In my opinion the attempt to start with a method is antithetical to philosophy. It raises a whole host of questions, including - Why a method? Why this method and not some other? If a method guides and shapes the inquiry then how confident should we be that this method does not occlude free and open inquiry?

To start at philosophy one should.... — Moliere

Philosophy is a social activity, but who do you keep company with? Even keeping company with books can be a social activity. More often than not, an author writes in order to be read, even if they are selective with regard to who the intended audience is. The dialogic nature of philosophical writing is not always apparent. Even if the author is not able to respond, a text can be interrogated, and the best philosophers often anticipate our questions and objections. The circle extends to other readers as well, and takes different forms including teacher/student relations, secondary literature, and more recently online forums.

As to the question of whether books are necessary, I know of no prominent philosopher at any time who did not read or hear the work of other philosophers. They do not simply read in order to know what others think but in order to think along with and against what they read.

I'm contemplating a thread about Davidson's project. It would be a long one. — Banno

I encourage you and anyone else familiar with Davidson to do this.

Academic incestuousness diminished. — jgill

Yes, I agree. Cross-fertilization and interdisciplinary approaches are promising against ossification and border protection fortifications.

From Wittgenstein's Zettel:

Do I want to say, then, that certain facts are favorable to the formation of certain concepts; or again unfavorable? And does experience teach us this? It is a fact of experience that human beings alter their concepts, exchange them for others when they learn new facts; when in this way what was formerly important to them becomes unimportant, and vice versa. (It is discovered e.g. that what formerly counted as a difference in kind, is really only a difference in degree. (352)

He accepts that there are facts, but facts do not determine concepts. We do not have the concepts we have because the facts are as they are, but if the facts were not as they are our concepts would not be as they are.

The closing remark refers to Darwin's On the Origin of Species. Elsewhere he says:

What a Copernicus or a Darwin really achieved was not the discovery of a true theory, but of a fertile new point of view. (CV 18)

If we look at species as kinds then we construct our picture of the world, or some aspect of it, in accordance to it, and attend to those facts that conform to this way of looking at things. But if we regard the differences between species as a matter of degree or variation then we begin to take into account facts that were previously overlooked or disregarded. We begin to see not only species but a great many other things differently. There is no fixed, unchanging order to life.

What are we to make of the following?:

Essence is expressed in grammar … Grammar tells what kind of object anything is. (Theology as grammar)” (PI 371, 373).

Is this an ontology? Yes and no. Grammar does not reveal the being of things as they are, but as they are for us, that is, how we regard them, what they mean for us. This is not the noumenal-phenomenal distinction. It is not metaphysical. Wittgenstein is not concerned with the question of how things are in themselves, but rather with what we say and do. The essence of something, what it is to be what is it, means it's place in our form of life. It is in that sense not fixed and unchanging.

Malcolm tells the following story

In response to a comment about Hegel by Drury, Wittgenstein said: 'Hegel seems to me to be always wanting to say that things which look different are really the same.Whereas my interest is in showing that things which look the same are really different.' He had thought about using a sentence from King Lear, 'I'll teach you differences', as a motto for his book.

so you would find philosophy's distinctiveness in the idea that it has a poetic admixture, whereas science does not? — Leontiskos

I am questioning the notion that philosophy has a distinctiveness that holds throughout its changes. What may be true of one philosopher may not be true of another.

There is a great deal more agreement in science, but I think some scientists are poets in the same sense that some philosophers are; they are makers of images and concepts. Of ways of seeing.

What distinguishes philosophy from science is, I think, changing again. I cannot say what that will look like though.

The dialectic is not presented as the best path from Alpha to Omega. It is presented as better than the alternatives,. — Paine

In the Republic and elsewhere there is diminution from what is simply best to the best we can do and obtain. From the truth itself to what in the absence of knowledge are likely stories. And to emphasize this difference unlikely stories as well.

The dialectical movement in the Republic can be seen in the rejection of the first city that Socrates establishes in speech. Glaucon objects. It is too austere. In response Socrates allows for certain "luxuries". The best city is one man is unwilling to live in.

The best city is unnatural. Certain accommodations must be made to man as he is. This raises the question of whether there is a nature or natures of men, and how this is to be determined. Tellingly, Socrates presents a lie about man's nature.

Dialectic itself is presented in the Republic as if the method of hypothesis could free itself from hypothesis. This stands in contrast to the story of the direct apprehension of the Forms themselves by imagined philosophers who possess the wisdom actual philosophers desire but do not possess.

Socratic philosophy straddles the line between poetry in the ancient sense and science in the modern sense. Nietzsche and Wittgenstein are modern practitioners of this way of doing philosophy. To the extent that this is true it is clear that science cannot take the place once held by philosophy.

This may be important for a few reasons:

Two prominent conservative law professors have concluded that Donald J. Trump is ineligible to be president under a provision of the Constitution that bars people who have engaged in an insurrection from holding government office. The professors are active members of the Federalist Society, the conservative legal group, and proponents of originalism, the method of interpretation that seeks to determine the Constitution’s original meaning.

It is important not only for Trump's campaign, but for Federalist Society, conservatism, and the constitution,

Theory of anamnesis / myth of anamnesis. Potato potato? I don't think so. How we interpret a theory is not how we should interpret a myth. But whether this is a myth or theory requires a deep dive that I won't undertake here. In my opinion, and I am certainly not alone here, the dramatic situation in which a dialogue takes place should not be ignored. In the Theaetetus, a dialogue about knowledge there is no mention of anamnesis. It does play a role in the Meno where someone who seems to be completely lacking in virtue asks if it can be taught. And in the Phaedo where Socrates attempts to charm his friend's childish fears of death and deal with the problem of misologic in the face of philosophy's inability to give an satisfactory account of death, which leads Socrates to appeal to myths.

Do you have citations pertaining specifically to the fact that this knowledge had to have at some time been gained directly? — Pantagruel

It is not spelled out. That is characteristic of Socratic philosophy. There cannot be an infinite regress in which what is recollected was not a some time first learned.

I don't want to get too sidetracked so will keep this brief.

The myth of anamnesis requires having at some time previous to this life learned what is in a later life to be recollected. In this earlier life knowledge could not be recollection. However this knowledge was gained it was not by recollection.

Without reincarnation there can be no anamnesis or recollection. If, as Socrates claims in the Phaedo, the human soul is immutable then how can we make sense of the idea that it can become the soul of donkeys and other animals of this sort, or wolves and falcons and hawks, or bees or wasps or ants. (82a -b)?

Accepting that Socrates' soul is immortal is not the same as accepting that Socrates is immortal. Plato addresses this problem in terms of number. If the soul is one thing then the body is another. Is Socrates then some third thing?

In the Charmides Socrates suggests that wisdom is knowledge of what you know and don't know.

Our lack of knowledge of knowledge is at the heart of the problem of knowledge.

But I haven't quite figured out what it has to do with this thread. — Leontiskos

The question of the thread is about whether philosophy is still relevant or, as you suggest, whether it ever was. Bacon is instructive with regard to the question of the pull of philosophy, for here we can see a change in the direction in which philosophy pulled the world.

This movement includes a change in what philosophy itself is. Philosophy became not simply for the improvement of the philosopher but for the improvement of mankind. Philosophy's own self-transformation continues with Kant's Copernican Revolution and Hegel's shift from timeless truths to thinking in time.

As to the question of whether philosophy is still relevant we can look to where it has been in order think about where it might go. In other words, the current state of philosophy is not the whole of the story of what philosophy is and will be. Right now the movement of philosophy includes a looking back. But this is not simply a matter of seeing what was that no longer is. The way forward includes a movement back. For there are prescientific ways of thinking and seeing and being that science occludes. Questions and problems of life that science does not address.

I think the scientific revolution was fueled by advances in mathematics.

Aristotle sums up the ancient position on knowledge when he says that all men naturally desire knowledge. Bacon marks the position of modern philosophy when he declares that knowledge is power.

Certainly there had been scientific and technological advances, but nothing on the scope of the scientific revolution.

I am in general agreement, but would not characterize the statis as "disguised".

Even if NOS believes it not possible for the judge and jury to be objective, he could, still evaluate the evidence and help assess what an objective judge/jury would decide, if it were possible. This would then be a better basis to judge whether or not the process was, or wasn't, fair - in the end. — Relativist

I am not sure he could. There is a peculiar disjunction is conservative circles, especially among the MAGA faithful. On the one hand a profound distrust of Democrats, American institutions, and the people who run them, but on the other hand, a blind acceptance of whatever Trump says and does. Evidence is suspect and disregarded when it contradicts Trump.

We're talking about the thesis that philosophy has a determinate pull (link). Saying, "There will always be points of divergence and points of convergence [among philosophers]," doesn't seem to help us in addressing that thesis. — Leontiskos

My first post was in response to your claim that:

there is an important sense in which philosophy was never relevant. — Leontiskos

In so far as there is divergence it might seem as though the pull would be in opposite directions and where there is convergence the pull would be in the same direction, but this is not an argument I would make or defend.

It seems clear to me that Plato moved society in a particular direction when his exoteric teachings were appropriated by Christianity, but his salutary public teaching is not the same as his philosophical teachings. Put in simple terms, the former provides the appearance of answers, and the latter problems and questions.

Nietzsche writes at a time when the accepted answers are no longer acceptable. He recognizes this as a crisis. His solution is in some respects like that of Plato - the creation of new values. Behind this is the problem that values are not ultimate. Philosophy contains what he calls 'deadly truths". How can one be willing to live and die for something that we know from history will in time be rejected?

In part he appeals to the innocence and forgetfulness of the child and the need for a "sacred yes" (Zarathustra, "The Three Metamorphoses of the Spirit"). To this end he too sees the need for a new religion for the benefit of the people. But the probity of the philosopher demands something else.

The "real philosophers", the commanders and lawgivers, do not give philosophy to the people. They give the people "noble lies". It is not that:

... philosophy produces a cumulative effect on society, — Leontiskos

or that

...the world moves in that "philosophical" direction. — Leontiskos

but that the philosopher moves society in ways that differ from the ways in which it moves those who are to be philosophers.

Pantagruel is right when he points to:

... the diremption of philosophy and science since Bacon ... — Pantagruel

Bacon wrote:

Science discovery should be driven not just by the quest for intellectual enlightenment, but also for the relief of man’s estate ...

The same force of knowledge is behind Descartes "provisional morality":

My third maxim was to try always to master myself rather than fortune, and to change my desires rather than the order of the world. (Discourse on Method)

It is provisional because his method will allow man to master fortune. Man will no longer have to accept things the way they are. This power marks a fundamental change from ancient philosophies. The modern philosophers gave themselves a task not entertained by the ancients, to master nature. Philosophy was no longer about the problem of how to live but to solve problems by changing the conditions of life.

This entails trying to objectively evaluate the evidence and the laws, and (I suggest) assuming an objective judge and jury. — Relativist

But this is something that Trump and NOS deny is possible. Trump wants to move the trial to West Virginia not because a jury there would be more objective, or in his words 'unbiased', but because he won West Virginia in 2020 and they would more likely be biased in favor of him.

Trump made his thinking clear back in 2016 when he attempted to discredit Judge Gonzalo Curiel in the Trump University fraud case because she is Mexican.

It seems to me that if the becoming has no end then there can be no ultimate convergence. — Leontiskos

The dyad divergence and convergence is not resolved or reduced to convergence. There will always be points of divergence and points of convergence, points of disagreement and points of agreement with regard to the whereto of mankind.

Of course not everyone agrees with this. Some envision progress as the movement toward universal agreement.

But isn't the essence of culture its values? — Pantagruel

Yes, but value change. Although not the first, the case of Socrates gives us a vivid picture of the dynamics at play. He was guilty as charged. He was a threat to Athenian culture. But we tend to see Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle as the height of Greek culture, even though the gods did not survive.

But the celebration of pluralism essentially defines universal consensus as an archaic concept. There is no longer any interest in an "overarching truth". — Pantagruel

The whither and why of mankind takes pluralism into account. It is in line with Nietzsche's notion of the creation of individuals. The whereto is not oriented to be being but to becoming. This might mean not only divergence but convergence.

However the technologization of our culture is in danger of fatally marginalizing philosophical values. If it can even be called a culture anymore. — Pantagruel

Knowledge brings change. This acknowledgement is at the root of our hybrid culture. This hybrid is not the culture of either of its roots. Technology changes culture. In doing so it some of the old culture is destroyed, but I don't think that means the end of culture.

Is asking universal questions irrelevant, for example? I don’t think so. I think we need it more than ever.

How philosophy is thought of today, as one academic subject of many, taught by those with Ph.D.s, who mainly discuss the history of the great thinkers and great books…yeah, this professionalization is basically irrelevant today. — Mikie

The history of the great thinkers and great books can be taught in such a way that it is about universal questions. It is in this way relevant today. After all, it is with these great thinkers and great books that these questions arise.

But Nietzsche's "real philosopher" would "set aside the previous labour of all philosophical workers." — Leontiskos

The first part of that statement reads:

They determine first the Whither and the Why of mankind, and thereby ...

The question then is whether in determining the whither and why of mankind the philosophers would pull in the same or different directions. As he determines this the pull would be to the ubermensch. This determination is diagnostic.

Does this mean we can't really 'know' unless we are engaged in an active process of transformation? — Tom Storm

Yes. As I understand it to know yourself you must become who you are. Nietzsche likens it to the art of the sculpturer, removing all that part of the work within.

I prefer Plato to Nietzsche. — Leontiskos

I prefer Plato to Platonism. And Nietzsche plays a role in making that distinction.

there is an important sense in which philosophy was never relevant. — Leontiskos

I think this overstates the case. We still read Plato and Aristotle. They played the long political game and made significant advances for freedom of inquiry and thought.

The philosopher has established his place in the cave alongside the poets, theologians, politicians, and sophists. The relationship between the philosopher and the city rests on two things: the return to the cave and their being able to mind their own business. The former is done in part for the sake of the latter. If the tension between the city and philosophy is to be managed the philosopher must prove to be of benefit to the city. The extent that this is no longer a primary problem is a testament to the success of philosopher. While Plato created a civic religion, its effectiveness depends on the appearance of being something else, namely the truth.

I agree with Nietzsche:

THE REAL PHILOSOPHERS, HOWEVER, ARE COMMANDERS AND LAW-GIVERS; they say: "Thus SHALL it be!" They determine first the Whither and the Why of mankind, and thereby set aside the previous labour of all philosophical workers, and all subjugators of the past--they grasp at the future with a creative hand, and whatever is and was, becomes for them thereby a means, an instrument, and a hammer. Their "knowing" is CREATING, their creating is a law-giving, their will to truth is--WILL TO POWER. --Are there at present such philosophers? Have there ever been such philosophers? MUST there not be such philosophers some day? . . . (BGE, 211)

While much is made of Nietzsche’s Dionysian desires, it is the Apollonian maxim: know thyself, that is central to Nietzsche. But to know yourself you must become who you are. This is not a matter of discovery but of creation. Nietzsche takes the exhortation to become who you are from the Greek poet Pindar. For both Plato and Nietzsche philosophy is a form of poiesis.. Their knowing is creating. The "ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry" is an interfamilial matter.

Studying and teaching philosophy does not make one a "real philosopher". Like Plato, Nietzsche is an elitist. The real philosopher is the rare exception. Whatever light the philosopher brings to the cave it remains a cave. The transformation brought about by philosophy is self-transformation.

I think it more helpful to determine what someone making the argument for or against materialism or naturalism or metaphysics means. Rather than the meaning of terms, what assumptions about the world, our inquiries, and our understanding are at issue.

With regard to Sam's claims, it seems to me that at the root is a set of beliefs about consciousness:

My belief is that consciousness is at the bottom of reality. It's a brute fact of reality. — Sam26

Of course there are many who hold to this belief without the added belief that individual consciousness is at the bottom of reality or that individual consciousness endures.

Juries can be wrong. — NOS4A2

Yes. And so can you. Do you want to do away with trial by jury?

As you said:

I’m not sure he did so fraudulently. — NOS4A2

So how is that to be determined if not by a jury based on evidence?

This shows just how deeply anti-democratic you are. It also shows a disregard for the legal system.

[Deleted]

I’m not sure he did so fraudulently. The claims that he did so knowingly and fraudulently are without evidence and therefor bullshit. — NOS4A2

What if the jury finds him guilty based on evidence? Would that be enough to convince you that he did so fraudulently?

I'll have to hunt this paper down; — Dermot Griffin

here

Update I was not able to find a free PDF

The movement of Geist (Spirit/Mind) is the movement of the whole to its self-realization, its consciousness of itself. The movement has come full circle.

From the preface to the Phenomenology:

18: The true is not an original unity as such, or, not an immediate unity as such. It is the coming-to-be of itself, the circle that presupposes its end as its goal and has its end for its beginning, and which is actual only through this accomplishment and its end.

20: The true is the whole. However, the whole is only the essence completing itself through its own development. This much must be said of the absolute: It is essentially a result, and only at the end is it what it is in truth.

With an online forum, on the other hand, silence is highly ambiguous. — Leontiskos

Yup.

He is a being beyond being — Gregory

Does Hegel say this?

The whole and not just individuals comes to self-consciousness. The death of the individual is not the end or death of self-consciousness itself even though the realization of self-consciousness comes about through individuals within the whole.

I think there could be two groups of members: one group where the people don't take part in discussions because they don't have enough data in the discussion itself (5 % or 10 % of the overall) and those who don't answer because you are not friends with (90 % or 95 %) — javi2541997

I don't think that the decision to respond or not divides in this way. Since the same topics come up over and over again, some members don't want to rehash it. And some topics are simply not of interest or too much work will be involved trying to disentangle things. In some cases it is not a matter of being friends but of having a good idea of where a member stands and how they will respond.

But I have said enough about why I think a post or poster might not get responses.

The article says "It is desirable that the discussion has as many participants as possible", not everyone. — Alkis Piskas

The statement was a direct quote from the section "participation".

One needs only to follow and apply the elements — Alkis Piskas

I don't agree, but will leave it there.