I wasn't meaning to deny existence because we are not receptive of a thing, but rather was saying that having a concept of something doesn't warrant its existence of it. — Corvus

Oh. That’s fine. I hope I didn’t give any indication I thought otherwise. Correlation not causation and all that.

Could you please elaborate? — Corvus

We should both step back, maybe. Your…

How do you prove something is possible independent of whatever intellect received it? — Corvus

….makes no sense to me, and my….

Nature is the totality of all that is possible independent of whatever intellect receives it. — Mww

…..seems to have made no sense to you. I meant by the proposition that just because we are not receptive of a thing is not sufficient warrant for us to den its existence. Whereas, if we were to deny the existence of that which is a cause of our sensations, we contradict ourselves.

Thanks for this exchange — AmadeusD

No prob, but it goes without saying…..any comment on Kant is only an opinion at least, and a best guess at most. I mean, when you come across sentences half a page long, you’re bound to miss the mark sooner or later.

is that, or how far is that, a reasonable unadornment ? — AmadeusD

Close enough. To reduce it all to the subtleties of transcendental philosophy might be a little different, but the gist is good enough for a general idea.

It sounds absurd that you can reason on something which is independent of whatever your intellect received. — Corvus

The difference between he intellect receiving from without, and creating from within. Logic, and by association, pure reason, still needs the guidance of experience for its empirical certainty.

How do you prove something is possible independent of whatever intellect received it? — Corvus

You don’t. You reason to a justifiable conclusion on sufficient grounds.

Is the suggestion here that without the concepts that allow phenomena to cohere in the understanding, we wouldn't actually intuit (in the Kantian sense) anything of any comprehendable nature? — AmadeusD

In a Kantian sense, it is already the case we don’t intuit anything in any comprehendable nature. Intuition is that faculty of representation by which the matter of objects given a posteriori, is synthesized with certain forms, given a priori “in the mind”, the arrangement of that synthesis being termed phenomena. We are not aware of this arrangement, which is the purview of the productive imagination.

It is the case as well, that concepts belong to understanding, as you say, so what you said actually becomes….without concepts that allow phenomena to cohere in the understanding, we wouldn’t actually cognize anything at all, as made clear here:

“….Thoughts without content are void (empty); intuitions without conceptions, blind…”
—————

Would you accept that even in that case, the objects exist, we just have no access to even their indication? — AmadeusD

Almost. In the case without concepts that allow phenomena to cohere in the understanding, we may still be quite aware of a existent object, merely from its sensation, but what we don’t have, is even the possibility of a representation of what that existent object actually is. What it is meaning nothing more than how it is to be judged, what judgement regarding that thing is permissible, such that object is or is not comprehensible. The arbiter here being simply the LNC, the domain of which is….pure reason her-very-own-damn-self.

Think of it as a tripartite system, in the form of a syllogism, in which the major is the understanding of the manifold of conceptions related to an object, the minor is the judgement regarding the compatibility of the synthesis of those conceptions to each other, and reason concludes the validity of that synthesis with respect to those already given, better known as the principle of non-contradiction. You know….like….square circles as an extreme example, but even such everyday cognitions such as driving on the wrong side of the road, going through a door without opening it. And my all-time favorite….swearing on a stack of bibles the stupid cup is still in the stupid cupboard, with the same certainty you had when you actually put it there. (Mumblesputtercuss-choke)

But I digress. So yes….the object does exist. If there is a phenomenon, there must have been a sensation. If a sensation, there must have been a perception. If a perception, there must have been an appearance. If an appearance, there must be that which appears. There must be a thing, an object, that appears.

Possible existence and phenomenon are not the actuality until they manifested, so should they not be irrelevant? — Corvus

A possible existence and its possible phenomenon may be irrelevant at a certain time, but time isn’t something to be ignored in general. Contingency in empirical knowledge mandates successions in time, so…..

You can have a brand new phenomena with no concepts and no understanding presumed, attached or presupposed as just a sensibility. — Corvus

Absolutely. But that isn’t the system as a whole. It is human nature so want to know, and for that the whole system…..whatever it may be…..is a prerequisite.

What is "Nature" here? — Corvus

Reality is the totality of sensation dependent on the intellect that receives it.
Nature is the totality of all that is possible independent of whatever intellect receives it.
My opinion, of course.

….concepts has nothing to do with existence or phenomenon of objects? — Corvus

Concepts, in and of themselves with respect to their origin, re: understanding, and method of use, re: logic, no, they do not. Existence has to do with Nature; phenomena with sensibility, Nature being given.

Concepts alone, their origin and method of use being granted, in the domain of pure thought they do not, but consideration still must be given to possible existence and phenomenon.

Within the system as a whole, from appearance in the beginning to knowledge at the end, it is impossible concepts have nothing to do phenomena, but Nature is still presupposed as having to do with existence.

Existence, the category, does not grant existence to objects, but only makes necessary that an object exist for it to be an experience. Hence, the logic: if this then that; if maybe this then maybe that; if not this then absolutely not that.

On the fatal flaw in common misunderstanding of noumena, from a Kantian point of view:

“…. I call a conception problematical which contains in itself no contradiction, and which is connected with other cognitions as a limitation of given conceptions, but whose objective reality cannot be cognized in any manner. The conception of a noumenon, that is, of a thing which must be cogitated not as an object of sense, but as a thing in itself (solely through the pure understanding), is not self-contradictory, for we are not entitled to maintain that sensibility is the only possible mode of intuition. Nay, further, this conception is necessary to restrain sensuous intuition within the bounds of phenomena, and thus to limit the objective validity of sensuous cognition; for things in themselves, which lie beyond its province, are called noumena for the very purpose of indicating that this cognition does not extend its application to all that the understanding thinks.

But, after all, the possibility of such noumena is quite incomprehensible, and beyond the sphere of phenomena, all is for us a mere void; that is to say, we possess an understanding whose province does problematically extend beyond this sphere, but we do not possess an intuition, indeed, not even the conception of a possible intuition, by means of which objects beyond the region of sensibility could be given us, and in reference to which the understanding might be employed assertorically. The conception of a noumenon is therefore merely a limitative conception and therefore only of negative use. But it is not an arbitrary or fictitious notion, but is connected with the limitation of sensibility, without, however, being capable of presenting us with any positive datum beyond this sphere.

The division of objects into phenomena and noumena, and of the world into a mundus sensibilis and intelligibilis is therefore quite inadmissible in a positive sense, although conceptions do certainly admit of such a division; for the class of noumena have no determinate object corresponding to them, and cannot therefore possess objective validity. If we abandon the senses, how can it be made conceivable that the categories (which are the only conceptions that could serve as conceptions for noumena) have any sense or meaning at all, inasmuch as something more than the mere unity of thought, namely, a possible intuition, is requisite for their application to an object? The conception of a noumenon, considered as merely problematical, is, however, not only admissible, but, as a limitative conception of sensibility, absolutely necessary. But, in this case, a noumenon is not a particular intelligible object for our understanding; on the contrary, the kind of understanding to which it could belong is itself a problem, for we cannot form the most distant conception of the possibility of an understanding which should cognize an object, not discursively by means of categories, but intuitively in a non-sensuous intuition. Our understanding attains in this way a sort of negative extension. That is to say, it is not limited by, but rather limits, sensibility, by giving the name of noumena to things, not considered as phenomena, but as things in themselves. But it at the same time prescribes limits to itself, for it confesses itself unable to cognize these by means of the categories, and hence is compelled to cogitate them merely as an unknown something.

I find, however, in the writings of modern authors, an entirely different use of the expressions, mundus sensibilis and intelligibilis, which quite departs from the meaning of the ancients—an acceptation in which, indeed, there is to be found no difficulty, but which at the same time depends on mere verbal quibbling. According to this meaning, some have chosen to call the complex of phenomena, in so far as it is intuited, mundus sensibilis, but in so far as the connection thereof is cogitated according to general laws of thought, mundus intelligibilis. Astronomy, in so far as we mean by the word the mere observation of the starry heaven, may represent the former; a system of astronomy, such as the Copernican or Newtonian, the latter. But such twisting of words is a mere sophistical subterfuge, to avoid a difficult question, by modifying its meaning to suit our own convenience.

To be sure, understanding and reason are employed in the cognition of phenomena; but the question is, whether these can be applied when the object is not a phenomenon and in this sense we regard it if it is cogitated as given to the understanding alone, and not to the senses. The question therefore is whether, over and above the empirical use of the understanding, a transcendental use is possible, which applies to the noumenon as an object. This question we have answered in the negative.…”
—————

From which follows that….
…….it is true noumena and things-in-themselves are both representations understanding thinks on its own accord;
……the thing-in-itself obtains its objective validity from the thing which appears;
……no noumenal thing ever appears, therefore noumena have no objective validity;
……and the fatal flaw is lack of recognition that anything the conception of which is given from understanding alone, without conjunction with any faculty in human sensibility, can never be or cause an object of sense.

What about the concept of God? Which came first? The phenomenon or the concept? — Corvus

Which presupposes God is, or may be, a phenomenon. If a God is conceived as the unconditioned, then to be a phenomenon necessarily contradicts the conception, insofar as all phenomena are conditioned by something other than itself.

The concept comes first as a thought, the phenomenon corresponding to it is impossible, therefore does not come at all.

what would something metaphysically impossible but logically possible be? — Lionino

Hmmm…..metaphysically impossible. If metaphysics is the doctrine of thought, the metaphysically impossible indicates a impossible thought. Any thought that occurs must be possible, but those thoughts that do not occur are not thereby impossible. Maybe they just haven’t happened yet.

If logic is the method of thought within the doctrine, then logically impossible just indicates an error in the method.

My guess: anything metaphysically impossible is logically impossible, but anything logically impossible must be metaphysically possible.

No apple, as such, ever existed independently of that by which it is conceived, and, thereby, is represented by that name. The object represented by the concept, however, does.
— Mww

This has struck me, in CPR, as absolutely nonsensical (which may just be me, hence questions).

How could the concept of an apple indicate it's actual existence? — AmadeusD

It doesn’t. The thing to be known by a particular name already existed; we just didn’t know what it was, how to talk about it.

No object comes named; every object is named by a human, once upon a time. CPR is just one speculative method by which naming is possible by the human kind of intelligence, affectionately termed by some successor or another, as the “Copernican Revolution”. From which follows that every name, without exception, is a human invention, determined by some particular methodological system.

Think about it: there are even to this day, in spite of your formal education and experiences, those occasions where you don’t know the cause of something that you’ve sensed. A bug bite on your arm….you sense the bite but that doesn’t immediately tell you which animal it was. The tickle on the back of your neck….you sense the tickle but don’t know whether it’s an errant hair or a spider. The loud bang from around the corner….you hear the sound, but don’t know whether it’s a firecracker or the tailgate on a dump truck.

These days, though, it is usually the case where you’re given the object and the name of it at the same time, re: rote classroom instruction. In the beginning, you’re given a pencil and a piece of paper and told to trace out symbols, which you’re informed are letters and numbers…..and it’s off to the races for you.

It’s easy to overlook the fact that the very first guy that decided what a 2 should look like, used exactly the same mental machinations as you used in learning it. And that machination is the relation between the thing as it is sensed, to the thing as it is thought. Simple as that, but to be complete, it remains to be considered which part of the relation occurs first.
————-

You couldn't possibly have the concept without the phenomena, and the phenomena informing the concept is tautological. — AmadeusD

For practical experience, true enough. Phenomena always antecede the conception, but they certainly do inform the concept. And it is not tautological, insofar as….remember the bug bite? If such were the case, you’d know immediately which animal bit you merely from the sensation of the bite itself. But you don’t.

Nevertheless….remember the time relation? Which came first? In the case of, e.g., black holes, the concept, grounded in math and pure logic, antecedes the phenomenon.

On the justification for, but not the deduction of, the pure a priori conceptions of the understanding:

“…. General logic, as has been repeatedly said, makes abstraction of all content of cognition, and expects to receive representations from some other quarter, in order, by means of analysis, to convert them into conceptions. On the contrary, transcendental logic has lying before it the manifold content of à priori sensibility, which transcendental æsthetic presents to it in order to give matter to the pure conceptions of the understanding, without which transcendental logic would have no content, and be therefore utterly void. Now space and time contain an infinite diversity of determinations of pure à priori intuition, but are nevertheless the condition of the mind’s receptivity, under which alone it can obtain representations of objects, and which, consequently, must always affect the conception of these objects. But the spontaneity of thought requires that this diversity be examined after a certain manner, received into the mind, and connected, in order afterwards to form a cognition out of it. This Process I call synthesis.

By the word synthesis, in its most general signification, I understand the process of joining different representations to each other and of comprehending their diversity in one cognition. This synthesis is pure when the diversity is not given empirically but à priori (as that in space and time). Our representations must be given previously to any analysis of them; and no conceptions can arise regarding its content analytically. But the synthesis of a diversity (be it given à priori or empirically) is the first requisite for the production of a cognition, which in its beginning, indeed, may be crude and confused, and therefore in need of analysis—still, synthesis is that by which alone the elements of our cognitions are collected and united into a certain content, consequently it is the first thing on which we must fix our attention, if we wish to investigate the origin of our knowledge.

Synthesis, generally speaking, is, as we shall afterwards see, the mere operation of the imagination—a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no cognition whatever, but of the working of which we are seldom even conscious. But to reduce this synthesis to conceptions is a function of the understanding….

….. Pure synthesis, represented generally, gives us the pure conception of the understanding. But by this pure synthesis, I mean that which rests upon a basis of à priori synthetical unity…..

….. By means of analysis different representations are brought under one conception—an operation of which general logic treats**. On the other hand, the duty of transcendental logic is to reduce to conceptions, not representations, but the pure synthesis of representations***. The first thing which must be given to us for the sake of the à priori cognition of all objects, is the diversity of the pure intuition; the synthesis of this diversity by means of the imagination is the second; but this gives, as yet, no cognition. The conceptions which give unity to this pure synthesis, and which consist solely in the representation of this necessary synthetical unity, furnish the third requisite for the cognition of an object, and these conceptions are given by the understanding. The same function which gives unity to the different representation in a judgement, gives also unity to the mere synthesis of different representations in an intuition; and this unity we call the pure conception of the understanding.

Thus, the same understanding, and by the same operations, whereby in conceptions, by means of analytical unity, it produced the logical form of a judgement, introduces, by means of the synthetical unity of the manifold in intuition, a transcendental content into its representations****, on which account they are called pure conceptions of the understanding, and they apply à priori to objects, a result not within the power of general logic.….”
(**and here is where the undetermined object of intuition becomes “apple”)
(***whatever any undetermined object becomes, it does so in accordance with a rule)
(****the rule)
—————-

On the justification for a priori pure intuitions:

“….. It must be admitted that the Leibnitz-Wolfian philosophy has assigned an entirely erroneous point of view to all investigations into the nature and origin of our cognitions, inasmuch as it regards the distinction between the sensuous and the intellectual as merely logical, whereas it is plainly transcendental, and concerns not merely the clearness or obscurity, but the content and origin of both. For the faculty of sensibility not only does not present us with an indistinct and confused cognition of objects as things in themselves, but, in fact, gives us no knowledge of these at all. On the contrary, so soon as we abstract in thought our own subjective nature, the object represented, with the properties ascribed to it by sensuous intuition, entirely disappears, because it was only this subjective nature that determined the form of the object as a phenomenon.

In phenomena, we commonly, indeed, distinguish that which essentially belongs to the intuition of them, and is valid for the sensuous faculty of every human being, from that which belongs to the same intuition accidentally, as valid not for the sensuous faculty in general, but for a particular state or organization of this or that sense. Accordingly, we are accustomed to say that the former is a cognition which represents the object itself, whilst the latter presents only a particular appearance or phenomenon thereof. This distinction, however, is only empirical. If we stop here (as is usual), and do not regard the empirical intuition as itself a mere phenomenon (as we ought to do), in which nothing that can appertain to a thing in itself is to be found, our transcendental distinction is lost, and we believe that we cognize objects as things in themselves, although in the whole range of the sensuous world, investigate the nature of its objects as profoundly as we may, we have to do with nothing but phenomena.

Suppose, then, that space and time are in themselves objective, and conditions of the possibility of objects as things in themselves. In the first place, it is evident that both present us, with very many apodeictic and synthetic propositions à priori, but especially space—and for this reason we shall prefer it for investigation at present. As the propositions of geometry are cognized synthetically à priori, and with apodeictic certainty, I inquire: Whence do you obtain propositions of this kind, and on what basis does the understanding rest, in order to arrive at such absolutely necessary and universally valid truths? There is no other way than through intuitions or conceptions, as such; and these are given either à priori or à posteriori. The latter, namely, empirical conceptions, together with the empirical intuition on which they are founded, cannot afford any synthetical proposition, except such as is itself also empirical, that is, a proposition of experience.

But an empirical proposition cannot possess the qualities of necessity and absolute universality, which, nevertheless, are the characteristics of all geometrical propositions. As to the first and only means to arrive at such cognitions, namely, through mere conceptions or intuitions à priori, it is quite clear that from mere conceptions no synthetical cognitions, but only analytical ones, can be obtained. Take, for example, the proposition: “Two straight lines cannot enclose a space, and with these alone no figure is possible,” and try to deduce it from the conception of a straight line and the number two; or take the proposition: “It is possible to construct a figure with three straight lines,” and endeavour, in like manner, to deduce it from the mere conception of a straight line and the number three. All your endeavours are in vain, and you find yourself forced to have recourse to intuition, as, in fact, geometry always does. You therefore give yourself an object in intuition. But of what kind is this intuition? Is it a pure à priori, or is it an empirical intuition? If the latter, then neither an universally valid, much less an apodeictic proposition can arise from it, for experience never can give us any such proposition. You must, therefore, give yourself an object à priori in intuition, and upon that ground your synthetical proposition.

Now if there did not exist within you a faculty of intuition à priori; if this subjective condition were not in respect to its form also the universal condition à priori under which alone the object of this external intuition is itself possible; if the object (that is, the triangle) were something in itself, without relation to you the subject; how could you affirm that that which lies necessarily in your subjective conditions in order to construct a triangle, must also necessarily belong to the triangle in itself? For to your conceptions of three lines, you could not add anything new (that is, the figure); which, therefore, must necessarily be found in the object, because the object is given before your cognition, and not by means of it.

If, therefore, space (and time also) were not a mere form of your intuition, which contains conditions à priori, under which alone things can become external objects for you, and without which subjective conditions the objects are in themselves nothing, you could not construct any synthetical proposition whatsoever regarding external objects. It is therefore not merely possible or probable, but indubitably certain, that space and time, as the necessary conditions of all our external and internal experience, are merely subjective conditions of all our intuitions, in relation to which all objects are therefore mere phenomena, and not things in themselves, presented to us in this particular manner. And for this reason, in respect to the form of phenomena, much may be said à priori, whilst of the thing in itself, which may lie at the foundation of these phenomena, it is impossible to say anything.…”

The claim, it follows, that these justifications were not given in the body of the text, is catastrophically false.

you know they are said to exist. — Janus

Agreed. To perceive the proposition is to perceive representations of its empirical content. To perceive a representation in the form of a word is not to perceive that real object which is represented by the word.

Hell…if I told you I put a pot on the stove, even if you know what those are, you don’t know I have either of them, or that I did anything with them if I had them.
————

I feel my side-comments are derailing the thread. — Wayfarer

Ahhh…if that’s your sentiment, so be it. I rather enjoy them myself.

I'll bow out now…. — Wayfarer

Hopefully not on my account.

No apple, as such, ever existed independently of that by which it is conceived, and, thereby, is represented by that name. The object represented by the concept, however, does.

“….. In whatsoever mode, or by whatsoever means, our knowledge may relate to objects, it is at least quite clear that the only manner in which it immediately relates to them is by means of an intuition. To this as the indispensable groundwork, all thought points. But an intuition can take place only in so far as the object is given to us. This, again, is only possible, to man at least, on condition that the object affect the mind in a certain manner. The capacity for receiving representations (receptivity) through the mode in which we are affected by objects, is called sensibility. By means of sensibility, therefore, objects are given to us, and it alone furnishes us with intuitions; by the understanding they are thought, and from it arise conceptions. But all thought (of objects) must directly, or indirectly, by means of certain signs, relate ultimately to intuitions; consequently, with us, to sensibility, because in no other way can an object be given to us. The effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, so far as we are affected by the said object, is sensation. That sort of intuition which relates to an object by means of sensation is called an empirical intuition.

The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called phenomenon. That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation, I term its matter; but that which effects that the content of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations, I call its form. But that in which our sensations are merely arranged, and by which they are susceptible of assuming a certain form, cannot be itself sensation. It is, then, the matter of all phenomena that is given to us à posteriori; the form must lie ready à priori for them in the mind, and consequently can be regarded separately from all sensation.

Now, independently of sensibility, we cannot possibly have any intuition; consequently, the understanding is no faculty of intuition. But besides intuition there is no other mode of cognition, except through conceptions; consequently, the cognition of every, at least of every human, understanding is a cognition through conceptions—not intuitive, but discursive. All intuitions, as sensuous, depend on affections; conceptions, therefore, upon functions.

By the word function I understand the unity of the act of arranging diverse representations under one common representation. Conceptions, then, are based on the spontaneity of thought, as sensuous intuitions are on the receptivity of impressions. Now, the understanding cannot make any other use of these conceptions than to judge by means of them. As no representation, except an intuition, relates immediately to its object, a conception never relates immediately to an object, but only to some other representation thereof, be that an intuition or itself a conception. A judgement, therefore, is the mediate cognition of an object, consequently the representation of a representation of it….”

From “Contact”…..Small moves, Sparky. Small moves. Baby steps.

“…. In truth, it is not images of objects, but schemata, which lie at the foundation of our pure sensuous conceptions. No image could ever be adequate to our conception of a triangle in general. For the generalness of the conception it never could attain to, as this includes under itself all triangles, whether right-angled, acute-angled, etc., whilst the image would always be limited to a single part of this sphere. The schema of the triangle can exist nowhere else than in thought, and it indicates a rule of the synthesis of the imagination in regard to pure figures in space. Still less is an object of experience, or an image of the object, ever to the empirical conception. On the contrary, the conception always relates immediately to the schema of the imagination, as a rule for the determination of our intuition, in conformity with a certain general conception. The conception of a dog indicates a rule, according to which my imagination can delineate the figure of a four-footed animal in general, without being limited to any particular individual form which experience presents to me, or indeed to any possible image that I can represent to myself in concreto.

This schematism of our understanding in regard to phenomena and their mere form, is an art, hidden in the depths of the human soul, whose true modes of action we shall only with difficulty discover and unveil. Thus much only can we say: “The image is a product of the empirical faculty of the productive imagination—the schema of sensuous conceptions (of figures in space, for example) is a product, and, as it were, a monogram of the pure imagination à priori, whereby and according to which images first become possible, which, however, can be connected with the conception only mediately by means of the schema which they indicate, and are in themselves never fully adequate to it.” On the other hand, the schema of a pure conception of the understanding is something that cannot be reduced into any image—it is nothing else than the pure synthesis expressed by the category, conformably, to a rule of unity according to conceptions. It is a transcendental product of the imagination, a product which concerns the determination of the internal sense, according to conditions of its form (time) in respect to all representations, in so far as these representations must be conjoined à priori in one conception, conformably to the unity of apperception.

Without entering upon a dry and tedious analysis of the essential requisites of transcendental schemata of the pure conceptions of the understanding, we shall rather proceed at once to give an explanation of them according to the order of the categories, and in connection therewith. For the external sense the pure image of all quantities (quantorum) is space; the pure image of all objects of sense in general, is time. But the pure schema of quantity, a conception of the understanding, is number, a representation which comprehends the successive addition of one to one (homogeneous quantities). Thus, number is nothing else than the unity of the synthesis of the manifold in a homogeneous intuition, by means of my generating time itself in my apprehension of the intuition….”
———-

Number does not exist in the mind as appearance or phenomena, unless it is created as such in a non-fallacious post hoc ergo propter hoc cognition following from a transcendental synthetic unity.

Every human, or every species with this particular intellectual method, including mathematicians and logicians, busboys and cab drivers, is a transcendental idealist and an empirical realist, or, more precisely, a dualist. A dualist fundamentally understood as that which has the ability to comprehend Nature under conditions which are not contained in it.

Or would you just say you agree with only Kant's metaphysics that are not about ethics? — Bob Ross

Metaphysics is general, although Kant’s ethics, more inclined toward what he called empirical anthropology and the moderns call cultural or the stronger even more modern sociocultural, has some quite repulsive stuff regarding women, other races, etc., which was not so out-of-tune for his day. But on the other hand, human aesthetics, the ground of purely subjective moral dispositions, hasn’t changed since his time, insofar as that requires the lapsed time of natural evolution.

Still, the crowd influences the individual; it does but it shouldn’t and it wouldn’t if the individual would just grow a pair. It is the growing which is the same for us these days as Kant’s moral philosophy espoused. It is the fact we in general are too weak to grow a pair, and that alone reduces practical moral subjectivist philosophy to junk.

Oh, I been in the back of the room, keeping my head down, taking notes.

A Kantian with respect to moral subjectivism I’ll admit. Ethics is more than that, I think.

Objective moral principle is like world peace. One can wish for it, visualize it, even figure out how to do it, but understands even if he does it, there’s precious little reason to expect anybody else to follow suit.

I always kinda figured you’d end up here.

The very point of a priori mental machinations never was the mind, re: human intellectual system, in relation to the world, but the relation of the human intellectual system to itself. Such system does not come pre-equipped with principles but with the faculty of reason, experience the condition of the development of them by means of that faculty. How else to escape constant conjunction, then to cognize the very possibility of exceptions to it?

“…. The question now is as to a criterion, by which we may securely distinguish a pure from an empirical cognition. Experience no doubt teaches us that this or that object is constituted in such and such a manner, but not that it could not possibly exist otherwise. Now, in the first place, if we have a proposition which contains the idea of necessity in its very conception, it is priori. If, moreover, it is not derived from any other proposition, unless from one equally involving the idea of necessity, it is absolutely priori. Secondly, an empirical judgement never exhibits strict and absolute, but only assumed and comparative universality (by induction); therefore, the most we can say is—so far as we have hitherto observed, there is no exception to this or that rule. If, on the other hand, a judgement carries with it strict and absolute universality, that is, admits of no possible exception, it is not derived from experience, but is valid absolutely à priori. Empirical universality is, therefore, only an arbitrary extension of validity, from that which may be predicated of a proposition valid in most cases, to that which is asserted of a proposition which holds good in all (…). When, on the contrary, strict universality characterizes a judgement, it necessarily indicates another peculiar source of knowledge, namely, a faculty of cognition à priori. Necessity and strict universality, therefore, are infallible tests for distinguishing pure from empirical knowledge, and are inseparably connected with each other.

“…. Besides, without seeking for such examples of principles existing à priori in cognition, we might easily show that such principles are the indispensable basis of the possibility of experience itself, and consequently prove their existence à priori. For whence could our experience itself acquire certainty, if all the rules on which it depends were themselves empirical, and consequently fortuitous? No one, therefore, can admit the validity of the use of such rules as first principles. But, for the present, we may content ourselves with having established the fact, that we do possess and exercise a faculty of pure à priori cognition; and, secondly, with having pointed out the proper tests of such cognition, namely, universality and necessity.…”

“…. Of far more importance than all that has been above said, is the consideration that certain of our cognitions rise completely above the sphere of all possible experience, and by means of conceptions, to which there exists in the whole extent of experience no corresponding object, seem to extend the range of our judgements beyond its bounds. And just in this transcendental or supersensible sphere, where experience affords us neither instruction nor guidance, lie the investigations of reason, which, on account of their importance, we consider far preferable to, and as having a far more elevated aim than, all that the understanding can achieve within the sphere of sensuous phenomena.….”

Reference? Link?

experiments on time and space — Corvus

An experiment on time. I’ll bet it’s actually an experiment on something relative to time.

There must be more than just one way to interpret Kant….. — Corvus

Of course. There should be as many interpretations as there are folks that bother with it. What he wanted the interpretation to be, should be singular, no matter how many folks bother. Which was the whole point of grounding the theory in logic, insofar as if these premises are the case, then that conclusion follows necessarily. One can, then, grant the conclusions given those premises on the one hand, yet refute the logic by denying those premises ever were the case on the other. In which case, Kant hasn’t been refuted, he’s been replaced.

one would be very prone to fall into prejudice and illusions — Corvus

So? Same is it ever was. That it is done is given; the possibility for guarding against it is what the Critque offers.

Take it or leave it, but first, understand it.

The entire human intellectual system is presupposed….
— Mww
Nothing is presupposed in nature and human intellect. That is why we need observation, reasoning and logic. When you see the data or content, you record, reason and apply logic to come to judgements. — Corvus

To record, reason and apply logic presupposes the capacity for it. To come to judgement presupposes there is that which is possible to come to.

many other Neo-Kantian and Anti-Kantian philosophers came up with their own views on Logic. — Corvus

Undoubtedly, but irrelevant.
(Glances up at thread title)

Kant had very limited views and knowledge on Logic. — Corvus

Compared to what….2023? Wonder what the views will be in 2123. Oh so easy to look backwards, innit?

Until one reads the statement with the analytic content in full, nothing is presupposed. — Corvus

Oh dear. The entire human intellectual system is presupposed. Do you have any idea at all, just how far it is in the procedural methodology, between reading the statement and the installation of the analytic content of it??????

Even after the clear example of the most basic operation of Logic — Corvus

According to Kant, the most basic operation of logic “treats of the form of the understanding only”. How is your example anything like that?

Of logic that “gives laws therefore to the understanding, without regard to the difference of objects on which it may be employed”……where in your statement “Bachelors are unmarried” is a law which governs without regard to whichever statement you had decided to use?

It is a well known fact from the numerous commentaries on Kant. — Corvus

Ohfercrissakes. Each and every commentary is mere opinion, insofar as there is no original printing in which he himself states a low opinion of logic. Unless, of course, there is one, and I’m just not aware of it, in which case, I’d be wrong. But until presented with an exact replication of the opinion in fact, I’m perfectly happy with my reading of the text, which ironically enough, is itself merely opinion. But at least one I trust.

When he says stuff like, “further than this logic cannot go”, he’s just warning the po’ fools trying to misuse it, but not that the misuse is the fault of logic.

An aberration of the whole point. You’re giving an example from understanding’s point of view, which presupposes the logic. In response to the accusation I’m denying the content of logic in its operation, which is true, I can still affirm the necessity of content for its proofs. Examples merely suffice to demonstrate the validity of a logical condition, but do nothing to establish what that condition is.

Kant had low opinion on Logic…. — Corvus

Or did he have a low opinion of the typical employment of it, in which manifests the “mere prating”?

“….. Now general logic, in its assumed character of organon, is called dialectic. Different as are the significations in which the ancients used this term for a science or an art, we may safely infer, from their actual employment of it, that with them it was nothing else than a logic of illusion—a sophistical art for giving ignorance, nay, even intentional sophistries, the colouring of truth, in which the thoroughness of procedure which logic requires was imitated, and their topic employed to cloak the empty pretensions.

Now it may be taken as a safe and useful warning, that general logic, considered as an organon, must always be a logic of illusion, that is, be dialectical, for, as it teaches us nothing whatever respecting the content of our cognitions, but merely the formal conditions of their accordance with the understanding, which do not relate to and are quite indifferent in respect of objects, any attempt to employ it as an instrument (organon) in order to extend and enlarge the range of our knowledge must end in mere prating; any one being able to maintain or oppose, with some appearance of truth, any single assertion whatever. Such instruction is quite unbecoming the dignity of philosophy….”

if we look at an example…. — Corvus

A mistake at the expense of, or in spite of, the quotations.

Mww (…) been opposing on the view that Logic can require contents for its operation. — Corvus

Yep, he does, at least empirical content. If one wishes to insist the content of logic is its own laws or principles for its operation, he has misdirected it, insofar as the laws of logic apply to the operation of the understanding, such that the application of its own laws to itself, is absurd.

“…. Now, logic in its turn may be considered as twofold—namely, as logic of the general, or of the particular use of the understanding. The first contains the absolutely necessary laws of thought, without which no use whatsoever of the understanding is possible, and gives laws therefore to the understanding, without regard to the difference of objects on which it may be employed….

…. Pure general logic has to do, therefore, merely with pure à priori principles, and is a canon of understanding and reason, but only in respect of the formal part of their use, be the content what It may….. As general logic, it makes abstraction of all content of the cognition of the understanding, that is, of all relation of cognition to its object, and regards only the logical form in the relation of cognitions to each other, that is, the form of thought in general.…. Consequently, general logic treats of the form of the understanding only, which can be applied to representations, from whatever source they may have arisen….

…..in the expectation that there may perhaps be conceptions which relate à priori to objects, not as pure or sensuous intuitions, but merely as acts of pure thought (which are therefore conceptions, but neither of empirical nor æsthetical origin)—in this expectation, I say, we form to ourselves, by anticipation, the idea of a science of pure understanding and rational cognition, by means of which we may cogitate objects entirely à priori. A science of this kind, which should determine the origin, the extent, and the objective validity of such cognitions, must be called transcendental logic, because it has, not, like general logic, to do with the laws of understanding and reason in relation to empirical as well as pure rational cognitions without distinction, but concerns itself with these only in an à priori relation to objects…”

(Insert possibly irrelevant yet nonetheless moronic iconographic representation here)

empirical knowledge for the objective sciences were not enough to be the source of infallible knowledge. — Corvus

Yes. All empirical knowledge is contingent and derived from inductive inference.

The A priori elements are needed for the science to be able to have grounds for the rigorous system of knowledge. — Corvus

Agreed. The elements are a priori. The elements are the content of inductive inferences, which suffices for the rigor of the system, but it is still contingent, insofar as the content may change over time, but the form of the inference remains the same over all time.
———-

I am not sure "impure" would be the right term. He has given out the official term for it i.e. "synthetic a priori" knowledge. — Corvus

It is the right term, for what it’s concern with. Synthetic is a relation of conceptions in a proposition or judgement, and is opposed to analytic. And it makes no difference what the proposition or judgement says. Propositions and or judgements of knowledge, must say something definitive in itself, or it isn’t knowledge.

There are synthetic propositions a posteriori, those in which the conceptions in both subject and predicate are derived from experience but are not contained in each other. Those synthetic propositions in which the conceptions in subject and predicate are not contained in the other, but do not arise from experience, are a priori.

Math is a pure a priori science, in that it constructs its own objects, and the principles of which are synthetic and purely a priori.
Physics is an impure science, in that it does not construct its own objects, yet the principles of which are also synthetic and purely a priori.

It is nothing to do with pure or impure…. — Corvus

….yet he states, clear as the nose on your face…..impure. How can it have nothing to do with exactly what he’s saying?

Not sure if pure / impure has much to do with experience — Corvus

“…. By the term “knowledge à priori,” therefore, we shall in the sequel understand, not such as is independent of this or that kind of experience, but such as is absolutely so of all experience….”

“…. Necessity and strict universality, therefore, are infallible tests for distinguishing pure from empirical knowledge….”, and, empirical already distinguished as having to do with experience.

But please bear in mind that Kant thought some knowledge is both a priori and also a posteriori e.g. Physics. — Corvus

“…. the acquisition of real, substantive knowledge is to be sought only in the sciences, properly so called, that is, in the objective sciences….

Real, substantive knowledge, if it should be acquired, is a posteriori, that is, having sources in experience.

“….. Mathematics and physics are the two theoretical sciences which have to determine their objects à priori. The former is purely à priori, the latter is partially so, but is also dependent on other sources of cognition….”

Partially so means impure; other sources means from out in the world, or, experience.

Knowledge given from the objective sciences is empirical, it informs as to experiences of the world; it is the way in which the knowledge is acquired, the systemic methodology for the development of principles and judgements, better known as logic, the intellect uses to acquire it, that is pure a priori.

Math is purely a priori because it constructs its own objects; physics is a posteriori because its objects are or can be given to it from an external source, re: the world.
————-

the cause of their perception of the colour red was the wavelength of 700nm. — RussellA

(Sigh) Once again….red is not a thing. Wavelength is a thing, but is not an sensation.

This apples and oranges shit is wearing me out.

Not sure what I’m supposed to do with all that.

Pink elephants and noumena are of no interest to me, and I’ve never seen 700nm.

It means….. — RussellA

Kindasorta, I suppose. We have the physiological capacity to perceive, in various modes, given from the type of biological being we are.

It means….. — RussellA

No it doesn’t. That objects don’t exist contradicts the human experience.
————-

Pure in CPR means "a priori". — Corvus

Yes, but a priori is not necessarily pure:

“…. “Every change has a cause,” is a proposition à priori, but impure, because change is a conception which can only be derived from experience….”

A priori carries the implication of universality and necessity; pure/impure carries the implication of the contingency of experience.

Kant wants it understood that by a priori, he means without regard to any experience or possible experience whatsoever. He just released himself from having to qualify the term with “pure” every time he used it, the word in the book’s title sufficing as the ground of the whole, the justification for the ground given early on in the text itself.

Devil’s in the details. What is a phenomenon; how did it get to be one; what makes it possible;

What does “pure” mean; what does “a priori” mean;

Virtually every term in CPR is re-defined from the status quo of the age, and when there wasn’t one suitable for what he wanted to say, he invented one and made it known what it was supposed to mean.

Empirical….nothing but a way to think about stuff, just like to think of stuff transcendentally, logically or hypothetically. To think space empirically is not to think it as being real, but merely to think of it as that which contains the real, in order for the relations of things becomes comprehensible.

If it were as real as that which it contains, it would have to be a phenomenon, which makes explicit it could never be pure a priori, and the entire system contradicts itself.

“…. It is therefore from the human point of view only that we can speak of space, extended objects, etc. If we depart from the subjective condition, under which alone we can obtain external intuition, or, in other words, by means of which we are affected by objects, the representation of space has no meaning whatsoever.…”

If the representation has no meaning whatsoever, to then talk of its empirical reality, is sheer nonsense. That Kant uses that wording, indicates he means something else by it.

It is true that in the CPR Kant writes that we have an a priori pure intuition of space — RussellA

Yep. Now all you gotta do is figure out exactly what that means, and how it reflects on the human cognitive system overall.

Your modern mentality combined with fixation on a single phrase has made thinking like an Enlightenment-era Prussian impossible.

Sense perceives invisible objects. — Corvus

Or, understanding thinks invisible objects.

He is talking about space as intuited concept in TI to explain how Geometry and visualisation works — Corvus

Almost, yes. He is talking about space as an intuited a priori representation, in order to remove it from the necessity of being a phenomenon.

Ok. Never mind.

Happy to be of service, nonetheless.