No, I’m just here to pronounce @DA671 the winner of the argument.

if the absence of joy doesn't matter due to an absence of an actual deprivation, the lack of damage cannot be considered good, since neither does it lead to a tangible relief/benefit. — DA671

I’m not particularly interested in the topic, but I think this is a good inconsistency to have found.

And we’re done. Good talk.

One more.

I’ll give you two more goes.

Arguments work by identifying inconsistencies and entailments that cast doubt on a belief.

If you’d like to continue arguing, think of a pertinent question you think goes towards identifying an inconsistency or problematic entailment in the following belief: God is omnipotent because all powers that exist come from God.

To put it more concisely, God is omnipotent because all powers that exist come from God.

That’s my view. To argue with it you need to ask pertinent questions that seek to identify inconsistencies and entailments that cast doubt on it.

Arguments work by identifying inconsistencies and entailments that cast doubt on a belief.

God is necessarily, I’ll say instead, omnipotent. To stop being omnipotent would contradict this. Contradictions aren’t things. God can still do any thing, because contradictions aren’t things.

That’s my view.

A bachelor can’t be married because that contradicts the definition of a bachelor.

God can’t not be omnipotent because that contradicts the definition of God.

He’s essentially those traits. A bachelor is essentially unmarried, so he can’t be married. God is essentially omnipotent, so he can’t not be omnipotent.

2

Divesting himself of his divine traits would be a contradiction on my terms, so it isn’t a limitation that he can’t.

Arguments work by finding inconsistencies and entailments that cast doubt on a belief. Your replies don’t address what I’ve said, so I’m counting that as a concession in respect to your own view. You can hold it, but to arrogantly proclaim it is silly.

To support my view:

Think about the words anything and nothing. Any thing. No thing. If God can do any thing, it isn’t a limit on his power if he can’t enact contradictions, if contradictions are deemed to be no things.

I’ve said that God as God in essentially omnipotent. For the sake of argument I’ve accepted that the person of God is not essentially omnipotent.

A bachelor as bachelor is essentially unmarried. The man who is a bachelor is not essentially unmarried.

The man takes priority over his bachelorhood.

On your terms the person of God takes priority over his divine traits like omnipotence.

You’ve given God personhood and given that personhood priority. This is a peculiar and contentious view of God, and your view of omnipotence rests on it.

This is your last go. But because I dislike quitting arguments I’ll argue with anyone else who disagrees with this characterisation (not that I expect anyone to be so interested).

Mate, I have. I’m actually a little distressed by how blind you are to it.

What I’ve just said accepts what you’ve been saying, and points out that what you’ve been saying entails a peculiar and contentious concept of God.

It isn’t at all. Really, it isn’t.

You’ve not tracked the argument.

The problem is your view of omnipotence rests on a peculiar and contentious concept of God, where he’s a person whose personhood takes priority over those traits that make him divine.

A bachelor is first and foremost a man, and this man happens to be unmarried. On your view God is first and foremost a person, who happens to have certain traits that make him God.

I was by default giving priority to God as God, not priority to some personhood (I take the classical view of God).

You said earlier that God stops being God once he ceases his omnipotence. Do you still agree with this?

This doesn’t address what I said.

A bachelor is essentially unmarried. He can get married because his manhood takes priority over his bachelorhood.

God is essentially omnipotent. So if he can make himself not be so, then his personhood must be what is taking priority over his divinity (omnipotence etc.).

Do you believe that God’s personhood takes priority over his divinity?

And your argument doesn’t work either way.

God’s omnipotence is essential to him. Bachelorhood is not essential to a man. A man can get married and remain essentially what he is - he has the potential to be married. God cannot lose his omnipotence and remain what he his - he does not have the potential not to be omnipotent.

We’re talking about the concept of God. We can’t be talking about his instantiation, because we’ve both offered different views about what that would be, and the argument doesn’t even require that he exists at all.

We’re talking about the concept of God. According to your concept of him he can potentially not be omnipotent. This is inconsistent with your affirmation that he stops being God when he ceases to be omnipotent. You tried to escape this by referring to a bachelor’s potential to be married, but you were referring to an instance of a bachelor and not the concept. We’re talking about the concept of God.

In the context of this discussion he’s certainly a concept.

God is a concept, so you’re making a category error when you compare him to an instance of another concept rather than the concept itself.

A bachelor (as opposed to a particular man who is a bachelor) does not have the potential to be married, because a bachelor can’t be married. God does not have the potential not to be omnipotent, because God is omnipotent.

God is omnipotent, but potentially not omnipotent. — Bartricks

Do you agree that what he say here then is inconsistent? God isn’t potentially not omnipotent if under that circumstance he stops being God.

If you say he stops being God once he creates the stone he cannot lift then you’ve effectively claimed that God can’t not be omnipotent (because in that case he stops being God).

Would you say that once he creates the stone he cannot lift then he stops being God?

God is omnipotent, but there are potential things that he cannot do (like lifting a certain stone).

The above statement is incongruous but it’s implicit in your idea of omnipotence.

How does being able to do something imply a 'lack' of power rather than possession of one? — Bartricks

It’s the being unable to lift the stone that affects the claim of his omnipotence. Unless no such power to lift the stone exists, in which case he isn’t deficient and so hasn’t divested himself of his omnipotence.

If you smash up your hand you won’t be able to pick things up. Picking things up is a power that hands have, so this would qualify as a deficiency. If hands had no such power, then it wouldn’t be a deficiency.

The two examples aren’t analogous. The possibility of marriage doesn’t affect the man’s bachelorhood, whereas the possibility of being unable to lift a stone does affect the claim of God’s omnipotence.

Being unable to divest himself of his omnipotence isn’t a deficiency if no such power exists.

“Haha! No spitting in public! That’s all we did to you, honest!”

There still seems to be an issue in that you can say of God before he creates the stone that there are potential stones that he can’t lift - there’s already a deficiency. Omnipotence understood instead as all powers that exist - like the power heat has to boil water - coming from God gets around these problems.

It represents a forfeit.

The laughing emoticon represents a forfeit. GG.

It’s rhetoric, or else he wouldn’t bother applying it in principle to the universe.

Plus, in the other quote Kant acknowledges the conception to be a logical possibility.

He’s rejecting its demonstrability. The concept remains intact, since he applies it in principle to the universe.