You are right. That was from the Hacker translation. I pulled the quote from an earlier discussion (3 years ago). https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/270361

For that discussion I was using a PDF of the 4th edition. I am currently using a PDF of the 2nd. I think others in that discussion might have been using the 4th.

From earlier in the present discussion:

A surveyable representation, an übersichtlichen Darstellung , (alternatively translated as perspicuous representation), a representative overview is said to be of fundamental importance. — Fooloso4

As I said to you before:

I did not want to get into the problem of translating übersichtliche Darstellung.At this point I think it would just muddy the waters. — Fooloso4

What is it about Hacker's translation that led you to caution me?

This seems to be Peter Hacker’s translation. — Joshs

I did not want to get into the problem of translating übersichtliche Darstellung.At this point I think it would just muddy the waters.

In any case, the quote is from Anscombe's translation.

Careful
you don’t mistake Hacker’s reading of Wittgenstein for the correct reading. — Joshs

Thanks for the warning, but not necessary, I do not know or care how Hacker reads Wittgenstein.

As to the "correct reading", I don't mistake any reading for the correct reading.

Ultimately, I think that is off topic unless you can explain. — Antony Nickles

Copernicus reoriented man's place in the world. It goes to the heart of how we see ourselves and our place in the world. Darwinian evolution did much the same. We are not the pinnacle or culmination of the fixed order of life. In both cases we are freed from a picture that held us captive. A point of view given to us and protected by Christianity. A point of view that was regarded as not only ordinary but true.

We fail to understand what the ordinary is until we understand why philosophy wants more. — Antony Nickles

I think it is the other way around - part of the problem is because of what philosophy wants that we fail to see the ordinary. For example, as you keep pointing to, looking for something hidden. More generally, the return to the ordinary is a rejection of metaphysics. On the other hand, science gives us a false sense that nothing is extraordinary. It can all be explained by science.

That philosophy claims that everything is before us does not mean it is already understood. — Antony Nickles

But this is not what philosophy claims. It cannot maintain both that something is hidden and that everything is before us. What Wittgenstein says is that philosophy, as he thinks it should be practiced, puts everything before us.

I've tried to piece it together myself but I'm at a loss — Antony Nickles

Wittgenstein gives us, what he calls "reminders". His style is often aphoristic. More a constellation then a line of or progression of argument. He leaves it up to the reader to interpret, to piecing it together

There are two issues here:

1) Modern skepticism. The problem of judgment, based on a theory of ideas or mental representation.

2) Descartes' doubt, which serves both an epistemological as well as protective rhetorical function.

1) The things we see are not present in the mind. What we see are representations. The problem of judgment arises because we cannot compare these representations to the things themselves in order to determine whether the representation is true to what it represents.

2) Under the guise of finding something indubitable, by doubting everything, Descartes could indirectly call into doubt the authority of the Church. He usurps of the authority of the Church with the authority of the thinking self.

He does not doubt because of some existential crises. It is deliberate and methodical:

To-day, then, since I have opportunely freed my mind from all cares and am happily disturbed by no passions, and since I am in the secure possession of leisure in a peaceable retirement, I will at length apply myself earnestly and freely to the general overthrow of all my former opinions. [Meditations, 1.1]

Descartes did not doubt that the Church was a threat. It is worth mentioning that he took Ovid's motto as his own:

He who lived well hid himself well.

If we are to understand Descartes we must discover what he is hiding in his apparent agreement with the Church on matters of the soul and God. The 4th Meditation, "Of Truth and Error", is a good place to start. In short, the Cartesian enterprise is about the perfection of man.

But the point of moral deliberation is to attain a state of knowledge from which we can act virtuously. — Hello Human

But that is not what Plato and Aristotle thought.

So, if I understand, we must put in continuous effort to make the right choice, and that right choice is knowledge? — Hello Human

The effort is to maintain a stable equilibrium of the soul. It is in this state of being that we are most likely to make good choices. This is not a state of knowledge. What the right choice is, is in many cases not something we know. Aporia is the condition for moral deliberation.

The point of view that Witt is claiming is that the method and tools of philosophy are in plain sight. — Antony Nickles

The point of view of Copernicus or Darwin is that the method and tools of philosophy are in plain sight?

My point was only that philosophy does not achieve this through empiricism but through understanding how and why we desire and create the picture that anything is hidden. This is not "ways" of seeing things, but a singular way that is different than traditional philosophy. — Antony Nickles

I don't think so. The rejection of something hidden should not be made into the whole of the problem of seeing.

Ordinary is a descriptor of our language and expressions and their senses (uses), which is only truly understood against the expressions of traditional philosophy and the senses of our words that it manufactures. — Antony Nickles

That is not the way I read it. It is not as if the ordinary has to be "truly understood" with the aid of philosophy. From #402:

When as in this case, we disapprove of the expressions of ordinary language (which are after all performing their office), we have got a picture in our heads which conflicts with the picture of our ordinary way of speaking.

The expressions of ordinary language are performing their office. The problem arises when philosophy regards this as inadequate. It is not that ordinary language has to be understood against the expressions of traditional philosophy, but that traditional philosophy fails to understand ordinary language. Philosophy, when done right, simply puts everything before us.

An example of the use of wonder as curiosity would be one wondering about how something came to be, the answer of its (hidden) cause. — Antony Nickles

Tractatus 6.44 It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists.

It is not about how it is but that it is.

the "complete clarity" (#133) at the end of philosophy (each time) is not the answers of science, but making aware our lives right before us. — Antony Nickles

I agree with the first part of this, but complete clarity is freedom from the entanglement in language that philosophy can lead us into. As I quoted previously (PI 122) it is about having an übersichtliche Darstellung:

A main source of our failure to understand is that we don’t have an overview of the use of our words. - Our grammar is deficient in surveyability. A surveyable representation produces precisely that kind of understanding which consists in ‘seeing connections’. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate links.

The concept of a surveyable representation is of fundamental significance for us. It characterizes the way we represent things, how we look at matters. (Is this a ‘Weltanschauung’?)

Aristotle thinks that knowledge begins with experience. We get to first principles through induction. — javi2541997

The term translated as 'induction' is epagoge.

It means "coming face-to-face with" something, and it belongs not to the dianoia, by which we make connections and figure things out, but to the nous, the contemplative intellect. [Joe Sachs,The Battle of the Gods and the Giants,12]

It is not something worked out by reason (dianoia) but something the intellect (nous) sees.

The assumption you make about mental illness may not be the assumption made by the preacher. Your assumption seems to be that since this person is mentally ill they are not responsible. But the preacher might think of mental health in other terms, that the sick can be made well.

I do not support this position, but it is not clear that what you take mental illness to be is what the preacher means.

But this is science and empiricism (repeatability by anyone allowing for stability and certainty). — Antony Nickles

It is Wittgenstein's example. The full quote:

What a Copernicus or a Darwin really achieved was not the discovery of a new true theory but a fertile point of view. (CV 18) — Fooloso4

He is talking about ways of seeing things.

“Ordinary” in this sense is like a technical term — Antony Nickles

I don't think he is using the term "ordinary" in a way that is not ordinary.

Is this to remain mysterious? — Antony Nickles

To some extent it must. Wittgenstein connected wonder and awe with the mysterious and unknown. But if we ask what these things are I have no answer.

...or just to end the discussion? — Antony Nickles

Not at all. I enjoy discussing Wittgenstein.

if that is unwanted I apologize. — Antony Nickles

What I was trying to say is that you were making incorrect assumptions. It was said in jest.

...unless you believe the Court has the power to enumerate the unenumerated rights ... — Hanover

This really does not make sense. It is not a matter of enumerating unenumerated rights but of recognizing that not all right are enumerated.

you cannot hold abortion to be Constitutionally protected right under the 9th Amendment. — Hanover

It is odd that you cite the 9th amendment because it undermines your position.

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. [9th amendment]

Rights are not limited to those that are enumerated. To not protect a right retained by the people, is to deny that right.

They are our ordinary criteria ... — Antony Nickles

It is not by such ordinary criteria that "a Copernicus or a Darwin really achieved a fertile point of view". The ordinary criteria at the time of Copernicus had the earth at the center. The ordinary criteria at the time of Darwin was to regard species were "kinds", and that order of life was the top down design of the creator.

... but the sense of wonder you are thinking of ... — Antony Nickles

I think you do not know what the sense of wonder I am thinking of is.

The right to privacy was found to encompass the right to an abortion, and the right to privacy is NOT an enumerated right. That means that abortion, under Roe, was found to be based upon an unenumerated right. — Hanover

And what follows from this?

There is a long and evolving history regarding the right to privacy in the United States. In the context of American jurisprudence, the Supreme Court first recognized the “right to privacy” in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965). Before Griswold, however, Louis Brandeis (prior to becoming a Supreme Court Justice) co-authored a Harvard Law Review article titled "The Right to Privacy," in which he advocated for the "right to be let alone."

Griswold and the Penumbras

​In Griswold, the Supreme Court found a right to privacy, derived from penumbras of other explicitly stated constitutional protections. The Court used the personal protections expressly stated in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments to find that there is an implied right to privacy in the Constitution. The Court found that when one takes the penumbras together, the Constitution creates a “zone of privacy.” The right to privacy established in Griswold was then narrowly used to find a right to privacy for married couples, regarding the right to purchase contraceptives. [https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/right_to_privacy]

Now you're just making stuff up. — Hanover

Nope:

In the early 1970s, when lawyers representing the state of Texas argued Roe v. Wade before the U.S. Supreme Court, they argued that a fetus is a person. [https://time.com/6191886/fetal-personhood-laws-roe-abortion/]

Texas's lawyers had argued that limiting abortion to situations where the mother's life was in danger was justified because life began at the moment of conception, and therefore the state's governmental interest in protecting prenatal life applied to all pregnancies regardless of their stage. The Court said that there was no indication that the Constitution's uses of the word "person" were meant to include fetuses, and it rejected Texas's argument that a fetus should be considered a "person" with a legal and constitutional right to life.

This makes absolutely no sense. It is the legislature and the legislature alone that has illegalized abortion. — Hanover

It is not quite so simple. Abortion was legal and protected. It did not become illegal simply because of state legislatures, but because the Supreme Court overturned its long-standing precedent. It removed that protection. And it is this than enabled states to implement "trigger laws" banning abortions.

Of course it supports the overturning of Roe. He indicated that the Court lacks the authority to declare the unenumerated rights implicit in the 9th Amendment, and since abortion is most certainly not an enumerated right in the Constitution, it cannot be used to strike down state laws related to abortion. — Hanover

Roe was not based on an unenumerated right to an abortion. It was based on a right to privacy. The Texas law at issue in Roe was based on the theory that a fetus is a "person" protected by the 14th Amendment. Where in the Constitution do we find that a fetus is a person?

It's simply not the case that the Constitution clearly and unequivocally protects the right to abortion ... — Hanover

What is clear is that a woman is a person (even though on a strict originalist interpretation this may not be the case). The right to liberty means the right to make choices. The fact that there is no law protecting the right to undergo a medical procedure, does not mean that the state is free to decide that a medical procedures is illegal under the questionable assumption that an early stage fetus is a person.

The majority decision in Dobbs was based in part on the claim that abortion is not "deeply rooted" in the country's history. But it is, as I pointed out in a previous post. It was common practice at the time the Constitution was ratified. It was not until the mid 1800's that the American Medical Association pushed for laws prohibiting abortion. In addition, Roe was federal law from 1973 - 2022.

Reversing Roe is not the striking down of a law. It's a reversal of precedent. — Hanover

Legal precedent is an important part of the law. Overturning established legal precedent is overturning how a law is to be understood and applied. In this case it struck down the protection under law to have an abortion.

One need only read the transcript of the Kavanaugh confirmation to see the hypocrisy of how stare decisis was used to hide his anti-abortion intentions. What the legislature would not do was done by other means through the court.

Has my labor and wealth not paid for such “benefits”? — NOS4A2

In what way has your labor and wealth paid for these benefits?

That the slave benefits from the services provided to him by his master does not alter the injustice of such relationship. — NOS4A2

Paying taxes does not make you a slave, but not paying taxes does make you a freeloader.

Your questions aren't pertinent to the issue being discussed. — Hanover

My questions are very pertinent to the larger issue being discussed according to the thread title. If what follows doesn't interest you please skip it. Maybe someone else might find it interesting.

Theories of personhood are essential to the question of abortion.If we are to look to the Constitution, then we have to look at how it is interpreted. Scalia's originalist interpretation continues to be influential in Supreme Court decisions. It is, however, problematic. It does not support the overturning of Roe. That decision was a religious one masquerading as a Constitutional issue.

The question is whether a fetus counts as a person. If we look back to the time the document was written (which is what originalists do), we find that at that time abortion was not a legal matter. It has since become a legal matter. An originalist interpretation simply does not properly apply to something that was not originally a legal matter.

The question is, who counts as a person. If we are to look at original documents, like the Declaration, in order to see how terms were used then fetuses, children, and women were not persons. If a fetus is to count as a person it is based on a theory of personhood that is not found in the Constitution.

Keep in mind that no where in the Constitution does it say the Supreme Court has the power to strike down laws or to declare what rights exist, especially not those that are unenumerated. — Hanover

And yet strike down laws is what the court did, even with all its empty talk of stare decisis.

No, that's not what an originalist position would hold. No one suggests that you should interpret the Constitution by looking at what the various laws of the states held at the time. — Hanover

Originalism is a theory of interpreting legal texts based on what how the Constitution was understood at the time it was written. To this end, it does look to such things as the various laws of the states held at the time, as well as such things as the Declaration, as evidence of how terms were understood at the time of the ratification of the Constitution.

Today's court has been shaped by the Federalist Society. Although they are careful not to take an official position, this paper, published by them, represents the prevailing opinion of its members regarding the interpretation of the Constitution.

“In my view, a right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children is among the ‘unalienable Rights’ with which the Declaration of Independence proclaims “all Men…are endowed by their Creator.’ — Hanover

Is this compatible with the claim that a fetus has the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness? Or, for that matter, that children have these rights? According to this a child does not have right to determine the course of life, liberty, or happiness. More so, an early stage fetus, which does not and cannot exist except as part of the mother, does not have these rights.

How does Scalia's claim square with the next statement of the Declaration? To wit:

That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed ...

The consent of the governed does not include the consent of fetuses, or children, or, at the time it was written, women.

This is followed by:

That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.

Again, fetuses, children, and women were not includes among the People who had this Right. Further, "the People" is not the same thing as an individual person. An individual person does not have the right to alter or abolish or institute new Government.

If one is to interpret the Constitution as an originalist then one needs to take a look at abortion practice and prohibitions at that time. It was legal and practiced without prohibitions. This changed in the mid-1800s.

I am only saying ... — NOS4A2

It is what you are not saying that is at issue. You do not live in isolation. It is unjust for you to benefit from all that the state makes possible while at the same time denying it the funds that make it possible.

Once again: how much are you willing to give up in order to redress what you take to be the injustice of taxation?

I cannot nor can anyone else because the state has acquired all power to make decisions in those ventures, even if in most of those cases the contract work out to private people. — NOS4A2

It is not simple a matter of having acquired the power but of having the ability to do what individuals cannot. You cannot lay asphalt and build bridges on your neighbor's property without their permission.

You might object that the state does not have that right either, and yet these things make it possible for you to live as you do.

The question then is how much are you willing to give up in order to redress what you take to be the injustice of taxation?

Your mistake is that you believe only the state can lay asphalt and build bridges and protect our dealings. — NOS4A2

Do you live off the grid?

Can you build an interstate transportation system? Can you develop a national and international communication system? Can you protect yourself and your assets from from foreign and domestic attack?

What you seem to fail to understand is that the state, including such things as infrastructure and legal protections, is a condition that makes possible your labor and its fruits.

Wikipedia ... — Banno

Great example.

The ultimate democracy? — Banno

Maybe.

Or the ultimate tyranny of the masses.

Doesn't this have some impact on the kinds of societies we build? — Tate

Of course. It is a question of whether we take people as they are or try to change them.
Great harm can come from trying to do great good.

Is it something we want to eliminate?
— Fooloso4

I don't know. What do you think? — Tate

Pre-internet I would have said definitely not. Now I think there is the potential for more voices to be heard. This may be preferable to leaving decision making in the hands of a few. But it is not a matter simply of more voices, but of the possibility of hearing the right voices, those with something useful or valuable to say that is being ignored or overlooked. Creative solutions those on the inside are too close to see.

But for this to happen there would have to be gatekeepers, bouncers, moderators. And so, another iteration of the few.

Therefore we have a lot of them. — Tate

It is not a matter of some "therefore". People have always had different opinions about their obligations to others.

Name a culture that didn't have its version of one percenters (or there abouts). — Tate

What are we to make of that? Is it something we want to eliminate? If there is a need for rulers does it make more sense that they be the few who are most capable? In other words, members of a true aristocracy.

quote="Tate;724972"]We can agree it's not right to ignore people in need without establishing the status of morality, can't we?[/quote]

And yet in practice many are ignored.

There is also differences in attitudes as to what "in need" covers and what this obligates us to do.

They are not aristocrats. They are plutocrats.
— Fooloso4

Pretty much the same thing. — Tate

Similar in that the few are in power, but also quite different. Today's plutocrats are not aristocrats in the Greek sense, or by birth, or in the sense meant by the US Founding Fathers.

Abortion is an exception to the rule. — Tate

Is it? There is a great deal of unresolved disagreement: We cannot even agree on the status of moral principles let alone what they are.

I think the system needs a revision that will only come when some event breaks the power of the reigning aristocrats. — Tate

They are not aristocrats. They are plutocrats.

I'm wondering if anyone else on this forum has similar opinions and/or feels that there is some kind of "class warfare" going on where some of the rich and powerful are trying to undermine the poor and disenfranchise who should be getting help but are not. — dclements

As things stand, the demagogues propped up by a segment the rich and powerful acting purely out of self-interest have managed to recruit a significant portion of the poor to their cause. It is the age old story of the demagogue posing as savior. It is, however, risky to scapegoat the rich and powerful, since they are behind the demagogue. It is the "elite" who are held up as the problem even though it is a group of elite who attack the elite.

It is relatively safe to attack the elite as opposed to the rich. The only thing they are in danger of losing is their elite status, which is exactly what they require in order to scapegoat others like themselves.

There are various forms of relativism. If we reject the idea that there is an absolute moral authority that determines right from wrong, good from bad, that is accessible to us, then the alternative is some form of relativism. This differs from "vicious relativism" in that it does not treat all moral claims as equally valid or invalid or dismiss them as undecidable.

If everyone stuck to their moral guns, the world would be different. — Tate

To what end? A shootout?

Anti-abortion advocates are not only sticking to their guns. They have an array of weapons and are using them effectively, ignoring the collateral damages.

Is it just coincidence that they frame both abortion and gun control in terms of the sacrosanct need to protect the unprotected?

Focusing on your own values is relativism? — Tate

That is not what I said.

... don't focus on the anarchist, focus on your own values (if you have any moral compass at all) and don't give in to the temptation to stray from what you know is right. — Tate

This, in my opinion, is part to the problem. It presents it as if it is simply a matter of competing values. Each side believes it knows what is right. Ranks are closed. Information is treated as if it is polemic and handled selectively.

It has become a form of vicious relativism. Once a point of attack and contention against the "left" by the "right", it is now standard practice on the right, albeit cleverly disguised as championing the truth. It is perpetuated by an acceptance of the belief that the mainstream ("lamestream") media is the enemy of the people. Thus, a significant part of the population is ignorant of what is going on. Or, to the extent they do know, they dismiss it as spin. They have their own sources of news and information, which provide the comforting illusion that they and they alone are informed of the real truth.

No one is wiser than Socrates. — Oracle of Delphi

Socrates' response:

a) He tells a story of how he set out to refute the oracle (21c)

b) He changes what the oracle said from no one is wiser than Socrates to "... you declared that I was the wisest ."(21c)

The oracle did not declate that he was the wisest.

Here once again we are confronted with the illusion that we are autonomous islands of rights. It is the failure to recognize that what is ours is a necessary condition for what is mine. The mistaken belief that the common good is arithmetic, nothing more than my interests plus or minus the interests of others.

Does it mean that we have to continuously put in effort to justify it ? — Hello Human

Follow up: It requires continued work in order to maintain:

a stable equilibrium of the soul,

Given that the main preoccupation of ethics at that time was the telos of human beings, it seems to me that goodness would be what gets one closer to that telos. So goodness would lie both in the action and the doer. — Hello Human

Rather than goodness being what gets one closer to that telos, what gets one closer to that telos is what is good, what is in accord with human nature.

So goodness would lie both in the action and the doer. — Hello Human

The question is what kind of thing a virtue is. If we look at the act itself we might regard it as good, but that does not mean it is a virtuous act. If what we regard as good in the act is not what was intended then the act was not virtuous even if the consequences are regarded as good.

If we take the traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief (at least just for the purpose of that discussion) — Hello Human

But for the purpose of this discussion, what is meant by knowledge is not justified true belief.

it is something requiring mental effort, what does it mean exactly? — Hello Human

It means, as @180 Proof pointed out that hexis is a matter of praxis of active doing rather than a passive condition. It is not as if one attains a state of knowledge from which one can then act virtuously based on that knowledge. There is still, in particular situations, the need for moral deliberation.

Does it mean that we have to continuously put in effort to justify it ? — Hello Human

Not to justify it, but to make the right choice in an attempt to do what is best.

Or does it mean that we have to constantly put in effort to believe in it ? — Hello Human

It is not a matter of belief.

Starting with the Presocratics, Greek philosophers were very sceptical of mythology. Plato (and probably Socrates) thought the ideal republic ought to curtail the teaching of myths. — Jamal

We should make a distinction between myths and what is called "mythology". Plato makes frequent use of myths. Some are his inventions, some are reworked from existing myths, some are said to be of foreign origin. In the Republic myths serve a necessary function, but they are taken from the poets and put in the hands of the philosopher-kings. Put differently, the philosopher-kings are philosopher-poets.

In the Phaedo the limits of reasoned speech leaves them in danger of misologic. The truth is, we do not know the truth of what happens when we die, and so Socrates turns to myths. The myths are intended to "charm away" their fears and to persuade them to live just lives.

Instead of wanting some specific criteria, we come to see our ordinary means of judgment and identity and felicity as good enough. — Antony Nickles

After absolutely agreeing with me I'm a bit hesitant to raise a note of disagreement:

What does our ordinary means of judgment mean?
Are we ordinarily awake to wonder?
Is it our ordinary means of judgment and identity that leads to new inventions and discoveries?

Seeing the extraordinary in the ordinary is not for most of us our ordinary way of seeing things

PI 90. ... our investigation is directed not towards phenomena, but rather, as one might say, towards the ‘possibilities’ of phenomena.

PI 126. One might also give the name "philosophy" to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions.

I agree.

I think that the "picture" you have both been trying to articulate is more of a way of seeing things, or a Weltanschauung, which he mentions at 122 when discussing surveyable representations. — Luke

I agree. See my earlier post:
Surveyable representation - übersichtlichen Darstellung

That is the point of the duck/rabbit and, one might say, the point of philosophy. — Luke

I take this to be what is meant in 126:

One might also give the name "philosophy" to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions.

I discussed this earlier in this thread

Here

and

Here

But Wittgenstein did not "crack the code" in the sense of solve the problem. — Antony Nickles

Of course he didn't! He thought he had but he eventually realized he hadn't. But see below.

126. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us.

129. The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity.

The idea that something is hidden does not have a single etiology. I have been trying to steer you away from that assumption.

His investigation finds that it is because we have fixed our gaze past them to something certain, universal, logical, etc., even if we have to imagine it to be hidden. — Antony Nickles

Both Plato and Aristotle say that philosophy begins in wonder. It is, however, the pursuit of philosophy that led to modern science:

Man has to awaken to wonder - and so perhaps do peoples. Science is a way of sending him to sleep again.(Culture and Value)

I think it is with regard to this that he says in 126:

One might also give the name "philosophy" to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions.

and in 129:

we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful.

Seeing the extraordinary in the ordinary.

Compare what he says in the preface to the Tractatus:

I therefore believe myself to have found, on all essential points, the final solution of the problems.

with PI 133:

For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear.

His desire for complete clarity is not something Wittgenstein rejected after the Tractatus.

He continues:

The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to.—The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself in question.

They're tautological. — Tate

Or contradictory. ( 4.46-4.461) If contradictory then false.

Logic says nothing about the world. That is not in dispute. Logic is used as a aid in examining and correcting our expressions of thought.

Logic is not about the world. Logic is about what we say about the world.