implies we don’t. What’s the big deal?
————

The group itself consists of all the separate instances of picking oranges. They do not require being taken account of. — creativesoul

Maybe not, but the metaphysics of it all, does.

Now, given that the maladies of human beings…. — Shawn

Personally, I find the relative value of S’s philosophy not related to human maladies, but to the general human investiture in transcendental idealism.

in your opinion, is his enduring influence to this day due to him being right? — Shawn

Nahhh, not from this armchair. Whatever influence he has, is due to his being Kantian. And Kant is on record as denying to himself any certifiable empirically-grounded correctness….being right…..re: metaphysics as a doctrine cannot stand the tests of being a science, and insofar as if it is the case that the apple doesn’t fall that far from the tree, then S should also deny being right to himself.

On the other hand, to posit for the record his philosophy is more right than Kant’s**, which is simply to say Kant was wrong about this or that, merely reflects conclusions from disparate initial conditions, but that doesn’t make S’s PSR or WWR any more or less “right” than CPR, CpR, or CJ.

That any of us these days think one or the other right, is a different story altogether, predicated on mere aesthetic agreement, rather than factual correctness.

** “…. What I have in view in this Appendix to my work is really only a defence of the doctrine I have set forth in it, inasmuch as in many points that doctrine does not agree with the Kantian philosophy, but indeed contradicts it. A discussion of this philosophy is, however, necessary, for it is clear that my train of thought, different as its content is from that of Kant, is yet throughout under its influence, necessarily presupposes it, starts from it; and I confess that, next to the impression of the world of perception, I owe what is best in my own system to the impression made upon me by the works of Kant….”
(WWR, 2, App., 1844, in Haldane/Kemp, (pub) 1909)

As I said: personally…..