But would it be morally intuitive to say that a social species that maintains their society by torturing another social species as doing something 'good'? That's what is implied by Aristotelian ethics if the social species requires it to fulfill their nature. — Bob Ross

What is it to be a member of this species? Is it to torture other species? By saying they do so to maintain their society implies that it is a means to an end and not an end in itself. If there were no external threats from another social species would they continue to torture other species? In a
Aristotle's terms, is the energeia and entelecheia of this species to torture other species? Does it cease to be when it is not torturing other species?

Are you talking about what we think is 'true' for ourselves? — Amity

I was referring to Nietzsche's claim about "real philosophers".

Fooloso4 - I think we discussed the meaning of Socrates last words in your thread?
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/10914/platos-phaedo/p1 — Amity

From page 12 of that thread:

Much has been written about what this means. Asclepius is the god of medicine. This suggests that there has been a cure or recovery. Some interpret this to mean that Socrates has been cured of the disease of life. But he says “we” not “I”.

In the center of the dialogue Phaedo said that they had been “healed” of their distress and readiness to abandon argument. (89a) In other words, Socrates saved them from misologic,about which he said "there is no greater evil than hating arguments". (89d)

There is one other mention of illness. In the beginning when we are told that Plato was ill. We are not told the nature of the illness that kept him away, but we know he recovered. Perhaps he too was cured of misologic. Rather than giving up on philosophy he went on to make the “greatest music”. Misologic is at the center of the problem, framed by Plato’s illness and the offer to Asclepius. And perhaps conquering the greatest evil is in the end a good reason to regard this as a comedy rather than a tragedy.

↪Fooloso4 Correct, but that is irrelevant to the OP. — Bob Ross

Of course it's relevant! It is not a "glaring issue" that Aristotle is avoiding. The question of the ethics of a species that is by its nature unethical makes no sense. It is asking how something bad is good.

Since Aristotle is attaching the 'goodness' or 'badness' of a thing relative to its nature, wouldn't it follow that a rational species, S, which had a nature completely anti-thetical to justice and altruism be a 'good' S IFF it was unjust and egoistic? — Bob Ross

What is the relation between nature and the nature of a species? Can they be at odds?

presumably "demon men" would be rational as well — Count Timothy von Icarus

What do we know of this imagined demon species? Why assume that they are men? Why assume that they are rational? See the following in reply to Bob Ross.

what about a devil species? — Bob Ross

Aristotle's ethics is about the human good, not some imagined devil species.

How is that pointing in the right direction? — Amity

In the Republic the education of the philosopher consists of gymnastics and music. That music is in large part appropriate stories. This education does not include philosophy. That comes later for those few with the right temperament and maturity. The developmental stages do not include the quest for the truth. The "truth" as it is given moves from stories to mathematics, from what is told to them as true to what can be demonstrated as true.

Our relation to the truth has changed. This is reflected in your statement:

I really don't find it easy to talk about the Big Truth or little truths as something to aim for. — Amity

And so, your question:

It isn't always about a desire for truth, is it? — Amity

is not so simple. Whether or not we might think the truth is or is not preferable, we do not have a choice, unless perhaps we live in a closed, sheltered society.

The talk of 'real philosophers' suggests that is a 'truth' for him. — Amity

We might look at this in different ways. As a truth for him, this might be regarded as merely his perspective, no more or less true than others. But perspectives are for him of great importance and not to be dismissed simply as one way of seeing things rather than some alternative. Perspectivism is additive. Not a matter of either this one or that one, but of what can be gained from seeing things this way or that way or this way and that way.

We need to consider what he means when he says that real philosophers are commanders and law-givers and whether or not it is true. It is in this way not simply a truth for him. In order to test this we need to look at how certain thinkers and ideas have influenced the way we think, what we believe, and how we live.

In so far as he intends to influence the philosophers who come after him, we might regard this as the story he tells them. If they are to be philosophers, what are their responsibilities to others both now and in the future? If, to use Plato's imagery, they are to be puppet-masters and opinion makers, what stories are they to tell?

where's your dedication, man? — Amity

I have limited time and energy. I am not sure where I will spend it, but it probably will not with Cicero.

Is that what you meant? — Amity

Yes. I don't think the need to hide, however, is for us at this moment something necessary, but that may change in the next few years.

It depends on what you mean by 'the philosopher'. — Amity

I mean the philosopher in the context of the education of the philosopher in the Republic.

It isn't always about a desire for truth, is it? I really don't find it easy to talk about the Big Truth or little truths as something to aim for. — Amity

I think Nietzsche points in the right direction:

He identifies three deadly truths:

... the doctrines of sovereign becoming, of the fluidity of all concepts, types and species, of the lack of any cardinal distinction between man and animals

(Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations)

These doctrines are the antithesis of what are often regarded as key Platonic doctrines based on immutable kinds or forms, which are key to the education of philosopher.

It is not simply that we do not always desire the truth, but that certain truths should be hidden, because they can be harmful.

That these truths are deadly may seem odd to us because:

“No one dies of fatal truths nowadays: there are too many antidotes.” (Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits)

That anything should remain hidden seems to us antithetical to free and open inquiry. But free and open inquiry is not value neutral. Plato's noble lies are not simply a political expedient. We have paid a price for "deadly truth". That what was long held out as the truth may not be the truth is a hard truth to accept. It can leave us rudderless.

On the question of the philosopher Nietzsche says:

The real philosophers, however, are commanders and law-givers ...

(BGE 211)

Accordingly, most who study and write on philosophy are not philosophers. He reserves the title for the rare, exception individuals who shape and determine our lives.

Have you read all of the Tusculan Disputations? — Amity

Most of it I have not read.

Is it a form of nostalgia? — Amity

I think the last line I quoted is important:

... and argue so as to conceal my own opinion ...

Justice Thomas wrote a separate bit in the recent immunity decision aimed at Special Counsels and Cannon received the lateral pass and ran with it. — Paine

Thomas did give it unofficial authority but I don't think it is a new argument. I think she is complicit in the Trump run out the clock strategy. The timing of her decision does not seem to me to be merely coincidental.

Is this something that just occurred to Cannon or was just brought to her attention or ...?

I can’t see how that can be construed as ‘theology’. — Wayfarer

I hope Paine will not mind me jumping in. When you say:

In Aristotle and Other Platonists, Gerson proposed a positive characterization of the tradition, as comprising seven key themes: 1. The universe has a systematic unity; 2. This unity reflects an explanatory hierarchy and in particular a “top-down” approach to explanation (as opposed to the “bottom-up” approach of naturalism), especially in the two key respects that the simple is prior to the complex and the intelligible is prior to the sensible; 3. The divine constitutes an irreducible explanatory category, and is to be conceived of in personal terms (even if in some Ur-Platonist thinkers the personal aspect is highly attenuated); — Join the Ur-Platonist Alliance!

What is at the top of this top down hierarchy? Is the intelligible dependent on an intelligible being? What is the divine which constitutes an irreducible explanatory category? Earlier in the thread you said:

'The gods' are, of course, those of the Greek pantheon, but from comparative religion, we learn that have much in common with the other Indo-European cultures, so there are parallels with the Indian pantheon. But in this case, they represent 'the divine' — Wayfarer

What does it mean to conceive of the divine in personal terms?

Whose words are they? Second-hand Socrates? Who is the audience and how will they be persuaded by whatever message the author is attempting to convey. — Amity

Some of the myths are probably Plato's own, but Socrates credits the ancients of different cultures. Some take themes, such as the afterlife and recollection, which Socrates says are hearsay., that is, things he has heard but has no first hand experience of. I think this relates to the question of who the audience is. The philosopher who desires the truth will not take these stories as true, but as part of her education they may be suitable.

To question is also to challenge the status quo. — Amity

That is true. Socrates does question in order to challenge.

In the interpretive tradition of the Midrash, questioning is a mode of understanding. This may come as a surprise to those who have been taught not to question scripture.

The Stoics revered Socrates, but that Socrates wasn't the Socrates of Plato.

From Cicero:

But Socrates was the first who brought down philosophy from the heavens, placed it in cities, introduced it into families, and obliged it to examine into life and morals, and good and evil. And his different methods of discussing questions, together with the variety of his topics, and the greatness of his abilities, being immortalized by the memory and writings of Plato, gave rise to many sects of philosophers of different sentiments, of all which I have principally adhered to that one which, in my opinion, Socrates himself followed; and argue so as to conceal my own opinion ...

(Tusculan Disputations, Book V, IV)

So if everything is divine, then the word means nothing. Is that the drift of the argument? That 'the divine' has no referent? — Wayfarer

Some things are not everything. In that short list three things are referred to as divine.


The behavior of the gods in the Greek pantheon seems to be problematic as a model.

'What is a Socratic philosopher?' — Amity

As I understand it, a Socratic philosopher is one who knows he does not know and thus devotes her life to inquiry. Some hold to the assumption that to question is to deny, but it can be a mode of inquiry, an attempt to understand.

It seems we have to go through a great deal of hellishness and deterioration of lives and services until rock bottom is reached. Before we can begin to climb out. — Amity

Wittgenstein said:

When you are philosophizing you have to descend into primeval chaos and feel at home there.

(Culture and Value)

I started a thread Wittgenstein the Socratic a few months ago. I do not think that Socrates was tormented by indeterminacy, but early on Wittgenstein was. He eventually came to see that the need for complete clarity was misguided.

Is this more subjective than objective? — Amity

I would not put it in those terms, but do think there are differences in character and @Tom Storm temperament that play a role.

It's strange but when I read 'Socratic philosopher', I was thinking of Stoicism. — Amity

Not so strange.

Is it about taking Socrates as a role model? Or the use of Socratic questioning? — Amity

Maybe a role model for questioning. His single-minded devotion, however, could only be suited to someone who shares that devotion.

'The gods' are, of course, those of the Greek pantheon — Wayfarer

Are they? I would think that Plotinus would agree with Socrates' criticism of the gods in Euthyphro.

The knowledge of which he speaks is rooted in revealed truth — Wayfarer

In the tradition of the Greek poets, the gods are credited as the author of the poet's works.

But I notice references to the divine ('the devas') in many of the excepts being discussed in the thread in ancient philosophy. — Wayfarer

In the Sophist Theodorus says with regard to the Stranger:

Indeed, the man does not seem to me to be a god at all, though he is certainly divine. For I refer to all philosophers as divine.

(216b-c)

In the Phaedo Socrates calls Homer divine. In the Iliad Homer call salt divine (9.214)

Has the philosopher outgrown the need for stories?
— Fooloso4

I'm not entirely sure what this quesion involves. Isn't human knowledge a story, or a series of interrelated, overlapping narratives? Can you say some more on this? — Tom Storm

The closing question relates to the opening question. Although it is not meant to close off but open up further consideration. What one expects from philosophy may determine how one thinks about the place of stories. I agree with you regarding narrative. The opening question is an invitation to narrative reflection.

Do you mean our knowledge and understanding could just as well degenerate as improve? — Janus

As it moves toward something, for example, the quest for certainty or linguistic analysis, it moves away from something vital to philosophy, the examined life.

It is the current state of political affairs that most concerns me. Does being a 'Socratic philosopher' help? — Amity

I don't know. Help in what way?

From the Republic:

Now, those who belong to this small group [those who are worthy to consort with philosophy] have tasted the sweetness and blessedness of this possession, and can also see the madness of the multitude quite well, realising that in a sense no one does anything reasonable in the conduct of civic affairs, nor is there an ally with whom a man could go to the aid of justice and still survive. Instead, he is like a man who has fallen in with wild animals, has no desire to conspire in wrongdoing but is not up to the task of resisting all their savagery, a man who will perish before he is of any benefit to the city or his friends, and would be of no use to himself or anyone else. Having understood all this through reflection, he is at peace, and attends to his own affairs, like a man in a storm of wind-driven dust and rain who crouches beneath a low wall. And seeing that all else is crammed full of lawlessness, he is content if somehow he can live this life here purified of injustice and unholy deeds, and take his departure with good hope, gracious and kindly as he goes.” (496 a-e)

I'm convinced that most of Trump's backers are not in because they like Trump or think that he's any good but because they can use him to pursue their own nefarious ends. — Wayfarer

I agree. I think they are mistaken however. Trump's own ends begin and end with Trump. They cannot control him. When their ends conflict with his ... Well I hope we will not have to find out.

We discussed the various examples of what I'm referring to in an earlier thread on esoteric philosophies. I seem to recall I gave the examples of Advaita Vedanta and Zen Buddhism, to which you replied something like 'you have to be prepared to believe in such things'. — Wayfarer

I do not recall the discussion but think it evident that if

He will leave that behind, and choose another, the life of the gods — Ennead 1.2. 30, translated by Armstrong

then he must have to be prepared to believe such things. Would he choose such a life if he did not believe it? But this does not get at what I am asking.

... but likeness to the gods is likeness to the model, a being of a different kind to ourselves. — Ennead 1.2. 30, translated by Armstrong

What is the model that this is a likeness of? If for us this life is one of renunciate spirituality, is it that for the gods as well? Do the gods too have desires that they must overcome? Can we become a being of a different kind?

Doesn't this plainly disparage the notion of 'civic virtue' and 'living the life of the good man' in favour of 'leaving that behind' and 'choosing another' - the 'life of the Gods' - — Wayfarer

But the good man may not be able to live the life of the gods, nor might he want to.

What does that life look like? This:

renunciate spirituality — Wayfarer

?

Surely there is more to the life of a god.

It looks like Trump's second term will be very different from his first. Although he denies it, the implementation of the game plan, Project 2025, will make all the difference. Trump will, of course, not change, but with his king makers behind him, those who want authoritarian rule will rejoice. Those who just want change may come to rue the day.

I wish that there was an equivalent to Horan's translations of Plato's Dialogues available to present what Plotinus wrote. — Paine

We have our friend @Wayfarer to thank for bringing it to our attention.

I sense I have worn out my welcome. — Paine

Speaking for myself, you are always welcome. Just leave your shoes at the door.

Often I find myself in a kind of dialogue with the ideas ... — Moliere

I often stress the idea of active reading, which is often met with blank stares.

Nietzsche reads like this — Moliere

Yup.

But that's still a real pleasure when a text teaches you a different way to read that also opens up the text to a deeper understanding. — Moliere

It is also a pleasure when you go back years later and find all kinds of new things.

Right, but you seem to suggest that the "sound person" never gets outside this condition? — Count Timothy von Icarus

If you mean never attains transcendent knowledge then yes, that is what I am suggesting. But I won't insist upon it.

But then it seems that if the "sound people" claim that they have found a "better" (more good) way of dealing with this situation they will have to claim to know something of goodness and what is better. — Count Timothy von Icarus

They may think that some way or ways of dealing with our ignorance are better than others, but they do not mistake this for knowledge of what they do not know.

If they're opinions are of equal merit with everyone else's then why would it be profitable to listen to them? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I have not said and do not think that all opinions are of equal merit.

If Socrates is ignorant of the Good, why should it benefit Glaucon to be influenced by Socrates' myths? — Count Timothy von Icarus

If you agree that not all opinions are of equal value then you must without knowing either accept one as not an opinion but the truth, or you must deliberate and discuss various opinions in order to decide which opinion seems to be best. In both cases we are starting from a position of ignorance, or do you think you do know?

If Socrates, in his ignorance, is wrong about the Good, then it seems he might simply be harming Glaucon by convincing him to follow Socrates into his particular brand of ignorance. — Count Timothy von Icarus

What is his particular brand of ignorance? In what way do you think it might be harming Glaucon?

The best philosophy, in my opinion, changes the way you think as you read it — Moliere

And, in my opinion, the best philosophy changes the way you read. For reading can be active form of thinking.

I'm unsure what a "sound person" is. I would assume it's something like "being ruled by the rational part of the soul." — Count Timothy von Icarus

The sound person is more than the ruling part of his soul. Consider the education of the guardians in the Republic:

So, what would their education consist of? Or is it hard to find anything better than what has been discovered through the passage of time? This, I presume, consists of physical training for the body, and music for the soul.

(376e)

But if the soundness of the person who judges arguments always only results in nescience and opinion — Count Timothy von Icarus

That is not the result, it is the condition from within which we judge.

So, when Nietzsche comes along ... what's the response? — Count Timothy von Icarus

In line with what you said about Plato's dialogues:

The dialogues aim at different audiences. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Nietzsche says:

What serves the higher type of men as nourishment or delectation must almost be poison for a very different and inferior type…. There are books that have opposite values for soul and health, depending on whether the lower soul, the lower vitality, or the higher and more vigorous ones turn to them; in the former case, these books are dangerous and lead to crumbling and disintegration; in the latter, [they are] heralds’ cries that call the bravest to their courage.

(Beyond Good and Evil, Aphorism 30)

As he says in the Forward to Twilight of the Idols, he is sounding out Idols with a hammer. He cheerfully smashes them, including Socrates the idol. But as Socrates advised his friends:

[you] should pay little regard to Socrates

Yes, he cares because he hopes Socrates can answer this question — Count Timothy von Icarus

And why does he hope Socrates can answer this question? This concern with being just is something he brings to the discussion.

But if all Socrates can offer is "edifying myths" — Count Timothy von Icarus

But that is not all he is doing. Aristotle says the rhetoric is the counterpart to dialectic. The sophists are not the only ones who attempt to persuade us, and it is quite evident that myths can be persuasive. In some causes they can be so persuasive that there are those who believe them to be the truth.

He will leave that behind, and choose another, the life of the gods ... — Ennead 1.2. 30, translated by Armstrong

What are we to make of this? What is the life of the gods? Can we leave behind our human life and choose the life of the gods?

Nice thread, but I couldn't figure out what its goal is. — Lionino

The question that opens the discussion:

What do you want and expect from philosophy? — Fooloso4

asks what your goal might be, or, if philosophy is for you something that aims at a goal, and if so, can that goal be reached. Or if even through engagement the aim of the goal has changed.

Many people have plumbed the depths of this question and determined that there is no such thing as "goodness" and thus that they should do whatever pleases them and is to their advantage.

That is why, in the Phaedo:
— Count Timothy von Icarus

Socrates turns from the problem of the limits of sound arguments to the soundness of those who make and judge arguments. — Fooloso4

But I suppose this brings up Glaucon's question in the Republic, why should we even care about being good or just? — Count Timothy von Icarus

And yet, he does care. The answer to that question matters to him.

I conclude that the dialectic is radically open-ended, that there is no final endpoint of knowledge or understanding. — Janus

Yes, I agree.

That doesn't mean that our knowledge and understanding cannot improve as we go along. — Janus

I don't think it is a one-way street though.

I am at a loss for how the passage you cite is supposed to support your claim. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Which claim?

The first:

We don't. Believing one does know when he does not is a problem. — Fooloso4

is not intended to be supported by the quote. The second one:

The question of what is best is inextricably linked to the question of the human good. — Fooloso4

is in response to the quote from the Phaedo.

He ultimately writes off the materialists ... — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't think so:

Tell me again from the beginning and do not answer in the words of the question, but do as I do. I say that beyond that safe answer, which I spoke of first, I see another safe answer. If you should ask me what, coming into a body, makes it hot, my reply would not be that safe and ignorant one, that it is heat, but our present argument provides a more sophisticated answer, namely, fire, and if you ask me what, on coming into a body, makes it sick, I will not say sickness but fever. Nor, if asked the presence of what in a number makes it odd, I will not say oddness but oneness, and so with other things.

(105b-c)

Ok, is everyone equally likely to be wrong? — Count Timothy von Icarus

No.

Must we be equally skeptical of all claims about what is good? — Count Timothy von Icarus

No.

Might we has well question if this "questioning" really has any value or if it's just a way for egg heads to waste their time? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I do not think that questioning what is good is a waste of time. Are we to just accept all claims about what is good? Or reject them all?

But such deliberations never move one past a state of skeptical nescience? — Count Timothy von Icarus

If you mean that one never moves past not knowing to knowledge of the just, the beautiful, and the good, I don't think we do. I do think, however, that Socratic knowledge of ignorance means more than just knowing that you are ignorant. It is knowledge how to think and judge and live in the face of ignorance.

What exactly is the benefit of "trying your best" to understand what justice is? — Count Timothy von Icarus

It may prevent you from acting unjustly or wrongly accusing others of acting unjustly. We act on our limited understanding. What alternative do we have?

This OP is so well-balanced and inspirational to new and old readers alike. — Amity

And, I am sure, anathema to others.

But thanks. I never object when someone says nice things about me, even if they are not true.

The only alternative to that would be to remain or become slaves to tradition and authority ... — Janus

This is what is at issue in the trial of Socrates. Some think that the tension between philosophy and the city remains with us but others think the tension has or can be resolved and that reason and revelation reconciled or that the solution is political tolerance, the separation of church and state. I think tradition is important but that we are not slaves to it as long as we question its authority. Questioning its authority has become part of our tradition.

How does one know if one is being good if one doesn't know what is good or in what goodness consists? — Count Timothy von Icarus

We don't. Believing one does know when he does not is a problem.

If then one wished to know the cause of each thing, why it comes to be or perishes or exists, one had to find what was the best way for it to be, or to be acted upon, or to act. On these premises then it befitted a man to investigate only, about this and other things, what is best.

(Phaedo 97b-d)

The question of what is best is inextricably linked to the question of the human good. About what is best we can only do our best to say what is best and why. The question of what is best turns from things in general to the human things and ultimately to the self for whom what is best is what matters most. The question of the good leads back to the problem of self-knowledge.

If we are to believe things because doing so will make us better it seems that we need some idea of what "better" consists in. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Having some idea of what is better is not knowing what is better. It is an opinion or belief. He could be wrong:

... being careful lest in my eagerness I deceive both myself and yourselves at the same time, and depart like a bee leaving my sting behind.

It is the question of what is better that is at issue. It involves deliberation about opinions about what is best. At best we do our best.

The dialogues aim at different audiences. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes. I agree. But we disagree as to what is being said to whom.

Perhaps, but when it comes to communicating with one another it seems that Plato thinks we will always need images. — Count Timothy von Icarus

We do need images. There are different kinds of images and different uses. We need images not just to communicate but to think and reason. The images used by the mathematicians is a good example.
We need not determine whether there is such a thing as a perfect circle in order to make use of these images. In fact, Socrates points out that such questions do not even arise for them.

There is a tendency to look beyond ourselves. No doubt Plato plays a role in promoting this tendency, but I think it was for Plato serious philosophical play. The real work is work on oneself.

I think Wittgenstein is a Socratic. I linked to a thread a started on this.

I'm not sure if you have read Pierre Hadot, who praised philosophy as a way of life. — Shawn

I have. Hadot also read and wrote on Wittgenstein.

The allegory of the cave has the philosopher return to it. Whatever good is done there does not stop it from being a cave. — Paine

Good point. What might the reformed cave look like? Would the philosophers do the very thing that Socrates was found guilty of?

However, we are not interested in the people: we are seeking the truth. — ibid. 246c

The foundations of the city and the most fundamental beliefs of the people are destroyed by the truth, for the truth is that what they believe, what they trust, what they take to be the truth itself are only images of images. Twice removed from the truth. This is why Socrates takes the old charges brought by Aristophanes more seriously than the current charges against him. He is guilty as charged.

If the philosopher is to take an interest in the people as well as the truth he cannot simply replace the images on the cave wall with the truth. He must replace the images with images of the truth. The cave remains a cave.

If the prisoner's shackles are removed and they are forcibly dragged out of the cave (515e) and not permitted to immediately crawl back in, the city and life as they know it is destroyed. We should not be too quick to assume that most would regard this as a blessing. The cave offers safety and security. It is their home. Unlike the philosopher the people may not be more interested in the truth.