Tell me where my thinking goes wrong. — 180 Proof

Not so much wrong, as insufficient. The brain is responsible for everything, but it is not known how the brain does what seems other than strict adherence to natural law. That it does is given; how it does is not.

And from that, I rather think....

So, no need for some quasi-platonic "transcendental deduction" ... pace Kant et al — 180 Proof

....that is a mistake, insofar as we do need, or perhaps convince ourselves we need, a theory of human cognition, for the same reason as we need theories for anything we don’t already know, as the means for logical explanation. Even if some cognitive theory is found deficient, we’ve lost nothing, because we don’t have the fullest knowledge the theory represents anyway. And we’ve gained nothing, for to find a theory deficient is to generate another to replace it, and that under exactly the same conditions but merely with alternative major premises. The only way to falsify a metaphysical theory is with empirical proofs, which more than likely we will never have. Even without empirical proofs, we are still entitled to grant to ourselves warrant for non-contradictory logical explanation.

Ask yourself.....if some measurement of the brain can be displayed that shows your deepest darkest secret, would you then feel as if you don’t really have one? It follows that if you don’t feel the display, while certainly existing in reality because it represents as a quantity in space and time, is the definitive interpretation of the secret as it really seems to you, there is a necessary qualifiable distinction between the two.

If A is in B and if B is in C, then A is in C is true, iff all A’s, B’s and C’s are the same kind, or inhere with congruent modality. If reason is in the brain and if the brain is in reality, then reason is in reality.....just doesn’t work, because they aren’t, and they don’t.

Or so it seems......

I think things become fuzzy quite quickly in the a-priori vs. empirical domain. — Manuel

It shouldn’t be all that fuzzy, if it be accepted that which we sense, the empirical, is very far from that which we merely think, which is always and only ever a priori. Brain mechanics aside, of course. How do we tell a beautiful object, if we don’t already have some notion of beauty?

Even though we cannot see it (we cant go behind our a-priori mechanisms and see them in action) — Manuel

Ahhhh....but we can. We know it as thinking. And we do separate, by delineating that which is sensed, from that which is thought.
————-

if whatever the a priori is that we have (....) is not a part of reality as such, then we can't speak of reality at all. — Manuel

I think it incorrect to say we cannot speak of it at all, because that which is conceivable, can be spoken of, insofar any conception can be represented by a linguistic symbol, a word. And to speak about it, is merely to assemble words representing conceptions conjoined with it, and to speak about it sensibly is just the assemblage of conjoined representations of conceptions that don’t contradict each other. Still, to speak of a thing is sufficient to prove its possibility, but not sufficient to prove an empirical existence.

If reality in and of itself is not an empirical existence, then it must be that we can talk about only by means of a priori conceptions. We can think reality, but we are never going to have a sensation caused by it, right? Case in point....if reality is conceived as that which contains all real things, reality cannot itself be conceived as a real thing, for then reality must contain itself, an impossibility. If reality is not a thing, but can be represented in thought, hence subsequently talked about, then it is nothing more than a conception, and the conceptions conjoined with it to form propositions about it, must themselves be either hypotheticals or altogether unknowable.

Good speaking with you as well, and don’t sell yourself short. Nothing trivial about this stuff. It is what we do, after all.

What say you regarding a-priori knowledge and its status in regards to reality? — Manuel

In short, a priori knowledge has nothing to do with reality in itself, that being an ontological domain. A priori conceptions, and by continuation, a priori cognitions, are the necessary ground for the possibility of experience of reality, given two conditions: a representational cognitive system, and that system operates under logical predicates, such as (theoretically) found in humans.

I won’t disagree with your “we can only have a posteriori knowledge if we have a priori "filters"”, which is, in effect, what I just said, but I would disagree that these “filters”, or any conceptions a priori, are part of reality.

Reality is best conceived as an empirical domain; real is best conceived as a rational quality. Separate accordingly, I should think.
————-

I’m always around. I just don’t talk as much as I read.

Reality: that which meets the criteria for a posteriori human knowledge, or, which is the same thing, experience.

I guess I shoulda just plain asked what you meant by “rational order of the cosmos”. I took the statement to tacitly affirm an intrinsic quality the cosmos possesses. Doesn’t sound like you, even from an Eastern perspective, for it hints that the cosmos, the other-than-mind, thinks.

But, as I said, I have no wish to take the discussion into an arena foreign to it.

Bones and sinews. — Wayfarer

Aye. The flexible to bond the rigid. The pure to structure the practical.

I can't see how the convergence of rational thought with the rational order of the cosmos can be denied. — Wayfarer

If we re-imagine forms as moral principles and universals..... — Wayfarer

That’s how.

I’m learning from this discussion, so I won’t taint the classical content of it with Enlightenment speculative metaphysics, but when the idea of forms is moved....re-imagined as moved....from the Platonic cosmos, to the predicates of rational thought alone, the convergence is easily denied, because the “rational order of the cosmos” disappears. The subsequent convergence then undeniable, is rational thought with the natural order of the cosmos.

Marvin pushes his glasses — Banno

I saw that!!! Wouldn’t catch Buddy Holly doing that, betcha.

But both at the same time! — Thunderballs

And yet....attempts to reduce metaphysical dualism to a non-starter, continues.

Whats an enlightenment thing? A way of enlightened thinking (according to science and scientific ratio)? — Thunderballs

A way of thinking yes, but not necessarily according to science, but instead, according to the principle sapere aude.

Is a human founded in enlightenment? — Thunderballs

Hmmm. This can only be answered as a matter of opinion, and mine would be.....these days, with the current evolution of technology and empirical knowledge in general, basically he is, but practically, he may not like to admit it.

Perfect.

Good analysis/critique. Something else philosophy is all about.

Except....there’s always one, seems like....

A human, which is a strictly Enlightenment thing, which reduces to proper subjective metaphysics.
— Mww

I don't agree. A human is more than a thing.. — Thunderballs

....”thing” here relates, albeit euphemistically, to “Enlightenment”, not a human.

The only human “thing”, is its body, as says.

I think that this reflects the distinction that I draw between the objective homo sapiens which I am, and the subjective "I". — Michael Zwingli

Agreed, in principle. I would agree unequivocally, if you’d left off the “which I am”. Whatever “I” am, “I am” not an objective homo sapien.

Yeah, but that may be just to dig a deeper hole. Being human can be a general objective proposition, a universal form if you’re into the Greek thing, which reduces technically to empirical anthropology insofar as it covers all of us, or, maybe (sputterchokegasp) psychology. Still, the only way to even think about it, is from being A human, which is a strictly Enlightenment thing, which reduces to proper subjective metaphysics.

Pick yer own poison, I guess, right?

the objective human being is simply that body existing as an object within objective reality — Michael Zwingli

What I meant by including that clause in my post, is that we have no evidence for any part of the human being other than the body — Michael Zwingli

Wouldn’t it be the more consistent to say we have no objective evidence for any part of the human being other than the body? It is true there is no other empirical, re: objective, evidence of the human being other than the body, but the whole of the human being may not be found in the body alone. And if that is true, more than objective evidence for the whole human being would be required, wouldn’t it?

Admittedly, the subject effectively changes from “human being” to “being human”, but are we not entitled to consider that form of reality?
————

What about me seeing color, feeling emotions...... — Thunderballs

......just like that.

I knew a guy once, maybe 30-40 years before you were even born, got all pissy over something I said, did an abrupt about-face, yanked the door open with a major flourish......and walked right into it. Funniest damned thing I ever saw. Felt sorry for the dumbass, though, like to broke his nose. After I got over my hysteria and he got over his tantrum, we burned a doobie, went about our business, never saw each other again.

(Sigh) I see petulance is still comical, after all these years.

I don’t see any profit in repeating anything. If there’s something new, related but different.....fine. Bring it on.

It never was the general notion contained in your thesis to which I took exception. I took exception only with the argument sustaining it, which is technically unsound for lack of critical thinking.

You begin with “YOU are not your body”, followed by “YOU is unanalyzable”. Even if you were merely trying to relieve some folks of a particular belief, you can’t do that by telling them the subject of the belief can’t be given due diligence. Not to mention the obvious occasion of forcing yourself into a contradiction, in that if YOU is unanalyzable, what ground is there for saying anything at all about it, especially in asserting what it is NOT?

And, no, you couldn’t inform me of how simple YOU is, for the very reason that it is unanalyzable. By asking you to inform me, you presupposed I didn’t already realize what your response would have to be. Analysis of “I” is possible; analysis of “you” is not. The former is a rational deduction with an intrinsic certainty, the latter, if susceptible to any kind of informal comprehension, is a mere empirical inference contingent on supposition from reason that does not belong to it. Hardly analytic, I must say.

Anyway.....enough of this. If I made my point, fine. If I didn’t, that’s fine too. The point being.....in case it’s buried too deep.... “iff it is true that an “I” is not the body in which it resides, then it is also true that all iterations of “I” are not the body in which it resides”. Now it should be clear no YOU is or needs be involved. Conflicts with realizations, analysis and inferences are eliminated, and everybody can go home, confident in that he speaks only for himself.

when the topic is about some arbitrary YOU
— Mww
Do you consider youself, a person a human being something arbitrary? — Alkis Piskas

These do not relate to each other.

What affirmation would I gain from being informed “how simple YOU is”?
— Mww
A lot! More than you can think of! (Hint: It has to do with realization, not concepts) — Alkis Piskas

This only works if realization does not involve understanding. If you can’t inform me of how simple YOU is, because it is that which is only given through realization, perhaps you can inform me how realization is possible without the understanding which necessarily accompanies it.

Even granting that realization without concepts is epiphany, that still couldn’t inform me of how simple YOU is, if I didn’t subsequently transpose such epiphany into the representations, in this case the concepts, made explicit by the contents of it.

If “more than I can think of”, indicates that which is beyond the capacities of my thinking, or, which is the same thing, that of which the conceivability is either not immediately present or altogether impossible, then all that is necessarily beyond my comprehension. If how simple YOU is, is a realization more than I can think of.....how in the hell would I ever be informed by it? Here we would have an unintelligible epiphany, which is, of course, a contradiction.

All that to say this: one can force his intelligence to deflect only to a certain point, after which it becomes deniable by an observer.

This topic was simply about YOU, not the "self"..... — Alkis Piskas

I say that people are lost in concepts instead of seeing the obvious, using simple logic. They seem to trust concepts more than what they themselves can experience directly. This is really sad. — Alkis Piskas

Doesn’t simple logic suggest any “you” represents a “self”? Seems logical that when the topic is about some arbitrary YOU, it can be nothing but a topic about some abstract yet validly represented self. The statement “the topic was simply about YOU, not the “self”, seems then, not to so much contradict itself, as to be a misnomer. Any YOU is a “self” without equivocation, but any YOU is the “self” is equivocal from perspective.

Am I not forced to trust the conceptual validity of a disconnected yet validly represented self, given from my own thinking alone, from the very impossibility of having the ability to experience it?

While I agree with the proposition, “YOU are not your body”, declaring the certainty of a negation does not warrant any affirmation related to it. What affirmation would I gain from being informed “how simple YOU is”?

Stupidity: an affliction...... — tim wood

recourse to irrationality...... — tim wood

Good.

Those reducible to deficiency of judgement (?) An affliction manifests in examples, but isn’t explained by them.

OK. Thanks.

But I also want to say that recognizing yourself as part of the world is not such a bad thing to do. — Srap Tasmaner

Nope, not bad at all. Actually, conventionally necessary, but oddly enough, at the same time, philosophically impossible.

Humans. The only known species with the innate capacity to confuse itself.
—————

Is your son modeling, or merely characterizing? Even if he is representing both of you in a drawing, he himself is still outside the drawing itself, yet is undeniably the cause of it. But what is he really doing, if not objectively recreating a subjective appearance? Being young, his recreation may contain the extensive manifold of representations possible only with imagination, which could be false, but not the representations given from experiential maturity, which will be true.

I rather think a model, as such, should be a definitive representation of something, composed of a multiplicity of conceptions, as opposed to a mere caricature, which will always have the fewer. Helps alleviate the aforementioned confusion. A caricature is a model, but a model is not a caricature, kinda thing.

The self and its world as a unified modelling relation don't exist at some single scale. They exist - in modern humans - at levels that are meta- to each other. We can't make the questions of selfhood simpler than they in fact are. — apokrisis

Agreed. Metaphysical reductionism taken too far, is always illusory. Hence, psychology aside, the theoretical limits of speculative pure reason.
———-

Oh. Wait. I mis-read. You said a self and its world, modeling, where I took it as a self and the world, being modeled. With this new understanding, I disagree, insofar as the self and its world as a unified modeling relation does exist. Otherwise, what would suffice as causality for any model at all?

wouldn't that refute Kant's argument that we can imagine nothing in space — Amalac

It’s a fine line between your imagine nothing in space, and Kant’s “think space with no objects in it”. If it is true that to think space with nothing at all in it, is self-contradictory, it is safe to assume that is not what Kant meant by thinking space with no objects. One should then allow himself to understand, within the context of the section in which Kant’s statement is found, he meant that we must grant the necessity of space as an intuition even if there are no objects contained in it. This in contradistinction to the absolute impossibility of intuiting an object if it is not contained in a space.

Or did Russell misinterpret what Kant meant by “imagine”? — Amalac

It is reasonable to suppose Russell was familiar with Kant’s productive/reproductive double-sense of the faculty of imagination. I don’t see any need of this confusion, when self-contradiction serves to negate the notion of space completely empty of all objects.

In addition, regardless of imagination. there is also the question of whether Russell took space as a conception, which in itself doesn’t include objects** indicating that space could be conceived as completely empty, or, as an intuition, which only manifests because no object whatsoever can be a phenomenon for us without it, which indicates either space cannot be completely empty, or, we never intuit phenomena. The latter being utterly absurd serves to justify the former.
(**Nod to )

the impossibility of the model containing that which models
— Mww

Why is it impossible? — Srap Tasmaner

Model and modeler is a relation. If the model contains the modeler, the modeler becomes a part of the model rather than being in a relation to it. The categorical error of confusing quantity, the schema here being unity, for relation, the schema properly being causality. The modeler causes the model, therefore cannot be a quantity in it.

To model a real thing such as a world, is to intuit its constituency as phenomena. None of the constituency of my self, predicated as they are on purely speculative principles, can be intuited as phenomena, hence no model of the self is possible, at least by intuition alone. We are certainly entitled to think the logical necessity of a self, simply because without it exceptions to the principle of cause and effect are tacitly allowed, an abhorrent contradiction. But still, a logical necessity is not a model.

to model a "world" in which we are there as the "other" of the world
— apokrisis

Sorry, I can't resist: is this the transcendental unity of apperception?

(@Mww?) — Srap Tasmaner

A serious answer would be no..... — apokrisis

Agreed, because of this:

.....not if the unity is understood in terms of a synthetic bundle of experiences. — apokrisis

According to a certain speculative metaphysics, the unity of apperception is represented by “I think”, the “I” of which in turn, is the representation of the transcendental ego, which in its turn, is the representation for the conception of consciousness, which....(sigh)....in its turn, is the unity of all our representations under a single self. Or, which is pretty near the same thing, the synthetic bundle of all our experiences.

To model a world in which we are there as the other of the world, merely reconciles the impossibility of the model containing that which models.

He almost single-handedly launched us into the modern world. — Joshs

That’s pretty near the definitive characterization of a paradigm shift. Has anyone else done that? Even though Descartes shifted from an object only ontology to a mind/object duality, he maintained a theocratic ground for both. The times simply did not allow him to conceive the possibility of doing otherwise. Hence, a philosophical progression, but still not a complete paradigm shift.
————

Why would you expect to see paradigm shifts in the sciences on a regular basis but not in philosophy? — Joshs

Further paradigm shifts in philosophy certainly cannot be said to be impossible. Paradigm shifts in natural science, on the other hand, are a given. There haven’t been any paradigm shifts in epistemic philosophy since Kant for the simple reason he did something within which no one has yet been able to encompass a greater domain, in the same manner in which Einstein’s theories encompassed a greater domain than Newton’s.

I don’t expect another paradigm shift, given the current epistemological conditions, without some sort of theory which shows the human cognitive system is something other than primarily logical, which in turn answers the question.....what would the next paradigm shift look like.

Going to be mighty difficult to release a human from the necessity of his logical truths, wouldn’t you agree?
———-

Kant believed , along with his predecessors, that there was a world whose existence was independent of the subject (...) Nietzsche rejected the idea of a world independent of the subject’s valuations. Whether you agree with this or not, would you say this constitutes a new paradigm? — Joshs

No, because Nietzsche never promoted a self-consistent logical theory to support his assertions. Besides, rejecting an idea carries very little implication compared to proving the impossibility of knowledge.

These philosophers stand i. the same relation to Kant as Kant did to Descartes, Aquinas Aristotle and Plato. — Joshs

I shall take exception here. Each and every properly recognized philosopher before Kant, from British empiricists to continental rationalists, in addition to the ancients, reduced his epistemic philosophy to theocracy in one form or another. Kant never once mentions any deity in any form, as the irreducible ground of either empirical or a priori human knowledge. As such, Kant stands in relation to his predecessors as a complete and utter paradigm shift, as his successors did not stand to him. The very primitive tenets of the brand new self-determinant transcendental philosophy epitomizes the human cognitive system as a self-contained whole in and of itself.

In addition, this same transcendental philosophy doesn’t care about the ontology of things, but only concerns itself with a logical method by which it is possible for them....whatever they really are.....to be known as something to us, because of us.

Now, even granting that every recognized philosopher after Kant accepted this paradigm shift in general, didn’t prevent a few of them from attempting to expand on it, because there existed a feeling Kant didn’t complete some task or other with respect to it. Truth is, if Kant didn’t expand on a thing, it was because he didn’t think such expansion necessary, the theory being sufficient as he stated it. I mean....if you’re trying to show all grass, as such, is green, to talk about winter is superfluous.

Kant’s only speculative stumbling block gains some authority from advances in natural science, answerable by two separate and distinct rejoinders. One, he can’t be blamed for that which he had no reason to conceptualize, and two, he wasn’t concerned with future experiences of humans, be them as they may, but human experience in general, which is always predicated under the exact same conditions. In other words, it matters not what we know, but rather, how knowledge is possible to begin with.

Anyway.....two, or maybe a couple, thalers, for your consideration.

Sorry....don’t know the best way to respond to those questions.

Tthe extention of possible objects? — Nummereen

Yes. Possible for us. Has nothing to do with the possibility of objects in themselves.

Everything Kantian has to do with us, without exception.

do you buy lock stock and barrel Kant’s metaphysics of moral reasoning? — Joshs

Yep, absolutely. Not because I think he’s right, which can never be proved, but because his theories make sense to me. Hell, we could both be blowin’ smoke, but until something better comes along.....

Lock, stock and barrel because of its logical consistency, its being completely self-contained, and it is entirely possible. What more does one need, in a purely metaphysical dynamic?

Of course, there are those that will inform me something better has come along but I’m blinded to it because of my better than half century’s worth of entrenched cognitive prejudices. To which I say, well, sure, but that’s a judgement call, judgements being thoroughly covered in its own treatise by....you know who.

I have, nonetheless, maintained a familiarity with both his contemporaries and his successors. Just in case....

By empty space, Kant refers to only that space which would bound the extension of a possible object.

“....We never can imagine or make a representation to ourselves of the non-existence of space, though we may easily enough think that no objects are found in it....”

Regarding Russell, who correctly denies the possibility of imagining space with nothing in it, for to do so is to imagine the non-existence of that which contains the subject thinking space as empty of all things, a contradiction, Kant stipulates that by objects space is thought to be empty of, are those external to he who is thinking, from which is derived the principle that space is no more than the necessary condition by which objects relate to each other as such, or, relate to us as mere phenomena.

“...in order that certain sensations may relate to something without me (that is, to something which occupies a different part of space from that in which I am); in like manner, in order that I may represent them not merely as without, of, and near to each other, but also in separate places, the representation of space must already exist as a foundation....”
————-

Kant's space is absolute, like Newton's, and not merely a system of relations.

Kant doesn’t call out space as absolute, and it certainly was nothing but a system of relations, but Russell invokes that representation, perhaps mistakenly, from this:

“....For, in the first place, we can only represent to ourselves one space, and, when we talk of divers spaces, we mean only parts of one and the same space. Moreover, these parts cannot antecede this one all-embracing space, as the component parts from which the aggregate can be made up, but can be cogitated only as existing in it. Space is essentially one, and multiplicity in it, consequently the general notion of spaces, of this or that space, depends solely upon limitations....”

In fact, in “The Metaphysical Principles in the Foundations of Natural Science”, Kant refutes Newton’s iteration of both absolute time and space, which ironically enough, predates Einstein by a century, and even though Einstein had precious little appreciation of Kant, at least in some respects.

Anyway....hope this helps.

I can say that we form better judgements about some action A the more experience we have, without making it a necessary condition that we have experience of doing action A. — Welkin Rogue

Right, and the only possible way to do that, is by means of pure practical reason. So, yes, I’m admittedly uncharitable, but only with respect to....

reason is not at the root of ethical wisdom. — Welkin Rogue

....which is the entire explanation for my participation herein. I may even be generally uncharitable towards your chosen representation of moral/ethical philosophy, but only because I disagree with its fundamental grounds, while not intentionally disrespecting either it or yourself.

Witt's (and Austin)'s method of examining our expressions (or examples of those--even made up ones) — Antony Nickles

What....method for me examining my own expressions, or methods for another to examine my expressions? If the former, such examination carries the implication of redundancy, in that I must have already at least somewhat examined my manifold of expressions in order to have picked one to express, and if the latter, such examination carries the implication of relevancy, in that it presupposes I care what some arbitrary external examination of my expression reveals, and I find myself right back on that proverbial, albeit figurative, couch, in effect, being reviewed by my peers.

not empirically, but to learn what the implications are of what we say — Antony Nickles

How can anything learned of a saying, with respect to its implications, be anything other than empirical knowledge? And given a plethora of possible implications of a saying, what exactly is the benefit of examining them? Can’t un-ring that bell, right?

As worthy a dialectician as you are, we have a history of opposing paradigmatic metaphysics. Which is fine, kinda cool, actually. I have answers for whatever you say, you reciprocate with equal vigor and justice. And the world is a better place.

"rationality [of ethics] lies in following the methods which lead (...) to a knowledge (...) of ourselves." — Welkin Rogue

reason is not at the root of ethical wisdom. — Welkin Rogue

Hmmmm...... Apparently, ethical wisdom begins with knowledge of ourselves, but the method for arriving at such knowledge is not derived from reason, insofar as....

You can't shortcut a deficit in experience with the sheer power of reason — Welkin Rogue

According to this....err, rationality, because I’ve never committed an abominable moral act, which is a particular deficit in experience, I lack wisdom with respect to what my judgement should be, given the occasion for the possible commission of such an act. But if I follow a perfectly rational method for obtaining sufficient knowledge of myself, what my act on the occasion of possibly committing an abomination, should already have been determined, which immediately presupposes reason is the root of ethical wisdom.

Without the sheer power of reason, how do I even know what an abominable moral act is? Do I have to commit one, hence gain wisdom from the experience of it? In other words, I must be immoral, in order to ascertain what the condition of my morality is? But that won’t help at all; if I lack moral wisdom I have no reason to judge my act as immoral in the first place, which then tells me absolutely nothing about my moral constitution.

The alternative can only be, I must be informed from external sources what an abominable moral act is. If such be the case, it cannot be said I’ve followed a method of rationality, which contradicts the methodological necessity of obtaining ethical wisdom, insofar as mere information about a thing is very far from the understanding of it.

This isn’t moral philosophy, it’s empirical anthropology. This isn’t where one employs pure practical reason, it’s where he pays $200 an hour to lay on a couch and lament his own unsatisfying subjective conditions.

Still, it seems to be the current state of intellectualism. As my ol’ buddies James and Lars say.....sad but true.

Anything that can be thought, can be described. Doesn’t mean the description is communicable, but that wasn’t the question.

Are our senses the only things that make the world real to us? — TiredThinker

The thread title question, “Is reality only as real as the details our senses give us?”, is having your cake, but the second question contained in the opening comment, is eating it too.

These are mutually exclusive, having two separate and distinctly opposing answers. Makes me wonder what it is you’re looking for.

Do you take this to mean that free will is required for all knowledge other than moral? — Hanover

By this I’m guessing you’re referring to:

Freedom of the will is a necessary precondition of some human understanding, but not any human understanding consistent with pure intuitions. — Mww

If so, then no, I take that to mean freedom of will is required for understandings other than empirical. Pure intuitions are the necessary prerequisites of knowledge a posteriori, or, experience. Moral understandings, with respect to Kantian moral philosophy at least, and deontology in general, are never derived from experience, but are given as a fundamental human condition, iff the transcendental conception of freedom is subjectively granted, not as the determinant of moral law, which arises from pure practical reason alone in the form of imperatives, but as merely sufficient logical causality for the possibility of such determinations.

where he specifically asserts that the "speculative cognition of freedom" is required for judgment or something along those lines? — Hanover

Actually, Kant says just the opposite, as quoted from Bxxix above, in that morality, the only proper employment of the will in the first place, does NOT require speculative cognition of freedom. This follows from the theoretical procedures incorporated in his epistemological and moral theses, insofar as judgements, which are merely procedural constituents, are far down the line from antecedent conditions from which they arise. It is then the case that freedom is not required for judgements, as such, at all, but only as an unconditioned causality for that which is to be judged. What is to be judged are our actions; our actions are judged as to their correspondence to our will; our will determines the actions autonomously; the will’s autonomy is given by the transcendental idea of freedom, insofar as the will is free to determine what the action ought to be, in order to sustain the moral constitution of the individual subject to whom the will belongs.

It’s like, say....necessity. We cannot cognize necessity, but only that which is necessary. Same for freedom, in that we cannot cognize freedom, but only that which is free.

There is, on the other hand, this, which says freedom is a necessary attribute, but not that it must be cognized as such:

“...Now I affirm that we must attribute to every rational being which has a will that it has also the idea of freedom and acts entirely under this idea. For in such a being we conceive a reason that is practical, that is, has causality in reference to its objects. Now we cannot possibly conceive a reason consciously receiving a bias from any other quarter with respect to its judgements, for then the subject would ascribe the determination of its judgement not to its own reason, but to an impulse. It must regard itself as the author of its principles independent of foreign influences. Consequently, the will of a rational being must regard itself as free, that is to say, the will of such a being cannot be a will of its own except under the idea of freedom....”
(Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, Sec 3, Para. 4)

Lotsa weeds way down here in the swamp of proper philosophy. Most don’t like getting their feet that wet. Might ruin their post-modernist analytic Gucci’s, doncha know.

I see free will as a necessary precondition for any human understanding consistent with a Kantian pure intuition (...) which I'd be grateful if someone could confirm or deny. — Hanover

I shall deny, albeit second-handedly.

“....This pure form of sensibility I shall call pure intuition..... (A20/B35)
“....it will be found that there are two pure forms of sensibility, or, pure intuitions, namely, space and time.... (A22/B36)
.....The sphere of phenomena is the only sphere of their validity, and if we venture out of this, no further use can be made of them....” (A39/B56)

Freedom of the will is a necessary precondition of some human understanding, but not any human understanding consistent with pure intuitions. That which takes the place of pure intuitions operating under speculative empirical conditions, are the so-called hypothetical or categorical imperatives, which legislate in the same manner but under practical moral conditions alone. The former has to do with what is, the latter with what ought to be.

“...Now morality does not require the speculative cognition** of freedom; it is enough that I can think it, that its conception involves no contradiction, that it does not interfere with the mechanism of nature. But even this requirement we could not satisfy, if we had not learnt the twofold sense in which things may be taken; and it is only in this way that the doctrine of morality and the doctrine of nature are confined within their proper limits....” (Bxxix)
(** absolutely requiring the pure intuitions of space and time)

For whatever all that’s worth......

I'm not familiar with this distinction of four perspectives. Is it raised later in the CPR? — darthbarracuda

(Sigh) Ya know, I often frown upon subjectively, and sometimes chastise objectively, those who take some passage and reinvent it. So...here I am, unceremoniously busted for doing exactly that. From this little bit in the B introduction at xxviii.....

“.....For pure speculative reason has this peculiarity about it, that it can and should measure its own capacity according to the different ways for choosing the objects of its thinking, and also completely enumerate the manifold ways of putting problems before itself, so as to catalog the entire preliminary sketch of a whole system of metaphysics; because, regarding the first point, in a priori cognition nothing can be ascribed to the objectsd except what the thinking subject takes out of itself, and regarding the second, pure speculative reason is, in respect of principlese of cognition, a unity entirely separate and subsisting for itself, in which, as in an organized body, every part exists for the sake of all the others as all the others exist for its sake, and no principle can be taken with certainty in one relation unless it has at the same time been investigated in its thoroughgoing relation to the entire use of pure reason....”

.....I unceremoniously took it upon myself to substitute perspective for relation. But there’s enough support for the substitution, elsewhere and throughout the text, I think, to make it at least not inconsistent. Kant is notorious for saying stuff like, understanding views all its conceptions....., or, imagination reaches for its synthesis....., which just makes it seem like these faculties have a sort of capacity to reflect or look at their objects, which is, for all intents and purposes, a perspective these faculties possess, relative to the mode by which objects are presented to them.

So rather than a reification of abstract ideas on my part, which is usually considered an argumentative fallacy, I think the use of perspective as more along the lines of a rhetorical device, which is sort of allowed. Still, CPR can be successfully studied without the notion of perspectives. Whatever suits the student, right?
—————

Space is not an intuition.....
— Mww

Not sure if I agree with this exactly....(...)
......but a representation cannot be both a concept and an intuition for they have a different nature. — darthbarracuda

Point to you. I should have said, “space is not an empirical intuition”, insofar as all intuitions are of appearances and space does not appear in sensations. It is easy to see that space is necessary for the determinations of sensible objects, insofar as objects must be in space in order to be a perception for us. This from the metaphysical exposition of the conception of space. As such, we represent to ourselves a condition which pertains to all objects, as opposed to intuitions respecting the dissimilar matter of them. I suppose Kant means to say that whenever something is represented about an object, the representation of its space must have already been given, from which is deduced that space is then the form of sensibility, or, “....that which effects that the content of phenomena can be arranged under certain relations...”. All this means is, we cognize one end of this undetermined object as “tail” and the other end as “head”, with absolute certainty, because one is intuited as being in a different spatial relation from the other, and all that such that the conception of “dog” doesn't contradict itself. And while this seems like an awful lot of trouble to go through every time, the methodology of the system as a whole, just wouldn’t work without doing exactly that.

On the other hand, from the transcendental exposition of the same conception...Kantian dualism once more....in the case of synthetic a priori cognitions in which there are determinations on objects that are not of sensibility, re: geometric figures, which give to us a representation of the determinable space these figures enclose, it is found that this space is necessarily intuited as well, but not under empirical conditions. Kant says of this, “....What, then, must be our representation of space, in order that such a cognition of it may be possible? It must be originally intuition...” (added in B41, omitted in A).

Apparently, a representation can be both an intuition and a conception, albeit from different perspectives. Space is represented here as an intuition, there as a conception, but always a priori.

There’s a very good examination of the background history of Kantian critical philosophy in the introduction by Guyer/Wood, found here: http://strangebeautiful.com/other-texts/kant-first-critique-cambridge.pdf . Damn thing is 80 pages long, just as a measly intro, but there’s a lot of interesting commentary in it. You might find it useful.

0. There really isn’t a definition qua certain criterion, for cognition as such. There are fly-by’s, like, “thought is cognition by means of conceptions”, or, “(truth is) the accordance of a cognition with its object”. Cognition, in and of itself, is hidden in this passage: “...the unity of the act of arranging diverse representations under one common representation....” (A68/B93), in which it may be surmised cognition is the culmination (the unity) of the act (the logical “function”) of the understanding in synthesizing a series of conceptions under a general representation.

1. Spontaneity. Which makes more sense....that there exists in some faculty of the human mind a repository of all possible conceptions, even for that of which there is as yet no thought, or, a certain faculty of human reason brings up new conceptions pursuant to a circumstance in which no extant conception is sufficient? If the former, there would be no need to conceive anything at all, for the conception of it, no matter what it is, is already present in the mind. But then we would need a mechanism by which the mind, which is itself not part of the cognitive system, picks and chooses the proper conception out of every possible standing iteration resident in the repository, and then gives the conception to understanding, which most certainly is part of the cognitive system. Now, such could be the case, but parsimony suggests the simplicity of just letting understanding be that faculty by which conceptions arise, and that only and always in conjunction with something else already given by the system, re: phenomenon, because in that way, the system remains a unified procedure, operating by and within itself, without the influence of that which is not contained in it.

Again....transcendental philosophy. We aren’t talking about what we know. We talking about how it is possible to know, which presupposes not knowing. It follows that T.P. concerns itself with that instance between the absence of and the acquisition of, knowledge. In other words, the first ever instance of it. People are fond of missing the implication, instead complicating it by insinuating the effect of extant knowledge, when the cognitive system is most effective in, and absolutely necessary for, the absence of it. From the conception of “wheel” to the conceptions of “quark”, it’s all done the same way, the only difference being the time of it.

3. “Our nature is such that intuitions are never not sensuous; they must always appertain to the way in which objects affect us”

How can Kant claim to know this, — darthbarracuda

He doesn’t claim to know it; he claims that according to transcendental philosophy, such is a necessary hypothesis such that the philosophy is internally consistent and logically coherent. There is never an empirical proof for speculative metaphysics. What may be said that he does know, is that if intuitions are in some case not of sensuous origin, the entire treatise is worthless.

4. “Pure general logic contains only a priori principles which can be applied to either empirical or transcendental content.”

By transcendental content, I take Kant to mean space and time? — darthbarracuda

No. Logic has to do with understanding, as phenomena has to do with sensibility. Kantian dualism. The transcendental content of the logic of understanding, are the categories, which provide “.....unity to the different representation in a judgement...”. Space and time, as pure intuitions, are that which makes representations of objects possible, but has nothing to do with either the empirical content of phenomena, nor with judgements respecting the unity of those representations. Space and time, on the other hand, as conceptions, are deduced transcendentally, which merely indicates their objective reality and logical validity are thought absent any empirical influence in the formulation of their respective representations, and, their employment is completely a priori. This does not, however, make them transcendental conceptions, but only indicates the manner of their production.

An a priori principle takes the form of conceptions such as “cause”. While we have no logical need of cognizing a cause for the possibility of objects of sense, we certainly must append the conception of space to them necessarily, as a pure a priori intuition, as a means to justify the invocation of the system in the first place. “....for mere intuition does not in any respect stand in need of the functions of thought...” (A91/B123)

6. The answer to that is in the notes.