“....To know what questions we may reasonably propose...... — Mww

Digging a hole to discover what’s in the dirt is one thing. Digging a hole just to put the dirt in a different place, is quite something else.
— Mww

A reference to deconstruction? — Astrophel

No. It is a rhetorical comment on your series of questions that are unreasonably proposed, thereby drawing attention away from the project at hand. I find myself spending more time figuring out how the questions relate to a philosophy, then I do critiquing it.

can go on forever in a childish game of what and why. — Astrophel

“....To know what questions we may reasonably propose is in itself a strong evidence of sagacity and intelligence. For if a question be in itself absurd and unsusceptible of a rational answer, it is attended with the danger—not to mention the shame that falls upon the person who proposes it—of seducing the unguarded listener into making absurd answers, and we are presented with the ridiculous spectacle of one (as the ancients said) "milking the he-goat, and the other holding a sieve.".....”

Digging a hole to discover what’s in the dirt is one thing. Digging a hole just to put the dirt in a different place, is quite something else.

Ok. Thanks.

Times two.

I think the existence of a thing, that default sense that things ARE, is inherently affective. — Astrophel

I, on the other hand, think the default sense that things ARE, is inherently logical.

I am weary of the answer to every question being “it’s purpose-relative”. — Srap Tasmaner

For every question, absolutely, certainly with respect to that which occurs naturally in the world of things. Those things we ourselves invent or create, I think the value, meaning and purpose are generally presupposed in them. Otherwise, there’s no reason for them, or, what’s worse, the creation and the purpose conflict with each other, the existence of the thing becomes irrelevant, which in turn negates its value. Some questions about these things could be purpose-relative, as, which hammers for which nails.

Given your purpose, the world presents itself to you a certain way, things announce their suitability or insuitability to your purpose, or occasionally, but not universally, as ambiguous, requiring reflection. — Srap Tasmaner

I dunno about that. The world presents itself, sure, but I get to decide suitability of things for a purpose. Should I fail in according to a purpose because I chose improperly, it can’t be the thing’s fault. You probably mean “announce” is a loose sense; things just kinda sit there, doing not much of anything on their own.

At some point, the world and the things in it must be understood in a certain way — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, which helps alleviate the ad infinitum process between having and accomplishing a purpose. Because we are human, the certain way of understanding anything at all, is the human way. We don’t know how that works, so the only way we can talk about it, is from speculative metaphysical theory.
Which is where the reservations in vocabulary enters the stage.

Tip of the pointy hat to .....made me flash on something:



Are you saying the value of a thing is its purpose? That which has purpose has value, and that value is its affectivity? So an act, the purpose of which is to solve some ethical problem, obtains its value from that solution, and that’s what ethics is?

That works for me, iff value is not taken to be a quality. If the value of the solution reduces to a relative quality, which is where I was coming from, we’re no better off than before.

Do you have any reservations about this vocabulary — that we classify something as valuable or assign it value? — Srap Tasmaner

I have no reservations, no, but the vocabulary is reserved for representing the conceptions of speculative metaphysics, in order to separate value as a quality from value as a purpose.

Same-page construct (?):
Affectivity...that from which a change in a given system is possible.
Structure of affectivity, then, is that by which the change occurs.
The first is an element in a system, the second is a method of that element in that system.

The structure of affectivity is twofold — Astrophel

Agreed, as stated in a plethora of texts. So saying, from the continental tradition, as you admit this current subject matter takes its ground, the duality of affectivity, in its Enlightenment continental form, is given from the distinction in judgements, re: aesthetic, which regards what the subject feels about a thing, and, discursive, which regards what a subject thinks about that thing.

On the other side of this subjective, call it a deficit, there is the true object, the qualified existent, the phenomenon of deliciousness, say, or misery. — Astrophel

Wherein lay the problem.
1.) The true object is not in the same system as affectivity and its structure. The true object is an effect on the system such that the system is affected by it. The true object is external to the system it affects.
2.) It is implied that the true object and the qualified existent are indistinguishable. While it may be necessary that a true object is an existent, it remains that there are no conditions under which its qualities are given from its mere existence.
3.) Phenomena are the affects of true objects on the system of sensibility in humans. If it is the case that no qualities are given from a mere existence, and mere existence is necessary for phenomena as affects of those true objects, then it follows that qualities do not belong to phenomena.
4.) Because qualities are determinable, but cannot belong to phenomena as an element in a system of sensibility, it follows that qualities are determinable by a method in a system which is itself affected by phenomena.
5.) Deliciousness does not belong to, is not a quality of, phenomena. The true object that effects, and the qualified existent that is an affect, are in fact distinguishable. Deliciousness, and all qualities, cannot be determined from a given object by sensibility, but must arise from a system incorporating a method capable of it, such that qualities can be determinable as relating to an object.

There is a valid “other side of this subjective”, but it does not entail an affectivity, which belongs to the affected subject alone. A cake sitting on the table is a true object, from which its affect on a subject as a phenomenon is given. Whether the cake is made with sugar or gasoline, by which the quality of its existence is determinable, cannot be ascertained from its merely sitting on the table.

That I will act when an act is called for, is given. How I should act is not given from the mere fact an act is called for. That I will act in a prescribed manner is not given from the mere fact I should act. If ethics is the compendium of acts, a description of personal conduct in general, nothing whatsoever is given from that, that suffices as determination of the acts themselves.

Consequentialism, therefore, is valid on the one hand for its effect (there are acts), yet insufficient on the other for a cause (that which determines the act)
—————-

we are res affectus, a "thing" of affectivity" — Astrophel

Yes. WE.....are. Not another thing not us. It is we alone that is affected and exhibit affectivity. All else is merely occasion for it.
—————-

.....value: the "impossible" goodness of something we call good. Non contingent goodness. — Astrophel

No such thing. Any good-ness is contingent on the something said to bear the quality of good. To call something good immediately makes it goodness possible.

Non-contingent good, on the other hand, is that good which has nothing related to it. Contingent on nothing. Good in and of itself, as that by which relative.....contingent.....goodness is judged.
—————-

It is the entirety of phenomenal possibilities we classify as value that I am saying is the essence of ethics. — Astrophel

Value is THE existential foundation of ethics, something existence "does" — Astrophel

Might it be that the entirety of phenomenal possibilities we classify as valuable serve as essence of ethics? In which case, consequentialism holds. But if we classify something as valuable, value is then a contingent assignment, and cannot be existential in that to which we assign the value, so consequentialism fails.

Closer to the content of the topic at hand.....true story......the other day I anonymously bought dinner for a young family unknown to me, for which I had no prior experience. If I understand you correctly, there was something about my immediate phenomenal experience of that family that was of such value as to cause my donation. Admittedly, I noticed a variety of existential matters of fact, insofar as they were not all that well-dressed, ordered less expensive items from the menu, ordered no dessert even with the presence of youngsters who would have appreciated a bowl of ice cream.
(This place....their in-house chocolate/peanut butter cheese cake is superb)

When there are a myriad of reasons for any of those existential matters of fact.....how is it possible to assign value merely because of an immediate observation? If the kids were lactose intolerant, if the whole family had just left the house they were in the process of remodeling, if nothing on the menu suited their tastes......all sufficiently explain what I observed, but do not necessarily explain why I paid for the dining occasion.

Nahhhh.....my ethical contribution was the consequence of my having already assigned the value of “deserving” as an aesthetic judgement, which may have been an affect of my observations, but cannot thereby be predicated on them alone. I judged them as deserving because I related that value in that instance, to another in which it was absent. It follows that the observation, the phenomenal experience, was valuable, in that it elicited an assignable value to my ethical act, but contained no predicate value in itself.

Again, the consequentialist ethics was given in the act; the cause of it was not.
————

I do have my arguments. — Astrophel

Yes, you do. But are they enough?

It is, if you will, right there on the sleeve of ethical issues, ignored because it is simply a given, and people don't argue about what is simply given. — Astrophel

Agreed. People love the cake they are given, but don’t bother considering its ingredients. That ethics manifests as a relation between humans is given, but without the bother of considering the humans which constitute the ingredients of it.

there is no need to justify wanting something delicious..... — Astrophel

Superficially true enough, and by the same logic, there is no need to justify not wanting something distasteful. The affirmation or negation of a “want” is given, without the need for arguing its justification, which reduces to the instance of a given effect (want of the cake), the cause of which is left empty (the ingredients of the how of delicious).

Now if the cause is left empty, and a superficial truth exemplified, if there is no need to judge a relative quality.....how is delicious or distasteful at all determinable? It must herein, be that the justification for the want, formerly posited as unnecessary, is given merely because it is delicious, which is the same as saying there is no reason for wanting something other than its quality. But to say there’s no need to judge an effect (the want) presupposes the judgement already made for its cause (its being delicious). Thus it is that “no need to justify” is superficial, because in truth, it contradicts itself.

It is fine to say an agent is effected by a want, but it shouldn’t be omitted that an agent is also a cause for the wanting.

And people don’t argue the given mostly because either the subtleties hidden within them are too difficult, or, they are simply not deemed to matter. The first is anthropologically lazy, the second, philosophically ignorant.

“.....In our times indeed this might perhaps be necessary; for if we collected votes whether pure rational knowledge separated from everything empirical, that is to say, metaphysic of morals, or whether popular practical philosophy is to be preferred, it is easy to guess which side would preponderate. This descending to popular notions is certainly very commendable, if the ascent to the principles of pure reason has first taken place and been satisfactorily accomplished. This implies that we first found ethics on metaphysics, and then, when it is firmly established, procure a hearing for it by giving it a popular character. But it is quite absurd to try to be popular in the first inquiry, on which the soundness of the principles depends. It is not only that this proceeding can never lay claim to the very rare merit of a true philosophical popularity, since there is no art in being intelligible if one renounces all thoroughness of insight; but also it produces a disgusting medley of compiled observations and half-reasoned principles. Shallow pates enjoy this because it can be used for every-day chat, but the sagacious find in it only confusion, and being unsatisfied and unable to help themselves, they turn away their eyes, while philosophers, who see quite well through this delusion, are little listened to when they call men off for a time from this pretended popularity, in order that they might be rightfully popular after they have attained a definite insight....”

Interesting read. Thanks.

All good.

But in the ethical problem, there is this unknown X, call it, in the spirit of Kant. As is, and this is a big point, I believe, speaking of Kant: where did Kant ever get that idea of noumena? He grudgingly had to postulate it, but why? — Astrophel

Yes, he did, and that’s an excellent reading. Nonetheless, Kant’s noumena pertains to the understanding thinking objects for itself, without relation to either the categories, or the human version of intuition.

If you’re thinking there is some possible unknown X pertaining to the matter of ethics, it would have to have a ground set for it. What would that look like? Kant’s unknown something reduces to a prohibition on sensibility, but that wouldn’t work for ethics, which requires unrestricted sensibility.

Interesting possibility, but methinks ‘tis a hard row to hoe.
———-

Aesthetics and ethics Wittgenstein puts in the same bin. — Astrophel

I’m sorry.....who???

Ahhh....so she’s showing the non-believers how foolish they are. I can dig that.

Sometimes I’m too literal for my own good. Comes from being a virgoyankeebabyboomer, ‘nuff said.

This makes him in my perception a somewhat harder and less soft man than I supposed — tim wood

Absolutely. The law is the law, Everyone wishes to be protected by law, and everyone accepts that the world operates according to law, so why not make law sufficient causality for personal conduct?

And feelings as pleasure and pain?! Perhaps the jewel bearing in this watchwork — tim wood

Yep. Feeling is an intrinsic human condition, as is reason. It’s just what we do as humans. Kantian dualism: we feel and we think. And just as there are different reasonings there are different feelings. But each have a irreducible, pure a priori origin, however metaphysically speculative that may be, that reflects the nature of the intellectual beast.

She not only clearly establishes that Kant was a transcendental idealist, but also an empirical realist. — Manuel

What benefit can there possibly be, in claiming to establish what has already been stated in the record?

I think when one looks closely at an ethical matter, and puts aside all else that would otherwise intrude into an interpretation of what is there, one will "see" that matter for what it is, and it is not a discursive discovery, it is intuitive. — Astrophel

Yes, I would agree with all that, considering your disposition towards consequentialism. On the other hand, from another disposition rather than yours, ethics in itself, as a doctrine, is neither discursive nor intuitive; it is aesthetic. This follows from the notion that ethics presupposes morality. Whether or not that presuppositions holds, is what the philosophy is all about.

The key, I think, is your “what is there” is in need of something that says how “what is there” got to be there, and perhaps more importantly, what the “what” actually is.

To put aside intrusions into matters by interpretations of them, is counter to basic human epistemological nature. We want to know stuff, always have, always will. Even granting that intrusions, re: analysis, of matters sometimes just makes the matter less explained, isn’t going to prevent us from doing it.

That a tough one, right there. Typical Kant....says something here, says something there that makes the here one confusing. Not only that, but he’s got this aggravating propensity to reduce concepts in definitions to definitions of their own, in a chain of definitions, in which by the time you get to the end, you’ve forgotten what he was defining. Plus, the architectonic system of all Kantian philosophy....the absolute necessity of dualism in its most general sense.

I’ve come to the conclusion....mine alone, I must say.....that what Kant means by “feelings” is found in CJ, 1788, Intro, Pt III:

“....For all faculties or capacities of the soul** can be reduced to three, which cannot be any further derived from one common ground***: the faculty of knowledge, the feeling of pleasure and pain, and the faculty of desire....”
** to replace soul with human condition may be more palatable;
*** the common ground simply being awake, aware and rationally competent.

It becomes clear that there are only two feelings, re: pain and pleasure. The moral feeling, then, with respect to this thread, merely announces a pain in disrespect for the moral law, or a pleasure in the conformity to the duty which a moral law prescribes.

Elsewhere in the Kant catalog, differences in feelings are stated as possible subjective conditions....how a subject feels because of something-or-other......determinable by aesthetic judgements from one source or another.

The intent of all that reduces to....it is provable that our empirical knowledge changes with experience, so it must be at least possible to comprehend why sometimes our inner convictions do not, regardless of experience. A nightmare for the metaphysician, and a complete non-issue for Everydayman.

As an aside, and I’m sure you’re aware, that Notes on Lectures on Ethics is not Kant, but iterations of Kant by his students. And just as everybody writing from Kant on venues such as this may have misinterpreted him, there is no promise whatsoever that his students didn’t as well. The Dude Himself said that students that take too much time taking notes probably missed the most important stuff. One can either pay attention, or he can write, but he can’t do both simultaneously.

What if an imperfect duty, say taking care of the moral well being of others conflicts with the perfect duty not to lie, as in Amalac's case. — Tobias

The relative texts in Kant’s corpus make clear to lie is always an affront to a good will, from which is derived to lie is never a moral practical objective. From that, it is just as clear the perfect duty is always more compelling.

I would rather be responsible for a guy’s possible torment that may not even manifest seriously, or that torment which subsides over time, than to jeopardize my moral character by lying in order to not cause it.

Well, this just a tad general, don't you think? — Astrophel

Sure it is, but so was the question to which it referred.

Reason could be here substituted for ethics and it would still be true. — Astrophel

To ask “what IS reason, you mean? Otherwise, I don’t understand the question. Anyway, not so sure it makes sense to ask what reason is. To reason about reason is intrinsically circular, whereas to reason from an ethical...or more accurately, a moral, predisposition.....is not. Ethics presupposes reason; reason does not presupposes ethics. So I don’t think there’s sufficient justification to substitute one for the other.

What kind of doctrine would an ethical doctrine be? — Astrophel

If ethics in general is the nature of man, then an ethical doctrine would be the kind premised on whatever one thinks the nature of man to be, then develops a metaphysics that relates one to the other. Pick a starting point, go from there.

what are the assumptions built into it that would expose a deeper understanding of ethics? — Astrophel

A deeper understanding of what ethics is, would be given as logical derivative of the metaphysics. It’s a metaphysical domain.....there are no proofs beyond the logical. So maybe something is always assumed, somewhere in the system.

what IS ethics? — Astrophel

Ethics in general, is the nature of man.

A theory on the nature of man gives a ethical doctrine related to it.

Same as it ever was.....

“....(a) I am only bound then to sacrifice to others a part of my welfare without hope of recompense: because it is my duty, and it is impossible to assign definite limits how far that may go. Much depends on what would be the true want of each according to his own feelings, and it must be left to each to determine this for himself. For that one should sacrifice his own happiness, his true wants, in order to promote that of others, would be a self-contradictory maxim if made a universal law. This duty, therefore, is only indeterminate; it has a certain latitude within which one may do more or less without our being able to assign its limits definitely. The law holds only for the maxims, not for definite actions.

.....(b) Moral well-being of others (salus moralis) also belongs to the happiness of others, which it is our duty to promote, but only a negative duty. The pain that a man feels from remorse or conscience, although its origin is moral, is yet in its operation physical, like grief, fear, and every other diseased condition. To take care that he should not be deservedly smitten by this inward reproach is not indeed my duty but his business; nevertheless, it is my duty to do nothing which by the nature of man might seduce him to that for which his conscience may hereafter torment him, that is, it is my duty not to give him occasion of stumbling. But there are no definite limits within which this care for the moral satisfaction of others must be kept; therefore it involves only an indeterminate obligation....”
(The Metaphysical Element of Ethics, VIII, 2, 1780)

No excuses. Rest assured I shall make the sincerest effort to release my head from its anal captivity.

Good post, well articulated. On this.....

Kant's reverence for the principle of autonomy. — Tobias

....I might rather have substituted the reverence for freedom, which autonomy presupposes, but......minor point and takes nothing substantial away from your comments.

Delete.

The question of whether I think another’s acts are right or wrong is irrelevant,
— Mww

Maybe to you it is, but not to me. — Amalac

Understood. Perhaps nothing but a distinction between your doctrine of normative teleological ethics with respect to rule-based community, and my doctrine of individual, subjective a priori principles with respect to practical applications in a rule-based community.

Yours presupposes community, mine makes community possible.
———

I should have said: Is it his duty to tell the truth about how he thinks I should have acted, according to the imperative? — Amalac

One more time: morality is subjective; what you do morally is your business. I have the authority to think for myself. I do not have the authority to think for you. The extent of my thinking about your moral actions is limited to their effect on me alone, given the experience they cause in me. In such case, nonetheless, I am judging the cause of the experience, and not the a priori subjective principles responsible for your actions, which I could never know.

This shouldn’t be so difficult to grasp. Me judging your moral dispositions, is like me judging your choice of favorite color. Which, by extension, makes my duty to tell the truth about what I think about your moral principles, beyond the boundaries of my authority.

I would not have lied.
— Mww

But I didn't ask him what he would have done, I asked him if he thinks what I did is wrong. So that doesn't answer the question. — Amalac

The point being, the rightness or wrongness of an act is never a thought of mine, but only the act’s felt moral integrity. To lie is to be intentionally deceitful, and the principle of intentional deceit can never stand as ground for a universal law, therefore to lie is refuse obligation to a c.i., and is thereby immoral. The question of whether I think another’s acts are right or wrong is irrelevant, for my thinking does not, and cannot, supervene on my purely subjective moral principles.

It is, on the other hand, I may judge the rightness or wrongness of me telling a lie, iff there results an experience of mine because of it, insofar as all experiences presuppose a discursive judgement that makes the experience possible. Even while knowing the immorality of telling a lie, I go ahead and tell one anyway, I am then offered the chance to judge its effect. The problem with this consequentialist approach is, I am judging the effect of my deceit on another subject, in which such effect can never be properly understood, for if it was I could claim to know his thoughts, which is impossible. I am, for all intents and purposes, assigning a right to my reason that far exceeds its boundaries. Thus, not only am I committing an immoral act, I am committing an irrational act as well. I am but a sad, ignoble, immoral egocentric. Woe is me. (Sniff)
(Kidding)
————

To stay silent is not to lie.
— Mww

I didn't mean to imply that it was, I was just wandering if the deontologist was forced to tell the truth about how he feels according to the imperative, or if he could stay silent. — Amalac

Wandering, were we? Spellchecker: can’t live with it, can’t kill it. (Sigh)

Forced is kinda harsh, but I get it. Guided by is more apt, in that reason has no causal force. So, no, the deontologist is not forced into anything. As to whether silence is justified as opposed to a definitive response, that is the prerogative of the subject.

Also, for the sake of consistency, “to tell the truth about how he feels according to the imperative” has the proverbial cart before the horse. Feeling is always the antecedent ground, being primal in humans, interactive with yet separable from, reason. As such, imperatives don’t tell you how you feel, you don’t feel according to an imperative. The proposition is better stated as.....he feels telling the truth is imperative categorically.

Disclaimer: not sure of your context here. It makes sense to tell the truth about how one feels about the taste of Lima beans, but that actually reduces to a cognition. He is merely being accurate in his recounting of what he thinks of Lima beans, insofar as he thinks they are an affront to his taste buds. Hardly a moral judgement preconditioned by an act of will.
————

do you think most such people spend a significant amount of time pondering about their actions and philosophizing? I don't. — Amalac

Nor do I. Generally, folks go with “that just doesn’t feel right”, or, “why did I do/say that”, without actually finding the why. If he thinks about it long enough, and under his given conditions, he might arrive at an answer already provided by one philosopher or another.

if I ask a deontologist if he thinks it was wrong for me to lie to the man on his deathbed about his son’s condition, would he answer with a “yes” or a “no”? — Amalac

A regular dude would answer by how he thinks, a pure moral deontologist would answer by how he feels. The former may answer yes or no, the latter would only answer....I would not have lied.

What does the categorical imperative say here? Should the deontologist truthfully answer that question, or is he allowed to stay silent? — Amalac

To stay silent is not to lie. The imperative is merely a formula, determined by principles held by the subject. Only the subject knows what the imperative commands.
———-

When you think something is for the best, you think a good as it is for yourself.
— Mww

In a sense yes, in so far as another person’s suffering would also make me suffer more, and their happiness make me happier. — Amalac

These two statements do not hold the same truth value. There is no reason why another person’s subjective condition must necessarily pertain to yours. You can allow it, but it is neither biologically nor metaphysically the case that it must be allowed. If you feel another’s subjective condition and make no reaction to it, you may merely sympathize and you’ve violated no moral law. If you feel another’s condition and do react to it from some sorryful inclination, you’ve more than merely sympathized, you’ve treated the other as an end for yourself, which does violate a moral law.

It has never been a consideration here, as to whether people in general actually do things this way. All this is about, is a exposition of what proper Kantian moral philosophy entails. As such, it is a determination of principles, which are always certain, not the actions possible because of them, which are not.
————

Is that “using another as an end for my own good”? Maybe, but why is that bad? — Amalac

It isn’t bad to help people. It is praiseworthy and admirable, from a common point of view, but may lack any moral import without the determining conditions for why you do it. Do you help people to alleviate their suffering to make yourself feel better, or do you help people from a duty that prevents you from not helping people. The former is mere inclination, the latter is lawful obligation.
————-

I wouldn’t want psychopaths who feel nothing when they watch or contemplate the sufferings of others to adopt a consequentialist criterion — Amalac

And how would you ever make that preventable? You cannot, so what matters what you want?

The deontologist also makes judgements on others, since he thinks they are acting wrong when the lie, or borrow money. — Amalac

No, that’s a wrongful interpretation. A deontologist makes a discursive judgement on a behavior not his own by his cognitive criteria, which is an experience. That experience informs by means of a aesthetic judgement as to whether he would or would not behave in similar fashion under the same conditions, measured exclusively by how such behavior would make him feel about himself.

The deontologist, then, would find no pleasure at all, in a intentional deceitful behavior. If he abstains from that behavior for that reason, he demonstrates his morality; if he commits to that behavior in spite of that reason, he demonstrates his immorality.

When you think something is for the best, you think a good as it is for yourself. If you use the thinking for what is good for yourself, but apply it to another, as would a typical consequentialist, you are in effect using that other as an end for your own good. To use others for your own good can never be justified as a universal law.

This might exemplify an inconsistency in Kolakowski‘s interpretation of Kant's c.i.: a consequential moralist makes judgements on others predicated on his criteria; a deontological moralist makes makes judgements on himself using his own criteria.

This raises the question of warrant for knowledge of my suffering. To witness the behavior of the sufferer says nothing of the suffering. In effect, a judgement is forthcoming for an impossible experience.

I sincerely hope it is not a consequentialist that finds me after my car accident, if he shoots me because he thinks it best I do not suffer.

(Actually, due to blood loss to the brain, I’m in a perfectly euphoric state, reliving my fondest memories from a long, illustrious life....and that clown ended it all because of something that completely escaped his judgmental criteria.)

Immoral indeed.

I was under the impression that Kant held some form of moral cognitivism....... — Amalac

“....we may especially remark that all in our cognition that belongs to intuition contains nothing more than mere relations. (The feelings of pain and pleasure, and the will, which are not cognitions, are excepted.)...”
(CPR A49/B67)

To think is to cognize, therefore if one thinks he is a cognitivist. To be a moral agent, one must act in a certain way, but he acts in accordance to what he feels, not what he thinks, therefore no moral agent is a moral cognitivist.

The argument is, then, a moral agent must think the principles from which his moral actions ensue. On the other hand, the conception of a moral constitution, or a moral predisposition, implies principles are innate, and that which is innate does not need to be thought.

Pick your own poison?
————

re-read the Critique of Practical Reason. — Amalac

Bear in mind....you don’t need the transcendental proof for the validity of freedom as a sufficient causality, if you do not grant the absolute necessity of the will in a human being as his only moral authority. CpR is a waste of time for those who do not hold with a deontological moral doctrine.

Do you agree with tim's claim that Kant doesn't tell us what to do? — Amalac

Yes, absolutely. No one can tell anyone else what to do, except in cases of instructions for, or in the pursuit of, a skill.

why, according to Kant, do we have to act as the categorical imperative says, instead of basing our actions on consequentialist/utilitarian principles? — Amalac

Generally, Kant promoted a strictly deontological moral doctrine, wherein respect for law as such, makes no allowance for possible consequence. This in turn is predicated on two fundamental human conditions: good in and of itself, without regard to any object of it, and, happiness, and the worthiness of attaining it, which is morality itself.

Kant claims that the categorical imperative is known a priori, in which case it could be deduced through logic alone, and as Kolakowski suggests, this would imply that we can have “independent and unquestionable moral certainty” — Amalac

It is known a priori, But perhaps not so much through logic alone per se, but through pure practical reason, by which is deduced on its own accord, those “commands of reason”.

The logic that grounds the deduction, in the form of cause and effect, has been argued incessantly, insofar as the causality here can never be proved, which logic requires, even while the effect is obvious in the actions that follow from it. Kant was chastised for his inability to prove the reality of transcendental freedom as a causality with the same necessity as empirical causality naturally, but based his entire moral philosophy on the impossibility of morality itself without it, whether or not it could be proved. Hence, the ground for the birth of consequentialism proper, post-Kant.

The independent merely indicates without empirical influences, which are wants or desires, and the unquestionable merely indicates the impossibility of disregarding that of which our own reason informs. Both of those are given, which makes Kolakowski’s implication correct.
———-

But how does Kant know that the way of being good moral agents is to follow the imperative — Amalac

There are no knowledge claims in pure speculative moral philosophy, so all this is not something Kant claims to know. Morality is based on feelings alone, from which follows that if one feels he has acted in accordance with the goodness of his own will, he can claim entitlement to being happy. There are, nonetheless, knowledge claims a priori in a subject, in that he knows either how he ought to act, or, he is acting, according to his will. He also knows when he does not, for he can feel it, in aesthetic judgements he makes on himself. The most familiar common knowledge a priori being.....”I’m sorry”.

Is “being a good moral agent” defined as “following the categorical imperative”? If so, that's a mere tautology, isn't it? — Amalac

Technically, this is correct, but allowances must be made for the fallibility of human nature in general. In trying to clarify things, I shot myself in the foot, by qualifying moral agents as good, when, in Kantian moral philosophy, good is restricted to the will the agent has. I should have said, an agent’s morality is defined by his compliance to the goodness of his will.

Of course, the goodness of a will is relative to the agent, which we witness in disagreements in moral actions across such agents in different cultures. As such, the guy beheading is acting morally from his principles, just as the guy that finds that action abominable, not ever even considering the possibility that he himself might have to become a beheader under any circumstance whatsoever. Easy to see how that could cause all kindsa problems.

So let’s just say, to follow the c.i. epitomizes what it is to be a moral agent.

categorical imperative [stated in the form: “you should act only according to a maxim that you can... (and so on)”] is true. — Amalac

The c.i. doesn’t have a truth value; it is a “command of reason”.

The c.i., because it is a command, is a “shall”, not a “should”. Should, or ought, denotes a hypothetical imperative.

If Kant really didn't mean that we ought to do as the categorical imperative says..... — Amalac

He didn’t mean we should; he means we must (in order to demonstrate the worthiness of calling ourselves good moral agents). What we are to do, is act. And to act in any situation governed by a moral feeling, in accordance with a principle you yourself will. “...Act only on that maxim.....”.

The OP's quote comes from the book — Amalac

Ahhhh....that explains it. Thanks.

he never says anything about the transcendental idea of freedom. — Amalac

It’s not in vogue so much these days.

And you will find that he is comprehensive in presentation to a degree that does not lend itself to short, easy summary-as-argument. — tim wood

I find it worse than that.

Kant's theory of practical reason has been perhaps the most audacious attempt to find an independent and unquestionable source of moral certainty — Kolakowski

The idea by which moral certainty is possible is given in CPR 1781. The ground for moral certainty is given in F.P.M.M.,1785. And while the essay is nearly exclusively predicated on the concepts from 1785, it says nothing at all about “audacious attempts to find an independent and unquestionable source” for those very concepts, which is given in CpR 1788.

And there’s more, but.....another time, perhaps.

In Kant, the source for moral certainty is the transcendental idea of freedom, not once mentioned in the essay. Or, at least the part of the essay posted here. I couldn’t find it to see if there was more to it.

So, yes, absolutely. Comprehensive in presentation. Over seven years and three separate volumes.

“what do you think of “whiteness”
— Mww

If I hear the word "whiteness", in my mind I link the physical word "whiteness" with several physical objects in the world, — RussellA

Which is not what the question asks, as pre-conditioned by what you shouldn’t do.
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I could invent a logical system whereby a single identity can exist and not exist at the same time — RussellA

You could invent a logic but couldn’t imagine whiteness?
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The question is why is one invented logical system accepted and used rather than another. The answer is that logical system which corresponds with what has been discovered in the world. — RussellA

Maybe, but probably much more likely that discoveries by humans correspond to the logical system intrinsic to humans. We don’t invent logic; we are logical. We merely invent the representations of its necessary systemic conditions.

So.....go ahead and try inventing a logic without using the logic with which you are naturally imbued.
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I would say that to date we have no literal knowledge of anything, meaning that there is no alternative but for the metaphor to suffice. — RussellA

We have no absolute knowledge, meaning there is no alternative but for contingent knowledge to suffice.

Knowledge is the highest degree of relative certainty, certainty literally is what is the case relative to the time of it. Exactly the opposite of metaphor.

I understand your literal/metaphorical dichotomy has purchase in a non-representational system, which is, oddly enough, self-defeating, in that literal and metaphor are each themselves representations. And even if they weren’t, it is far from established, that a non-representational system holds over a representational one as the whole of human intelligence qua rational thought.

As the saying goes "Getting knowledge about something is like making a map of a place or like travelling there. Teaching someone is like showing them how to reach a place". — RussellA

Whatever bonehead said that didn’t heed its weakness. Knowledge is literally making a map; teaching is metaphorically giving a map. The map made is pure experience; the map given is the opposite in the form of rote instruction.

But I get it, it’s how you claim knowledge of red flowers in vases.....because somebody told you so. Somebody showed you how to get from physical object in the world to what you should call it from then on. And you never bothered to ask yourself how that happened, and apparently, no one ever gave you a map that took you to a place you didn’t want to go.

Your system works well enough, as long as there’s no glitches. Just as soon as there is one.....for which there is ample historical precedent....that kind of system cannot sustain itself.

The word "whiteness" exists as a physical object on the screen that you are currently reading. — RussellA

If I speak to you, say, “what do you think of “whiteness”, in which case the word appears in the world as a sound to your ears just as it appears to your vision as a word on the screen, what object am I referring to, per Russell’s comment? You shouldn’t bring any worldly object to consciousness at all, because I didn’t ask what you thought about white things, but only the relative quality of white in general. That which many thoughts of whiteness have in common is their object, and the object of all thoughts of whiteness, is.....white. And white is not an object in the world.
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......because I believe that an object in the world cannot both exist and not exist at the same time then it follows that I also believe that human thought is not to be taken seriously. — RussellA

That’s not what I said. I said......I think you don’t assign enough importance to human thought, as a consequence of reading you say logic exists in the world, and is not a human invention. What you did with the existence thing, is merely provide a proof for the logic already thought by a human. The world is the existence of things, so the simultaneous thing and no-thing cannot be a condition of the world, but only a condition of some intelligence that thinks about it in a logically self-contradictory way. I’m only rather emphatically contending that a typical human intelligence should already know all that, and a decent cognitive philosopher certainly would.
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Perhaps one should think of the apple as a metaphor rather than something literal. — RussellA

Metaphors are never sufficient for knowledge; only the literal will suffice. The irreducible, the unconditioned. The truth as far as we can tell.

One must already have the experience of red flowers in vases, before he can say an instance of perception, is that.
— Mww

Indeed. A nice point of agreement to end with! — Andrew M

Apparently, we aren’t ending, and we certainly aren’t agreeing, insofar as your “indeed” here has missed the point, and is not supported by what you’ve already said. You’re treating red flowers in a vase as always given, when it isn’t. What is given is a thing containing things. I’ve already argued all this in the preceding pages, re: the mosquito bite, ‘57 DeSoto’s, and such. “Before he can say an instance of perception, is that” makes explicit time as a necessary condition for experience of objects, therefore empirical knowledge itself.

I think it of no intellectual consequence here, to follow the chronology back to the beginning, when the tree we all claim to know, was just this thing poking out of the dirt, and the only reason we know it as such now, is because it was recorded as such then. As it is for every single known object ever. The metaphysical implications are enormous, which is probably why they’re forfeited to the nonsense of mere language on the one hand, and the restrictions to pure physicalism on the other.
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I reject that we see only images (of unknown things), hence the allusion to Kant: — Andrew M

“...but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something....”

You should reject that we see only images of unknown things, insofar as Kant’s “appearance” is not your “see only images”. In Kant, the unknown things we see are not images (they are phenomena, “the undetermined objects of intuition”), and images we have are not unknown things (they are called schema, and represent “the synthesis of the understanding into a possible cognition”.

I’ve noticed you’ve never used that word....understanding. I suppose your thesis has no need of it, in that, in this discussion, we’ve never got past the transition from the physical external to the rational internal, and furthermore, that physicalist explanations for brain mechanics is both necessary and sufficient for human knowledge. Problem is, of course, that while physicalist predicates are certainly necessary, the sufficiency of them is not given by their mere necessity, and can never arise from it alone.

Also, without the use of understanding as a rational condition, you’ve entitled yourself to say stuff like.....

the object whiteness and the word "whiteness" are physical things in the world. — RussellA

....and, my personal favorite, so far anyway.....

Independent of the mind, logic exists in the world. — RussellA

.....which is fine, if that’s how you roll, but you’re gonna have a hellava job supporting either of those assertions, that eliminates the inconsistencies in them. I get it, honest, I do, I guess. You’re of the opinion that human thought is not anything to be taken seriously. You might grant that everybody thinks, but the how and why of it doesn’t matter. And if everything is in the world, from red flowers to logic to whiteness, and given to us as it is, we don’t need to think about the world becoming comprehensible to an intelligence such as humans possess.

But humans are wrong about so much, and distinct from each other in so many ways, it might be best to figure out humans, rather than just give us all a world to hide behind.
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Consider an object having a physical existence independent of any observer....... — RussellA

Duly considered. To consider is to think, and I can think an object having physical existence without observing it. Doesn’t mean I know there is such a thing that conforms to my thinking, but if I can think it without implicit contradiction, it must be a possible thing.

.....such as an apple. — RussellA

An apple is a determined object. A determined object cannot be independent of that which determines it. From a human point of view, the only one from which we are entitled to speak, apple is a human determination, which makes explicit a human observer of an object having physical existence.

there are plenty of people out there who do share my fondness for Thai — Andrew M

Categorically false.

Sufficiently true: you and many people out there have similar experiences of Thai food because all of the individual qualitative judgements made on it, are congruent with each other.
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Presumably..... — Andrew M

Metaphysics concerns itself with that which is true, under a given set of conditions, thereby eliminating presumptions. We don’t care about the conditions under which you presumably might (think/experience/know) later, but rather, the reasons why you don’t (think/experience/know) now.
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The red flower itself is not passed on, only information. That information allows us to perceive the object (in the world) in a particular form. — Andrew M

Obviously then, if red flower itself is not passed on, but information is, then red flower itself is not contained in the information. (Sounds familiar, donnit)

How did the perceived object in its particular form get to be the red flower we know? If the information in a particular form is the red flower, how is it that we didn’t have the red flower itself passed on?

You do realize, don’t you? That the only way we can know the information contained in the perception of a particular smell is the particular object “bacon”, is from experience? So saying, your system only works for extant knowledge, but is hopelessly futile for that of which we have no experience. Yet, there are multiple instances of perceiving information to which we can relate no object at all.

Nobody cares about what is known. The natural human proclivity is to learn what we don’t. And for that, we need to think. Talking is necessary for rote instruction, but hardly necessary for assimilating such instruction, and not even present in a purely personal experience, into a subjective consciousness.
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This is just another way of saying that to perceive a red flower in a vase entails that there is a red flower in a vase (i.e., the logic of perception). — Andrew M

A “...mere worthless sophism...”, as The Highly Esteemed Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at Koenigsberg would exclaim. To perceive a red flower in a vase presupposes knowledge of what a red flower in a vase entails. One must already have the experience of red flowers in vases, before he can say an instance of perception, is that.

This dialectical back-and-forth is endless, but at least it is something to do.

conjunction between....analytic...and....continental philosophers. — RussellA

Oil and water!!!! Fire and ice!!! Mom’s apple pie and Tabasco!!!!