I am sure you have plenty more sparklers to magically whisk out of your top hat or psychedelic pants. — Amity
Well, like I said, I thank Fooloso4 for introducing me to it. — Amity
The core system is still in place. — frank
I think the regulatory bodies we have now came from a liberal wave in the 1970s. — frank
His success isn’t unilateral, to be sure, but that hardly forecloses on its merit. — Reshuffle
“And what specifically has Trump done to improve the unemployment rate for minorities?”
He’s induced businesses to hire them at a significant rate. The instruments behind the inducement range from de-regulation to tax breaks to favorable trade deals. — Reshuffle
Why do you say it's about role? I was talking about endurance. — frank
He wanted to turn back the clock. He thinks the US of the 60s and 70s can be revived. — frank
Whatever you think of him, there is an actual point of view in there. — frank
The average unemployment rate under Obama for minorities, especially women, was %18 at its lowest (best) level. During the bulk of his reign, it averaged in the 20s. No “boon” existed. Regrets. — Reshuffle
Think of it as a test of the American gov't system. If it breaks down, then Trump revealed an underlying flaw. — frank
Trump has reduced joblessness. — Reshuffle
I take it you don't know if you can conceive of a world without mind or consciousness. — frank
But basically, Hegel is still criticizing and deconstructing the main ideas of German Romanticism in §10, right? — WerMaat
Well, yeah, he gets where they're coming from. But isn't he accusing them of choosing the easy path, which they claim leads to deep understanding but is really just a superficial dream? — WerMaat
Do you think that he's picking up the bud and flower metaphor from earlier? — WerMaat
And while we're looking at metaphors: note that §10 ends in a sentence about sleeping and dreaming, i.e. Romanticism, while §11 ends with the "break of day" of Enlightenment. — WerMaat
But I'm not sure yet what this "qualitative leap" is supposed to be exactly? — WerMaat
... intentionally stands aloof from both the concept and from necessity, which it holds to be a type of reflection at home in mere finitude.
The force of spirit is only as great as its expression, and its depth goes only as deep as it trusts itself to disperse itself and to lose itself in its explication of itself.
... While abandoning themselves to the unbounded fermentation of the substance ... suppose that, by throwing a blanket over self-consciousness and by surrendering all understanding, they are God’s very own, that they are those to whom God imparts wisdom in their sleep.
... is interrupted by the break of day
... spirit is never to be conceived as being at rest but rather as ever advancing.
... the gradualness of only quantitative growth [and then] it makes a qualitative leap and is born.
... in bringing itself to cultural maturity, spirit ripens slowly and quietly into its new shape, dissolving bit by bit the structure of its previous world, whose tottering condition is only intimated by its individual symptoms.
The kind of frivolity and boredom which chips away at the established order and the indeterminate presentiment of what is yet unknown are all harbingers of imminent change. This gradual process of dissolution, which has not altered the physiognomy of the whole ...
... is interrupted by the break of day, which in a flash and at a single stroke brings to view the structure of the new world.
I would say the ideal offspring would be self knowledge. For only through wisdom, can we see how ignorant we are. — Mark Dennis
With all these immigrants around, it makes you wonder why we can’t find any real white nationalists to play the racism card any more. All these foreigners are taking the jobs away from our pure-bred bigots. They ought to go back to where they came from. — Richard Wolffe
The Preface explains just what this transformation of philosophy into science fundamentally involves. In the first place, it involves the repudiation of the romantic notion, associated with Hegel's friends from the Tübingen Stift, Hölderlin and Schelling, that absolute truth can be grasped only in intuition or immediate feeling. In his younger days, Hegel shared with Hölderlin and Schelling the aspiration to overcome the dichotomies of Kant's critical philosophy, in particular its denial that we can have knowledge of the absolute or thing in itself. In the Phenomenology, Hegel does not abandon this aspiration, but he rejects Hölderlin's and Schelling's conception of absolute knowledge in terms of immediate intuition or feeling. Such a conception, he argues, dissolves the rich differentiation and determination of empirical content into a "night in which all cows are black" (94).
Corresponding to this requirement ...
... to save mankind from its absorption in the sensuous, the vulgar, and the singular.
... were like worms, each and all on the verge of finding satisfaction in mere dirt and water.
There was a time when people had a heaven adorned with a comprehensive wealth of thoughts and images. The meaning of all existence lay in the thread of light by which it was bound to heaven and instead of lingering in this present, people’s view followed that thread upwards towards the divine essence; their view directed itself, if one may put it this way, to an other-worldly present.
It was only under duress that spirit’s eyes had to be turned back to what is earthly and to be kept fixed there ...
... a long time was needed to introduce clarity into the dullness and confusion lying in the meaning of things in this world, a kind of clarity which only heavenly things used to have ...
... to draw attention to the present as such, an attention that was called experience, and to make it interesting and to make it matter.
Now it seems that there is the need for the opposite, that our sense of things is so deeply rooted in the earthly that an equal power is required to elevate it above all that.
Spirit has shown itself to be so impoverished that it seems to yearn for its refreshment only in the meager feeling of divinity ... That it now takes so little to satisfy spirit’s needs is the full measure
of the magnitude of its loss.
... there is only one thing that is absolutely necessary: that the laws of nature are contingent.
... all those aspects of the object that can be formulated in mathematical terms can be meaningfully conceived as properties of the object in itself.
The thesis we are defending is therefore twofold: on the one hand, we acknowledge that the sensible only exists as a subject’s relation to the world; but on the other hand, we maintain that the mathematizable properties of the object are exempt from the constraint of such a relation, and that they are effectively in the object in the way in which I conceive them, whether I am in relation with this object or not.
But Hegel's polemical regard for "edification" could use some edifying explication. — tim wood
Corresponding to this requirement is a laborious and almost petulant zeal to save mankind from its absorption in the sensuous, the vulgar, and the singular. It wishes to direct people’s eyes to the stars ...
It's also important to note that 'Notion' (or concept) is used here (beginning in section 6 iirc) in contrast to 'intuition'. — emancipate
#6:
Hegel is opposing his claim that:
... truth has the element of its existence solely in concepts
with the claim that it is not the concept but the feeling and intuition or immediate knowing of the absolute which are supposed to govern what is said of it. — Fooloso4
Newton knew first hand what gravity is, while making it known that he didnt know what it is in the sense of having a theory for it. — frank
I'm not making any claims. I'm just pointing out that lacking a scientific theory of consciousness, there is nothing but personal bias and possibly contemporary fashion supporting the idea that consciousness had a beginning. — frank
I've been through it with Wayfarer a couple of times — fdrake
Meillassoux' ... After Finitude: — fdrake
Countrymen are to a country, like family is to a home.
Immigrants are to a country, like a stranger is to a home.
Notice the word like, implying likeness and not sameness. — Tzeentch
Excuses to justify inaction. — Tzeentch
Don't you see the inherent hypocrisy in preaching about how other people should accept total strangers to negatively impact their lives, while at the same time these preachers don't carry any of the negative consequences and squander every opportunity to help their fellow man? — Tzeentch
If one wishes to be a saint ... — Tzeentch
There's nothing faulty about my analogy. — Tzeentch
But since we're on the topic of preaching, how many immigrants and homeless people have you let into your house so far, dear Judas? — Tzeentch
That is not how I interpret that quote at all. — Tzeentch
I wouldn't let a stranger stay in my home — Tzeentch
If such a requirement is grasped in its more general context ...
... it has gone beyond this immediacy of faith
... now demands from philosophy not knowledge of what spirit is; rather, it demands that it again attain the substantiality and the solidity of what is, and that it is through philosophy that it attain this.
unlock substance’s secret and elevate this to self-consciousness
... to take what thought has torn asunder and then to stir it all together into a smooth mélange, to suppress the concept that makes those distinctions, and then to fabricate the feeling of the essence.
What it wants from philosophy is not so much insight as edification. The beautiful, the holy, the eternal, religion, and love itself are all the bait required to awaken the craving to bite. What is supposed to sustain and extend the wealth of that substance is not the concept, but ecstasy, not the cold forward march of the necessity of the subject matter, but instead a kind of inflamed inspiration.
When you have rebutted my argument, you may claim this. Without pointing out a false premise or a logical misstep, this remains your unsupported belief. — Dfpolis
Then you should not claim the authority of Aristotle. — Dfpolis
This mischaracterizes the argument. — Dfpolis
Third, in my proof infinite being does not stand as unexplained, but as self-explaining and precisely because it is infinite being, so that what it is entails that it is. — Dfpolis
I made it clear in the OP that I was not talking about discursive explanations, but about dynamical ones. — Dfpolis
Infinite being [who] can act in all possible ways in all possible places at all possible times. — Dfpolis
Premise 2: Whatever exists is either finite or infinite. — Dfpolis
Premise 6: A finite being cannot explain its own existence. — Dfpolis
But, being human does not imply that I exist. If it did, no human could cease existing. — Dfpolis
Hence also the possession of it [wisdom, universal knowledge of causes and principles] might be justly regarded as beyond human power.
… we must assert that it is necessary that there should be an eternal unmovable substance.
For substances are the first of existing things, and if they are all destructible, all things are destructible.
Further, in virtue of what the numbers, or the soul and the body, or in general the form and the thing, are one-of this no one tells us anything; nor can any one tell, unless he says, as we do, that the mover makes them one.
That is why I provided a proof. — Dfpolis
Do you have a citation for Aristotle? — Dfpolis
I agree that my argument uses insights due to Aristotle, ibn Sina and Aquinas. Still, being old is not a fallacy. Do you have an objection other than the ancient roots of my thought? — Dfpolis
Aquinas wrote for a more philosophically literate audience -- one that knew the distinction between essential and accidental causality. — Dfpolis
Has that caused you any difficulty? — Dfpolis
Contingent facts cannot explain themselves. — Dfpolis
I think you can work that out for yourself. The question is irrelevant to the soundness of my argument. — Dfpolis
I myself am an Ethicist, so fortunately I had other options than just teaching. — Mark Dennis
Nor do I feel it appropriate to hog the "commentary." — tim wood
