Doncha just love it when a plan comes together?

It's odd to call Kant's critique a "Copernican Revolution" though because he put humanity right back at the centre of things. — Janus

I think the point was relocation of center. One de-centered Earth in favor of the Sun, the other de-centered various forms of ens realissimum in favor of a certain form of thinking subject.

As for the plate and congruent macro-conditions, as long as my food stays where my fork can get to it, I’m good, as I’m relatively sure the plate-in-itself will be just as good…..whatever it may be.

Perspective, yes indeed.

It's very difficult for me to imagine what it might mean to have a degree of reality, in contrast to an existent which has a property of a given intensity. — fdrake

FYI, just in case you wanted to know, and even then notwithstanding the Enlightenment limitations, there is a sense in which the intensive quantity of degrees is meant to indicate the transition from the appearance of a thing, to the sensation of it. So it isn’t so much a relative degree of reality, which is always a unity, as it is a relative degree of consciousness of it.

Physics proper says any change of energy state invokes a loss, so philosophically that physical loss is commensurate with the difference between the thing and the representation of it.

But if you’re not interested in all that, I’d still agree it is hard to imagine what it might mean to have a degree of reality.

Yeah…the ship you build on this hand, the river you step into on that hand. I get it.

One Copernican Revolution to rule them all.

I wonder if anyone asked that guy…..who doesn’t Google, by the way……when the plate wasn’t the same plate. What if you ate two dinners in a row, one right after the other? If you ate dinner once on the plate right side up, then ate the next dinner on the same plate upside down….is it the same plate?

I just ate dinner from the same plate I ate dinner from last week.
— Mww

Are you sure the plate was exactly the same? — Janus

But I didn’t say it was exactly the same. As far as my perception informs me, it was unchanged, which is merely to highlight that to say change is always of things is not to say there is always change in the thing.

The plate perceived is the same only insofar as I do not contradict myself by continuing to call it a plate.

But I think you knew that already.

Sorry. My fault. I don’t want to work that hard unpacking your posts.

What is the substance of the object (…)? — Moliere

It’s material composition, whatever it may be.

And what is this different conditioning? — Moliere

Time.

I was taken aside by a kindly lecturer, David Stove — Wayfarer

As in Stove’s Gem notoriety, I presume.

How apropos, in a thread arguing pros and cons of elevated philosophical dialectics.

First you said….

Kant is not saying here that space and time vanish as soon as the subject vanishes. — L'éléphant

Followed by…..

Because to Kant, even space and time are only appearances to us — L'éléphant

Now you say….

And if we remove our own subject, then all relations in space and time, indeed space and time themselves would disappear — L'éléphant

Hopefully this indicates you now understand the point being made in the text, that space and time belong to the subject himself, so that when there isn’t a subject there aren’t those necessary pure intuitions that belong to him, precisely what Kant meant by the disappearance of the one entails the disappearance of the other.

He never meant it to be understood they disappear in sense of being themselves appearances, which are real physical things external to the senses. When the subject disappears there is no effect on things that appear, which makes explicit space and time, iff they were appearances, wouldn’t disappear merely because the subject did, and the transcendental methodology contradicts itself. On the other hand, if space and time are not appearances but belong to the subject himself, it is a given that when the subject disappears, it is impossible space and time remain.
————-

it is best to maintain the distinction between change of place and internal change, as a fundamental ontological principle. — Metaphysician Undercover

Oh absolutely, except maybe under those conditions where such distinction is not necessary for supporting a proposition. Change is most obviously this, but it is also this and this and this.

Ya know….I wondered if I was going to be presented with the fact the plate I ate dinner on today couldn’t possibly be the same, unchanged, plate I ate on last week, insofar as electrons in the outer shells of the plate matter would have jumped to photons, or some such quantum mystique.

it is not time or change that changes but things. — Janus

Not really. Or, not always. I just ate dinner from the same plate I ate dinner from last week.

Anyway….not that important.

Must the cogito rely upon a notion of the past and future in order for its doubt to make sense? — Moliere

The cogito is I think. Does the validity of the notion that I think, require time?

The notion of past, future and therefore time itself, would be necessary regarding that which I think about, iff it is the case thoughts are always and only singular and successive. Even in the occurence of a single thought, i.e., “not-x”, or the instantaneous act of doubting, there is the antecedent time of its non-occurence, but that is in relation to the thought alone.

On the other hand, I at one time didn’t think to doubt x, and iff I subsequently think to doubt x, there must be a time of my not thinking the one then a different time of me thinking the one.

I vote for time being a necessary condition for the cogito to make sense of anything thought about, which is the same as any thought in general, which is the same as thought itself. I am, after all, nothing but my thoughts.

Descartes’ mistake: the subject isn’t as much a different substance than the object, as it is differently conditioned than an object.

For the sake of argument this is the only thing that justifies this belief. — Michael

For the sake of the current argument, perhaps. From the perspective of a metaphysical antirealist, any belief is justified by its construction, and as far as JTB is concerned, there is nothing but a mere cum hoc ergo propter hoc logical mistake.

Belief just means something is missing; knowledge just means nothing is missing, between the thought of something and the relative certainty of it.

The metaphysical antirealist doesn’t think in propositions, therefore the proposition “the cat is in the box” as expressed to him is merely a possible state of affairs for him, under the assumption he already knows what cats and boxes are. If he doesn’t, the proposition as expressed doesn’t even represent a possible state of affairs to him.

When he expresses himself with the proposition, “the cat is in the box”, he does not necessarily know anything at all about particular cats or boxes, re: idle musings, and the recipient of that expression can do nothing with it, and he himself neither knows nor believes anything in particular except he hasn’t expressed a non-sensical absurdity.

When he is expressing a fact that the cat is in the box, his belief in and of itself relative to the fact, is utterly irrelevant, insofar as the judgement the expression represents has already been proven by experience, and thereby the cum hoc mistake never occurs.
————-

That there is some thing now is possible knowledge; that there is this thing now is empirical knowledge. That there was this thing then, is nothing but deductive inference now, insofar as the time of the one is not the time of the other, hence the empirical certainty of the one, re: experience, is not possible from the mere logical certainty of the other.

Correlation (logical consistency) is not causation (experience). Some famous guy said that, I just stole it. You know….argument from authority and all.

And while it is perfectly rational to suppose that which is now was the same at som time then, or, that which was then is the same now, it is irrational to claim that supposition as knowledge. And, of course, the negation of either is rational/irrational just as well, re: just because we don’t know of a thing then doesn’t permit us to deny there ever was that thing now.

Everybody here knows this shit already, not like I’m teaching any wonderous story. (tip of the pointy hat to Jon Anderson) The mockery of it, on the other hand…..

Time is nothing more than change. — Janus

Not quite; time is the representation of change, change presupposes time as the means by which changes are determinable. Change requires things that change, usually in the form of movement, but nevertheless, something empirical, whereas time itself does not change. But time itself is not empirical, insofar as the form of time is infinite and without substance, and all times are but one time.

For us, then, this argument stipulates there can be time without change in things, but there cannot be change in things without time, therefore one must be something more than, or at least very different from, the other.

Kant is not saying here that space and time vanish as soon as the subject vanishes. (…) Look again. "space and time exist only in the subject as modes of perception. Because to Kant, even space and time are only appearances to us — L'éléphant

Given minor differences in translations, yes, he is, and no, they are not. Mode of perception is not perception, and neither space nor time is ever an appearance, but only that which is in space and time, is.

“….It will first be necessary to explain as distinctly as possible our opin­ion in regard to the fundamental constitution of sensible cognition in general, in order to preclude all misinterpretation of it.
We have therefore wanted to say that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of appearance; that the things that we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them to be, nor are their relations so con­stituted in themselves as they appear to us; and that if we remove our own subject or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, then all the constitution, all relations of objects in space and time, indeed space and time themselves would disappear, and as ap­pearances they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. What may be the case with objects in themselves and abstracted from all this recep­tivity of our sensibility remains entirely unknown to us. We are ac­quainted with nothing except our way of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, and which therefore does not necessarily pertain to every being, though to be sure it pertains to every human being. We are con- cerned solely with this. Space and time are its pure forms, sensation in general its matter. We can cognize only the former a priori, i.e., prior to all actual perception, and they are therefore called pure intuition; the latter, however, is that in our cognition that is responsible for it being called a posteriori cognition, i.e., empirical intuition. The former ad­heres to our sensibility absolutely necessarily, whatever sort of sensations we may have; the latter can be very different for different subjects. Even if we could bring this intuition of ours to the highest degree of distinctness we would not thereby come any closer to the constitution of objects in themselves. For in any case we would still completely cognize only our own way of intuiting, i.e., our sensibility, and this always only under the conditions originally depending on the subject, space and time; what the objects may be in themselves would still never be known through the most enlightened cognition of their appearance, which is alone given to us….”
(Guyer/Wood, 1988, emphasis mine)
(Kemp Smith, 1929 is clearer, but older, so….)

Cognition in general is the process writ large, for which perception is merely the initial occasion;
To take away the nature and relations of objects is not to take away the objects;
The mode of perception merely indicates particular affected sense(s);
“ and as ap­pearances they cannot exist in themselves” only means the constitution and relations of objects of appearance;
To be real is to appear to a sense as given matter, to appear to a sense is to affect it, to affect it is to cause a sensation,
…..there is no sensation of space or time, neither affect a sense, neither appears to senses in general, neither are appearances, neither are real as given matter;
The mode of perception is not the same as the mode of intuition, the former determined by physiology, the latter determined by the type of sensation such physiology provides;
Space and time merely represent the irreducible commonality of every sensation, without regard to its physiological cause;
Absent this particular, albeit speculative, form of human intelligence, there is no need for irreducible commonalities, thus the absence of space and time is given from the absence of the human subjective condition.

But that is besides the point: the babies conscious experience is still in space and time. — Bob Ross

What point is it beside, when I’m agreeing with it? All experience is IN space and time, whether or not the subject is cognizant of relations as such, in general. And it is a given that thinking and cognizing are not the same thing, at least in accordance with this particular metaphysic.

I think the term 'antirealism' can sometimes be misleading. — Wayfarer

I got one for you, for a change. Hopefully not overly simplistic.

“….Most writers on the topic agree, as the name suggests, antirealism is defined in contrast to realism: antirealism is not what realism is. In J. L. Austin’s phrase, realism wears the pants of the pair…”
(Braver, “Thing of This World”, 2007)

https://books.google.com/books?id=YIGHyP3tesC&pg=PA13&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=2#v=onepage&q&f=false

what, then, would a square, which is a spatial concept, be in a consciousness that doesn't represent it in space?!?? — Bob Ross

A baby does not have the experience required to name things as square. No parent says to a baby….this is round, that is square, keep ‘em separate, because he knows the baby desn’t know the difference.

What the baby’s doing….who knows.

Ehhhh…..the continental antirealist in general will only go so far as to say if the cat’s in the box, fine; if the cat’s not in the box, that’s fine too. If I’m interested enough, if it’s important enough, to know which, I’ll go look for myself.

All that, and the overarching premise grounding CPR, is the determination of rational governances, not the exceptions to them. This necessarily presupposes imbued in the subject the condition by which pure reason is not so much merely possible, but manifests its activity. Infants are not subjects in which pure reason is active, insofar as it is impossible that humans with such insufficient empirical knowledge have the required inkling to question possible experiences, which is the major raison d’etre for pure reason’s activity…..construct principles by which possible experience doesn’t contradict Nature.

I mean…babies do in fact try to put a round object in a square hole. At least once, and it is impossible for a cognizant observer to determine whether trial and error or mere frustration is the reason he doesn’t just keep trying the impossible. If he immediately recognized the impossible, he wouldn’t have tried in the first place, right?

Antirealism doesn't claim, and nor do antirealists acknowledge that it entails, that all truths are known. — Michael

Depends on what truth is, as such. The antirealist generally considers truth, the stand-alone conception in itself, in A59/B84, 1787, to be the agreement of an object with the cognition of it, re: ’s active participant thesis. Also, Putnam, 1988: “…Truth involves some correspondence relation between words or thought-signs and external things…”.

Given that no cognition is unknown to the subject that thinks it, and given the cognition corresponds without contradiction to the object to which it is related, then it must be the case the relation is itself a object of knowledge, which is just to say it is known to the subject, and it is by this means alone that the criterion for the definition of truth is satisfied, and from which follows that all truths are known.

Funny. I was going to blame your Zahavi post for my 4-hour sojourn through cloudspace, where I found Intro to Phenomenology. Like a freakin’ bait trail, this leading to that leading to the other, ending up with exposures I wouldn’t have bothered finding on my own and for which, I must say, am the better off for even without agreeing with much of it.

I can do continental constructivism, at least from an epistemological perspective, if not so much from educational psychology.

Oh. And Death of God. It seems some form of qualitative ethical measure of what is best, is owed, seeing as how we killed him. According to Freddie, anyway, who could hardly be considered Anglo or analytic.

….isn’t existentialism generally concerned with ethical normativity…. — Wayfarer

At least in part, sure, but moreso I think in opposition to abstract systemic metaphysics, some of which, ironically enough, prioritize the subject’s existence, and investigate aesthetic judgements naturally incorporated in his rationality.

But I’m not all that familiar with the particulars of existentialism as a discipline, so I better quit while I’m ahead.

But the import is that the acuity of perception to see ‘what is’, is an ethical discipline rather than an objective methodology, let’s say. — Wayfarer

Shouldn’t I then question phenomenology in general, and Husserl in particular, for the notion of a first methodological principle towards a further procedure, as given in the Introduction quote? Just seemed like you were advocating for it, albeit with a Zahava proxy.

I haven’t grasped a form of qualitative value judgement, in keeping with an ethical discipline, in phenomenology, even if some sort of specialized perception for what is, is its objective.

Anyway…thanks. Don’t want to take you any more away from the thread.

….does not entail in the slightest that they do not experience in space and time. — Bob Ross

I think this is correct, or at least feasible, insofar as if otherwise, it must be the case infants have, not so much an underdeveloped human intellect, but an entirely different intellect altogether. And even if that were the case, it then becomes necessary to speculate on a time condition in which a transformation would occur. Even if experience is the ground for development, it has nothing to do with pure a priori intuitions by which they are possible in the first place.

“….The very idea that our cognition should be nothing but a representation of something mind-independent consequently has to be abandoned….” — Dan Zahavi, Husserl’s Legacy

“….. France's greatest thinker, Rene Descartes, gave transcendental phenomenology new impulses through his Meditations; their study acted quite directly on the transformation of an already developing phenomenology into a new kind of transcendental philosophy. Accordingly one might almost
call transcendental phenomenology a neo-Cartesianism, even though it is obliged — and precisely by its radical development of Cartesian motifs — to reject nearly all the well-known doctrinal content of the Cartesian philosophy….”
(Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, Intro,1931, in Cairns, 1960)

“…. the idea of science and philosophy involves an order of cognition, proceeding from intrinsically earlier to intrinsically later cognitions, ultimately, then, a beginning and a line of advance that are not to be chosen arbitrarily but have their basis "in the nature of things themselves"….”
(Ibid, 1 Med, #12)

“…. By this preliminary work, here roughly indicated rather than done explicitly, we have gained a measure of clarity sufficient to let us fix, for our whole further procedure, a first methodological principle. It is plain that I, as someone beginning philosophically, since I am striving toward the presumptive end, genuine science, must neither make nor go on accepting any judgment as scientific that I have not derived from evidence , from "experiences" in which the affairs and affair-complexes in
question are present to me as "they themselves"….”
(Ibid 1Med, #13)

So…apparently, not representation of mind-independent things, but mind-independent things as such? Which I suppose must be done, if the object is to make Husserl-ian transcendental metaphysics a science in itself, which prior Enlightenment analytics had already established as being impossible.
————

All well and good…it’s what philosophers do, make what was once determined as impossible seem possible after all. But having been exposed to a situation…..

“….. Instead of a unitary living philosophy, we have a philosophical literature growing beyond all bounds and almost without coherence. Instead of a serious discussion among conflicting theories that, in their very conflict, demonstrate the intimacy with which they belong together, the commonness of
their underlying convictions, and an unswerving belief in a true philosophy, we have a pseudo-reporting and a pseudo-criticizing, a mere semblance of philosophizing seriously with and for one
another. This hardly attests a mutual study carried on with a consciousness of responsibility, in the spirit that characterizes serious collaboration and an intention to produce objectively valid results. "Objectively [objektiv] valid results" — the phrase, after all, signifies nothing but results that have been refined by mutual criticism and that now withstand every criticism. But how could actual study and actual collaboration be possible, where there are so many philosophers and almost equally many
philosophies? To be sure, we still have philosophical congresses. The philosophers meet but, unfortunately, not the philosophies. The philosophies lack the unity of a mental space in which they
might exist for and act on one another….”

….it stands to reason the won’t ever be a “unitary living philosophy”, given the propensity for none of them being able to “withstand every criticism”, a sorrowful vastness of which is “mere semblance of philosophizing seriously”.

Besides….what would the alleged transcendental ego be, if not the immediate precursor for that very “mental space in which they might exist for and act upon one another”? I find it quite odd the two majority shareholders of transcendental idealism posit such conception, but only one of them doesn’t subtract from it in his theory, what he’s already prescribed for it in his speculative deductions.

All that to express interest in a forthcoming (?) metaphysical heuristic predicated on abandonment of “the very idea that our cognition should be nothing but a representation of something mind-independent…”, at least with regards to empirical knowledge.

It is pre-cognitive and so cannot be taken into account. — Janus

“It” here being observation, and observation is pre-cognitive? If so, I agree, from which follows that “apparatus of perception, which includes (…) conceptual apparatuses of interpretation”, is false.

But I'd suggest there must be account, however mere….that is to say, trivially given…. it may be.

Of course there is a sense in which our perceptions are always already interpretations. — Janus

I would agree with this as well, iff interpretation here is meant as judgement. Experience is the common character of already interpreted perceptions, but not all perceptions result in determined experience, so always interpreted cannot be imposed on experience. Judgement fits both always and already, and….added bonus…judgement is the very epitome of conceptual apparatuses’ functionality.

Pick any object X (…) with following features a,b,c..etc. It’s conceivable that I can alter all the features you perceive of X by changing your brain chemistry or neural structuring. In which case, the object X would just be some empty "thing in itself" with no inherent features to it, — Sirius

If it is the case that all “features a, b, c, etc” of any object are prescribed to it by the subject himself, but are not perceived in it as such, and if the means by which those features are prescribed, change…..why wouldn’t the subject merely think he perceived a different object, Y?

In which case, the object X would just be some empty "thing in itself" with no inherent features to it, if we establish identity across change. — Sirius

Given that we have established identity across change in that object X has become object Y because the features by which I cognize it have changed, why should that identity change be sufficient reason to cause object X revert to anything? Nothing about the thing has changed; only my own means for determining what the thing is. Or, in truth, you’ve forced me to alter how that thing appears to me.

The boundary between extra mental and mental objects belongs to neither camps. Kant ran into this problem and there hasn't really been any satisfactory response to it. — Sirius

Boy howdy!!: he did run into the problem, he did respond to it, but the response may not be all that satisfactory. I mean….transcendental object? That is the name given to whatever ensues transitionally between the input to the sensory device, re: appearance of a thing, and the output of each of them, re: sensation of the effect which represents a thing. Which isn’t quite right still, in that the boundary between is neither one or the other, but the transcendental object here is certainly mental yet just stands for what isn’t, all in the interest of methodological continuity, however speculative that may be.

And…YIKES..…The “Principle of the Succession of Time According to the Law of Causality” as explanation? But ya know, considering this….

“…..what we call outward objects, are nothing else but mere representations of our sensibility, whose form is space, but whose real correlate, the thing in itself, is not known by means of these representations, nor ever can be, but respecting which, in experience, no inquiry is ever made….”

….already conditions the subject himself not to bother with what he cannot know, with that which he is not even equipped to know. So why would Everydayman care that “the boundary between mental & extra-mental objects is blurry”? What has he lost by not knowing?

The distinction isn’t useless or wrong, it’s just…..superfluous?

I could change the wording of my belief…. — RussellA

Good luck with that.

But, in terms of what we actually are, as opposed to what we appear to ourselves, we cannot say any of this is true…right? — Bob Ross

That would seem to be the case, but where does that leave us? We continue to think even without apodeitic certainty of being right under any and all conditions. We are left, then, to think as well as we can, in which logic is chosen the sole arbiter.
———-

How can transcendental analysis demonstrate that there can only ever be one thought we have…. — Bob Ross

Because transcendental analysis is downstream from that which it analyses, and it is logically parsimonious by introspection, and is confirmed by experience, that thoughts do not coexist. How that analysis proceeds is unknown, but they don’t coexist, and apparently they don’t, there are a multiplicity of them, and obviously there are, then they must be successive. And if they are successive, they must be one at a time, the whole syllogism comprised of synthetic principles a priori forms a transcendental deduction of pure reason, by which the notion comes to the conscious forefront in the first place.

Funny, innit. We love our science but understand we’re limited in our knowledge from it. Why should it be surprising we’re limited in the thoroughness of our metaphysical speculations?
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How would such a noumena, though, be a representation of something which is real? — Bob Ross

Representation of something real is phenomenon. Noumenon, then, cannot be representation of something real.

The understanding can create an object of pure intellect, but that would always just be a product of imagination—wouldn’t it? — Bob Ross

Not quite. While it is a condition of transcendental metaphysics that the understanding can think whatever it wants, that which it does think must still be under the rules provided by cognitive overwatch, if you will. One aspect of that overwatch is, even though imagination would be the only means for representation of that which the understanding thinks, imagination cannot conjure an otherwise impossible object, or, that object that does not come under the jurisdiction of the same set of rules, in short, that object for which no possible cognition is forthcoming.

A-Hem…
Thought is the synthesis of different conceptions, by imagination; cognition is that by which the relation of different conceptions to each other produce an experience. When understanding thinks an intellectual object, there is no synthesis of different concepts, hence no relation of them to each other insofar as there is no other, hence no cognition and obviously, no experience, is at all possible for conceptions of intellectual objects alone.

Dems da rules, donchaknow, thus it turns out imagination cannot always produce that which the understanding conceives.

Yes, "synthetic a priori" is the name of a principle, not a description….. — RussellA

I’m sticking with the text, in which, first, the content of cognitions are examined in relation to each other, and second, the domain in which certain conceptions used to form such cognitions, is examined.

It does not follow from the fact all sciences of reason contain synthetic a priori judgements as principles, that instances of particular relations of particular conceptions, are all principles in themselves.

“….The term principle is ambiguous, and commonly signifies merely a cognition that may be employed as a principle, although it is not in itself, and as regards its proper origin, not entitled to the distinction. (…) Cognition from principles, then, is that cognition in which I cognize the particular….(((2 + 2 = 4)))…. in the general…(((any quantity adjoined to any other quantity is an aggregate quantity)))….by means of conceptions. Thus every syllogism is a form of the deduction of a cognition from a principle. For the major always gives a conception, through which everything that is subsumed under the condition thereof is cognized according to a principle. Now as every general cognition may serve as the major in a syllogism, and the understanding presents us with such general à priori propositions, they may be termed principles, in respect of their possible use…..”
(A300/B357)—- (((….))) are mine —-

The relation of numbers and the arithmetic operation attached to them is an synthetic a priori judgement, subsumed under the general condition that any quantity adjoined to any other quantity is an aggregate quantity, and the arithmetic operation is cognized according to that principle, but is not itself a principle.

If you wish to stipulate that Kant’s synthetic a priori is the principle that….that’s fine, but I doubt it’s what Kant intended for it.

Mww? — Bob Ross

That’s the way I understand it, yes. Perhaps, rather, an impossibility of intellectual capacity than a contradiction in terms.

That understanding can think noumena….which is their true origin after all….. is not contradictory, but the cognition of them with the system we are theorized to possess, is impossible, for the exact reason that forming a representation through our form of sensuous intuition, of an object merely thought by understanding alone, is impossible.

We know this is the case, insofar as we talk about noumena as this something-or-other ‘til Doomsday but never once figure out what one would be like if it was right there in front of our face. We can’t even imagine anything about a noumenal object, that sufficiently distinguishes it from a mere phenomenon.

….our internal thinking in-itself occurs only with one occurring at a time….. — Bob Ross

Yes, with the understanding that what we call thinking is nothing but an initial condition of a theoretical metaphysic. In other words, it seems as though we have this mental activity we subsequently conceive as thinking as a function of that activity. When thinking-as-conceived is reduced to a series of thoughts, experience confirms we cannot think a plurality of thoughts simultaneously, which is to say we cannot think more than one thing at a time, which is the same as saying we have only one thought at a time. But this is only a general rule in accordance with the theory, insofar as there may be exceptions to such rule, re: savants, autistics, sheer geniuses, and the like.

People in general, however, all else being equal, do not have the capacity to think more than one thought at a time. In addition, for those promoting the notion all thought is in images, it is quite clear it is impossible to hold more than a single image as a focus of attention, at any one time. Even following upon each other apparently instantaneously is still one at a time.

Thinking-in-itself, that supplemental physical system functionality for which we have grossly insufficient empirical knowledge given from thinking-as-conceived, may indeed have a clandestine level not included in the empirical domain. But insofar as there is no experience, a predicate of a metaphysical system, at all possible from the functionality of a purely physical system, whatever thoughts-in-themselves which reside below the level of conscious awareness are by definition unintelligible, hence necessarily of no consequence.

Perhaps it is merely the natural workings of the physical system, rather than the conscious workings of the metaphysical system, that permits confinement of some thinking to subconscious levels, as a way to prevent mental overload. But then the question arises how does the physical system ascertain which thinking to hold subconscious and which to raise to conscious level, to which the metaphysical system answers…..instinct.
————-

I don’t see how one could prove, transcendentally, that I cannot have two thoughts at a time; other than to say that my brain would fail to properly render that into my self-consciousness — Bob Ross

It isn’t proved; the transcendental analysis of experience demonstrates there is only ever one thought at a time, which does not prove more than one is impossible. Maybe it’s a simple as the transcendental principle that knowledge of a thing is its certainty, and from that principle, if all certainty follows from the synthesis of certain conceptions in a single judgement relative to that which is thought about, then if there are multiple thoughts in the form of syntheses of conceptions, there would then be multiple judgements relative to that which is thought about, in which case certainty is merely contingency and the fundamental notion of knowledge itself, becomes self-contradictory.

The critique of pure reason is the textual admonishment not to go beyond what is possible to know, in the fruitless search of what there is no possibility of knowing.

Bergson's critique aligns with Kant in suggesting that time is not merely a succession of isolated moments that can be objectively measured, but a continuous and subjective flow that we actively synthesize through consciousness. — Wayfarer

Do you think it appropriate that we denote the succession of isolated moments as change, leaving time itself to represent continuous and subjective flow, which we think of as motion?
————-

Your primacy of perspective should be considered Philosophy 101.

Kant writes about synthetic a priori unity (B264), synthetic a priori concepts (A220), synthetic a priori about appearances (B217), synthetic a priori cognitions (B19) and synthetic a priori judgements (B19). — RussellA

“….. the predicate B lies completely out of the conception A, although it stands in connection with it. (…) the latter add to our conceptions of the subject a predicate which was not contained in it (…) By the addition of such a predicate, therefore, it becomes a synthetical.…”

“…. Mathematical judgements are always synthetical…”
“…. proper mathematical propositions are always judgements à priori…”

“… Not only in judgements, however, but even in conceptions, is an à priori origin manifest….”

“…. The science of natural philosophy (physics) contains in itself synthetical judgements à priori, as principles….”

“…. I shall adduce two propositions. For instance, the proposition, “In all changes of the material world, the quantity of matter remains unchanged”; or, that, “In all communication of motion, action and reaction must always be equal.” In both of these, not only is the necessity, and therefore their origin à priori clear, but also that they are synthetical propositions. For in the conception of matter, I do not cogitate its permanency, but merely its presence in space, which it fills. I therefore really go out of and beyond the conception of matter, in order to think on to it something à priori, which I did not think in it. The proposition is therefore not analytical, but synthetical, and nevertheless conceived à priori; and so it is with regard to the other propositions of the pure part of natural philosophy…”

“…. metaphysics, according to the proper aim of the science, consists merely of synthetical propositions à priori….”
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Of course the synthetic a priori is a principle. — RussellA

Synthetic a priori is not itself a principle; it is the condition of principles, unities, conceptions and anything else to which it applies, in which representations relate to each other in a certain manner, re: synthetically, and, representations are of a certain origin, re: a priori.
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If you want to say certain forms of representations adhere to the synthetic a priori principle, you haven’t in the least said anything about those forms, other than give them a name, without anything about what it means to be so. So now you have to go back and describe what it means to adhere to such a principle, and you arrive at exactly where you should have began.

Ever notice…given that experience is knowledge, there is such a thing as synthetic a priori knowledge but no such thing as synthetic a priori experience?

Transcendental philosophy is rife with dualisms, and this is just another one of them.

I’ve said it before….you come up with the most interesting stuff to read. Hell, I read them when they aren’t even addressed to me.

I’m inclined to suggest Bergson was Kantian, but the article doesn’t support me, so I better not.

Einstein, though….that guy. While the guy on the train sees the thing differently that the guy on the tracks, it takes a guy that is neither to see them both, which ol’ Albert doesn’t see fit to mention. It must have been he that was that third guy in order to construct the simultaneity of relativity in the first place, but in fact, he was neither. Philosophically, he nonetheless denied the validity inherent in Kantian synthetic a priori cognitions….all the while being thoroughly engaged by them.

“…. In my opinion the answer to this question is, briefly, this: as far as the propositions of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality…”
(Einstein, “Geometry and Experience”, 1921, in Norton, U. of Pittsburgh, 2013)

You said synthetic a priori is a principle; Kant says synthetic a priori judgements are principles.

Hopefully, it is merely your language use that disguises the fact you actually do understand the difference.

I get it; sorry, I shoulda stayed away from ill-begotten attempts at humor.

On agreeing with the difficulty in questioning the instinctive sense of reality of the sense-able world, re: those that say stuff like….time passes. They instinctively understand it as time passing or changing, they have difficulty in questioning their instinctive notions, especially when they change their clocks and thereby insist their manipulations are altering the passage of time. Transcendental idealism, on the other hand, argues that time does not pass or change, but only things in time.

Even a word like “yesterday” implies a time that was, and the common understanding has no issue with attaching meaning to the word synonymous with the passage of time, but in truth, there ever was only a succession of discreet times.

Ehhhh…..not never. Let’s be honest. 1964, it was. Historical precedent for me being wrong. I told my buddies those mop-haired caterwallin’ British punks would never be bigger than the Beach Boys.

Don't you think the issue here is the difficulty of questioning the instinctive sense of the reality of the sense-able world? — Wayfarer

It might be part of the issue, but I think the greatest divide is differences in understanding the overall intent of Kant’s text. I think my present dialectical opponent is bound and determined to make a molehill out of a mountain.

Even if Kant does provide sufficient proof for external objects, the transcendental idealist already grants their necessary reality so couldn’t care less about a proof for them. He may have reason, on the one hand, to care about those that wish to doubt or deny altogether such existence, and on the other those that give such existence more attention than they deserve, and it is they that need to be directed to the sufficient method for getting their nose away from the tree far enough to provide the forest an opportunity to show itself.

Or……my understanding is wrong, and that is the issue. But even if it is, I’ve been given nothing but repetitive textual references without supporting argument, such that I might have some ground for changing my mind.

But to answer directly, I don’t have enough experience with Russell’s personal philosophy to grasp whether he questions the instinctive sense of the reality of the sense-able world. I may be inclined to think he grants such reality, but it remains a question by what means is that grant warranted.

Thanks for the Magee; he’s definitely worth a serious read.