why do you think Plato refrains from saying anything like: "I maintain that these things are unknowable — Count Timothy von Icarus

On the one hand:

Plato did not wish to extinguish the fire of the desire to know. There is a difference between the claim that it is not possible to know, which is not something he knows, and the recognition that one does not know, between human and divine wisdom.

But on the other:
— Fooloso4

In the Apology he says:

... to be dead is one of two things: either the dead person is nothing and has no perception of anything, or [death] happens to be, as it is said, a change and a relocation or the soul from this place here to another place
(40c).

If the dead are nothing then there is no recollection of the Forms. If knowledge is not for the dead because the dead are nothing then knowledge is nowhere to be gained. — Fooloso4

It should also be noted that the story of transcendent knowledge in the Republic and the story of knowledge when dead are not the same. Which of these stories is true and how do you know that? I am with Socrates and know that I do not know. As I read him Plato is not giving us answers.

At any rate, I think you are confusing "myths and images" as a vehicle for/aid to attaining knowledge with all knowledge being of myths and images alone. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I am not claiming that all knowledge is of myths and images. I am saying that in the absence of knowledge he gives us myths and images.

It seems to me that people who tend to think of the forms as existing in a magical "spirit realm" are generally hostile to Plato. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I am not hostile to Plato. He is my favorite philosopher and I do not think the forms exist in a magical spirit realm.

More skeptical versions of Plato on the other hand seem more born of literalism, and in some cases a lack of imagination. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think it is the other way around. Those who believe in transcendent knowledge of Forms read him literally. It is not lack of imagination. Imagination is essential but, as the divided line indicates, there is a difference between what we might image and what we know.

The story of the Forms remains just that, a story, not something he knows.
— Fooloso4

Could it be that this is because you yourself don't understand what is intended by the 'eidos' and you're then reading this absence into the texts? — Wayfarer

When Socrates claims that he knows nothing noble and good (Apology 21d) I take this to mean he has no knowledge of the Forms (eidos).

Plotinus is an ancestor of modern psychology. — Paine

It would be interesting if you traced this,fleshed it out and developed it.

When we exercise intellection upon ourselves, we are, obviously, observing an intellective nature, for otherwise we would not be able to have that intellection. — ibid. III. 9. 3

There is a kind of anthropomorphism at work here. Because we have intellect and use it in an effort to make the world intelligible, the world must not only be intelligible it must be the work of intelligence. That the whole is intelligible, however, remains an open question.

But eidos isn't invoked as an expedient for justifying a political system. Quite the opposite, Socrates only looks at justice within the context of a city to help pull out the nature of justice vis-á-vis the individual, and the philosopher king is analogous to the rule of the rational part of the soul. The exposition begins as a response to Glaucon's challenge re the "good in itself," not as a means of advancing a political position. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Knowledge of the Forms is the justification for the rule of the philosopher. The analogy with the soul is problematic absent knowledge in the soul. This is not to say that reason should not rule the soul but without knowledge we must rely on what seems best to us. Hence the emphasis on moderation developed through a musical education and upbringing.

What happens to Socrates as the hands of the city points to the importance of political philosophy. The city's animosity to philosophy means that the philosopher must receive a political education in the sense of learning how to live and philosophize within the city without invoking the wraith of the city. The philosopher must take on the role of benefactor. This includes telling stories about the good that are good for them.

Eidos shows up throughout the dialogues ... — Count Timothy von Icarus

It does, but the meaning of the term as it was commonly understood includes 'look', 'kind', and 'idea'. It is thus not some thing that exists on its own in some intelligible world but how something appears or seems to be for us. The myth of Forms attempts to resolve disagreement regarding opinions about things like justice, beauty, and the good by going beyond how they appear to us with claims about how they are in themselves as known to the philosophers. Such philosophers are not the philosophers of the Symposium who desire to be wise but are not. Philosophers who are in this regard not like Socrates.

Then those who are wise are wise by wisdom and all good things are good by the good … And these are somethings ... — Count Timothy von Icarus

Compare this to what he says in the Phaedo:

I simply, naively and perhaps foolishly cling to this, that nothing else makes it beautiful other than the presence of, or the sharing in, or however you may describe its relationship to that Beautiful we mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise nature of the relationship, but that all beautiful things are beautiful by the Beautiful. That, I think, is the safest answer I can give myself or anyone else.”

(100e)

He calls the hypothesis of Forms (100a) simple, naive, and perhaps foolish, and later "safe and ignorant". (105 b)

This is surprising given that this occurs in a discussion in which he is attempting to persuade his friends that death is something good for those who are good in part based on recollection of the Forms.

After introducing the “Socratic Trinity”, the Just, the Beautiful, and the Good. (65d) But he says nothing of them, and for very good reason:

“… if we can know nothing purely in the body's company, then one of two things must be true: either knowledge is nowhere to be gained, or else it is for the dead.”

(66e)

In the Apology he says:

... to be dead is one of two things: either the dead person is nothing and has no perception of anything, or [death] happens to be, as it is said, a change and a relocation or the soul from this place here to another place

(40c).

If the dead are nothing then there is no recollection of the Forms. If knowledge is not for the dead because the dead are nothing then knowledge is nowhere to be gained.

If Plato intended to promulgate ἀπορία ... — Count Timothy von Icarus

He doesn't. Aporia is the result of our lack of knowledge. If one is to strive to know, however, coming face to face with one's lack of knowledge is a necessary step if one is to be disabused on the assumption that he already knows.

We can add here that this view also entails that Aristotle, Plato's prize pupil who studied closely with the man for two decades, would then also have completely misunderstood him. — Count Timothy von Icarus

To the contrary. I think he did understand him. He understood the difference and made use of the distinction between salutary public speech, which is to say political speech, and what those who were well suited discussed in private.

I don't know how you explain Plato's later, considerable efforts to figure out how to deal with the forms, universals and predicates in the Sophist/Statesman if the Forms are just a political myth (same with the troubleshooting in the Parmenides). — Count Timothy von Icarus

Good question.The problem is that one who does not “allow that for each thing there is a character that is always the same" will “destroy the power of dialectic entirely” (Parmenides, 135b8–c2). Something like the Forms underlies (hypo - under thesis - to place or set) thought and speech.

The myth is that the Forms are eternal beings that are known to the philosopher by the power of dialectic and thus the philosopher, knowing the just, the beautiful, and the good is uniquely qualified to rule. In the Republic Socrates says:

"Well, then, go on to understand that by the other segment of the intelligible I mean that which argument itself grasps with the power of dialectic, making the hypotheses not beginnings but really hypotheses—that is, steppingstones and springboards—in order to reach what is free from hypothesis at the beginning of the whole. When it has grasped this, argument now depends on that which depends on this beginning and in such fashion goes back down again to an end; making no use of anything sensed in any way, but using forms themselves, going through forms to forms, it ends in forms too."

(511b)

If it is possible to use hypothesis to free oneself from hypothesis then evidently Socrates did not succeed. The story of the Forms remains just that, a story, not something he knows. Plato did not wish to extinguish the fire of the desire to know. There is a difference between the claim that it is not possible to know, which is not something he knows, and the recognition that one does not know, between human and divine wisdom.

This just keeps getting more difficult. — Paine

Yes. I think our inability to make sense of the dialogue reflects our inability to make sense of the world. No doubt Platonists would not agree. [Edit: To them] The idea that the world is not intelligible seems not just wrong but disconcertingly so.

There is a difference between using one's hand to touch or move something, and being aware that it is one's hand one is using to touch or move something. — Banno

I do not think that one can use their hand to touch or move something without being aware that it is one's hand that one is using. If not one's hand then what?

Just as a dog may be expecting his master to come, but not to come next Wednesday. — Banno

One is not just like the other. How is being aware of one's hand just like a dog expecting his master but not expecting him to come next Wednesday?

Much of our world is constructed within and by language, and the associated mental content. — Banno

It is true that much of our world, but not the world of a dog, is constructed within and by language, but it does not follow that a baby's awareness of its hands is.

Using one's hand is not physical so much as animal. — Banno

An animal is a physical thing. It is not a question of one or the other. I first wrote biological, but that too could be misconstrued.

For Wittgenstein aesthetics and ethics are shown in performance, so that expressions of ethical or aesthetic preference are all but irrelevant — Banno

I was referring his statement regarding silence. The collection Culture and Value show that he did talk about these things.

The suggestion that ethics and aesthetics are matters to be resolved by linguistic analysis badly misrepresents W.'s view. — Banno

Right. The question was:

Is there anything he says in the Investigations that refutes the insight in the Tractatus that ethics and aesthetics are not matters to be resolved by linguistic analysis? — Fooloso4

The answer is that there is not.

As I said:

It is, rather, not to speak of such things as if they are the same as the propositions of natural science. — Fooloso4

But is the "unmade and the un-generated being offered as an alternative in this context? I read it as: Stuff is getting made and nobody can explain why. — Paine

You are right with regard to the lack of an explanation.

Copying from the Chora thread:

In addition to Forms and sensible things, Timaeus introduces a “third kind” (triton genos, 48e), the chora (χώρα).

The three kinds are:

… that which comes to be, that in which it comes to be, and that from which what comes to be sprouts as something copied. And what’s more, it’s fitting to liken the receiver to a mother , the ‘from which’ to a father, and the nature between these to an offspring (50d).

Like intelligible things, the chora always is. But unlike intelligible things, it is changeable. (52a) Unlike sensible things it does not perish. Befitting its indeterminacy, the chora does not yield to simple definition.

It is said to be the seat of all that has birth. (52b)

He calls it:

… a receptacle for all becoming, a sort of wet nurse.

The chora does not take the shape of anything it receives but is:

… both moved and thoroughly configured by whatever things come into it; and because of these, it appears different at different times ... (50c)

And because she is filled with powers neither similar nor equally balanced, but rather as she sways irregularly in every direction, she herself is shaken by those kinds and, being moved, are always swept along this way and that and are dispersed - just like the particles shaken and winnowed out by sieves and other instruments used for purifying grain … ( 52e)

The chora is not itself active, but due to what is active within it, it moves and thus contributes to the movement of what is in it. Like a sieve, it is not active but by being acted on it acts on what is in it.

I am reluctant to accept the second paragraph. — Paine

Plato probably creates Timaeus, so the divine craftsman would be Plato's creation. Perhaps a creation engendered by wonder. Aristotle says philosophy begins with wonder. If the question of origins cannot be answered definitively, then philosophy is a kind of poetry.

But I won't insist. Perhaps this is just my non-philosophical poetic image of philosophy.

The difference between what is generated by nature and produced artificially ... — Paine

The role of a divine craftsman plays off this difference. Is what is made by the craftsman by nature or is nature made by the craftsman or is there something eternal, unmade and ungenerated at the source?

The divine craftsman is said to be "poet and father" (28c) Is he a product, something made by a poet? My suspicion is that Timaeus, is the father and poet of this likely story of things made and unmade.

Sallis is economical and direct. This is part of what makes him difficult to read. His work on Plato is one aspect of the larger scope of his work on reason and imagination.

John Sallis — Paine

A careful reader who needs to be read carefully. Not for the casual reader but highly recommended. His "Chorology" was helpful in my attempt to understand the Timaeus. Results of that attempt can be found in the thread Shaken to the Chora

A bit more from that thread on the "bastardly discourse" that Sallis refers to:

The chora, to the extent it is understood, is grasped by:

… some bastard reasoning with the aid of insensibility, hardly to be trusted, the very thing we look to when we dream and affirm that it’s somehow necessary for everything that is to be in some region [topos] and occupy some space [chora] and that what is neither on earth nor somewhere in heaven is nothing (Timaeus 52b-c).

To be clear, it is not that the chora is posited as the result of bastard reasoning. It is the attempt to understand it that relies on bastard reasoning. We cannot understand the chora itself. We rely on images of space and place. In dreams we mistake images for their originals (Republic 476c), but the chora is not some thing with its own properties and identity. Reasoning about it cannot make use of the image/original distinction. It is indeterminate and something thought of only in terms of images.
The image of chora as mother and the father as that “from which” the offspring come raises the problem of paternity. Both the divine craftsman and the Forms have been identified as the father of what comes to be.

From what I can tell, American conservatism is Locke's classical liberalism. — BillMcEnaney

Not anymore. The roots of both liberal and conservative ideologies can be found in the works of classical liberalism but today's Republican Party is not conservative as the term was generally understood in the pre-Trumpian era.

With its emphasis familial piety, ritual, and ren (virtue) Confucianism is conservative in a way that differs from Liberalism with its emphasis on the individual.

Saying that facts condition our grammar, as per Moyal-Sharrock, seems to diminish the autonomous nature of grammar, especially since it’s grammar that determines what we mean by fact, object, and reality. So, our grammar presupposes these concepts, but it’s not independent of reality. — Sam26

How are we to understand the following?

PI 497. The rules of grammar may be called “arbitrary”, if that is to mean that the purpose of grammar is nothing but that of language.
If someone says, “If our language had not this grammar, it could not
express these facts” - it should be asked what “could” means here.

It is not that grammar determines facts:

Do I want to say, then, that certain facts are favorable to the formation of certain concepts; or again unfavorable? And does experience teach us this? It is a fact of experience that human beings alter their concepts, exchange them for others when they learn new facts; when in this way what was formerly important to them becomes unimportant, and vice versa. (It is discovered e.g. that what formerly counted as a difference in kind, is really only a difference in degree.

(Zettel 352)

The logical role of hinges is that of being beyond doubt and therefore beyond truth and falsity. To bring in the idea that hinge beliefs are true and false is to miss one of the core points of On Certainty. It’s like trying to shove a square peg into a round hole. — Sam26

It is not that they are beyond doubt and truth or falsity, it is that their truth is not doubted. But this is not eternal and immutable. At one time it was accepted that the sun revolves around the earth and that no one has been on the moon.

The baby and the builder are not unaware of their hands, any more than aware of their hands. — Banno

I won't get into early child development and body awareness, but researchers do not agree. Having spent a great deal of time with my own children I cannot agree either.

Which comes first, meaning or mental content? Will we follow Sellers in taking mental content as deriving from linguistic meaning? Or Grice in taking linguistic meaning as deriving from mental content? — Banno

This is a different issue. Awareness of having hands, confidence that one has hands, knowledge that one has hands is first and primarily physical not conceptual.

There are deep differences between the aesthetics of the Tractatus and the Investigations — Banno

From the article you cited:

By “entirely misunderstood”, it emerges that he means both (1) that aesthetic questions are of a conceptual type very distinct from empirical questions ... and (2) that the philosophically traditional method of essentialistic definition – determining the essence that all members of the class “works of art” exhibit and by virtue of which they are so classified – will conceal from our view more than it reveals.

This speaks directly to my question:

Is there anything he says in the Investigations that refutes the insight in the Tractatus that ethics and aesthetics are not matters to be resolved by linguistic analysis? — Fooloso4

and indicates continuity from the Tractatus to the later works. By silence he does not mean not saying anything at all about aesthetics. It is not a prohibition against expressing appreciation or what one experiences when seeing or hearing something beautiful. It is, rather, not to speak of such things as if they are the same as the propositions of natural science.

So again, it is perhaps a mistake to see any of Wittgenstein's writings as complete, and hence an exegetical error to attempt to set out a coherent and complete picture. — Banno

Has anyone claimed that they are?

In that regard, he is too inclusive and sees everything through the goggles of Plotinus. — Paine

It is no surprise that when seen through the interpretive lens of the Platonist Plotinus Plato and Aristotle are regarded by Gerson as Platonists. Central to Gerson's Platonism is the intelligible world. Perhaps the world is intelligible, but that does not mean it is intelligible to us. Gerson acknowledges this distinction. For example, in a

review of a book on Plato's Timaeus he says, with regard to Timaeus' likely stories:

Likelihood is in principle the best we can aim for in dealing with a likeness, though, if we had direct knowledge of the eternal model, we could no doubt give a better account. As it is, the best we can aim for is “conviction” ( pistis) not “truth” ( aletheia) ...

This likely account is, therefore, a muthos as well as a logos, a muthos for humans. From the divine perspective, however, there would undoubtedly be a genuine logos of creation, because from that perspective the purposes of creation would be transparent.

The philosopher, like the poets and theologians, deals in likely stories. They too are myth makers. They do not bring truth and light to the cave, They too are puppet-makers, makers of images that by the light of the cave cast shadows on its walls.

I will leave it to others who are more familiar with Plotinus and other Platonists to say how closely the philosopher as myth-maker aligns with their teachings.

They have not forgotten. They are convinced that kissing the ring or ass is necessary if the are to be reelected. Those who refuse have decided not to run again.

Has anyone else noticed that now that all the sycophants are now wearing red ties Trump is now wearing other colored ties?

Others might agree that there is more to silence than mere inactivity. — Banno

Of course there is more:

There must indeed be some kind of ethical reward and ethical punishment, but they must reside in the action itself.

(6.422)

Hopefully in silence, baby sucks its fist, unawares of being a baby , or having a fist . That this is a fist arises as the baby takes its place in its family, in its linguistic community. — Banno

In the builder's language there is no word for 'hand' but surely they are aware they have hands. They use them skillfully. The baby becomes aware that it has hands as it learns to use them, not as it takes its place in a linguistic community. It learns to use them skillfully. To touch things, to feel things, to hold things. That they are called hands comes later.

We need to go the step further and see why that silence needed to be broken by the Investigations. — Banno

He came to see that the way he thought about language is not the way it works. Language is a social practice. It is not determined by an a priori transcendental logic. Is there anything he says in the Investigations that refutes the insight in the Tractatus that ethics and aesthetics are not matters to be resolved by linguistic analysis?

The distinction is between the public teaching and matters which are not made public. In the OP a theory of Forms is regarded as a "core doctrine" that represents Plato's own view. There is, however, a great deal in the dialogues that call the Forms into question. The idea found in the Republic of eternal, fixed, transcendent truths known only to the philosophers is a useful political fiction. This "core doctrine" is a myth, a noble lie.

Are you claiming that Plato did not intend to make anything whatsoever public? — Leontiskos

No. Both Plato and Aristotle write in ways intended to mitigate the problem of writing. Both have a salutary public teaching.

The letter does not say that Plato holds no positions, or that none of his positions are inferable from his texts, or that none of his positions are inferable from Aristotle's texts. — Leontiskos

Nor did I say that. Once again:

In other words, according to Plato in the Seventh Letter there are no core doctrines or any doctrines at all in his writings that can rightly be attributed to him. — Fooloso4

If you are arguing that his core doctrines are unwritten that is a whole other discussion. Griffin's review of Gerson, however, addresses such things as the unmoved mover and the "theory of Forms", that is, what is written.

I already addressed this in the parenthetical remark at the end of that paragraph. — Leontiskos

Here is what you said:

Therefore Plato held knowable positions (insofar as we accept Aristotle's depiction of Plato's thought) — Leontiskos

Are you claiming that Aristotle made public what Plato intended to keep private? Wouldn't that be a breach of trust? Do you think he rejects what Socrates says about the problem of writing in the Phaedrus:

[E]very [written] speech rolls around everywhere, both among those who understand and among those for whom it is not fitting, and it does not know to whom it ought to speak and to whom not.

(275d-e)

Aristotle too was aware that what is appropriate to say or not to say must take into consideration who one is speaking to. He had no control over who was reading his work or listening to his lectures. And so, like Plato, only made public what he thinks will benefit the reader or listener while not disclosing what only a few might be able to understand.

One thing that is verifiable is that Gerson's criticism of Aristotle is a repetition of Plotinus — Paine

In following Plotinus I think Gerson misrepresents both Plato and Aristotle. Plotinus' first principle, the arche of the Whole, is the Good or One. He tries to resolve the problem of the One and the Many in this principled way, but neither Plato or Aristotle do this. For them the problem stands as a limit of human understanding.

Socrates is heard joining the criticism of Heraclitus but does not explain why he won't criticize Parmenides except to say he was wise. — Paine

An interesting observation. Plato's Timaeus begins with a devastating criticism of the Republic. It is radically incomplete. It is a city created by intellect without necessity, that is, a city without chance and contingency. A city that could never be. The fixed intelligible world is unintelligible. Heraclitus rather than Parmenides seems to have the last word.

Ok, fair enough, but with the assurance that you will know? — ENOAH

No assurance is given. In the Republic Socrates tells stories about transcendent knowledge but given his profession of ignorance these stories should not be mistaken for knowledge.

Gerson's central focus, as a scholar, has been upon Plotinus and his contemporaries (broadly speaking). — Paine

Are you saying that Gerson's interpretation of Plato is through his reading of Plotinus? That seems right to me.

Beyond the role of the mid-wife taking precedence over that of recollection, Socrates is heard defending Parmenides who also criticizes the Forms (in that named Platonic dialogue). — Paine

If we look at the dramatic chronology of the dialogues Plato places Parmenides criticism of the Forms at an early stage of Socrates own philosophical education. This raises doubts as to whether Socrates own criticism of Forms should be explained away as the result of Plato having changed his mind in a later stage of his development.

In his role as mid-wife he says he is able to help others bring their ideas to birth but is himself barren and without wisdom.

Is there such clear evidence of this lingering-skepticism ... — ENOAH

It should be understood that Socratic skepticism differs from other types of skepticism. It is the desire to know based on the knowledge of our ignorance. It is, as the root of the word indicates, the practice of doubt and inquiry.

With regard to evidence, we must follow the argument and action of the dialogues in Plato that lead to aporia and the dialectic of Aristotle. In both cases there is not a move from opinion to unqualified knowledge. I have discussed some of this in various threads that look closely at their writings.

My point is that it does not entail what you say it does. — Leontiskos

What does:

There is no treatise (suggramma) by me on these subjects, nor will there ever be. — Fooloso4

mean if not that Plato did not give us written doctrines?

It seems you missed the point of my post. — Leontiskos

Your post began by saying that the quote from the Seventh Letter was:

... a 21st century thesis in the sense that Plato and Aristotle died 2500 years ago ... — Leontiskos

How do you understand this if it does not mean what he said in the letter?

If Plato held no knowable positions, then Aristotle could not have argued with Plato. — Leontiskos

Of course he could. He was responding to what was said in the dialogues. Surely he was aware of how what is in the dialogues differed from Plato's own positions as they known by and discussed with those whom he trusted and not by and with others. He was also aware of how Plato was being interpreted. As you go on to say:

Aristotle had access to Plato's person, not just his texts. — Leontiskos

This does not mean that Aristotle disclosed what Plato kept from those he regarded as unsuited to hear them. If Plato did not make them public then it is almost certain that Aristotle would not disclose them.

Gerson accepts Plato's theory of Forms and argues against a break between Plato and Aristotle regarding Forms. But Plato himself gives us reason to doubt that he seriously held a theory of Forms. He did, however, apparently think it better that those not well suited to the truth believe in Forms rather than what the poets, sophists and theologians taught.

That's a 21st century thesis in the sense that Plato and Aristotle died 2500 years ago and we can argue about their texts ad infinitum. — Leontiskos

Some argue that the Seventh Letter was not written by Plato. As far as I know Gerson accepts its legitimacy. In the letter Plato says, as quoted:

"There is no treatise (suggramma) by me on these subjects, nor will there ever be." (341c) — Fooloso4

That is not a "21st century thesis", it is, if genuine, what he wrote. Even if you think it is a forgery it is not a 21st century forgery.

The problem is that Aristotle was Plato's literal student. Aristotle knew Plato, Aristotle was taught by Plato, Aristotle and Plato inevitably argued with one another about things, and Aristotle continued to argue with Plato in his own writings. — Leontiskos

This is only a problem if you claim that Aristotle rejected Plato. I don't think he did.

The claim that Plato held no doctrines or positions is almost certainly false — Leontiskos

The claim is that there is no written doctrines by Plato. No doubt he has his opinions on such matters, but Plato never spoke in his own name in the dialogues. Make of this what you will. If you want to discover Plato's doctrines in what one or more of his characters say in the dialogues then such claims must be weighed against what is said and by whom in other places both within that dialogue and in other dialogues.

But crucially false is the claim that we cannot discern doctrinal differences between Plato and Aristotle from their writings, and especially from Aristotle's writings. — Leontiskos

Not only can differences be found between Plato and Aristotle, differences can be found within the dialogues themselves and in the works of Aristotle themselves. Explanations abound as to why. Whether these differences are doctrinal is not the same thing.

One of the key strengths of Gerson’s work is his detailed comparative analysis of the core doctrines of Plato and Aristotle. — Dermot Griffin

I think that this is the key weaknesses of his work. In Plato's Seventh Letter he says:

"There is no treatise (suggramma) by me on these subjects, nor will there ever be." (341c)

In other words, according to Plato in the Seventh Letter there are no core doctrines or any doctrines at all in his writings that can rightly be attributed to him. I have included more from the letter below.

According to the Phaedo, if there is a "theory of forms" it is, as part of Socrates' second sailing, a hypothesis. (Phaedo 96a-100a) It is a turn away from the attempt to see the things themselves as they are themselves, which like looking directly at the sun can cause blindness, to take refuge in speech. The hypothesis of Forms is called "safe and ignorant" (Phaedo 105c) The inadequacy of Forms is the starting point of the Timaeus.

With regard to Plato and Aristotle their shared common ground is that they are both Socratic skeptics, inquirers who know that they do not know. Their writings are dialectical or dialogical. The dialogue between Plato and Aristotle is part of their practice of thinking and writing as both internal and external dialogue. It models the reader's or listener's active role as skeptical inquirers.

More from the Seventh Letter:

If it seemed to me that these [philosophical] matters could adequately be put down in writing for the many or be said, what could be nobler for us to have done in our lifetime than this, to write what is a great benefit for human beings and to lead nature forth into the light for all? But I do not think such an undertaking concerning these matters would be a good for human beings, unless for some few, those who are themselves able to discover them through a small indication; of the rest, it would unsuitably fill some of them with a mistaken contempt, and others with lofty and empty hope as if they had learned awesome matters.

(341d-e)

For this reason every man who is serious about things that are truly serious avoids writing so that he may not expose them to the envy and perplexity of men. Therefore, in one word, one must recognize that whenever a man sees the written compositions of someone, whether in the laws of the legislator or in whatever other writings, [he can know] that these were not the most serious matters for him; if indeed he himself is a serious man.

(344c)

Any man, whether greater or lesser who has written about the highest and first principles concerning nature, according to my argument, he has neither heard nor learned anything sound about the things he has written. For otherwise he would have shown reverence for them as I do, and he would not have dared to expose them to harsh and unsuitable treatment.

(344d-e)

What is it according to the Tractatus that we must remain silent about? The answer is, the sense (Sinn) of the world, as opposed to the sense of things in the world (6.41). Matters of value, of ethics and aesthetics as opposed to the accidental facts of what happens in the world. Things in the world, both as they are in themselves and as they are for us phenomenally, are not things about which one must remain silent.

I won't get into the odd notion of one's own hand as an external thing in itself. In any case, I don't think it has anything to do with the problems of On Certainty.

We evict questions of meaning, looking instead to questions of use, and so trade silence for action. — Banno

Wittgenstein does not evict questions of meaning. 'Meaning' has different senses that in German can correspond to Sinn and Bedeutung. The meaning of a word, how it is used, is not the same as a word being meaningful or having significance or importance. What is meaningful, matters of value, of ethics and aesthetics, are not matters of the use of terms. We might see from someone's actions that something has meaning for them, but the action does not explain the meaning of the action.

... the confidence that this is a hand comes from communal agreement, not from the perception of a homunculus or solipsistic conviction. It is inherently a public activity. — Banno

A baby grasps things. It uses its hands to put things in its mouth, including its hands. It does not become confident that its hand is a hand. It becomes confident in the use of its hands. That this is a hand arises when it learns the name of things.

But On Certainty does not present us with a "Third Wittgenstein". — Banno

I agree, although for reasons that perhaps differ from your own. I see it as a development of such things as the notion of a form of life, as part of the shift away from propositions as foundational.

From OC:

In the beginning was the deed.

(OC 402)

But that means I want to conceive it as something that lies beyond being justified or
unjustified; as it were, as something animal.

(OC 359)

I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but
not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of
communication needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of
ratiocination.

(OC 475)

Following or going against a rule allows us to implement practices, ways of doing things, that have a social role despite in a sense not having an empirical grounding. — Banno

The rule is determined by the practice rather than the practice being determined by the rule.

See:

26. But can it be seen from a rule what circumstances logically exclude a mistake in the
employment of rules of calculation?
What use is a rule to us here? Mightn't we (in turn) go wrong in applying it?

And:

OC 139. Not only rules, but also examples are needed for establishing a practice. Our rules leave loopholes open, and the practice has to speak for itself.

OC 140. We do not learn the practice of making empirical judgments by learning rules: we are taught judgments and their connexion with other judgments. A totality of judgments is made plausible to us.

The remedy for this misunderstanding of On Certainty lie in Philosophical Investigations. — Banno

And what is the remedy for misunderstanding Philosophical Investigations? Certainly not a rule!

Crime data in the US has been manipulated for years for political gain. — BitconnectCarlos

To the extent this might be true it is not something that one party does and the other eschews. In the case of Trump data does not matter.

Well said!

But don't fall for the 'equivalence' fallacy. — Wayfarer

Right! It is a rhetorical tactic. There is no equivalence, but when the danger of Trump and the red tie sycophants is pointed out their propaganda machine accuses Biden and everyone else who tries to hold Trump to account of the very things that Trump is guilty of.

The erosion of trust is likely to continue no matter who is elected. 'Us vs Them' leaves no common ground. Perhaps the disarray of coalitions falling apart will lead us to something better. Perhaps not.

a ‘mirror universe’, a world of ‘alternative facts’, — Wayfarer

An apt description. Each side suspecting the other of the same things. One result of this rhetorical
tactic is that reasoned argument is defeated.

I'm quite concerned that President Biden is now attempting to imprison his main political rival ... — BitconnectCarlos

Trump has effectively turned civil and criminal matters into political matters and is accusing Biden of doing exactly what Trump himself is doing. When Trump declared his run for President so early the astute observation was that he did so in order to avoid prosecution.

There is no evidence that Biden is attempting to imprison Trump. The judge, not Biden, determines sentencing.

How could we have, and why would we need, proof against radical skepticism, if it incoherent? — Janus

Moore thought it necessary, which is the reason he claimed to know he had hands.

I think the counterpoint would be something like 'What could it possibly mean for it to be false?'. — Janus

Yes. That is what Wittgenstein does.

Let me know when they start razing blocks and destroying stores. — BitconnectCarlos

If such things concern you then pay attention to what happens, and not only to what has not happened. You do not need me to let you know.

You seem to be pushing Witt into a more relativistic position — Sam26

A relativistic position might be one of many different positions called relativistic.

305. Here once more there is needed a step like the one taken in relativity theory.

I take this to be related to the following:

152. I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them
subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that
anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.

There is no fixed point that serves as the basis for beliefs and judgments. The system of judgments varies from time to time and place to place and to some extend from person to person. Some might think this is a situation that must be resolved, but I do not think that Wittgenstein intends to offer any kind of solution.

There is a relativistic point to all this of course, but there is also an objective component, which is more important. — Sam26

But you make a distinction between hinges that are proper and those that are not. You include belief in God with those that are not. For those who believe God may be what is most important and against which all other things are measured. For the same reason one who does not believe might also think it important. Wittgenstein seems to be content to let such differences stand.

Anyone notice the lack of rioting and looting after the Trump verdict? — BitconnectCarlos

There have been threats of violence by Trump supporters. We do not know the extent to which they will follow through or when such actions might occur. The January 6th insurrection attempt did not occur until two months after the election.

The question becomes, are there good reasons to reject or doubt what they consider a hinge belief? — Sam26

What may count as good reasons for you may not be what others regard as good reasons. Once again:

336. But what men consider reasonable or unreasonable alters. At certain periods men find
reasonable what at other periods they found unreasonable. And vice-versa.
But is there no objective character here?
Very intelligent and well-educated people believe in the story of creation in the Bible, while others
hold it as proven false, and the grounds of the latter are well known to the former.

And one that has been quoted many times including by you:

166. The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing.

Also:

612. I said I would 'combat' the other man, - but wouldn't I give him reasons? Certainly; but how far do they go? At the end of reasons comes persuasion. (Think what happens when missionaries
convert natives.)

Does the missionary convert the natives by providing good reasons? Are there good reasons to convert them? Are there good reasons to reject the missionary's Christian beliefs?

Doubting that there is a God makes perfect sense. — Sam26

Not to those who are convinced otherwise. To doubt it would put everything, their whole system of beliefs, into doubt.

Is there any support in Wittgenstein for the notion of a "proper hinge"?

My view is that belief in God is not a hinge belief. — Sam26

In an earlier post you said:

For many religions, belief in God is a hinge. — Sam26

107. Isn't this altogether like the way one can instruct a child to believe in a God, or that none
exists, and it will accordingly be able to produce apparently telling grounds for the one or the other?

That belief is part of their inherited background of our world picture. That there is or is not a God is for them bedrock, foundational.

Do you agree that the philosopher must uphold, almost, a fiduciary duty towards the public, in terms of living a certain life? — Shawn

Well, the public sentenced Socrates to death for living a certain life that they thought threatened their way of life.

Historically, the practice of philosophy moved from the personal to the impersonal, under the assumption that the truth is independent of the thinker. For Heidegger thought itself, as what is to be thought, is independent of man in so far as what is to be thought withdraws from man. Accordingly, man's responsibility is toward thinking itself.