A couple of differences: Abraham speaks face to face with his god. He makes a bargain with him and questions his morality in destroying Sodom and Gamorrah. Moses would be destroyed if he were in the direct presence of his god. His god must appear to him in a burning bush. Moses' god gives the people the Law.

It is also worth mentioning the Jacob wrested with god. For some this is a defining characteristic of Judaism - the struggle to know God. Here too the question of names arises - both the changing of Jacob's name to Israel and the refusal of whoever it was that he wrestled with to tell him his name. Replying:

Why do you ask my name? (Genesis 32:29

The question of names and what something is is a recurring theme, starting with finding suitable mate for Adam:

The Lord God said, “It is not good for the man to be alone. I will make a helper suitable for him.”

Now the Lord God had formed out of the ground all the wild animals and all the birds in the sky. He brought them to the man to see what he would name them; and whatever the man called each living creature, that was its name. (Genesis 2:18-19)

So how is the Abrahamic God different from the Mosaic one? — frank

This is an interesting question.

Moses said to God, “Suppose I go to the Israelites and say to them, ‘The God of your fathers has sent me to you,’ and they ask me, ‘What is his name?’ Then what shall I tell them?

God said to Moses, “I am who I am. This is what you are to say to the Israelites: ‘I am has sent me to you.’”

God also said to Moses, “Say to the Israelites, ‘The Lord, the God of your fathers—the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob—has sent me to you.’

(Exodus 3:13-15)

Why is there a question of God's name? There are several different names for gods in the Hebrew Bible. Monotheism is often assumed and following this the names are taken to be different names for the same god, but monotheism was a later development. In other words, the problem Moses faces is which god will the people to heed. The answer avoids names and says instead that the god of your fathers is the same god, the god of Abraham, the god of Isaac, and the god of Jacob. Moses unites the various stories and beliefs that developed over time among the Egyptian Jews.

But the Jews of Exodus may be a myth. In other words, it is not a unification that occurred historically in this way but rather through the myths, which include not only this story but the weaving together of various stories that were compiled and edited to form the books of the Hebrew Bible.

Intelligibility is a potential that exists prior to being actually known. So, it is not "derived." It is in nature. — Dfpolis

This ignores the point. First, by derived I mean abstracted. Second, if the mathematical structure is in nature but that structure is knowable without being abstracted from nature then there is reason to think that structure might be independent of nature.

I suggest you read a calculus book. — Dfpolis

I suggest you read why I said it was nonsense and respond to that. Here it is once again:

With regard to Zeno, it is the divisibility that is infinite. With regard to infinitesimals the quantity is smaller than can be measured. In neither case is it something derived from experience. They are theoretical constructs. Whether reality is continuous or discrete remains an open question. — Fooloso4

First, Zeno's paradox is not something abstracted from nature. Second, both Newton and Leibniz used a concept of infinitesimals that was not abstracted from nature given that the infinitesimal is not measurable. Third, the question of whether reality is continuous or discrete is something that is dealt with in physics not mathematics.

Your claim is that mathematics is an abstraction from experience. But now you say that the parallel postulate cannot be abstracted from experience.
— Fooloso4

Reread the OP. — Dfpolis

If you are referring to 2a, an axiom or postulate is not a hypothesis.

One can be right about some things, and wrong about others. While I am happy to allow Bolyai his joy, his assessment is clearly inaccurate. Human creativity consists in imposing new form on old matter, not creation ex nihilo. — Dfpolis

Of course it is not creatio ex nihilo! He did not mean it literally. Nit picking does not address what is at issue. Once again, non-Euclidean geometries are not abstractions. The negation of the parallel postulate is not a hypothesis, it is an axiom. What is of interest is what follows from it, and what follows is completely independent of physical reality.

I grant that most modern mathematicians are not thinking of the real world when they work. That does not mean that the content they work with is not derived from our experience of reality. — Dfpolis

The negation of the parallel postulate is not derived from our experience of reality, nor is what follows from it.

What percent of students are actually there to learn anything anyway? — ZhouBoTong

Most are there in order to get a job. Learning is not a high priority

22:

… reason is purposive doing.

Hegel notes that this claim has fallen into disrepute, because nature is regarded to be above thinking and without external purpose. He says that this misconstrues thinking and that purpose does not entail external purpose. He appeals to Aristotle’s determination of nature as

... purposive doing, purpose is the immediate, the motionless, which is self-moving, or, is subject.

This is important in several ways. It shows that the development of knowledge is not simply a linear progression in which those who come later see more clearly and accurately than the ancients did. Aristotle is taken up again anew, which is not to say ahistorically. In addition, nature as purposive means that nature is not the action of blind forces, there is purpose in its doings. Nature as subject means that thinking is not below or above nature. Aristotle’s unmoved mover is the movement of the subject, the thinking I.

Its abstract power to move is being-for-itself, or, pure negativity. For that reason, the result is the same as the beginning because the beginning is purpose – that is, the actual is the same as its concept only because the immediate, as purpose, has the self, or, pure actuality, within itself.

The beginning is purpose, the result the actualization of purpose. From beginning to end, in moving away from itself the move is back to itself, it is the actuality of purpose, being for itself.

What has returned into itself is just the self, and the self is self-relating sameness and simplicity.

But what is the self? Is it the same or different from myself or yourself?

23:

The need to represent the absolute as subject has helped itself to such propositions as “God is the eternal,” or “God is the moral order of the world,” or “God is love,” etc.

Does Hegel intend for us to draw a connection between “God is love”, “The life of God and divine cognition ... as a game love plays with itself” (19),and the goal of philosophy as moving “nearer to the goal where it can lay aside the title of love of knowing and be actual knowing (5)?

In such propositions, the true is directly posited as subject, but it is not presented as the movement of reflection taking-an-inward-turn.

That is, such propositions only reflect the negative movement, the movement away from itself, its otherness, which has not yet reached the moment of the movement when reflection turns back to itself. So, what’s love got to do with it? Love is the desire for unity. In religious terms it is the unity of man and God. In philosophical terms the unity of man and knowledge. In knowledge the desire for unity with God is overcome, for the movement has returned back to the self from the otherness of God.

One proposition of that sort begins with the word “God.” On its own, this is a meaningless sound, a mere name. It is only the predicate that says what the name is and is its fulfillment and its meaning. The empty beginning becomes actual knowledge only at the end of the proposition. To that extent, one cannot simply pass over in silence the reason why one cannot speak solely of the eternal, the moral order of the world, etc., or, as the ancients did, of pure concepts, of being, of the one, etc., or, of what the meaning is, without appending the meaningless sound as well.

Instead of saying: “God is the eternal” or “God is the moral order”, etc., why can’t we just say the eternal or the moral order without appending the meaningless sound God? The answer is provided in the next sentence:

However, the use of this word only indicates that it is neither a being nor an essence nor a universal per se which is posited; what is posited is what is reflected into itself, a subject.

We should keep in mind that Hegel says the subject is self-positing (18).In other words, the positing of God is the self-positing of the subject. But:

... at the same time, this is something only anticipated. The subject is accepted as a fixed point on which the predicates are attached for their support through a movement belonging to what it is that can be said to know this subject and which itself is also not to be viewed as belonging to the point itself, but it is solely through this movement that the content would be portrayed as the subject.

The positing of God is at that moment the positing of something fixed and unchanging, something wholly and completely other. But:

... not only is the former anticipation that the absolute is subject not the actuality of this concept, but it even makes that actuality impossible, for it posits the concept as a point wholly at rest, whereas the concept is self-movement.

The problem is that the subject, God, is thought of as being at rest and unchanging. As the theologians have argued, God is perfect and thus unchanging, for change implies imperfection.

Another victory for the plutocrats: the merger of t mobile and sprint. Trump once again demonstrating that his being a champion of the average citizen against the "elite" was a con. It is crony capitalism and Trump benefits financially. https://www.vox.com/2019/7/29/8932025/trump-sprint-tmobile-hotel

Trump attacks Sharpton. Is it just a coincidence that he has attacked yet another minority? To see this as just examples of Trump's racism misses the point. Trump is playing a version of the child's game "I know your are but what am I" or "I am rubber and you are glue, whatever you say bounces off of me and sticks to you", accusing others of what you have been accused of. If he is a racist then so are they. As with words such as 'truth' and 'facts', they come to loose their meaning.

Trump nominates a "loyalist" as Director of National Intelligence. To be clear, a loyalist to Trump. As with Barr, Trump moves to protect himself from investigation by putting people loyal to him in charge. The fox guarding the hen house.

This is a very confused statement. If a mathematical theory applies to reality accurately ... — Dfpolis

It is not a theory, it is a formal deductive system based on the negation of the parallel postulate.

... since we presumably know the instantiation, we can abstract the theory from it. So, one need not "maintain that there is a mathematical reality." — Dfpolis

Once again,it is a purely formal, logical system that was developed prior to and independently of any instantiation.

...empirical reality has a mathematical intelligibility. — Dfpolis

And in this case an intelligibility that was not empirically derived, suggesting that the physical world is structured mathematically, that the mathematics are fundamental, formative.

Since they do not exist, they are not constructs.The theory uses small quantities tending to zero, while always remaining finite. — Dfpolis

This is nonsense. With regard to Zeno, it is the divisibility that is infinite. With regard to infinitesimals the quantity is smaller than can be measured. In neither case is it something derived from experience. They are theoretical constructs. Whether reality is continuous or discrete remains an open question.

Do you think that I'm the first to notice that Kant's arguments are inadequate? — Dfpolis

Your claim was that Kant had no reason to claim that experience is constructed. This was followed in another post by:

Having read Kant's reasoning, he seems to have been unaware of the errors he was making. — Dfpolis

What do you provide in support of that? That you read Kant's reasoning. My response was sarcastic - The title of your paper: Kant's Reasoning Regarding Experience Faulty. The text of the paper: I read Kant's reasoning.

I do know that the parallel postulate has been suspect since classical times precisely because it cannot be abstracted from experience -- which was my point. — Dfpolis

Was it? Your claim is that mathematics is an abstraction from experience. But now you say that the parallel postulate cannot be abstracted from experience. That would make it a theoretical construct, but you have denied that there can be such a thing. You also say that:

non-euclidean geometries could be abstracted from models instantiating them. — Fooloso4

So, now a central part of Euclidean geometry cannot be abstracted from experience but non-Euclidean geometry can.

The fact is, though, once again, that non-Euclidean geometry was not abstracted from experience. All of this leaves your claim about mathematics being an abstraction muddled. But I take it that was not your point.

They did not have a hypothetical status because they were not hypotheses. They were formal logical systems that were not intended to relate to anything else.
— Fooloso4

That is you view. I already noted that Bolyai discussed which geometry described reality, which means that he saw geometry as potentially reflecting reality, and the status of the parallel axiom as a hypothesis to be studied by physics. — Dfpolis

This is what Bolyai is quoted saying in that article:

I have discovered such wonderful things that I was amazed...out of nothing I have created a strange new universe.

The article also states:

The discovery of a consistent alternative geometry that might correspond to the structure of the universe helped to free mathematicians to study abstract concepts irrespective of any possible connection with the physical world.

Clearly they were not hypothesis about the physical world, or, as your prefer, reality. They were neither abstracted from or hypothesis about the physical world.

I am discussing how we come to posit its axioms, and their epistemological status. — Dfpolis

And how do we come to posit the parallel postulate, if, according to you, it is not an abstraction from reality? Its negation is not an abstraction from reality either. Both, however, have their application in reality.

Yes, still, the name is not intrinsic to it, but assigned in light of its relation to the game. — Dfpolis

We have been through this. It is not a name assigned to a ball that came to exist independent of the game. It is the name of a ball specifically designed and made to be used to play the game of baseball. If not for baseball the ball would not exist.

No, it's because you're intelligent and good-hearted. — frank

Thank you.

It's always nice to talk with you (even when you're mostly wrong). — frank

Perhaps that is why you think it is nice.

The conditions of Earth now are conducive to the flora and fauna that exist. If those conditions change the conditions will no longer be conducive to some and more conducive to others. One large question is how conducive they will be to man and the plants and animals we depend on and the population increase of disease carrying organisms.

After the petroleum and natural gas are gone, hundreds of years worth of coal wait to be burned. — frank

Hence the need to develop energy alternatives. It is not simply a matter of following the law but of survival.


Added: the topic is not global warming. I am not going to continue discussing it.

Hegel is using the Embryo-to-aware-self as a metaphor, he's not expounding a theory of education. — WerMaat

I agree. What I am stressing is the importance of culture in the development of the thinking I. In terms of the context and history of the term it seems to me to not be an interpretation rather than translation, although the line between them is not always clear.

In reading the letter, I'm unclear as to how it succeeds in what it aims -- "that no such obligation can be so transmitted I think very capable of proof" — JosephS

Well, since Jefferson's idea was rejected, we don't know if or how t would have succeeded. It has wide ranging impact on property, contracts, laws.

Jefferson was not completely ignored though. Article 5 of the Constitution:

The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.

note the section I bolded. The Koch brothers and other ultra wealthy conservative plutocrats have been pushing to take advantage of this little known clause. In effect if they are successful in convening a convention then they will be able to rewrite the Constitution if ratified by three fourths of the states.

Trump doesn't mean anything at all from that broad a view. Neither does global warming. — frank

In so far as evolution is a response to environment, global warming is of enormous importance. How could it not be? It will bring about significant environment change, that is, environmental pressures.

The self-development of the individual takes places within the self-development of the whole, which in turn is led by the philosophers from within the whole. We do not each of us come to think as we do on our own. The development of the thinking I is a historical development not something that develops on its own in each individual.

I dont think there's much he could do because his power is dwarfed by that of corporate interests. — frank

Corporations are not sovereign entities. They must comply with government regulations. And this is the crux of the matter. Trump has rescinded environmental regulations. This benefits the corporation, but does not impose, as some would have you believe, undue burdens. Corporate profits are at an all time high. Income disparity is also at an all time high. When Trump rolled back regulations on the coal industry it did not create jobs it simply increased profit margins.

There are many products produced overseas in order to avoid regulations. The best way to prevent this is by rejoining the Paris climate accord and establish global environmental regulations. Upon withdrawing Trump followed a familiar pattern of lies - it was a terrible deal, not good for the American people, and he is going to replace it with something much better.

Hegel's context leaves it open whether the rationality has simply "formed" and developed itself, or whether it was "educated" from an outside source. And the word "cultural" does not show up at all. — WerMaat

Not from an outside source. As I said in an earlier post, there is no outside, all is within the whole.

I feel that Hegel is leaning more towards the self-formed. — WerMaat

Yes, I think that this is right, but self-formation is a cultural formation. We are shaped by and within our culture. As individuals we are not wholly separate or other. To use the agricultural root from which we get culture, it is the soil in which we grow and are nourished.


From the Wiki article on Bildung:

Bildung (German: [ˈbɪldʊŋ], "education, formation, etc.") refers to the German tradition of self-cultivation (as related to the German for: creation, image, shape), wherein philosophy and education are linked in a manner that refers to a process of both personal and cultural maturation.

More specifically:

The concept of Bildung. What is a fundamental theme of Hegel's philosophy is Bildung. This term might be translated as 'education', but it could also be rendered, more appropriately in many contexts, as 'formation', 'development' or 'culture'. For Hegel, the term refers to the formative self-development of mind or spirit (Geist), regarded as a social and historical process. Bildung is part of the life process of a spiritual entity: a human being, a society, a historical tradition. (Allen W. Wood, "Hegel on Education". https://web.stanford.edu/~allenw/webpapers/HegelEd.doc

I understand why some are willing to overlook his shortcoming because of what they think they gain in return, but I cannot understand how anyone who knows what he is doing would conclude that he is isn't really that bad.

You could do that if you could offer a reason to think he has the power to stop global warming. — frank

He alone does not have that power, but he is the leader of a nation that has a great deal of power, both to contribute to and abate the problems of global warming. Is your claim that nothing can be done or that there is nothing that he can do? It the former then that is a discussion for another time. If the latter then I think you are mistaken. It is in his power to provide a great deal of resources aimed at addressing the problem. It should be noted that addressing the problem is not stopping global warming, although that is the eventual goal. One thing that must be addressed is the damage caused by severe weather. Another is the development of alternative energy. A third is to reduce emissions and non-biodegradable waste. But there are things that must be done on the individual lever, which requires educating the public and regulating energy consumption. Trump has the power to allocate resources in all of these areas.

As it stands, with his predecessor as a benchmark, Trump isn't really that bad. — frank

I will note my disagreement on this and leave it there.

Without those individuals the giant anthill will soon fade into nothingness. The anthill will fade into nothingness anyway, so why should it matter? The Earth is an insignificant planet in an insignificant solar system in an insignificant galaxy. All will fade into nothingness. Why should any of it matter? But the fact is, to most of the people who live on this planet it does matter, and what happens to themselves and to those individuals they care about it matters.

I suspect that in asking the question it matters to you as well, otherwise you would not ask why it should matter. It may be an expression of despair, but there is no despair when nothing matters.

You're just shoveling out warnings of dire consequences that haven't happened. I'm starting to think that you cant look at the situation objectively. — frank

These are two different things. Cracks in and the undermining of the foundation do not mean that the house is falling. If nothing is done, however, the house may fall. Warning of consequences are not negated by pointing out that they have not yet occurred.

There's no reason to think human extinction will be a result of global warming. — frank

I did not say extinction, although that is certainly a possibility. I said the Earth will become hell for humans. It was in response to your "hell scale". Someone on a sinking ship may deny that the ship is sinking as long as he is above water. When his feet get wet he shrugs it off, but when we can no longer keep his head above water suddenly he is surprised.

If Trump was on your side, that's exactly the kind of exaggeration he would engage in. — frank

If Trump were on my side he would make every effort to determine what can be done to protect the Earth and its inhabitants. One can put his head in the sand and proclaim that he sees no evidence of
anything wrong, but I put my trust in what the environmental scientists are telling us. They are almost unanimous in their agreement that the consequences will be dire. I also trust that some things can be done, even if we have not yet figured them all out. Your question:

What could he do to stop global warming? — frank

might mean - there is nothing he can that will make a difference. I prefer the question: what should he do to stop global warming? Some are in search of answers, he ignores the question. It is not clear where you stand.

So you actually approve of his methods. — frank

There is a wide gap between saying global warming will lead to human extinction, which was not something I said, to what Trump is doing, which goes far beyond what he says. There is also a big difference between saying something that might or might not be an exaggeration and lies and deceit for one's own benefit.

So, we should thank our lucky stars ? For the 'few' - who knew what to do? — Amity

Since we are reading Hegel it would only be appropriate to that him.

And the opposing view ? — Amity

Of the many? Hegel thinks he and the gang have taken care of that as well. What was once the possession of the few has now become available to all.

So far they're acting like children. "Look, I seized your boat!" That doesn't show up on the Hell scale. — frank

The potential is there for things to escalate. Wars have been started over more trivial things than seizing a boat. It is not clear how close Trump came to bombing Iran. It may have been minutes, it may have been bluster and bluff.

Yes, Trump has diminished the standing of the US in the world. How is that a bad thing? — frank

It the allies of the US can no longer trust it then yes that is a bad thing.

fanning the fires of divisiveness,
— Fooloso4

Again, not on the Hell list. — frank

Lincoln said "A house divided against itself cannot stand". Just because it has not fallen that does not mean that there are not cracks in the foundation. Rather than repair them Trump is widening them.

He is destroying the rule of law and the constitutionally established separation of powers.
— Fooloso4

No he isn't. — frank

Oh, but he is. He is not alone. The Republican party, the Department of Justice, and others are all complicit. When law thwarts power they trample the law. Fortunately for Trump there are people in the administration who have stood up to him. Unfortunately, many of them have resigned. Trump refused to cooperate with the Mueller investigation and with the House inquiries, blocking key witnesses from testifying. He has cast a shadow over the FBI, the CIA, and any other agency that has seen fit to investigate his questionable activity. He has questioned the integrity of the courts, attacking them when he thinks they will rule against him. He has personally attacked Representatives Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez,Ilhan Omar, Ayanna Pressley, and Rashida Tlaib. And more recently Elijah Cummings. While not illegal, these are dictatorial tactics.

He's not leading an effort to protect the earth, true. — frank

It is not simply that he is not leading an effort, he is undermining efforts to protect the earth, putting plutocratic interests ahead of all else.

You'd have to make an impressive case that he's capable of making a significant impact there. — frank

Do you think that rolling back environmental protections does not have a significant impact? Look at what is happening to rivers and streams since he rescinded regulations on coal, it is having a noticeable impact on wildlife and human health. His rollback on regulations on gas consumption would have an impact but California effectively blocked it. Automakers would rather improve gas mileage than not be able to sell cars in California. So, why would Trump do this? The answer is simple, the more gas cars and trucks consume the more gas the oil companies can sell. And speaking of oil companies, who benefits from the US becoming an oil exporter? The plutocrats prosper and the environment suffers. It is well established that a continued reliance on oil negatively effects the environment. Environmental protection is a global problem but Trump walked out on G-20.

Do that and you could chart somewhere on the potential Hell scale. — frank

Unless something is done there will be no Hell scale for earth will become Hell,at least for humans.

So, becoming all that you can be depends not only on capacity for reason but being part of a society of others with whom you can relate and depend on for nourishment and enrichment. Combined with reflection it leads the way to an improved understanding of particulars and the universal. Is that about right ? — Amity

Yes, the development of the individual is through the development of the culture. But also, it is "the few" the philosophers who are responsible for the development of the culture.

I am surprised that the importance of history in or as self-development wasn't recognised by the Greeks. — Amity

Human nature, according to the Greeks, is unchanging. Self-development is toward this end. The realization or actualization or completion of one's nature is not dependent on history. We are no more or less capable of this than the Greeks.

The importance of history, the ability to think change, was one of if not the most important contributions of Hegel's philosophy. It has been said (I don't know by who) that Hegel is Spinoza plus time.

What did they see as the truth ? — Amity

The truth is what they sought. Whatever it is, they thought, or perhaps more accurately publicly professed, it must be unchanging. If the truth can become false then the truth has no meaning.

How does this compare with the Romans ? — Amity

It became the standard, the eternal verities, veritates aeternae. One might think of it as the victory of Parmenides over Heraclitus, but with Hegel Heraclitus lives to fight another day.

I think one thing is clear, God is not known by revelation or by intuition or by feeling. Since truth has the element of its existence solely in concepts (6), what is necessary is the expression of the concept of God.

In paragraph 4 we find the following statement:

However, the commencement of cultural education will first of all also have to carve out some space for the seriousness of a fulfilled life, which in turn leads one to the experience of the crux of the matter, so that even when the seriousness of the concept does go into the depths of the crux of the matter, this kind of acquaintance and judgment will still retain its proper place in conversation.

What is a fulfilled life? Given the themes of wholeness and completion, a fulfilled life is only realized within the movement of or perhaps with the completion of the whole. In any case, it must be a life guided by reason. If is the life that is self-positing. The life in which the thinking I, the subject, is its own authority.

I do not think a neutral stance is arrived at by looking at Obama.

On the international front, we still do not know what the consequences of Trump's breaking the Iran nuclear deal will be. It does show that he is untrustworthy and does not honor agreements. His strategy of increasing sanctions makes Iran increasingly desperate. He believes they will bend to his will, but desperate people do desperate things.

And speaking of desperate he thinks the same tactics will solve the immigration problem. He is either blind or indifferent to the plight of thousands of people desperate to escape intolerable conditions.

At home he is fanning the fires of divisiveness, showing a disregard for all who do not agree with or dare criticize him. His lack of civility and basic decency is not a matter of style, it is corrosive, a manifestation of his moral vacuity and lack of integrity.

He is destroying the rule of law and the constitutionally established separation of powers.

From day one he has refused to be briefed on what is happening nationally and internationally.

He is ignorant of environmental threats, rolling back regulations, and suppressing the findings of the government funded environmental research. He claims that windmills cause cancer, backs coal and oil, and ignores alternative energy.

But, like I already said: he´s got something... He is the president of USA. — James Pullman

And every day he demonstrates how unsuited he is for the job.

Maybe. Or maybe it’s both? I tend to think it’s both that he’s a racist prick and that he understands that there is a large proportion of the country that he can string along. — Noah Te Stroete

I think he was as surprised as everyone else that he won the election. He has no filter and says whatever comes out of his mouth. It plays well with his base and encourages him.

But Trump is smart. — James Pullman

There are plenty of people who know him well from their time in his administration who would strongly disagree with that.

People do like him, he is the US President. — James Pullman

Some people like him others do not. An election is not a popularity contest, but Clinton received 48.2% of the votes to Trump's 46.1%.

I do think he may win the 2020 election. I will give him credit for being a successful liar, but I think this has more to do with his lack of integrity and moral vacuity. He was mentored by Roy Cohn and learned a few things from him - If you are attacked strike back harder. If you are caught in a lie double down, never back down, and never admit you are wrong.

Trump has always surrounded himself by people who work to make him look good and keep him out of trouble. Anything he says that sounds intelligent is probably something that someone wrote for him. When he first became president he read his speeches as if he were a third grader. He seems to have spent a lot of time practicing, now he sounds like an ill prepared sixth grader. At his rallies its a different story. He sounds like someone doing a bad comedy routine.

I don’t believe Trump actually believed the birther bullshit. — Noah Te Stroete

Perhaps not, maybe he just did not want a black president and wanted to cause trouble and plant seeds of doubt. But maybe someone told him that and he wanted to believed it.

Also, your second paragraph which I quoted above furthers the argument that Trump understands people (at least a lot of people). — Noah Te Stroete

If these are his beliefs then I do not see how it furthers the argument that he understands people, it just means that they are all motivated by fear and resentment, including Trump. Trump knows it plays well, but that does not mean he understands people, just that he is encouraged by their approval.

I think Trump is very smart ... I meant that he understands people. He got the votes, did he not? — James Pullman

There are several reasons Trump got the vote, none of them have to do with him being smart or understanding people.

First, Hillary was not a good candidate. Even though she won the popular vote, she was not well liked even by Democrats and because of all the rumors and accusations she was not trusted. Trump on the other hand, was unknown outside of the New York area, except as a TV personality with a fictional history of business success. Those in the New York area have known for years that he is a con artist who cannot be trusted. New York banks refused to lend money to him.

Second, he resonates with those whose political sentiments are based on fear and resentment. It is not that he understood this, but rather that these are his political sentiments too. They range from his opposition to government regulations which force him to comply with safety and environmental codes when building, to being forced to rent to blacks, which he fought in court and lost, to scapegoating Muslims and minorities even though his businesses hire many illegal immigrants.

Third, he made a deal with Evangelicals. Trump, who until recently favored abortion rights, became a anti-abortion champion. I do not recall ever expressing strong pro-Israel, pro-Jerusalem views before the Evangelicals made a deal with the devil. Why they are pro-Israel, pro-Jerusalem is something I discussed in this topic not too long ago. Why he is is because of their political power. Like his attraction to ostentatious displays of wealth, he is drawn to power like a moth to a flame.

I think Hegel at no point goes theologica — tim wood

I don't know what this means. Did Spinoza "go theological"?

The first question should not be whether he believed in God but what he means by God. Once that question is answered the answer to whether he believed in God would be, for those who hold traditional beliefs, no. But that is not the end of the matter. Like talking about man when he is but an embryo, we should wait to see how things develop.

He does not reject:

... taking God to be the one substance

When he talks about:

The life of God and divine cognition ...

this reads to me like an affirmation. But it seems clear from what he has said that his concept of God is not the God of the Bible or the God the traditional theologians.

I also think even in his time it was unwise to be to clearly or explicitly anti-religious. — tim wood

There is some truth in this and I am sure that Hegel, like his predecessors, was well aware of the practice of philosophical esotericism - hiding your meaning from those who are not ready for it. I think that what he says would be regarded as anti-religious by many both in his time and ours, who consider themselves religious. His comment about:

... taking God to be the one substance shocked the age in which this was expressed ... — tim wood

speaks to this.

19. The life of God and divine cognition might thus be expressed as a game love plays with itself.

“Thus” indicates that the life of God and divine cognition follow from what has been said. God and the divine are not separate from but within the circle. A game love plays with itself, the game of uniting two as one, but to play the game one must first become two, dividing and uniting itself with itself. Divine life and divine cognition are being and knowing.

Hegel immediately adds that this idea must be thought with due seriousness, that it was won through the suffering, the patience, and the labor of the negative. The reference is to the life and death of Christ and the themes of suffering and sacrifice, death of the body and life of the spirit. Whatever Hegel’s own beliefs were on such matters, they are an important part of the history of spirit, if not in terms of actual events then in terms of the shaping of consciousness.

Precisely because the form is as essential to the essence as the essence is to itself, the essence must not be grasped and expressed as mere essence, which is to say, as immediate substance or as the pure self-intuition of the divine. Rather, it must likewise be grasped as form in the entire richness of the developed form, and only thereby is it grasped and expressed as the actual.

What does the pure self-intuition of the divine mean? First, this intuition is the subject’s intuition. As immediate substance it takes the divine to be other than itself. To be grasped and expressed as form requires that it be articulated both as self-forming and formed, as both the development of form and the entire richness of the developed form. It is only from this stage of its development, when it has become actual, that it can know itself.

This is summed up in #20:

20: The true is the whole. However, the whole is only the essence completing itself through its own development. This much must be said of the absolute: It is essentially a result, and only at the end is it what it is in truth.

He goes on to express this:

The beginning, the principle, or, the absolute as it is at first, or, as it is immediately expressed, is only the universal. But just as my saying “all animals” can hardly count as an expression of zoology, it is likewise obvious that the words, “absolute,” “divine,” “eternal,” and so on, do not express what is contained in them; – and it is only such words which in fact express intuition as the immediate.

Zoology is not adequately expressed by the universal “all animals”, for in the universal the particular is negated or not expressed. All animals tells us nothing about any particular animal. In the same way, “absolute,” “divine,” “eternal,” tell us nothing about the particulars within the universal.

Whatever is more than such a word, even the mere transition to a proposition, is a becoming-other which must be redeemed, or, it is a mediation.

Hegel goes on to explain mediation:

21: ... mediation is nothing but self-moving self-equality, or, it is a reflective turn into itself, the moment of the I existing-for-itself, pure negativity, or, simple coming-to-be.

The transition from a word to a proposition is mediation for it must be thought and expressed. So too the absolute, the divine, eternal, must be mediated, that is, thought and expressed, given shape and content. But they are mediated by, the I. Existing-for-itself, the I is other than the subject or object of thought. At the same time it negates this otherness by making it one’s own by the understanding. What is thought, the universal, comes to be the subject matter, which is to say, the subject’s matter.

The I, or, coming-to-be, this mediating, is, on account of its simplicity, immediacy in the very process of coming-to-be and is the immediate itself. – Hence, reason is misunderstood if reflection is excluded from the truth and is not taken to be a positive moment of the absolute.

Reason is not unmediated intuition. It is not the understanding. It is positive in that it reflects on what is taken up in the understanding as immediacy without reflection on the process of unity. It is, in other words, reflection on a central problem of philosophy at least since it was first expressed by Parmenides: thinking and being are the same.

The movement in consciousness is from the immediacy of objects in consciousness, to their difference or negativity as objects of rather than from consciousness, to the immediacy of objects of consciousness, their sameness or positivity as objects from consciousness.

Reflection is what makes truth into the result, but it is likewise what sublates the opposition between the result and its coming-to-be. This is so because this coming-to-be is just as simple and hence not different from the form of the true, which itself proves itself to be simple in its result. Coming-to-be is instead this very return into simplicity.

Hegel expresses the same idea in yet another way, this time making explicit that it is not just something that occurs in the consciousness of the individual:

However much the embryo is indeed in itself a person, it is still not a person for itself; the embryo is a person for itself only as a culturally formed and educated rationality which has made itself into what it is in itself.

It is not the capacity for rationality but the culturally formed and educated rationality that allows the person to become for herself what she is in herself. While the importance of culture was recognized by the Greeks, it was to a large degree atemporal. The importance of history as self-moving and self-development was not a factor. The truth was regarded as unchanging. Today both views are represented and defended.

You might be interested in this exchange between Jefferson and Madison. Jefferson says that no generation has a right to bind another. https://jeffersonpapers.princeton.edu/selected-documents/thomas-jefferson-james-madison

Truth is not a value, but a relation between mental judgements and reality. Since it depends on judgements, it can't be prior in time to them. — Dfpolis

There is no judgment of the truth of the deductions of non-Euclidean geometry that independent of reality, unless of course you maintain that there is a mathematical reality. They are formal logical truths. Whatever your theory of truth may be, non-Euclidean geometry works. They find their application in reality.

There are no actual infinitesimals in calculus. — Dfpolis

The point is that they are theoretical constructs. They are not abstracted from nature.

Having read Kant's reasoning, he seems to have been unaware of the errors he was making. — Dfpolis

Him and several generations of Kant scholars. When are you going to publish your findings in a peer reviewed journal?

I said that non-euclidean geometries could be abstracted from models instantiating them. — Dfpolis

But the fact that you are trying to dance around is that they didn't.

If so, that would mean they had a hypothetical status until it was realized that they could be instantiated. — Dfpolis

They did not have a hypothetical status because they were not hypotheses. They were formal logical systems that were not intended to relate to anything else.

According to the Wikipedia article: "Bolyai ends his work by mentioning that it is not possible to decide through mathematical reasoning alone if the geometry of the physical universe is Euclidean or non-Euclidean; this is a task for the physical sciences." — Dfpolis

This is besides the point. They were not constructed as models of the universe. The question is how is it that they do apply? Is it just coincidence?

I have answered all this previously. Knowing an object's intrinsic nature need not entail knowing its relationships. — Dfpolis

The problem is that a baseball being a baseball is not a relationship. It is intrinsic to what it is to be a baseball.

One might figure it out, but only if one knew there were beings that could use it so. — Dfpolis

You might claim that a car's being a mode of transportation is not intrinsic to it being a car, but that is only because you want to maintain your questionable claim about intelligibility. If not for that you would define it as everyone else does.

I think you are entirely right. It would be helpful to circle back. After all, the circle is the best and most powerful image of the self-movement of spirit. Since it is so easy to get lost in the details and opacity of Hegel's writing, before moving forward I want to collect a few things together that he has said.

12: ... the whole which has returned into itself from out of its succession and extension and has come to be the simple concept of itself.

Returning to itself from out of itself the whole comes to know itself. This is the fundamental movement of spirit in its self-realization. It is articulated by Hegel in various ways. It is important to see that this is a self-enclosed movement whose progress is not linear. There is nothing outside of it.

13: Only what is completely determinate is at the same time exoteric, comprehensible, and capable of being learned and possessed by everybody. The intelligible form of science is the path offered to everyone and equally available for all.

Until the whole completes itself, that is, comes to know itself, knowledge is still indeterminate, incomplete and the possession of the few. Who are these few? The philosophers who have moved knowledge forward. Knowledge is self-knowledge is a double sense - the movement from the Delphic "know thyself" to knowledge of the spirit's knowledge of itself. With the completion of this movement the individual, the subject knows itself in the truth of the whole. It is not available for all in the sense that information is, but rather as self-realization.

13: To achieve rational knowledge through our own intellect is the rightful demand of a consciousness which is approaching the status of science. This is so because the understanding is thinking, the pure I as such, and because what is intelligible is what is already familiar and common both to science and to the unscientific consciousness alike, and it is that through which unscientific consciousness is immediately enabled to enter into science.

The understanding is thinking, thinking is the pure I, the pure I is the understanding. Knowledge and understanding are in this way distinguished. How is it that what is intelligible is what is already familiar and common? What is intelligible is what is or can be understood, that is, made intelligible through the understanding, through the I that thinks, and is thus found not in the object but in thinking the object. What is made intelligible in thinking is then available to all. It is through the thinking of the few that knowledge is made possible to all who think. Thinking is carried forward by the few and becomes the available possession of all.

17: In my view … everything hangs on grasping and expressing the true not just as substance but just as much as subject.

Hegel is not just expressing an opinion. It is his view that will become what everyone will be able to see. In this moment of the movement substance and subject are distinct. But the true is as much one as it is the other.

17: ... substantiality comprises within itself the universal, or, it comprises not only the immediacy of knowing but also the immediacy of being, or, immediacy for knowing.

Substance is the whole, knower and known. Substance is not in or a name for the universal. The universal is within substance. It should be noted that Hegel is not rejecting immediacy. We know the immediacy of being in that we are. The immediacy for knowing is 'der Sache selbst', the thing itself that is to be known. I intentionally translated it in this way to draw the connection with Kant.

17: However much taking God to be the one substance shocked the age in which this was expressed, still that was in part because of an instinctive awareness that in such a view self-consciousness only perishes and is not preserved.

If substance is the whole, and as such there can only be one substance, then God is in truth subject. It is not just that God was taken or regarded to be subject. It is something now understood if not yet known. And because it is not fully realized, self-consciousness perishes, but this is only half of it. It is also preserved, taken up anew.

18: Furthermore, the living substance is the being that is in truth subject, or, what amounts to the same thing, it is in truth actual only insofar as it is the movement of self-positing, or, that it is the mediation of itself and its becoming-other-to-itself.

The movement of self-positing is the movement described in paragraph 12, the movement in which the subject returns to itself from out of itself. It is a mediated process, but not, as for example with Kant, the mediation of the object given in experience by the subject's understanding, but rather the mediation of the subject with itself. This is not to exclude the object. The object is taken up in the understanding, the I thinks it. In taking up the understanding itself, the understanding is mediated, that is, becomes an object for knowledge for the subject.

[Edited to add:

18: The true is not an original unity as such, or, not an immediate unity as such. It is the coming-to-be of itself, the circle that presupposes its end as its goal and has its end for its beginning, and which is actual only through this accomplishment and its end.

I was telling you why abstract numbers do not occur in nature, which is what we were discussing. — Dfpolis

Of course abstract numbers do not occur in nature, nothing abstracted from nature exists in nature.

If five is an abstraction from particular instances of five units or items then it is not actual except in that it is an actual abstraction.
— Fooloso4

Exactly! At last we agree. — Dfpolis

At last? I have never said anything to the contrary. What was at issue was your denial five of something is actually rather than potentially five of something. You recently corrected yourself on that matter.

People can argue whatever they like. There is no sound argument that "mathematical truths are not dependent on experience." How can we even know they are true unless they reflect our experience of reality? — Dfpolis

It those truths precede in time our experience of reality then they cannot be dependent on experience. Such is the case with non-Euclidean geometries. As another example consider infinitesimal calculus. There is no experience of infinitesimals. Not only are they not found in experience, they confound experience, as Zeno's paradoxes show. They are not abstracted from nature, they are theoretical constructs applied to it. In addition, the experience of motion or change does not yield the mathematics that adequately describes it.

non-Euclidean geometries. They are not abstracted from experience.
— Fooloso4

They can be. They are instantiated on spherical and saddle-shaped surfaces. If some axiom can't be, it's hypothetical. — Dfpolis

Instantiation is not abstraction.

Nothing can tell us something of the world without being instantiated in it -- and if it's instantiated in it, it can be abstracted from it. — Dfpolis

The historical fact of the matter is that they weren't abstracted. Non-Euclidean geometries were first developed as purely formal systems.

Kant had no sound reason to claim that. — Dfpolis

I won't bother getting into this. Do you imagine that neither Kant nor those who followed him were aware of this?

Perhaps, but as counting never exhausts the potential numbers, so human knowing never exhausts anything's essence. There is always more to learn. — Dfpolis

What is at issue is your claim regarding the intelligibility of an object. Whether or not human knowing exhausts something's essence, if intelligibility inheres in the object then a sufficiently advanced intelligence should be able to know what a baseball is without knowing what the game is, or, perhaps, would know from the ball what the game is. But there is nothing in the ball that would provide this information.

Yes, that is the issue, but your argument is based on the fact that our knowledge is not exhaustive. That our knowledge is only partial does not show there is no potential to know more -- no greater intelligibility that that we have actualized. — Dfpolis

No, my argument has nothing to do with the limits of human intelligence. It has to do with what is knowable from the object itself. Not knowable within the limits of human intelligence but from an intelligence without our limits.

Its purpose is in the minds of humans, not in the ball. — Dfpolis

That is right and that is why you cannot tell from the ball what its purpose is. To the extent the ball is intelligible its purpose is not part of that intelligibility. By your logic the intelligibility of a car does not include the potential to know that it is a means of transportation.

We can use the ball for other purposes, such as to be a display or even a paperweight. — Dfpolis

Yes, we have been through this already.

You said you were not a mathematical Platonist. — Dfpolis

I am not but your topic is an attack on mathematical platonism and if you are going to attack it you must accurately represent it.

I was explaining to you why the abstract five is not actual until abstracted. — Dfpolis

Your talk of potential and actual is misleading. If five is an abstraction from particular instances of five units or items then it is not actual except in that it is an actual abstraction.

No, it is not a mere assertion, but an appeal to experience. Platonists have no basis in experience for their position. — Dfpolis

I think they might argue that the fact that mathematical truths are not dependent on experience is all the experience they need. Consider, for example, non-Euclidean geometries. They are not abstracted from experience. They were initially seen an useless, mere curiosities. But with the discovery of the curvature of space, they found their application. They work. They are not merely formally or internally consistent, they tell us something about the world without being dependent on it.

If we merely constructed concepts, there would be no reason to think they apply to or are instantiated in, reality. — Dfpolis

First, see above regarding non-Euclidean geometries. Second, to some extent (Kant would say completely) experience is itself constructed. Third, concepts that are constructed are not all "merely" constructed, the construct may be based on experience but cannot be reduced to experience.

The intelligibility of an object is knowledge of its essence, that is, what it is to be the thing that it is.
— Fooloso4

First, intelligibility is not knowledge. It is the potential to be known. — Dfpolis

Okay. Let me rephrase it: The intelligibility of an object is the potential to know its essence. This changes nothing about what I said that follows from this. To use your favored language, knowledge of an object's essence is the actualization of its intelligibility.

Second, all human knowledge is partial, not exhaustive. We may, and usually do, know accidental traits rather than essences. — Dfpolis

The question is whether intelligibility inheres in the object. Whether or not our knowledge is partial is not at issue. The question is whether from the baseball alone it can be known that it is a baseball. An intelligence far greater than ours would not know this unless it also knows what the game is.

Third, there is nothing intrinsic to a baseball that relates it to any particular game. — Dfpolis

Of course there is! Being a baseball is not incidental to it being a baseball. It is constructed according to specific rules for a specific purpose. 'Baseball' is not simply a name attached to it. But if there is nothing intrinsic to a baseball that relates it to any particular game then your argument fails. We could not tell from it that it is a ball designed, manufactured, and used for one specific purpose.

In the same way, there is no actual five in nature. — Dfpolis

The mathematical platonist does not claim that there is an actual five in nature.

What is not actual is abstract fiveness, i.e. the pure number. — Dfpolis

That is nothing more than an assertion. The platonist asserts that there is, but it is not in nature.

Our act of attending/awareness actualizes intelligiblity, converting it into concepts. — Dfpolis

I agree with those who say we construct concepts rather than actualize them.

We have to distinguish inherrent intelligiblity from relational intelligiblity. All objects have both. — Dfpolis

The intelligibility of an object is knowledge of its essence, that is, what it is to be the thing that it is. What it is to be a baseball is not something that inheres in the object. It is to that extent not intelligible unless we know it as a baseball. To know it in its role in the game is not relational, it is essential to what it is.

My hope is that there are still enough people who value the truth and can distinguish truth from lies, and, and this is important, they reside and will vote in one of the states that will determine the election.

Mueller reluctant to the last to come straight out and say that the President committed impeachable offenses — Wayfarer

This is a big problem. Unfortunately, the Republican politicians are putting their own interests ahead of the country's and together with Fox News have convinced a large portion of the country not to believe Mueller while at the same time convincing them that Mueller did not find that Trump did anything wrong.

I am not denying that you have 5 fingers on your hand -- it is just that five fingers is not the abstract number 5 -- it is specific instance of five, not the universal five. — Dfpolis

What you seemed to be claiming is that the number, whether it is fingers or fruit, is not actual but potential until it is counted. One iteration of what you said is:

The number is predetermined, but not actual until the count is complete. — Dfpolis

What I said is that I actually have five fingers whether I count them or not. If I only get to three I still have five fingers.

As I said early on, I do not intend to defend platonic mathematics. For one, I am not well versed in the arguments. For another, I am agnostic on the matter.

If we cannot determine the unit, we can't count. The things we count are prior to our counting them. — Dfpolis

Agreed. I have said this from the beginning in my discussion of Greek mathematics.

The count of your fingers was predetermined to be five before anyone counted them, but there was no actual count of five fingers. — Dfpolis

Here we go again. There is no actual count until they are counted, but there are actually five fingers, which is confirmed by the count.

If it were not able to be known, no one could know it -- and if the knower were not able to be informed she could not be informed about the ball. — Dfpolis

Knowledge is not passive reception of "intelligibility". Knowledge is conceptual.

The ball is a baseball because of its relation to the game. Knowing the ball in itself will not tell us its relation to the game. — Dfpolis

And it follows from this that the intelligibility of a baseball is not something that inheres it the object.

The assumptions are all after learning. You have provided no alternate account of learning the concept. — Dfpolis

The child has learned to count the objects. If she is not told, or as you would have it, learned what a number is, what she thinks a number is can vary. Is she is taught by a mathematical platonist what she learns the concept is is not what she learns if you tell her what you think it is.