As long as it is meant to binding then it fulfills the necessary condition I set out—a necessary condition which subjectivism and emotivism do not meet. — Leontiskos

What I am questioning is the claim that some as yet unspecified set of obligations are binding. I am also asking how it is determined that these moral propositions are objective and true?

To say more would be to go beyond the scope of this thread and the argument at hand ... — Leontiskos

To not say more is to skirt the issue at hand. If you are claiming that there are objective moral truths then you must not simply assert that they exist, but provide and defend at least some of them.

Prohibitions against abortion are the same kind of propositions as prohibitions against murder. — Leontiskos

There are significant differences that render the comparison problematic and questionable.
There is a generally accepted distinction between killing and murder. Murder is by definition wrong, killing is not. There are cases where killing is regarded as acceptable.

The point is not to argue the morality of abortion but rather to point to the fact that it is arguable moral issue. Rational people are unable to agree. That should not be the case with propositions that are objectively true.

... and to move into a discussion of your personal political positions, which is probably what you are aiming at. — Leontiskos

The relation between morality or ethics and political philosophy is important but is not what I am aiming at.

Moral propositions are (meant to be) binding upon oneself and others — Leontiskos

Should the moral proposition, 'you must not abort a fetus but carry it to term' be binding? What makes this proposition either true or false? By what moral authority can this be determined and by what force is it made binding?

I think the problem is that those who attempt to reduce moral deliberation to some set of self consistent propositions forget that what is at issue is not an abstracted analysis of the truth of moral propositions, but how our lives and those of others are benefited and harmed by what we say and do and think.

I think that within these constraints there is still some degree of play and freedom. There are from time to time those who are able to see beyond the limits of their time. Those who are not products of their time but who influence how those who follow will see and think.

they are both similarly projections of Language and its autonomous processes — ENOAH

I don't think so. I think we are historically/culturally/linguistically situated but not thereby determined.

That it is pictures of facts that present those facts in logical space, if the facts are already in logical space? — 013zen

The facts are in the world.(1.13) A picture of the facts is in the world. The picture represents a possible situation (2.202) What is represented, however, may not be in the world.

Just as the only necessity that exists is logical necessity, so too the only impossibility that exists is logical impossibility.

(6.375)

That it is possible to picture the world is a logical possibility.

What makes logic a priori is the impossibility of illogical thought.

(5.4731)

Put differently, thought too is in logical space.

A fact does not have this necessity - it's objects are their relations are merely accidental. — 013zen

The structure of a fact is not accidental. That some facts exist and others do not is accidental.

In logic nothing is accidental: if a thing can occur in a state of affairs, the possibility of the
state of affairs must be written into the thing itself.

The world is determined by the facts, and by these being all the facts. (1.11)

Yes, they do determine the world, but they do not make up the world. Pictures do, and insofar as pictures are pictures of facts, the facts ultimately determines the world. — 013zen

If I want to eat, a picture is not going to do the job. You do not make up a pizza from pictures of dough and cheese. This seems so obvious that I think you must mean something else, but I can't figure out what that is.

Witt is thinking, I believe, of the realist/idealist/, empiricist/rationalist debate. — 013zen

I am reminded of something Wittgenstein said:

The language used by philosophers is already deformed, as though by shoes that are too tight

[CV, p. 47].

Shoes that are too tight make it difficult to walk. The language used by philosophers make it difficult to think.

Your challenge does not demonstrate a unique uncovering of real truth — ENOAH

Certainly not unique but it does point to something that has been covered. Whatever the "real truth" might be, it is not something we possess and not something we can come to know through a misguided model of reason based on the success of mathematics.

It is just another conditioned path which surfaced because multiple "words" moving in your locus of history triggered the beliefs you are espousing. — ENOAH

"Words" can have multiple paths that can be traced by their history. To do so may require desedimentation. Doing so can open paths that have been closed, leading us away from our conditioning. Paths can be walked and paths can be made.

Both do not kill and don't eat meat follow that process and are neither relative to subjective choice, nor grounded in Natural Law. — ENOAH

What these prohibitions mean is subject to interpretation. Is killing an enemy in war prohibited? Is killing an animal to eat it prohibited? Do fish and fowl count as meat? The process by which such determinations have been made is not always a process that already exists to be followed. At some point it had to be established. Exceptions had and in some cases still have to be dealt with.

1. A belief is a (cognitive) stance taken on the truthity of a proposition; and
2. Beliefs make moral propositions true or false. — Bob Ross

Your definition of moral subjectivism misses the mark because it rests on two questionable assumptions:

1. That moral beliefs are adequately addressed in terms of propositions.
2. What makes a moral claim true or false is whether or not it is believed.

1. This marks a wrong turn in the history of philosophy that fails to strike us as odd and out of touch because we have become so accustomed to philosophers making such claims, as if thinking and feeling are two separate, independent things. Rather than an analysis in propositional terms, we need to begin with what is more fundamental and primal. A baby will smile in response to a smile and become distraught when the face in front of them is sad. That others seem happy or troubled matters to them. The roots of morality lie here, in our nature as social beings who care.

2. What this criticism of subjectivism fails to to into account is the difference between the belief in an objective morality and our failure to identify what that might be. Without such knowledge some form of subjectivism is the inescapable default position. Moral reasoning is deliberative not deductive. It begins with a critical examination of opinions. It does not end with indisputable, apodictic universal moral truths, but with beliefs and practices accepted by some or many but perhaps not by others. At best in our ignorance we settle on what seems best, and this may be subject to change.

2. Facts - not in logical space — 013zen

All facts are in logical space.

The facts in logical space are the world.

(1.13)

Logic underlies and makes possible both fact and pictures or representation of facts.

2. The existence of a fact means the existence of an atomic fact. — 013zen

'Atomic fact' is an infelicitous translation from the Ogden translation.

The Pears/McGuinness has:

What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs.(2)

In German "das Bestehen von Sachverhalten".

The term'Sachverhalt' simply means a fact, what is the case, a state of affairs, not an atomic fact.

This is important. Reality, is the existence and non-existence of atomic facts, while the world is only the existence of an atomic fact. — 013zen

This distinction does not hold:

The world is determined by the facts, and by these being all the facts. (1.11)

For the totality of facts determines both what is the case, and also all that is not the case. (1.12)

The sum-total of reality is the world. (2.063)

It's not the gambit or the vanilla, it's the always. — tim wood

Right. That is why I asked:

Why should what I always do and what you always do be related in any way other than this being what we always do? — Fooloso4

and:

Would you ask if what I sometimes do is related to what you sometimes do? — Fooloso4

When you say:

The structure of the inquiry being, is-it, what-is-it, what-kind-of-a-thing-is-it, genus/species, quiddities; and the tools being the simple "why" and "what." — tim wood

and follow this with the example of 'always' then 'always' is being treated as a kind of thing with its own "whatness". It seems to me that you are reifying 'always' as if it plays a determinate role in what is being done.

But what is at issue here is 'purpose'. Your initial question:

The questions here are, then, what is purpose (in itself), where does it come from, what is its ground? Or, what exactly gives it all meaning, makes it all worthwhile? — tim wood

"Purpose in itself" treats it as if it is some thing that exists on its own apart from those things that have purposes.

...on the working assumption that there is something there to see. — tim wood

I am questioning that assumption. The problem is that when working with that assumption leads one to find what may not be there to find. And if not here then there.

Thus if you always play the king's gambit, and I always chose vanilla, we can ask if in any way these are related, the "always" being the clue. And if related, presumably in some way by the "always," then there is a subject that might be pursued without any reification risked. — tim wood

Why should what I always do and what you always do be related in any way other than this being what we always do? My reasons for always playing the king's gambit may have nothing to do with why you always choose vanilla. Would you ask if what I sometimes do is related to what you sometimes do?

The assumption is that if there are various particulars of some kind then there must be some one thing that underlies them all by virtue of which they are the things they are. If there are purposes then there must be some more basic and general thing, PURPOSE, without which there could be no purposes.

This is reductive reification. It posits an entity where none is to be found and thus invents a transcendent realm of eternal beings where it is to be discovered.

If this is part of some secret plan by the conservative Supes, I wonder what it is. — fishfry

I do not think it is some secret plan. They are anti-regulation, anti-LGBT rights, pro-discrimination on the basis of religious freedom, and pro-gun.

I would go further and say that Wittgenstein is opposed to the framework of things in themselves versus things for us. — Paine

I agree. The discussion of the cube at 5.5423 is instructive:

This no doubt also explains why there are two possible ways of seeing the figure as a cube; and all similar phenomena. For we really see two different facts.

Facts are separate from and independent of our perception of them.

In a letter to John Taylor he says:

Democracy, nevertheless must not be disgraced. Democracy must not be despised. Democracy must be respected. Democracy must be honoured. Democracy must be cherished. Democracy must be an essential, an integral part of the Souvereignty, and have a controul over the whole Government, or moral Liberty cannot exist, or any other Liberty. I have been always grieved, by the gross abuses of this respectable Word. One Party speaks of it as the most amiable, venerable, indeed as the sole object of their Adoration: the other as the Sole object of their scorn, abhorrence and Execration. Neither Party, in my Opinion, know what they Say. Some of them care not what they say, provided they can accomplish their own Selfish Purposes. These ought not to be forgiven.

The two parties at that time were the Federalists and the Democratic-Republicans. He was a member of the Federalists. This would raise doubts for the those who wrote and supported the Republican resolution @jorndoe cited above, if only they knew where Adams stood.


According to his wife he was an avid reader of Plato, but I think his views on democracy were shaped in part by his own experience and observations regarding human nature. A Democratic republic differs from the Athenian democracy in important ways.

Surely you can think of a few cultural moral norms that seem unlikely to be parts of cooperation strategies. — Mark S

There is a difference between a moral norm that in some way promotes cooperation and a strategy to promote cooperation via moral norms.

The same norm can result in cooperation between some but discord among others.

In what way is a norm prohibiting abortion a cooperation strategy? Such rules are often divisive and harmful. They may not lead to cooperation but to oppression.

In what way is a norm against homosexuality a cooperation strategy? It too is often divisive and harmful and can lead to oppression rather than cooperation.

If you suspect the hypothesis is false, any candidate counterexamples would be welcome. — Mark S

I have no alternative hypothesis. I regard this whole endeavor as a fruitless dead end.

...that hypothesis is robustly supported by inference to the best explanation... — Mark S

Inference to the best explanation is not scientific evidence.

John Adams is quoted but his position if far more subtle than this naked attempt at a power grab.

In John Adams' "Thoughts on Government" he asks:

As good government, is an empire of laws, how shall your laws be made?

and answers by:

... a few of the most wise and good.

That is, not by a political party but by those who are wise and good,.

He goes on to say:

The principal difficulty lies, and the greatest care should be employed in constituting this Representative Assembly. It should be in miniature, an exact portrait of the people at large. It should think, feel, reason, and act like them. That it may be the interest of this Assembly to do strict justice at all times, it should be an equal representation, or in other words equal interest among the people should have equal interest in it.

If the people at large favor policies that are progressive and socialists then the Republicans are not representatives of the people.

Adams also says:

Of Republics, there is an inexhaustable variety, because the possible combinations of the powers of society, are capable of innumerable variations.

As the greatest leader of the Republican Party said, this nation is a government:

of the people, by the people, for the people.

It is a mixed regime with elements of aristocracy and democracy.

A lot of people think the court's on Trump's side and not being judicially impartial. And opinions about that correlate with people's opinions on Trump. — fishfry

I do think that there are members of the court who have an agenda. It is not that they are on Trump's side but that they see Trump as useful to their side. An expedient for attaining their conservative goals.

You appear to not understand what is included in empirical evidence for scientific truth. — Mark S

I think it is the other way around. If, as you claim,

The principles that underlie descriptively moral behaviors are what people have thought of as moral (because it has been encoded into the biology underlying our moral sense) for as long as we have lived in cooperative societies. — Mark S

then you must provide evidence and not just arguments supporting your hypothesis. Just claiming that what people have thought of as moral is encoded is not 'science'. The claim that what people think is of as moral is encoded means that moral judgments are encoded, that 'x' is morally acceptable and 'y' is not. In other words, that a moral code is encoded.

I missed the fact that there was a thread on the Supreme Court. If I was aware of that I would not have started a new thread. I though you meant I should not have put it in the Lounge.

The evidence is in 1) the explanatory power for virtually all the diversity, contradictions, and strangeness of descriptively moral behaviors as parts of cooperation strategies, 2) huge superiority over any competing hypothesis, 3) simplicity, 4) integration with the rest of science, and other normal criteria for scientific truth. — Mark S

So in other words no empirical evidence. Cooperation is too thin and insubstantial to stand as a moral strategy.

Right. I would add that some will cooperatively conspire against others (or other societies) while believing they are acting morally. — Mark S

And many who cooperate to conspire are not concerned with morality but with their own gain.

Isn't our knowledge of hormones scientific evidence? — Athena

Evidence of morality?

All social animals are biologically influenced to conform to social expectations ... — Athena

I agree, but I think Mark is saying something more than this. Being a social animal is not a principle that underlies and encodes what it is that people think is moral. Within a societies there may be agreement but between societies there may be disagreement as to what behavior is and is not acceptable. He points to cooperation within a society but this is not the same thing as cooperation between societies. And even within a society we may cooperate with some members while conspiring against others.

If you read the comment, I am only using the term insofar as I am quoting the text wherein Witt uses the expression "presented" here:

"The picture presents the facts in logical space" (2.11) — 013zen

You say more than that:

a)

The world is made up of pictures in our mind ... — 013zen

and:

b)

A fact, can only "exist" in logical space and present the world insofar as it is a picture. — 013zen

a) Wittgenstein does not say that the picture that presents the facts is something in the mind

b) A fact does not present the world. The picture presents the facts.

... we need to somehow make sense of the fact that:

1. Fact in logical space make up the world
2. Facts are presented in logical space by pictures — 013zen

1. Wittgenstein is making a distinction between facts and things or objects. The world is all that is the case. Facts and not things determine what is and is not the case. That a thing can exist in a state of affairs is not accidental. The possibility of it occurring in states of affairs is necessary. This necessity is logical necessity. The space in which it occurs is logical space.

2. The logical structure underlying both the facts and the pictures of the facts is what makes it possible for pictures to present the facts.

An exhaustive collection of all the facts re-presented in logical space, as pictures, form the world. — 013zen

The pictures do not form the world. The facts do. The facts exist even if they are not pictured.

The principles that underlie descriptively moral behaviors are what people have thought of as moral (because it has been encoded into the biology underlying our moral sense) for as long as we have lived in cooperative societies. — Mark S

That what is thought of as moral is biologically encoded is at best a hypothesis and at worse an unsubstantiated assertion. In either case it is in need of scientific evidence. What is that evidence?

“The science of morality studies the psychological, neurological, and cultural foundations of moral judgment and behavior”. — Mark S

If the foundations of moral judgement and behavior are biologically encoded then they is not cultural. To the extent those foundations are cultural they differ from culture to culture.

There is some amount of speculation always I agree as to what persuades people, but I don't think the strategy to prosecute Trump out of the race has been generally effective. — Hanover

As a strategy I agree, but I don't think this is what is going on. His legal problems began before he announced he would run. At that time there was a widely held assumption that he decided to run as a way of avoiding legal troubles. Declaring he was running two years ahead of the election he attempted to turn his legal troubles into political opposition.

The general strategy of criminal defendants is to delay, object, and refuse to cooperate — Hanover

That is true. It is what he has done his whole life. Something he learned from his father and his mentor Roy Cohn.

I don't know that it's the election he's most concerned about as opposed to just getting convicted. — Hanover

I think he hopes to avoid the latter by way of the former.

If anything it should go in “Supreme Court (general discussion)” thread. — Mikie

I'll leave that up to the moderators. I put it here because it is an election issue. But if they take up the larger issue of the extent and specifics of presidential immunity then it is no longer simply an election issue.

This assumption assumes the conservative members of the Court share the Left's delusion that the trial or even a conviction would reduce Trump's support. — Hanover

It is not unreasonable to think that there is some segment of voters who may be sways by what might be uncovered in trial. Given how close the election is likely to be this could make a difference. There is a reason why Trump is doing whatever he can to postpone or prevent the trials from taking place.

Shouldn't this thread go into the Trump thread — fishfry

No. What Trump says and does and what the Supreme Court says and does are not the same.

What else could I possibly mean by constitute? — 013zen

You could possibly mean:

be (a part) of a whole.
make up, form, compose
found
establish
to be or be considered as something

You just disagree. — 013zen

I do disagree, but gave you a chance to clarify what you meant. The world is not "pictures in the mind". A picture and what is pictured are not one and the same.

So, the facts in logical space that make up the world are presented in logical space by pictures. — 013zen

Your use of the term 'presented' is ambiguous. There is a difference between phenomena as what shows or presents itself and what is or can be presented in a picture. What is presented "by" pictures are not the facts themselves that are presented in the picture. The picture re-presents what is pictured. It is an image of it. Your toe does not hurt in a picture of you stubbing your toe.

A fact, can only "exist" in logical space and present the world insofar as it is a picture. — 013zen

There are no illogical facts. Facts are what is the case. If the book is on the table then it is the case, a fact, that the book is on the table. A statement of fact "the book is on the table" is not the fact that the book is on the table. A statement of fact is a picture of the fact. The fact itself, the book is on the table, is not a picture. If we want to read the book we do not find it in a picture.

But is it? Anyway, their reason for believing that is not true - i.e. a bad reason. — Ludwig V

What is at issue is the education of the guardians. It consists of gymnastics for the body, the proper kind of music to moderate their spiritedness, and the noble lie. They must believe that the good of the city is their own good if they are to protect it even if they die doing so. It there reason for believing is not true that is an indication that a lie is needed. A mercenary will only fight if it benefits them.

The latter presents facts in logical space, and thereby constitute the world. — 013zen

What do you mean by constitute? The world is not made up of pictures. The world and pictures of it are not the same thing. Analogously, you and a picture of you are not the same thing. If they were then you could be in two or more places at the same time, depending on the number of pictures.

You asked:

Which distinction? — 013zen

To which I responded:

Between the world as pictures in the mind and reality as not made up of pictures in our mind. — Fooloso4

Here is your original claim:

There is a distinction being made between reality and the world. The world is made up of pictures in our mind; reality is not made up of pictures and certainly not pictures in our mind. — 013zen

The first claim is wrong. The world is not made up of pictures. The second claim is correct, reality is not made up of pictures, but, as I pointed out:

A proposition is a picture of reality.

(4.021)

Both the world and reality are pictured. Whatever distinction you are trying to make between them, that distinction cannot be based on pictures.

We have to re-calibrate our view of Plato's view of the value of truth. — Ludwig V

I do not think it is a question of the value of truth but of the problem of certain political truths around the natural interest in what one's own versus those of the city. The truth may be that about certain things at certain times sometimes it is better to lie. It is not simply a matter of pragmatism but of the good.

I think that the criteria for a just society will not be the same as the criteria for a just person. — Ludwig V

That may be, but if we do not know what justice is in the one and the other we cannot say what the criteria should be. When Socrates suggestion that:

“Then, perhaps, there would be more justice in the larger object and more easy to apprehend.

my response is: perhaps not! The opposite is likely to be the case. Unless we are very unjust we are likely to encounter more injustice in the city than in ourselves.

But if there is a part of me that wants to do it, and another part that does, I am not in conflict with myself, and the problem is misrepresented. — Ludwig V

Do you mean another part that does not? In that case you both want to do it and not do it. Isn't that a conflict?

But the city as an institution has neither heart nor soul of its own — Ludwig V

In line with the question of noble lies consider allegiance to the fatherland and/or mother earth. Patriots consider their state or country or homeland as more than just an institution. It is their own.

The puzzle is why people will sometimes put the good of the city above their own or anyone else's good. — Ludwig V

The noble lie is a solution to this puzzle. People come to believe that the good of the city is their own good. All one big happy family.

I think you will admit it is not the traditional interpretation — Ludwig V

Yes, but the "traditional" interpretation continues to change. Two quick examples of recent changes. There is now a greater awareness and serious attention to what the Phaedrus calls “logographic necessity” (264b). The dialogues are not doctrines surrounded by window dressing. The dramatic setting and action are important, not to be ignored or abstracted from when Plato is discussed in terms of theories and doctrines. There is also a shift in attention from the supposed period during which a dialogue was written to the dramatic time in which the dialogue takes place. Perhaps most significantly, consideration should be given to the fact that the Parmenides takes place when Socrates was young. Typically the focus is on whether this is a middle or late period dialogue with the assumption that this marks a change in Plato's views of the Forms. Rather than a change in Plato's view, the dramatic setting implies that what Plato has Socrates say about Forms in the dialogues was from early on informed by what he learned from Parmenides in that imaginary dialogue.

Whether, and how far, that argument works is the issue. — Ludwig V

If noble lie is accepted as the correct translation then the issue is whether and why such a lie is needed.

To start with, the theory of forms sits in the background ... — Ludwig V

I do not see it as "the theory of forms" but as the problem of knowledge of justice, or, rather our lack of such knowledge. Unless what justice is is something known then we are in the realm of opinion. This is our natural starting point. The task then is to try and determine what seems to be the best opinion when it comes to matters of justice and the just life.

But his analysis is presented as if were a dissection. — Ludwig V

If I understand you correctly the point is that there is no clear divisions. I agree with that, but I think Plato points to that problem rather than maintaining the divisions. A world of Forms is not the world we live in. A world populated by people who are either rational or spirited or appetitive is not the world we live in. Our world is, as Socrates says, messy, things are mixed and blended.

The parts of a person are not people and have no rights of their own. — Ludwig V

He is, of course, speaking metaphorically. But we are often at odds with ourselves. If I want to be healthy I should not sit on the couch eating cake. I might claim that I am free to do this or not do it, and even though there is a part of me that does not want to do it, I may end sitting on the couch eating cake anyway.

The city is obligated to its people, for their own sake, not merely for the role they play in society. — Ludwig V

That is the view of modern liberalism. We might endorse and defend this view, but it is a matter of political philosophy not a matter of fact or even settled agreement. It is not a one way street. There are things we owe to the city.

There is no business of the city over and above the good of its citizens — Ludwig V

As individuals? What stands as the good of the people? What I might regard as good for me might not be what you regard as good for you.

The soonest Trump could pardon himself is January. SCOTUS will not take that long. — RogueAI

Good point. It does seem likely that the trial will have concluded by then, but if the trial is not completed before the election then the results of the election might be determined by the court's unwillingness to render a timely decision. Their unwillingness to clear the way is tantamount to election interference.

Careful deliberation is certainly always necessary but on such an important issue it is incumbent upon them to act quickly. Despite defense claims, to act quickly does not mean to act without careful deliberation. If they put other issues before them aside the claim of absolute immunity can be decided in a matter of days and then the trial can and should proceed. The extent to which he is immune need not delay the trial further if they rule that he is not immune from charges of attempting to overturn the election.

If Trump pardons himself the case against him will not proceed. If the case does not proceed the question of whether he has blanket immunity will not be addressed unless some other case arises before the court addressing this issue.

Logical space is like the the common playing field of thoughts, without being tied to any individual instance of thought. — 013zen

Logic underlies both thought and the world. Logic is prior to, independent of, and the transcendental condition for them.

The only commonality between pictures which compose the world, and reality, is the logical form of the picture and the state of affairs it is a picture of. — 013zen

The pictures do not compose the world. The world is not a collection or arrangement of pictures. The pictures of the world are pictures of reality made possible by the logical structure underlying both the picture and the world, that is, the picture and reality.

The world is made up of pictures — 013zen

The world is not made up of pictures. Nowhere does Wittgenstein say this.

The world is the totality of facts, not of things.

(1.1)

A fact is not a picture, although a picture can picture a fact.

The world, is a possible picture of reality. — 013zen

The world is not a possible picture.

The world is all that is the case.

(1)

All that is the case is not a picture of what might be the case.

There are not "pictures of the world" and "pictures of reality", with one being in the mind and the other not. — 013zen

Isn't that what you said?

There is a distinction being made between reality and the world. The world is made up of pictures in our mind; reality is not made up of pictures and certainly not pictures in our mind. — 013zen

There's more at stake than just Trump. — RogueAI

Yes. I agree. Although we might not agree as to the scope of what is at stake.

quote="RogueAI;899432"]Well, there was some concern that the criminal laws might be used by political opponents of former presidents to go after them for decisions they made or acts they took.[/quote]

That is something to be adjudicated on a case by case basis. The attempt to protect a president should not extend to protecting them from being held accountable for illegal actions.

There was concern that presidents were — or knowing that there's no immunity, might actually pardon themselves for everything before they leave office. — RogueAI

I can't follow the logic of this. Is the argument that they should have immunity because if they don't they will in effect make themself immune by pardoning themselves? The result is the same. Perhaps the solution is to pass a law against self-pardon. But that is beyond the scope of the judiciary.

But, most importantly, I think there was concern about whether there would be a chilling effect on a president doing his or her duties if there is no immunity at all for official acts. — RogueAI

The problem with that concern is that immunity need not be all or nothing. The question before the court is:

“whether and if so to what extent does a former President enjoy presidential immunity from criminal prosecution for conduct alleged to involve official acts during his tenure in office.”

The court need not answer this in order for the trial to proceed. A president should not be free to overturn the legitimate results of an election. That does not fall within the scope of his or her official acts and duties. That is clear cut and unequivocal.

The defense should be allowed to argue that what Trump did was done within his official acts, but they do not want to do this, because they know they will loose. If the court allows this tactic to derail or unduly delay the trail then they are at best dupes and at worse complicit.

It's more important for SCOTUS to get this right than to ensure Trump goes on trial before November. — RogueAI

If it does not go to trial before the election and Trump wins then the possibility of getting it right vanishes.

Elected officials are only part of the system.

To not take any principle, rule, or law seriously goes much deeper. It matters. Things could be much worse. There will always be those who pay attention and are ready to step in to seize power if unopposed.