we never see the tree itself, but only the reflected light from the tree, itself then assembled into our own image of it - our image removed in time and substance and by successive media from anything the tree itself might be. — tim wood

There’s a perfect little nutshell if there ever was one, right there. Especially the successive media part, which even the rabid physicalists cannot deny, without making themselves foolish. The brain doesn’t sense stuff; it only registers that other body parts have sensed stuff. As long as a one-to-one correspondence between those is physically impossible, any epistemological theory centered around the thing-in-itself can never be refuted.
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Defining science as the asking of well-crafted and answerable questions, which in the course of experiment are in fact answered (some way or other), with respect to, say, that tree over there, is it the Kantian position that we can know nothing about it (-in-itself-as-it-is-in-itself)? — tim wood

Correct, according to his theory of human knowledge, keeping in mind this is with respect to our perception of things, meaning our basic sensory apparatus in juxtaposition to real spacetime objects. When using devices of experiment, on the other hand, we have merely relinquished the sensing of the object, from which we get our representations, and replaced it with the sensing of the equipment, which is still a representation to us, but a representation that represents what is being tested.
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And we can build up quite bit of knowledge about the tree, if even only by negation (e.g., by what it isn't and where it isn't, etc.). — tim wood

Yeah, but, Abboooottttt!!!! We don’t care about what a tree isn’t. All the conceptions judged not belonging to the intuition of a thing, does nothing to tell us what it is. Instead, we end up with a perpetually undetermined phenomenon. So, yes, we can build up quite a bit of knowledge, by synthesizing conceptions understanding thinks as belonging to an intuition. How do you think it is, that we got so farging many kinds of nails!!!
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The substance being not that science cannot know.... — tim wood

Yep. It isn’t that science cannot know, meaning it isn’t that science cannot tell us, but rather, it is us that sometimes may not know what to ask science to tell us and, possibly, it is us that doesn’t accept what science has to say.

Kant, through logic, felt like all metaphysical inquiries were fruitless — 3017amen

I wouldn’t agree with that, as much as I would agree Kant thought metaphysical pursuits....wondering, if you will.....culminating in the certainty of a science, is fruitless. While it is necessary to treat metaphysics as if it were a science, in order to gain as much certainty as possible, and that using the purity of logical form, as long as experience is required to prove what metaphysics proposes by means of that logic, just as experience is required to prove the sciences proper, we are at a loss.

Not to argue without cause, but there is at least one condition under which metaphysical pursuits are fruit-FUL, and that is to restrict pure reason to its proper bounds. But that’s the very philosophy of which Everydayman has no recognition of needing despite being endlessly guilty of violating.

he at least did acknowledge that humans have that (....) wonder...which is intrinsic a priori to the intellect. — 3017amen

Absolutely. The opening paragraph of the A edition says almost exactly that, albeit in Prussian academic Enlightenment prose, setting the stage for the next 700 pages. He does walk it back slightly in the B edition, by saying all that, but it only applies if one “rises to the height of speculation”. I guess he had to account for the folks that didn’t care about wondering, blessed with a mere “common understanding”. Which is still a lot kinder than Hume, who says of Everydayman “a man of vulgar understanding”. (Grin)

science is indirectly working on totally uncovering the thing-in-itself with the Standard Model as a good beginning. — val p miranda

You know, from a Kantian point of view, science only tells of a thing, what a human asks. If we don’t know a thing as it is in itself, but only as our sensibility presents it to us, what could we direct science toward, other than the representations sensibility gives us? In effect, we are asking science to justify our interpretation of the world, rather than inform us with direct evidence of the world as it is in itself.

An appearance is not what appears; a representation is a word for appearance. — val p miranda

Substituting, it should be congruent that a representation is not what appears.

What appears is the thing-in-self.... — val p miranda

Substituting again, it should be congruent that representation is not what appears, but rather, the thing-in-itself is what appears, from which follows that it should be congruent that the thing-in-itself is not a representation nor an appearance.

......but our sensibility detects macro reality. — val p miranda

It can only be assumed now, rather than substituted, that because the thing-in-itself is not representation, and our sensibility only detects macro reality, then the thing-in-itself is what our sensibility detects such that it then appears to us, making the thing-in-itself contained in or by macro reality.

But the assertion reads, “the thing-in-itself is what appears, but our sensibility detects macro reality”, which implies the thing-in-itself is not what our sensibility detects thus is not contained in macro reality. Or, put another way, the thing-in-itself is what appears, but the thing-in-itself is not what is detected, which reduces to, what appears is not what is detected.

Or it could be that the thing-in-itself appears by some other means than its detection by our sensibility, which carries the implication that there is a multiplicity of methods for the manifestation of what appears, that at the same time must not be a representation, given from the first substitution.
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As a matter of curiosity alone, did you derive your entry from this little tidbit......

“...At the same time, it must be carefully borne in mind that, while we surrender the power of cognizing, we still reserve the power of thinking objects, as things in themselves. For, otherwise, we should require to affirm the existence of an appearance, without something that appears, which is absurd...” (CPR Bxxvii)

.......and if not, wherefrom, may I ask?

Do you agree with the argument? — Aoife Jones

To say I don’t know what it is like to be a bat, but I do know that to be a bat is to be like something....otherwise, for me, there can be nothing in any way like a bat at all, an obvious contradiction.....all I have said about my knowledge system is its determination of its own limits, but nothing about any particular kind of world to which my knowledge directs itself.

So saying, no, I do not agree with the argument.

1.) The major is true, in that there is something it is like to be a bat.
2.) The minor is partially true, in that no matter the quantity of things I do know, the fact remains that my knowledge of everything is impossible, hence not knowing the something the being of a bat is like, is merely among the things I don’t know, and also partially incomplete, in that the “I can never know” can arise from either an inductive inference as an a priori condition of time, or, from a deductive inference as an empirical condition of mere physiological impossibility. But....
3.) The conclusion does not follow from the premises, in that.....

A.) it neglects the possibility that reality and the objective world are already determined as indistinguishable by the very self-limiting knowledge system that is investigating things possible to know.....
B.) it neglects the logic that because it is the case that something is not known, warrant is immediately relinquished for determining the world to which that something belongs, and....
C.) having knowledge of something is sufficient to claim its necessity, but having no knowledge of something is not sufficient to claim its impossibility.

Or so it seems.......

I hope you’re aware that the A249-A254 section from which that quote is taken, was re-written by the author, in the B edition. While it is true he said all that stuff, it is just as true he thought better of it six years later, thereby making this quote obsolete, as far as the overall treatise is concerned.

Doesn’t really matter all that much, with respect to the thread title. Kant never did posit a noumenal “world”, hence whether or not he was justified in positing its existence, is moot.

Just sayin’......

I asked if you would grant that morality derives from respect. — Banno

I answered to the best of my interpretation of your question:

No, I would not. It is my philosophical contention that morality is given, as a pure subjective human condition, hence not derivable. I qualified my answer with......the loss of self-respect being the greatest possible affront to morality......which indicates respect presupposes morality itself, its form be what it may.
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You're not behaving morally, nor immorally, if you are acting only out of obligation. — Banno

Correct, insofar as, deontologically speaking, obligation is necessary but not in itself sufficient, for acting morally, for there must still be practical reasons for being obligated, that are not mere inclinations. Being aware of your predispositions on the topic, I won’t burden you with the theoretical predicates. Just the kinda guy I am, doncha know.

Surely you’d grant that morality derives from respect for others, not for oneself... — Banno

No, I would not. If what you say is the case, then I am morally destitute for no other reason than I hold no respect for another human. I am no more obliged to respect another than I am myself; the difference is the sense of loss associated with it, the loss of self-respect being the greatest possible affront to morality. Keeping in mind that to not respect is very far from to disrespect.

It is my philosophical contention that morality is given, as a pure subjective human condition, hence not derivable. The exhibition of it, on the other hand, by one from his sense of it, and the judgement of that, by another from his own sense of it, according to the Great and Highly Esteemed Roger Waters, “is what the fighting’s all about”.

Surely you’d grant that a virtuous man thwarts his desires for the sake of his precious, better known as self-respect.

If the illusion is persuasive enough, maybe it isn’t one.

True, he can chose his rules. But if he chooses different rules for different situations, without a rule to rule them all, he is hard pressed to assume a standard of action, being rather at the whim and whimsy of his own desires.

Gotta be a bottom, do-not-cross, line somewhere, somehow, right?

What does your brand of virtue ethics say about that?

If there is a way to know what one should do, why is it still a question?
— Mww

The question shouldn’t exist because morality should be inherently there like thinking — SteveMinjares

Agreed, and was my point.

As for the rest, too anthropological/psychological for me. I prefer my philosophy, and particularly moral theory, separate and distinct from them. I’m old-fashioned that way.

I rather think Everydayman’s core is pretty tidy, as a rule.

It still remains, that the ground for how he acts, in response to "What should I do, now, in this situation?", isn’t given by the situation.

The real question is "What should I do, now, in this situation?" — Banno

How is that not haphazardly contingent?

If there is a way to know what one should do, why is it still a question?

I maintain you also have a sense of morality — counterpunch

I maintain that (....) morality is primarily subjective — counterpunch

Robinson Crusoe cannot behave immorally, alone on a desert island — counterpunch

You had my support.....as clandestine as it may have been, tucked away in the back of the room here.....but now I’m having second thoughts.

Better you fix it, elst the vultures get a freebie.

It's unclear what Mww is doing, especially given that he says "I agree with it" then "I don't"... — Banno

You asked what I found interesting, so I told you. This part of the essay is interesting to me so I give it a thumbs up, that part of the essay is interesting to me as well, but I give it a thumbs down. Simple.

A guy that takes a metaphor and turns it into a riddle, by the employment of conceptions that contradict each other, re: “foundation walls carried by the whole house” is just wasting himself in doing crappy philosophy.

But nobody’s gonna buy that he was doing crappy philosophy, so it is given a nice comforting name, language games. The epitome of which is found in Grayling’s characterization of #248, “the clever rendition of the transcendental argument”. The reader is required to substitute the constituents of the proposition, while retaining its intent, arriving at something like....all my rock-bottom convictions are carried by my propositions. So the game is the choice of substitutions, the language is what is substituted, and the result......which has been the case since man dragged woman back to the cave by the hair......obtains as right back to crappy philosophy. Not because no one can make sense of it, but when he does make sense of it by playing language games, he finds it’s all been said before.

But, you know. Opinions are like noses......

I say: There is no Law but the Law! — Ciceronianus the White

Agreed, if you mean there must be the pure conception of law before there can be instances of it.

The belief that the law must conform to an "assumed standard" of some kind, and isn't the law if it does not, ignores the law; it doesn't explain it. It leads to a fundamental ignorance of the nature of the law and its operation. — Ciceronianus the White

Disagreed. Law, by which I do not mean a law, or the law, but law in itself, does conform to a standard, it isn’t law if it doesn’t, and it explains what law is, hence is not the ignoring of it even while ignoring its instances.

Agreed, though, that there is already a fundamental ignorance of the nature of law, in the ignorance of its assumed standards, and that because the standards for law in general, without regard to that which law directs itself, are universality and absolute necessity.

Feelings are things. Ideas are things. Feelings and ideas are a causal part of the world, just like everything else we make statements about. — Harry Hindu

I disagree. That which is given to sensibility is a thing, that which to us becomes phenomena. Causality for things in the world requires both sufficient reason and necessity; feelings are sufficient reason for some things but do not carry necessity for those same things, so fails the criteria for causality of things in the world.

But, if you ain’t buyin’ none of that, that feelings are not things, c’mon over and we’ll crack open this brand new jug of righteousness, grill up some happy, top off the evening with nice game of timid, and we’ll talk about these......er..... things.
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Feelings don’t matter in statements not about feelings but about things.
— Mww
...which was the point I was making about the distinction between objective and subjective statements - when you confuse talking about things that are not your feelings with talking about your feelings. When you tell me the apple is red, are you talking about the apple or your feeling? — Harry Hindu

One cannot talk intelligibly about his feelings without some object in the predicate of the proposition, that identifies them, that predicate immediately makes the proposition objective. A purely subjective proposition has the form, “I feel bad”. Or, “Juicy ripe apples make me feel happy”, where the predicate is the feeling. Both worthless tautologies. A big fat.....yeah, and???

Rather than a category error, I think the distinction between objective and subjective statements is what can be possibly done with them. Objective, possible dialogue; subjective, no dialogue, or amendment to an objective statement in order to facilitate a possible dialogue.

Or not. Too much bother, methinks. The technicalities beyond the scope.

You: If statements are about feelings, then what are feelings about?
Me: And if they’re not, why would it matter?
You: Exactly. If feelings aren't about anything, then your words and your feelings wouldn't matter...

Statements not about feelings are statements about things.
Feelings don’t matter in statements not about feelings but about things.
Statements not about feelings doesn't mean feelings aren’t about anything.
Feelings are always about something. If feelings aren’t about anything, statements with feeling as predicates are worthless tautologies, re: beauty is a feeling.

Our feeling of reading words is about words that exist on the screen — Harry Hindu

No. Our understanding of reading words is about words that exist, and that from an assertorial judgement on a given cognition on empirical grounds; feeling is only an aesthetic judgement that is not given from any cognition, but on a priori ground alone. Understanding is an affect on experience; feeling is an affect on personality (technically, subjectivity) because of an experience.

Do try to separate feelings from cognitions, psychology from philosophy.

there is a passive state of subjectivity (when thought is not active) — TheGreatArcanum

I would name this sensibility.

and an active state of subjectivity (when thought is active) — TheGreatArcanum

I would name this understanding.

that is to say that the subject has a quasi-unconscious non-representational a priori knowledge of its potential to create change within itself through thought. — TheGreatArcanum

I would name this consciousness.

subject doesn't need to represent itself using propositions to know that it exists, — TheGreatArcanum

Reification, or misplaced concreteness generally, and James’ (1890) psychologist’s fallacy in particular. Or so it seems. And if not that, then the logical mistake of using existence as a predicate. If a subject knows anything at all, whether from its propositions or otherwise, then its existence is given which makes knowing it exists, quite superfluous.
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the subject, while the active state is not instantiated, is not non-existent, but existent in a state of potentiality, in which every aspect of its essence (with the exception of a few; I'm sure you can guess which ones are active and which are not) are still existent. — TheGreatArcanum

So the mind has a process, which involves a series of steps, so to speak. At some point in that process, according to your theory, some steps are inactive because the subject is not actually thinking, per se. What happens to the input to a system, when it meets an inactive step? What comes out the other side, if its activity is blocked by an inactive step in the process? It sounds to me like you’re proposing the aspects of the subject are still there, but just not doing anything.

OK, so....there is an aspect in which the subject’s active state is not instantiated, meaning the subject is not engaged in thought, and I name it “sensibility”. It is that in which the matter of perceptions (theoretically, mind you) is found, and gives to the active, thinking subject its material, which I name phenomena. But as you can see, it is very far from inactive, for otherwise, we might perceive an object but never be given the means to henceforth think it as the representation of, e.g., “bulldozer”.

This is all quite reasonable, given that all sensations, traveling from the receptivity of organs responsible for each type along their specialized, dedicated nerves to the CNS, the empirical facts and therefore the absolute necessity of which we are never the least bit conscious.

Now....state of potentiality. Sounds at first rather far-fetched. Seemingly wants to be reduced to possibility, which just sounds better. But that reduction misses a very fine point that potentiality grants, and that is....there is no smell of frying bacon unless bacon is in fact frying. Experience tells us that the stuff frying is bacon, but potentiality tells us how bacon would smell if it fries. Your potentiality is not far-fetched at all; I just name it differently, as intuition.
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even people who disagree with my philosophy are going to love my philosophy simply because of its poeticness and its originality. — TheGreatArcanum

Weeellllll....it isn’t all that original, and I don’t want my philosophy poetic. But your thinking is admirable nonetheless. You know.....cuz it adjoins my own enough to say so. Which only means we both might be so FOS our eyes are brown. (Grin)

This leads@Mww puzzling over the mistaken metaphor as to whether the house is built on its foundations or the foundations built under the house. — Banno

What....I was supposed to get that, out of this?

“....given at 248: 'I have arrived at the rock-bottom of my convictions. And one might almost say that these foundation-walls are carried by the whole house.'....”

That’s like the other day, this guy tells me...the fly is trapped in the bottle because it’s transparent.

I suppose there’s some kind of epiphany in both of those, but the expense of effort isn’t worth the find.

how can we say that knowledge is reducible to propositional knowledge? — TheGreatArcanum

Dunno, which is why I would never say that. I, in fact, reject the notion entirely, under either a priori or a posteriori conditions.

As for the rest, I’ll have to think about it. Some seems right, some not so much. But I’m cognitively prejudiced, so there is that......

the process is contained within the essence of the subject and does not exist independently of it. — TheGreatArcanum

The subject never even arises until or unless the system thinks about itself, insofar as the subject merely represents the first person nature of the system, by means of propositions the system constructs in accordance with its own rules.

Hence, the aforementioned intrinsic circularity.

the logical form and process of thought and its relationship to the logical form of the mind considered in itself — TheGreatArcanum

meaning that the essence of the subject involves the formulation of thoughts; — TheGreatArcanum

Logical consistency requires that if the first is the case, then it follows that the second should read....the essence of the mind involves the formulation of thoughts. The subject is that to which the thoughts belong, the subject is not itself the process. The essence of the subject, though, is merely the manifold of his representations.

But hey........it’s your philosophy, do with it as you wish. Who knows; we might be witnessing another paradigm shift.

the logical form and process of thought and its relationship to the logical form of the mind considered in itself — TheGreatArcanum

This is the what a system of thought does, considered in itself. There are no propositions, hence no circular reasoning involved therein, but are deriveable from it by means of it.

When I asked about the intrinsic circularity contained in the system, you answered with the circularity possible from the illogical employment of the system.

Can’t mix the two, in building a new philosophy.

Kant's Metaphysics — 3017amen

Mentioned.

Dismissed as......primitive.

Systems. Antecedent to propositions constructed by it.

That is to say that the structure of the mind is logical, and can be known, logically. — TheGreatArcanum

And what is to be done with the intrinsic circularity of such a system?

If statements are about feelings, then what are feelings about? — Harry Hindu

And if they’re not, why would it matter?

Are you an anti-realist or solipsist? — Harry Hindu

Depends. Is there prize or penalty for the right answer?

allows me to infer, from particular to universal, with absolute certainty. — TheGreatArcanum

Oh. Ok.

Good luck with that.

Start at the beginning: Critique of Pure Reason. Make no mistake......whatever is said today, about what you’re asking, is grounded in one way or another, pro or con, by that complete metaphysical treatise on the human cognitive system.

As an added bonus, you get a real test of your comprehension abilities.

Have fun!!!

That is the category error - when a statement is asserted to be about the empircal state-of-affairs when it is really about the person's feelings or emotional state. — Harry Hindu

Because every statement ever made is first constructed by a subject, and because a subject has feelings, then any implied empirical statement is really a statement about feelings, hence a category error?

Too absurd to be true, so I’ll grant the benefit of the doubt and assume that’s not what you meant.

The fly is trapped in the bottle because it's transparent. — T H E

I’m gonna go ahead and assume that right there exemplifies good philosophy, but I’m just too dense to grasp it, and the benefit in expending the hard work of making the hidden assumptions visible, isn’t obtained by the effort.
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trapped' in the transparent bottle of Cartesian assumptions — T H E

'Prove to me I have a hand.' — T H E

It's just wheels spinning in the mud. — T H E

Yeah, just like that. Because ol’ Rene said he could doubt he had a hand presupposes it (the mud), so the proof thereof is given, making the request for such proof superfluous (a spinning wheel).

'Do I see a chair or a representation of a chair?' — T H E

Dunno. Try sitting in a chair with your eyes closed, see if your butt lands on the floor. The spinning wheel here, is the mistaken relation between what is perceived and the representation of it. It isn’t the same. Never was.
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I can't do the word-math that proves the confusion in a word-math approach. — T H E

Seems that way, yes. If you could, you wouldn’t be questioning the chair. So maybe the confusion isn’t in the approach itself, but merely its proper application.

the whole man-in-the-box problem of getting to the real world — T H E

The word-math system shows the man-in-the-box that he doesn’t have to get to the real world, for the simple reason that real world is given to him. The real world gets to him so much so that it is absolutely impossible for him to ignore it. Sorta like that fly.....it is in no way self-contradictory to propose he (fly/man) isn’t so much trapped in a transparent bottle (box) objectified as his real world, as to propose he is, rather, protected by it. The boundary restricts his exorbitant creations (language games/inconceivable abstractions) concerning the other side, being necessarily governed by a very particular domain of possibilities he has been fated to populate.
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Mentalistic man-in-the-box language is unfortunately necessary. — T H E

There’s an inescapable reason for that, and it’s unfortunate only because it is impossible to work around that very necessity intrinsic to a “word-math” system. Which, of course, says loads about such attempts.

Good talk. Coin-side one vs coin-side other.

I don’t see why we can’t say reason depends on non-physical stuff, if only because reason is itself non-physical
— Mww

That's begging the question there. — Pfhorrest

.....says the guy that doesn’t deny human reason, insists it must in no way depend on non-physical stuff, yet can’t measure it. Can’t show how signals from a sense organ enable some quanta of neurotransmitters such that Lima beans are translated into that which the brain registers as gawd-awful. Then, even enables itself to inform some other brain it has registered Lima beans as gawd-awful, with which that other brain may not agree. Maybe because it has no “gawd-awful” pathways enabled....dunno.

I’d rather just beg the question.

Any time you make a statement that asserts how some state of affairs exists for all humans (....) like what perception and understanding is for all humans, you are making a objective statement. — Harry Hindu

Point, but of questionable relevance.

Subjective statements are categorical errors, insofar as statements are technically empirical objects in the world, hence are not contained in the mind....or brain, if you wish....hence not subjective. Nevertheless, statements are themselves merely empirical manifestations of cognitive goings-on.....reason.....of the subject that creates them. The inescapable folly of language games. No statement is at all possible without the subject that creates it, so.....

I just figured it went without saying, that because perception and understanding are faculties belonging to all humans in general and thereby to each human in particular, then it follows necessarily that the objects of those faculties belongs to any human in possession of them. Which is sufficient reason to claim perception and understanding of reality, or anything at all in fact, is entirely subjective, the ontology of perception and understanding themselves, standing beside the point. They are given from the conditions of human nature, from where makes no difference. And refutable by the principle of induction, sure, but if you find a human without these faculties, no one will deny you your Nobel. (grin)

I don't at all deny human reason, only that it depends at all on some kind of non-physical stuff. — Pfhorrest

Agreed....reason cannot depend on non-physical stuff, in the strictest sense. So you.....and everybody else that “...rises to the level of speculation....” grants the necessity of physical ground for reason, but nobody knows how one follows from the other. So we don’t deny the reality of that which we know nothing real about. An insurmountable paradox best left alone.

I don’t see why we can’t say reason depends on non-physical stuff, if only because reason is itself non-physical, FAPP, and it is reason that tells us about itself. It’s how humans operate, so to reject that operational character is to reject our own intrinsic humanity.

You do decent philosophy, but at what cost?

Ok, thanks.

Usually the burden on the claimant, at the very least, is to show warrant in the text of the claim. Otherwise, there is naught but mere assertion.

In the case of the OP, however, by saying “if all perception and understanding.....”, no claim has been made, but merely a premise has been stated, from which a claim is to follow in the predicate of the proposition. You’ve given the “if, but not the “then”, so you haven’t claimed anything, so there is no burden for anybody.

Actually....what purpose do the parentheticals hold? What’s the difference between “if all perception and understanding of reality....” and “if all (perception and understanding of) reality....”? Either way, the conditions under which “all reality” must necessarily be taken, is exactly the same.

I agree, by the way. All perception and understanding of reality is subjective. How could it be otherwise. Doesn’t mean reality is itself subjective.

It's better perhaps to think of Wittgenstein as doing a kind of phenomenology, which is to say call our attention to what would be obvious if it wasn't so terribly taken for granted. A certain kind of philosophy is trapped in a picture. — T H E

And what is it that is taken for granted? That a certain kind of philosophy trapped in a picture is experienced as necessary, when it should be experienced as merely contingent?

Perhaps it would it be better to think this kind of phenomenology when attempting to understand Wittgenstein, but seems rather inept when attempting to understand human nature in general.

Keeping with language games, all philosophies are trapped in their respective pictures by the mind that creates them. Never stays that way, re: interpretational distinctions, which raises concerns over what being trapped really means. If trapped in every mind, it isn’t trapped in any. The epitome of contingency.

Burden of proof is not on.........what.

The first part of OC1is interesting because I agree with it, with respect to the set of components attributed to Wittgenstein in support of it, “...The view I shall call OC1 and which constitutes a version of a foundationalist refutation of scepticism, and therefore a contribution to the theory of knowledge...”

And this is interesting because I don’t:

“....a clever encapsulation of the transcendental argument is given at 248: 'I have arrived at the rock-bottom of my convictions. And one might almost say that these foundation-walls are carried by the whole house.'...”

Metaphoric representation aside, it remains that foundation walls are not carried by the house; the foundation walls carry the whole house, in which case it is found that the clever encapsulation of Wittgenstein’s transcendental argument...is neither clever nor that argument.

While the transcendental argument is the means to arrive at what’s called the rock-bottom of my convictions in the form of propositions which are not susceptible to doubt, re: #341 (in the Kantian sense, the unconditioned), and is a foundation of that which is possible to follow from it, it is self-contradictory to then say it is that which is built upon the conviction, that is itself foundational.
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I had a bone of contention with Antony, a Wittgenstein advocate of high caliber, as to method. In the present article is found....

“.....Of course it only sketches a kind of view; it amounts to recognising that theories of knowledge like, say, Kant's–framework-invoking theories–are on the right lines. Now one would like to see the hard detail of such a theory....”

....which exactly describes my lack of reception of Witt’s philosophy: he tells me all this stuff but never once tells me how it comes to be that way. I mean....

“....#450. A doubt that doubted everything would not be a doubt.....”

......is an analytic truth, a tautology, and while correct in itself, never gets used to justify something relatable to it. It’s one of those foundational rock-bottom convictions of his, but without the bother of building a house the foundation would support.

Anyway.....now you know. Not to rain on your parade or anything, just some personal observations.

Isn’t there a need to distinguish kinds of determinism?
— Mww

I'm not clear what you mean here, but it sounds like you're talking about determinism in the physical world versus determinism in some kind of non-physical world that interacts with the physical world. I deny that any such non-physical world could possibly exist in the first place, but even if it did, that wouldn't solve any problems with regard to free will. — Pfhorrest

I’ve not read where you deny the metaphysical domain of human reason, so I wonder how you can categorically deny the possibility of some kind of non-physical world here. If it is impossible to deny the appearance.....the seemingness......of human rationality, isn’t it permissible to grant the validity of its sufficiently critiqued cognitive machinations? Why can’t the metaphysical domain be a valid placeholder for a non-physical world?

I submit that a metaphysical domain does solve the problems of free will, if one is satisfied by mere acceptance of possible logical consistency, rather than necessary empirical proofs.
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The non-physical agent would still either make the decisions it makes on the basis of prior facts (....), or else it makes its decisions without regard to the facts, at random, in which case its decisions are undetermined. — Pfhorrest

What of the possibility that determinations can be made without regard to facts, but with regard for law? In such case, those determinations cannot be in any way random.

I think we must account for A.)....circumstances in which the facts are not known, yet in which some determination is nonetheless required, and B.)....circumstances in which the facts are known but the agent makes his determinations in direct opposition to them. In other words, it doesn’t hold that the predicates of a purely physical world can be the sole arbiter of the human decision-making procedure. Which you apparently condone, given your “.....an ability to correctly assess what you should do...”, which presupposes some ability to relate a subjective judgement to its objective manifestation.

As I said.....applause for the conception of a metaphysical will, but I regret to see you spoil it by denying its usefulness.