Would that happen today, no? — ssu

If Trump was asked : "Have you no sense of decency?" he would just smirk and say: "I have the most decency, the best decency. They say no one has more decency than me." It is, of course his complete lack of decency and his shamelessness that shields him from even being bothered by the accusation.

Do you think his conclusion—a kind of ontological argument for the existence of God—is also feigned? — Janus

Yes.

Or that his skepticism regarding the authority of the church extended to the 'holy book' itself? — Janus

He makes good use of the good book for his own ends. In Genesis 2 after man gains knowledge God says that man has become like one of us. God blocks them from eating of the tree of life and becoming one of them, that is, immortal. But Descartes, in agreement with the NT, says that the soul/mind is immortal.. The theme of being god-like is continued in the story of the Tower of Babel:

The Lord said, “If as one people speaking the same language they have begun to do this, then nothing they plan to do will be impossible for them.

(11:6)

In the fourth meditation Descartes says:

I know by experience that will is entirely without limits.

and:

My will is so perfect and so great that I can’t conceive of its becoming even greater and more perfect ... — Fooloso4

Once again we see what Trump means by MAGA, a return to the time of his mentor Roy Cohn and McCarthyism, a campaign of fear and repression, with the "deep state" now taking the place of communism as the enemy within.

You can infer ... — Corvus

You ignore what Descartes says and impose your own inference based on your own opinion rather than on anything said in the text.

How could he exist without his body and senses? — Corvus

A good question, but your rejecting the possibility does not mean that Descartes thought, even briefly, that is it impossible. Imposing your own opinions onto your reading of Descartes is bad practice.

He briefly doubts his own existence — Corvus

Where does he say this? He doubts his body and his senses, but not that he exists. He posits a malicious demon that will do everything he can to deceive him, but concludes it cannot deceive him about his existing.

He doubted everything even his own existence. — Corvus

He does not doubt that he exists. From the second meditation:

I will set aside anything that admits of the slightest doubt, treating it as though I had found it to be outright false; and I will carry on like that until I find something certain, or – at worst – until I become certain that there is no certainty. Archimedes said that if he had one firm and immovable point he could lift the world ·with a long enough lever·; so I too can hope for great things if I manage to find just one little thing that is solid and certain ...

Now that I have convinced myself that there is nothing in the world – no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies – does it follow that I don’t exist either? No it does not follow; for if I convinced myself of something then I certainly existed.

My point was existence precedes doubting and thinking — Corvus

So you have said, again and again and again. I agree, but it is not as simple as you assume. It is not a matter of taking his side but of trying to understanding him. When you say:

Doubting one's own existence negates one's own sanity. — Corvus

you show that you do not understand him. He does not doubt his existence. That is the one thing he cannot doubt. That is his starting point.

One way to approach him is by attempting to read him as someone at that time might have. Belief in an immortal, immaterial soul was widespread and fundamental to the teachings of the Church. By substituting mind for soul reasoned thought rather than Church dogma and doctrine becomes fundamental. In addition, the unquestioned authority of Aristotle in matters of science is also called into question and replaced by certainty.

The question of whether consciousness is fundamental is an open question. We should not be too quick to dismiss Descartes because he held a similar view.

Right I agree but surely to be consistent Descartes must have imagined that he had grounds for skepticism regarding the existence of those other thinkers. — Janus

I don't think so. I think his doubt is rhetorical. A way to doubt the teachings and authority of the Church by feigning to doubt everything.

Added: Doubt is methodical, the purpose of which is to gain certain knowledge based on what is indubitable.

Is it not the case, that he must have existed in order to think? — Corvus

You are mixing tenses.

Existence is a precondition for thinking. — Corvus

It is a condition for thinking. Whether it is a precondition is not as obvious as you think. From Anaxagoras to the present there have been educated people who belief in the existence of a non-physical nous/mind/intellect/consciousness. In addition there have been and still are those who believe in the existence of a soul separate from the body.

All thoughts must have its contents or objects. — Corvus

Right.

When you say, a thinking being, it doesn't mean much without the knowledge of what the thinking is about. — Corvus

What is the point?

Without the content or object of the thought, Cogito is not saying much more than I dance, or I sing. — Corvus

Descartes concludes that he cannot doubt that he exists and cannot be deceived about his existing. He might be dreaming that he dances or sings but even if he is dreaming he is certain that he exists.

A person called "whoever" sounds still ambiguous. — Corvus

Whoever mistakes "whoever" for what a person is called is confused. This reminds me of how the Cyclopes is fooled by Odysseus.

These are the operations of mind which are only possible under the precondition of the living bodily existence. — Corvus

Right, sensing and willing are operations of the mind or of a thinking thing. You have made it clear that you think this requires a body, but this is not a good reason to misunderstand or misrepresent him, especially in cases where you are in agreement with him regarding the confirmation of your existence.

If the content of thought is empty or unknown, what meaning or relevance does the thought have with one's own existence on claiming cogito? — Corvus

That one is thinking and what is thought are not the same. He must exist in order to think.

Whoever is a name for nonexistence and unknown, hence meaningless. — Corvus

?

Isn't it a meaningless utterance? — Corvus

No.

I do exist. But my existence is confirmed by my own sense perception of the world of my own body and the actions I take according to my will. Not by cogito. — Corvus

In the second meditation Descartes says:

Well, then, what am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wants, refuses, and also imagines and senses.

So you are saying thinking is the something that exists that is thinking, doubting and feeling? Saying that the "who" is Descartes really tells me nothing at all. — Janus

Although Descartes isolates himself in his room, as a thinking thing he is not isolated. As a thinking thing he is connected to thinking itself, that is to say, to what is thought not just by him but other thinking beings before and after him. The nature of thinking is something we do together, a joint project, something that occurs between human beings. The thinking self is not just the individual but thinking itself, which is by its nature public.

The point is even if you said, I think therefore I exist, it doesn't say anything about the content of your thought. — Corvus

But the content of his thought is not relevant to his not being deceived about his existence.

Whoever exists, exists is a tautology, therefore meaningless. — Corvus

I meant to say whoever thinks. You asked:

Who is "whoever"? — Corvus

in response to my saying:

whoever thinks, must exist, — Fooloso4

If all thoughts are strictly private to the thinkers, then your cogito is just a solipsistic utterance to me. It doesn't give any meaningful knowledge to anyone else. — Corvus

Do you exist? Could you be mistaken or deceived about this?

If that is the case, then he would have known the fact that he must have existed before thinking. — Corvus

The issue is not as clear cut as you seem to think. Consider the current idea of the existence of sentient matter, panpsychism, and the idea that consciousness is fundamental. In Descartes time and for some in our time as well, the soul is believed to exist independently of the body. I am not advocating any of these beliefs. My point is simply that we cannot appeal to "science" as if the matter is settled or conclude that Descartes was ignorant of science because he argues that he is essentially a thinking thing.

In addition, as I pointed out in my discussion with J, Descartes also says:

my whole self insofar as I am a combination of body and mind ...

My sole concern here is with what God has given to me as a combination of mind and body.

All of this makes it clear that, despite God’s immense goodness, the nature of man as a combination of mind and body is such that it is bound to mislead him from time to time. — Fooloso4

I'm guessing this was about religious doctrine, where plain speaking in a Catholic country could get you in trouble. — J

It think it likely that this is part of it. He did not want to suffer the fate of Galileo. But from a letter to Mersenne

...there are many other things in them; and I tell you, between ourselves, that these
six Meditations contain all the foundations of my physics. But that must not be spread abroad, if you please; for those who follow Aristotle will find it more difficult to approve them. I hope that [my readers] will accustom themselves insensibly to my principles, and will come to recognize their truth, before
perceiving that they destroy those of Aristotle.

.

Linguistic expressions are not thoughts themselves. — Corvus

Okay, but I don't see the point.

"Whoever thinks must exist" is a guess at best. It is not a logical statement. — Corvus

Can you explain how someone can think but not exist?

Who is "whoever"? — Corvus

Anyone and everyone who exists.

All thoughts are private to the individual who thinks. — Corvus

I don't see the connection with existence.

You sounded as if Descartes had no contemporary scientific knowledge at his life time — Corvus

To the contrary, he was on the forefront of science.

And my point to that was, that one's bodily existence is precondition to mental operations is not a contemporary science, but a very basic biological fact which could be even classed as a commonsense knowledge. — Corvus

Descartes uses the terms soul and mind interchangeably. There are plenty of people who do not lack commonsense who believe in the soul exists apart from the body.

He starts by saying:

I have a very good reason for offering this book to you, and I am confident that you will have an equally good reason for giving it your protection ...

and ends by asking for their help. He never gained their endorsement. Accepting his work is not the same as an appeal for them to change.

If he'd wanted freedom from the Church, that was easily available in nearby Protestant territory. — frank

Do you mean he could have avoided the fate of Galileo by escaping? Perhaps, but this would not save his writings from censorship by the Church. In addition, freedom of thought is not limited to his own thinking.

Descartes was clearly not on a quest to undermine the authority of the Church. — frank

Is that a fact or an opinion? Evidence?

Two different issues. One is Trump's criminal, unconstitutional actions. The other is what people voted for or against.

but this sounds more like a 19th century way of reading than 17th century. — J

None of the quotes are from 19th century authors.

To say in one's unpublished Private Thoughts that one "goes forth wearing a mask" surely speaks to the difference we all experience between our private and public selves, no? — J

I take going forth to mean not just a public persona but putting forth his writings.

Why would you think he was referring to his philosophical writings? — J

This thought remained private because unpublished. His advise to his student:

Do not propose new opinions as new, but retain all the old terminology for
supporting new reasons; that way no one can find fault with you, and those who
grasp your reasons will by themselves conclude to what they ought to understand.

This is a masking of one's opinion.

I suppose it depends on how you evaluate Descartes' status as a philosopher — J

Good point.

I'll just comment that you do this a lot. You come up with some weird subterfuge related to a famous philosopher and then announce your theories as if they're facts. — frank

My interpretation like any other is just that, an interpretation. Is your claim that Descartes wanted the Church to reform your own theory. If so, you do not announce it as such. If it is a fact, what is the evidence to support it?

Let's look at some facts:

From the Dedication to the Meditations:

For us who are believers,it is enough to accept on faith that the human soul does not die with the body, and that God exists; but in the case of unbelievers, it seems that there is no religion, and practically no moral virtue, that they can be persuaded to adopt until these two truths are proved to them by natural reason.

It is of course quite true that we must believe in the existence of God because it is a doctrine of Holy Scripture, and conversely, that we must believe Holy Scripture because it comes from God; for since faith is the gift of God, he who gives us grace to believe other things can also give us grace to believe that he exists. But this argument cannot be put to unbelievers because they would judge it to be circular.

But in its eighth session the Lateran Council held under Leo X condemned those who take this position, and expressly enjoined Christian philosophers to refute their arguments and use ail their powers to establish the truth; so l have not hesitated to attempt this task as well.

In addition, I know that the only reason why many irreligious people are unwilling to believe that God exists and that the human mind is distinct from the body is the alleged fact that no one has hitherto been able to demonstrate these points. Now I completely disagree with this: I think that when properly understood almost all the arguments that have been put forward on these issues by the great men have the force of demonstrations, and I am convinced that it is scarcely possible to provide
any arguments which have not already been produced by someone else.
Nevertheless, I think there can be no more useful service to be rendered in
philosophy than to conduct a careful search, once and for all, for the best
of these arguments, and to set them out so precisely and clearly as to produce for the future a general agreement that they amount to demonstrative proofs. And finally, I was strongly pressed to undertake
this task by several people who knew that I had developed a method for resolving certain difficulties in the sciences - not a new method (for nothing is older than the truth), but one which they had seen me use with some success in other areas; and I therefore thought it my duty to make some attempt to apply it to the matter in hand.

But although I regard the proofs as quite certain and evident, I cannot therefore persuade myself that they are suitable to be grasped by everyone. In geometry there are many writings left by
Archimedes, Apollonius, Pappus and others which are accepted by everyone as evident and certain because they contain absolutely nothing that is not very easy to understand when considered on its own, and each step fits in precisely with what has gone before; yet because they are
somewhat long, and demand a very attentive reader, it is only comparatively few people who understand them. In the same way, although the proofs I employ here are in my view as certain and evident as the proofs of geometry, if not more so, it will, I fear, be impossible for many people
to achieve an adequate perception of them, both because they are rather long and some depend on others, and also, above all, because they require a mind which is completely free from preconceived opinions and which can easily detach itself from involvement with the senses. Moreover, people who have an aptitude for metaphysical studies are certainly not to be found in the world in any greater numbers than those who have an aptitude for geometry. What is more, there is the difference that in
geometry everyone has been taught to accept that as a rule no proposition is put forward in a book without there being a conclusive demonstration available; so inexperienced students make the mistake of accepting what is false, in their desire to appear to understand it, more often than they make the mistake of rejecting what is true. In philosophy, by contrast, the belief is that everything can be argued either way; so few people pursue the truth, while the great majority build up their reputation for ingenuity by boldly attacking whatever is most sound.

He then asks for them to come to his aid by granting him their patronage. Rather than attempting to reform the Church, after asking for the help of the faculty he says:

The reputation of your Faculty is so firmly fixed in the minds of all, and the name of the Sorbonne has such authority that, with the exception of the Sacred Councils, no institution carries more weight
than yours in matters of faith; while as regards human philosophy, you are thought of as second to none, both for insight and soundness and also for the integrity and wisdom of your pronouncements.

He wanted the Church to reform, and he thought he could help it do that. — frank

Wouldn't the Church consider this heresy? Rather than reform the Church he attempts to reform man,

But all thoughts are private to the thinker. — Corvus

Not f he reveals them of makes them public.

Therefore your claim that whoever thinks, must exist, is false? — Corvus

I don't see how this follows.

Would you not agree it is a commonsense knowledge rather than a contemporary Science? Even ancient Greeks would have known about it. — Corvus

You asked about the scientific point of view, which is not the same as common sense knowledge. In any case, he cannot be deceived about his existence because he must exist in order to be deceived. As to whether he first exists and only subsequently thinks, he rejects this. He exists as a thinking thing. As such, it makes no sense to separate his existing and this thinking.

We see how conflicted Descartes is ... — J

I am not so sure. I ascribe to the idea that when a careful writer says things that seem contradictory that is is sign that we need to look closer and attempt to resolve the conflict.

He also clearly has trouble with using "mind" and "soul" interchangeably. — J

I think it is an intentional rhetorical strategy.

If his own nature is a "totality of things bestowed by God," surely this is the soul, rather than a thinking thing. — J

In the language of theology it is a soul, but in Descartes terminology a mind.

All these represent criticisms of Descartes on his own terms, pointing out contradictions or inconsistencies. — J

I am attempting to point beyond the contradictions and inconsistencies. It is part of his art of writing to conceal certain things that the attentive reading will attempt to make sense of. A few quotes from the
online appendix to Arthur Melzer's "Philosophy Between the Lines":

Descartes writes to one of his more imprudent disciples:
Do not propose new opinions as new, but retain all the old terminology for
supporting new reasons; that way no one can find fault with you, and those who
grasp your reasons will by themselves conclude to what they ought to understand.
Why is it necessary for you to reject so openly the [Aristotelian doctrine of]
substantial forms? Do you not recall that in the Treatise on Meteors I expressly
denied that I rejected or denied them, but declared only that they were not
necessary for the explication of my reasons?
– René Descartes to Regius, January, 1642, Œuvres de Descartes, 3:491-
92, quoted and translated by Hiram Caton in “The Problem of Descartes’
Sincerity,” 363

From the first paragraph of Descartes’ early, unpublished “Private Thoughts”:
I go forward wearing a mask [larvatus prodeo].
– René Descartes, “Cogitationes Privatae,” in Œuvres de Descartes, 10:213

Descartes took care not to speak so plainly [as Hobbes] but he could not help revealing
his opinions in passing, with such address that he would not be understood save by those
who examine profoundly these kinds of subjects.
– G. W. Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, 2.1:506, quoted and translated
by Richard Kennington in On Modern Origins, 197

For example, here is Leibniz, reacting to Descartes’ seeming embrace of the view that all
necessary truths, like the principle of non-contradiction, are the product of God’s free and
arbitrary will:
I cannot even imagine that M. Descartes can have been quite seriously of this opinion….
He only made pretence to go [there]. It was apparently one of his tricks, one of his
philosophic feints: he prepared for himself some loophole, as when for instance he
discovered a trick for denying the movement of the earth, while he was a Copernican in
the strictest sense.
– G. W. Leibniz, Theodicy, 244 (2.186)

Whatever he recounts about the distinction between the two substances [mind and body],
it is obvious that it was only a trick, a cunning devise to make the theologians swallow
the poison hidden behind an analogy that strikes everyone and that they alone cannot see.
– Julien Offray de La Mettrie, Machine Man, 35

After corresponding with Descartes concerning the issue of whether animals were mere
machines, Henry More concluded that Descartes was “an abundantly cunning and abstruse
genius” who insinuated that mind as an incorporeal substance is a “useless figment and
chimera.”
– Henry More, Philosophical Writings, 184, 197-98

Thus one is right to accuse Descartes of atheism, seeing that he very energetically
destroyed the weak proofs of the existence of God that he gave.
– Baron d'Holbach, Système de la nature, 2:150, quoted and translated by Hiram
Caton in “The Problem of Descartes’ Sincerity,” 355

Does it entail then,
God thinks (doubts), therefore God exists? — Corvus

It does not entail that God thinks, but if God does think then God exists.

But that is not the case from the scientific point of view. — Corvus

No doubt that if Descartes has the benefit of contemporary science some of his views would change.

Is "I" extendable to other subjects such as he, she, you, it or they? Or is cogito strictly to "I" only? If it does, then could you say, "He thinks therefore he exists", or "It thinks, therefore it exists."?

If it is only for "I", then wouldn't it be just a solipsistic utterance?
— Corvus

Just realised that you have not answered to this question. What's your thought on this point? — Corvus

In response to your first question I said:

Whoever thinks, whoever doubts, whoever is subject to deception much exist.

With regard to the second question, if he were to have stopped there then yes.

I don't exist is untrue (not from cogito, but from my sensory perception), therefore it implies cogito is untrue as well. Agree? — Corvus

No.I must exist in order to have sensory perception. He does not doubt that he senses. What he doubts is the judgment that what he senses corresponds to anything outside his mind.

What is that something? — Janus

In terms of a what that something is thinking. In terms of a who it is Descartes.

He wouldn't have needed to displace the authority of the Church if that was his agenda. He could have just left and gone to live in Protestant territory. — frank

But Descartes' concern was not simply personal. It was to displace the authority of the Church from the mind of the thinking man,

does suggest that Descartes believed that being a thing that thinks was an identity. — J

In the sixth meditation he says:

Nature also teaches me, through these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst and so on, that I (a thinking thing) am not merely in my body as a sailor is in a ship. Rather, I am closely joined to it – intermingled with it, so to speak – so that it and I form a unit.If this were not so, I wouldn’t feel pain when the body was hurt ...

As to the first question, it's unwarranted if the "is" of "he is a thing that thinks" is construed as an essence or identity. — J

The essence of something is its nature. He says:

... nature or essence...

... nothing else belongs to my nature or essence ...

About the concept of nature he says:

... I have been using ‘nature’ ... to speak of what can be found in the things themselves

and:

... my own nature is simply the totality of things bestowed on me by God.

On the one hand:

I know that I exist and that nothing else belongs to my nature or essence except that I am a thinking thing

but on the other:

... the nature of man as a combination of mind and body ...

If nature is what is essential and in the things themselves, and among the things bestowed on him by God is his body, then it would seem that the nature of the self is to be both mind and body.

And yet he says:

I am really distinct from my body, and can exist without it.

He distinguishes between his nature or essence and the nature of man, just as he distinguishes between a badly made clock which:

... conforms to the laws of its nature in telling the wrong time.

and a clock that work badly:

... a clock that works badly is ‘departing from its nature’

In the first case he is talking about the nature of a particular clock, a badly made one, while in the second he means the nature of clocks, that is, what it is to be a clock.His nature as a particular man is not the same as the nature of man. We might say of someone, for example that it is his nature to be timid or gregarious. It is Descartes' own nature to be a thinking thing. In this he aligns himself with an idea of the philosopher that goes back at least to Plato's Phaedo.

But there is another aspect to this. What he seems to be hinting at is made more clear when we take note of the fact that what he calls the mind is what the theologians call the soul. In the sixth meditation he says:

my whole self insofar as I am a combination of body and mind ...

My sole concern here is with what God has given to me as a combination of mind and body.

All of this makes it clear that, despite God’s immense goodness, the nature of man as a combination of mind and body is such that it is bound to mislead him from time to time.

If the nature or essence of man is a combination of mind or soul and body, then the theological teaching that the soul is what is essential and Descartes claim that he is a thinking thing, to the extent it disregards the body, is like a badly made clock and its maker a poor craftsman.

But the idea that the self or I is a soul persists. If, however, the soul is the mind then it is given the kind of agency that may be missing from the concept of soul. Thinking for Descartes is not fundamentally contemplative or meditative but constructive. Thus he sought foundations on which to build. Although a lot of attention is paid to his epistemology it was the groundwork for a science that would change the course of nature. We might say, of his nature to find the Archimedean point from which to move the earth.

I would say the unwarranted conclusion has to do with an essential identity being attached to “thinking thing.” — J

What does this mean? Is it unwarranted to conclude that he is a thing that thinks? Isn't thinking essential to being human?

Again, Ricoeur’s criticism is coming through Nietzsche and Freud. — J

How much of the problem of consciousness can be found in Descartes?

Why may my self, my “I”, not just as well comprise the unconscious part of my being? — J

Where does Descartes discuss the problem of consciousness and the unconscious? Or is the problem that he does not discuss this? An analysis of consciousness is not his concern. That he is conscious suffices.

Why assume that the thinking thing , and all its activities, is the most important and most characteristic part of being a subject? — J

The thinking thing is the most important part for his purposes - to displace the authority of the Church with the authority of the thinking/reasoning subject.

What if, the content of the thought was the negation of existence? — Corvus

One must exist in order to think the negation of existence.

I think I don't exist, therefore I exist.
Wouldn't it be a contradiction in that case? — Corvus

A paradox but not a contradiction.

As I understand it, doubting entails existence. Existing is a necessary condition for doubting.

Is "I" extendable to other subjects such as he, she, you, it or they? — Corvus

Whoever thinks, whoever doubts, whoever is subject to deception much exist.

Descartes has drawn what Ricoeur believes to be a false, or at any rate unwarranted, conclusion. — J

At the risk of being obtuse, what is the unwarranted conclusion? I agree that what he says falls short of the task of self-knowledge, but that is not Descartes' task. It does seem clear though that whatever he is in its fullness he doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wants, refuses, imagines, and senses.

Paul Ricoeur also raises this question of the nature of the "I" of the cogito -- whether what it is is self-evident as a consequence of the cogito. — J

In the second meditation Descartes says:

Well, then, what am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wants, refuses, and also imagines and senses.

No, Jack Smith's immunity filing in the case of The United States v. Donald J. Trump, if nothing else, becomes an important historical document for future historians.

It preserves the words and the deeds of Trump in trying to overturn a legal election. — Questioner

I agree. An historical perspective will counteract the current hype-partisanship and denialism.



.

Do you agree with my prima facie reading of the Meditations? That Descartes claims to deduce knowledge of God's existence on the basis of the foundation of certainty he finds in the Cogito? — Moliere

I agree, but do not think it prima facie. I think all the stuff about God is nothing more than a rhetorical defense to avoid the fate of Galileo. Descartes took his motto from Ovid:

He who lived well hid himself well. (Bene qui latuit bene vixit)

In that moment where else would you say the idea of perfection comes from? — Moliere

Contrary to Descartes' claim, it comes from a lack or want, from a need or desire to improve, to have or be without defect.

With regard to the perfectibility of man, perfect comes from the possibility of avoiding error by limiting what I will to what I know.

In the third meditation he says:

My knowledge is gradually increasing, and I see no obstacle to its going on increasing to infinity. I might then be able to use this increased and eventually infinite knowledge to acquire all the other perfections of God. In that case, I already have the potentiality for these perfections ...

In the fourth meditation:

It is only the will, or freedom of choice, which I experience as so great that I can’t make sense of the idea of its being even greater: indeed, my thought of myself as being somehow like God depends primarily upon my will.

And:

When I look more closely into these errors of mine, I discover that they have two co-operating causes – my faculty of knowledge and my faculty of choice or freedom of the will. My errors, that is, depend on both (a) my intellect and (b) my will.

He asks:

Well, then, where do my mistakes come from? Their source is the fact that my will has a wider scope than my intellect has, so that I am free to form beliefs on topics that I don’t understand. Instead of behaving as I ought to, namely by restricting my will to the territory that my understanding covers, that is, suspending judgment when I am not intellectually in control, I let my will run loose, applying it to matters that I don’t understand. In such cases there is nothing to stop the will from veering this way or that, so it easily turns away from what is true and good. That is the source of my error and sin.

What first struck me when I began reading the Timaeus is how odd it all seemed. Not the least of which is Socrates uncharacteristic silence throughout most of the dialogue. When at the beginning he says that in his opinion Timaeus has reached the very peak of all philosophy (20a) is he being sincere or ironic?

When Timaeus says:

So then, Socrates, if, in saying many things on many topics concerning gods and the birth of the all, we prove to be incapable of rendering speeches that are always and in all respects in agreement with themselves and drawn with precision, don’t be surprised. But if we provide likelihoods inferior to none, we should be well-pleased with them, remembering that I who speak as well as you my judges have a human nature, so that it’s fitting for us to be receptive to the likely story about these things and not search further for anything beyond it.

... it’s fitting for us to be receptive to the likely story about these things and not search further for anything beyond it.

(29c-d).

Socrates responds:

Excellent Timaeus! And it must be received entirely as you urge.

(29d)

Why must likely but contradictory stories concerning the gods and the birth of the all be accepted? How many different likely stories should be accepted? This one is inferior to none, but that does not mean it is superior to all others.

Since the chora, this third kind in addition to Forms and sensible things, is graspable by some bastard reasoning with the aid of insensibility, as in a dream, and is hardly to be trusted, is it reasonable to treat it reasonably in the same way we do Forms and sensible things?

The "chora itself" is not like a Form or a thing itself. It is like something to be looked to as in a dream, but it is not like the images of things seen in a dream. In attempting to reason about it we cannot make use of the image/original distinction.

So it sounds like Plato had the sceptic and mystic elements in his thoughts on the world, human life and the gods. — Corvus

The term'mystic' has been used to mean what is beyond our knowledge and understanding and also to mean what the mystic knows through transcendent experience,. I think Plato points to the former and provides a myth about the latter.

I meant was the others from the philosophers, not from the mystics. — Corvus

Paine pointed to Plotinus. They are mystic philosophers.

Have you read the other Plato such as Timaeus? It is filled with cosmogony and the Gods. — Corvus

I have. I started a thread on it here.

Whose direct, unmediated apprehension? — Corvus

The philosophers of the Republic.

Are we able to apprehend them via direct unmediated apprehension — Corvus

I don't think we are, but according to the mythology of the Republic, some humans are.

If we can apprehend them, then it seems to be a bridgeable gap between the world of the Forms and the world of materials. Why was your reply a negative? — Corvus

My argument is that we cannot apprehend the Forms. This is a rejection of Platonism, but not of Plato. The Platonists believe in the reality of Forms. On my reading, Plato does not.

The Forms are hypotheticals.
— Fooloso4
In what sense? Is it what Plato said? — Corvus

From the Phaedo:

... I feared that my soul would be altogether blinded if I looked at things with my eyes and tried to grasp them with each of my senses. So I thought I must take refuge in discussions and investigate the truth of beings by means of accounts [logoi] … On each occasion I put down as hypothesis whatever account I judge to be mightiest; and whatever seems to me to be consonant with this, I put down as being true, both about cause and about all the rest, while what isn’t, I put down as not true.

(99d-100a)

We don't know if the gods are noble and good.

Right. You said:

[/quote — Corvus

So it seems clear that they are claiming the existence of the gods, and the knowledge of the gods — Corvus

I should have asked who they are. I don't think there is anywhere in the dialogues that Socrates makes any claim about the gods. He does, however, refer to common beliefs about the gods.

The transcendent realm of Forms from the Republic were the founding principles of the later occultism, Gnosticism, mysticism, and the Hermetic Kabbalists in the medieval times. There seems to be far more implications to the concept than just a philosophical poetry. — Corvus

There were many in Plato's time who believed the poet's myths. The Forms are not presented as poesis, that is, image making. Many then and now believe there is a transcendent realm of Forms as presented in the Republic. If Socrates had presented them as stories they would not have the power they do.

Who are the "Others"? — Corvus

Don't those you just listed believe in a transcendent realm that can be known directly? Isn't that a feature of mysticism?

Is the gap between the knowledge of the Forms and everyday life bridgeable by any actions or methods? — Corvus

I don't think so. Knowledge of the Forms is a matter of direct, unmediated apprehension. From and earlier post:

The third level of the divided line, if we are working out way up, is dianoia, rational thought. Reason functions by way of ratio, that is, understanding one thing in relation to another. The singularity of the Forms means that they are not accessible to reason. They are grasped at the fourth or highest level directly by noesis, by the mind or intellect, as they are each itself by itself. — Fooloso4

Or are they two distinct entities which are inaccessible to each other? — Corvus

The Forms are hypotheticals.

So it seems clear that they are claiming the existence of the gods, and the knowledge of the gods. — Corvus

Well, if the gods are noble and good then we are wise to know that we do not know anything about them.

Whatever the case, doesn't it sound like some sort of mysticism on their part? — Corvus

On whose part? On my reading the transcendent realm of Forms from the Republic is Plato's philosophic poetry. An image to compel the lover of wisdom to continue to journey.

Others believe it exists and that there are some who have direct knowledge of it.