I do not think that the phenomenon of “Fake news” could be explained by someone’s intentional fabrication and/or manipulation. — Number2018

My point was not to explain the phenomenon but to identify the key element that distinguishes fake news from information that may simply be wrong or false. But that point is rapidly becoming moot as the term is being used in different ways that blur that distinction. As used by Trump it is an attempt to discredit any information, no matter its accuracy and veracity, that he does not want you to believe. It has escalated from a war of words to a war on words.

Declarations of "post-truth" may echo favored narratives and given the shifting terminological landscape one might say fake news.

There is a distinction between "fake news" and false information. The intent of fake news is to deceive. Without that intent it is simple false information. Although it may not be the intent of someone who repeats fake news to deceive, the information was still manufactured with the intent to deceive. When Trump accuses news sources of being fake news he deliberately blurs the distinction. There is always the implication that the story is manufactured with the intent to deceive, to lie, but this implication hides behind the more benign accusation that the information is simply false.

I think you are right. I had not read the paragraph carefully enough and had skipped your exchange with MU for reasons I won't go into.

I think the way of looking at things refers to the problem of understanding. At 143 he asks:

How does he come to understand this system?

Again at 146 he asks:

Has he understood the system if he continues the series to the hundredth place?”

Looking back, I see that this is consistent with what your quote from Baker and Hacker said, and what prompted your question about the student's way of looking at things. With all the noise the signal gets lost.

Sorry for the misunderstanding.

Although I quoted you I was not offering a direct answer your question:

What "way of looking at things" is required in order for the student to copy the numbers on the page in front of him? — Luke

Rather I was trying to consider how the student might have looked at the series of numbers he wrote on the assumption that if we can understand how he looked at it we might be able to provide another way for him to look at it that would conform to the normal series. To that end I pointed out that the series he wrote is probably not random, that there is a logic to it. Perhaps this was obvious to others. When it comes to my mathematical abilities Wittgenstein would probably have concluded: our pupil's ability to learn has come to an end.

Strauss is definitely not a casual read. He does not waste words. I think you would find Laurence Lampert's "How Philosophy Became Socratic" more accessible. He has learned a great deal from Strauss but is more interested in bringing into the open what Plato concealed.

That it is not the end of the matter? If so, what would be the point of his even bringing it up?

That by changing the way we look at a problem it can be resolved?:

122. A main source of our failure to understand is that we don’t have an overview of the use of our words. a Our grammar is deficient in surveyability. A surveyable representation produces precisely that kind of understanding which consists in ‘seeing connections’. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate links.

The concept of a surveyable representation is of fundamental significance for us. It characterizes the way we represent things, how we look at matters. (Is this a ‘Weltanschauung’?)

[emphasis added]

308. How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and about behaviourism arise? —– The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk of processes and states, and leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we’ll know more about them - we think. But that’s just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a certain conception of what it means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that seemed to us quite innocent.) a And now the analogy which was to make us understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. And now it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don’t want to deny them. [emphasis added]

309. What is your aim in philosophy? To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle.

I think that’s exactly the principle that is being expressed by this ‘concealment’ - lest these matters of high philosophical import be seized upon by the hoi pollloi, to create something awful (like modern Western ‘culture’. — Wayfarer

Based on your description it sounds something like that. One point is that there is an art of reading corresponding to the art of writing. In other words, it does not require face to face transmission. Another is that although this was a common and well known practice it is no longer commonly practiced and not only is it no longer well known, claims regarding the practice are dismissed and denied.

The best contemporary book on this is Arthur M. Melzer's "Philosophy Between the Lines: The Lost History of Esoteric Writing". There is an extensive online appendix from which I took the quotes in my previous post: https://www.press.uchicago.edu/sites/melzer/index.html

The classic that inspired it is Leo Strauss' "Persecution and the Art of Writing", which I think was inspired by Nietzsche.

Maybe he can't continue. — Luke

Perhaps with this student it is, but I don't think Wittgenstein intends for this to be the end of the matter. I take the larger point to be that by changing the way we look at a problem the problem can be resolved.

I think I might disagree with you though. There isn't always a unique justification for someone using language in any given way, there can be plurality of understandings consistent with it. — fdrake

I don't know what you are disagreeing with. I though of one way the student might be looking at it. You suggested another. I think the example you gave in better and would be the first I would employ if I had to teach this series (unless someone suggests another that is easier to see); but of course, both are dependent on first understanding the series that the student appears not to have understood.

I agree that there can be plurality of understandings consistent with it. I take this to be one of the main points Wittgenstein is making here. It is consistent with a quote I cited some pages back:

What a Copernicus or a Darwin really achieved was not the discovery of a true theory, but of a fertile new point of view. (CV 18)

Which is to say, if I read you right, that ethics/morality (EM) are not a priori. — tim wood

From an earlier post:

If one were inclined to speak this way, we might say that care is the a priori condition for ethics. — Fooloso4

But that is not the same as saying that EM deliberations are a priori.

I'm confident you know, probably better than I, that a whole branch - tree - of EM, as deontology, is based in reason. Arguably then a priori, but at a cost of being general instead of specific. — tim wood

Yes, this is primarily what I had in mind when I said:

the attempt to ground ethics in reason, understood as apodictic, autonomous, and universal, is fundamentally flawed. — Fooloso4

As to the general and specific, the assumption is that if the general is sufficiently determined the specifics will be addressed by the general.

And that leaves "situation." Reading into you, I infer that for you the situation is the given, the "from-which" that you depart from to consult such as you think relevant to resolve the situation that is always already yours. — tim wood

Our situatedness is a given. I think it is more a matter of the "from within which" from which we can never completely depart. Of course the situation from within which EM discourse takes place today includes both the claim that the situation should have no bearing on EM deliberation and determination, and the claim that EM deliberation and determination requires consideration of circumstances. This last point holds both with regard to meta-ethics as well as applied ethics and ethics in general.

In terms of EM based in reason, I would argue that the given is reason itself. One encounters the situation and seeks to apply reason to it, the process as it happens requiring some art and creativity, in the same way that mathematics can. — tim wood

The analogy with mathematics is telling, for here we can see the difference between phronesis or practical or prudential reason and what might be called modern mathematical reason. Modern reason, based on the model of mathematics, is apodictic, autonomous, and universal. The proposition, one must not lie, is treated as if it is equivalent to the proposition 2+2=4. But many recognize the untenability of the rule that one must not lie and attempt to provide additional rules of exception.

"Not independent of culture": agreed. But at the same time not subject to it absolutely. — tim wood

Agreed.

And I think the argument that reason could have been a means to transcend in thought if not in practice the evils of (that) culture would be compelling. — tim wood

I am not so sure. Here again we can consider the comparison with mathematics. Our beliefs, attitudes, fears, desires, values, prejudices, and so on play no role in mathematics, but they do in EM. Certainly there were Nazis who were quite capable of reasoning, but if the regarded a race or group of people as sub-human, (the depictions of Jews as rats is telling), then whatever dignity and rights are due to human beings are not due to them. I do not think that reason would have changed their minds.

Being on the deontological side, v. utilitarianist — tim wood

I do not ascribe to either. I think that it is the shortcomings of these approaches that have led some contemporary ethical thinkers to return to Aristotle. This includes Nussbaum, although she is not strictly an "Aristotelian".

I look for the greater good in the maxim of reason. — tim wood

I think that reason is an essential part of EM deliberation and guidance but not in the form or maxims, but rather phronesis.

Doesn't he mean that care, as a basis of ethics, appeals to you? — Terrapin Station

Perhaps, but the same could be said of any claim one puts forth regarding the basis of ethics.

I Googled "Judith Miller lies. Iinterestingly, when I Googled "Judith Miller," Google autocompleted "lies" as the first suggestion. — fishfry

Apparently you do not know how google works via algorithms based on what is on your computer.

I googled it and the first entry was Wikipedia followed by a story about her release from prison then her position at the Manhattan Institute and then www.judithmiller.com.

As to the aluminum tubes mentioned in the first link, Wiki cites Chris Mathews:

A substantial part of the story was based on deliberate leaking of classified information to the Times reporters by Scooter Libby, the chief of staff of Vice President Dick Cheney

(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraqi_aluminum_tubes)

The article goes on to cite a CIA report:

In July 2002, in the run up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the CIA reported to Congress that "Iraq's efforts to procure tens of thousands of proscribed high-strength aluminum tubes are of significant concern. All intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons and that these tubes could be used in a centrifuge enrichment program. Most intelligence specialists assess this to be the intended use, but some believe that these tubes are probably intended for conventional weapons programs."

You still hanging on to hope the WMDs will be found? — fishfry

A weak attempt at diversion. I agree with the following from the article you cited:

Salon’s Juan Cole, however, cautions against viewing Miller as a puppet of the neocons. He writes, “In the end, it seems that Miller will go down in history not so much as a true believer as a useful idiot.”

This is supported by Mathews claim that the information was deliberately leaked to her. She did not make up the lies, she reported what was fed to her. As a journalism she had a responsibility to be more critical of the information she received, but she was repeating and not making up lies.

The NYT helped Bush lie the country into war. If you don't know this, you're the last person in the country to find out. — fishfry

Are you claiming that without Miller's stories in the NYT we would not have gone to war?

Once again, there is a difference between manufacturing lies, which the Bush administration and other sources she relied on did, and repeating them, which Miller did. You have not provided any evidence that Miller fabricated or the NYT fabricated lies.

Yes, I think it is easier to see if looked at that way.

What "way of looking at things" is required in order for the student to copy the numbers on the page in front of him? — Luke

143. ... he copies the series 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,... like this: 1, 0, 3, 2, 5, 4

Let's turn this around. Has he copied a series of numbers? What is that series? How does one have to look at it in order to continue?

Skip the first number, 0, and write down the next number 1 followed by the skipped number 0, then skip the next number 2 and write down the next number 3 followed by the skipped number 2, then skip the next number 4 and write down the next number 5 followed by the skipped number 4. The series continues 7, 6, 9,8 (unless I made a mistake).

Too much! If you mention care as the basis of ethics then you have decided on what appeals to you and made this the basis of ethics. — RW Standing

Care and what may appeal to me are not the same. Without care one would have no regard either for herself or others. Any claims about what one ought to do have no persuasive power if one does not first decide she must do whatever it is she ought to do. How do we answer her question "why should I care?". We might help her to see that she does care, if not about this then about something else, unless of course she truly does not care at all. And here we reach the end of the road. If her lack of care were endemic then there would be no possibility of ethics.

Ethical values are all that relate to and define life. — RW Standing

Can there be ethical values, or any values for that matter, in the absence of care? To value is to esteem, to hold in high regard, to care about. What we care about we care for.

The basis is not what is built on that basis. If one were inclined to speak this way, we might say that care is the a priori condition for ethics.

But fake news is a specific form of propaganda. One that uses specifically the way news propagate via the internet, and more specifically social networks, in order to distribute false or misleading content. — Echarmion

The term originated in response to false information via social media with links to websites that propagated false information, much of which benefited Trump in the election. Trump in turn accused "mainstream media" of being fake news. The transformation was aided by the fact that for years Fox News and others had sold the idea that it was the "liberal media". Trump drew the battle lines conservatives/Christians/Evangelicals against liberals and their news sources, which he labelled the enemy of the people. And so, anything that sheds an unfavorable light on Trump is "fake news". He effectively owns the term.

The age of hyperbolic social commentary where everything that is said and done gains exaggerated significance disproportionate to its importance.

They were deliberate fabrications for the purpose of lying the country into war. — fishfry

Are you claiming that Judith Miller was guilty of deliberate fabrications? What evidence do you have of this? She reported what she was told by her sources, many of whom were government, military, and intelligence. There is an important distinction between reporting what turned out to be fabrications, including those by the Bush administration, and fabricating stories.

If you say yes, then in terms of reach and influence and bloody consequences, the NYT is the greatest purveyor of Fake News in the world. — fishfry

By your logic every news outlet that covered what George W. Bush claimed, what Dick Cheney claimed, what Colin Powell claimed, what Condoleezza Rice claimed, what Donald Rumsfeld claimed, and what others in the government, military, and intelligence claimed about weapons of mass destruction are complicit as purveyors of Fake News.

Every news source gets it wrong sometimes but to blur the distinction between legitimate, credible sources of information and deliberate fabricators of lies and misinformation is a serious error.

BY DEFINITION whatever is in the Times isn't fake news because the definition of Fake News is NEVER what the Times prints — fishfry

Except the NYT came to realize that it had been misled and should have done more to verify to reliability of the information they had reported.

So pick one. NYT stories on Saddam's WMDs that drove the country into a disastrous war that we're still stuck in: Fake News or not Fake News? — fishfry

You have got this backwards. It was the Bush administration that drove the country to war and they did not do so because they were persuaded to by the NYT or by any other news outlet or by public opinion. As far as what influenced public opinion, the readership of the NYT was nowhere near the number of viewers of television nightly news or listeners to radio reports.

So pick one. Either you are not able to see the distinction between fabricating a story and reporting on a fabrication or you are aware of the difference but ignore it in order to create your own fabrication.

In the Phaedrus Socrates explains why he never wrote:

[E]very [written] speech rolls around everywhere, both among those who understand and among those for whom it is not fitting, and it does not know to whom it ought to speak and to whom not. (275d-e)

Plato's writing must be read in light of this problem. In other words, it must conceal itself from those for whom it is not fitting who read the book. The wily Plato does this by leading the reader to believe that he, the reader, has discovered some wondrous secret known only to those few who have ascended from the darkness of our ignorance to the light of truth.


From Plato's Seventh Letter:

If it seemed to me that these [philosophical] matters could adequately be put down in writing for the many or be said, what could be nobler for us to have done in our lifetime than this, to write what is a great benefit for human beings and to lead nature forth into the light for all? But I do not think such an undertaking concerning these matters would be a good for human beings, unless for some few, those who are themselves able to discover them through a small indication; of the rest, it would unsuitably fill some of them with a mistaken contempt, and others with lofty and empty hope as if they had learned awesome matters. (341d-e)

For this reason every man who is serious about things that are truly serious avoids writing so that he may not expose them to the envy and perplexity of men. Therefore, in one word, one must recognize that whenever a man sees the written compositions of someone, whether in the laws of the legislator or in whatever other writings, [he can know] that these were not the most serious matters for him; if indeed he himself is a serious man. (344c)

Any man, whether greater or lesser who has written about the highest and first principles concerning nature, according to my argument, he has neither heard nor learned anything sound about the things he has written. For otherwise he would have shown reverence for them as I do, and he would not have dared to expose them to harsh and unsuitable treatment. (344d-e)

And from Plato's Second Letter:

Now, considering these things, watch out that you never regret things that fall into unworthy hands. The greatest safeguard is not to write, but to learn by heart; for it is not possible for the things that are written not to fall [into such hands]. (314b-c)

Aristotle says:

But some points concerning the soul are stated sufficiently even in the exoteric arguments, and one ought to make use of them—for example, that one part of it is nonrational, another possesses reason.
(Nicomachean Ethics, 1102a26)

... the question has already received manifold consideration both in exoteric and in philosophical discussions. (Eudemian Ethics 1217b20)

Aristotle too, contrary to the assumptions of many contemporary scholars, practiced concealment.

One example, of which there are many, Alfarabi says:

Whoever inquires into Aristotle’s sciences, peruses his books, and takes pains with them will not miss the many modes of concealment, blinding and complicating in his approach, despite his apparent intention to explain and clarify. (Harmonization)

The cumulative combination of imperfect images of a Form will not eliminate the imperfections of those images.

The shadows on the cave wall are shadows of the things paraded in front of the cave fire. The image of the cave is “an image of our nature in its education and want of education, likening it to a condition of the following kind.” (514a)

No question there - except, again, for 'why'? What drove that? Is there any overarching purpose to it beyond survival and propagation? You may or may not agree but whichever view you take, I don't think that's a scientific question. — Wayfarer

I do agree that these are not scientific questions, but whether they are a good philosophical question is open to discussion. The ability to ask such questions does not mean they must have answers.

May be, but your opinion doesn't make it so. How about developing an argument, best with at least a little research and thought on the topic. — tim wood

That is correct, but I have done quite a bit of reading and thinking on the topic.

Let's take, for example, ethics and morals: synonymous, to start with. But some philosophers assign different meanings to the terms. — tim wood

They do, but unless something turns on the distinction, I join those who do not put much emphasis on it. Those who do make the distinction do not all agree, some putting on one side what others put on the other.

And, do you take ethics to have anything of an imperative or compulsive "should, had better" aspect? — tim wood

Not in any absolute sense, that is, not if they are understood as apodictic, autonomous, and universal. The question of what I should do and what I taught my children that they should do and what would be better in a particular situation is part of ethics, but the answers are situated.

Are all ethics mutable, changeable? Some? None? — tim wood

I would say that ethical deliberation and determination are not independent of culture. That does not mean cultural relativism but rather that we cannot step outside of the ways in which we understand ourselves, our political and social relations, our values, and so on.

You start with "care," — tim wood

We are social beings with the capacity to empathize. Babies are attuned to faces and what look like faces. They will smile in response to a smile, become emotionally upset in response to sad or angry faces, and often cry when someone else cries. Children have an innate sense of fairness. All of these things, however, can vary and are influenced by upbringing.

... and history records that some people have cared about horrible things. — tim wood

I agree. We have little or no control over how we are raised, but we may still be capable of moral deliberation, phronesis (practical reason or practical wisdom, prudence), and sophrosyne (moderation or temperance, but also wisdom and discretion). One may still be able to live an examined life.

From the image of a chair one can build a chair but it is not clear what you mean by an ideal chair. We can imagine the eidos or idea or look or kind or Form of the chair itself, of which all chairs that we can see or touch or sit on are images or copies, but any chair we build is itself a copy of that Form.

Fake news is a term that Donald Trump claims he invented, which, of course, is not true but is an excellent example of fake news.

There has always been what is now called fake news - propaganda, lies, misinformation, disinformation, but this is not news.

Very quickly the news was severed from the fake. Fake news now serves as a topic for academics and intellectuals, which can generate its own abuses, that is, "fake news".

It comes from the religious conception that "Jesus died for all mankind". — Wayfarer

The idea of a messiah predates the identification of Jesus as the Messiah. This was the "messianic age", an age in which it was believed that the messiah would come, and there were many who claimed or others believed was the messiah. The death of Jesus stood for some as evidence that he was not the promised messiah, but Paul, being the masterful rhetorician he was, turned it around and made Jesus' death fundamental to the Messiah's mission.

In any case, I do not see in this mythology the notion of inalienable rights and dignity. That is the language of Liberalism. For Paul there were the elect, those who would be saved, and everyone else. Salvation was open to all, but only those who sought it would be saved.

But one of the dogmas of the secular view of evolution, is that it has nothing like an overall direction or purpose, and so the fact of the existence of intelligent self-aware beings has no particular significance in the overall scheme. — Wayfarer

It is not clear what you mean by overall scheme if one rejects an overall direction or purpose. That there are intelligent self-aware beings is a given. One of the challenges of evolution is to figure out how this came to be. It is in this sense no different that figuring out how features, or feet, or lungs came to be.

Now one can put a metaphysical spin on it and claim something along the lines that in this way nature becomes aware of itself, but this kind of closed circle, teleological self-realization is not inherent in evolutionary theory.

PI 144. ... (Indian mathematicians: “Look at this!”)

In Zettel Wittgenstein says:

461. ... (I once read somewhere that a geometrical figure, with the words "Look at this", serves as a proof for certain Indian mathematicians. This looking too effects an alteration in one's way of seeing.)

When W. says: “the pupil’s ability to learn may come to an end here”, I think he intends for us to look at it in two ways. First, the student can go no further because the way he is looking at it is not the way that one must look at it in order to conform to the practice. Second, we can go no further in teaching the student unless it occurs to us that he may be looking at it differently, and so, we must change the way we are looking at the student's inability to learn.

Of course the larger issue here is not to teach a series of numbers. Philosophical problems may arise not because we are not thinking rigorously enough but because we are not looking at the problem is a perspicuous way.

Working in philosophy … is [working] .. On one’s own way of seeing things. (CV 16)

That's the point I'm making. Shadows and images are something, they're "things-in-themselves"--discarding them via just arbitrarily or by fiat putting them into a separate bin doesn't make much sense. — Terrapin Station

The problem with calling them things in themselves is that they are dependent on something else. One might say, however, the same thing about the Forms since they are dependent of the Good. But Plato says that the Good is not. The Neoplatonist Plotinus makes a great deal of the idea that the Good as the source of what is is not something that is. Some contemporary theologians, most notably Tillich, follows this line of thinking and thus claims that God as the source of being is not.

In any case, Plato's distinction between dianoia (thought) and noesis (intellection) as well as the hypothetical character of dialectic indicates why all such theological speculation ends in aporia. Reason functions by way of ratio, that is, understanding on thing in relation to another. The singularity of the Forms means that they are not accessible to reason. If they are to be known they must be grasped as they are in themselves. So, for example, shadows can only be understood is relation to the things they are shadows of.

The ontology of the Republic is the image of an epistemology. In the absence of knowledge, however, this ontology is at best a likely image, but it is one that Plato shows the careful reader that she should be skeptical of. The cardinal mistake here is to mistake this image for the thing it is supposed to be an image of.

Take away the things that they are shadows and images of and the shadows and images disappear.

To be clear, I think the idea of things in themselves is problematic as is the idea that shadows and reflections are not real or do not exist.

The worse for the Republic then. — Terrapin Station

The education of the philosopher and the education of the gentleman are not the same. The salutary teaching of the gentlemen who will govern the city is based on a noble lie. The education of the philosopher involves not only the ability to see past the lie but the recognition of the necessity of the lie and thus how to replace the prevailing lies with more salutary ones when necessary. Nietzsche, who read Plato as a philosopher, called it the revaluation of values.

By what criteria would we be saying that some occurrences are things in themselves and some aren't? — Terrapin Station

In some cases, such as shadows and reflections, it is easy enough to make the distinction, but if we reject the idea of Forms then the distinction does not hold. It is then not a matter of truth versus opinion, but of opinion versus opinion. And then the question becomes, by what criteria should we hold to this opinion rather that some other?

The basis of ethics is care. Things matter to us. Care about the well-being of others. Care about justice. Care about doing good.

If something is said to be right or wrong in Ethical terms, doing so must be based on values that have already been accepted. — RW Standing

In my opinion, the attempt to ground ethics in reason, understood as apodictic, autonomous, and universal, is fundamentally flawed. We must start with what is valued and accepted, but where we start is not where we must end. We cannot start from scratch. We do not reject values in toto but piecemeal, evaluating specific things in light of others that are not now called into question, but at some later point may be.

Not according to the argument in the Republic. This is the point of my saying that the prisoners are only mistaken if the things we see are only images.

But, nevertheless, I believe that in the metaphysics of the Republic, there is an underlying sense of the 'ascent to truth'. It is made obvious in the analogy of the divided line, which divides the kinds of knowledge from lower (pistis, doxa) to higher (dianoia, noesis). — Wayfarer

This is an image. Socrates calls it an image. Images are at play on many levels in the Republic.

Plato’s point is that the prisoners would be mistaken. — Wayfarer

They would only be mistaken if, using your example, the books we see are only images of the one real book which exist in an eidetic realm. Two peculiar things about this - first, the connection between eidos (Forms) and images in the mind, second, since the Forms are singular, what would be contained in the book and how does this relate to the content of books as they exist in our experience, that is, within the cave?

When the prisoners are released, they can turn their heads (metanoia) and see the real objects. Then they realize their error. — Wayfarer

When the prisoners are released from their shackles they see puppets, which are themselves images. They are still in the cave but can now see the work of the puppet-masters, the image-makers, the opinion-makers, the poets. It is only when one is able to ascend from the cave into the light of the sun that he is able to see that the light in the cave provided by the fire is the image of the light of the sun. But in turn the light of the sun is an image of the light of the Good.

As to the turning of the soul, this too has a double sense - a turning away from the things of the visible world toward the truth, and a turning toward the truth itself. This is analogous to the turning away from the images on the wall to the source of those images, but the source of those images, the puppets, are themselves images. And this is where we remain in looking toward the Forms. They are the work of the puppet-master Plato. We are able to see that our opinions are shaped by opinion-makers, but we do not thereby transcend or escape the realm of opinion. Plato gives us a likeness of the truth, but unless one is able to compare that likeness to the truth itself one cannot tell how close or far that likeness is to the thing it is a likeness of. The education of the philosopher is an education in self-knowledge, knowledge of our ignorance.

Platonism generally says ... — Wayfarer

Platonism is a misunderstanding of Plato. Fundamental to the education of the philosopher in the Republic is the ability to see things as they are in themselves. The Platonist may believe in transcendence, but unless one has actually seen things as they are in themselves, she is dwelling in the realm of the imagination, imaging what things in themselves must be.

But the forms transcend existence — Wayfarer

The Forms are what most truly are. It is only the Good itself as the source of what is that is beyond existence. But Socrates says:

So, do we have an adequate grasp of the fact—even if we should consider it in many ways—that what is entirely, is entirely knowable; and what in no way is, is in every way unknowable? (477a)

If the Good itself is beyond being, then the Good cannot be something knowable.

Very generally, the ordinary man, the hoi polloi, was enchanted by, and captured by, the veil of appearances; the task of philosophy was awakening out of that illusory state and to a greater reality (as per the classic Platonist analogy of The Cave.) — Wayfarer

Very generally, Plato created a veil with the appearance of a greater reality that is nothing other than a dreamlike illusory state, an image on the cave wall that many to this day still fail to realize is only an image.

I have posted the following before:

What is often overlooked is the difference between the Socrates who knew that he did not know and the Socrates of the Republic who speaks of knowledge of the whole. One key to reconciling the difference is the banishment of the poets from the Republic. Their myths are replaced by a philosophical poesis. When asked Socrates is circumspect but clear in stating that he does not actually have knowledge of the Forms:

"You will no longer be able to follow, my dear Glaucon," I said, "although there wouldn't be any lack of eagerness on my part. But you would no longer be seeing an image of what we are saying, but rather the truth itself, at least as it looks to me. Whether it is really so or not can no longer be properly insisted on. But that there is some such thing to see must be insisted on. Isn't it so?" (533a)

The truth as it looks to him may not be the truth, and he is not insisting that it is. But he insists that there is “some such thing to see”. What he shows us is a likeness of what the beings must be, that is, an image. He too is a poet, literally a maker. The Forms are, ironically, images. Those who read Plato and think that they have ascended the cave because the Forms, the eidos, the things themselves as they are in themselves, have been revealed, are simply seeing new images on the cave wall, images created by Plato.

In the Republic Socrates does not claim to know what justice itself is. He creates a myth of transcendent knowledge, of noesis, but in doing so points in the other direction to remind us that we are squarely within the realm of opinion; and as a matter of opinion questions of justice remain inconclusive. This is what Socrates famous “second sailing” is about. We do not have in our sights the things themselves, in this case justice itself, and so must take refuge in speech. We must rely on dialectic, on argument to reach conclusions that always fall short of knowledge and so must remain open to further consideration.

Both quotes raise the point of modernity's relation to its past, its history. It was a deliberate break with the past, which creates problems and issues that did not arise when the present was contiguous with the past. A key feature was the attempt to establish knowledge, political life, and ethics on universal, independent reason. Since man is endowed with reason he is regarded as autonomous, his own authority.

So yes, Trump created this mess and now he's solving the mess he created. — fishfry

There is no evidence that he is solving the mess he created. Is calling off an attack at the last minute your idea of solving the mess?

Thing is, I haven't heard much about Iran from the Democrats, in particular their presidential candidates. — fishfry

There is no telling what the situation will be if and when one of the Democratic candidates wins. I would think that most would favor returning to the agreement, but that might already be too late. I would also think that they would be in favor of loosening sanctions and negotiating. But that is contrary to what Trump is doing and so empty talk since there is nothing they can do about it now.

Cory Booker demanded that Biden apologize ... — fishfry

Completely irrelevant.

But that is Trump's style. Blow things up then calm things down. — fishfry

Blow things up, blame someone else, claim that only he can fix it, and then claim that he has fixed it.

Just like his announcement that he was going to initiate nationwide immigration raids. Got everyone hysterical, then he cancelled that order too. That's his style. — fishfry

Creating fear and uncertainty is not a "style".

can't the left step back and stop getting triggered and going insane with anger every time he plays the same game? — fishfry

The problem is no one knows when he will actually carry out one of his threats.

Trump thrives on chaos. That doesn't mean YOU need to. — fishfry

It is not simply a matter of him thriving on chaos, he creates chaos. It has real consequences that are not mitigated by pretending that it doesn't.

Even Trump haters have to acknowledge that this week he's the sanest person in Washington. — fishfry

There is nothing sane about his posturing and threats and calling for a strike and then calling it off at the last minute for still undisclosed reasons.

Among the Dem 2020 candidates, only Tulsi Gabbard advocates for peace, and she's polling at around 0.3%. What's wrong with the Democrats these days? — fishfry

Have you forgotten or are you just ignoring the fact that Trump brought the world to this precipice by backing out of an international agreement and putting a stranglehold on Iran with his sanctions? And then he ignored Pompeo who said that the sanctions were working and decided to escalate the situation and then call it the attack. He created a crisis and now has everyone guessing what will happen next.

First, Trump has definitely proven that he imagines what sounds best and then jumps to just saying that, regardless of whether it makes any sense or is in consistent with what he's being saying so far. — boethius

I agree. I do not think that his decision had anything to do with what he said. I was poking holes in his claims not trying to explain his decision in terms of them. I am sure that an analysis of causalities is something done at the beginning and was discussed early on, not something that no one considered until Trump brought it up at the last minute.

However, that there might be a connection to the congress vote to block the Saudi Arabia arms deal is way over complicating things. Trump can veto this legislation ... — boethius

As I said, I don't think that explanation matches up with the timeline. I do think that in general he is very concerned with maintaining the appearance of a united front though.

Also, other theories like "sending Iran a threatening message" by attacking and the cancelling are also over complicating things. That's not how you send that kind of message. — boethius

Trump does things his own way, and that includes the messages he sends. I do not think that whatever messages he might be sending are intended only for Iran but to the American voters as well. The thing is though that if he did intend to send a message it is not at all clear what that message is.

If they really do know that the drone was in Iran airspace and that was the reason, then they would say something like ... — boethius

That would be to admit some responsibility. One of Trump's mottoes is deny, deny, deny. I think the U.S. was playing a game of chicken and lost.

Now, it's possible it's only due to Trump's unpredictable personality. But I feel if this was the case there would be moaning and groaning from the neocons ... — boethius

They have for the most part turned a blind eye to whatever Trump does. This thing has not played out yet. If they think he should not have attacked then calling it off was a good thing. If the think he should have attacked, there is always tomorrow. In either case, they are reluctant to expose him as erratic and indecisive, but again, there is always tomorrow. That too would make the U.S. look weak.

My theory I believe explains things much better. — boethius

I don't see how this explains why he went from being "cocked and loaded" to calling it off at the last minute.

Discourse expresses, gives voice to, to have one’s say, to be heard, to find one’s voice.

Discourse articulates, distinguishes, brings forth, and gathers together (the Greek ‘leg’ is the root of logos, meaning to collect or gather together).

Discourse is communicated, makes known, conveyed, transmitted - stories, mythologies, revelations, narratives, accounts, explanations.

Discourse calls - to make a call or determine, to call someone out, summons, to be called, to have a calling.

Edited to add: Dialogue - dialectic, argument, response to what earlier philosophers have said

I'd be surprised if there's further violence from iran. — ernestm

It would not surprise me, but as Trump is fond of saying: we'll see.

At the same time as Trump called the attack, the senate was debating on his sale of weapons to United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and other countries neighboring Iran. Just after the GOP made a rare move against Trump and blocked the sale, he called off the attack. — ernestm

If I remember correctly I read about the vote to block the sale in the afternoon, hours before Trump called off the attack. I don't know the timeline of when he ordered the attacks and when he learned of the Senate's blocking the sale, but I don't think he only learned of the Senate's opposition minutes before he called it off. It may be that he ordered the attack before learning the sale was blocked, and it may be his decision to call it off had something to do with his fear that they might not back him, but calling off the attack with minutes to spare still seems suspicious. A show business cliffhanger with him saving the day.