This raises several questions regarding wisdom and the possible limits of what is and can be known.
— Fooloso4

But, you're right given the historical evidence. — 013zen

Speculation about first things is not knowledge. The reason is simple. We have no experience of the beginning or origins. Knowledge begins with the senses, aided by memory in some animals, and by art and reasoning in the case of human beings. Knowledge and art result from experience. (981a)

Democratus' was more right — 013zen

Democritus gave a more plausible account of material causes but Aristotle's inquiry extends to the good of each thing and the whole of nature. (982b) A full account should not only address the good of each thing and the whole, but it should be good, that is, beneficial to human beings. Even if the account fails to satisfy the former it can aim to satisfy the latter.

Aristotle points out that knowledge of such things is not productive, and concludes:

All kinds of knowledge, then, are more necessary than this one, but none is better.

(983a)

Between these statements he questions whether such knowledge is appropriate for human beings. It is divine knowledge, both in the sense that it is knowledge of the divine as cause and knowledge that a god alone or most of all would have. Above the entryway to the temple of Apollo are inscribed the words "know thyself". One way in which this was understood is that man should know his place. He is not a god and does not possess knowledge of the gods in the double sense of knowing the gods and knowing what the gods know. Knowledge of the source and cause of the whole is not something that human beings possess. We do not even know if the divine is a cause or if the divine knows the cause.This should be kept in mind when Aristotle turns to theology.

He begins by noting the desire to know. This raises several questions regarding wisdom and the possible limits of what is and can be known.

I can see you no longer want to focus on the quotes wherein Witt does not make a distinction between the world, and "my world". — 013zen

Where he does not make a distinction must be looked at in light of where he does. The text hangs together as a whole.

Where he literally says, when death occurs THE world ceases to exist. — 013zen

How are we to understand this? Clearly the world does not literally cease to exist. Wittgenstein is dead. The world has not ceased to exist. There is more to this than can be seen by focusing on a part to the exclusion of the whole.

I appreciate you directing me to another post, but truthfully if you can't admit how your interpretation requires you to supplant what's literally said with slight modifications in order to maintain it, that's indicative that - while you might be right in many regards - that your theory needs reworking. — 013zen

It does not supplant what is said, it attempts to explain it in light of what else is said, that is, with regard to its place in the whole of the text. It is not as if he is rejecting what he said previously about the world being the totality of facts.

Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a non-psychological way.

What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that ‘the world is my world’.

The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world not a part of it.

(5.641)

That "the world is my world" means that the world of the metaphysical subject ends when the metaphysical subject does. My world is the world I see, the world I experience, the life I lead. My limits are its limits. It comes to an end.

The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world.

(5.632)

It is like the eye and the visual field. It does not alter what is in the world, but rather the ability of the metaphysical subject to see it, to experience it, to live it.

Did you read the moral subjectivism section? — Bob Ross

If you are talking about the SEP link to "Moral Anti-Realism", this is the whole of what is says about moral subjectivism:

[This entry uses the label “non-objectivism” instead of the simple “subjectivism” since there is an entrenched usage in metaethics for using the latter to denote the thesis that in making a moral judgment one is reporting (as opposed to expressing) one’s own mental attitudes (e.g., “Stealing is morally wrong” means “I disapprove of stealing”). So understood, subjectivism is a kind of non-objectivist theory, but there are many other kinds of non-objectivist theory, too.]

This is a good example of the problem I have been pointing to. It is as if certain terms must be avoided and replaced to avoid confusion regarding terminology.

No. SEP is just being very careful to include the nuances of the topic. There is a generally agreed upon definition, that I already outlined./quote]

It goes beyond being careful. This is the sentence that follows it:
— Bob Ross

Crispin Wright (1992: 1) comments that “if there ever was a consensus of understanding about ‘realism’, as a philosophical term of art, it has undoubtedly been fragmented by the pressures exerted by the various debates—so much so that a philosopher who asserts that she is a realist about theoretical science, for example, or ethics, has probably, for most philosophical audiences, accomplished little more than to clear her throat.”

Rather than there being general agreement there is, in his words, no general consensus of understanding about 'realism'.

You are misunderstanding: moral relativism stands opposed to moral absolutism. — Bob Ross

We are at an impasse. You treat this as if it were a terminological problem. My position is that treating ethics as if it is about terminology is the problem.

Moral subjectivism is standardly ... — Bob Ross

There is no agreed upon standard as to what moral subjectivism means. From the article you cited on moral anti-realism, (another term without an agreed on definition):

All three terms [Anti-realism,” “non-realism,” and “irrealism”] are to be defined in opposition to realism, but since there is no consensus on how “realism” is to be understood, “anti-realism” fares no better.

It goes on to say that it is:

unlikely that the label “moral anti-realism” even succeeds in picking out a definite position.

... this link, without elaboration, was not helpful. Some of it, wasn't even about moral subjectivism (e.g., ethical relativism is NOT a form of moral subjectivism, let alone a form of moral anti-realism). — Bob Ross

It supports the claim that there is no single agreed upon definition of terms.

Some authors do treat ethical relativism as a form of moral subjectivism. From the IEP article on moral relativism:

In principle, the standpoint in question could be narrowed to that of a single individual, in which case, the relativism becomes a form of moral subjectivism.

Moral relativism is also a contested concept. It can refer either to a culture, a group, or an individual.

this one is an article states nothing that helps your case. — Bob Ross

Of course it does! There are various forms of moral or ethical subjectivism. The article cites some of them that can be found in the literature. The first is under the heading of "Old Fashioned Subjectivism and Relativism, which according to the article are:

... invariably about the attitudes of a certain individual or a group.

An attitude is not a proposition, but can be expressed as a proposition. Using an example from the text, if my attitude is that eating meat is wrong, it is my attitude toward eating meat that makes it wrong. This is not some grand, universal, apodictic moral claim that must be either true or false for all human beings for all time. Attitudes toward such things change. This change should be acknowledged as a condition under which moral claims are made and discussed rather than a defect to be remedied by attempting to universalize such claims.

Under "New Wave Subjectivism and Relativism" he says:

... the proposition invariably expressed by a given moral sentence does not have an absolute truth value, full stop or in and of itself. Rather, the key idea is that the proposition can be only true relative to a context of assessment.

In other words, moral propositions do not stand on their own in some world of eternal verities.

I think you just linked these half-lazily thinking I would do your argumentation for you...which I am not going to do (: — Bob Ross

I think it clear that you are not sufficiently acquainted with the literature and will not, as you admit here, do the research to become better informed. What I cited should be enough to show that there are terminological differences. They cannot be waved away. Once again, what this means is that you cannot start with your preferred definitions and proceed from there as if what these terms mean is settled and moral discourse is an analysis of these settled terms.

I never implied or said this. Moral subjectivism is a specific moral anti-realist position — Bob Ross

You just said it! The problem is that moral subjectivism is not a specific position.

Here is a current overview of the literature.

Here different types of moral subjectivism are listed.

There are other forms of moral anti-realism (e.g., non-cognitivism, nihilism, etc.). — Bob Ross

Your attempt to clarify compounds the problem by dragging in additional contested terminology.

What I was saying, is that, at best, what you were conveying (viz., the underlying meaning of which you were speaking) was denying moral subjectivism. — Bob Ross

What I am conveying and what you take it to mean are not the same. I am not denying moral subjectivism. I am questioning the value of the terminology. I reject claims that morality is objective. The problem is, if I reject that morality is objective, you might conclude that I must therefore be a moral subjectivist, and if I am a moral subjectivist I must believe whatever Wiki says I do.

a proper analysis — Bob Ross

I agree with the importance of a proper analysis. For you this means an analysis of concepts. For me it is first and foremost an analysis of deeds and the practice of the examined life.

You cannot analyze X if you do not have an idea about what X is. — Bob Ross

As I see it, moral deliberation has its roots in the world of opinion, in the world at large rather than in the cloistered world of concept formation and analysis shaped by argumentative strategies.

Correct - the same reality, despite the worlds being "quite another" entirely. — 013zen

The facts of the world are the facts of reality, the world and reality are the same. There are not my facts or your facts, they are the facts. They remain as they are when I die. They do not cease to be.

The logical relationships within the world are not the only relationships. There is also the relationship between the "I' and the world.

Here is a long post on Wittgenstein's discussion of solipsism and "my world",







.

Then you are denying that moral subjectivism is true at best — Bob Ross

What I am denying is that thinking constricted by select definition of terms leads to what is true at best. Rather than appeal to a definition we should determine what someone means when they use a term. It is foolish and wrongheaded to insist that what someone means is not what they say they mean but rather what you found in a definition.

Everything starts with concepts: there’s no way around that. — Bob Ross

Morality is rooted in our immediate visceral response to what happens to us or others. My suffering does not begin with the concept of suffering. I do not need to form a concept to know that it is bad. Most of us are capable of empathy and do not first develop or appeal to a concept of empathy in order to be able to empathize. We do not need a concept of care in order to care. We do not need a concept of something mattering in order for something to matter to us.

... while reality is the totality of positive and negative facts. — 013zen

The world and reality are not distinguished by the existence or non-existence of negative facts.

The propositions ‘p’ and ‘∼p’ have opposite sense, but there corresponds to them one and
the same reality.

(4.0621)

If 'p' exists in the world then 'not p' does not. If If 'p' exists in reality then 'not p' does not. That 'not p' does not exist is a negative fact. It is true that 'not p' does not exist.

How else could the world of the happy man be different from the world of the sad man? — 013zen

They do not differ with regard to the facts of the world. In both cases the facts remain the same.

The world...my world, is in my mind and is made up of pictures of reality. — 013zen

He makes a distinction between the world and my world. It should be obvious that when someone dies the world does not end. People die every day and the world goes on. The discussion of the happy man is part of his discussion of ethics and aesthetics. They are not found in the world.

I was obviously using the example of 2+2=4 because Bob Ross had already been using it, not because I think ethics is the same as mathematics. — Leontiskos

Am I wrong to assume you are using it because you agree with it?

You say:

The rather obvious point of that post is that ethical claims are about ethical truths, not beliefs (or beliefs about ethical truths). — Leontiskos

This is a belief about ethical claims. While it is clear that the truth of 2+2=4 can be demonstrated, it is not clear that an ethical proposition can be demonstrated to be true. So in what way are they of the same type?

1. Moral judgments are proposition (i.e., moral cognitivism). — Bob Ross

Moral judgments can be stated in propositional form, but this does not mean that they are propositions. We do not regard something as right or wrong or good or bad as the result of propositional acceptance or analysis.

You are looking through the wrong end of the telescope. Moral philosophy should not begin with some set of contested definitions.

Your premise that the activity of ethical reasoning is like mathematical reasoning is an opinion, a belief.
— Fooloso4

'Never said it was. — Leontiskos

What you said is:

When we engage in ethical reasoning, are we inquiring into whether people believe something, or whether something is right or wrong? I take it that it is obvious that ethical reasoning pertains to the latter, and is not about peoples beliefs. — Leontiskos

By the latter you are referring to what you call "type 1" propositions and give 2+2=4 as the paradigm example. You go on to say:

I take it that it is obvious that ethical reasoning pertains to the latter ... — Leontiskos

The latter being these type 1 propositions. If ethical reasoning concerns and pertains to type 1 propositions then ethical reasoning is like mathematical reasoning.

That ethical reasoning is "type 1" reasoning is your belief not an established and uncontested truth.

In another post from today you say:

I think the reason moral subjectivism is basically non-existent in professional philosophy is because ... — Leontiskos

Evidently you are unaware and uninformed about the current literature. You will find not only a rejection of moral objectivism, but that the concept of reason itself is once again changing. See, for example, the work of Richard Bernstein or Joseph Margolis.

Leontiskos: The activity of ethical reasoning is X; the subjectivist is not doing X; therefore the subjectivist is not engaged in ethics. — Leontiskos

Your premise that the activity of ethical reasoning is like mathematical reasoning is an opinion, a belief. It is shared by some but rejected by others. The term 'subjectivism' is used in different ways. To pick one from Wikipedia and treat it as if this is the only thing that those who defend some form of subjectivism must mean goes against the idea of free and open inquiry and discussion.

The irony is that you use own beliefs regarding morality to argue that morality is not about beliefs.

Prove to me, via ethical reasoning, that abortion is wrong. More generally, how is anything proved to be wrong? — Leontiskos

After responding to this several times it now looks as if you are no longer arguing in good faith. I have not asked you to prove that abortion is wrong or right. Abortion is a clear example of what is at issue, namely, the claim that ethics like mathematics is objective. The unresolved moral controversies surrounding abortion clearly demonstrates that ethical deliberation is not like adding 2 plus 2.

If you really think that I am asking you to prove anything then you have not understood what I am saying. Moral problems are not like mathematical problems. They are not subject to proof.

The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is reality.

(2.06)

To state the obvious, non-existing states of affairs do not exist. Reality does not contain non-existing facts.

2.06 includes the parenthetical remark:

(We call the existence of states of affairs a positive fact, and their non-existence a negative
fact.)

also:

The totality of existing states of affairs also determines which states of affairs do not exist.

(2.05)

If we could know the totality of states of affairs we would thereby also know those states of affairs that do not exist, that is, any state of affairs that contradicts those states of affairs that do exist.

Then what is the purpose of Witt saying:

"The total reality is the world" (2.063). — 013zen

Compare this to:

The totality of existing states of affairs is the world.

(2.04)

The purpose is, at least in part, to exclude ethical and aesthetic propositions from what is the case. They do not refer to how things are in the world. They do not depict reality.

In logical space, however, I can picture the process of making a pizza, without it actually obtaining in reality. — 013zen

In your imagination you can make this pizza, but this pizza does not exist in the world. It is not real.

Like, you're seemingly outright conflating the world and reality, — 013zen

In order to conflate them there must be some pertinent distinction that is not understood. I do not see how or where Wittgenstein makes such a distinction. It is a distinction you impose on the text.

When he says:

Reality is compared with propositions.

(4.05)

he is talking about the propositions of natural science, that is, propositions about the world. Propositions about what is the case. Facts.

If you want to start a thread on abortion or the epistemology of moral obligation or intractable disagreement then you should go do that; I'm not biting on the derailment. — Leontiskos

I don't know if you are trying to avoid addressing the problems raised by declaring them out of bounds or if you are simply unable to see what is at issue. What is at issue is the claim that moral subjectism (sic) is internally inconsistent. In support of that claim you say:

Moral propositions are (meant to be) binding upon oneself and others — Leontiskos

but when I question what it means to be binding you complain it is a derailment.

You claim that:

The question is whether ethics concerns statements of type (1) or type (2). — Leontiskos

and:

When we do philosophy we are usually concerned with statements of type (1) — Leontiskos

The type 1 proposition you cite is: 2+2=4. If ethics and more generally philosophy is concerned with this type of proposition then the problem of agreement with some propositions of this type such as 2+2=4 and disagreement with others of this type such as abortion needs to be explained. Once again, what is at issue is not abortion but the lack of agreement regarding moral propositions. When I point to this problem you complain it is a derailment.

You say "the epistemology of moral obligation" is a derailment and yet you ask:

When we engage in ethical reasoning, are we inquiring into whether people believe something, or whether something is right or wrong? — Leontiskos

If we are inquiring into whether something is right or wrong then the question of how we know that something is right or wrong is not a derailment. If it is of the indisputable, demonstrable, objective type 1 then it is not a derailment to point out that moral propositions are not true to type.

But we don't need to be too serious all the time, and there's something fun in the exercise, I think — Moliere

I took the tone of the thread to be serious. I find any serious attempt to think about ethics in terms of the construction and assault on categories comical.

I am reminded of Arthur Koestler's definition of philosophy:

The systematic abuse of a terminology specially invented for that purpose.

(The Act of Creation)

And, for good measure, from Wittgenstein:

The language used by philosophers is already deformed, as though by shoes that are too tight.

(CV, p. 47)

As long as it is meant to binding then it fulfills the necessary condition I set out—a necessary condition which subjectivism and emotivism do not meet. — Leontiskos

What I am questioning is the claim that some as yet unspecified set of obligations are binding. I am also asking how it is determined that these moral propositions are objective and true?

To say more would be to go beyond the scope of this thread and the argument at hand ... — Leontiskos

To not say more is to skirt the issue at hand. If you are claiming that there are objective moral truths then you must not simply assert that they exist, but provide and defend at least some of them.

Prohibitions against abortion are the same kind of propositions as prohibitions against murder. — Leontiskos

There are significant differences that render the comparison problematic and questionable.
There is a generally accepted distinction between killing and murder. Murder is by definition wrong, killing is not. There are cases where killing is regarded as acceptable.

The point is not to argue the morality of abortion but rather to point to the fact that it is arguable moral issue. Rational people are unable to agree. That should not be the case with propositions that are objectively true.

... and to move into a discussion of your personal political positions, which is probably what you are aiming at. — Leontiskos

The relation between morality or ethics and political philosophy is important but is not what I am aiming at.

Moral propositions are (meant to be) binding upon oneself and others — Leontiskos

Should the moral proposition, 'you must not abort a fetus but carry it to term' be binding? What makes this proposition either true or false? By what moral authority can this be determined and by what force is it made binding?

I think the problem is that those who attempt to reduce moral deliberation to some set of self consistent propositions forget that what is at issue is not an abstracted analysis of the truth of moral propositions, but how our lives and those of others are benefited and harmed by what we say and do and think.

I think that within these constraints there is still some degree of play and freedom. There are from time to time those who are able to see beyond the limits of their time. Those who are not products of their time but who influence how those who follow will see and think.

they are both similarly projections of Language and its autonomous processes — ENOAH

I don't think so. I think we are historically/culturally/linguistically situated but not thereby determined.

That it is pictures of facts that present those facts in logical space, if the facts are already in logical space? — 013zen

The facts are in the world.(1.13) A picture of the facts is in the world. The picture represents a possible situation (2.202) What is represented, however, may not be in the world.

Just as the only necessity that exists is logical necessity, so too the only impossibility that exists is logical impossibility.

(6.375)

That it is possible to picture the world is a logical possibility.

What makes logic a priori is the impossibility of illogical thought.

(5.4731)

Put differently, thought too is in logical space.

A fact does not have this necessity - it's objects are their relations are merely accidental. — 013zen

The structure of a fact is not accidental. That some facts exist and others do not is accidental.

In logic nothing is accidental: if a thing can occur in a state of affairs, the possibility of the
state of affairs must be written into the thing itself.

The world is determined by the facts, and by these being all the facts. (1.11)

Yes, they do determine the world, but they do not make up the world. Pictures do, and insofar as pictures are pictures of facts, the facts ultimately determines the world. — 013zen

If I want to eat, a picture is not going to do the job. You do not make up a pizza from pictures of dough and cheese. This seems so obvious that I think you must mean something else, but I can't figure out what that is.

Witt is thinking, I believe, of the realist/idealist/, empiricist/rationalist debate. — 013zen

I am reminded of something Wittgenstein said:

The language used by philosophers is already deformed, as though by shoes that are too tight

[CV, p. 47].

Shoes that are too tight make it difficult to walk. The language used by philosophers make it difficult to think.

Your challenge does not demonstrate a unique uncovering of real truth — ENOAH

Certainly not unique but it does point to something that has been covered. Whatever the "real truth" might be, it is not something we possess and not something we can come to know through a misguided model of reason based on the success of mathematics.

It is just another conditioned path which surfaced because multiple "words" moving in your locus of history triggered the beliefs you are espousing. — ENOAH

"Words" can have multiple paths that can be traced by their history. To do so may require desedimentation. Doing so can open paths that have been closed, leading us away from our conditioning. Paths can be walked and paths can be made.

Both do not kill and don't eat meat follow that process and are neither relative to subjective choice, nor grounded in Natural Law. — ENOAH

What these prohibitions mean is subject to interpretation. Is killing an enemy in war prohibited? Is killing an animal to eat it prohibited? Do fish and fowl count as meat? The process by which such determinations have been made is not always a process that already exists to be followed. At some point it had to be established. Exceptions had and in some cases still have to be dealt with.

1. A belief is a (cognitive) stance taken on the truthity of a proposition; and
2. Beliefs make moral propositions true or false. — Bob Ross

Your definition of moral subjectivism misses the mark because it rests on two questionable assumptions:

1. That moral beliefs are adequately addressed in terms of propositions.
2. What makes a moral claim true or false is whether or not it is believed.

1. This marks a wrong turn in the history of philosophy that fails to strike us as odd and out of touch because we have become so accustomed to philosophers making such claims, as if thinking and feeling are two separate, independent things. Rather than an analysis in propositional terms, we need to begin with what is more fundamental and primal. A baby will smile in response to a smile and become distraught when the face in front of them is sad. That others seem happy or troubled matters to them. The roots of morality lie here, in our nature as social beings who care.

2. What this criticism of subjectivism fails to to into account is the difference between the belief in an objective morality and our failure to identify what that might be. Without such knowledge some form of subjectivism is the inescapable default position. Moral reasoning is deliberative not deductive. It begins with a critical examination of opinions. It does not end with indisputable, apodictic universal moral truths, but with beliefs and practices accepted by some or many but perhaps not by others. At best in our ignorance we settle on what seems best, and this may be subject to change.

2. Facts - not in logical space — 013zen

All facts are in logical space.

The facts in logical space are the world.

(1.13)

Logic underlies and makes possible both fact and pictures or representation of facts.

2. The existence of a fact means the existence of an atomic fact. — 013zen

'Atomic fact' is an infelicitous translation from the Ogden translation.

The Pears/McGuinness has:

What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs.(2)

In German "das Bestehen von Sachverhalten".

The term'Sachverhalt' simply means a fact, what is the case, a state of affairs, not an atomic fact.

This is important. Reality, is the existence and non-existence of atomic facts, while the world is only the existence of an atomic fact. — 013zen

This distinction does not hold:

The world is determined by the facts, and by these being all the facts. (1.11)

For the totality of facts determines both what is the case, and also all that is not the case. (1.12)

The sum-total of reality is the world. (2.063)

It's not the gambit or the vanilla, it's the always. — tim wood

Right. That is why I asked:

Why should what I always do and what you always do be related in any way other than this being what we always do? — Fooloso4

and:

Would you ask if what I sometimes do is related to what you sometimes do? — Fooloso4

When you say:

The structure of the inquiry being, is-it, what-is-it, what-kind-of-a-thing-is-it, genus/species, quiddities; and the tools being the simple "why" and "what." — tim wood

and follow this with the example of 'always' then 'always' is being treated as a kind of thing with its own "whatness". It seems to me that you are reifying 'always' as if it plays a determinate role in what is being done.

But what is at issue here is 'purpose'. Your initial question:

The questions here are, then, what is purpose (in itself), where does it come from, what is its ground? Or, what exactly gives it all meaning, makes it all worthwhile? — tim wood

"Purpose in itself" treats it as if it is some thing that exists on its own apart from those things that have purposes.

...on the working assumption that there is something there to see. — tim wood

I am questioning that assumption. The problem is that when working with that assumption leads one to find what may not be there to find. And if not here then there.

Thus if you always play the king's gambit, and I always chose vanilla, we can ask if in any way these are related, the "always" being the clue. And if related, presumably in some way by the "always," then there is a subject that might be pursued without any reification risked. — tim wood

Why should what I always do and what you always do be related in any way other than this being what we always do? My reasons for always playing the king's gambit may have nothing to do with why you always choose vanilla. Would you ask if what I sometimes do is related to what you sometimes do?

The assumption is that if there are various particulars of some kind then there must be some one thing that underlies them all by virtue of which they are the things they are. If there are purposes then there must be some more basic and general thing, PURPOSE, without which there could be no purposes.

This is reductive reification. It posits an entity where none is to be found and thus invents a transcendent realm of eternal beings where it is to be discovered.

If this is part of some secret plan by the conservative Supes, I wonder what it is. — fishfry

I do not think it is some secret plan. They are anti-regulation, anti-LGBT rights, pro-discrimination on the basis of religious freedom, and pro-gun.

I would go further and say that Wittgenstein is opposed to the framework of things in themselves versus things for us. — Paine

I agree. The discussion of the cube at 5.5423 is instructive:

This no doubt also explains why there are two possible ways of seeing the figure as a cube; and all similar phenomena. For we really see two different facts.

Facts are separate from and independent of our perception of them.

In a letter to John Taylor he says:

Democracy, nevertheless must not be disgraced. Democracy must not be despised. Democracy must be respected. Democracy must be honoured. Democracy must be cherished. Democracy must be an essential, an integral part of the Souvereignty, and have a controul over the whole Government, or moral Liberty cannot exist, or any other Liberty. I have been always grieved, by the gross abuses of this respectable Word. One Party speaks of it as the most amiable, venerable, indeed as the sole object of their Adoration: the other as the Sole object of their scorn, abhorrence and Execration. Neither Party, in my Opinion, know what they Say. Some of them care not what they say, provided they can accomplish their own Selfish Purposes. These ought not to be forgiven.

The two parties at that time were the Federalists and the Democratic-Republicans. He was a member of the Federalists. This would raise doubts for the those who wrote and supported the Republican resolution @jorndoe cited above, if only they knew where Adams stood.


According to his wife he was an avid reader of Plato, but I think his views on democracy were shaped in part by his own experience and observations regarding human nature. A Democratic republic differs from the Athenian democracy in important ways.

Surely you can think of a few cultural moral norms that seem unlikely to be parts of cooperation strategies. — Mark S

There is a difference between a moral norm that in some way promotes cooperation and a strategy to promote cooperation via moral norms.

The same norm can result in cooperation between some but discord among others.

In what way is a norm prohibiting abortion a cooperation strategy? Such rules are often divisive and harmful. They may not lead to cooperation but to oppression.

In what way is a norm against homosexuality a cooperation strategy? It too is often divisive and harmful and can lead to oppression rather than cooperation.

If you suspect the hypothesis is false, any candidate counterexamples would be welcome. — Mark S

I have no alternative hypothesis. I regard this whole endeavor as a fruitless dead end.

...that hypothesis is robustly supported by inference to the best explanation... — Mark S

Inference to the best explanation is not scientific evidence.

John Adams is quoted but his position if far more subtle than this naked attempt at a power grab.

In John Adams' "Thoughts on Government" he asks:

As good government, is an empire of laws, how shall your laws be made?

and answers by:

... a few of the most wise and good.

That is, not by a political party but by those who are wise and good,.

He goes on to say:

The principal difficulty lies, and the greatest care should be employed in constituting this Representative Assembly. It should be in miniature, an exact portrait of the people at large. It should think, feel, reason, and act like them. That it may be the interest of this Assembly to do strict justice at all times, it should be an equal representation, or in other words equal interest among the people should have equal interest in it.

If the people at large favor policies that are progressive and socialists then the Republicans are not representatives of the people.

Adams also says:

Of Republics, there is an inexhaustable variety, because the possible combinations of the powers of society, are capable of innumerable variations.

As the greatest leader of the Republican Party said, this nation is a government:

of the people, by the people, for the people.

It is a mixed regime with elements of aristocracy and democracy.

A lot of people think the court's on Trump's side and not being judicially impartial. And opinions about that correlate with people's opinions on Trump. — fishfry

I do think that there are members of the court who have an agenda. It is not that they are on Trump's side but that they see Trump as useful to their side. An expedient for attaining their conservative goals.

You appear to not understand what is included in empirical evidence for scientific truth. — Mark S

I think it is the other way around. If, as you claim,

The principles that underlie descriptively moral behaviors are what people have thought of as moral (because it has been encoded into the biology underlying our moral sense) for as long as we have lived in cooperative societies. — Mark S

then you must provide evidence and not just arguments supporting your hypothesis. Just claiming that what people have thought of as moral is encoded is not 'science'. The claim that what people think is of as moral is encoded means that moral judgments are encoded, that 'x' is morally acceptable and 'y' is not. In other words, that a moral code is encoded.