That’s not an infinite line.

You must have known that, so what did you think you actually proved?

Dream. What consciousness does when it plays with itself.

So if one argues that Kant's argument “proved” that the temporal series of the universe must have had a beginning in time, by the same reasoning one could also prove that the series of negative integers must have a first term, a smallest negative integer, since otherwise the series could not end with -1, which is clearly not the case. — Amalac

Again....forward vs backward. The infinite series of negative integers doesn’t end with -1, it begins with it. The smallest negative integer is -1, in that it is the least distant from its referent. The universe, conversely, is the absolute furthest from its referent, which is its non-existence, made explicit by the consideration of its infinite past.
———-

And why would there being infinitely many finite intervals of time be impossible given a universe with no beginning in time/ infinite past, exactly? — Amalac

That there are an infinite amount of intervals of time of the universe is not contradictory, for any given whole is infinitely divisible, and the universe is itself a given whole. But how can there even be a universe with no beginning in time?

No beginning in time does not carry the same implications as an infinite past of time. Past implies backward from original present, so an infinite past just means backwards indefinitely from the present. In both of these, the present is given. But for a universe with no beginning, there cannot be a given present, hence the absurdities in connecting a non-existent, re: the universe, insofar as that which does not begin does not exist, with its past, infinite or otherwise.

To think the infinite intervals of times of the universe, does not contradict itself. To think the infinite past of the universe, from its present, does not contradict itself, but experience does show its contradiction in fact. To think the universe as having no beginning contradicts everything about the universe. To say there is an infinite time lapse before the beginning of the universe just makes the universe impossible.

Infinite time, in itself, and the universe, by itself, are incompatible. Metaphysically, this is a legitimate thesis if time is only a condition of all things and the universe is a thing. Or, it is equally legitimate if time is meaningless unless it relates things, and the universe is a thing.

Take care. Lot’s of edits here. Depending on when your response begins, in relation to my final edit.

Ever onward......

In a universe with an infinite past, one could say that there would be infinitely many finite intervals of time, which, when added, make up an infinite amount of time.

But if that's all that Kant meant when he said that:

“....up to every given moment of time, an eternity must have elapsed, and therewith passed away an infinite series of successive conditions....”
— Mww

... then I don't see what the supposed contradiction is, he says (in my translation of the Critique):

the infinity of a series consists in that it can never be finished by means of successive syntheses.
— Kant — Amalac

Kant is working onward, you are working backward. Referencing your universe with “past” presupposes a regression in time from some other given time, otherwise “past” is irrelevant. His “up to every given moment” presupposes a progression in time from every other time, so it makes no difference what that some other time is. They are indistinguishable. Kant is working with time alone, you are working with something existing in time.

The contradiction resides in your inclusion of the universe as an uncompleted series. If it was, then the elapsed time of the universe, your “infinitely many finite intervals of time” for the universe is impossible, therefore there could be no universe, a contradiction. The universe would never be “finished by means of successive synthesis”, from which follows necessarily that talk of “in a universe with an infinite past”, is meaningless. Even if you think the universe the same as Kant thinks the world, it is still to be treated an a completed series of times, from which there arises a present condition of that which is called “universe”.
————-

in the same way in which the series of negative integers — Amalac

The set of negative integers is an uncompleted series, in which the last member is impossible to represent. Even so, the conception of integers remains. In the case of the universe, given its existence, which is the equivalent of zero for the reference of infinite negative integers, it is merely the infinite set of constituents of the universe that cannot be represented, while the conception of the universe itself remains. This shows the compatibility of arguments with respect to integers, with arguments with respect to the infinite series of times for an existent whole.

Nevertheless, while it is possible to think the infinite past of the universe in which it has no beginning, such thought is necessarily contradicted by experience. It is at the same time possible to think the infinite series of negative integers, and forever be safe from contradiction by experience. So the arguments are not compatible.

Hence.....the conflicts of pure reason, the antinomies.
—————

Hmmm......and what of the idea of a succession of a series of times that never completes? Isn’t a succession in a series of times the same as an elapse of time?
— Mww

I guess you meant to say “Isn't a succession in a series of time the same as a lapse of time?” — Amalac

No, I said what I meant to say. Time can contain nothing but intervals of itself. Things are in time, but time is not in the things. Ultra-modernists posit time as a property, such that time can be in things, but then they cannot explain how empirical things can have an infinite property.
————-

So, to make the mathematical analogy clear: — Amalac

It is clear, but I don’t think it sufficient to support the OP, which asks “can the universe be infinite towards the past”, and, of course, has nothing whatsoever to do with the antinomies.

Metaphysics.....the most fun to be had without paying for it.

what I said was that he maintained that if the past were infinite then that implies that an infinite amount of time has elapsed.

I'm not saying Kant maintained that the universe had an infinite past, I'm doubting the truth of that hypothetical proposition. — Amalac

The hypotetical I'm refering to is “If the universe has an infinite past, then an infinite amount of time has elapsed up to the present”. — Amalac

Man, this hypothetical’s got a farging mind of its own donnit? Seems “up to the present” makes an appearance in this current iteration, which changes the entire proposition.

Anywhooo.....so you doubt the truth of the proposition that if the universe has an infinite past then an infinite amount of time has elapsed up to the present.
————-

You’re equating your “if the past were infinite” with his “an eternity must have elapsed”
— Mww

No, I don't think those two mean the same thing, — Amalac

Neither do I. I was guessing you were equating them because that’s all I could find that was even close.
——————

I'm saying: The past is infinite ≠ an infinite amount of time has elapsed — Amalac

I am vindicated!!!! No where in this: If the universe has an infinite past, then an infinite amount of time has elapsed up to the present, is to be found this: The past is infinite ≠ an infinite amount of time has elapsed. YEA!!!

to say that time has elapsed implies that it elapsed since some moment in time to some other moment in time — Amalac

OK.....

hence the notion of time elapsing is not applicable to infinite amounts of time, but only to finite intervals of time. — Amalac

Hmmm......and what of the idea of a succession of a series of times that never completes? Isn’t a succession in a series of times the same as an elapse of time? A succession in a series makes no need of an amount for each time of the series. Even so, isn’t an infinite series of successive finite intervals of minutes, still an infinite amount of time?

“....up to every given moment of time, an eternity must have elapsed, and therewith passed away an infinite series of successive conditions....”

But how, then, do you define “the past”, if not as the time previous to the present moment? — Amalac

That is how I would define it, but I didn’t use “past” in my statement. You transcribed the term into it.
———-

I'm doubting the truth of that hypothetical proposition. — Amalac

Hence, the antithesis. Or in your case, a possible antithesis, upon your presentation of a thesis self-consistent and necessary in its own right, but constructed with different initial conditions than he used.

As long as the Kantian antinomies are the ground of the discussion, best to keep in mind.....

“....Thetic is the term applied to every collection of dogmatical propositions. By antithetic I do not understand dogmatical assertions of the opposite, but the self-contradiction of seemingly dogmatical cognitions (thesis cum antithesis), in none of which we can discover any decided superiority. Antithetic is not, therefore, occupied with one-sided statements, but is engaged in considering the contradictory nature of the general cognitions of reason and its causes. Transcendental antithetic is an investigation into the antinomy of pure reason, its causes and result. If we employ our reason not merely in the application of the principles of the understanding to objects of experience, but venture with it beyond these boundaries, there arise certain sophistical propositions or theorems. These assertions have the following peculiarities: They can find neither confirmation nor confutation in experience; and each is in itself not only self-consistent, but possesses conditions of its necessity in the very nature of reason—only that, unluckily, there exist just as valid and necessary grounds for maintaining the contrary proposition....”

....so if you’re going to argue the falsity of all or parts of the series of antinomies, you should stay in the context provided by the section in which they are found.
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I'm not saying Kant maintained that the universe had an infinite past, I'm doubting the truth of that hypothetical proposition. — Amalac

So you’re doubting the truth of the hypothetical proposition that the universe had an infinite past. Regardless of what that has to do with Kantian antinomies, and best you refrain from referencing them when expounding on how you conclude the fallaciousness of that hypothetical, what truth contained in it is doubtful, and how is it doubted?

On the other hand, if you insist on referencing the antinomies, perhaps start with this.....

“.....Now the infinity of a series consists in the fact that it never can be completed by means of a successive synthesis. It follows that an infinite series already elapsed is impossible...”

......which, while having nothing to do with the universe, does.....er....maintain....that no infinite series can have a past, an “already elapsed”, so the truth of the hypothetical proposition “the universe had an infinite past”, is already refuted, so you are correct in doubting it.
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what I said was that he maintained that if the past were infinite then that implies that an infinite amount of time has elapsed. — Amalac

So is this where you’re coming from? And by association, is this the hypothetical proposition the truth of which you find doubtful?

“....up to every given moment of time, an eternity must have elapsed, and therewith passed away an infinite series of successive conditions...”

You’re equating your “if the past were infinite” with his “an eternity must have elapsed”, probably, which is fine. Close enough. As well, your “an infinite amount of time must have elapsed” is close to his “therewith passed away an infinite series of successive conditions”.

So why are you doubting the truth of what he says given you are saying practically the same thing?

The problem arises upon recognition that his hypothetical proposition is prefaced by granting there is no world. You can find the truth doubtful in his hypothetical proposition, just as he himself does, from the excruciatingly sufficient reason that there is a world.

All I can do now, is grant I got the hypothetical propositions mixed up, and that’s not what you’re talking about at all. If so, you’ve successfully confused the hell outta me, and I’m at the end of my dialectical rope. So fix the confusion, or forget the whole thing.....up to you.

Yeah, my bad. I saw it, but couldn’t fix it without starting over. Compromised between making an effort and taking the heat.

I wish to know how the two concepts in Kant's definition are described: infinite and infinity. — god must be atheist

Didn’t I do exactly that? Dunno what else you want.
—————

If the infinite is an adjective as you say,
— Mww

you are using it as a noun. You used it as a noun when you quoted Kant.

Are you referencing this: “Now, just as the unit which is taken is greater or smaller, the infinite will be greater or smaller”?

Ehhhh....that just means regardless of how many minutes there are in an infinite time, there will be more of them than an infinite time composed of hours.

Easy peasey — god must be atheist

Witnessing indicates observation. To witness an object from outside its limits merely indicates observing the object’s spatial boundaries.
— Mww

What is the boundary of the world then? I guess you mean something like the CMB? — Amalac

I diverge from Kant here, and adjoin Schopenhauer, re: the world as “will and representation”, in that I consider the world to be the immediate unity of phenomena, that which directly appears to my representational faculties, a much narrower view of experience proper. All else, being possible experience doesn’t change the my idea of world, but rather, enlarges its content and thereby its limits. As such, the boundary of my world is the totality of my possible experience, and, because of that restriction, the CMB is irrelevant.
—————

Assuming the absolute validity of the principle, the only reconciliation is simultaneity, in which time is no longer presupposed, yet for which account is given.
— Mww

So by simultaneously you don't mean “at the same time”, what do you mean by that then? Logically simultaneous? — Amalac

I think more the simultaneity of the initiation of phenomena, with the possibility of the representation of them, by an eventual intellect equipped with a cognitive system predicated on it. Within such a system, time is not an object so doesn’t depend on the ontology of objects, but it is used by the system in referencing objects to the system or to each other, so as soon as objects become possible, so too does the possibility of referencing them. Time is therefore irrelevant if there are no objects and if there is no system.
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If there's no present, and an infinite amount of time has elapsed as Kant maintains in the first thesis, since when to when did it elapse? — Amalac

Again, he doesn’t maintain it, he supposes it in order to have something to debunk. There is a world in existence, therefore an infinite time is impossible, for that world. There may be an infinite time regressively from the beginning of the world, but not from an infinite time progressively to the beginning of the world. There is no present for the world from a progressively infinite time makes no sense. From the progressively infinite time point of view, to ask what time elapsed to what time, makes no sense. What is there to reference it to?

If you read the antinomies, you should have found he did the same thing in the antithesis. In the thesis he supposed the world had no beginning then proved it did, in the antithesis he supposed the world had a beginning and proved it didn’t. They are called conflicts of transcendental ideas for just that reason; either can be proved in its own way.

therefore he can't equate the two. — god must be atheist

Make of these what you will:

“...A quantity is infinite, if a greater than itself cannot possibly exist....”
“...The true (transcendental) conception of infinity is: that the successive synthesis of unity in the measurement of a given quantum can never be completed....”
—————-

Now, just as the unit which is taken is greater or smaller, the infinite will be greater or smaller
— Mww

This is actually not right. There is no such thing as "infinite" other than to describe a feature of infinity. — god must be atheist

If the infinite is an adjective as you say, why can’t it describe a feature of a quantity? It may have been clearer if he’d said the unit is taken to be more or less, then the infinite will be greater or smaller. Still, this must be understood as a quantity approaches infinity by means of the more or fewer units in it.

Dunno how infinity can have features anyway. All it can ever be is an uncompleted series. Then it is only a feature of the series, described by its incompleteness.

As I said, for whatever it’s worth....infinity is a conception of its own, there is no object associated with it. That which is infinite, has as many conceptions associated with it as there are infinite things.

Anyway.....this is the kinda thing that can be played with all day, no one the happier for it beyond the time used for it not wasted somewhere else.

There are two ways of thinking about infinity — god must be atheist

I will disagree. There is one way to think of infinity, and another different way to think of the infinite.

Infinity is its own thing; all that is infinite is each its own thing.

Which is Kant’s argument, among others. Fascinating or not, not wrong.

“...Now, just as the unit which is taken is greater or smaller, the infinite will be greater or smaller; but the infinity, which consists merely in the relation to this given unit, must remain always the same, although the absolute quantity of the whole is not thereby cognized....”

we’ve witnessed it in its entirety from outside its limits — Mww

unknown parts of the world, and parts we have not observed yet or of whose existence we are not even aware at present — Amalac

Limits indicates a spatial boundary. Witnessing indicates observation. To witness an object from outside its limits merely indicates observing the object’s spatial boundaries. Observing a boundary has nothing to do with the experience of the total constituency of the object observed. In fact, the total constituency, the composition, of an object is immediately given because it is bounded, whether or not there is any experience of it.
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the universe, according to you, was the condition for space and time, in which case wouldn't that imply that the universe is determined by time, contrary to what you said? — Amalac

I don’t think it logically correct to grant empirical causality from simultaneity. That every effect has a cause presupposes a time by which the cause is antecedent to the effect. If the universe causes time, and time is already presupposed, the principle of cause and effect self-destructs. Assuming the absolute validity of the principle, the only reconciliation is simultaneity, in which time is no longer presupposed, yet for which account is given.
————

Assuming the universe was infinite towards the past, and that an infinite amount of time passed all the way to the present, since which moment down to the present did it pass? Since when to when did it pass? — Amalac

There is no present. Questions predicated on impossibilities are irrational.

If you are not using the words “world” and “universe” as synonyms, then what's the difference between the two? — Amalac

The world is a phenomenon, an object of experience, now that we’ve witnessed it in its entirety from outside its limits; the universe is not. If the universe is the condition for space and time, it cannot be a phenomenon determined by them. Trying to equalize them, is, as the Good Professor says, “...a mere subterfuge...”, nevermind the lengthy exposition on why this is so.
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we could deduce the proposition “The universe has a necessary origin in time” without experience, merely by analysis of the concept “world”, right? — Amalac

I don’t know how that would be possible, if the world is a particular thing but the universe is all particular things in general. Claiming the last because of the first would be induction, which everybody from Hume onward, epistemologically worthy of his letters, says is unreliable. Besides, claiming anything empirical without the regulation of experience is not sufficient for knowledge.
————

show me how that proposition is analytic. — Amalac

How the universe has a necessary origin in time? Hmmmm.....I don’t think that can be shown, unless it can be shown the origin of the universe is simultaneous with the origin of time.

Anyway.....does that work for you? Don’t forget we’re doing metaphysics here, not hard science.

you said before that it was a tautology, which seems untrue — Amalac

I said that the world exists and therefore has a necessary origin in time, is a tautology, a analytic truth.

Evidence that the universe is finitely existent in the past is provided by the mathematically logical necessity of singularities.
— Mww

If you have to look for evidence in support of that proposition, then it's no longer a tautology. — Amalac

I’m not supporting the proposition, but merely stating it. The solutions to the field equations support it, which are not subject/copula/predicate propositions, but mathematical formulations, and while not analytical, are nonetheless true. If otherwise, the entire human system for knowledge certainty is in serious jeopardy, regardless of its adaptability to changes in observational data.
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It (mathematically logical necessity) may be logically necessary given the laws of physics that govern the actual universe, — Amalac

Laws don’t govern the universe; they are human constructs representing how the universe appears to govern itself. In that regard, I agree you are correct, in that they are only as certain as the observation data from which they are derived. Mathematical certainty is not predicated on the apparent operation of the universe, in that they must be certain under any conditions whatsoever, no matter what we discover about the universe. Mathematics is our creation; the world is not.
—————

I thought you were using the words “world” and “universe” as synonyms. — Amalac

Nope. Using the concepts....the words.... as you are.
—————

I don't know how we could know if time exists outside of our minds or not. — Amalac

Nor do I. Theoretically it cannot, but you know what they say about theories.

That the world exists and therefore has a necessary origin in time, is an analytic...tautological....truth of logic, insofar as its negation is impossible.
— Mww

Seems to me like that would only be true if the universe were finite towards the past, which doesn’t seem tautologically true — Amalac

Evidence that the universe is finitely existent in the past is provided by the mathematically logical necessity of singularities. If singularities are real phenomena, then the existence of the universe follows the same logical criteria as is followed by the world. Thing is, experience informs us of the phenomenal reality of the world, but cannot inform us of the phenomenal reality of the universe or of singularities. Can’t use the criteria for what it is possible to know, in determinations for what is not.

With respect to Kant reflected in Popper, the world exists, which makes explicit a necessary origin in time
— Mww

Doesn't seem that explicit to me, how does that follow? (1. The world exists, 2.???, 3. Therefore, the world has an origin in time) — Amalac

That’s fine; it doesn’t have to be explicit to you. I said with respect to Kant reflected in Popper, in which there is no 2.???. That the world exists and therefore has a necessary origin in time, is an analytic...tautological....truth of logic, insofar as its negation is impossible.

As a matter of dialectical interest, though, how does the statement not follow, from your point of view?

isn't that as fallacious as arguing that the series of negative integers cannot be infinite because otherwise it could never reach -3? — Amalac

Negative integers have a necessary originating condition, so arriving at -3 is not impossible. The totality of the series of integers is infinite, but a particular member of the series is given by the mere assembly of count from whatever arbitrary origin. Now, the infinite divisibility of an aggregate quantity, represented by numbers, on the other hand, would make arriving at -3 impossible.

With respect to Kant reflected in Popper, the world exists, which makes explicit a necessary origin in time, therefore the time of the world cannot be an infinite series, even if time itself, is, irrespective of phenomena. And while space is infinitely divisible, the world is already a whole conceptual aggregate in itself which immediately defines the limits of its own finitely divisible space. The tacit understanding here is, if divided too far, in order to conform to the infinite divisibility of space in general, but regarding only that space the world inhabits, the world is no longer conceptually identical to its original, hence the incurrence of a “transcendental illusion”.....the very thing the antinomies make apparent.
———————

my point is that the argument he used to prove that the universe cannot be infinite to the past doesn't appear valid. — Amalac

Interesting. Where do he prove that, exactly? I don’t know of it, and couldn’t find a reference in the texts for it. As far as I understand the antinomy, he describes the confines of it, to certain determinations, of which there is the world, and there is nature...not Nature, nor reality in general, just the constituency of whatever is being considered at the moment....but only makes reference to the universe as a object in the refutation of its viability in any argument with respect to the world.

In fact, I don’t think he attempted to prove the universe cannot be infinite to the past, for to do so is to exchange a phenomenal object of sensibility, which is solely determined by the pure intuitions of space and time thus a possible experience, for an intellectual object of understanding, which cannot be so determined at all thus can never be an experience. If anything, he proved the universe cannot be argued to be infinite to the past, or infinite in any relation to time or space, under the same conditions from which the world is so argued.

But...maybe I missed something, so I’d welcome a little help.

Ok. Thanks.

I did not manage to specify the field..... — Manuel

You did specify the field, in your response to . But all that does is presuppose that to which the field belongs, but says nothing about what that entails.

I don't know how else to formulate the topic. — Manuel

The historical precedent for formulation of anything, always begins by proving the possibility of it. If successful, its possibility is always followed by proving its necessity.

Exacting criteria, to be sure, but hey.......you brought it up, so the onus is on you.

Good luck!!!

We ‘see’ with our occipital lobes. — I like sushi

Yeah......and?

I don’t care what the occipital lobe is doing. When I close my eyes I know why I can’t see.

I'm assuming you want to add something I missed or correct a mistake — Manuel

Nahhhh. You “took up arms in a sea of troubles” so up to you to suffer the “slings and arrows of outrageous fortune”.

Still, it would seem you had your dialectical legs kicked out from under you from the very beginning, for not establishing the legitimacy of the domain, prior to inquiring about the possibility of legitimate questions arising from it. And because of that, as soon as laptops and sundry post hoc ergo propter hoc foolishness writ large in language philosophy entered the field, the war was lost.

You were heading in the right direction. Or at least heading in the same direction I already went.

All well and good. Now insert time in there somehow.

Good catch. I like them both, but favor Kant.

Why didn’t you just say for what we CANNOT perceive and for what we cannot conceptualize (we cannot name).
— Mww

Hehe... this claims we can only name things that we can both conceptualize and perceive at the same time and at the same respect — god must be atheist

So a claim for what cannot be named is at the same time claim for what can? Nope, ain’t buyin’ it.

The first is quite obviously true insofar as that which is neither perceivable nor conceivable cannot be known to exist as far as we’re concerned, while the latter is quite obviously false insofar as we can certainly name things conceived long before that thing is ever perceived, if it ever is.

Connective consistency is important; logical consistency is paramount.

So the senses pass physical information that can be used as input, presumably for mental content, which the dictionary (sigh) terms “perception”. As well, apparently, perception can comprise mental content without the passing of physical information, insofar as at least one kind of perception doesn’t use the senses. Where does the mental content come from that isn’t passed by physical information? I suppose thinking can provide mental content, but still, what kind of content can it be, if not physical information from sensory inputs?

Perception as mental content comprised of physical information passed by the senses, and perception as mental content comprised of something other than physical information not passed by the senses. Seems like there should be a difference, so how does the mind tell the difference, and how does the mind treat one differently than the other, if there is one?

I understand all that. I’m not begrudging your definitions.

Still, granting that the senses aren’t used in your system of mental content, what part do they play?

Thinking of time perception as mental content...... — Mark Nyquist

Thinking as mental content...ok;
Thinking of time as mental content....ok;
Thinking of time perception as mental content....not ok.

Because thinking of time as mental content is already granted, the only way thinking of time perception as mental content can be consistently affirmed, is to treat perception as a function of the mind. If perception is a function of the mind.....what are the senses for?

Oh. Psychological matter.

That lets me out.

Instead, you decide. After all, your discussion. And when you've said, then the rest of us can pick at it, making it strong if it's any good. — tim wood

Agreed. Can’t have an answer consistent with a very specific question, without a proper ground being given for it. Always best to separate the sophists from the dialecticians.

Time is how we perceive entropy. — I like sushi

True enough, but we don't care that time is how we perceive, when we wish to know how time is perceived.

Why didn’t you just say for what we CANNOT perceive and for what we cannot conceptualize, we don’t have a name. No one can beat that horse beyond its expiration date, or, as in my case, no proper yankeevirgobabyboomer can analyze that such that the logical inconsistency of what you did say, becomes glaringly obvious. (Grin)

Ok. Thanks.

emotions provide an aesthetic 'intuition' about a decision and its potential outcome based on reason. How do these aesthetic judgements arise or change in one's mind? — Shawn

By the creation of an object of desire or inclination, from practical reason, by which the subjective condition explains itself to itself. I may have feelings about something, not necessarily because of what it is, but merely from how I am inclined to think of it, or, for some affect I wish it to impart to me.

It should be noted that emotions, while prevalent, are not necessary for humans. We know there are things for which we have no feelings at all, things for which no judgement is made with respect to that thing’s affect.

I think, technically, we don’t know how aesthetic judgements arise, but only speculate on the conditions under which they become possible. It is plain they are merely subjective, because it is plain one subject may have very different feelings than another, given exactly the same circumstance. And anything purely subjective, is pretty much impossible to quantify across the board.

We don't need to perceive it directly. We can compute it, and we do — god must be atheist

No, technically, we do not; we compute duration or succession, and represent such computations with everything from clocks to scratches on a wall. Flowers bloom under conditions right for them, but it is only with respect to humans, that flowers bloom in the spring. Spring, of course, a human conception, having absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with flowers themselves. Just as the first directly visible light from the sun on Earth itself has nothing to do with “morning”.
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for what we don't perceive, and for what we can't conceptualize, we don't have a name. — god must be atheist

Not “and for”. “Or for”. Your language makes explicit we must perceive all we name, which is obviously not the case. It follows that iff there is no perception of time as such, and yet time is nonetheless a name for something, it only names a conception, which can be argued to be the case without contradiction. Whereas time as a perception, is full of them, one for each and every instance of treating time as an object. Misplaced concreteness writ large? I mean....if time is perceivable, shouldn’t we be able to smell it?

What we don’t understand and for what we can’t conceptualize, we don’t have a name....is perhaps a better description of the human condition. Now, if time is something merely understood, we have reason to name it, but we have no occasion for, and are relieved of the absurdity of, smelling it.
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Human language is the extension of models of reality — god must be atheist

Absolutely. Human models described by human language derived from human experience.
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the very title of the thread is "How do we perceive time?" — god must be atheist

Yep, and I understand you mean that to ask that question presupposes the truth of it, in that we actually do perceive time, and the query simple asks about the means by which such perception occurs. That being the case, I must admit I don’t know how we perceive time.

does not need guidance. — Fooloso4

I see I misspoke: you said mechanistic but I wrote deterministic. Sorry....not paying proper attention.

Anyway, agreed, mechanical systems need no guidance. What ground is there or attributing extension to systems, when Descartes in Principles only attributes extension to “corporeal substance”?

I’m aware of but not well-versed in Descartes’ science, having more interest in his metaphysics. I shall have to take your word for it, that he regards the world as deterministic, so jettisons final causes. But if he claims that mind, body and god all are not responsible for guidance in the course of things, does he then claim Nature itself, is? I mean....what’s left? That, or the course of things isn’t guided at all, I guess. Excluded middle kinda thing.
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at once consistent with it and contrary to it. — Fooloso4

Yeah...if you’re gonna upset the applecart, ya gotta be ready to appease the owner.

I hope it makes a little sense to avoid the dichotomy of either treating emotions as "rational" or "irrational"? — Shawn

It can make sense to avoid the dichotomy, insofar as rational/irrational implies logical judgements based on reason, whereas emotions imply aesthetic judgements based on feelings alone. It follows that emotions need not be treated as rational/irrational, thus avoiding the dichotomy.

Humans, after all, reason to a logical judgement, but reason from an aesthetic judgement. On the one hand, we have to understand things about an object before we know what the object is, but on the other hand, we very well may already have feelings about something before we know what it is about it, that causes those feelings.

Expressions of emotion may be rational/irrational. But emotions themselves, as purely subjective conditions, are not.

why does he want to distinguish them? — Fooloso4

In modern parlance.....the quest for the unconditioned? The irreducible. The absolute certainty. From which the possibility of knowledge itself is given.

Recognition of the validity of thinking outside the Bible.